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Report to the National Security Council by Project Solarium Task Force A - Part 4 of 7
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Report to the National Security Council by Project Solarium Task Force A - Part 4 of 7
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UTOP SECRET
SOL-TF/A-1
SECURITY INFORMATION
SEC. III
THE LIGHT Duight Dr
III
B.
MAINTENANCE OF THE ECONOMY
1. Task Force A's policy has, as one of its general objectives, the
maintenance of "a strong and sound U.S. economy based on free enterprise."
2. Comparison with Soviet Economy
a. We were interested in the comparative strength of the U.S.
and U.S.S.R. economies over a sustained period (Chart B-1). According
to the estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Soviet economy
will not grow so as to reduce our preponderance of economic strength in
the foreseeable future -- assuming that our economy continues an average
growth of the order of 3½ percent a year, shown on the Chart.
3. Implications of Our Economic Objective
a. The general objective, stated in par. 1 above, emphasizes
a need for a security policy minimizing both the risk of war and of the
necessity for a high state of mobilization with their concomitant risks
of a controlled economy. The stated objective also implies a steady
course of security effort at a reasonably high level of preparedness.
Major fluctuations in the security program are bound to disrupt the
economy. Any recession in our security effort which meets a sudden
increase in tension with the Soviet Union is likely to necessitate
limited mobilization, to regain an adequate plateau of preparedness,
with consequent temporary impact on free enterprise. General war, of
course, would leave us little of either health or free enterprise,
- 44 -
TOR'SECRETED
SECURITY
BILLION $
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
B /
500
450
ECONOMIC
400
GROWTH OF
Gross National Product-United States
350
us AND USSR
(based on 3.6% annual increase)
300
250
Annual Increase 1962
200
150
10 Year Increase
100
Gross National Product-USSR
(based on 6.0% annual increase)
50
1952
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
USSR
U.S.
44a 4
TOP SECRET
Dwight
TOP SECRET
THE
10
SOL-TF/A-1
SECURITY INFORMATION
SEC. III
4. Ability of the Economy to Sustain the Security Load
a. Task Force A has studied the trends in our economy over the
period since 1947 during which we have been engaged in combatting Commu-
nism and notes that:
(1) Our industrial plant has been greatly expanded and
modernized through a steady, high rate of investment.
(2) The gross national product has risen steadily --
averaging 4-5 percent per year.
(3) Our non-renewable resources have not been consumed
significantly faster than under a condition of near full employment
with lower security expenditures. The products of our economy, under
the latter condition, would of course have been different and might have
resulted in a fraction less consumption of some metals. Our country has,
in effect, been putting resources both into its military shield for the
economy and into the standard of living. The resources would otherwise
have gone partly to accelerate further the rise in the standard of living.
There might have been additional public investment, providing the govern-
ment and public had been willing to continue to take by taxes some of the
increment, which have instead been devoted to security, to build roads,
schools, etc.
(4) The civilian standard of living has gone up steadily,
averaging a rise of over two percent per year in consumption exp enditures
and slightly lessthan two percent per year in disposable income.
(5) Economic controls, imposed during about two years of the
- 45 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Daight
TOP SECRET
THE
SOL-TF/A-1
SECURITY INFORMATION
FIRST
SEC. III
limited mobilization since 1950, have, with a few exceptions, been elimi-
nated due to the production expansion generated by our private enterprise.
b. Turning to an appraisal of U.S. capacity to support a security
program over a sustained period, Task Force A considered the currently pro-
jected security expenditures to 1960, in comparison with the estimated
national production for the same period (Chart B-2).
c. In order to generate a reasoned view as to the impact of
likely security expenditures on the standard of living, we considered
(Chart B-3) the same information as on the previous chart, but presented
to assume that the standard of living (the highest yet attained) is frozen
at the current level. It is apparent that, barring a serious recession,
there should be an increasing increment of production available for either
increased investment and a higher standard of living, or for increasing
the effort against Communism. This increment may be of the order of 70-80
billion dollars by 1960 or not much below the current magnitude of total
Soviet production (Chart B-1).
d. Believing that relative rather than absolute costs may be the
best measure of the true impact of the security program on our economy,
we considered that program (Chart B-4) as a proportion of national produc-
tion. As now estimated, the proportion declines steadily in future years.
e. Task Force A concludes that there is no question that our
country has the economic capacity to provide a high plateau of prepared-
ness -- certainly the program envisaged by Task Force A -- over a sus-
tained period.
