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Report to the National Security Council by Project Solarium Task Force B - Part 2 of 5
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Report to the National Security Council by Project Solarium Task Force B - Part 2 of 5
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A C LIMITY OH!
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PART TWO
SEC. I
PART TWO - TASK FORCE STUDY
I - THE SITUATION WHICH THE UNITED STATES
AND THE FREE WORLD MUST MEET
1. Task Force "B" did not consider it necessary to include in
this report a discussion or interpretation of the nature of international
Communism and the aims and objectives of the Soviet Union. It wishes to
state its conclusion, however, that the United States must accept as fact
that the nations of the Free World are confronted with a Soviet-Communist
philosophy and program of conquest which if unchecked will result in the
loss of their independence and the destruction of their free institutions.
After being confined to the Soviet Union for more than twenty years the
Soviet leadership gained its first major opportunity for Communist expan-
sion with World War II, and it exploited this opportunity with signal
success in Eastern Europe and the Far East. It is probable that the
Kremlin had high hopes that expansion could be carried further - hopes
which came close to realization in France, Italy, and Greece at a time
when the Free World had almost completely demobilized and was licking
its wounds of World War II. Perhaps the only deterrent to a more for-
cible attempt to expand was the possession of the atomic bomb by the
United States, later supplemented by a growing firmness in United States
policy marked by such measures as the Marshall Plan and NATO.
2. Despite these deterrents Soviet-Communist pressures have
actively persisted, probing each weak spot in turn and achieving their
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greatest success with the attachment of China to the Soviet Bloc. Other
efforts to expand - Iran, Greece, Berlin, Indo-China, Korea - have all
been halted or impeded in one way or another by counter-action of the
Free World under U.S. leadership.
3. In its efforts to contain Communist expansion the United
States, which can alone give ultimate strength and hope to the Free World,
has thus far reacted to Soviet pressures and aggressions as they have
appeared at one point or another on the Free World periphery. This policy
has not been entirely successful. It has inherent limitations which make
it less likely to succeed in the future. Not knowing where Soviet Bloc
pressures may appear, the United States must be prepared to meet them
everywhere. It may be compelled to engage in a series of "police actions."
This strategy, if continued, may be beyond the economic capabilities of
the United States, will deprive this nation of the initiative, and will
certainly divert the American people from the task of making the best
possible use of their power and resources to be prepared to inflict de-
cisive defeat on the Soviet Union if it imperils the vital security of
this nation by continuing an active policy of expansion.
4. Task Force "B" assumes that the American and Soviet power-
centers are approaching an age of atomic plenty when each will have the
means to destroy almost completely the war-making capacity of the other
despite any known or foreseeable defenses and regardless of which side
has the advantage of surprise. This point may be reached in ten years'
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time. In any event, the U.S. stockpile of atomic weapons will grow to such
enormous proportions in the next few years that the critical military factor
will become not their number but the capability for their employment. There
is every reason to believe that the Soviet program will not lag far behind,
five to ten years at the outside.
5. This overriding factor confronts the Free World with two
major alternatives: either a preventive war while the United States has
a wide lead in the development and production of atomic weapons and their
means of delivery, or the adoption of a policy that will do most to
ensure the longest possible period of peace in which changes in the world
situation and balance of forces, which must inevitably occur, may redound
to the advantage of the Free World. However, since preventive war for a
variety of reasons is rejected by the Free World, Task Force "B" has de-
voted its principal efforts to seeking a policy that offers the longest
possible period of peace, in which efforts must be made to retain our
lead in new weapons and strengthen our relative power position - a policy
which will best utilize available resources, promote Free World strength
and unity, and capitalize on Soviet weaknesses. Even if it could not
solve the problem of the growing Soviet atomic stockpile, such a policy
if successful would tend to minimize this danger and at the very least
would preserve our strength and our freedom up to the time when, with
both power centers in the age of atomic plenty, the threat of universal
devastation may prove to be the only effective deterrent to war.
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6. To these ends Task Force "B" recommends the policy set out
below.
