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Report to the National Security Council by Project Solarium Task Force B - Part 5 of 5
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Report to the National Security Council by Project Solarium Task Force B - Part 5 of 5
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The Dwight DEPARTMENT D
APPENDIX A
U.S. COMMITMENTS IN REGARD TO THE DEFENSE OF COUNTRIES
SUBJECT TO ARMED ATTACK BY THE SOVIET BLOC
In general, the areas which the United States is committed to
defend, as a result of its alliance obligations, its position as occupy-
ing power, or the presence of its armed forces, extend from the Western
Hemisphere (included in its entirety) across the Atlantic to include most
of western and southern Europe, and across the Pacific to include most of
the island chain off east Asia from Japan to Australia. These commitments
are not necessarily automatic, being drafted with a view to our consti-
tutional system, but nevertheless they are generally understood as mean-
ing the United States will fight a general war against the aggressor in
the event that one of these areas is directly attacked.
There is another series of countries toward which the United States
does not have specific alliance obligations but to which we stand more or
less committed as a result of authoritative public statements, whether
in the nature of a pledge or of a statement of intention or policy.
Beyond these are countries on which no such specific statements have
been made but to which military assistance is being granted under the
Mutual Security Program on the ground that their strategic location and
their will and ability to defend themselves are important to the security
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of the United States.
A fourth group consists of countries not presently receiving aid
but which under current NSC policy are regarded as of such great importance
to U.S. security that the United States would probably take military action
of some kind if they were attacked. There are, of course, among the coun-
tries in this group some variations in the degree of U.S. security interest
involved.
Subsequent sections will take up the individual countries in each of
the above four broad categories, giving the precise nature of the United
States commitment, policy or expression of interest.
It should be recalled that the United States, whatever its specific
commitments to particular countries and in particular regions, has not in-
dicated indifference to the fate of other countries and other regions where
aggression might take place. The decision to defend South Korea in 1950
illustrated our conviction that our own ultimate security and hopes of
maintaining a collective effort to preserve the Free World from piecemeal
destruction required action in an area where we had no legal commitment and
which lay beyond the perimeter of the zone considered vital, from the mili-
tary standpoint, to our immediate security. Shortly after the attack on
South Korea President Truman declared that any further act of aggression
might well strain to the breaking point the fabric of world peace. In
this and other authoritative statements American concern over direct
Soviet or satellite aggression anywhere beyond the periphery of the Soviet
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Bloc, and the possibility that it would bring on general war, have already
been made clear. Under NSC 153/1 it is a U.S. objective "to prevent sig-
nificant expansion of Soviet Bloc power, even though in certain cases
measures to this end may be used by the Soviet Bloc as a pretext for war."
A. AREAS WITH RESPECT TO WHICH CLEAR COMMITMENTS EXIST.
1. Latin America (20 republics)
The relevant articles of the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance (signed 2 September 1947 , entered into force 3 Decem-
ber 1948) are as follows:
"Article III.
"l. The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack
by any State against an American State shall be considered as
an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each
one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in
meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of in-
dividual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of
the Charter of the United Nations.
"2. On the request of the State or States directly attacked
and until the decision of the Organ of Consultation of the
Inter-American System, each one of the Contracting Parties may
determine the immediate measures which it may immediately take
in fulfillment of the obligation contained in the preceding
paragraph and in accordance with the principle of continental
solidarity. The Organ of Consultation shall meet without delay
for the purpose of examining those measures and agreeing on the
measures of a collective character that should be taken.
"3. The provisions of this Article shall be applied in case
of any armed attack which takes place within the region de-
scribed in Article 4 (Western Hemisphere) or within the terri-
tory of an American State
"4. Measures of self-defense provided for under this Article
may be taken until the Security Council of the United Nations
has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace
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and security."
"Article V.
The High Contracting Parties shall immediately send to the
Security Council of the United Nations, in conformity with
Articles 51 and 54 of the Charter of the United Nations,
complete information concerning the activities undertaken
or in contemplation in the exercise of the right of self-
defense or for the purpose of maintaining inter-American
peace and security."
2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Canada, U.K., France,
Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Portugal,
Greece, Turkey).
The relevant articles of the North Atlantic Treaty (signed
4 April 1949, entered into force 24 August 1949) are as follows:
"Article V.
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack
against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an
armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of
individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51
of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party
or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and
in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems neces-
sary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain
the security of the North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council. Such
measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has
taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain interna-
tional peace and security.'
