Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
331916976
label
Report to the National Security Council by Project Solarium Task Force A - Part 5 of 7
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
331916976
contentType
document
title
Report to the National Security Council by Project Solarium Task Force A - Part 5 of 7
citationUrl
collections
Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Eisenhower Administration)
National Security Council Subject Files
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
331916976
levelOfDescription
item
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
849774f4ca8624b0
ocrText
TOP SECRET
Dwight
SOL-TF/A-1
SECURITY INFORMATION
SEC.III
Liarary The
C.
MAINTENANCE OF FREE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
1. The U.S. objectives considered as coming under this heading fall
into three categories: (a) the assurance of the vitality and soundness
of our own institutions; (b) the creation of adequate public understanding
and support for our policies with relation to Soviet power; and (c) the
provision of appropriate safeguards against subversion through methods
consistent with the maintenance of a vital and democratic society.
2. Task Force A does not feel itself competent to undertake an assess-
ment of the degree to which our American institutions may actually be
threatened by contemporary trends within American society, nor does it con-
sider that it would be useful for it to attempt to do SO. It must, however,
call attention to the fact that there is a considerable portion of our public,
and particularly of its most vocal elements, which feels that these institu-
tions are today being so threatened in one degree or another. The circum-
stances that have given rise to these apprehensions are ones that have been
widely publicized both in this country and abroad, particularly in Europe;
and they have conveyed to foreign opinion generally the impression that
American governmental processes and public life have fallen extensively
under the influence of psychological and political trends Europeans would
regard as totalitarian in nature. It is plain that in the case of a country
in our position, undertaking to establish a bid for leadership in the defense
of free institutions no more unfortunate impression could be created. It
is the view of Task Force A that the full significance of this development
- 57 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
The
Dwight
OF
SOL-TF/A-1
SECURITY INFORMATION
LIBITY
SEC.III
has not yet been generally appreciated by our government and public.
The Task Force considers that unless a fairly drastic reversal of this im-
pression can be achieved the long-term psychological consequences must be
expected to be extremely serious: so much so as to nullify a good portion
of whatever positive measures the U.S. Government may take to offset the
Soviet danger.
3. It is difficult to make specific suggestions in this field without
finding one's self in the middle of domestic-political controversies of the
moment. We can only recommend that all Departments and Agencies of the
Government be enjoined to bear in mind that there is a real problem here,
of correcting a most unfortunate impression that has been conveyed to other
countries concerning the present trend of American political life, and that
in all actions having important impacts on other countries, either by direct
impingement on their interests or indirectly through reports that receive
currency and publication abroad, every effort should be made not to do things
that would tend to give substance to this highly unfortunate view of American
developments but rather to attempt at every point to combat and offset it.
If this injunction is to have any practical effect, it means that a deliberate
effort must be made to avoid showing ourselves timid, bureaucratic,
inflexible, lacking in self confidence, distrustful of our own people,
unwilling to rely on the basic health and soundness of our own system. We
must rather contrive to appear to the outside world as the opposite of all
these things: as people who are mature, confident, alert to outside danger,
yet not torn with fears and doubts and suspicions about themselves, prepared
- 58 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
The
Dwight
9
SOL-TF/A-1
SEC. III
SECURITY INFORMATION
12/01/17
to show flexibility and common sense in all matters, and particularly those
of governmental administration, prepared in particular to show scrupulous
respect for the dignity and reputation of the individual citizen or visitor.
4. Admittedly, only a part of this can be done by the Government itself;
but the Government has, in our opinion, no excuse for not doing what it can
within the limits of its competence, nor should we be deterred from making a
maximum effort to develop this state of mind and posture in the United States
by the fact that because of the human emotions and weaknesses of our people
we cannot expect wholly to solve this problem. Any substantial improvement,
however, would be most worthwhile.
5. This raises immediately a second of these points: namely, the
provision of adequate security against subversion. It is very largely, if
not exclusively, in this field that the impressions have been created which
are undermining world confidence in our leadership in the struggle against
communist totalitarianism. The accent falls here on the measures taken by
the U.S. Government to assure security within the ranks of its own personnel
as well as in other areas within its competence, such as admission of aliens
to the country, control over movements of aliens within the country, control
of ports, handling of information and exchange programs, etc. The Task Force
recognizes that more is involved here than simply the will and power of
decision of the Executive Branch of the Government, and that the handling
of this problem is bound to be importantly affected by Congressional and
public opinion. We cannot ignore the fact, however, that to other countries
the impression has been conveyed that these present measures of security on
- 59 -
TOP SECRET
SECUDITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
our
Dwight D.