- 46 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
BILLION $
SECURITY INFORMATION
B2
500
450
FEDERAL EXPENDITURES
400
Compared to
Gross National Product
350
300
250
Civilian Economy
200
TODAY
150
100
50
W.W.II
Foreign Aid
National Security Expenditures
Other Governmental Expenditures
1941
43
45
47
49
51
53
55
57
59
61
46a
TOP SECRET
a
TOP SECRET
500
SECURITY INFORMATION
in
BILLION $
450
Total Gross National Product
(Based on average increase)
400
Other National Security Expenditures Increased Seased of Living ? ?
Governmental Expenditures
350
Security
300
250
200
Civilian Economy at a Steady Per Capita Standard of Living
150
100
AN INCREASED ECONOMY
FOR INCREASED STRENGTH
50
1950
'52
'54
'56
'58
'60
TOP SECRET
Percent
TOP SECRET
B4
SECURITY INFORMATION
100
90
FEDERAL EXPENDITURES
80
as a Percentage of
Gross National Product
70
60
Civilian Economy
50
TODAY
40
30
W.W.II
Foreign Aid
20
10
National Security Expenditures
Other Governmental Expenditures
1941
43
45
47
49
51
53
55
57
59 60
46e
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
OHL
Duight D,
SOL-TF/A-1
SECURITY INFORMATION
SEC. III
LIBIRTY
f. NSC 153/1 states that the cost in resources of our security
program over a sustained period (we interpret a sustained period as ten
years or more) may from the economic standpoint present a principal threat
to the survival of the U.S. way of life. The real threat, from the eco-
nomic standpoint, in our opinion, does not arise from absolute cost of
security so much as from other dangers. They include:
(1) The effect on adequate legislative action of the unpre-
cedented absolute cost short of war.
(2) The effect of an economic recession which might occasion
a retreat from our military position, gravely upset the economies of
countries in the in-between world with consequent political disruptions,
and provide a great propaganda victory for Communism by giving a demon-
stration (they would say) of the inadequacy of our economic system com-
pared to theirs. The U.S.S.R. might grasp the opportunity for economic
warfare.
(3) Lack of an economic readiness for mobilization, general
war, and atomic attack on the U.S. NSC 153/1 does not, we think, contain
any policy guidance for those preparatory economic and industrial mobiliza-
tion arrangements within the Executive Branch which are consistent with
our stated policy of military readiness. The long run need for standby
production and consumer control measures as part of a defense against
atomic attack seems clearly apparent. These arrangements, for a full mobili-
zation, require about nine months to place in operation according to informa-
tion available to the Task Force, providing it is necessary to start from
scratch.
- 47 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
OHL
Dwight
DI
SOL-TF/A-1
SEC. III
SECURITY INFORMATION
LIBITY
g. Task Force A considers the government planning should take
account of the points raised in (2) and (3) above and that, at the appro-
priate opportunity, standby legislation should be obtained on which to
base sustained economic mobilization readiness consistent with military
readiness. These internal problems just listed, and they are serious,
are under our own control and arrangements -- unlike the external threat.
5. Ability of Governmental Arrangements to Provide Resources
a. The capability, existent in the economy, to support an ade-
quate security program still does not assure that the governmental mech-
anisms exist to provide these resources to the security effort. There is
certainly a point at which the fiscal and tax structures no longer can
make the needed transfers from the civilian economy -- or can make these
transfers only with unacceptable damage to that economy. Based on the
World War II experience of the United States and Great Eritain, we think
the saturation point of the economy in all-out war is the diversion to
the war effort of somewhere between 50 and 60 percent of national produc-
tion. This rough estimate assumes no material atomic damage. We believe
our Government should be carrying forward studies of the capabilities of
the economy in case of such atomic damage. We make no estimates thereon
since we are dealing in our examination with the problems of the economy
in supporting not a war program but a preparedness program of the scope
required by the policy of Task Force A.
b. Our Task Force was impressed by the budgetary and financial
problems, currently facing the U.S. Government, as explained to us by the
- 48 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
Dwight
SOL-TF/A-1
SEC. III
SECURITY INFORMATION
a Library 041
Director of the Bureau of the Budget. Charts B-5 and B-8 contain some data
indicating the nature of these problems. Certainly our Government should
not operate in ordinary times on an unbalanced budget continuously year
after year. The current problem is one of completing a build-up of mili-
tary strength over the next two to four years and then sustaining that
strength at a high level of preparedness. The current years are, we hope
and believe, not ordinary times. The main question concerning the national
debt is, to us, whether it is likely to become so high as to be a threat
to the strength of the U.S. Charts B-9 and B-10 show the debt (the latter
presenting it as a percentage of national production) assuming that there
is no significant increase thereof. This we realize may prove to be an
unwarranted assumption but it does not necessarily invalidate our conclu-
sion as to the degree to which the debt constitutes a threat. Any threat
existent in the debt does not seem comparable to the Soviet threat. The
debt situation does, however, have grave political and psychological
problems and presents major difficulties to our federal financial
administration.
c. The economic policy set forth in NSC 153/1 contains an impli-
cation of a reduction of taxes and certainly no suggestion of increasing
the level of taxes to balance the budget. We understand that the reduction
of federal income which may occur due to lapses of taxation legislation is
of the order of eight billion dollars a year.
d. In searching for a guide to tax capacity and for possible
arguments for our implied economic policy in the tax area we examined the
- 49 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
B5
Confidential security information
GROWTH OF FEDERAL EXPENDITURES
$Bil.
%
Expenditures
Military and International
Programs as % of Total
100
Total
80
75
50
40
88%
Military and International
66%
61%
25
41%
Other
17%
0
1940
53*
19
$
o
45
'50
'58*
1940
43
'50
'53*
'58*
Fiscal Years
*Projections based on programs as of Jan. 9,1953
8.1109
49 a
B6
Confidential security information
FEDERAL BUDGET AND DEBT OUTLOOK
$Bil.
$Bil.
Debt Projection
100
320
80
Expenditures
300
Statutory
Debt Limit
60
Deficit
275
Surplus
307
40
3
260
Receipts
274
20
240
264
O
0
1940
'45
'50
'53*
'58*
'53*
*54*
'58*
Fiscal Years
June 30
*Projections based on programs as of Jan. 9,1953.
B-1112
STATE MOME The
49b
CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION
UNITED The
B7
ESTIMATED REVENUE LOSS FROM
SCHEDULED TAX REDUCTIONS UNDER PRESENT LAW
Initial
Ultimate
Date of
effect
effect
Type of tax
expiration
fiscal year
fiscal year
1954
1956
(In billions of dollars)
Corporation
excess profits
June 30, 1953
.8
2.3
Individual
income
December 31, 1953
1.1
3.1
Selected
excises
March 31, 1954
.2
1.0
Corporation
income
March 31, 1954
-
1.9
Total
2.1
8.3
CONFIDENTIAL
490
B8
GROWTH OF THE FEDERAL DEBT
$Bil.
Peak
Now
Korea
240
160
280
257½
267½
Pre-
80
World
Post-
War II
World War I
Post-
Pre-
Peak
World War I
World
Low
48 1/2
1½
War I
26½
16
O
Mar. 31.
Aug. 31.
Dec. 31,
June 30,
Feb.28,
June 30,
Jan. 31,
1917
1919
1930
1940
1946
1950
1953
49d
8-108
$ 917 Lia = The .o DRIBATO
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
500
(BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
B9
COMPARISON OF NATIONAL DEBT
TODAY
450
AND GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
400
350
Gross National Product
Tax Rate based on Level National Debt
300
National Debt
250
200
150
100
Federal Expenditures
50
Federal Receipts
1941
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
49e
TOP SECRET
B/O
140
U.S. NATIONAL DEBT
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
AS PERCENT OF G.N.P.