"Article VI. (Revision of former text as result of protocol
of amendment which entered into force 15 Feb. 1952):
"For the purposes of Article V an armed attack on one or more
of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack (1) on the
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territory of any of the parties in Europe or North America, on
the Algerian departments of France, on the territory of Turkey
or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties
in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
(2) on the forces, vessels or aircraft of any of the Parties,
when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe
in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed
on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the
Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic
of Cancer."
The United States has special relationships with two of its
NATO allies, Canada and Iceland.
Canada.
Ever since President Roosevelt's statement in 1938 that "the
people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian
soil is threatened", it has been clear from the facts of geography, from
the subsequent statements of leaders on both sides of the border, and from
the joint planning and cooperation for defense that an attack on Canada
would immediately involve the United States in war at Canada's side. No
formal commitment exists, however, beyond the NATO obligations.
Iceland.
The United States, acting on behalf of NATO, has assumed a
special responsibility for the defense of Iceland. The relevant clauses
of the U.S. - Iceland Defense Agreement (signed 5 May 1951, entered into
force 5 May 1951) are the following:
"Preamble: Having regard to the fact that the people of
Iceland cannot themselves adequately secure their own defenses ..., the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization has requested, because of the unsettled
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state of world affairs, that the United States and Iceland, in view of the
collective efforts of the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty to preserve
peace and security in the North Atlantic Treaty area, make arrangements
for the use of facilities in Iceland in defense of Iceland and thus also
the North Atlantic Treaty area,"
"Article I.
The United States on behalf of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and in accordance with its responsibilities
under the North Atlantic Treaty will make arrangements re-
garding the defense of Iceland subject to the conditions
set forth in this Agreement. For this purpose and in view
of the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area, Iceland
will provide such facilities in Iceland as are mutually
agreed to be necessary."
"Article VII.
Either Government may at any time
.....
request the
Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to re-
view the continued necessity for the facilities and their
utilization, and to make recommendations to the two Govern-
ments concerning the continuation of this Agreement
"
3. Western Germany, Western Sectors Berlin, Western Austria,
Western Sectors Vienna, U.S.-U.K. Zone Free Territory of Trieste.
Article VI of the North Atlantic Treaty specifically covers
the case of an armed attack on the forces of any NATO power in these OC-
cupied areas. A U.S.-U.K. French declaration issued at the signing of the
EDC Treaty reaffirmed this commitment with respect to West Berlin. Exist-
ing directives to CINCEUR and CG/USFA stat e that in the event of deliberate
armed attack by Soviet forces against occupation forces of the U.S.-U.K. or
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France, or against their installations or the lines of communication to
or within their occupation areas, of such a nature as to jeopardize the
security of United States forces in Europe, they are authorized to imple-
ment existing emergency war plans (NSC 39). In the event of a Soviet or
satellite attack on West Berlin, the United States "will have to act on
the assumption that general war is imminent." In addition to resisting
the initial attack and placing itself in the best possible position for
immediate global war, the United States should, if circumstances permit,
address an ultimatum to the Soviet Government before full implementation
of emergency war plans, and should act with its NATO allies if possible
and obtain the widest possible support in the United Nations (NSC 132/1).
4. Japan.
By a Security Treaty concluded with Japan at the time of the
Japanese Peace Treaty, the United States undertook responsibility for the
defense of Japan, as a provisional arrangement until Japan could defend
itself, and obtained the right to maintain U.S. armed forces in Japan. The
relevant articles of the Security Treaty (signed 8 September 1951, entered
into force 28 April 1952) are the following:
"Preamble
On the coming into force of (the Peace)
Treaty, Japan will not have the effective means to exercise its inherent
right of self-defense because it has been disarmed. There is danger to
Japan in this situation because irresponsible militarism has not yet been
driven from the world
...
Japan desires, as a provisional arrangement for
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its defense, that the United States of America should maintain armed forces
of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan. The
United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, is presently
willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, in the
expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsi-
bility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, always
avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other
than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and prin-
ciples of the United Nations Charter."
"Article I.
Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts, the
right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and
of this Treaty, to dispose United States land, air and sea
forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to
contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in the
Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack
from without, including assistance given at the express re-
quest of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale
internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through in-
stigation or intervention by an outside power or powers.
"Article IV.
This Treaty shall expire whenever in the opinion of the Govern-
ments of the United States of America and Japan there shall
have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such
alternative individual or collective security dispositions
as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United
Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in
the Japan area. "
5. Ryukyu Islands and Pacific Trust Territories.
These territories, insofar as a commitment and decision to
defend them are concerned, are considered as United States territory. The
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Pacific islands are held as a security trusteeship approved by the United
Nations. While the final legal status of the Ryukyus is not yet settled,
they were occupied during the war and have been governed by the United States
ever since; U.S. forces are stationed there. Any attack on them would clearly
mean war.
6. Republic of the Philippines.
Through the agreements providing for the maintenance of U.S.
forces in the Philippines the United States has assumed responsibility for
the external defense of that country. There is also a Mutual Defense Treaty
(signed 30 August 1951, entered into force 27 August 1952), the relevant
clauses of which are as follows:
"Article IV.
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific
Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own
peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the
common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.
Any such armed attack and all measures baken as a result
thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council
of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when
the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to
restore and maintain international peace and security."
"Article V.
For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of
the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the
metropolitan territory of either of the parties, or on the
island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or
on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the
Pacific."
7. Australia and New Zealand.
The relevant clauses of the Security Treaty with Australia
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and New Zealand (signed 1 September 1951, entered into force 29 April 1952),
which is of indefinite duration, are as follows:
"Preamble:.. Desiring to declare publicly and formally their
sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under
the illusion that any of them stand alone in the Pacific Area,
and desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collec-
tive defense for the preservation of peace and security pending
the development of a more comprehensive system of regional
security in the Pacific Area. "
"Article IV.
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific
Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own
peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the
common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result
thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council
of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated
when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to
restore and maintain international security."
"Article V.
For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the
Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metro-
politan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island
territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its
armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific."
"Article VI.
This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as
affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the
Parties under the Charter of the United Nations for the main-
tenance of international peace and security."
"Article VIII.
Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of
regional security in the Pacific Area and the development
by the United Nations of more effective means to maintain
international peace and security, the Council, established
by Article VII, is authorized to maintain a consultative
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relationship with States, Regional Organizations, Associa-
tions of States or other authorities in the Pacific Area in
a position to further the purposes of this Treaty and to
contribute to the security of that Area."
B. COUNTRIES WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS DECLARED OR PUBLICLY
IMPLIED IT WILL DEFEND.
1. Republic of Korea.
The situation with respect to South Korea is complicated by
the fact that the United States is now engaged in hostilities in Korea as
an ally of that government. What the nature of the U.S. commitment will be
in the future will depend on the armistice terms, the terms of any political
settlement which may be concluded, and bilateral U.S.-Korean negotiations.
In any case it seems probable that the United States will have a de facto
commitment for some time to come, first, because U.S. forces will remain in
South Korea after an armistice, and second, because the President has
announced this Government's willingness to negotiate a mutual defense treaty
with South Korea. The relevant portion of President Eisenhower's letter
to President Rhee, released on 7 June 1953, is as follows:
"I am prepared promptly after the conclusion and acceptance of an
armistice to negotiate with you a mutual defense treaty along
the lines of the treaties heretofore made between the United
States and the Republic of the Philippines, and the United States
and Australia and New Zealand. It would cover the territory
now or hereafter brought peacefully under the administration of
the Republic of Korea. Of course you realize that under our
constitutional system any such treaty would be made only with
the advice and consent of the Senate. However, the action which
the United States has heretofore taken, and the great investment
of blood and treasure which has already been made for the inde-
pendence of Korea, are certainly clear indications of American
temper and intentions not to tolerate a repetition of unprovoked
aggression."
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2. Formosa.
The intention of the United States to protect Formosa against
any Communist attack was set forth in President Truman's statement of
27 June 1950 as follows:
"In these circumstances (the attack on South Korea) the occupation
of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the
security of the Pacific area and to United States forces per-
forming their lawful and necessary functions in that area.
Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any
attack on Formosa. As a corollary to this action, I am calling
upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea
operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that
this is done.
President Eisenhower later repealed the corollary, stating in his
State of the Union message of 2 February 1953 that "there is no longer any
logic or sense in a condition that required the United States Navy to
assume defensive responsibilities on behalf of the Chinese Communists
I am, therefore, issuing instructions that the Seventh Fleet no longer be
employed to shield Communist China."
It is current United States policy to "deny Formosa to any Chi-
nese regime aligned with or dominated by the USSR and expedite the strengthen-
ing of the defensive capabilities of Formosa. (NSC 48/5).
C. COUNTRIES RECEIVING MILITARY GRANT AID FROM THE UNITED STATES.
Most of the countries which are our formal allies or which the
United States is publicly pledged to defend are receiving military assist-
ance on a grant basis under the Mutual Security Program. Certain other
countries outside our alliance system are considered sufficiently important
to U.S. national security to warrant this effort to strengthen their
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capacity for defense. The Mutual Security Act provides with respect to
Europe, for example, that military assistance will go, in addition to NATO
countries, to any other country "which the President determines to be of
direct importance to the defense of the North Atlantic area and whose
increased ability to defend itself the President determines is important
to the preservation of the peace and security of the North Atlantic area
and to the security of the United States." (Section 101, a). With respect
to the Near East the Act states that the President may provide assistance
to any country in that area "if he determines that the strategic location
of the recipient country makes it of direct importance to the defense of
the Near Eastern area, such assistance is of critical importance to the
defense of the free nations, and the immediately increased ability of the
recipient country to defend itself is important to the preservation of the
peace and security of the area and to the security of the United States."
(Section 202).
While the United States has undertaken no obligation to fight in
the event that the countries listed below are attacked, their importance
to our security is emphasized both by their inclusion in the Military
Assistance Program and by special circumstances in each case; thus there
is a strong possibility that an attack on one of them would involve the
United States in war.
1. Yugoslavia.
The United States is now providing Yugoslavia with military
equipment at the rate of about $300 million per year. Most of that now
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being furnished is being used, under an informal understanding on the
military level, to equip Yugoslav forces whose mission is to defend the
Ljubljana Gap, the main approach to Italy from the East. Military talks
between Yugoslav and Western representatives have been initiated with a
view to coordinating war planning. Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish staff talks are
also in progress, although no firm defensive alliance of these three coun-
tries has yet been concluded. In short, measures are being taken which
should have the effect of bringing Yugoslavia into close alignmentwith NATO
so that operations may be adequately coordinated in case of war. The United
States has encouraged this trend and has supported formal recognition by
NATO of the vital importance of the maintenance of Yugoslavia's independence
to the security of the NATO countries.
High U.S. officials have stated publicly that the United States
would take a serious view of aggression against Yugoslavia and have made
clear the importance we attach to the continued independence of Yugoslavia
from Soviet control. The British and Yugoslav Governments announced, at
the time of Tito's visit to London this year, their belief that a conflict
starting with an attack on Yugoslavia could not remain localized. The
United States has made no binding commitment as to action to be taken in
the event of a Soviet or satellite attack on Yugoslavia. However, in order
that the United States may be prepared to take whatever action may be appro-
priate at the time, it is existing policy to "make and keep current plans
to provide Yugoslavia appropriate military support" in the event of Soviet
or satellite attack, such plans to be implemented in the light of the
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circumstances then existing and recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff at the time" (NSC 18/6). It must be recognized that the growing
military cooperation between Yugoslavia and NATO countries increases the
likelihood that an attack on Yugoslavia would result in general war.
2. Iran.
The modesty of the U.S. program of military aid to Iran
reflects the uncertainties of the present political situation and Iran's
delicate position between the West and the U.S.S.R. rather than any
tendency on the part of the United States to minimize the importance of Iran
to our own security. This importance has been made clear in a number of
authoritative public statements, especially during the Iranian crisis of
1946 when President Truman declared that the rivalry of the great powers in
that area could erupt suddenly into conflict and that the United Nations,
to which we were giving the lead in the crisis, "have a right to insist
that the sovereignty and integrity of the countries of the Near and Middle
East must not be threatened by coercion or penetration" (Army Day Speech,
6 April 1946).
At present the United States is proceeding on the basis that
it is of critical importance that Iran remain an independent and sovereign
nation, not dominated by the U.S.S.R. In the event of a Soviet armed attack
on Iran, "the United States in common prudence would have to proceed on the
assumption that global war is probably imminent". (NSC 136/1).
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3. Indo-China.
The United States is providing large-scale assistance to
French and Vietnamese forces fighting in Indo-China. It is American policy
to prevent Indo-China and the rest of Southeast Asia from passing into the
Communist orbit, and vigorously to oppose an overt attack on those countries
by Communist China (NSC 124/2). Official U.S. spokesmen have indicated that
the United States would not allow Communist China to take advantage of an
armistice in Korea by attacking in Indo-China. The President, in his speech
of 16 April 1953, referred to "direct and indirect attacks upon the security
of Indo-China" and stated that "any armistice in Korea that merely released
aggressive armies to attack elsewhere would be a fraud".
This subject has been discussed officially WL th the French
Government in the same sense, but without the giving of any precise commit-
ment to the French as to what military action the United States would take
in the event of obvious and direct Chinese aggression in Indo-China. The
United States has, however, favored the idea of issuing a tripartite U.S.-
U.K.-French warning to Communist China of the grave consequences of such
aggression. Since agreement has not been reached on the military action to
be taken by the three powers in such an event, the warning has not yet been
issued.
In case of overt intervention by Chinese Communist forces or
of covert participation to such an extent as to jeopardize retention of the
Tonkin Delta by French Union forces, it is presently contemplated that the
United States would take military action against China but not against the
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U.S.S.R. We would take the following measures (NSC 125/2):
a. Support a request by France or the Associated States
for immediate action by the United Nations which would include a U.N. reso-
lution declaring that Communist China has committed an aggression, recommend-
ing that member states take whatever action may be necessary, without geo-
graphic limitation, to assist France and the Associated States in meeting
the aggression.
b. Whether or not UN action is immediately forthcoming, seek
the maximum possible international support for, and participation in, the
minimum courses of military action agreed upon by the parties to the joint
warning ("C" below).
C. Carry out the following minimum courses of military action
either under the auspices of the U.N. or in conjunction with France and the
U.K. and any other friendly governments: (1) a resolute defense of Indo-
China itself to which the United States would provide such air and naval
assistance as might be practicable; (2) interdiction of Chinese Communist
communication lines including those in China. The United States would provide
the major force for the latter task and would expect France and the Asso-
ciated States to carry the burden of providing ground defense forces. The
United States would also, if appropriate to the situation, establish a
naval blockade, in conjunction with the U.K. and France, of Communist China,
intensify covert operations to aid anti-communist guerrilla forces in China,
utilize as desirable and feasible anti-communist Chinese forces, including
Chinese Nationalist forces, in military operations in Southeast Asia, Korea,
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or China proper, and provide assistance to cover necessary evacuations of
allied forces. If, subsequent to aggression against Indo-China and execu-
tion of the minimum necessary courses of action mentioned above, the United
States should determine jointly with the U.K. and France that the situation
required expanded military action, the United States and those two allies
would take air and naval action against all suitable military targets in
China, avoiding insofar as practicable those targets in areas near the
boundary of the U.S.S.R. in order not to increase the risk of direct Soviet
involvement. If French and British concurrence to expanded military action
against Communist China were not obtained, the United States would consider
taking unilateral action (NSC 124/2).
4. Thailand.
Military equipment is being provided by the United States to
Thailand to assist it in creating conditions of internal security and
maintaining its alignment with the Free World. In the event of communist
domination of either Burma or Indo-China, the United States would immediately
put into effect whatever measures may be determined as feasible to forestall
an invasion of Thailand or a seizure of power by local Thai communists. In
the event of Chinese Communist aggression against Thailand, the United States
would (a) support an appeal to the U.N. by the Thai Government; (b) consistent
with world-wide U.S. commitments, take appropriate military action against
Communist China as part of a U.N. collective action or in conjunction with
France and the U.K. and any other friendly governments; (c) employ as desirable
and feasible anti-communist Chinese forces, including Chinese Nationalist
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forces, in military operations in Southeast Asia, Korea, or China proper
(NSC 124/2).
D. COUNTRIES CONSIDERED IMPORTANT TO UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY
BUT TO WHICH NO MILITARY GRANT AID IS BEING GIVEN.
Several countries whose strategic location or resources make them
particularly important in terms of our security interests are nevertheless
not participating in the program of military grant aid, because of traditional
neutrality, fear of American "imperialism", fear of provoking the U.S.S.R.
or China, or special circumstances of one kind or another, although some of
them are purchasing considerable military supplies in the United States under
the "reimbursable aid" provisions of the Mutual Security Program. While in
no sense members of an American-led alliance system or bloc, however, their
loss by the Free World would seriously affect the strategic and political
position on which our alliances and our security rest. Therefore, it is most
likely that an attack launched on any of these countries from the Soviet bloc
would carry with it the likelihood of a general war.
1. Sweden.
By its attempts to include Sweden in NATO at the time of its
formation, the United States showed its conviction with respect to Sweden's
strategic importance in the system of Western defense. It is current United
States policy to encourage closer association of Sweden with its NATO
neighbors and with the United States, recognizing the importance of adequate
Swedish defense to the defense of Denmark and Norway. While it would be to
our interest to have Sweden in NATO, Sweden's policy of avoiding alliances
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is recognized as a political fact to be taken into account as the United
States does what it can to strengthen Sweden's military establishment, increase
its contribution to Western defense, and place it in the best possible posi-
tion to resist Soviet pressure or aggression (NSC 121).
Sweden is so closely tied to its Scandinavian neighbors that
it seems likely that any Soviet attack on Sweden would soon involve them
and thus the rest of NATO.
2. Switzerland,
Switzerland also follows a traditional neutrality policy and
has not wished to accept military grant aid from the United States. On the
ground that Switzerland's ability to defend itself is important to our
security, we have provided reimbursable military aid and have attempted to
expand the area of Swiss cooperation with the NATO defense effort. It is
our purpose ultimately to work out with Switzerland coordinated defense
plans which would become effective in the event Swiss territory is violated
by the Soviets or the Swiss determine that an attack is imminent (NSC 119).
As Switzerland is not adjacent to the territory of the Soviet
Bloc, any Soviet attack on Swiss territory would probably follow Soviet
aggression elsewhere against an area to the defense of which the United
States is formally committed. The question of a commitment or policy
decision to fight in case of aggression against Switzerland is therefore
somewhat academic.
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3. Spain.
Spain is still in the category of countries not receiving
military aid, for which Congress has already appropriated funds, only because
the negotiations involving this question and that of U.S. naval and air bases
in Spain have not been completed. Geographically, Spain is surrounded by
NATO countries, which could not permit it to fall under Soviet control. For
political reasons, however, it has not been taken into NATO, and neither
the United States nor its NATO partners are formally committed to Spain's
defense. It is an objective of U.S. policy to cbtain early Spanish partici-
pation in NATO, and pending that eventuality to conclude alternative mutual
security arrangements which would include Spain and which would not prejudice
the above objective. While these matters are under negotiation and it is not
clear to what extent Spain will be committed to more than defense of its own
territory, American policy is directed toward developing urgently the
military potentialities of Spain's strategic geographic position for the
common defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area, not solely for the defense
of the Iberian Peninsula (NSC 72/6).
4. Morocco, Tunisia, Libya.
Morocco and Tunisia are French protectorates, with which the
U.S. Government does not have direct diplomatic relations or military agree-
ments. They are not covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, as is Algeria.
However, their strategic location and particularly the existence of U.S. air
bases in Morocco give the United States a vital interest in their defense
against any attack.
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The United States also has an important air base in Libya,
which presumably it would defend, but has not assumed any direct obligation
to the Libyan Government concerning action to be taken in case of aggression
against Libya,
5. Arab States and Israel.
The United States is not committed to the defense of the Arab
states or Israel, but it recognizes the political and strategic importance
of this area as so great that it is in its own security interest to take
whatever appropriate measures it can to prevent the extension of Soviet
influence, strengthen the will and ability of these countries to resist
possible fubure aggression by the U.S.S.R., and insure that the resources
of the area are available to the United States and its allies for use in
strengthening the Free World (NSC 129/1).
By proposing jointly with the U.K., France and Turkey the
formation of a Middle East Command (October 1951) and by later declaring
its interest in a Middle East Defense Organization in which both Middle
Eastern countries and outside powers having interests in the area would
cooperate in its defense, the United States has publicly indicated that it
is prepared to undertake specific obligations for the defense of the Middle
East whenever it becomes possible to build the necessary alliance or defense
organization, which presumably will require prior settlement of the major
Arab-Israel and British-Egyptian disputes. It is current U.S. policy to con-
tinue efforts to establish MEC or MEDO in concert with the U.K., France and
Turkey, making every appropriate effort to obtain the participation of the
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states in the area and the contribution of at least token forces from
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, and when practicable, from Pakistan.
While maintaining flexibility as to the commitment of U.S. forces for the
local defense of the area in the event of general war, the United States is
prepared to assign token forces in a Middle East defense arrangement if U.S.
willingness to bake this Action is seen to be the key to the establishment
of such an arrangement and to the settlement of the dispute between the U.K.
and Egypt (NSC 129/1). Official U.S. statements of willingness to participate
in MEDO obviously do not commit us to anything at this time. But they may
be taken as indicating that the United States is prepared, in some circum-
stances, to accept a commitment to take military action in the event of Soviet
aggression in the Middle East against an Arab state or Israel, Iran, or even
Pakistan.
Since the Arab states and Israel do not border on Soviet ter-
ritory, the question of direct aggression probably would not arise vatil
there had been earlier Soviet aggression or internal take-over in Turkey or
Iran. The vital American concern with the entire Middle East, however, makes
it impossible to ignore the threat which the instability, weakness and vul-
nerability of these states represents. It is recognized that until some
progress is made in the political sphere, it will be most difficult to build
a regional defense organization or to gain much through military programs
to individual countries. Saudi Arabia is in a rather special position in
that it is less vulnerable to attack, contains the most important petroleum
resources, and has an agreement with the United States granting use of the
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air base at Chahran. The United States has a bilateral agreement with Saudi
Arabia (18 June 1951) providing for the extension of procurement assistance
in the purchase of military equipment in the United States, under the terms
of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949.
6. Burma.
Burma concluded an agreement with the United States in 1950
on the provision of military assistance, in which Burma accepted in very
watered-down form the principles laid down in the Mutual Defense Assistance
Act of 1949, but only a limited amount of aid was provided under this agree-
ment and Burma has since crossed itself off the list of recipients not only
of military aid but of economic and technical aid as well. Following a
policy of "neutrality" in the cold war, Burma has shown no inclination to
seek any alliance or guarantee from the United States. Burma is nevertheless
of great importance to the security of the United States as a key position
in Southeast Asia, the loss of which to the Soviet Bloc would render the U.S.
position in the Pacific offshore island chain precarious and would seriously
jeopardize fundamental U.S. security interests in the Far East. In the event
of overt Chinese Communist aggression against Burma, the United States would
support an appeal to the United Nations by the Burmese Government, and con-
sistent with world-wide U.S. commitments, would take appropriate military
action against Communist China as part of a U.N. collective action or in con-
junction with France and the U.K. and any other friendly governments, employ-
ing as desirable anti-communist Chinese forces in military operations in
Southeast Asia, Korea, or China proper (NSC 124/2).
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7. Malaya.
The United States has no specific commitments to or aid
programs for Malaya, since it is a dependent territory of the United Kingdom.
Because of its particular strategic and economic importance, however, it is
recognized that the loss of Malaya by the Free World would seriously jeopardize
fundamental U.S. security interests and could result in such economic and
political pressures in Japan as to make it difficult to prevent Japan's
ultimate accommodation to communism. It is United States policy to support
the British in their measures to eradicate communist guerrilla forces in
Malaya, and, in the event of Chinese Communist aggression against Malaya,
in addition to appropriate military action contemplated against Communist
China, to assist in the defense of Malaya as appropriate, as part of a
U.N. collective action or in conjunction with the United Kingdom and any
other friendly governments (NSC 124/2).
8. Indonesia.
Indonesia, like Burma, has tried to follow a policy of
neutrality and non-involvement in the cold war. It has received only limited
military aid, in 1951, in the form of equipment for the national police. It
has been reluctant even to agree to the terms required for the receipt of
economic aid from the United States. Indonesia is of such strategic and
economic importance to the United States and the Free World, however, that
the consequences of its falling into Communist hands would be very serious.
It is current U.S. policy, in the event of a seizure or attempted seizure
by internal communist action in Indonesia, to seek maximum international
response to a request by the legal government for friendly nations to come
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to its assistance against the insurgents, and, consistent with world-wide
U.S. commitments, to take appropriate military and other action to wrest
the area from communist control. In the event of Chinese Communist aggres-
sion against Indonesia, the United States would, in addition to military
action contemplated against Communist China, take appropriate military action
to assist in the defense of Indonesia as a part of a U.N. collective action or
in conjunction with other friendly governments (NSC 124/2).
9. India.
India is vociferously "neutral" in the cold war and has tried
to avoid measures which would seem to align it with the United States and
other Western nations, although it did go so far as to conclude an agreement
with the United States (16 March 1951) covering the furnishing of military
equipment by the latter, accepting the obligation "to use such items as may
be provided to foster international peace and security within the framework
of the Charter of the U.N. through measures which will further the ability
of nations dedicated to the principles and purposes of the Charter to partici-
pate effectively in arrangements for individual and collective self-defense
in support of those purposes and principles. " There has been, however,
no program of military grant aid to India.
The United States is proceeding on the basis of the proposition
that the loss of India to the Soviet Bloc "would mean that for all practical
purposes all of Asia will have been lost; this would constitute a serious
threat to the security position of the United States" (NSC 98/1). U.S.
policy is therefore directed toward improving our security position by pursuit
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of the following objectives, among others: (a) development of sound, endur-
ing friendly relations with India; (b) continuance in power of a non-Communist
Government, the strengthening of its ability to resist Communist Imperialism
in Asia, and its association with the United States and like-minded countries
in opposition to Communism; (c) development of attitudes which would assist
the United States and its Allies to obtain the facilities desired in time
of peace or required in the event of war, and which would prevent the U.S.S.R.
from obtaining military support or assistance from India either directly or
indirectly. While there has been no decision on how the United States would
react to an attack on India by the U.S.S.R. or Communist China, the critical
threat to our security position which such an attack would represent is clearly
recognized (NSC 98/1).
Nepal and Bhutan, which border on Communist-controlled Tibet
and have a protected status in relation to India, presumably would be con-
sidered as falling within whatever policies the United States adopts with
respect to India.
10. Pakistan.
The position of Pakistan relative to U.S. security interests
is roughly similar to that of India. Pakistan also concluded a military
aid agreement with the United States (15 December 1950) but has not been a
recipient of grant aid. The same U.S. objectives and policies mentioned
above in relation to India apply also to Pakistan. As in the case of India,
the geographical location of the country, its size and resources, the
prestige and influence of its leaders, and other factors make it an important
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U.S. interest to deny Pakistan to the Soviet Bloc. Pakistan, however, has
been more inclined to cooperate with the West than has India; the chief
difficulty from our viewpoint has been that to encourage this tendency, so
long as Kashmir and other issues divide the two nations, is to run the risk
of alienating India.
Pakistan has been considered by the United States as a logical
eventual member of MEDO (NSC 129/1) and also of a possible South Asian
regional grouping of non-Communist countries including India and possibly
Afghanistan and Ceylon (NSC 98/1). Neither of these regional defense organi-
zations is anywhere near realization at the moment. Accordingly, the United
States may have to decide with reference to Pakistan alone what action it
will take in the eventuality of aggression against that country.
E. OTHER COUNTRIES SUBJECT TO POSSIBLE AGGRESSION FROM THE SOVIET BLOC.
Two other countries to which we have no commitments deserve mention
because they border on the Soviet Bloc and are open to possible attack from
that direction, an eventuality which would require, either in advance or at
the time, policy decisions for appropriate action on the part of the United
States.
1. Afghenisten.
The U.S. objectives with respect to India and Pakistan,
mentioned above, apply also to Afghanistan although with lessened force
because India and Pakistan are the "key" nations of the South Asian area
(NSC 98/1). Continuance in power of a non-Communist Government in
Afghanistan and the strengthening of its ability and determination to resist
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Communist imperialism, individually and collectively with other South Asian
nations, are the principal American objectives. Limited U.S. economic and
technical assistance is furnished in support of these objectives. However,
there is no military assistance program for Afghanistan, and there is no
policy decision on how the United States would react to a Soviet attack on
Afghanistan.
2. Finland.
Finland is in a special position in that it is not Soviet-
dominated and therefore not a member of the Soviet Bloc, but it has treaty
relationships with the U.S.S.R. providing for a Soviet naval base on its
territory (Peace Treaty of 1947) and establishing certain mutual defense obli-
gations in case of an attack on Finland or on the U.S.S.R. through Finland
(Treaty of mutual assistance, 6 April 1948). The latter treaty specifically
takes into consideration "Finland's endeavors not to be involved in clashes
between great powers" and also provides that neither party will enter into
any alliance or take part in any coalition against the other.
From the standpoint of military strategy, Finland is already
in Soviet hands. Destruction of Finland's independence, therefore, would
not greatly increase the Soviet threat to the NATO position in the Baltic
although it would have important political significance and would be a shock
to the Scandinavian countries, especially Sweden.
The key to U.S. policy with respect to Finland is to avoid
any steps which would threaten the delicate balance of Finnish-Soviet
relations and call forth drastic Soviet measures inimical to Finnish
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independence (NSC 121). It is in our interest that Finland maintain its
independence, but since there is little the United States can do directly
to help Finland resist Soviet pressures, it is considered unwise to assume
the role of Finland's protector. Nevertheless, a clear-cut aggressive Soviet
move, in violation of existing treaties, to occupy Finland and impose a
Soviet-dominated regime would present the United States with the need for
deciding whether to take action, through the U.N., through NATO or unilater-
ally, or to accept the aggression as a fait accompli.
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