Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
331916973
label
Report to the National Security Council by Project Solarium Task Force A - Part 2 of 7
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
331916973
contentType
document
title
Report to the National Security Council by Project Solarium Task Force A - Part 2 of 7
citationUrl
collections
Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Eisenhower Administration)
National Security Council Subject Files
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
331916973
levelOfDescription
item
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
8aedb9fd814356bc
ocrText
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
TASK FORCE B
The
Dwight
OF
1. Mission
Listery L
As directed the policy of the U.S. would be:
a. To complete the line now drawn in the NATO area
and the Western Pacific so as to form a continuous line
around the Soviet Bloc beyond which, the United States
will not permit Soviet or Satellite military forces to
advance without general war;
b. To make clear to the Soviet rulers in an appro-
priate and unmistakable way that the United States has
established and is determined to carry out this policy;
and
c. To reserve freedom of action, in the event of
indigenous Communist seizure of power in countries on
our side of the line, to take all measures necessary to
reestablish a situation compatible with the security
interests of the United States and its Allies.
2. Method of Approach
a. The policy is, in final analysis unilateral.
b. An agression which would bring on general war
would be no trifling border incident but armed aggression
that would be clearly recognized as such by the President
and the people of the U.S. as well as the free world as
a whole.
c. General war is defined as a war in which the U.S.,
assisted by those allies it might have at the time, would
apply its full power -- whenever, however, and wherever
necessary to defeat the main enemy, and to achieve its
other war objectives.
DECLASSIFIED
Authority MR 89-211 #/
By DJH NLE Date 8/12/91
d. Alternative "B" furnishes a new frame for the
fabric of U.S. policy, but does not replace the myriad of
threads that now go to make up that fabric. Alternative
"B" would accept many of the concrete recommendations of
Alternatives "A" and "C", modifying them only as necessary
to accomodate one new premise: The warning of general
war as the primary sanction against further Soviet-Bloc
aggression.
e. Alternative "B" requires the U.S. to maintain for
the foreseeable future the military capability necessary
to meet the Soviet Union in general war. This is an
expense that must be borne by any policy that purports to
- 19 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Dwight D.
insure the security of this country. Any suggestion is
LIBERTY
rejected that there is a place in the atomic age for a
U.S. military establishment having less offensive power
than that which the rulers of the Soviet Union must regard
as an unacceptable risk in war.
f. Alternative "B" is essentially a means for bring-
ing the full measure of U.S. power into play to deter
Soviet aggression over an expended period. It is proposed
as a support, rather than a substitute for existing
policies. Within its framework, there is room for great
flexibility in the conduct of U.S. policy in all of its
other aspects; for example, as regards treatment of
individual countries in Western Europe, or as regards compe-
tition between Asia and Europe for U.S. attention.
3. Analysis of the Soviet Threat
a. The United States must accept as fact that the
nations of the free world are confronted with a Soviet-
Communist philosophy and program of conquest which, if
unchecked, will result in the loss of their independence
and the destruction of their free institutions.
b. The U.S. policy of reacting to Soviet pressures
and aggressions as they have appeared at one point or
another on the periphery has not been entirely successful.
It will be less so in the future. Overriding atomic con-
siderations confront the U.S. with two major alternatives:
either a preventive war while the U.S. has a wide lead in
atomic weapons or the adoption of a policy that will do
most to insure the longest possible period of peace. Pre-
ventive war is rejected. The second alternative pre-
supposes that changes within the Soviet Bloc, and in the
balance of basic forces in the world, can be made to serve
the cause of freedom. Alternative "B" is based on the
latter consideration.
4. The Line of No Aggression
a. No satisfactory close-in line was found which
would include only the "minimum" areas necessary to U.S.
security, without consideration of present obligations,
sentiment or past associations. The U.S. now depends on
its overseas alliances for a most important, perhaps
critical, part of its military capability. Hypothetical
gains of freedom of action would become meaningless.
b. No line was found which would exclude any large
areas as not absolutely vital to U.S. security, while
not discarding the overseas military bases which are so
- 20 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
OF
Duight D.
STATE
very important for the present, and without banding large
industrial resources to the Soviet Union. It is proposed
that the line be drawn along the borders of the present
Soviet Bloc, filling the gaps in the Middle East and
South Asia which are not covered by current NATO and other
commitments, as well as clearing up final uncertainty as to
U.S. intentions under these alliances.
c. The "Two Worlds Concept" is rejected as undesirable
and impractical.
d. The policy of Alternative "B" is, therefore,
restated as follows:
(1) That any advance of Soviet Bloc military
forces beyond the present borders of the Soviet Bloc
be considered by the United States as initiating
general war in which the full power of the United
States will be used as necessary to bring about the
defeat of the USSR and the dissolution of the Soviet
Bloc.
(2) That the United States make known publicly
in an appropriate and unmistakable way that it has
established and is determined to carry out this policy.
(3) That the United States reserve freedom of
action, in the event of seizure of power by indigenous
Communist forces in countries beyond the borders of
the Soviet Bloc, to take all measures necessary to
re-establish a situation compatible with the security
interests of the United States and its allies.
5. Predicted Effects of the Policy
a. A clear indication that further military aggression
by the Soviet Bloc would result immediately in general
war will reduce the likelihood that such a war will occur.
b. The policy makes most effective use of U.S. power,
and exploits Soviet weakness.
(1) It will reduce the effectiveness of Communist
power politics and penetration in free countries. It
renders subversion of a free country more difficult.
(2) It will make clear that the U.S. does not
hire others to fight its war for it, and will provide
a firmer basis for U.S. relations with other free
world countries.
- 21 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
(3) It will assist the growth of dependably
anti-Communist regional groupings of nations.
