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Report to the National Security Council by Project Solarium Task Force B - Part 4 of 5
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Report to the National Security Council by Project Solarium Task Force B - Part 4 of 5
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Daight D.
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PART TWO
SEC. IV/V
clear to the Soviet people. This awareness will in turn increase, from
within the Soviet power-bloc, the pressure on the leadership to restrain its
own expansionist ambitions and thus to avoid putting its control over its
own people and its satellites to the test of severe destruction and, pre-
sumably, of defeat. Such a change in Soviet policies offers the best basis
for avoidance, over the long term, of general war. Alternative "B" offers the
best chance of using U.S. power to promote conditions favorable to the
"settling down" of the Soviet regime and gives time to internal Soviet factors
of development to work in this direction.
V. WEAKNESSES OF ALTERNATIVE "B"
1. Introductory.
1, Task Force "B" has examined its advocated policy particularly
with a view to determining its inherent weaknesses, those which may develop,
and the difficulties which may arise in connection with its implementation.
There are, in the view of the Task Force, no weaknesses sufficiently grave to
warrant not undertaking the policy at all. There are various hazards and
difficulties which Task Force "B" does not wish to minimize, but many of them
will confront whatever policy is adopted and they are all, we believe, capable
of being reduced to acceptable proportions by wise and determined U.S.
leadership.
2, The countervailing arguments to the weaknesses and difficulties
set forth below are not given fully in this section but appear in other parts
of the paper where the positive arguments in favor of Alternative "B" are
presented.
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B. SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS.
1. Alternative "B" does not, as has been pointed out, solve the
problem of the growing Soviet atomic capability. It is based on the thesis
that the threat of the use of U.S. strategic atomic power will deter the
U.S.S.R. from starting a war, little or big, at least until the period of
Soviet atomic plenty. At that time, the United States may face the ultimate
in danger. This would certainly be the case if it ever allowed its own atomic
capability and defenses to fall to the point where the U.S.S.R. could calcu-
late a good chance of knocking out the United States while itself escaping
destruction. In that event, no U.S. warning, or lack thereof, would have much
practical bearing on Soviet action.
2. No absolute prediction can be made, moreover, concerning the
position the Soviet leaders will take over a period of years, and more par-
ticularly, concerning the way in which they will react to the announcement
of the policy set forth in Alternative "B". It is barely possible that they
might read the warning as an indication that the United States was preparing
to attack the Soviet Union. In that case, Alternative "B" might hasten the
war which it seeks to deter.
3. The Soviet Bloc may continue to enlarge its economic capacity
at a more rapid pace than the Free World, although the latter will continue
for many decades to possess far greater productive capacity. It may be argued
that, being ensured by Alternative "B" against a preventive war, or any war
except that provoked by its own decision, the Soviet Union will be able to
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utilize its long-run economic potential more rationally and to greater long-
run efficiency. However, Task Force "B" considers that the Free World has
far greater resources, flexibility and ingenuity and can thus take full
economic advantage of the protection which the proposed policy offers.
C, EFFECTS ON OTHER FREE WORLD COUNTRIES.
1, Despite our best efforts to allay their fears, our allies may
feel that Alternative "B" means that the United States is basically inter-
ested in destroying the Soviet war-making capacity rather than in preventing
the Soviets from overrmming them. On the other hand, they may tend to rely
too mush for their defense on U.S. strategic power and not enough on their
own efforts. Either reaction could lead to a relaxation in the build-up and
maintenance of their conventional forces, a development which could be
increasingly dangerous as conventional forces assume greater importance with
the approach of atomic plenty. These same risks, however, may be even greater
under Alternatives "A" or "C". Under "A", the nations of the Free World will
have no assurance in advance that they will be adequately protected. Under
"C", they will fear that U.S. policies over which they have no control may
jeopardize their very existence.
2, Although Alternative "B" is intended to operate as a joint
policy for the defense of the Free World, other Free World countries may
(a) resent it as an assertion of U.S. world hegemony which makes them "pro-
tectorates" of the United States, deprived of some of the traditional attri-
butes of sovereignty and equality, and (b) distrust it as an assumption of
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too much responsibility for world peace by a nation which they regard as
"trigger-happy" and likely to engage in impetuous and ill-considered actions.
Alternative "B" may also polarize more sharply pro-American and pro-Soviet
political forces in the Free World. It may stimulate the concentration of
long-standing political, economic, social and national grievances around the
pole of anti-American sentiment and thus enhance Soviet capacity to promote
internal disunity and instability. In the extreme case, forces of disunity
might disrupt the present U.S. alliance system and deprive the United States
of bases necessary for the most effective application of strategic power.