SOL-TF/A-1
SECURITY INFORMATION
SEC. III
LIBIRTY
the part of our Government are elaborate, ponderous and onerous in a degree
out of all proportion to the seriousness of the problem with which they have
to deal. It is difficult for people in other countries to understand how
measures so drastic, spectacular, and so out of accord with the general
practice of mature states with republican institutions, could be required in
a great country with a firm tradition of representative government and with
a healthy society, confident in itself and in its traditions. Particular
harm is done, here, by evidences of timidity, extremism, discourtesy and
harshness with relation to the handling of visa matters, and other matters
in which our governmental authorities come directly into contact with
individual foreign nationals.
6. While Task Force A has not had the opportunity to make any
systematic independent study of this problem, it shares the view that our
present system of security precautions is in many respects out of accord with
the actual dimensions of the danger it is designed to meet, and embraces a
number of elements antagonistic to the effective operation of the governmental
services. Acknowleding that it does not lie within the power of the Executive
Branch to correct these conditions immediately or entirely, the Task Force
nevertheless urges that everything possible should be done to correct them
insofar as they represent the products of executive policy; and that insofar
as they are attributable to pressures outside the Executive Branch of the
Government, every effort be made to bring home to public opinion the serious-
ness of the adverse effects which they are having on governmental morale and
on the prestige of this country abroad.
- 60 -
TOP SECRET
SECUDITV INFORNATION
TOP SECRET
SOL-TF/A-1
Duight
SECURITY INFORMATION
SEC. III
THE LIGHT 0.
7. This leads directly to the third of the elements of this objective
as indicated above: the cultivation of a vigorous and informed public
opinion in support of the measures taken by our Government to meet the
Coviet danger. Here the Task Force considers it important to make clear to
the public that what is immediately involved in this problem is not a
question of direct Soviet-American dealings over bilateral issues, affecting
only these two countries, but a question of the control of great areas that
lie between the Soviet Union and the United States: the problem, that is,
as to whether the peoples of these areas are to be governed by indigenous
governments playing an independent role on the international scene or whether
they are to fall within the orbit of Soviet power, to be governed by stooge
elements of one sort or another, and to have their human, economic, and
military resources exploited to the benefit of the Soviet leaders. One of
the vital determinants of this problem is the attitude of the peoples of these
"in between" areas with relation to our own country. It is their behavior
that must in the long run be the main determining factor in deciding their
own fate. But in the formulation of their behavior, a very important part
is played by their feelings about this country. If these feelings are ones
of respect and confidence -- confidence not so much in our willingness to do
them direct favors of one sort or another, but rather in our ability and
determination to carry on as an important and enlightened and reliable factor
in world affairs -- the entire tenor of the behavior of these peoples will be
different than it would be if they were to lose this sort of respect and
confidence in us. This does not mean that they need to be babied or catered
- 61 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORNATION
of
Dmight
a
SOL-TF/A-1
TOP SECRET
LIBITY
SEC. III
SECURITY INFORMATION
to, or overwhelmed by gifts and favors. But it does mean that our posture
toward them must be one of calmness and dignity and self assurance, combined
with a friendly and respectful interest in their problems and aspirations;
and that this posture must flow from the tone of public discussion within
this country as well as from the positions taken by the Government. The
world is extremely sensitive about us just at this time, and international
opinion can be greatly affected by things that seem to us to be very small
things indeed. It is important for Americans to understand that in these
circumstances there can be no place for capricious conduct, for irresponsible
slights and offenses to other people, for abrupt and erratic departures in
American policy, or for anything that creates outwardly the impression of
unreliability, eccentricity or lack of understanding for international
realities.
8. What is required, therefore, in the way of American cpinion in
support of our policies in the face of Soviet danger is not a greater per-
suasion of the American public as to the iniquities of the Soviet leadership
but a greater appreciation on our part of the maturity and the constructive
leadership the U.S. must put forward if its posture is to be adequate to the
requirements of leadership that rest upon it.
9. Conclusions
The Task Force recognizes that the requirements of our international
relations, precisely as defined in this report, come into conflict with the
deepseated views and habits of thought on the part of certain elements of the
American citizenry. Basically, the resulting problem is one of political
- 62 -
TOP SECRET
SECUDITY INFORMATION
Dwight
TOP SECRET
The
D.