The
Delgat D
(4) It will on balance strengthen the United
LIBIRTY
Nations.
(5) It will on balance improve the basis for
resistance to Soviet domination in satellite countries.
(6) It provides a safeguard against aggression
by Communist China, while also providing a basis
for friction between the Chinese Communists and the
Kremlin.
(7) Alternative "B", although it will be most
effective in maintaining stable peace over a period
of years, offers considerable assistance also in the
settlement of the current peripheral wars in Korea
and Indochina.
c. The proposed policy clarifies the principal
purpose of U.S. forces and enables their most economical
development and maintenance.
d. By clarifying the principal purpose of U.S.
military forces, and the circumstances in which they would
be employed, the U.S. will similarly clarify the size and
nature of other necessary military forces around the
Soviet periphery.
e. The proposed policy will find the U.S. and the
free world best prepared to conduct a general war if it is
in the Soviet scheme that there must be one.
6. Costs
Alternative "B" will help stabilize the economy
of the free world, by stabilizing the cost of defense and pro-
viding a confident political atmosphere for economic develop-
ment. It is not contended that this alternative enables free
world defense expenditures in the long term to be reduced from
present levels, but it is contended that it will stabilize
defense requirements, furnish a better basis for public under-
standing of them, and above all, provide a framework for most
rewarding expenditure of the money that is in fact made avail-
able.
Since Alternative "B" rules out peripheral wars, its
military costs will in the long term be less than the cost of
any alternative that accepts such wars - by the amount those
wars cost. The cost of a general war is not in question; all
alternatives aim at preventing it.
- 22 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Whatever our defense necessities, they must be met.
Task Force B is in agreement with A and C that the upper limit
on the ability of the U.S. to bear the costs of defense and of
a minimum civilian economy, in case of ultimate need, is not
the danger of national bankruptcy, but the capacity to produce
The
Dwighto.
gross national product. Whatever the evils of inflation,
whatever the economic problems involved in efforts to control
LIBIRTY
it, these cannot be weighed in the same scales with the great
danger to our national survival.
7. Soviet Reaction to Alternative "B"'s Policy
a. They will most probably adopt a defensive posture.
b. Soviet economy will not adjust quickly to meet
the policy, or derive any particular economic advantage
from it during the next decade. Economic strength of the
USSR will not nearly obtain parity with that of the U.S.
in the foreseeable future, nor will the relative economic
position of the USSR vis-a-vis the U.S. improve to a degree
involving an unacceptable risk to the U.S.
C. As further Soviet Bloc expansion is made more
risky by a U.S. policy which clearly defines the retaliatory
threat of general war, Soviet leadership must reckon with
the latent risk of losing control over its own masses in
a war which would bring destruction directly upon them.
8. Implementation
The policy must be announced in terms which emphasize
that a decisive step has been taken. To have the desired effect
on the rulers of the USSR, and on the free world, it is essen-
tial to drive home the point that the U.S. stands solidly
behind its proclamation. A joint Resolution of Congress will
be the most powerful means of making this point. It is
important to attract maximum support from U.S. allies, as
well as to explain and defend the policy in the UN with the
understanding that it is subject neither to the veto of our
allies or of the UN.
- 23 -
TOP SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Authority NLE-2016-51 #1 #1
By MMK NLDDE Date 4/22/19
TASK FORCE C
THE
Deight D
1. Mission
As directed the policy of the U.S. would be:
a. To increase efforts to disturb and weaken the Soviet
Bloc and to accelerate the consolidation and strengthening
of the free world to enable it to assume the greater risks
involved.
b. To create the maximum disruption and popular re-
sistance throughout the Soviet Bloc.
2. Method of Approach.
As a result of their analysis of the Soviet threat, the
Task Force has established the necessity of courses of action
developed in three distinct phases. The basic problem was
to correlate the timing of actions by the United States
against the time when the Soviet Union will be capable of
dealing a destructive blow to the United States (five years).
The short-term period during which specific tasks are
recommended, is set at five years. The mid-term period
is set at seven years beyond the end of the short-term. For
this period no specific tasks, but rather general courses
of action, are recommended. The long term is that period
beyond the mid-term, with no set terminus. No specific
tasks or courses of action are recommended, but U.S. ult-
imate objectives are summarized, which should be obtained
during this period.
3. Analysis of the Soviet Threat
The Task Force concludes from a study of the Soviet
threat that time has been working against us. This trend
will continue unless it is arrested, and reversed by pos-
itive action. Co-existence with Soviet Communism is not
considered as possible except conceivably after the reduction
of Soviet capabilities to a point where they no longer
threaten the security of the free world. The most feasible
method of attaining U.S. security, and of avoiding general
war, is to end the cold war. The only way to end the cold
war is to win it. Recent experience indicates that more
positive and aggressive action can be taken against the
Soviet Union without provoking general war.
- 24 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
4.
Basic U.S. Objectives
Under this policy the general peacetime objectives of
The
DWISDED
NSC 153/1 are accepted, but the wartime objectives are
added. The basic purpose of national security policies
remains unchanged: to maintain the fundamental American
LIBERITY
values and institutions which rest on the essential dignity
and worth of the individual in a free society. Similarly,
the objectives which call for building of U.S. military
and non-military strength, protecting a strong U.S. economy,
and calling for free political institutions and informed
public opinion, are maintained.
Instead of preventing "significant expansion" of Soviet
Bloc power (NSC 153/1), the alternative is categorical as
to preventing any further expansion. In reducing Soviet
power this alternative calls for this action "without,
however, initiating general war" instead of the stipulation
of "without unduly risking a general war" of NSC 153/1.