100%
Gross National Product
90
80
TODAY
70
National Debt
60
50
Federal Expenditures
40
30
20
10
Federal Receipts
1941 42
44
46
48
50
52
53
54
56
58
60
TOP SECRET
1
TOP SECRET
OHL
Dwight D.
SOL-TF/A-1
SEC. III
SECURITY INFORMATION
taxes of our principal Allies (Chart B-11) and made an estimate of the
likely U.S. situation in 1960 under our current program. Taxes as a
percentage of national production would in that year be less than all
except two or three of our NATO Allies today. The average per capita pro-
duction of these countries (Chart B-12) is below 40 percent of ours for
the best of them. Hence their tax burden is almost certainly more oppres-
sive than in the U.S.
e. Looking at comparative defense expenditures as a percentage
of gross national production (Chart B-13) ours will, according to our cur-
rently proposed security program, be lower by 1957 than the present defense
expenditures of England and France. By 1960 our program will be propor-
tionately below the average of current programs of the Furopean NATO
countries.
f. There is a way of thought in some governments with which we
deal in our collective security effort, which equates the Soviet military
threat to something less than a selected tax rate or a selected percentage
of the national production. Task Force A considers that the United States
is certainly not yet in a position where it needs to consider this line of
reasoning which would have the effect of providing military defenses which
may bear little relationship to the military requirement.
g. Our Task Force knows that some of the matters falling within
our mission are the subject of complicated and controversial economic anal-
ysis. We seriously question, however, that, in the face of an unbalanced
budget, the current security need, and an economy operating at around full
- 50 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORNATION
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Bil
TAXES AS A PERCENT OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
GERMANY
33.9%
UNITED
KINGDOM
32.7%
FRANCE
31.4%
NETHERLANDS
31.0%
BELG.-LUX.
28.9%
NORWAY
27.9%
UNITED
1960 20.5%
26.1%
STATES
ITALY
23.9%
DENMARK
21.9%
GREECE
19.1%
TURKEY
14.5%
TOP SECRET
50a
B12
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
COMPARISON OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES &GNP. PER CAPITA
DEFENSE EXPENDITURES (FY. 1953 Data)
PER CAPITA GROSS
as % of G.N.P.
NATIONAL PRODUCT
UNITED STATES
CANADA
DENMARK
NORWAY
UNITED KINGDOM
BELGIUM - LUX
FRANCE
GERMANY
NATO AND GER.
NETHERLANDS
Defense Expenditure Per Capita
ITALY
Remaining G.N.P. Per Capita
GREECE
Defense Expenditures as a
TURKEY
Per cent of G.N.P.
PORTUGAL
Percent 15
10
5
0
250 500 750 1000 1250 1300 1750 2000 2250
TOP SECRET
50b
Per Cent
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
B13
15
us
UK
?
France
?
10
Av. Eur.
NATO
?
Belg-Lux
?
?
5
Italy
DEFENSE EXPENDITURES
as percentage of
Gross National Products
1950
'52
54
'56
'58
'60
50c.
TOP SECRET
Dwight
TOP SECRET
TAB
.0
SOL-TF/A-1
SEC. III
SECURITY INFORMATION
STATEMENT
normal capacity, there is any urgent economic argument for reducing the
total of federal taxes. We recognize it may be desirable to change from
one type of tax to another.
h. Task Force A, although given a general mission of advocacy
of NSC 153/1, does not advocate all the tax policies implied therein. It
recommends continuation of taxes at the present or higher levels. The
United States seems certainly to have the tax structure, debt situation,
and general fiscal capability to sustain any security load which seems
likely under the program of Task Force A.
i. There remains, however, the problem of the completion of the
military buildup and temporary "humps" in defense costs, such as might be
occasioned by a rapid expansion in continental defense. One possible way
of dealing with such a situation would be to accept, temporarily, deficit
financing. Special taxation should be considered in connection with the
financings of such "humps." Our Task Force was impressed by the fact that
clearly demarcated temporary defense taxes, defined for specific purposes,
such as continental defense, would serve the useful multiple purposes of
(1) impressing on citizens the need for a particular type of defense,
(2) emphasizing the citizen's responsibility in the defense of his country,
and (3) helping to balance the budget.