II - RECOMMENDED NATIONAL POLICY
A. STATEMENT OF THE POLICY (HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS
ALTERNATIVE "B").
1. That any advance of Soviet Bloc military forces beyond the
present borders of the Soviet Bloc be considered by the United States as
initiating general war in which the full power of the United States will
be used as necessary to bring about the defeat of the U.S.S.R. and the
dissolution of the Soviet Bloc.
2. That the United States make known publicly in an appropriate
and unmistakable way that it has established and is determined to carry
out this policy.
3. That the United States reserve freedom of action, in the event
of seizure of power by indigenous Communist forces in countries beyond the
borders of the Soviet Bloc, to take all measures necessary to re-establish
a situation compatible with the security interests of the United States and
its allies.
B. CLARIFICATION OF THE POLICY.
1. This policy is essentially a device to deter Soviet aggres-
sion and safeguard the security of the United States over an extended
period. It is proposed as a support, rather than as a substitute, for
existing policies, many of which Task Force "B" would expect to see con-
tinued; its acceptance is quite consistent with acceptance of most of the
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proposals of Task Force "A" or "C". It is intended to provide a firmer
basis for national efforts in such fields as diplomacy and the maintenance
of the military establishment. It will not solve specific problems such
as Iran or Germany but should establish a posture of strength and leader-
ship enabling the United States to deal with them more successfully.
2. In effect the proposed policy draws a line around the present
limits of the Soviet Bloc and announces that any Soviet or satellite mili-
tary advance beyond that line would result in general war. It further in-
forms the Kremlin that in such a war the full power of the United States,
including its atomic power, will be used. Under existing alliances and
national policy it is likely that the United States would be prepared to
engage in war in the event of aggression against almost any country on
the borders of the Soviet Bloc (See Appendix A). Alternative "B" adds to
and makes more rigid existing commitments in that (a) it covers countries
with respect to which no policy decision has been taken (e.g., Finland,
Afghanistan), (b) it makes a public commitment with respect to countries
regarded as of great importance to U.S. security but to which there are
no alliance obligations, and (c) it fortifies existing alliances by adding
the specific statement of intention to invoke general war in case of an
attack.
3. The "general war" envisaged is one in which the United States,
assisted by those allies it might have at the time, would apply its full
power - whenever, however, and wherever necessary - to defeat the main
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enemy and to achieve its other war objectives. It does not mean that all
reliance would be placed on an immediate strategic atomic attack. The
military strategy would depend on the war plans and circumstances existing
at the time.
4. Alternative "B" is, in the final analysis, a unilateral
policy, although every effort would of course be made to enlist the
sympathy and support of other nations. This follows from the wording of
the directive to this Task Force: to establish a line around the Soviet
Bloc "beyond which the United States will not permit Soviet or satellite
military forces to advance without general war." To make it multilateral
now or in the foreseeable future would be, indeed, impossible. That it
must be unilateral does not invalidate it, as the United States, like any
other nation, reserves the right to take any action it considers vital to
its security.
5. The main purpose of Alternative "B", however, is to prevent
general war, and Task Force "B" believes that it will have that effect.
Yet the policy cannot be based on bluff. The United States must be pre-
pared to make good the commitment to use its full military power in the
eventuality, however unlikely, that Soviet aggression should take place.
Such deliberate aggression, in the face of a clear U.S. warning, would
indicate the willingness and intention of the Soviet leaders to engage in
general war in pursuit of their aims. Such a policy and line of action on
the part of the Soviet leadership would face the United States with a
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choice of fighting or retreating, regardless of whether the United States
had adopted Alternative "B" or any other policy.
6. It is understood that the United States would take the deci-
sion to apply the ultimate sanction of general war only on the basis of the
most careful and serious consideration of the facts of the particular case
and not whimsically or lightly. It would have to be clear that the advance
of Soviet Bloc military forces was no trifling border incident of the sort
that has occurred many times in the past and presumably will occur in the
future, but an armed attack that would be recognized as such by the President,
the Congress and the people of the United States.
7. Task Force "B", in deciding upon the substance of its proposal,
considered several alternative locations for the proposed line but came to
the conclusion that only if drawn along the present borders of the Soviet
Bloc would it meet the security objectives of the United States. Only this
line would give promise of preventing Soviet aggression and checking the
fears, uncertainties and dispersion of effort which have marked the Free
World's efforts to defend itself.
C. REJECTED ALTERNATIVE LINES
In In: accordance with its instructions Task Force "B" considered
a line which would exclude certain countries not now in the Soviet Bloc, on
grounds that such countries, because they were traditionally neutral or
fearful of the Soviet reaction, did not want any American "gyarantee" and
might publicly reject it, or that they were not of sufficient strategic
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importance to the United States. Recognizing that there are good reasons
against announcing specific guarantees to such countries as Sweden, Afghan-
istan, India and others, Task Force "B" nevertheless felt it necessary to
reject the concept of a group of "in-between" countries lying beyond the
line which could not be crossed by Soviet Bloc armed forces without general
war. In its view the United States must take its stand in principle against
any aggression and in practice against any further expansion of Soviet-Com-
munist power. To leave any Free World countries beyond the line would be to
invite Soviet aggression against them. By including them all the United
States can make the policy more accept able to all. To do otherwise would
be to invite endless and dangerous speculation why some were included and
some were not, to engender ill-will and to promote disunity. No other line
would have the same moral foundation, the same value as a deterrent, or the
same chance to endure.
2.0 Task Force "B" also explored the possibility of drawing a line
to include only the "minimum" areas necessary to U.S. security. It rejected
this concept, both in its narrower "Fortress America" form and its broader
version including key base areas overseas such as Britain and Japan. Such
a line, which would in effect be a line of withdrawal, would differ funda-
mentally and not merely in degree from our proposed line along the present
Iron Curtain and indeed comes close to being ruled out by the directives to
this Task Force, which excluded "a course which would, as a deliberate choice,
rely solely upon the economic and military strength of the United States."
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Furthermore, the idea of drawing a line only around the "minimum" territory
essential to American security, regardless of existing commitments and past
associations, is in the view of Task Force "B" unrealistic, both from the
political and the military standpoint.
3. Task Force "B" attaches the utmost importance to having strong
Allies, particularly if general war does take place. The United States must
strive to maximize the strength and resources of the Free World and to deny
them to the enemy. This would be manifestly impossible if the U.S. Govern-
ment should deliberately write off these countries, whether presently formal-
ly allied with the United States or not, by drawing a "minimum" line.
4. U.S. strategic interests, moreover, are too far-flung to be thus
restricted. Task Force "B" believes that present commitments and associa-
tions exist largely because they do in fact reflect the basic security needs
of this country. Of the greatest importance to U.S. security are bases from
which air, naval and ground attacks may be launched against the Soviet Bloc.
For example, air bases in Western Europe and North Africa will be vital until
we can count on full-scale intercontinental delivery of our atomic power;
the same considerations hold in the Far East, Even with the attainment of
such intercontinental atomic delivery capability, the power of the United
States to deter Soviet aggression and to inflict military defeat on the U.S.S.L.
if it occurs would be enormously enhanced by the ability to use such bases.
5. With military realities requiring that U.S. power be exercised
from so many distant points throughout the Free World, there is no profit,
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and possible danger, in selecting countries and areas to be written off as
non-essential. Moreover, one area is dependent on another; many of the
strategically "vital" areas are linked, politically or economically or cul-
turally, to other Free World countries and might easily become untenable if
those other countries were taken over by the Soviet Bloc.
6. In any alliance, the United States loses a certain amount of
political freedom of action in return for compensating advantages which may
include heightened political power and leadership, an increase in overall
economic and military strength by combining resources with its Allies, or
access to a strategic point on the map. Some military freedom of action
may be lost as a result of the loss of a free hand politically, but the over-
riding military consideration in the case of existing alliances is that a
greater military capability is realized especially by gaining access to
areas suitable for advanced bases. Task Force "B", therefore, sees a net
loss to the United States in any attempt to cut down its alliances or com-
mitments for the purpose of increasing its flexibility of decision and
operation, for in so doing it would at the same time be diminishing rather
than improving its capabilities.
7. At the same time a U.S. decision to withdraw to a "minimum
area" would open a wide field for Soviet expansion, to be effected at
times of Soviet choosing and by a wide variety of political, economic and
ideological pressures. Since these pressures would be backed by Soviet
military power and would not be opposed by U.S. military power or the threat
of military retaliation by the United States, the outcome would be determined.
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8. The human and natural resources of the area from which we might
withdraw would become integrated into the Soviet Bloc, increasing its total
strength and making available to its military forces additional base areas
which would improve its military operational capability. The resources of
Western Europe, for example, would be a gain of incalculable importance to
the U.S.S.R. Extension of the Soviet Bloc to include such large and popu-
lous new territories would, of course, bring problems as well as advantages.
Task Force "B" believes, however, that the United States could not afford to
rely on hopes that the Soviet-Communist leadership could not control or ex-
ploit these territorial gains to the great peril of this country.
9. Withdrawal to a "minimum security area" would have the even-
tual effect of requiring the American people to live in a beleaguered garri-
son-state, with consequent economic sacrifices and dangers to free political
institutions. The United States has great political potential, not only in
the Free World but within the Soviet Bloc, because of what it is and what it
stands for. If it seeks timid refuge in the pseudo-security of a "minimum"
area, its spiritual and political powers of leadership will shrink and
shrivel even more rapidly than its military and economic resources, and it
will sooner or later face a direct challenge from a greatly swollen, confi-
dent, and powerful Soviet rival,
10. Therefore, Task Force "B" believes that the security require-
ments of the United States lie not in the drawing of a minimum line of de-
fense but in the prevention of any Soviet Bloc attack on any nation of the
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Free World. The Soviet threat can be defeated only if the Free World, backed
by U.S. power, grows in strength and unity to meet it.
D. REJECTION OF THE "TWO WORLDS" CONCEPT.
1. In accordance with its instructions, Task Force "B" explored
the question of a complete isolation or outlawry of the Soviet Bloc from the
rest of the world. From the military standpoint, by setting up the strongest
possible deterrent to the movement of Soviet Bloc forces across the Free
World border, the recommended policy does attempt the "outlawry" of the bloc,
at least in the sense of pointing to it as the criminal who must be re-
strained. But the Task Force does not regard the "sealing-off" of the Iron
Curtain countries for all political, economic, cultural and other purposes
as desirable or even possible.
2. Such a sealing-off would presumably involve the rupture of
diplomatic relations by all Free World countries with all Soviet Bloc
countries, the cessation of all East-West trade, the termination of radio
broadcasts and all other means of communication with the peoples behind the
Iron Curtain, the expulsion of the U.S.S.R. and its satellites from the
United Nations and other international organizations, and the denial of the
rights and benefits of international law to Soviet Bloc countries and their
nationals.
3. Task Force "B" believes that the United States could not pos-
sibly persuade all other countries of the Free World to cooperate in the
sealing-off process, and that attempts. to use pressure to induce their coop-
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eration would only tend to break up the solidarity of the Free World and
isolate the United States. Obtaining general Free World acceptance of
Alternative "B", in the form of a U.S. decision to invoke general war in
case of armed aggression by the Soviet Bloc, may be difficult enough without
the additional aspect of a proposed severance of all contact with the Soviet
world.
4. Task Force "B" believes that such a severance of contact,
even if it could be attained, would be contrary to American traditions and
interests as well as unnecessary as an adjunct to the proposed policy. Dur-
ing the period of peace envisaged by the policy, it will be in the interest
of the United States to maintain what contact it appropriately can both
with the governments of Soviet Bloc countries, for purposes of negotiation,
and with the peoples under Soviet rule, who are potential allies.
5. Similarly, there is nothing to be gained by an attempt to
exclude all Soviet Bloc countries from the United Nations and other inter-
national organizations, even if such a move might be accepted by the rest
of the world. So long as the principal reliance for preventing Soviet ag-
gression is placed on U.S. power and not on the U.N., there need be no rush
to transform that organization into an anti-Soviet coalition. American in-
terests in the foreseeable future will be best advanced if the U.N. can
continue to serve as a forum for discussion and a channel for negotiation
as well as a means of rallying world opinion. The development of an ef-
fective world security organization must be regarded as a long-range prop-
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osition which will not necessarily be brought closer by the withdrawal of
the Soviet Bloc or the Free World members from the United Nations as pres-
ently constituted.
6.
The maintenance of a necessary minimum of diplomatic and other
relations with the Soviet Bloc is desirable as a means of maintaining contact
and of obtaining information. The continued existence of some trade will also
be of benefit to the Free World; to eliminate it altogether would be to de-
prive Free World countries of even the opportunity to make trade bargains
clearly to their own advantage. And the Soviet Bloc economy will continue
to grow, even if all trade is cut off, since over the long run it is de-
pendent only to a minor extent upon imports.
7.
Actually, trade and ideas and influences are going to flow
back and forth across the line, no matter how hermetically it may be sealed
by law or policy. The very existence of the Soviet Union will continue to
exercise political influence within the Free World, as the existence of the
United States and other free countries makes them a powerful potential in-
fluence among the peoples of the Soviet Bloc.
8.
Furthermore, the Soviet leadership cannot be expected to give
up its basic philosophy or to deny itself the privilege of political pene-
tration and subversion in Free World countries. It has imposed a type of
Iron Curtain suitable to its own purposes. Task Force "B" regards it as
unwise for the United States to accept the existence of this barrier to free
international intercourse as justified or permanent, and doubly unwise to
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try to establish a new and thicker curtain which is inconsistent with American
principles and detrimental to American interests. It is only realistic to
recognize the fact of continuing political and ideological interaction across
any line that is drawn as a military barrier, and to make every effort to
turn it to the advantage of the security of the United States.
III. SUMMARY OF ADVANTAGES
A. ENUMERATION OF PRINCIPAL ADVANTAGES.
1. Following is a brief summary of the principal advantages which
Task Force "B" believes will result from adoption of the proposed policy:
a. By invoking the warning of general war, including use of
atomic weapons, it makes the most effective use of U.S. military strength
and exploits Soviet weakness.
b, It diminishes to the vanishing point the probability that
the U.S.S.R. will either deliberately initiate or blunder into a general
war, at least until such time as the Kremlin believes its atomic capabilities
are sufficient to knock out the United States.
C, If however, the Soviet leadership does bring on general
war, it puts the United States in the most favorable position to wage it.
d. It provides a safeguard against aggression by Communist
China.
e. It contributes to the solution of existing peripheral con-
flicts by placing an effective sanction behind any settlement reached on Korea
and by deterring Chinese military intervention in Indo-China.
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f. It can be expected to assure a fairly long period of peace
during which the balance between the Soviet Bloc and the Free World may change
to the advantage of the latter.
g. It permits the United States to use its resources most
effectively and to get the maximum return for the dollars expended on its
security.
h. It allows the Free World to develop strength and unity behind
a protective barrier, provides a clear mission enabling more efficient and
effective development of military forces, and avoids dissipation of military
and economic resources in peripheral wars at times and places of Soviet choos-
ing.
i. It renders more difficult Soviet-Communist subversion in
countries of the Free World, but also leaves the United States free to take
advantage of any opportunities which may appear for diminishing the power
and extent of the Soviet Bloc.
j. The clarity and firmness of the policy will make it under-
standable to the American people and will facilitate their support of the
efforts and sacrifices necessary in the interest of national security.
B. EFFECTIVENESS OF ALTERNATIVE "B" IN MEETING POSSIBLE SOVIET LINES
OF ACTION.
1. Task Force "B" has examined the recommended policy and its
effectiveness in meeting the following three alternative Soviet lines of
action. They are specifically set forth here because comment on them is
called for by the instructions given to the Task Force, They should, however,
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be considered in conjunction with the discussion of probable Soviet reactions
to Alternative "B" on pages 79-84-below.
a. Should the Soviet Bloc seek a military decision with the
West at any time and resort to war, either by intention or by accident,
Alternative "B" will:
(1) Find the United States and the Free World best pre-
pared to conduct a general war because they will have avoided the necessity
of preparing for an unknown number and variety of peripheral wars.
(2) Find the United States with a lead in the development
and production of atomic weapons, although that lead will become less mean-
ingful at such time in the future when both sides reach the age of atomic
plenty. Thus, the sooner the Soviet Bloc initiates general war the less its
chance of victory.
b. Should the Soviet Bloc maintain, at some risk of general
war, aggressive pressure, continuously or interspersed with "peace offensives",
Alternative "B" will:
(1) Act as the strongest possible deterrent to Soviet
military aggression for the longest period of time.
(2) Ensure that Soviet aggressive pressures would not
result in draining the strength of the Free World in a succession of "Koreas"
because general war would result from any Soviet-Bloc military aggression.
(3) Call for a Free-World posture of readiness for general
war whether the Soviet Bloc was in an aggressive or placatory mood.
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(4) By making possible a rational and sustained U.S. and
Free-World defense effort, avoid the effects of the alternation of crisis
and let-down caused by shifting Soviet tactics between aggressive pressures
and "peace offensives."
C. Should the Soviet Bloc accept a defensive posture in order
to consolidate its present position and avoid the risk of general war while
relying upon and encouraging the divisive forces of the Free World, Alterna-
tive "B" will:
(1) Be as effective as any policy available to the United
States in assuring that the Free World maintain an effective military posture.
Indeed, it might be the best policy in this respect because its firm tone
and explicit commitment make it manifest that the policy will require pre-
paredness to meet adverse reaction.
(2) Allow scope for genuine settlement of specific issues
by negotiation with the U.S.S.R. or other non-military means, especially if
the Free World is growing stronger and more cohesive in comparison with the
Soviet Bloc.
(3) Give the United States and its allies flexibility in
devising tactics to meet specific Soviet divisive efforts.
IV. ANALYSIS OF IMPLICATIONS
A. MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE "B".
1. The military problem posed by the Soviet Union has two main
aspects. The more familiar aspect comprises those traditional elements of
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Soviet military strength in being which have been used as a powerful tool in
expanding the Soviet Orbit and implementing Soviet policy. It is this aspect
of the problem which U.S. policies and actions in recent years have chiefly
sought to counter -- by resisting armed aggression where it has occurred,
undertaking to resist if necessary at numerous other points around the
Soviet periphery, and building up the strength of countries subjected to
Soviet pressures.
2. However, of overriding military consequence to the United
States in the long term is the second aspect: the ever-increasing potential-
ity of the Soviet stockpile of atomic weapons, taken together with a develop-
ing capability for their delivery on important targets throughout the world,
relatively free from the classic hindrances of distance and geography. This
growing threat not only greatly raises the importance of the direct defense
of the United States itself; it also profoundly alters the conditions for
the defense of all free nations within reach of Soviet power.
5. This is the aspect of the Soviet military threat which is both
more dangerous and more enduring. Any U.S. policy which claims to afford a
continuing safeguard to the security of the United States must find its
military basis solidly in the capabilities of atomic weapons. Alternative "B",
while carrying no guarantee of permanent security, does rest on such a basis.
4. Alternative "B" is not in any way unique in that it envisages
the possibility of general war, for which this country must be prepared under
any policy. It is Task Force "B"'s contention that, by specifically stating
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the willingness of the United States to meet aggression with general war,
Alternative "B" offers the best chance both to stop Soviet encroachment and
to avoid general war. A comparison with Alternatives "A" and "C" in this
regard is given in Enclosure 1.
5. By invoking the warning of general war, including the ultimate
sanction of atomic destruction, Alternative "B" provides the only practical
way to re-introduce U.S. military strength as an effective factor in world
politics.
a. Soviet military strength in conventional forces and weapons
will continue to be an effective instrument in the pursuit of Soviet objec-
tives as long as the United States continues to attempt, as best it can, to
counter Soviet force in kind, whenever and wherever it is applied. As long
as the United States foregoes the firm threat of general war as the primary
sanction against further Soviet aggression, free nations close to the Soviet
Bloc must live in recognition of the danger that one by one, or in groupings,
they may be eliminated as the Soviet leaders decide. The men in the Kremlin
are fully aware that no determined and lasting military program can emerge
from such an atmosphere, particularly in alliances of nations which are
competitors as well as allies.
b. Uncertainty and despair can, however, be converted into
assurance and hope if the United States makes it unmistakably clear that
the full extent of its military power will be applied immediately against the
Soviet Bloc in the event of armed aggression against any nation of the Free
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World. By thus reducing the potency of the Soviet and satellite military
threat to contiguous states, the United States would also furnish the
practical basis for intelligent improvement in their defenses.
6. By giving a clear indication that further military aggres-
sion by the Soviet Bloc would result immediately in general war, Alterna-
tive "B" will reduce the likelihood that such a war will occur.
a. By eliminating small "hot" wars, the United States wi 11
also eliminate the always dangerous possibility that a general war,
unwanted even by the Kremlin, may grow up accidentally or by Soviet mis-
calculation out of an incident or a peripheral action. In addition, by
making clear the conditions under which it will engage in general war, the
United States gains a posture which limits Soviet freedom of action to
embark deliberately on general war. At present, because of uncertainties
as to American intentions, the Kremlin is permitted to assume that the U.S.
capability might not be exercised, even in a general war, until quite late.
The Free World consequently faces the continuous hazard that if general war
is in fact in the Soviet scheme it can be begun in ways which could keep the
U.S. military power off balance until the United States itself had been
struck a lethal blow. Further, by preceding such a war with a series of
peripheral actions, the U.S.S.R. can force the United States into maintain-
ing strength in forces which would have only limited usefulness in a general
war.
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b. In the face of a clear policy that the United States will
henceforth, in the development and deployment of its military forces, regard
them primarily in the light of their prospective effectiveness in a general
war, Soviet planners will surely be inhibited, and can be precluded from
considering deliberate general war as an even fairly safe gamble.
C. It is argued for less positive policies that the Free
World, and particularly Western Europe, desires above all else that the
United States avoid a war which would probably bring destruction to Western
civilization. Task Force "B" believes that these nations know that the
decision for general war rests with the U.S.S.R. now and would still rest
there after the new U.S. policy was announced; and that they also know it is
most unlikely that the U.S.S.R. would bring on such a war until it considered
its atomic capability quite adequate and, even then, only if it calculated
that conditions were such that the Soviet Union could itself escape being
destroyed.
do The growth of the Soviet atomic stockpile. is inevitable
in any case, but not the creation of the conditions prerequisite to its
employment. Task Force "B" believes that these nations, with firm leader-
ship by the United States, would be relieved to have a good reason to dis-
card their current rationalization of an unpleasant prospect and give
vigorous support to the U.S. effort to see to it that conditions will not
be allowed to become favorable to Soviet success in an all-out war.
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e. Task Force "B" does not pretend that such a war would be
less than terribly destructive even to the victor. It submits only that if
the United States flees from the atomic reality of the present and near
future, the nations of the Free World will recognize our fright for what it
is and, sharing it, continue to fall successively by the wayside. They will
thus assist the U.S.S.R., at least passively, in bringing about the only
circumstances in which such a war would in practical fact become a proba-
bility.
f. Alternative "B" provides no guarantee that the Kremlin
will not take the decision for general war. If such a decision is certain
to be taken, it is obvious that U.S. chances for survival are not likely to
increase with time. Should the adoption of Alternative "B" precipitate the
inevitable Soviet decision, the United States would at least be in the most
favorable position to achieve the objectives of the advocates of preventive
war.
7. Alternative "B" will clarify the purposes of Free World forces,
enabling their more effective and economical development and maintenance.
a. At present, partly because the Free World cannot be sure
whether, when or how the United States would fight to stop further aggression,
most efforts at rearmament suffer from confusion as to the type and size of
forces needed, There is not only the question whether the action would be
local or general. Even in the latter case, there are wide-open questions
concerning strategy and forces.
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b. It is general ly assumed that the United States would invoke
general war in the event of a major Soviet attack in Western Europe. The
same assumption may be make for certain other parts of the world. But even
this assumption fails to answer several important questions. For example,
as regards Western Europe, would the United States : trike quickly and deci-
sively to destroy the source of the aggression, or would the historical
theater of general war again be the scene of the major military action? For
lack of an unequivocal answer to questions such as this, not only is there
apathy as to the necessary level of effort, there are discontinuities and
indecision in the application of the effort that is in fact being put forth.
C. With a clear indication that the United States will reply
to further military aggression anywhere by striking with full power at the
Soviet Bloc, it will be made similarly clear that while there remains a
vitally important requirement for peripheral forces, it is different from
the requirement that would follow from a concept that all wars will be fought
solely as peripheral wars and in theaters chosen by the Soviet leaders.
d. Friendly forces around the Soviet periphery will continue
to be needed to stabilize the defense of the peripheral zone. Without them
it would be difficult in some instances even to tell when aggression occurred.
They would be needed in the event of war as protection against being easily
overrun, and in the same role would undoubtedly be able to shorten the war
in some areas, They would be essential in restoring post-war order in
liberated or enemy territory.
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e. They are valuable for many other purposes. But, under
Alternative "B", they would not be depended upon for the main effort to
defeat the U.S.S.R. itself in an atomic war. Their task, therefore, would
no longer be a hopeless one, and it would be the sort of task that is subject
to analysis and sound decisions as to the level and nature of effort that
is necessary. Task Force "B" believes that the outcome would be a substantial
increase in the effectiveness of the military programs of our allies, while
enabling the United States to keep the requirement for U.S. support in funds
and equipment on a realistic level.
8. By clarifying the principal purpose of U.S. military forces
and the circumstances in which they would be employed, Alternative "B" will
permit U.S. militery policies and programs to be formulated and executed
with much greater wisdon and economy, and will best assure the necessary
degree and continuity of public support.
a. The cardinal element in U.S. military policy must be to
develop and maintain the military strength necessary to defeat the main
enemy, the U.S.S.R. A military policy which depends on trying to stalemate,
or even win, a number of peripheral wars is inherently self-defeating. It
denies to the U.S. even a. meaningful strategic concept to form a basis for
deciding on the scrb of forces needed, let alone their size or method of
employment.
b. A basic policy which honestly and courageously recognizes
this fact can bring enormous benefits to the formulation and execution of
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subordinate policies and programs, in the form of intelligent decisions and
continuity of public support. Under Alternative "B" the United States will
have a basis for selectivity in deciding on forces to be built and maintained,
recognizing that this country cannot maintain for an indefinite period the
desirable levels of all types of forces that would be needed to fight the
variety of possible wars the Soviet Union might choose to force upon us.
C. The United States will thus stabilize military programs,
with attendant orderliness and economy in the application of resources, mini-
mizing false starts and extravagant obsolescence of equipment.
d. A commitment to general war to meet Soviet aggression,
under clearly defined rules which may be tough but which must be conceded to
be just, is not only the sort of commitment the Kremlin will respect; it is
one the average American can understand and support. On the other hand he
will have increasing difficulty in understanding the importance of costly
small wars none of which seems to lead anyth ere except to another one, par-
ticularly as he sees the potential of widespread atomic destruction tower
higher and higher over such military operations.
e. A commitment which is publicly understood and accepted
as necessary will give the best chance for the country to remain adequately
alert to the Soviet threat. The alternative, which is obviously unwise and
even dangerous, is to depend on a series of "Koreas" to accomplish that
purpose, with intervening periods of confused counsel as to what the basic
U.S. purpose really is.
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