In adding U.S. war objectives to our peace objectives, the
following aims result:
a. Ending Soviet domination outside traditional borders.
b. Destroying the Communist apparatus in the free world.
c. Curtailing Soviet power for aggressive war.
d. Ending the Iron Curtain.
e. Cutting down the strength of any Bolshevik elements
left in Soviet Russia.
These latter objectives are considered the true object-
ives of the United States. NSC 153/1 does not provide for
their attainment other than by recourse to general war.
The policy of Alternative Claims to achieve them through
cold war, although admittedly running greater risk of
general war.
5. Major Policies and Cuidelines to Govern Courses of Action
a. Prosecute relentlessly a forward and aggressive
political strategy in all fields and by all means: military,
economic, diplomatic, covert and propaganda.
b. Evolve and maintain a military policy that will sup-
port the strong political line until a real and permanent
decision has been secured.
- 25 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
The
Dwight
o.
12.07
c. Establish, perfect and employ an executive cold war
machinery that can plan and execute a dynamic program of
action.
d. Continue integration and build-up of all elements
of anti-Soviet strength.
e. Exploit to the fullest, use of military forces as
instruments of national policy to achieve political,
propaganda and prestige objectives by both military and
diplomatic means.
f. Utilize the technical and productive genius of the
United States combined with the power of our matchless
industrial plant, our skilled manpower and a largely self-
sufficient economy.
2. Educate the public of the U.S. in the nature of our
enemy, the threat to our freedoms and existence and the
necessity for intense and sustained attack against our real
political enemy, the Kremlin group.
h. Employ negotiations as a means for exploiting
favorable developments and improving our political position
but bar those in which the United States would be on the
defensive or which could risk loss of certain vital elements
of strength and position.
i. Prosecute initially a large part of our intensified
cold war covertly using a national program of deception and
concealment from public disclosure and Soviet discernment as
to the depth and extent of our challenge.
1. Miss no opportunities to confuse and unbalance our
enemy nor any to discredit him: within his own borders, in
the eyes of our public and in satellite and international
circles.
k. Attain limited but definite time-phased objectives
of an operational nature leading progressively to more com-
prehensive distant objectives.
1. Limit political commitments so that the United States
can retain its initiative and freedom of action and exercise
free world leadership.
- 26 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Dalght
OHL
6. Summary of Political, Economic and Military Considerations
FIRSTY
a. The policy is one of dynamic political warfare
designed to create a climate of victory which will encourage
the free world and attract doubting nations to our side.
It exploits the principle that nothing succeeds like success.
b. The free nations need early tactical victories in
order to reverse the trend of Communist successes.
c. The policy is a departure from our traditional
concepts of war and peace. It requires Congressional and
popular support of the costs of building a stronger military
establishment than presently contemplated. It requires an
increased tempo of diplomatic and political activity towards
the Soviet Bloc.
d. The allies would be a source of strength and weak-
ness. They would undoubtedly oppose such an agressive
policy. Therefore, the full scope of the plan would be
revealed to them only gradually as successes were won.
e. The United States and its allies must as a first step
meet commitments under the recently amended force goals in
NATO. These goals must not be revised downward further.
f. The United States would overtly and covertly attack
the Communist apparatus on a world-wide basis. The
Communist Party in the United States would be outlawed.
be Nationalism would be exploited as an effective wea
pon against Communism.
h. In dealing with Communist forces engaged in actual
hostilities, the United Staes would not suspend the tempo
of those hostilities or reduce military pressure on the
enemy before a settlement is actually reached.
i. The policy must never be made to appear as a policy
of aggression.
i. Germany. A united and rearmed Germany integrated
in the European community is sought. A lesser objective
would be a neutralized East Germany and a rearmed West
Germany. In seeking these objectives, the possibility is
recognized that an agreement with the Soviet Government for
unification of Germany could only be obtained on condition
that it would be neutralized though permitted a small
national defense establishment. Under Alternative C the
- 27 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
PHY
Deighto
K-PART
United States would be prepared to accept such a risk as an
interim step toward attainment of our main objective. Our
minimum objective, however, is a rearmed West Germany
associated with the West. It is recommended that we press
forward toward all of these objectives until a point is
reached which requires that we make a final choice in the
light of realities of the then existing situation. The
EDC nations should be informed that if they do not consti-
tute their defense community by the end of this year, the
United States will rearm West Germany on a bilateral basis.
Concurrently, the NATO nations will be reassured that we
will come to their aid if attacked by Germany.
k. France. Tactfully but firmly inform France that the
United States is now embarked on a new course of action
which requires an end to delays in getting our mutual
security interests in order.
1. East-West trade should be undertaken on a selective
basis with maximum advantage to ourselves and minimum gain
to the enemy. Exploitation of those areas in which the
Soviet Bloc is not economically sufficient, frequently by
preclusive buying. Establish stringent controls and
harassing policies on Soviet shipping.
m. Foreign Aid Programs. Continuation of aid to our
allies, at least on a maintenance basis, for as long as the
cold war continues. Liberalized U.S. trade and tariff
policies.
n. Immediately strengthen our military posture, both
offensively and defensively, in order to carry out the mili-
tary operations contemplated, and to be prepared to meet
any risks of general war resulting therefrom. To include
the following:
(1) Organize, train and equip the additional ready
forces required.
(2) Prepare for early mobilization of the reinforcing
units required.
(3) Deploy additional forces to sensitive areas.
(4) Accelerate improvements in our continental air
defenses:
- 28 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
(a) Development of a much improved early
BUL
Dwight D
warning capability.
(b) Early completion of an integrated Army-
Navy-Air Force air defense plan closely coordinated
with the Canadians.
(c) Expedite research, development and early
production of new air defense weapons.