6. Public Will to Pay Taxes
a. The will of the people, as reflected through their elected
representatives, to bear the tax burden is the principal determinant of
the resources allocated to security over a sustained period -- unless our
- 51 -
TOP SECRET
SECLIDITY INFORLATION
Duight D
TAB
TOP SECRET
SOL-TF/A-1
LIBITED
SEC. III
SECURITY INFORMATION
country were to operate on a sustained unbalanced budget, a course which
we do not recommend. Taxes are the minor part of the defense burden for
many. Personal service, worry over sons away from home -- such intangibles
hurt more than taxes.
b. Our Task Force is cognizant of the existence of a concern that
continued high taxes will serve as a brake on expansion of production. This
is a point hard to prove either way although the economic indicators for
the last six years do not give a significant, if any, indication support-
ing the view.
c. The tax problem seems to us, in the context in which we are
required to consider it, to be primarily a political and psychological
problem. This makes it part of the problem of gaining public support for
an adequate program for security. The main problem becomes that of con-
vincing local leadership and the general public of the need to pay more
taxes in order to pay as we go. There have been some negative forces
affecting the public will to pay taxes and the will of Congress to enact
them. We offer the following suggestions as being consistent with this
report's overall approach that the U.S. should take a balanced and confi-
dent attitude in dealing with the security problem:
(1) Put the wastes and inefficiencies (there will always be
some) in their proper perspective, so that newspaper headlines about a
small sum will not create the impression that billions are being poured
down ratholes.
(2) Place more emphasis on positive statements about the
- 52 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Deight
TOP SECRET
THE
OF
SOL-TF/A-1
SEC. III
SECURITY INFORMATION
LIVE
general and increasing efficiency of our Government. The inefficiencies
should be sought out and eliminated ruthlessly. The public should be
informed of essential facts concerning the elimination of waste but such
facts should not be treated in a sensational way, since such treatment
reduces the public will to support security measures.
(3) Present the fact that each citizen, in deriving benefits
from the security of our way of life, has a responsibility to provide means
to the Government to do an adequate security job.
7. Evaluation of Economic Policy in NSC 153/1
a. Task Force A was given a mission of evaluation of current
policy. We believe that the economic aspect of security policy and the
need for a sound, healthy economy should be stressed continually. We do
question, however, that the policy expressed in NSC 153/1 is based on a
completely correct estimate of the true nature of the economic threat to
the U.S. way of life under the policy contained in that paper. As stated
previously, rather than the absolute cost of the sustained security pro-
gram constituting the threat, we feel that the much more likely dangers
lie in other areas. These other areas include the hazards inherent in a
recession (even though the economy remai ned basically sound, healthy, and
one of free enterprise), the d ependence of the in-between world on the U.S.
in economic matters, a possible growing executive unpreparedness for eco-
nomic mobilization, and the political-economic problem of adequate tax
legislation. We also question, as in the case of the military portion of
the policy in 153/1 that the statement of the economic portion is as well
- 53 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORNATION
Duight
TOP SECRET
OF
OF
SOL-TF/A-1
SECURITY INFORMATION
SEC. III
integrated with other parts of the security policy as it could be.
b. If the United States is to succeed in the deterrent aspect
of its security strategy, and Task Force A believes it can and will, the
economic (and also the military) portions of the security policy will both
be used primarily in support of the political aim of the policy. While
guidance for improved integration is hard to set down in words and harder
to indoctrinate throughout the huge administrative structure dealing with
these matters, it is worth trying. Task Force A recommends that the eco-
nomic portions of NSC 153/1 be restudied in light of the foregoing.
C. As part of our evaluation we should give some comparison with
the probable costs of the programs studied by the two other Task Forces in
the Task Group. Each Task Force has to allow for costs incident to the
particular risks of general war under its proposed course of action and,
in addition, must allow for costs to make the various aspects of its policy
effective short of war.
d. Task Force A considers that its course of action in the short
and mid-term is materially less costly than the other two courses. Task
Force B (which, stated oversimply, "draws a line" and issues an atomic
ultimatum) increases the risk of general war in the viewof our Task Force.