SOL-TF/A-1
SEC. III
SECURITY INFORMATION
leadership, on which the Task Force does not feel itself qualified to make
suggestions. It does feel, however, that the following can and should be
done.
a. Full recognition should be given to the fact that a great many
features of our behavior which we are accustomed to think of as ones
essentially domestic in nature, and therefore not subject to modification in
the light of foreign reactions, actually have important repercussions on our
international position. This is particularly true of our methods of handling
internal security, of the laws and procedures governing immigration and
tariffs, etc.
b. To the extent that these conditions are not remediable by executive
action, they should be recognized as a real modification of our potential
accomplishment in the international field, and we should not delude ourselves
into believing that the adverse facts can be overcome by propaganda or
informational activity. Until there is greater respect in wide circles of
our public for outside opinion, particularly among our allies, and greater
readiness to accept the possibility that this opinion might even have reason-
able foundation, we should not deceive ourselves in thinking that the U.S.
can be "fully understood" by foreign peoples. This should be a reason for
restraint in pursuing lines of action that assume the collaboration of other
governments as a direct consequence of our leadership, rather than as an
expression of their own self interest.
c. To the extent that modifications in the practices of the Executive
Branch of the Government could serve to correct the impression being conveyed
- 63 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY
INFORNATION
Duight D
THE
TOP SECRET
SOL-TF/A-1
LIBIT
SEC. III
SECURITY INFORMATION
abroad that we are leaning toward fascist practices, such modifications should
be brought about. The Task Force considers that a small team of competent
persons with some personal experience of international affairs should be
established under the authority of the National Security Council with
instructions to examine all manifestations of activity within the Executive
Branch of the Government which affect this question and to see that these
are conducted with tact, common-sense, discrimination and humanity. This
pertains particularly to the administration of our internal security pro-
cedures in ways that are directly observed by foreigners, to the handling
of visa matters, to our control over movements of aliens, etc.# The survey
should be aimed at the achievement of greater felxibility, maturity, and
common sense in the handling of all these matters. The members of this
team would have to be persons enjoying the highest security clearance and
would have to be authorized to demand of and receive from the various
executive authorities all information requested in the conduct of their
inquiry.
d. In our approach to our own public opinion, we should be ex-
tremely careful how we treat the problem of the Soviet danger. We should
endeavor not to create moods of panic or depression among the population
*An excellent example of the sort of thing that needs correction is the
recent reported move by our immigration authorities to deport the Russian
wife of one of our former officers in Moscow (Mrs. Richardson) on grounds
that she was once a member of a communist youth group, and to do this
precisely at the moment when the Soviet Government is finally, after
long pressures from us, showing sufficient liberality to release from the
U.S.S.R. other Russian wives in precisely the same position.
- 64 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
The
Deighto
SOL-TF/A-1
SECURITY INFORMATION
Library
SEC. III
by frightening them with the spector of a push-button atomic war, but should
rather portray the civil defense program to the public as a reasonable and
prudent but serious measure of national preparedness, essential as one of
the deterrents to precisely the thing we do not wish to have happen. The
public should be encouraged to feel that if it goes along confidently with
the general and civil defense programs, placing their confidence in the
executive in those matters in which they cannot hope to be fully informed,
and being given access to the maximum amount of information that can pro-
perly be made available to them, there is no cause for a preoccupation with
military dangers to the detriment of a positive and hopeful participation
in the normal interests and pursuits of American society; but that the de-
fense programs, based on a sober recognition of the realities of weapons
development and of our international position are absolutely essential to
the preservation of a situation in which we can have this confidence. It
should be stressed that this condition is not going to change with any
foreseeable fluctuations in the international situation and should not be
expected to be affected by such things as the outcome of the Korean war or
the immediate progress of discussion and negotiation with the Soviet Govern-
ment.
e. On the other hand, every effort should be made to convey to the
public that our security can be as dangerously threatened by deterioration
in our prestige abroad as by the direct growth of Soviet military capabilities,
and that this is a field in which the behavior of all Americans plays a part,
and particularly of those who bear any responsibility for the forming of public
- 65 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY
TOP SECRET
SOL-TF/A-1
SEC. III
SECURITY INFORMATION
THE Deight D 1
opinion. It should be emphasized that what is required is not flattery or
hypocrisy with respe ct to other governments and peoples, or even agreement
with their attitudes, but only that these attitudes be considered and dealt
with reasonably and on their merits and that the discussion of international
problems be conducted in a restrained and moderate manner.
- 66 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
THE Doight D.
SOL-TT/A-1
SECURITY INFORMATION
S ,C. III
III.
D. STRENGTHENING THE FREE WORLD
D1. GENERAL
1. Success in strengthening the Free World is of especially great
significance in the case of the national policy supported by Task Force A:
This is true because there is much less of the element of unilateral U.S.
action in our courses of action than in the suggestions being made by other
Task Forces. Our case rests in large part on the proposition that the Free
World can construct a system far superior in every respect to that of our
enemies. We believe if this is done while we at the same time maintain the
necessary alert posture of military strength, the battle will be won because
the pressures and examples from the Free World, acting on spiritual and ma-
terial weaknesses of the totalitarian system, will progressively cause that
system to deteriorate - both absolutely and relatively to ours.
2. In building strength, we must give attention to all its major com-
ponents - spiritual, political, military and economic. President Eisenhower,
when he was in command at SHAPE, put this point with great effect when he
described strength as the product - not the sum of these factors - so that,
if any one of the factors falls to zero, the product becomes zero.
3. At the outset, we should like to emphasize the vast preponderance
of resources, spiritual, human and natural, possessed by the Free World
over the Soviet Bloc.
- 67 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Duighto
TOP SECRET
THE
SOL-TF/A-1
SEC. III
SECURITY INFORMATION
Limited
Far too small a proportion of these resources, however, is brought to bear
as bulwarks against Soviet-Communist designs because of insufficient cohesion
and purpose within the Free World.
4. We have the potential, spiritual and moral strength inherent in a
system which gives free play to the initiative and resourcefulness of free
men. Opposed to us is a slave state with repression and fear constituting
the mainsprings of action. Our system should have a resiliency and enduring
strength which no totalitarian system could match, whatever its achievements
obtained by ruthless organization, dictation and tighter control exercised
by its authorities.
5. On the physical side, the following table shows the superiority of
the Free World:
Percent of Total World Production
U.S.
Rest of Free World
Soviet Bloc
Steel
44%
36%
20%
Coal
28%
38%
34%
Crude Petroleum
51%
41%
8%
Primary Aluminum
42%
45%
13%
Electric Power
41%
43%
16%
Merchant Vessels
31%
66%
3%
On any basis of comparison our fundamental superiority is overwhelming. The
fact that this potential exists, but is less effective than it could be due
to divisive forces which exist today, should be more generally taken into
account in forming our policies and should be emphasized much more in our
public information programs both here and abroad. We have every reason to
be confident of our strength if we accept the challenge of the need to make
that strength fully effective.
- 68 -
TOP SECRET
SECUDITY INFORNATION
TOP SECRET
DII 11
SECURITY INFORMATION
THE SOVIET
THE FREE WORLD
COMMUNIST BLOC
% OF
WORLD
% OF WORLD
STEEL &
POPULATION
ENERGY
50
100
40
80
30
60
ERRORS IN THIS CHART ARE BEING CORRECTED.
20
40
CO RRE CTED CORRECTED COPY WILL BE FO ORWARDED,
10
20
USA
FREE EUROPE
REST OF
USSR
SATELLITES
CHINA
FREE WORLD
PER CAPITA GNP
POPULATION
XXX
ENERGY
STEEL
(in units of $250
PRODUCTION
PRODUCTION
U.S. dollar equiv.)
68a
TOP SECRET
Dwight
TOP SECRET
our
OF
SOL-TF/A-1
SEC. III
SECURITY INFORMATION
LIMITED
6. Task Force A recommends that our objective of strengthening the
Free World be achieved through the following four main courses of actions:
a.
A strong drive to develop a greater sense of common purpose
and mutual interest with countries outside the Soviet Orbit.
b.
A more selective approach to building strength in the Far
East and the Middle East.
c.
A vigorous attack on the most troublesome situations which
are blocking progress to strength in the Free World.
d. A continuation of our foreign aid programs.
7. Some of our suggestions for developing these courses are of world-
wide application. These we cover in this section of the report. In the
geographic sections which follow this general section, we will deal with
our proposals concerning specific areas and countries.
8. The first of these four courses - developing a greater sense of
common purpose and mutual interest with countries outside the Soviet Orbit -
requires a deeper understanding and wise and consistent action in support
of long-range constructive policies which will commend our leadership to
the rest of the Free World. We should try to show by our attitudes and
actions that we are sensible, strong and resolute, and that we are confident
of the ability of the Free World to cope with the Soviet threat. In pursu-
ing this course, Task Force A recommends as especially important specific
policies:
a. That we repose an increasing degree of responsibility on our
NATO allies to determine what they are prepared to do for their own defense.
- 69 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
SOL-TF/A-1
Duight
SECURITY INFORMATION
the
0.
SEC. III
LIBIRTY
This point is more fully covered in the section on Europe.
b. That we accept the fact that many nations outside the Soviet
Orbit are so preoccupied with their own pressing problems, or so fearful at
the moment, that they are presently unwilling to stand up and be counted
on either side in the struggle in which we are engaged. Further elaboration
of this suggestion is contained in the section on the Far East and the Near
East.
c. That we attempt to develop plans to speed up economic expansion
in the Free World. Hope for progress in achieving increased production
and economic activity and better standards of living can have a powerful ef-
fect in building morale and confidence and a sense of common purpose among
peoples. The fact of progress along these lines can constitute a convincing
proof of the speciousness of Communist claims and propaganda. Such plans
should not envisage the U.S. giving increased quantities of grant economic
aid, but rather giving increased attention and emphasis to policies and
actions in our country and in other countries which will reduce economic
nationalism, encourage private initiative and increase trade and production
throughout the Free World.
9. In seeking to promote economic expansion, the following present
programs, in addition to those more fully discussed below, should be pressed
forward vigorously:
a. Trade liberalization in Western Europe designed to increase the
size of markets and to promote the growth of competitive forces and thus to
develop increased production at lower prices.
- 70 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY
TOP SECRET
Dwight
OHL
9
SOL-TF/A-1
SEC. III
SECURITY INFORMATION
STRIBTI
b. Offshore procurement of military end items -- both for the
effect in meeting balance of payments requirements of our allies and in
building a production and mobilization base.
c. Interchange of technical know-how and promotion of use of
improved methods of production in all regions.
d. Stimulation of American private investment in foreign countries.
e. Maximum use of the International Bank and the Export-Import
Bank where these institutions can provide needed capital.
Underdeveloped Areas
10. Task Force A feels that real possibilities for speeding up and
dramatizing Free World economic development may be found in stimulating nations
to make better use of their combined resources to their mutual advantage.
Some comment and observations concerning the underdeveloped areas will prove
useful at this point.
11. There is no precise definition of the term "underdeveloped area"
but it is generally accepted as meaning those lands, either technically sov-
ereign or colonial, where per capita income is very near the bare subsistence
level, illiteracy is widespread, sanitation primitive, and mechanization and
the use of modern techniques is rare. The underdeveloped areas, so defined,
cover one half of the world's land area and include almost two thirds of the
world's population outside the Communist area.
12. The populations of the underdeveloped areas have in the last few
decades been exposed to new and startling ideas as to the material and politi-
cal advances achieved by more developed nations, and this exposure has created
- 71 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
The
Dwight
E
SOL-TF/A-1
SECURITY INFORMATION
Library
SEC. III
widespread dissatisfaction with the status quo. The resulting so-called
world-wide "sociological revolution" has become a dynamic force in the world.
The Soviet-Communist leaders were quick to realize the potentials of this
vast dissatisfaction and have consistently exploited it to their ends. Many
of the industrialized nations of the world, particularly the European ones,
while recognizing it, have almost as consistently opposed it and have only
reluctantly bowed to its strength. This attitude might be justified in terms
of current factors of real power were it not for the increasing dependence of
the highly industrialized nations on expanding markets to abosrb the fruits of
and to support the increases in their production.
13. Thus the industrialized free nations have a real interest in the
underdeveloped areas for two reasons: (1) their possible subversion and
capture by the hostile Soviet-Communist Bloc, and (2) their potential, even
though perhaps distant in time in some cases, to become great markets to sus-
tain the continued progress of the industrialized nations.
14. In the underdeveloped areas many factors conflict with the Western
interests. The political forms in nearly all of these lands have been in
some way feudal in character. The sociological revolution is sweeping away
these time-honored forms with a speed which has not permitted stable alterna-
tive forms to be evolved. Herein lies one of the major, if specious, attrac-
tions of Soviet-Communist propaganda -- the myth of the beneficial results of
Communist economic direction and organization. The breakdown of old estab-
lished order has coincided with a wave of passionate nationalism in certain
- 72 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Dwight
TOP SECRET
OHL
SOL-TF/A-1
SEC. III
SECURITY INFORMATION
LIBIRTY
countries, focused in an antipathy and suspicion of the Western World -- a
heritage of previous centuries of much publicized imperialism and exploita-
tion by the colonial powers. Furthermore, the religions and philosophies of
most of these areas place small value on the individual, and thus provide
little basis for the development of common interests with the West. Also
important is the inexperience, incompetency and even venality in the govern-
ments of these areas, and the almost total lack of the concept of civic or
public service.
15. In the face of such obstacles to the improvement of either political
or economic relationships between the West and these areas, it is easy to
accept the idea that little or nothing can deliberately be done by the U.S.
to further our own and Western interests in the underdeveloped lands.
Certainly it would be unwise either to expect rapid results or to invest any
substantial amount of our resources in trying to force results.
16. There is, however, an opportunity to achieve substantial results,
over a period of time, if we can make proper use of the fact that there is
already, by the nature of things, a great degree of interdependence between
the industrialized and the underdeveloped countries. In 1952, 57% of the
imports of the U.S. came from these countries and 46% of our exports went to
them. In the case of Western European countries, this interdependence is of
even greater scope. In 1952 Western Europe obtained 59% of its imports and
sold 71% of its exports in trade with the underdeveloped areas.
17. Many scattered efforts have been and are being made along the lines
of stimulating healthy development and expansion in the underdeveloped areas.
- 73 -
TOP SECRET
SECUDITV INFORNATION
D/2
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN
INDUSTRIALIZED AND UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS
46% OF OF EXPORTS OF U.S.
57% OF OF U.S. IMPORTS
71% OF OF WEST.
59% OF NATIONS WEST. EUR.
OF IMPORTS
TOP SECRET
720
19.
Duight D.
TOP SECRET
SOL-TF/A-1
SECURITY INFORMATION
SEC. III
There are such things as the programs of European countries to promote develop-
ment in their overseas territories, our own technical assistance, basic
materials development, and overseas territories programs, the Colombo Plan,
etc. There have been some useful studies and proposals attacking the problem,
such as the Report entitled "Economic Strength for the Free World" made to
the Director for Mutual Security by his Advisory Committee on Underdeveloped
Areas. What is needed now is a pulling together of these programs and con-
cepts into a well-organized, coordinated effort which will appeal to the
imagination of the countries of the Free World and induce lending agencies
and investors to increase their interest and participation in this field.
The challenge of developing such a program and enlisting the participation
of other nations needs to be accepted by the U.S.
18. The main goals of such a program would be:
a. To establish mutual recognition in and among the industrialized
and the underdeveloped nations of the Free World that their economic progress
and political stability are becoming increasingly dependent on the develop-
ment, to the mutual advantage of both areas, of the markets and the increased
production of basic materials necessary to support expanding trade and invest-
ment.
b. To create a political, psychological and sociological community
of purpose between the industrialized and underdeveloped nations, based on
the recognition of economic interdependence, which will permit substantial
increase in the effective investment of capital and know-how by advanced
communities in the underdeveloped nations.
- 74 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
ONLY
Duight
9
SOL-TF/A-1
SECURITY INFORMATION
SEC. III
FIRTH
19. In the short time available, Task Force A has not been able, nor
do we have the competence, to outline such a program in detail. However, we
do suggest that the U.S., in dealing with these problems, express and adhere
to the following principles in all contacts with industrialized and under-
developed areas:
a. That the provision of funds for development is primarily a matter
of internal organization and finance and only secondarily one for outside
assistance.
b. That capital and know-how from industrial nations, especially
from private sources therein, will become available in direct proportion to
the responsibility and genuine interest evidenced by the governments and
private interests of the recipient nation.
C. That selfish exploitation of the resources and skills of under-
developed areas is neither politicall feasible nor desirable, but the mutual
benefits which can accrue to the investors and to the areas being developed
make such enterprise worth while.
d. That substantial amounts of the proceeds of investment and
increased production should become available to the local populations on a
broad base in order to provide increased purchasing power and thus to develop
markets.
e. That the U.S. would favor the development of indigenous light
industries and, in due course, heavy industry where it is clearly economically
advantageous.
- 75 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
Dwight
TEE
OF
SOL-TF/A-1
SECURITY INFORMATION
LIBITED
SEC. III
f. That the U.S. is, in international and governmental programs of
development, willing to work through international agencies and to support
its due share of the costs of recruiting technical experts from any and all
sources -- not solely from the U.S.
20. Increased trade, larger quantities of needed raw materials, and wider
markets would follow a successful program of this nature. Stronger bonds of
interest and friendship would develop between the industrial and underdevel-
oped countries. In this way also lies one of the practical means of dealing
with the antagonisms which have grown out of old colonial relationships.
East-West Trade
21. We also recommend that we review and revise our East-West trade
policies. It is, of course, essential to prevent, as far as possible, the
provision of arms and war materials and other items of real strategic impor-
tance to the Soviet Bloc. Relaxation of our pressure to prevent trade in all
except such items would have a profound psychological effect on our partners
in the Free World and contribute in some degree to their economic expansion
and well-being. We do not advocate, however, any relaxation in respect to
Communist China while the hostilities in Korea and Indo-China are continuing.
22. This question has recently been the subject of an NSC study --
NSC 152. We recommend that substantially the course outlined in Alternative 4
of that paper, except as to the policy to be applied to Communist China, be
adopted as U.S. policy. This course, in effect, would limit controls to a
relatively small list of items which have major strategic significance to the
strength of the Soviet Bloc.
- 76 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
SOL-TF/A-1
SECURITY INFORMATION
THE
Dwight D.
SEC. III
23. The advantages of this course would be many. Among the most impor-
tant of these are:
a. The goods imported by our Allies from the Soviet Bloc -- notably
grain, timber and coal - are needed in the West. If not obtained, as has
been traditional, from Eastern Europe, at least until satisfactory non-dollar
alternative sources can be developed, they must be supplied from the dollar
area, and thus increase the problem of the dollar deficits of our allies.
This, in turn, would, in many cases, require larger grants of economic aid
from the U.S. unless we were prepared to see a substantial fall in consumption
and living standards in Western Europe.
b. Markets for many non-strategic items are favorable in the bloc
countries. Thus important possibilities exist for increased production and
economic activity in the West through supplying these markets.
c. The effectiveness of controls would be greatly increased both
because our allies would be convinced that those remaining were vitally neces-
sary and because it would be possible to police the controls of the fewer
number of items much more closely.
d. Major propaganda advantages could be gained by the West by relax-
ation of East-West trade controls.
(1) A most serious source of friction with our allies could be
removed. A more relaxed and confident attitude on our part in this respect
would have a major effect on our influence and leadership.
(2) We should be able to demonstrate the falseness of Soviet
propaganda which claims the U.S. is dictating in this field to our allies
- 77 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Dwight
THE
a
TOP SECRET
SOL-TF/A-1
SECURITY INFORMATION
LISTRICT
SEC. III
and is responsible for an iron curtain of its own on trade.
(3) The Soviet Union has been claiming that vast trade oppor-
tunities would open up if we did not restrict East-West trade so severely
and has been painting glowing pictures of the profits and economic well-being
which would develop in the West if trade were freed. There is serious questior
that the bloc could continuously supply much more in the way of goods desired
by the West than they are now doing. Here is an opportunity to call the
Russians' bluff on trade.
24. While we are putting this policy into effect, we should stimulate in
every feasible way the development of production, in the non-dollar area, of
supplies which are now obtained from the bloc, since it is desirable, in spite
of the considerations advanced above, to reduce dependence on trade with the
Russian Bloc countries. Alternative sources of markets and raw materials are
important, especially if the present tension should be long continued or war
should develop. In this connection, programs of development in the under-
developed areas assume increasing importance.
25. Support for this policy of relaxation of East-West trade controls
in the United States will not be easy to obtain. There are vast misunder-
standings and prejudices on this subject, both among the public and in
Congress. A major educational campaign would have to be undertaken before
the necessary understanding and support would be forthcoming. Changes in
legislation -- the Battle Act -- would also be required before the recommended
policy could be put into effect.
26. We further recommend that we make a major effort to reduce barriers
- 78 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
OHL
Deight D.
SOL-TF/A-1
SECURITY INFORMATION
SEC. III
LIMITY
to imports into the U.S. We recognize that this is already an important
element in the program of this Administration, and wish merely to stress its
significance from the point of view of our assigned task. Probably no other
single action we could take would have a greater effect in establishing the
climate of economic confidence throughout the non-Soviet world. The psycho-
logical impact would probably far transcend the actual effect on balance of
payments deficits. It would be a practical demonstration of our ability and
willingness to assume constructive leadership.