(d) Establish a workable civil defense program.
(5) In the field of atomic weapons:
(a) Ensure that counter-air strikes could be
launched without delay by placing the complete
weapons in the hands of tactical units designated to
employ them. This requires many important govern-
mental policy decisions regarding the use of
atomic weapons and particularly inter-governmental
agreements before a general war is forced upon us.
(b) Expedite development of a logistic
capability and of operational procedures orhandling
and employing atomic weapons on tactical targets,
(6) Build-up of equipment reserves, including some
overseas stockpiling.
(7) Stepped up delivery of equipment to our allies.
(8) Continue a vigorous research and developmant
program to maintain and widen our technical lead over
the enemy.
(9) Avoid losing freedom of action through partici-
pation in additional regional pacts.
(10) Minimize participation in disarmament discus
sions.
(11) Adopt a basic system of universal military
training and service.
7.
Additional Courses of Action in Various Parts of the World.
a. Western Hemisphere. Elimate Communist footholds in
the Western Hemisphere.
- 29 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
The Dwight D.
b. Europe
(1) Detach Albania from the Soviet Bloc.
(2) Support closer Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav political
and military cooperation.
(3) Expedite the development of the Volunteer
Freedom Corps.
c. Middle East.
(1) Secretly establish a US-Uk-Turkish planning
group. Subsequently, and openly, invite the area
nations to participate.
(2) Do not pressure to induce membership.
d. Far East.
(1) Indochina.
Press for a high-level conference in Paris
to arrive at a complete understanding with the
French concerning political, economic, and military
policies to be taken with respect to Indochina
including the following specific actions:
(a) Press the French to grant full dominion
status to the Associated States by early 1954 and,
at war's end, to permit them to vote on continued
membership in the French Union.
(b) Urge the election of a Vietnam National
Assembly at an early date.
(c) Press the French Government to clearly
define the status of their nationals in Indochina.
(d) Expand the indigenous forces and adopt
U.S. training methods.
(e) Press for more vigorous prosecution of the
war in Indochina including: closer US-French
military collaboration; expansion of forces;
organization of divisional size units; more vigorous
and aggressive cônduct of war; cut enemy lines of
supply from Communist China.
- 30 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
OHLY
Dwight D
LIBERTY
(2) Communist China.
(a) Take actions to isolate Communist China
politically and prevent her being seated in the UN
or any other international body.
(b) Maintain an embargo on trade with
Communist China and induce our allies to do the
same.
(c) In the event of continued war in Korea,
blockade the Chinese coast with the assistance of
the Nationalists.
(d) In the event of a cease-fire agreement,
utilize the war between Communist and Nationalist
China as a basis for a blockade. Provide the
Nationalists with the means to effect the blockade.
(3) Nationalist China.
(a) Employ Nationalist forces for conducting
active military operations against the Chinese
Communists.
(b) Before mounting operations against the
mainland, employ these forces to recapture the
island of Hainan.
(4) Japan
Essentially the same policy as that of Task
Force A, but greater pressure on Japanese to meet
scheduled organiation of Japanese Safety Force.
(5) Korea.
(a) If a cease fire agreement is reached:
i. At the peace conference, insist
upon a unified, independent Korea, not
under Communist control or domination.
ii. No withdrawal of UN forces from
Korea until a peace is signed and indigene-
ous defense forces developed.
- 31 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
OUT
Deight D
The
iii. Establish 10 mile demilitarized
zone astride the present Korean-Manchurian
border.
(b) If no cease-fire agreement is reached, or
if a political conference fails and fighting is
resumed in Korea, intensify military operations
in order to:
i. Seize a position across the waist of
Korea.
ii. Capture or destroy maximum enemy
forces and equipment.
iii. Create conditions that would force
the enemy to accept a settlement favorable
to the UN.
iv. Atomic weapons would be employed in
these operations.
V. Extend the air and sea war to Commun--
ist China with priority to lines of comm-
unication and industrial facilities.
(c) An effective UN economic and rehabilitation
program in Korea is viewed as essential.
8. Special Actions Required in the Field of Propaganda and
Covert operations.
a. United States propaganda and covert apparatus have
failed to a certain extent, largely due to two deficiancies:
(1) lack of a national strategy to end the cold war by
winning it, and (2) lack of a national command post to
concentrate our political, military and economic resources on
winning. Adoption of the policy of Alternative Co as a
national strategy would solve the first deficiency. The
establishment of a governmental organization (such as that
recommended by the Jackson Committee) for implementing the
strategy is recommended.
b. A large-scale expansion and development of our covert
apparatus is urged.
9. Implementation.
The United States Government must take the necessary steps,
in terms of organization and procedures, to attain the ability
- 32 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
ONL
Dwight D
LIBIRTY
to effectively prosecute the policy. Speed of action,
continuity of policy and programs and security of opera-
tions are required.
10. Costs.
a. It is estimated that expenditures to carry out
Alternative C would be of the order of $60 billion in
FY 1954 and 1955. Expenditures decline to below $45
billion by FY 1958. If fighting was resumed in Korea,
the figures for FY 1954-1955 would be between $60 billion
and $65 billion. These figures do not include preclusive
buying, which would be limited and selective. Peacetime
costs would be higher in the short term than under
Alternatives A or B, and higher than presently proposed
programs. In the long term, costs should be substantially
lower when we have won the cold war, and lower than the
current policy or Alternative A or B, which do not end
the cold war.
b. The Task Force is generally in accord with the
views of Task Force A relating to the capacity of the United
States to provide and finance these resources require-
ments.
11. Legislative Requirements.
a. Appropriations covering the increased program costs.
b. Tax legislation consistent with these appropriations.
c. Reduction of tariffs and simplification of customs
procedures.
d. Stand-by legislation for wartime economic controls.
e. A basic system of universal military training and
service.
f. Increased latitude with respect to immigration.
12. Additional Requirements.
a. Greater continuity of security policies and programs.
b. Special arrangements to reconcile the necessity for
security of sensitive operations with the need for Con-
gressional understanding and support.
13. Public Opinion.
The alternative puts major demands on public support.
The necessity and rightness of the policy must be fully
and expressly conveyed to them.
- 33 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
14. Allies.
OHL
Dwight
0.
Alternative C's policy would strain our system of al-
LISTER
liances which remain essential to consolidation of the
strength of the free world. It is believed that a situa-
tion exists where the United States can and should be less
solicitous of specific internal problems of the Western
European countries, and can and should feel less constrained
to subject its actions outside the scope of the NATO
commitment to the veto of NATO partners, specifically
France and the United Kingdom.
- 34 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Dwight
The
15. The Timetable: Short Term.
a. U.S.S.R.
(1) Political.
(a) Withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Germany
and Austria.
(b) Release German and Japanese prisoners of war.
(c) Austrian State Treaty.
(d) United Germany, pro-western and rearmed.
(e) Condemn repressive measures in occupied
territories.
(f) Unrelenting pressure on Soviet leaders on
each political issue that arises.
(2) Military.
(a) Show U.S.S.R. strong defense, demonstrating
folly of attack on free world and especially
on the United States with any hope of
success.
(3) Economic.
(a) Apply principle of selective sanctions.
(b) Deny vital strategic materials including
natural rubber, electronic tubes, machine
tools, and tungsten wire.
(c) Impede shipping--throw burden of overhaul on
Soviet shipyards--push for goods movement
in only Orbit bottoms.
(d) Adopt as principle that of limited, selective
preclusive buying.
(4) Propaganda.
(a) Support lines set forth under political lines.
(b) Advocate student and cultural exchange.
(c) Abandon pushing merits of United States.
(d) Concentrate on evils of Soviet system:
(i) Slave labor camps.
(ii) Restriction of movement within Russia.
(iii) Inequalities of living.
(iv) Stratification of Soviet society.
(v) Promotion of a phony peace.
- 35 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Dwight
THE JO
D.
(5) Covert.
(a) Build both long-term and crash standby
apparatus.
(b) Limited penetrations for intelligence and
preparatory purposes.
(c) Step up subtle sabotage of Soviet bureaucracy
and economic machine.
(d) Attack key leaders through "black operations".
b. Communist China.
(1) Political.
(a) Withhold recognition or any diplomatic
relationship as long as they support
hostilities in Korea and Indochina.
(b) Press for a unified, independent Korea, not
under Communist control.
(c) Block Membership in the United Nations.
(d) Seek to drive a wedge in the Moscow-Peiping
axis.
(2) Military.
(a) If no truce--defeat Chinese Communist armies
in Korea.
(b) Seize Hainan and, if successful, attack one
point on the mainland with the Chinese
Nationalist forces, successively by 1955.
(c) Tighten blockade of the mainland, using
Chinese Nationalist forces.
(3) Economic.
(a) Maintain tight economic blockade during
period of hostility.
(b) Tighten restrictions on overseas contribu-
tions to Communist China.
(c) Selective and limited preclusive buying.
(d) Prevent acquisition of external assets that
improve international trade position.
(e) Deny all strategic materials during
belligerency period--tighten all other
materials.
- 36 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
(4) Propaganda.
The
Doight
(a) Attack subservience to U.S.S.R. through
LIBITY
ridicule--theme "Mao is puppet."
(b) Restore family and community loyalty.
(c) Point up aggression--Tibet, Korean, and
Indochina.
(d) Point up isolation from free world because
of their own aggression.
(e) Ridicule inability to reduce Chiarg Kai-shek
and Chinese Nationalists.
(5) Covert.
(a) Establish covert system based largely on
Chinese Nationalist and Japanese assets
in sequence; intelligence, resistance,
guerrilla, sabotage, subversion.
(b) Buy off fringe Army commanders.
(c) Develop Third Force Chinese elements.
(d) Discredit Red leaders through "black opera-
tions".
(e) Subtle sabotage of bureaucracy and economic
system.
c. European Satellites, East Germany, and Austria.
(1) Political.
(a) Hamper consolidation of Soviet control over
satellites and keep alive satellite morale
and aspirations for national independence
without inciting them to premature or
suicidal insurrection.
(b) Maintain diplomatic relations as long as
advantages outweigh disadvantages.
(c) Prepare political setting for liberation of
Albania.
(2) Military.
(a) Build strength on adjacent borders-
Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary.
Pose no threat.
(b) "Recapture" the Baltic by Allied fleet visits.
(c) Maintain naval strength in Mediterranean.
(d) Decry large forces in being in the satellites.
- 37 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Too Dwight D.
(3) Economic.
LIBITY
(a) Apply principle of selective sanctions.
(b) Permit large flow of luxury items to drain
foreign exchange.
(c) Deny vital strategic materials.
(d) Open trade in items that will reduce reliance
of satellites on Soviets.
(e) Limited and selective preclusive buying.
(4) Propaganda.
(a) Stress puppet status of satellites.
(b) Advocate student and cultural exchange.
(c) Point up restrictive measures, inequality of
treatment, destruction of national aspira-
tions.
(d) Abandon attempting to "sell" the United States.
(e) Point information to receptivity of the
country receiving it.
(f) Repeat free world readiness to cooperate, as
with Yugoslavia.
(g) Indicate Soviet oppression on peoples with
progressive free world ideas.
(5) Covert.
(a) Install apparatus in priority: intelligence,
resistance, sabotage, subversion, guerrilla.
(b) Sabotage economic system outside the Soviet
bloc.
(c) Incite small-scale revolts for propaganda
exploitation, carefully timed.
(d) Discredit Red leaders through "black
operations".
(e) Subtle sabotage of Red bureaucracy and
economic system.
d. Free Europe -- Northwest Africa.
(1) Political.
(a) Evacuation of Eastern Germany and Austria
by Soviet occupation forces.
(b) Unified Germany, pro-western and rearmed.
(c) Austrian State Treaty.
(d) Reduction of Communist Party strength,
particularly in France and Italy.
- 38 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
(e) Adoption of progressive policy by colonial
OHL
Dwight D.
powers with respect to their colonial
possessions leading to self-government.
-
(f) Support European regional institutions,
including EDC, unless and until a choice
must be made between EDC and a unified
Germany.
(2) Military.
(a) Set goals for European countries consistent
with their capabilities and assessment of
the threat. Continue the build-up.
(b) Pursue principle of regional balanced forces
as opposed to national balanced forces.
(c) Increase depth of defense to include Spain
in regional agreements.
(d) Improve flexibility and adequacy of logistic
support.
(3) Economic.
(a) Continue marginal support of economies with
emphasis on defense support.
(b) Continue effort to expand European trading
system started in Schuman Plan.
(c) Seek substitute sources of materials presently
coming from satellites.
(4) Propaganda.
(a) Stress repressions in satellites as salutary
warning.
(b) Point to continued presence of Soviet Armies
in Central Europe as bar to peace.
(c) Support vigorous diplomatic front with
tailored propaganda for respective areas.
(d) Promote greatest possible number of exchanges
with United States.
(e) Ridicule as dupes those "voting Communist".
(f) Keep sense of humor as only convincing
approach.
- 39 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
(5) Covert.
OF
(a) Use as base of operations against the
Soviet bloc.
(b) Develop elaborate apparatus, especially
in areas that may be over-run.
(c) Develop capability of fomenting civil war
in France and Italy in event of Communist
victory at the polls.
(d) Ruthless attack on Communist system in
France and Italy.
e. Middle East -- Northeast Africa.
(1) Political.
(a) Expand United States activities demonstrat-
ing long-term friendship and interest in
the area.
(b) Establish a regional planning group looking
to the defense of the Middle East, includ-
ing initially the United States, United
Kingdom, and Turkey with an invitation to
other area countries to participate and
notification to Pakistan.
(c) More formal relations with Israel with
emphasis on less open professions of
total support.
(d) More direct and indirect pressure for Israeli-
Arab settlement of differences.
(2) Military.
(a) Immediate steps to establish a MEDO Planning
Group; invite Arab State (s) association.
(b) Plan defense of the area.
(c) Consummate bilateral agreements with those
nations willing and able to participate in
the area and with which we do not already
have an agreement.
(d) Maintain high priority of support to Turkey.
(e) Establish safeguards to prevent improper use
of military aid furnished them.
- 40 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
(3) Economic.
081
Dwight D
(a) Expand technical aid at the village level.
(b) Initiate project to restore productivity of
LIBIRTY
Tigris-Euphrates Valley.
(c) Work to diversion of oil profits to research
projects beneficial to area:
(i) Desalinize sea water.
(ii) Solar power.
(iii) Irrigation.
(d) Improve sanitation.
(e) Expand edicational facilities.
(4) Propaganda.
(a) Respect and stress the basic tenets of
Muslimism.
(b) Stress repressions under Soviets.
(c) Keep theme simple, stressing provisions of
wells, schools, health benefits, with
emphasis on benefits that can be seen.
(d) Avoid over-commitment to attacks on Communist
ideology.
(e) Present basic solidarity of free world.
(5) Covert.
(a) Establish covert apparatus.
(b) Emphasis in Iran on counter to Tudeh Party.
(c) Covert attack on control apparatus of Kremlin-
controlled parties.
(d) Through "black operations" create reaction
of disgust and revulsion to Communist aims
throughout Islam.
f. Northeast Asia -- Korea.
(1) Political.
(a) Establish as objective unified independent,
non-Communist Korea.
(b) Continue suppression of Communist Party in
free Korea.
(c) Press for wider internal political latitude-
deplore one-party system.
(d) Establish 10-mile neutral zone at Yalu subject
to international inspection with respective
governments retaining jurisdiction over
national territory.
(e) Include Korea in regional defense pact.
- 41 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
one
Uwimbt
D.
(2) Military (NO TRUCE).
LIBIT
(a) Build force to inflict sound military defeat
on Chinese Communists.
(b) Maintain U. S. forces in Korea as stabiliz-
ing influence.
(c) Continue build-up and support of ROK armies.
(d) Press for greater U. N. contributions as
evidence of good faith. By-product is
wider world support for outright defense
against overt aggression.
(TRUCE)
(a) Maintain full U. N. force in Korea until
acceptable peace is signed. (Objectives
in political are obtained)
(b) Limit peace talks to definite period--six
months maximum.
(c) Renew and extend war under failure of peace
talks and so state.
(d) Issue "greater sanctions" statement.
(3) Economic.
(a) Restore Korea to economic self-sufficiency
except for heavy military hardware.
(b) Press for establishment of trade relations
with Japan.
(c) Extend technical aid in improving agricultural
methods--stress village level.
(4) Propaganda.
(a) Play up Korean effort in repelling aggression.
(b) Broaden student, leader, and technical ex-
change program.
(c) Play Korea as the show piece of the free
world against the ramparts of Communist
Asia.
(d) Present basic solidarity of the free world.
- 42 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
OHE
Duight D
(5) Covert.
LIBITY
(a) Develop and consolidate apparatus sympathetic
to U. S. interests.
(b) Develop machine that can go underground in
peacetime to continue fight against
Communist apparatus in North Korea.
(c) Support Korean nationalism as device to attain
anti-Communist unification.
g. Northeast Asia -- Japan.
(1) Political.
(a) Press for constitutional changes that will
permit re-arming.
(b) Press for outlawing Communist Party.
(c) Continue close ties with Japanese Governement.
(d) Press for Japanese inclusion in U. N.
(e) Demand of Russia a peace settlement with
Japan.
(2) Military.
(a) Push development of minimum ten-division
National Safety force with sea and air forces
of appropriate size in point of defense
mission involved. Expand Japanese forces
when United States forces are withdrawn.
(3) Economic.
(a) Seek trade outlets for Japanese industrial
output.
(b) Seek raw material sources for Japanese
industry.
(c) Expand technical aid seeking self-sufficiency
in food-stuffs.
(4) Propaganda.
(a) Stress repressions of Soviets.
(b) Keep prisoners held by Soviets before
Japanese people.
(c) Expand student exchange--make this a two-
way street.
(d) Present basic solidarity of free world.
- 43 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
OHL
Dwight
(5) Covert.
(a) Develop Japan as a principal base for
operations against Chinese Communists and
against the Kremlin-controlled Communist
conspiracy throughout Asia.
(b) Maintain an internal organization to combat
Communist apparatus within Japan proper.
h. Northeast Asia -- Formosa.
(1) Political.
(a) Maintain support of Chiang regime.
(b) Seek support of overseas Chinese for Chiang-
more for effect of denial on Mao.
(2) Military.
(a) Require positive military act by Chiang--
against Hainan or mainland.
(b) Build up naval capability of blockade of
mainland.
(c) Build air defense capability.
(3) Economic.
(a) Continue effort to make Formosa self-
sufficient except for heavy military hard-
ware.
(4) Propaganda.
(a) Play up Chiang's fight for freedom.
(5) Covert.
(a) Develop covert organization for support of
Chinese Nationalist seizure of Hainan and
preparations for later invasion of the
mainland.
(b) Initially, limit penetrations of mainland to
espionage, preparatory and propaganda
purposes.
- 44 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
OHI
Dwight
i. Southeast Asia -- Indochina.
LIBITY
(1) Political.
(a) Insist on full independence for Indochinese
States by February 1954.
(b) Support Indochinese affiliation with French
Union, as the best safeguard against
Communist encroachment after independence.
(c) Seek admission of Indochinese States into
the United States.
(d) Inclusion of the Indochinese States in a
regional pact involving other states of
Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.
(2) Military.
(a) Develop increased military force to win
outright victory in Indochina.
(b) Inclusion in mutual defense pact for Pacific
area after freedom is attained.
(3) Economic.
(a) Continued Economic aid.
(b) Economic reforms within the Indochinese
States.
(c) Expanded trade relationships with Asiatic
countries--emphasis on Japan.
(4) Propaganda.
(a) Ridicule useless sacrifices of duped Viet
Minh.
(b) Conduct subtle campaign against reactionary
colonialists in Indochina.
(c) Emphasize indoctrination of armed forces to
assure future loyalty.
(d) Create regional consciousness in Southeast
Asia.
(e)
Present basic solidarity of the free world.
(f)
Promote exchanges with neighboring countries,
especially the Philippines.
- 45 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
OF
Dwight
OF
(5) Covert.
Count
(a) Develop organization to combat Communist
apparatus.
(b) Develop stay-behind and guerrilla forces in
case of Communist military or political
victory.
16. Mid-Term Guidelines for Courses of Action (1958-1965)
a. Continued development of covert apparatus.
b. Mop-up of Communist control apparatus outside of
Soviet bloc and continued surveillance to prevent resurgence.
c. Direct attacks (not military) on satellites.
d. Continued effort against Communist China.
e. Continued pressure on the Soviet Union.
f. It was not deemed feasible to specify courses of
action for a period five years away. At the end of the
short-term period in 1958, it is believed that under
Alternative C, U. S. and free world strength would have
greatly increased. There would be no lasting peace in
Korea. A severe blow to Chinese prestige through the
administration of a sound military defeat and the destruc-
tion of some of her industrial centers would have been
dealt. Relations between the Soviet Union and China
would have been strained, and China would be beset by
internal difficulties. In Europe, Germany would be united
and committed to neither side, though oriented toward the
free world; or, alternatively, she would be divided with
West Germany an armed and active partisan of the West.
Soviet armed forces would conceivably be withdrawn within
the borders of the Soviet Union. The satellites would
experience internal deterioration.
g. In the Middle East an acceptable degree of internal
stability would have been attained.
h. In Africa and in Latin America improved stability
and the destruction of a substantial part of the Communist
conspiracy would have been attained.
- 46 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
17. Mid-Term Specific Guidelines.
one
Dwight
a. Political.
LIBIRTY
(1) Continued "hard" policy toward our enemies, but
tempered by an increased willingness to bargain, since we
will be negotiating from a position of strength.
(2) Continued friendship toward those areas, primarily
Latin America, neutralist Asia and Sub-equatorial Africa,
in which the Communist threat has been materially reduced.
(3) Continued effort to maintain the support of Allies,
though resorting to a "hard" policy when required. Our
task is to command respect, not necessarily love and
devotion.
(4) All-out political offensive to overthrow satellite
governments and bring them into the family of free nations.
b. Military.
(1) Continued maintenance of a strong base at home,
with forces deployed world-wide as best serves the interests
of moving in on the Soviet Union--actually tightening
encirclement, not overt military attack.