An increased cost, clearly apparent, lies in the necessity for having a
higher degree of readiness. Otherwise, the Soviet Union (and our allies)
probably would not consider the policy as meaningful, nor would the U.S.
people be willing to live, without a very high state of continental defense,
- 54 -
UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
Duight
THE
D.
SOL-TF/A-1
SECURITY INFORMATION
SEC. III
THE
under a policy by which our own Government might pull the trigger on the
Soviet atomic capability. As a sample of immediate increased readiness
required, U.S. forces in Germany would have to have increased allied (and
U.S.) support before any other nation would be likely to consider the
policy meaningful or, for that matter, the U.S. people would be likely
to support the policy.
e. As to Task Force C's policy, this would mean, in the opinion
of our Task Force, an increased risk of war and a materially increased
cost in the next few years. We are unable to reach a judgment on the
long term costs if the policy were successful.
f. If either of the policies B or C prove unsuccessful, the
United States may well be committed in the long term to exp enditures of a
magnitude which would threaten, through impact on our economy, the U.S.
way of life. It is always possible to shift from Policy A to either B or
C.
But once shifted, our country could not turn back easily, if at all,
and would be committed to the new course -- both more costly and more
hazardous.
g. When the values being hazarded are those of the U.S. way of
life, Task Force A considers that the lesser hazard should be chosen and
that the policy of NSC 153/1 is both the lesser hazard and less costly.
8. Conclusion
a. Task For ce A has not stated unoualifiedly that our country
should spend more on security although, at least in the short run, some
increase in currently programmed expenditures seems necessary to do the job
- 55 -
UNCI ASSIFIED
TOP SECRET
Dwight
TOP SECRET
THE LIGHTS OF
SOL-TF/A-1
SEC. III
SECURITY INFORMATION
envisaged in NSC 153/1 as developed by this Task Force. Any unqualified
statement would imply an accuracy of estimating which is beyond our capa-
bility. Our Task Force is convinced that the United States can spend more
than now contemplated, if necessary, and still maintain over an indefinite
sustained period a sound, healthy, free enterprise economy. The United
States can and should reduce the deficits in the annual budgets, should
not have a policy of operating continuously on an unbalanced budget, and
should achieve those objectives by paying more taxes as we go forward in
this age of danger. Task Force A has no fears, of the order of our
concern over the Soviet threat, for our sustained economic future under
the policy the Task Force advocates to the National Security Council.
b. Stated in one sentence: The United States can afford to
survive.
- 56 -
TOP SECRET
SECUNITY
TOP SECRET
SOL-TF/A-1
SECURITY INFORMATION
ANNEX I to
SEC III B
BASIC DATA UTILIZED IN ECONOMIC CHARTS
: National Sec:
: urity less
:
Foreign
:
Other
:
Total