This is a danger, however, which steady American leadership can do much to
allay and which, in the extreme case of successful Communist subversion, can
presumably be dealt with under paragraph 3 of Alternative "B", behind the
protective barrier established by the warning of general war.
30 The existence on the periphery of (1) divided states (Germany,
Austria, Korea) and (2) dangerously unstable areas (e.g., Korea, Indo-China,
Iran) increases the difficulty of maintaining the clear and unequivocal
character of the policy which is so important to its success. It also offers
the Soviet Roadership opportunities to attempt to create, in connection with
Alternative "B", confusion, uncertainty and embarrassment for the United States
and its allies. This situation poses the problem of how to reassure those
peoples of the U.S. interest in their eventual unity, in the case of the
divided states, and in their security. There is no reason why the United
States, rather than the U.S.S.R., should not take and keep the initiative on
these issues,
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4. Alternative "B" might tend to encourage activities embarrassing
to the United States by irresponsibly inclined Free World politicians. For
example, leaders like Mossadegh and Rhee, confident that they could provoke
Soviet intervention in their respective countries, might attempt to exploit
this potential to blackmail the United States into greater concessions. They
might also feel that they could with impunity embark on irresponsible adven-
tures against the Soviet Ploc, relying upon an automatic guarantee of U.S.
intervention to inhibit Soviet armed retalistion against them. However, as
compered with Alternatives "A" and "C", Alternative "B" limits this risk more
effectively by making clear to both friend and foe the basic purposes of U.S.
policy. It would be up to the U.S. Government to restrain any such adventure-
someness and to make clear that the sanction of general war would be applied
only in case of clear and unprovoked aggression on the part of the Soviet Bloc.
5. While Alternative "B" is couched in clear and unequivocal
terms in order that it may be undersbood and respected by the U.S.S.R., some
of our allies may regard it as unduly harsh and provocative. It might also
be argued that the policy as stated imposes upon the United States a rigidity
and lack of flexibility which could be avoided, while retaining the deterrent
effect of the policy, by phrasing it in just as determined but less explicit
terms. Task Force "B" holds that, while the essence of its policy is rigid,
it can be and must be implemented with wisdom and flexibility. And the rigid-
ity considered necessary in this one aspect of U.S. policy to prevent further
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Soviet expansion does not rule out flexibility throughout the many other
fields of U.S. foreign policy.
D. SUPPORT OF THE POLICY BY THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.
1. Alternative "B" may not receive from the American people the
unwavering and unquestioning support which is vital to its long-term effective-
ness. Recerd events have again demonstrated that the continuity of judgment
of many Americans --- even of well informed and responsible observers -- con-
cerning the ultimate purpose of Soviet policy can be shaken overnight by a
few Scviet gestures. It is not improbable that some substantial and genuine
concessions by the Soviet leadership might have an effect on American (and
Free World) opinion which would necessitate reconsideration of the policy.
2. As emphasized above, wholehearted public and Congressional sup-
port would be vital to the success of Alternative "B" and, in the case of
Congress, constitutionally necessary. In the case of direct attack on the
United States or U.S. forces, it could confidently be assumed that full-scale
retaliation would inspire such support and would roceive ex post facto Con-
gressional approval. If, however, the war should begin with peripheral aggres-
sion by the Soviet Ploc against some area remote from both Soviet and U.S.
territory, for example in Burma Or Indo-China, the Congress might not be willing
to find that a state of war automatically existed directly between the United
States and the Soviet Union. However, the same problem faces Alternatives "A"
and "C", which rely upon an unstated threat of general war for their successful
implementation. The difference is that under Alternative "B", Congress, the
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American people, the entire Free World, and even the Soviet leadership will
know in advance the settled purpose of the United States to retaliate by
general war against any new Soviet attack upon the peoples of the Free World.
: The problem of inspiring initial American support for the pro-
posed policy differs somewhat from the problem of maintaining that support over
the long term. Waile Task Force "B" believes this initial support would be
forthsoming, it recognizes that no one can predict the reactions of American
public opinion with certainty and that it is important to avoid a situation
in which policy gets too far ahead of public opinion, such as occurred at the
time 22 President Roosevelt's "quarantine the aggressors" speech in October
1937. While not attempting to pose as experts on American public opinion, we
have franed our recommendations on implementation of the policy with this
problem vory much in mind.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
A. GENERAL considerations.
In So far as the Task Force is aware, Alternative "B" is unprece-
dented in the history of U.S. foreign policy in that it is a clear and unmis-
takeable consitment to wage general war under certain specific conditions.
All previous American "hands-off" statements have rested on implied rather
than explicit sanctions, Even President Truman's statement of 19 July 1950
after the attack on South Korea warned only that "new recourse to aggression
in the world today might well strain to the breaking point the fabric of world
peace."
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2. At the same time it is widely, if in many cases subconsciously,
believed throughout the world that the United States has in effect already
adopted, without specifically declaring it, a policy indistinguishable from
Alternative "B".
3. This near-paradox creates a very delicate problem in presenta-
tion. To be fully effective as a deterrent, Alternative "B" must be made to
appear in all its stark reality; at the same time no opportunity can be left
to permit its interpretation as a chip-on-the shoulder warning of imminent
preventive war.
4. Another vital characteristic of the policy is that its effec-
tiveness will depend to an unusual extent upon the degree of public support
which it attracts both in the United States and in other Free World countries.
If it had only limited support at home and was rejected by our allies, its
probable effectiveness would be so low that consideration would undoubtedly
have to be given to abandoning it. On the other hand, in the event that it
received immediate and overwhelming support in the United States and among
our allies, it could greatly reduce the fear of war and spectacularly improve
Free World stability and morale. This factor makes the public relations
aspects of implementation of extraordinary importance.
5. A third feature of the policy is that, in contrast to almost
all major American foreign policy developments, such as the Open Door and the
"Truman Doctrine", it is a statement of principle not necessarily associated
with any specific actions or set of existing circumstances. This obviously
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greatly increases the difficulty of planning effective specific steps to
implement the policy. These difficulties would be eased if some specific
situation could be found --- the signature of a Korean truce, for example --
which could be used as a peg upon which the policy could be hung. Task Force
"B" recommends that if possible such a peg be found and used.
6. The tactics of any policy implementation must of course be con-
ditioned by circumstances as they exist and develop. In the case of a major
addition to current U.S. foreign policy the actions best designed to inaugur-
ate it effectively and establish it firmly necessarily require decisions by
the Chief Executive that cannot be forecast in advance except in very general
terms,
7. The proposals which follow, made with the above considerations
and reservations in mind, are to be understood as an approach which seems
reasonable to Task Force "B" in the circumstances of today. They might well
be modified by a fullor understanding of the detailed realities of the domes-
tic and foreign political scene, particularly as that scene may change, in
Korea for example, in the future.
B. SPECIFIC PROPOSALS.
1. Establishment of the policy by a single, highly publicized and
emphasized act would, on balance, be preferable to its establishment by secret
decision and step-by-step promulgation to the world; to attempt to do it by
revising and extending our alliance obligations would be wholly impractical.
The gradual procedure might inspire less unfavorable reaction in the Free
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World but it would substantially increase the difficulty of developing the
policy into the clear and forceful instrument it must be, It will be essential
to drive home to the rulers of the U.S.S.R. and to the whole world that this
is a clear commitment and that the United States stands solidly behind it.
2. A large measure of public support for the policy could probably
be inspired by its establishment as a result of ostensibly legislative rather
than executive initiative, e,g. a Joint Resolution of Congress followed by
appropriate statements by the Executive Branch fitting it into general foreign
policy. This method would also have the advantage of giving the Executive
Branch an opportunity to judge public reaction before committing itself
firmly and thus enable it to frame its supporting action with maximum effec-
tiveness.
3. This Joint Resolution would include a statement of the American
people's abhorrence of war, their intention of continuing to abstain from
all acts of aggression, and their support of the principles of the U.N.
Charter, as well as the warning to the U.S.S.R. However, it would not inhibit
the President in the use of the power which he already has to order the armed
forces to take military action essential to the national interests of the
United States, nor would it affect the Constitutional power of Congress to
declare war. It would be so worded as to allow the procedure to be determined
according to the circumstances. For example, if direct Soviet aggression
against Iran took place, the President presumably would ask the Congress to
declare war before he gave orders undertaking acts of war; on the other hand,
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if in such a crisis, word was received that a Soviet air fleet was on the
way to drop atom bombs on the United States, the U.S. counter-offensive
obviously could not await a formal declaration of war. This problem is not
peculiar to Alternative "B" but would exist as well under any other policy
in the event that general war suddenly broke out.
4. During the time which would be required for legislative action
on the Joint Resolution, informal diplomatic discussion with our allies,
particularly Great Britain, Canada and France, would be carried on to ensure
as favorable a climate for the Policy as possible.
5. Simultaneously with the adoption of the Joint Resolution,
efforts would be made to induce our allies, particularly the above three
powers, to express approval of this action by the United States.
6. The U.S. Government would explain and defend the policy in the
United Nations, without attempting to obtain any vote of approval. It would
probably be necessary to give some general form of assurance that the United
Nations would be consulted before the United States embarked upon general
war in retaliation against Soviet aggression. It would probably be necessary,
in addition, to agree to consult with the British and possibly the French in
this connection. However, the agreement to consult would be left in general
terms and would not amount to a right of veto, either by the United Nations or
by the British or French Governments. In fact, the United States would have
to reserve to itself the right to take action immediately if the situation
necessitated it, so that consultation would under some circumstances be only
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nominal and in an extreme case would consist of notification simultaneously
with military action by the United States against the Soviet Bloc.
7. It will be desirable to take such corollary actions as may be
appropriate to make the proposed policy more palatable to the Free World and
more difficult for Soviet propaganda to attack. The adoption of Alternative
"B" might be timed to coincide with an ostensibly conciliatory offer to
carry on negotiations with the Soviet Union or with specific proposals for
the settlement of one or more issues (e.g., Germany). This would tend to
vitiate Soviet attempts to make the policy appear to be a "warmongering"
move and would help to attract Free World support. At the same time the
United States would press vigorously in the United Nations for proposals it
has previously made to make the U.N. more effective, such as implementation
of the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution of 3 November 1950. It should also be
prepared to state its continued adherence to the goal of eventual limitation
and international control of armaments and willingness to consider any
straightforward Soviet proposal for dealing with this problem. However, in
the context of the new policy, the United States would have to look more
closely than before for evidence of good faith on the part of the U.S.S.R.
in any such move.
8. If, at the time the policy was adopted, consideration was being
given, for example, to expanding the area of atomic cooperation with the
British, or to making arrangements for the use of tactical atomic weapons in
European continental defense, it would be desirable to postpone announcement
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of the policy until decisions on these matters were reached. If the deci-
sions were favorable in either or both cases, they should be used as bargain-
ing factors to assist in enlisting British and French support. Similarly,
if a decision in favor of alternative 4 of NSC 152 (some relaxation of East-
West trade restrictions) had been reached, transmission of the decision to
our allies should be coordinated with our efforts to enlist their support
for Alternative "B".
90 In view of the importance of implementation and the difficulty
of reducing the policy to specific actions, Task Force "B" felt that it
would be helpful to consider in some detail the general flow of events that
might be expected to follow a decision to adopt Alternative "B". Accordingly,
an illustrative timetable of possible action is attached as Enclosure 2. It
is included with full realization that it is wholly hypothetical and would
inevitably be greatly modified in practice.
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THE ROLE OF GENERAL WAR UNDER ALTERNATIVES "A", "B", AND "C".
1. According to any of the three alternative policies, the United
States must be prepared at all times to wage a general war in the event of
an attack upon any one of a considerable number of countries. One difference
between "A" and "B" is that "A" leaves open until the last moment the question
whether the United States would tolerate by inaction, or resist by general
war, a Soviet encroachment on the Free World. Alternative "B", on the other
hand, states in advance that, in attempting by military force to expand the
Soviet Bloc beyond its present boundaries, the U.S.S.R. must reckon on U.S.
retaliation by general war. Under both "A" and "B", the threat of general
war is the ultimate deterrent to Soviet aggression but "B" makes that
deterrent unmistakably clear.
2. Alternative "A" also leaves open until the last moment the
question whether Soviet peripheral aggression will be opposed by peripheral
defense alone or by general war. Alternative "B" assumes that the principal
deterrent to Soviet aggression, and the principal instrument of U.S.
victory, is general war, and that Soviet Union can be deterred from aggres-
sion by the foreknowledge that aggression will subject it to general war.
3. The threat, under Alternative "A", to counter Soviet expansion
by means short of general war may tempt the Soviet leadership to undertake
peripheral aggressions at places and times of its own choosing and through
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employment of strategies and resources which are convenient to the Soviet
Bloc and are costly and risky to the United States. While under any of the
three alternative policies the final deterrent to continued Soviet aggressive
expansion is the Soviet fear of provoking the United States to wage general
war, under "A" it is not clear at what point this deterrent may be effective,
and the U.S. decision to invoke it may be postponed until Soviet aggression
has overrun one or several additional countries. Alternative "B", on the
other hand, sets up the strongest available deterrent against committing
aggression in the first place.
4. To be internally consistent with their refusal to use the
explicit deterrent of general war, supporters of Alternative "A" must decide
in advance what territories they are prepared to defend by means of general
war and what territories they are prepared to abandon to Soviet control in
order to avoid or postpone the initiation of general war by the United
States. Alternative "B" avoids this fatal moral and political dilemma by
stating in advance that any Soviet Bloc encroachment will be met by the
initiation of general war. It is based on the thesis that if the threat of
general war can deter any Soviet aggression, it can deter all Soviet
aggressions. Under Alternative "B" it is no longer necessary to decide
which are "first-class" nations that must be protected from Soviet aggression
and which "second-class" ones that can be thrown to the wolves.
5. The considerations mentioned above in relation to Alternative
"A" also apply generally to "C". Furthermore, the success of Alternative
"C" also depends ultimately on the probable or certain resort to general
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war by the United States as a deterrent to compel the Soviet Union to
acquiesce in the loss of its control over outlying areas of the Soviet Bloc.
If Alternative "C" is to be successful in detaching such areas from the
Soviet Bloc, the Soviet leadership must conclude either that it will be
defeated by the United States in any given peripheral war or that the
United States will resort successfully to general war rather than accept
defeat in a peripheral war or allow the U.S.S.R. to retake territory lost
to the Soviet Bloc through local action. Thus, Alternative "C" proposes
that the threat of general war should be exerted to roll back Soviet control
at a number of points around the Soviet periphery, whereas Alternative "B"
proposes that this threat should be applied primarily to defend the Free
World against new Soviet aggression.
6. Task Force "B" believes that the purpose of promoting the
security and strength of the Free World, which presumably is common to all
three proposed policies, will be better served by Alternative "B" than by
"C", which may disrupt the unity of the Free World because of the greater
risks of general war and because of the more aggressive policies to be
pursued under it. Thus, Alternative "C" may deprive the United States of
the political alliances and advanced bases which it requires in order to
carry out any of the policies, particularly "C". It will also, especially
if the Soviet response to Alternative "C" is conciliatory in words and
manner, tend to drive the countries "in-between" the United States and Russia
into a political and geographical "Third Force" position which would
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eventually be vulnerable to Soviet pressures. Meanwhile, U.S. power would
no longer be pressing against the Soviet periphery and would therefore be
unavailable to support continued pursuit of Alternative "C".
7. Alternative "B" offers the best opportunity to unify the Free
World against the dangers of Soviet encroachment while leaving it free to
take advantage of any opportunities which may appear for diminishing the
power and extent of the Soviet Bloc.
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POSSIBLE MEASURES OF IMPLEMENTATION
INTRODUCTION.
In view of the importance of implementation and the difficulty of reduc-
ing Alternative "B" to specific actions, the Task Force felt that it would
be helpful to consider in some detail the general flow of events which might
be expected to follow a decision to adopt it. The following illustrative
timetables are the result of this consideration. They are included in this
study with full realization that they are wholly hypothetical and would
inevitably be greatly modified in practice.
A. Alternative "B" tied to a specific development.
Illustrative assumptions: One, a Korean truce is concluded, or, two,
negotiations with the Soviets result in agreement on a unified Germany not
included in NATO and not otherwise guaranteed against aggression.
1. Shortly before it was anticipated that negotiations on one of the
above problems would be successfully concluded, appropriate friendly govern-
ments would be confidentially informed of the President's intention to
announce Alternative "B". These governments would include Britain, Canada,
France and perhaps in addition all members of NATO and ANZUS. In order to
emphasize the importance of the subject the allied governments would be
informed by the Secretary of State calling in their Ambassadors in Washington,
by our Ambassadors in the various capitals calling on Foreign Ministers or,
preferably, Prime Ministers, and through regional pact channels such as the
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NATO Council. A very full explanation of the policy would be given, empha-
sizing its defensive character, the solemn sense of responsibility with which
it would be adopted and, without actually denying its unilateral character,
the great extent to which its application would be made a matter of joint
consultation.
2. At the same time the appropriate governments would be informed of
any other recent policy decisions which might be expected to influence them
favorably toward Alternative "B", such as an expansion of the scope of British-
Amorican atomic cooperation or a relaxation of East-West trade restrictions.
3. Initially no attempt would be made to high-pressure allied govern-
ments into accepting the policy. The line would be that the U.S. Government
realized the importance of the policy to the Free World and was sure its
advantages would be recognized upon full study and consideration; in the
moantime 1t would hope that an attitude of at least benevolent reserve would
be maintained.
4. Simultaneously with the announcement of the conclusion of the hypo-
thetical agreement with the Soviet Union on the German or Korean question, the
President would make a formal statement (a regularly scheduled speech would
probably be an impractical vehicle for the announcement because of the timing
requirements), emunciating the policy as a principle and associating it appro-
priately with the agreement.
5. Immediately thereafter the President would initiate action in the
Senate (either by formal communication or by talks with individual Senators)
on a Joint Resolution supporting the policy.
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6. U.S. Ambassadors in countries on the Soviet periphery with which
the United States did not already have mutual defense treaties would be
instructed that, in response to possible official inquiries, they should
state that the United States is prepared to discuss the possibilities of
negotiating treaties embodying the U.S. commitment under the announced policy
(assuming that further study indicated the practicability of such treaties
and that satisfactory drafts had been worked out).
7. An ostensibly conciliatory offer would be made to the Soviet Govern-
ment to negotiate some outstanding issue or issues. If time and circumstances
permitted, this offer would involve the abandonment of some particularly
intransigent position which the United States had built up with this end in
view.
8. Public information resources of the U.S. Government would be mobil-
ized in support of the policy.
B. Alternative "B" implemented without reference to other developments.
1. After the decision to adopt Alternative "B", the President would
wait for an appropriate juncture in Congressional activity. He then (on X-Day)
would call in a Senator in whose reliability and discretion he had complete
confidence and who, he had reason to believe, would be sympathetic to the
proposed policy.
2. He would describe the policy to the Senator, explain his conviction
that it could only be successful if it had firm, wholehearted support in the
United States and at least widespread "benevolent neutrality" elsewhere in
the Free World, and his opinion that this could best be ensured if the policy
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emerged ostensibly as a result of Congressional initiative. If the Senator
was receptive, he would give him a suggested Joint Resolution and ask only
that the Senator give him a few days warning before a Resolution was intro-
duced.
3. On X-plus-10 the Senator would inform the President that he intended
to introduce a Resolution on X-plus-14 and would perhaps hand the President
a copy of his final draft.
4. On X-plus-11 the President would inform the Ambassadors in London
and Ottawa and perhaps the Ambassador in Paris that he had just learned of
the imminent introduction of the Resolution and would instruct the Ambassadors
to see the respective Prime Ministers and explain to them personally and con-
fidentially that the Administration had just learned of the impending resolu-
tion, that the President did not intend immediately to take a strong position
on the subject but saw advantages to the Free World in the policy, and that
he therefore very much hoped that the British, Canadian and French Governments
would at least maintain a reserved attitude until its advantages and disad-
vantages became clarified in the course of Congressional consideration.
5. At his first press conference after X-plus-14 the President would
be asked about the policy. He would reply that he had been informed of the
Senator's intention to introduce the Resolution only a few days previously,
that he had raised no objections to its introduction, that its advantages
and disadvantages were being studied by the Administration, and that the
Administration's views would be made clear in the course of the Congressional
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hearings on the Resolution. All other Government officials would be under
instructions to refer all inquiries on the subject to the White House.
6. Hearings would be scheduled for X-plus-30. If public reaction by
that time was sufficiently favorable to warrant the expectation that the
policy might eventually receive a full measure of support, the Administration
would support it vigorously with such amendments as seemed wise in the light
of public reaction. If, on the other hand, reaction in the United States
and abroad was so unfavorable as to make it unlikely that firm support could
be rallied, the Administration could withhold support from the Resolution
without loss of prestige or substantial weakening of the U.S. position vis-
a-vis the U.S.S.R.
7. Assuming a decision to support the Resolution, the President on
X-plus-28 would instruct the U.S. Permanent Delegate to the United Nations
to discuss the policy informally with his principal. colleagues. Permanent
U.S. representatives to regional organizations such as NATO and the O.A.S.
would be similarly instructed. Chiefs of all U.S. diplomatic missions in
Free World countries would be circularized on the subject and given authority
to take it up, within their discretion, with the governments to which they
are accredited.
8. On X-plus-28, U.S. Ambassadors in countries on the Soviet periphery
with which the United States did not already have mutual defense treaties
would be given appropriate instructions regarding the possibility of nego-
tiating such treaties (See A, 6 above).
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9. Beginning on X-plus-30, speeches favorable to the policy would be
made by high U.S. Government officials and all other public relations
resources of the Government, both in the United States and abroad, would be
mobilized behind the policy.
10. At appropriate moments on or after X-plus-30, the United States
would inform the concerned governments of any previously decided upon con-
ciliatory actions such as expansion of the scope of British-American atomic
cooperation or relaxation of East-West trade relations.
11. Also at an appropriate time after X-plus-30, the United States would
make an ostensibly conciliatory offer to the Soviet Union to negotiate some
outstanding issue (See A, 7 above).
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ANNEX I
EXAMINATION OF ALTERNATIVE "B" IN THE LIGHT OF
"MEMORANDUM ON BASIC ISSUES"
A. GENERAL
1. In the Annex to the directive ven to Task Forces "A", "B",
and "C" of Project Solarium, entitled "Memorandum on Basic Issues", are
listed many problems which "cut across all lines of action" and affect
any general foreign policy. Since the Task Forces are not asked to consider
these problems specifically, Task Force "B" has confined itself to a study
of them in the light of its own proposed policy. The following comments
reflect that study.
B. NEGOTIATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
1. Alternative "B" does not rule out negotiation with the Soviet
Union on any question in which there might be a conflict of interest and
on which there is a reasonable chance of reaching agreement. To the con-
trary, if the policy is effective and the Soviet Union must accept the
confines of the present borders of the Soviet Bloc for the foreseeable
future, it will most probably attempt to accomplish its immediate objectives,
at least in part, through negotiation. There are many questions of interest
to the Soviet Bloc and to the Free World that are susceptible of negotiation.
It may be useful for the United States to negotiate on such questions, in
order both to advance its own objectives through satisfactory agreements
when possible and to expose Soviet intransigence or bad faith when satisfactory
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agreements prove unattainable.
2. Alternative "B" creates a posture of confidence and tranquillity
which strengthens the negotiating position of the United States and the Free
World. Under the proposed policy the Free World will be able to insist on
suitable guarantees that decisions reached through negotiation will be
implemented in both letter and spirit.
3. Task Force "B" believes that the United States should welcome
negotiation on any question it considers is open to negotiation. Many of
the questions raised in the "Memorandum on Basic Issues" are subject to
negotiation. Many are not. It is difficult to say whether a question is
subject to negotiation until the full context of the proposal for negotiation
is known. For instance, the United States and its allies might profit by
the opportunity to put forward new proposals for negotiation on Germany. On
the other hand, the NATO countries would certainly refuse to negotiate a
proposal that NATO should be dissolved, except against a satisfactory quid
pro quo such as full restoration of the independence of the Soviet satellites.
For this reason Task Force "B" has gone no further than the generality
expressed above in connection with the many outstanding questions of
difference between the Soviet Bloc and the Free World listed in the
"Memorandum on Basic Issues".
C. IS TIME WORKING ON OUR SIDE?
1. Task Force "B" has given much time and thought to the study of
this question. It has reached conclusions identical with those contained
in the most recent CIA study on the subject - chiefly, that it is impossible
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to say.
2. In the military sense time is working against us in that at
some juncture, say in ten or fifteen years, both the Soviet Bloc and the
Free World will have atomic weapons and the means for their delivery
sufficient to destroy completely the war making capacity of each other
regardless of the strength of presently known defenses or regardless of which
side has the advantage of surprise - the age of atomic plenty. If we believe
that at that juncture one side or the other will make an atomic attack, then
the only way that time can be made to work for us is to make such an attack
before the Soviet Bloc reaches the age of atomic plenty. For many reasons,
not the least of which is that of morality, we reject preventive war. We
then must hope that the time gap that will exist before the Soviet Bloc
will have an adequate atomic capability will be sufficiently long (1) to
allow for favorable changes in world tensions, including favorable changes
within the Soviet Bloc, (2) to bring a realization that atomic warfare means
universal destruction,which realization should be the greatest deterrent,
(3) to allow for development of presently unknown means of atomic defense,
and (4) to permit greater development of the Free World's military strength
in case general war becomes unavoidable.
3. In brief, Task Force "B" believes that time must be utilized
for the continued development of the strength of the Free World in atomic
weapons, atomic defense, conventional forces and weapons, and economic and
political solidarity of the Free World. We must have a policy in which we
refuse to be diverted from the development of these strengths by costly
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peripheral actions. Alternative "B" offers the best means of accomplishing
this objective.
Ao THE ROLE OF GENERAL WAR
Task Force "B" believes that general war, even on the scale on
which it could be carried out if initiated today, would be so devastating
that it is impossible to predict its effects. One can only speculate to
what degree society or any of its institutions could survive. As time goes
on the destructive potential increases.
In putting forth its recommendations, Task Force "B" offers no
great promise that the Free World and its institutions will survive atomic
war whether it be sooner or later. Resort to general war is the ultimate
sanction. Alternative "B" is in effect an announcement that the United
States and the Free World will accept the risk of annihilation before
they accept Soviet domination. Should the Soviet leadership violate the
policy set forth in Alternative "B", it in effect announces that it will
accept the risk of annihilation of the U.S.S.R. before it will abandon the
objective of world domination. If this be the Soviet leaders' attitude,
it follows that they would initiate atomic war if that be the only way to
attain the objective of world domination. In that case general war becomes
inevitable regardless of the successes we may have had in a series of peri-
pheral wars. In the light of these considerations, Task Force "B" believes
that its proposed policy offers not only the greatest deterrent to general
war but also the best state of preparation if it must come.
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E.
THE ECONOMIC LOAD-CARRYING CAPACITY OF THE UNITED STATES
Task Force "B" has made no attempt to carry out the economic re-
search which would be required to ovide even speculative answers to the
economic questions raised in the "Memorandum on Basic Issues." The inter-
relationships among such factors as defense expenditures, national income,
the level of taxation and budgetary deficits are complex and controversial.
Attempts to arrive at reasonably precise estimates of these interrelated mag-
nitudes have not appeared a rewarding expenditure of the time available. The
Task Force did agree, however, on the following general conclusions.
The basic limit upon our national capacity to provide the means for
national defense is simply our physical ability to produce goods and services
and not any danger of national bankruptcy. The willingness of the American
people to bear taxes cannot be expressed in percentages of the national in-
come because the willingness is conditioned to a vital degree by whether
they think that the taxes they are called upon to pay are necessary and
equitably shared, Upon this willingness to bear the burden of taxation may
depend the success of maintaining the correct ratio between taxation and
budgetary deficits necessary to avoid the evils of inflation.
The evidence indicates that the economy of the Free World and
particularly the United States is not seriously nearing the limits of the
capacity to support defense measures. Thus far we have engaged in the "cold
war" on a reasonable basis of military readiness and with extraordinary al-
location of resources to defense purposes while indulging "as usual" in all
of the luxuries and refinements of our standard of living - indeed, we have
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increased them. This, while opposed to an enemy that has the capability
of devoting a somewhat great er percentage of a much lower gross national
product to war preparations because its people are accustomed to and expect
a much lower standard of living.
Task Force "B" wishes to point out that in connection with the
increases in defense expenditure since the beginning of the Korean War it
has not yet become necessary to invoke austerity or belt tightening. At,
the same time it suggests that U.S. policy must be such as to keep American
resources from being dissipated in peripheral wars as epitomized in Korea,
since the possibility cannot be ruled out that even greater expenditures
might at some time become necessary to insure national security.
F. ELEMENTS OF A FREE WORLD COALITION
The questions raised in this section of the "Memorandum on Basic
Issues" present 80 many intangibles and imponderables that they defy defini-
tive answers.
Task Force "B" recognizes that the basic world struggle is between
Soviet imperialism under Russian leadership on the one side and the forces
of freedom under United States leadership on the other. In this, as in any
struggle, friends and allies are important for the material and spiritual
strengths they bring with them and to preserve the widest possible area of
freedom. It is not, probable that in the end there can be neutrals; thus no
effort should be spared to bring those who are now neutrals over to the side
of freedom - indeed in almost all cases their natural leaning is in our
direction.
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The differences that exist between the United States and many
of its friends and among those friends themselves impose strains on the
Free World coalition. But these are differences that can and should be
negotiated to satisfactory settlements. With these people we know that
agreements have sacctity. No valid generalization can be made as to how
much the United States should defer to the views of other Free World nations,
or how far it should go in promoting settlement of issues in which it is
not a party immediately concerned. But in all matters vital to the strength
and unity of the Free World coalition the United States must exert a wise,
benevolent but nonetheless firm leadership. To the extent that the U.S.
fails in this responsibility, weakness in the Free World will inevitably
ensue,
Task Force "B" believes that the adoption of Alternative "B" would
be a new and unmistakable sign of responsible U.S. leadership for which the
remainder of the Free World has been perhaps unconsciously but nonetheless
hopefully waiting,
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