(2) Continued stress and support of preparedness on
the part of our Allies, with emphasis on those countries
adjacent to satellite territories.
c. Economic.
(1) Continued limited aid in those areas where Point
IV aspects of current aid have been stressed.
(2) Reduced economic aid where applicable but con-
tinued support of military forces in being on a sustaining
basis. This envisages a marked reduction in economic aid
in Western Europe and in Japan.
d. Propaganda and Education.
Increased tempo of the attack on the Soviet Union.
e. Covert.
(1) Use of covert elements in the satellites as they
are marked for overthrow or subversion.
(2) Increased covert effort within the Soviet Union
and within Communist China.
- 47 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
The
Duight
a
18. Long-Term Guidelines.
Lintury
a. At the end of the mid-term or in 1965, it is
envisaged that the satellites will be freed, or in such
a state of disaffection with the U.S.S.R. as to constitute
a serious weakness rather than strength in the Soviet
bloc. The strains between Communist China and the U.S.S.R.
will have reached a point where prospects are favorable for
driving a final wedge between them.
b. There will be two ultimate objectives in the long
term:
(1) The reduction of Soviet power and militancy
and the elimination of the Communist conspiracy; and
(2) Overthrow of the Communist regime in China.
Since this phase of the conflict is in the distant future,
no specific courses of action are recommended. It is
important to keep these objectives in mind throughout all
periods. No action should be undertaken that does not
lead ultimately to the goal of liquidation of the Communist
menace.
- 48 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
SUMMARY OF POINTS MADE IN DISCUSSION
The
FOLLOWING PRESENTATION BY TASK FORCES
July 16, 1953
Library
1. Task Force B. While armed, easily identifiable
aggression by Communist forces across the "line" drawn by the
United States would be grounds for general war, the United
States would, in the case of indigenous Communist seizure of
power in a country on our side of the line, retain freedom of
action to restore the pre-existing situation as we saw fit
by using any means at our disposal.
2. Task Force B. The basic policy of Task Force B should
strongly deter the aggressive movement by Communist forces
across the "line" drawn by the U.S., and thereby create a
stronger political and psychological climate in the countries on
our side of the "line". Thus, it will become easier for these
countries to deal with and minimize the possibility of indigenous
subversion.
3. Task Force A. Our initial position with respect to
the arming of Germany should leave this issue to be decided by
the Germans themselves, following an ultimate peace settlement.
The difficulty of restricting German rearmament would lie in its
international regulation by a body such as the UN, a body of
which the Soviets are members. A very careful examination
should be made before being willing to accept a neutralized
Germany.
4. Task Force A. The primary objection to implementing
EDC at this time is the loss of negotiating position vis-a-vis
the Soviets in connection with an ultimate settlement of the
German question. An implemented EDC would mean that the free
world would be asking the Soviets to withdraw their forces from
East Germany, while we would be free to include East Germany
with West Germany in an alliance directed against the Soviets.
NATO provides a good framework for negotiation, apart from EDC.
If we do not entwine the Germans more than necessary in EDC and
NATO, they and we will have more flexibility in developing
successful negotiating positions with the Soviets.
5. Task Force A. Concurrently with attempting to re-unify
Germany and secure Russian withdrawal, we should proceed with
the unilateral rearmament of West Germany. While such unilateral
rearmament would weaken and strain NATO, it would not destroy
it. There is great possibility that Germany can be brought into
EDC only after German unification, and not before or as a
condition of German unification. While the U.S. was checked
two and a half years ago on unilaterally rearming Germany, there
- 49 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
The
Deight
exists a considerably different situation today. Our allies
Library
then feared we would take away equipment and supplies intended
for them, and give them to the Germans. We should not be
restrained in our liberty of action by basically unsound French
fears of Germany. We recognize however that French fears and
reactions must be seriously considered and if possible modified,
because France is an indispensable part of our military geo-
graphy.
6. Task Force A. Some preference exists for a unilaterally
rearmed Germany as opposed to Germany as a part of EDC, but the
decision turns upon and is related to other matters. There
is hope that following achievement of German unification and
withdrawal of Soviet forces from Germany, the Soviets might
withdraw their military forces from the satellites. Such a
situation in turn would lead to the necessity of the Soviets
creating new arrangements for the protection of their position
and interests in the area.
7. Task Force A. Germany is the key to developing the
strength of Western Europe. We cannot accept as the price for
obtaining French and British support against the Soviet Union
suppression of Germany's natural vigor and power. We do not
wish Germany again to be a menace to Europe. Yet the restriction
of her rearmament to certain types of conventional weapons
presents difficulties and is questionable. We should take
advantage of our very favorable position as it exists today in
Germany, rather than lose this opportunity because of a risk
that the German menace may reappear.
8. Even if the U.S. could get along economically and on
the basis of sufficient raw materials by concentrating its
efforts on the West and letting the Far and Middle East fall
where it might, our allies could not get along without the
essential resources and dollar earnings of those areas. There
would result a deterioration of the allies' political and eco-
nomic position and their will to resist, which in turn would
affect the U.S. From the military point of view, such a course
of action would lead to a danger so great to the U.S. as to
necessitate spending much more than we are today for defense.
For example, if the power complex of Japan were added to the
Soviet Union's capability, the resultant increase in Soviet
strength would be a great danger to the U.S. The union of Japan,
China, and Manchuria in a communist system would be incalculably
dangerous. Furthermore, it would create a climate of defeat
through the free world.
9. Task Force C. Rather than taking fewer actions
stretching out over a longer period of time in order to involve
less dollar costs, Task Force C believes its program might be
strung out over too long a period.
- 50 -
TOP SECRET