:
Federal
: National
: Civilian
YEAR
:
GNP
:
For.
Aid
:
Aid
: Government
: Expenditures
:
Receipts
:
Debt
: Economy
:
$
:
$
:
%
:
$
:
%
:
: %
:
$
:
%
:
$
:
%
:
$
:
%
:
00
: %
1941
:
125.3
:
6.4
:
5.0
:
:
--
**
6.4
:
5.0
:
12.8
:
10.0
:
12.8
:
10.0
:
49.0
:
39.1
:
112.6
:
90.0
1942 : 159.6 : 26.0 : 16.3
:
:
:
6.7
:
4.2
:
32.7
:
20.5
:
12.8
:
8.0
:
72.4
:
45.4
:
130.9
:
79.3
1943 : 194.3 : 72.1 : 37.1
:
:
: 6.1 : 3.2 : 78.2 : 40.3 : 22.3 : 11.5 : 136.7 : 70.2 : 116.1 : 59.7
1944 : 210.6 : 87.0 : 41.3
:
:
: 6.7 : 3.2 : 93.7 : 44.5 : 44.1 : 20.9 : 201.0 : 95.5 : 116.9 : 55.5
1945 : 215.2 : 90.0 : 41.8
:
:
: 14.0 : 6.5 : 104.0 : 48.3 : 46.4 : 21.6 : 258.7 : 120.2 : 111.2 : 51.7
1946
:
211.1
:
45.0
:
21.3
:
1.0
:
.5
:
17.7
00
8.5
:
63.7
:
30.3
:
43.0
:
20.2
:
269.4
:
139.1
00
147.4
:
69.7
1947 : 233.3 in 14.7 : 6.4 : 2.2 : 1.0 : 25.6 : 10.9 : 42.5 : 18.3 : 40.2 : 17.2 : 258.3 : 121.3 : 190.8 : 81.7
1948 : 259.1 : 10.9 : 4.2 : 5.2 : 2.0 : 22.9 : 8.8 : 39.0 : 15.0 : 42.2 : 16.3 : 252.3 : 97.5 : 220.1 : 85.0
1949
:
258.2
:
11.9
:
4.6
:
5.6
:
2.2
:
22.6
:
8.6
:
40.1
:
15.4
:
38.2
:
14.8
:
252.8
:
98.9
:
218.1
:
84.6
:
1950 : 284.2 : 12.3 : 4.3 : 4.6 : 1.6 : 23.3 : 8.2 : 40.2 : 14.1 : 37.0 : 13.0 : 257.4 : 90.5 : 244.0 : 85.9 :
1951 : 329.2 : 20.5 : 6.2 : 4.5 : 1.4 : 19.6 : 5.8 : 44.6 : 13.4 : 48.1 : 14.6 : 255.2 : 77.6 : 284.6 : 86.6
1952
:
350.0
:
39.7
:
11.4
:
5.0
:
1.4
:
21.4
:
6.1
:
66.1
:
18.9
:
62.1
:
17.8
:
259.1
:
74.0
:
284.0
:
81.1
:
1953 : 363.0 : 44.4 : 12.2 : 5.8 : 1.6 : 24.4 : 6.7 : 74.6 : 20.5 : 65.2 : 18.0 : 268.5 : 74.0 : 288.4 : 79.5
1954
:
376.0
02
43.4
:
11.5
:
6.5
:
1.8
:
24.3
:
6.5
:
74.2
:
19.8
:
71.0
:
18.9
:
271.7
:
72.2
:
301.8
:
80.3
:
1955
:
390.0
:
40.0
:
10.3
:
6.3
:
1.6
:
24.2
:
6.2
:
70.5
:
18.1
:
70.5
:
18.1
:
271.7
:
69.7
:
319.5
:
81.9
:
1956 : 404.0 : 39.2 : 9.7 : 5.0 : 1.2 : 23.9 : 5.9 : 68.1 : 16.8 : 68.1 : 16.8 : 271.7 : 67.2 : 335.9 : 83.2
:
1957
:
418.0
:
36.4
:
8.7
:
3.0
:
.7
:
23.7
:
5.7
:
63.1
:
15.1
:
63.1
:
15.1
:
271.7
:
65.0
:
354.9
:
84.9
1958
:
433.0
:
35.4
:
8.2
:
3.0
:
.7
:
23.7
:
5.5
:
62.1
..
14.4
:
62.1
:
14.3
:
271.7
:
62.7
:
370.9
:
85.4
1959 : 448.0 : 35.4 : 7.9 : 3.0 : .7 : 23.7 : 5.3 : 62.1 : 13.9 : 62.1 : 13.9 : 271.7 : 60.6 : 385.9 : 86.0
1960 : 463.0 : 35.4 : 7.6 : 3.0 : .6 : 23.7 : 5.1 : 62.1 : 13.3 : 62.1 : 13.4 : 271.7 : 58.5 : 400.9 : 86.4
NOTES: 1. All dollar figures are in billions of dollars.
2. All percentages are % of gross national product.
3. The statistical abstract of the United States was used as the source
of G.N.P. data for years 1941 to 1951.
4. The G.N.P. projection for years 1952 to 1960 was based upon an annual increase
LIMITY
OHIO
of 3.6%. This factor is slightly lower than the actual percentage increase of
gross national product in constant dollars for the years 1946 to 1951.
5. Expenditure and receipt data were extracted from annual volumes of the Budget of the U.S.
Government for previous years and on informal advice of Bureau of the Budget for forward years.
I-1 (of ITI B)
TUP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION