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"SECRET\n\nSHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT - OMAHA BEACH\n\nHARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE\nU.S. GOVERNMENT\n\n0-5, the last of Force \"O\", arrived. It also was some twelve hours late. Work progressed slowly because of the obstacles which still impeded access to the beach despite the efforts of the demolition parties who were working on them whenever tidal conditions permitted. In the light of later experience it is regretted that a practice of drying out the LSTs and larger LCTs was not commenced immediately. This would have materially speeded up the unloading and would have freed the LCT(5)s and (6)s and Rhino Ferries for unloading MT ships which were beginning to arrive. ANCXF's directive stated specifically, however, that LSTs were not to be dried out except in an emergency, and at this stage of the operation it did not appear to the Force Commander that the situation could be so construed.\n\nBetween midnight and morning of D + 2 day, there were two air raid alarms; the first about 0105, and the other about 0610. Neither developed into a serious attack although it was believed at the time that some mines had been dropped in the Assault Area. Repeated sweeps, however, failed to detect them. Clearing of obstacles and unloading had continued during the night of D + 1, and by 1000 D + 2, all LSTs of Force \"O\" had finished discharging. About 1100 the 5th Ranger Battalion which had landed on DOG GREEN Beach with the 116th Infantry and had been fighting its way steadily westward along the shore line established contact with the survivors of the three Ranger companies which had landed on the POINTE DU HOE to knock out the enemy batteries there. The latter had accomplished their mission, but had been hemmed in within a small area near the tip of the point where they had been under constant enemy attack for more than forty-eight hours. Repeated requests had been received from them for boats to evacuate wounded, additional ammunition, and reinforcements. These requests had been passed to the Commanding General, V Corps, and boats to carry the reinforcements were offered. Gunfire support ships were doing their best to help by delivering supporting fires as requested by the Liaison Officer with the Rangers, but their situation was desperate. (Further account of Rangers may be found in naval gunfire chapter). Finally, on the afternoon of D + 1, two boats from the Flagship with medical supplies landed on the POINTE DU HOE and delivered them to the group beseiged there.\n\nFrom: Commander Assault Force \"U\". (UTAH BEACH).\n\nOrder of Landing Assault Waves: Early planning provided for two waves of infantry in LCVPs, Wave 1A of DD tanks, Wave 3 of LCT(A)s, with Demolition Units in LCVPs and LCMs landing with Wave 4 at H plus 17. Because of the urgency of earliest attack upon substantial beach obstacles known to exist, a late decision was made to move up 4 LCVPs with Navy Demolition units, on each beach, from Wave 4 to Wave 2, thereby starting demolition work 12 minutes earlier. This resulted in Wave 2 totalling 15 LCVPs on each beach. It was well understood that this number of craft was more than could be effectively controlled\n\n4-12"

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Context sent to Scholar

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