27. As is well known to those who are informed on this question, fears
as to what increased imports into the U.S. might do to business volume and
employment have been greatly exaggerated. The Bell Report estimated that the
substantial reduction in tariffs and the simplification of Customs Procedures
recommended in that report would involve an increase of total imports, after
an interval of 3 to 5 years, of about $700 million to $1 billion a year, or
about 1/4 of 1 percent of our national production. Of this, it was estimated
between $500 and $700 million a year would be manufactured products -- a small
fraction of 1 percent of the value of the total output of manufactures in this
country. Such an increase, it was stated, would amount to the output of
60,000 to 90,000 workers, but it was estimated that at most 45,000 would be
likely to have to transfer to other jobs over the 3-5 year period. This
number is less than 1 out of every 1000 gainfully employed in the United State
28. Liberalization of barriers to imports into the U.S. can make a con-
siderable contribution to lessening dependence of other countries on the
Soviet Bloc, since many of the goods now obtained from the Bloc can be supplie
- 79 -
TOP SECRET
SECUDITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
OFF
Duight
SOL-TF/A-1
SECURITY INFORMATION
LIBITY
SEC. III
by the U.S. or other parts of the dollar area. The bar to increased use of
the U.S. as the source is lack of dollars, which could be earned through
sales to the U.S.
29. The second main course which we advocate for strengthening the Free
World is that of adopting a more selective approach to building strength in
the Far East and the Middle East. Many of the countries in these areas do
not possess, at the moment, the ingredients upon which strength can be built.
A few others do possess the necessary potential. We should concentrate on
making the most of the potentialities in such countries. By this means, we
would build up centers of power which will attract and keep on our side the
weaker countries, thus avoiding the undesirable and potentially dangerous sit-
uation of having to rely almost exclusively on U.S. power, rather than on the
power of nations in the area concerned. This is not to say that we should
overlook the possibilities of contributing gradually to the stability and
strength of the weaker countries themselves, but it will take time to accom-
plish this. Our specific suggestions on this score appear in the geographic
sections which follow.
30. The third main course is that of vigorously attacking certain major
specific problems which are blocking progress to strength in the Free World.
These also are dealt with in the geographic sections which follow.
31. The fourth main course we advocate is continuation of our foreign
aid programs. These programs have been, and will continue to be necessary for
the building of political stability, economic progress and military strength
in the Free World. For an expenditure which comes to about 1/1/2% of our Gross
- 80 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
Dwight D
THE
SOL-TF/A-1
SECURITY INFORMATION
SEC. III
Lights
National Product and about 7% of our total Federal Budget we are obtaining
returns in Free World strength which we cannot afford to forego. The great
bulk of our aid has come to consist of military and defense support assist-
ance. This should continue to be the case. Nevertheless, the relatively
moderate amounts of economic and technical assistance in our aid programs
are of great importance and should be carried on.
32. Certain clarifications in our military aid policies are suggested.
Our aid should continue to be given to certain countries to help create sub-
stantial military strength to deter and, if necessary, effectively oppose
armed Soviet aggression. The NATO countries in Europe, and Japan, Korea and
Indo-China in the Far East are examples of such countries. In the neutralist
countries, primarily in Asia and the Mid-East, the creation of such indigen-
ous strength seems neither likely nor desirable. Here our military aid
objectives need to be carefully considered, country by country, and such
assistance should be designed to do no more than to build internal security
forces capable of maintaining order and suppressing internal Communist sub-
version.
33. Our aid plans need to include substantial amounts for the maintenance
and replacement of American military equipment given other free nations. In
the present economic situation of our allies, it seems likely that a number of
them will not be able to pay for these items, at least for some years to come.
34. These recommendations for increasing the strength of other countries
in the Free World do not, in the view of Task Force A, involve increased
costs for the United States. Aid programs at about the present level of
- 81 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
SOL-TF/A-1
SECURITY INFORMATION
THE LIMITED Dwight 19 .
SEC. III
dollar authorizations, and decreasing in future years as we succeed in stimu-
lating economic expansion, increased confidence and more effective use of
resources, should be adequate for achieving our objectives. The cumulative
effect of well-coordinated action on all of these interrelated fronts would,
we believe, have a profound effect on the climate of confidence in our world
and on stimulating action to marshal the elements of strength which we pos-
sess.
- 82 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORNATION