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Report to the National Security Council by Project Solarium Task Force C - Part 1 of 9
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Report to the National Security Council by Project Solarium Task Force C - Part 1 of 9
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TOP-SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
SOL-TF/C-1
COPY NO. 24
OHL
buight
E
A REPORT
Library
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
by
TASK FORCE "C"
of
PROJECT SOLARIUM
on
A COURSE OF ACTION WHICH THE UNITED STATES MIGHT
PRESENTLY OR IN THE FUTURE UNDERTAKE WITH RESPECT
TO THE SOVIET POWER BLOC - ALTERNATIVE "C"
16 July 1953
WASHINGTON, D.C.
I
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLE 2011-122
theru page 37
By MMK NLDDE Date 6/27/12
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TOP SECRET
PREFACE
SECURITY INFORMATION
D
WASHINGTON, D. C.
16 July 1953
941
Dwight D
PREFACE
Library
Pursuant to its directive, Task Force C of Project SOLARIUM has studied,
developed, and evaluated a course of action to carry out the broad line of
policy for the United States set forth in Alternative C. The results of our
work are presented in the attached report.
As directed, the Task Force has focussed its efforts particularly on the
oral presentation to the National Security Council, the full text of which
is contained in Part Two of the report. The presentation is supported by, and
was derived from Part Three, the main body of the report, in which is set
forth our more comprehensive staff study and plan.
The work of our Task Force has had as its purpose "to assist the National
Security Council in making its recommendations of the best courses of action
to be adopted by the United States."
We were instructed to act as advocates of Policy C in developing our
presentation and report, but to express any individual reservations or dis-
sents considered necessary. There have proved to be no reservations of this
nature on the program as a whole. Details and particulars, however, remain
subject to further evaluation and study.
We are agreed upon the program of action set forth in our report as a
generally valid and feasible means of carrying out Policy Alternative C.
We are further agreed that Policy Alternative C, thus carried into effect,
offers major returns and advantages as a basic policy for the United States.
These advantages are set forth in detail in the report.
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SECURITY SECRETED INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.
PREFACE
16 July 1953
We respectfully recommend this report to the consideration of the
National Security Council.
Vice Admiral R.L. Conolly, U.S. Navy, Chairman
Lieutenant U.S. Army
General L.L. Lemnitzer,
G. F. Reinhardt
Kilbourne Wilbourne Johnston finstan
Andrew Andrew Bradpasher
Colonel J. Goodpaster U.S. Army
Leslie
Leslies S. Brady Brady
H. 115 Phinson
Colonel Harold K. Johnson, U.S. Army
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Preface
i
PART ONE
I.
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
1
II.
SUMMARY OF COURSE OF ACTION PROPOSED; RECOMMENDATION
3
PART TWO
III.
ORAL PRESENTATION
A. The Problem
9
B. The Program
15
PART THREE
IV.
THE TASK ASSIGNED
A.
Clarification and Differentiation of
Alternative "C"
71
B. Basic Reasoning Supporting Alternative "C"
73
V.
METHOD OF ATTACK EMPLOYED
78
VI.
PLAN IN BROADEST TERMS
A. Basic Premises
83
B. Principles of Aggressive Cold War
85
C. General Objectives in Over-all Concept
91
VII.
MAIN COURSES OF ACTION
A. Functional Actions
1. Political and Diplomatic
97
III
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2. Military
106
3. Economic
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4.
Propaganda and Education
122
5.
Covert Operations
131
B.
Regional Actions
1. U.S.S.R.
144
2. Satellites
156
3. China
165
4. Free Europe - Northwest Africa
171
5. Middle East - Northeast Africa
182
6. Sub-Equatorial Africa, Latin America
190
7. Northeast Asia
202
8. Southeast Asia
208
C.
U.S. Governmental Procedures for
Implementation
228
VIII. EVALUATIONS OF RESULTS, RISKS, AND COSTS
A. Analysis of Soviet Reactions and Evaluation
of Risk
232
B. Evaluation of Results
239
C. Evaluation of Costs, Legislative Requirements
Public Opinion, and Reactions of Allies
244
IX.
SUMMARY OF LINES OF ACTION - SHORT TERM
257
IV
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ENCLOSURE 1. MAINTENANCE OF THE ECONOMY
THE LIGHT Dwight Di
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APPENDIX A. COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN LATIN
AMERICAN COUNTRIES
A-1
APPENDIX B. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON INDO-CHINA
B-1
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WASHINGTON, D. C.
PREFACE
SECURITY INFORMATION
16 July 1953
The
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PREFACE
LIBIRTY
Pursuant to its directive, Task Force C of Project SOLARIUM has studied,
developed, and evaluated a course of action to carry out the broad line of
policy for the United States set forth in Alternative C. The results of our
work are presented in the attached report.
As directed, the Task Force has focussed its efforts particularly on the
oral presentation to the National Security Council, the full text of which
is contained in Part Two of the report. The presentation is supported by, and
was derived from Part Three, the main body of the report, in which is set
forth our more comprehensive staff study and plan.
The work of our Task Force has had as its purpose "to assist the National
Security Council in making its recommendations of the best courses of action
to be adopted by the United States."
We were instructed to act as advocates of Policy C in developing our
presentation and report, but to express any individual reservations or dis-
sents considered necessary. There have proved to be no reservations of this
nature on the program as a whole. Details and particulars, however, remain
subject to further evaluation and study.
We are agreed upon the program of action set forth in our report as a
generally valid and feasible means of carrying out Policy Alternative C.
We are further agreed that Policy Alternative C, thus carried into effect,
offers major returns and advantages as a basic policy for the United States.
These advantages are set forth in detail in the report.
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PREFACE
SECURITY INFORMATION
16 July 1953
We respectfully recommend this report to the consideration of the
National Security Council.
Rl Vice Admiral Consiles R.L. Conolly U.S.
Navy, Chairman
Lieutenant Army
L General Lemity L.L. Lemnitzer, U.S.
G.F
G. F. Reinhardt
Kilbourne Wilborra Johnston finston
Colonel J. Goodpaster, U.S. Army
Andrew Andrew Bradpasher
Leslie
Leslies S. Brady Brady
Hank glinson
Colonel Harold K. Johnson, U.S. Army
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PART ONE
I - STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
1. To study, develop and evaluate a course of action designed to
carry out a broad line of policy for the United States as set forth in
Alternative C:
"a. The policy of the United States would be:
(1) To increase efforts to disturb and weaken the Soviet
bloc and to accelerate the consolidation and
strengthening of the free world to enable it to assume
the greater risks involved; and
(2) To create the maximum disruption and popular
resistance throughout the Soviet bloc.
"b. The purpose of this policy would be, by actions such as those
suggested below, to force the Soviets to shift their efforts
to holding what they already have rather than concentrating
on gaining control of additional territories and peoples
and, at the same time, to produce a climate of victory
encouraging to the free world. While this policy is not
designed to provoke a war with the Soviet Union, it involves
a substantial risk of general war which will vary according
to the nature and timing of the steps taken to implement it.
"c. The following actions should be among those considered, with
proper time phasing, as means of implementing the above
policy:
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(1) To remove the threat arising from the Moscow-Peiping
axis by (a) bringing about the overthrow of the Peiping
regime or (b) separating Peiping from Moscow.
(2) To take such steps as are practicable to separate
selected peripheral areas from the Iron Curtain.
Examples might be Hainan, Albania, and possibly Kwantung
Province, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.
(3) To bring about clear-cut defeats, by military and other
means, of present local Communist aggressions in Indo-
China and Korea and the effective suppression of
Communist-inspired guerrilla operations in Malaya, the
Philippines, and other areas. If
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II - SUMMARY OF COURSE OF ACTION PROPOSED;
RECOMMENDATION
A.
SUMMARY OF COURSE OF ACTION PROPOSED
1. There follows a brief summary of the course of action envisaged
by Task Force C for the accomplishment of Alternative C set forth above.
This course of action has been time-phased, in that a time-table involving
three distinct phases of action has been developed. In establishing this
time-table the basic problem has been to correlate the timing of actions
(political, military and economic) by the United States against the time
when the Soviet Union will be capable of dealing a destructive blow to the
United States. A realistic estimation and assessment of Soviet capabilities
has been developed and presented. It leads us to the conclusion that by
the end of five years, our current atomic capability, while growing, will
be neutralized largely by decisive stocks and delivery capabilities in the
hands of the Soviet Union. For timing purposes then, the short-term period,
and the one in which specific tasks are recommended, is set at five years
(although certain courses of action initiated during this period may continue
into later periods). The mid-term period is set at seven years beyond the
end of the short-term. For this period no specific tasks but rather
general courses of action are recommended. The long term is that period
beyond the mid-term, with no set terminus. For this period neither spe-
cific tasks nor specific courses of action are recommended--rather, we
merely summarize our ultimate objectives, which should be attained during
this final phase.
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2. In broad terms, the first phase involves the following general
courses of action:
a. Development of a suitable posture of strength by the United
States and its Allies.
b. Development of a world-wide covert apparatus.
C. Initiation of attacks on the Communist apparatus, particularly
in the areas outside the borders of the Soviet Bloc.
d. Penetration by all possible means of the Soviet Bloc.
3. In the mid-term (1958-1965) the following general guidelines are
established:
a. Continued development of covert apparatus.
b. Mop-up of Communist control apparatus outside of Soviet Bloc
and continued surveillance to prevent resurgence.
C. Direct attacks (not military) on Satellites.
d. Continued effort against Communist China.
e. Continued pressure on the Soviet Union.
4. In the long term, after 1965, will occur the reduction of those
Satellites not defected earlier and direct pressure against the Soviet
Union.
5. Section IV in the body of this report indicates the specific
courses of action to be taken within the short term by area and country,
where applicable.
6. Mid-term courses of action:
a. It is not deemed feasible to specify courses of action under
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Alternative C for a period that is five years away, except to point out
general actions that would be initiated but would culminate during the
short-term period. At the end of the short-term period, in 1958, we believe
that under Alternative C we would have increased strength around the world.
No lasting peace would have been attained in Korea due to Communist
intransigeance. We would have dealt a severe blow to Chinese prestige
through the administration of a sound military defeat and the destruction
of some of their industrial centers. We would have imposed a severe drain
on Soviet industries to re-equip the Chinese and at the same time have
imposed a strain on relationships between the two countries. China would
have demonstrated no progress toward self-sufficiency. Current conditions
of poverty would exist and unrest would be on the rise.
b. In Europe, we would present a united front. Germany would
be united and ostensibly committed to neither side, although definitely
oriented toward the free world which would provide the bulk of her markets;
or, alternatively, she would still be divided but Western Germany would
be an armed and active partisan of the West. [Soviet armed forces would
be withdrawn within the borders of the Soviet Union, although poised on
the border to bolster control over the Satellites.7 There would be con-
tinued governmental shifts in the Satellites and general conditions per-
taining to living standards would show continued deterioration giving
rise to more unrest. This condition might well arise in particular
countries at any time during the short-term period, but would be general
by the end of the period, unless there were a turn-about on the part
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of the Kremlin which is held by this Task Force to be unlikely.
c. In the Middle East, an acceptable degree of internal stability
would have been attained. Only a limited military capability would have
been developed beyond Turkey, although this capability would be such as
to counter anything less than an all-out effort on the part of the Soviets
if they were to decide to encroach upon this territory.
d. In Sub-equatorial Africa and in Latin America an acceptable
degree of stability would be attained and a substantial part of the
Communist conspiracy destroyed.
e. Within this framework we propose the following guidelines for
the second phase:
(1) Political:
(a) Continued "hard" policy toward our enemies, but
tempered by an increased willingness to bargain, since we will be nego-
tiating from a position of strength.
(b) Continued friendship toward those areas, primarily
Latin America, neutralist Asia and Sub-equatorial Africa, in which the
Communist threat has been materially reduced.
(c) Continued effort to maintain the support of Allies,
although resorting to a "hard" policy when required. Our task is to
command respect, not necessarily love and devotion.
(d) All-out political offensive to overthrow Satellite
governments and bring them into the family of free nations.
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(2) Military:
(a) Continued maintenance of a strong base at home, with
forces deployed world-wide as best serves the interests of moving in on the
Soviet Union--actually tightening encirclement, not overt military attack.
(b) Continued stress and support of preparedness on the
part of our Allies, with emphasis on those countries adjacent to Satellite
territories.
(3) Economic:
(a) Continued limited aid in those areas where Point IV
aspects of current aid have been stressed.
(b) Reduced economic aid where applicable but continued
support of military forces in being on a sustaining basis. This envisages
a marked reduction in economic aid in Western Europe and in Japan.
(4) Propaganda and Education: Increased tempo of the attack
on the Soviet Union.
(5) Covert:
(a) Use of covert elements in the Satellites as they
are marked for overthrow or subversion.
(b) Increased covert effort within the Soviet Union
and within Communist China.
7. Long Term:
a. At the end of the mid-term or in 1965, it is envisaged that the
Satellites will be freed, or in such a state of disaffection with the
U.S.S.R. as to constitute a serious weakness rather than strength in the
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Soviet Bloc. The strains between Communist China and the U.S.S.R. will have
reached a point where prospects are favorable for driving a final wedge
between them.
b. There will be two ultimate objectives in the long term:
(1) The reduction of Soviet power and militancy and the
elimination of the Communist conspiracy; and
(2) Overthrow of the Communist regime in China.
Since this phase of the conflict is in the distant future, no specific
courses of action are recommended. It is important to keep these objectives
in mind throughout all periods. No action should be undertaken that does
not lead ultimately to the goal of liquidation of the Communist menace.
B.
RECOMMENDATION
1. Task Force C recommends the adoption of Alternative C as a policy
for the United States. It is our considered judgment that the most feasible
method of attaining our objectives and, at the same time, of avoiding
general war is to end the cold war. We are convinced that the only way
to end the cold war is to face up to the challenge posed by the Communist
conspiracy and devote the necessary effort to the task of winning the
cold war. Alternative C should be adopted because it is a positive course
of action designed to seize the strategic initiative and deliberately
undertake the task of eliminating the Communist threat to the free world.
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PART TWO
III - ORAL PRESENTATION
A.
THE PROBLEM
1. In accordance with the directive of the National Security Council,
Task Force C has formulated and now presents an alternative course of action.
Our concept of planned action requires that the United States seize the
political initiative and operate aggressively against the Soviet Bloc by
waging a political offensive. Such a strategy would, while not designed
to provoke war, accept a substantial risk of war, whenever justified by
the gains to be achieved. With the belief that we cannot live with a
political stalemate because of the rising threat to our existence posed by
our adversary, Task Force C recommends that the United States unoquivocally
accept the challenge. It should be made plain that our real enemy is the
organization in the Kremlin which has usurped power and exercises control
over the world-wide Communist apparatus, the Soviet armed forces, the secret
police and thus the enslaved peoples of the Soviet Union. It has announced
intentions to overthrow our government, subvert our institutions and absorb
us into its system. (We have no reason to doubt that it means just that.)
In this struggle we want victory and to attain our ends and frustrate theirs
we must proceed to bring about the political subversion and liquidation of
the conspiracy against us.
2. In order that we gain victory, in this so-called cold war, the
United States must set as its goal the same objectives or aims that we
would require for an acceptable end to a "hot war." Sufficient to say that
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if we could achieve these aims by political means, even combined with mili-
tary operations short of general war, we would have eliminated this mortal
threat and have secured the nation and the free world from subjugation.
3. Courses of action previously followed have at various times
employed the measures prescribed by Alternatives A and B. Task Force C
believes that restrictions imposed on such courses of action have greatly
limited their effectiveness. While results have been sometimes rewarding,
usually resulting from sporadic and localized departure from a passive
attitude, the whole underlying philosophy has been negative and defensive.
Implied acceptance of the status quo disqualifies both those alternatives
as means to lasting security and a free world. Time has been working
against us. We must arrest, reverse the trend by positive action. What
is needed is dynamic, offensive, political action started now and progres-
sively accelerated. We would proceed to the attainment of definite middle-
term goals but always with sustained and unrelenting resolution to achieve
our ultimate aim, the downfall of our enemy. It is time that we began to
force the pace.
4. In this conflict one is either winning or losing. There can be no
continuing balance, no state of real world stability in the face of this
implacable conspiracy. We have lost ground for a decade. Loss of our ex-
clusive atomic supremacy and growing Russian atomic capabilities further
reduces our margin of security.
5. The present situation cannot be considered as an acceptable basis
for a settlement. We are still losing. It is explicitly stated in our
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directive that Task Force C would propose action that accepts greater risks,
involves greater efforts. It is unmistakably implied that we must procure
greater results sooner and with more certainty.
6. The fundamental danger in the world situation is due to a relative
preponderance of ready military power available to our enemy on the Eurasian
land mass coupled with his aggressive imperalistic intentions. The power
imbalance has existed ever since the defeat of Germany and Japan and our
precipitate demobilization, together with tardy and sometimes reluctant
rearming, and that only since the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. The
intentions of our adversary have been increasingly evident from the end of
the war and were unmistakably disclosed by the subversion of Czechoslovakia
in 1948. In spite of the present "Peace Offensive" and the possible tempo-
rary assumption of a defensive attitude, there is no real reason to believe
that these intentions have been lastingly modified. In spite of some dis-
array in the command organization, we find its sources of power intact and
its menace unabated.
7. Before proceeding further, it would be profitable to define the term
"cold war. " We have searched for a better term but found none. We intend to
use it to describe the condition of international struggle in which we are
now engaged. This encompasses every form of military and political conflict
short of a general war of global scope with our principal adversary, the
U.S.S.R. itself.
8. Task Force C believes that there is only one central threat to our
security: the combination of "the formidable power and aggressive policy of
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the Communist world led by the U.S.S.R." This threatens many of our basic
institutions including our powerful economy, the political freedom of the
individual, and our whole national manner of free life. But the primary
threat is certainly to our existence as a free and sovereign nation. The
others should, we believe, be considered as stemming from it.
9. The political strategist must form his own estimate of the risk
involved in each proposed action. It is estimated that the Soviet Union
will not be satisfied with maintaining permanently a defensive posture in
order to avoid risk of general war and with the purpose of consolidating
its present position. It will accomplish this purpose by continued aggres-
sive pressure accepting some considerable risk of general war, interspersed
with active phases of "Peace Offensives." This has been the pattern of its
action and obviously indicates a policy that it has followed with success.
There seems to be every indication that it will continue such a policy but
with variations to suit the times and in readiness to exploit opportunities.
One variation might be: assumption temporarily of the passive defensive.
This would provide the Soviet Union opportunity for consolidation of posi-
tion and controls. But the worst possible effect would be to undermine the
determination and resistance of the United States and its Allies.
10. We have accepted the National Intelligence Estimate No. 65, which
sets forth Soviet capabilities. We believe that the U.S.S.R. will have by
1955 a considerable stock pile of atomic weapons and a capability of deliver-
ing it against vital targets in the Continental United States. This threat,
within a few years, if not effectively countered, would dangerously imperil
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our ability to wage a general war against the U.S.S.R. The rapid development
of defensive measures therefore is imperative. It is necessary that we pros-
ecute our intensified campaign during the period when our atomic superiority
is significant and to reach a decision before our enemy has achieved the
atomic "enough" point.
11. We believe that our present military strength justifies the initia-
tion of the first phase of our program. As the intensity of our attack there
after increases, we will require increased military strength to back our
action. This must be both "ready," to deal with localized situations, and
"potential" (including the ready strength), to deal with the possibility of
general war and to serve as a deterrent to it.
12. Alternative C will produce added strains upon ties with our Allies.
Where any positive course of action is projected, we cannot expect unanimity.
While not advocating a policy of "going-it-alone," we would be forced on
occasion, after exhausting every means to secure concurrence of Allies, to
proceed unilaterally. Effective action must not be inhibited nor achievement
of our ultimate aims frustrated.
13. We must not be content with our present position. Mere containment
is sterile as a continuing policy. Threat of retaliation by invoking genera
war will not suffice to restrain our enemy from continued erosive action
against our world position. It is necessary that we create a climate of
victory. Success in our cold war operations will encourage our Allies and
cement them to us. It will favorably influence friends and neutrals and
make possible their adherence to us. It will weaken our enemy and create
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defection in his Satellites and unrest and deterioration in his state-
structure. We can make no acceptable peace with the group in the Kremlin.
We must proceed to bring about the destruction of its power and the over-
throw of its leadership.
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B.
THE PROGRAM
1. Objectives and Over-All Concept
a. I will now take up the over-all concepts and objectives which
we have adopted as the framework for action. We have developed a statement
of objectives paralleling closely the general peacetime objectives of NSC
153/1, but have added the wartime objectives.
b. we retain unchanged the basic purpose stated by the NSC -- to
maintain the fundamental American values and institutions which rest on the
essential dignity and worth of the individual in a free society. Likewise,
we have not changed the objectives which call for: building of U.S. military
and non-military strength, that envisaging a strong U.S. economy and that
calling for free political institutions and informed public opinion. We
have re-worded for added clarity the objective concerning the strengthening
of our Allies: to achieve their stability, to prevent Communist domination
of them short of war, to deter Soviet recourse to war, and to enable them
to act at the limit of their capabilities against the Soviet Union in case
of war.
(SHOW VISUAL AID)
C. We differ materially from NSC 153/1 on the objective of pre-
venting further expansion of Soviet Bloc power. Instead of preventing
"significant expansion", Alternative C is categorical as to preventing any
further expansion, which we interpret to be Soviet domination of, or entry
into, additional territorial areas. We have also changed the objective on
reduction of Soviet power and influence. Instead of "without unduly risking
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a general war", Alternative C calls for this action "without however
initiating general war". We feel that these changes, which have far-reach-
ing consequences, are inherent in the more aggressive policy of Alternative C.
d. By the shorthand term "reduction of Soviet power", we refer to
steps generally as enumerated by the NSC in peacetime courses of action --
straining Soviet-Satellite relations and disruption of Soviet power. But we
1
will add to these the wartime objectives: ending Soviet domination outside
traditional borders destroying the Communist apparatus in the Free World,
4
curtailing Soviet power for aggressive war, ending the Iron Curtain, and
cutting down the strength of any bolshevik elements left in Soviet Russia.
We wish to emphasize that the inclusion of these war objectives in our policy
makes it fundamentally and radically different from the policy of Alternatives
A and B and the approved policy of the NSC. T.e consider, in fact, that
NSC 153/1 is defective in that it provides no means of attaining these so-
called war objectives -- certainly the true objectives of the U.S. -- other
than by recourse to general war. We aim to achieve them by our Cold War.
e. We have identified certain policies and guidelines which have
general application under Alternative C to govern our courses of action:
(1) Prosecute relentlessly a forward and aggressive political
strategy in all fields and by all means: military, economic, diplomatic,
covert and propaganda.
(2) Evolve and maintain a military policy that will support
the strong political line until a real and permanent decision has been
secured.
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(3) Establish, perfect and employ an executive Cold War
machinery that can plan and e xecute a dynamic program of action.
(4) Continue integration and build-up of all elements of
anti-Soviet strength.
(5) Exploit to the fullest, use of military forces as instru-
ments of national policy to achieve political, propaganda and prestige
objectives by both military and diplomatic means.
(6) Utilize the technical and productive genius of the United
States combined with the power of our ma tchless industrial plant, our skilled
manpower and a largely self-sufficient economy.
(7) Educate the public of the U.S. in the nature of our enemy,
the threat to our freedoms and existence and the necessity for intense and
sustained attack against our real political enemy, the Kremlin group.
(8) Employ negotiations as a means for exploiting favorable
developments and improving our political position but bar those in which
the United States would be on the defensive or which could risk loss of
certain vital elements of strength and position.
(9) Prosecute initially a large part of our intensified
Cold War covertly using a national program of deception and concealment
from public disclosure and Soviet discernment as to the depth and extent
of our challenge.
(10) Miss no opportunities to confuse and unbalance our enemy
nor any to discredit him: within his own borders, in the eyes of our public
and in satellite and international circles. Keep on the pressure.
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(11) Attain limited but definite time-phased objectives
of an operational nature leading progressively to more comprehensive distant
objectives.
(12) Limit political commitments so that the United States
can retain its initiative and freedom of action and exercise Free World
leadership.
* * *
f. We now will proceed from the general to the more specific.
Within the scope of the above policies, General Lemnitzer (to be followed
by Mr. Kilbourne Johnston) will present specific courses of action which
are designed to lay the ground work during the first time-phase (approxi-
mately five years). This action is designed to accomplish what is shown
on this chart (show Visual Aid). During the second phase (1958-1965) we
cannot foresee so exactly what our courses of action will be, but we will
be proceeding according to our policies and guidelines toward our
objectives. In phase three (1965 onward) we will be on the borders of the
Soviet Union and our objectives will be clearly in sight. We will be in
a position to exploit the opportunities earlier created.
General Lemnitzer
.....
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:2. Political, Economic and Military
a. As Admiral Conolly has stated, ours is a dynamic policy
designed to seize the initiative from the Soviets, wage a political offensive
against them and create a climate of victory which will be encouraging to
the Free World and attract doubting nations to our side. It exploits the
principle that "nothing succeeds like success."
b. We in Task Force C believe that the free nations need early
tactical victories if they are to reverse the trend of Communist successes
in the cold war. We believe important opportunities are being presented
every day. While admitting that it is desirable to strike at the very heart
of the predatory enemy in the Kremlin, our program begins with actions that
are local in nature and may appear to be far from the principal objective.
We believe, however, that they all contribute toward the effective carrying
out of the policy assigned this Task Force. Most of our recommended actions
will require considerable time to make the necessary preparations and we
believe we should begin those preparations now. We believe, however, that
our present military posture is sufficiently strong to initiate many of the
proposed actions now, although prompt build-up of our strength is necessary
to meet later requirements.
c. (1) The successful carrying out of our policy will present
the people and government of the United States with a challenge that is un-
paralleled in the peacetime history of this nation. Our traditional concepts
of war and peace are not applicable to the situation in which we find our-
selves today.
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c. (2) At home it would require Congressional and popular
support of the costs of building up a stronger military establishment than
presently contemplated. It would require the acceptance of more positive,
and sometimes potentially more dangerous, political positions in the inter-
national field.
(3) Toward the Soviet Union and satellite governments it
would require an increased tempo of diplomatic activity. Immediate objectives
such as securing unification of Germany and the withdrawal of Soviet forces
from that country and from Austria, would requirc continuing diplomatic pres-
sure on the Soviet Government and a readiness on our part to exploitsany
breaks or favorable developments. Where direct negotiations run into obe
stacles raised by our adversaries we would wage a relentless propaganda
battle supporting our point of view. For example, instead of denying that
that we encouraged riots in Eastern Germany, we would take advantage of that
development by vigorously seizing the political and propaganda initiative.
We would condemn the Soviets for exploiting the people of Eastern Germany be-
yond human endurance and demand the withdrawal of their forces from East
Germany and the unification of Germany. We would not permit ourselves to be
put on the defensive because of actions such as the Republic of Korea releas-
anti-Communist prisoners. On the contrary, we would condemn the regime that
that is unable or unwilling to account for thousands upon thousands of
United Nations and ROK prisoners that they have captured in Korea. We would
also continue to focus the spotlight of public opinion on the U.S.S.R., which,
eight years after the conclusion of World War II, still holds hundreds of
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thousands of German and Japanese prisoners. We would employ the forum of
the United Nations to expose and censure the Soviet's relationship with its
satellites, particularly the mockery they have made of their commitments
under the peace treaties to establish free and democratic governments in
Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary.
d. Allies would be both a source of strength and weakness in
implementing our policy. They would be an element of defensive strength,
but there is little doubt that most of our allies would draw back in terror
at the thought of our adopting a policy that would risk war. They would no
doubt take heart and claim partial credit for each advance that is made but.
they would deplore each retreat. However, with few exceptions, they would
probably not be willing to join in carrying out such an aggressive policy.
Indeed, they would probably seek actively to block any move on our part which
in their opinion exposes them to a risk of war. It is therefore imperative
that the full scope of our plan become apparent to them only gradually as
our over-all position improves.
e.
The first step in consolidating and strengthening our over-
all position would be for our allies and ourselves to meet commitments under
the recently amended force goals in NATO. This means that we would meticu-
lously meet our own commitments in this regard and we would insist that they
meet theirs. We would resist every tendency on the part of our allies to
further revise these goals downward on the grounds that the Soviet threat is
diminishing or that new and wonderful weapons will reduce the requirement for
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forces to employ them. Every impartial study made in this regard has failed
to support such a thesis.
f. In carrying out our policy, we recommend that this Govern-
ment aggressively, both overtly and covertly, attack the Communist apparatus
wherever it may be found in the world. To this end, and as a necessary first
step, we would outlaw the Communist Party in the United States. It has been
demonstrated over and over again that it is not really a political party at
all but is in fact part of an international conspiracy having as its objec-
tive the overthrow of this and all Free World governments. We realize that
this recommendation will be opposed by some with the often-mentioned object
tion that such action would drive the Communists underground and thus make
it difficult to observe and deal with them. This view fails to take into
consideration the fact that much of the present Communist mechanism - the
most dangerous part - is already underground. We have full confidence in
the ability of our FBI and other governmental agencies to deal effectively
with the resultant underground threat. What we seek to do is to harass
and hound every conceivable Communist activity using all available political,
legal, financial and economic devices in our possession. Such action would
immediately put the Communists on the defensive. It would force them to
utilize most, if not all, of their effort merely to survive and keep a sem-
blance of their organization in being, instead of devoting most of their
effort toward the attainment of their announced objectives as they do at
present. Having taken this step, but recognizing that the situation in
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allied countries, particularly France and Italy, may not permit identical
actions on their part at this time, we would press our allies to take every
feasible action under their respective forms of government to harass their
Communist parties and render them as impotent and as ineffective as possible.
g. We note a recent tendency in the United States to criti-
cize and play down nationalism as something undesirable. We regard this as
a mistake. We believe that in many areas the forces of nationalism offer
strong and effective weapon against international Communism and Soviet am
bitions. Under our policy we would exploit these forces.
h. The United States has in the past effectively used the de
ployment of its military forces in peacetime as an instrument of national
policy to achieve diplomatic objectives. The presence of military forces
gives visible proof of national interest and influence in a given area. Ac-
cordingly, in carrying out our assigned policy we would move immediately to
stop the growing Soviet encroachment on the tradition of freedom of the
Baltic Sea. We would "recapture" the Baltic by resuming naval visits in
force to Danish and Swedish Baltic ports.
i. We would take full advantage of our recent experience in
the military and diplomatic fields; particularly in dealing with Communist
forces with which we are engaged in actual hostilities. We would, for ex-
ample, not suspend the tempo of those hostilities or reduce military pressure
on the enemy before a settlement is actually reached. In addition, we would
limit participation in the military and political conferences held to end
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hostilities to those nations who have provided forces and participated with
us in those operations.
j. The essential element in the political field is that the
policy advocated by this Task Force, though more vigorous, must never be
made to appear as a policy of aggression. It would be portrayed as being in
response to requests for assistance from people struggling for freedom and
independence. We would play down disagreements with our allies and not have
them appear as major international strife. Then, too, we would avoid over-
publicizing inter-departmental disputes and difficulties in our own Govern-
ment.
k.
(1) Despite its weaknesses and tensions, the only center
of power outside the U.S. and the Soviet Bloc, which possesses resources of
comparable magnitude, is Western Europe. Loss of this area would be an
enormous gain to the U.S.S.R. and a very serious loss to the Free World. Any
strengthening of the area represents an improvement in our power position.
Within the area, Germany represents the most serious problem and the key to
the future.
(2) Under our policy we would seek a united and rearmed
Germany integrated in the European Community. A lesser objective would be a
neutralized East Germany and a rearmed West Germany. In seeking these objec-
tives we recognize the possibility that an agreement with the Soviet Govern-
ment for unification of Germany could only be obtained on condition that it
would be neutralized though permitted a small national defense establishment.
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Under our policy we would be epared to accept such a risk as an interim
step toward attainment of our main objective. Our minimum objective, however,
is a rearmed West Germany associated with the West. We recommend that we press
forward toward all of these objectives until a point is reached which requires
that we make a final choice in the light of realities of the then existing
situation.
(3)
We further recommend that the European Defense Com..
munity nations be given to understand that if they are unable to institute
their defense community by the end of this year, the United States will be
compelled to rearm West Germany on a bilateral basis. Concurrently, we
would assure the NATO nations that the United States will honor its commit-
ments to them under the North Atlantic Treaty and will come to their aid if
they are attacked by anyone, including Western Germany.
1.
In addition to the problems involv ed under EDC, France poses
the greatest single political problem to the U.S. because of its instability
and the role it plays in resolving our security problems both in Europe and
in Indo-China. Under our policy we would tactfully but firmly inform France
on the highest level that the U.S. has now embarked on a new course of action
which requires an end to delays in getting our mutual security interests in
order.
m.
In the economic field, we believe that damage can and
should be done to the Soviet economy through the application of East-West
trade on a selective basis - with maximum advantage to ourselves and minimum
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gain by the enemy. We would exploit those areas in which the Soviet Bloc is
not economically self-sufficient. We would take every advantage in those
areas where transportation is a factor in alleviating their problems of mal-
distribution of raw materials and of finished products. For example, there
is a million-barrel refinery in southern Manchuria at Dairen that stands
idle for lack of crude oil. Accordingly, we would prevent tankers from the
world fleet being used to haul oil to Dairen. If this is not completely suc-
cestful because of shipments of oil in Soviet vessels from relatively nearby
sources in the Far East, such as Borneo and the Celebes, we would resort to
preclusive buying to deny that oil to Communist controlled areas in the Far
Bast.
n. Since the Trans-Siberian Railway cannot fill the gap created
by the lack of a merchant marine, we would, through the application of sanc-
tions and heavy financial pressures, prevent non-Communist world shipping
being employed between countries of the Soviet Bloc or between the Bloc and
the outside world. Augmenting the foregoing, particularly with preclusive
buying and sanctions, we would:
(1) Deny the Soviet Bloc all forms of military and elec-
tronic equipment, natural rubber, tungsten wire and machine tools.
(2) Deny repair facilities to Soviet shipping in Free
World shipyards and effect maximum delay in the operation of Soviet shipping
through sanitary inspections and the strictest application of maritime laws
and regulations:
O. In order to strengthen the economic position of our loyal
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allies we would advocate the reduction of tariff on a selective basis and the
simplification of customs procedures to permit them easier access to our
markets. We understand that legislation designed toward that end is current-
ly being considered in the Congress - its passage will contribute materially
to the success of the policy advocated by Task Force C.
p. Adoption of our policy will require continuation of aid to
our allies, at least on a maintenance basis, for as long as the cold war con-
tinues. While some of these allies have succeeded in equalling, or even
in surpassing pre-war levels of production and enjoy higher standards of
living, nations like Italy, Greece and Turkey can never maintain the required
levels of modern armed forces from their own economics - accordingly, they
will continue to require our help. Previously mentioned selective tariffs
would provide marginal assistance but would not eliminate entirely the need
for limited direct aid from the United States.
q. Adoption of the policy advocated by Task Force C will re-
quire certain important military actions. Since a greater risk of general
war is involved, we and our allies, as a preliminary step, would immediately
have to strengthen our military posture, both offensively and defensively,
to carry out the military operations contemplated under the policy and, at
the same time, be prepared to meet any risks of general war resulting from
those operations. We would:
(1)
Promptly organize, train and equip the additional
ready forces required.
(2)
Prepare for early and expeditious mobilization of the
reinforcing units required.
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(3)
Deploy additional forces to sensitive areas to meet
our commitments or D-Day requirements in those areas. An example would be
the deployment of the additional armored division in the case of NATO.
(4) Accelerate improvements in our Continental air
defenses to insure that our vital mobilization and industrial base would not
be critically damaged by atomic attack. The Free World cannot conduct and
win a general war without it. Improvements in our continental defense would
reduce the damage the Soviets could inflict with an atomic attack at any time
and would, we believe, decrease the risk of war. It would also sharpen our
awareness to danger and thus would help the United States face the greater
risks which our policy involves. In addition, improvements in our air de-
fense would have an important impact on the Soviet mind add create doubts:as
to their ability to deliver a decisive atomic attack against us and thus would
lessen the likelihood of their ever launching such an attack. Our study of
this problem indicates that our most immediate requirements in the air defense
field are:
(a) Development of a much improved early warning
capability.
(b) Early completion of an integrated Army-Navy-
Air Force air defense plan that is closely coordinated with the Canadians.
(c) Expedite research, development and early pro-
duction of new air defense weapons, some of which are already in sight.
(d) In addition, we would establish a workable
civil defense program which concentrates on areas most likely to be attacked
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and avoids needless expenditure of money and effort on areas that do not
contain important military, industrial or population targets.
(5)
In the field of atomic weapons:
(a) We would insure that our counter-air-strikes
could be launched without any delay whatsoever. This requires that important
governmental policy decisions regarding the use of atomic weapons be taken
beforehand and that the weapons required are in the hands of tactical units
at the bases from which the initial strikes are to be launched. We would
clear up now details of consultations with our allies regarding restrictions
on the use of bases located in their territories and required for these
strikes, or required for the employment of atomic weapons in tactical opera-
tions and direct support of allied ground forces.
(b) We would expedite development of a logistic
capability for handling atomic weapons, particularly for employment by ground
forces so as to insure their availability to tactical units when and where
required. We would also expedite the development of operational procedures
for the timely and effective employment of atomic weapons on tactical targets
in the forward areas, particularly against fleeting ground targets.
(6) Equipment reserves would be built up so as to support
combat operations until wartime production could meet the total requirement.
Adequate stockpiles would be established overseas to meet requirements during
periods of initial transportation deficiencies.
(7)
The build-up and readiness of the Armed Forces of
our allies depends in large measure on the deliveries of equipment furnished
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under our Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Because of the unprogrammed
requirements of the Korean war, some deliveries are as much as a year behind
schedule. Under our policy, deliveries of this equipment would have to be
stepped up and slippages eliminated.
(8) Faced as we are by an enemy with massive human re-
sources, we must maintain and even widen our technical lead over that enemy.
To carry out our policy, a vigorous research and development program is im-
perative. We regard it as the key to survival of the Free World.
(9) We would not, through participation in additional
regional pacts, lose our freedom of action and thus be forced by commitments
therein always to react wherever the enemy acts.
(10) We would minimize our participation in disarmament
discussions and would make it clear to the world that henceforth we intend
to employ any weapon in our arsenal, when and if we consider it in our in-
terests to do so.
(11) We would urge the adoption by the U.S. of a basic
system of universal training and service to provide a more permanent, stable
and equitable system of military service than we now have. It would, we be-
lieve, be more effective and economical and would certainly have a profound
effect on our friends and enemies alike.
r. In addition to the foregoing courses of action, we would
take the following actions in various parts of the world to implement the
policy advocated by Task Force C:
(1) In the Western Hemisphere. We would move promptly
to clean up principal Communist footholds on our own continent. We would,
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for example, organize a coup d'etat in Guatemala at an early date to elimi-
nate the present Communist domination of the government and labor unions in
that country.
(2) In Europe.
(a) We would launch a strong and coordinated covert
effort to detach Albania from the Soviet Bloc. It is separated geographically
from the Bloc and is a very favorable target for such action.
(b) We would strongly support the development of
closer Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav political and military cooperation. We would
press for more frank and substantive military planning with Yugoslavia which
is currently being developed in cooperation with the British and French.
(c) We would expedite the development of a Volun-
teer Freedom Corps as a nucleus for subsequently organizing large forces
comprising anti-Communist personnel from East European states. Initial units
would be attached to U.S. divisions in Europe for training and organization
of cadres for larger units.
(3)
In the Middle East.
(a) Under our policy, we would, as a preliminary
step in the formation of a Middle East Defense Organization, promptly and
secretly establish a U.S.-U.K.-Turkish Planning Group patterned after the
Military Committee of the Five Powers in London in 1948, which was the fore-
runner of the NATO military planning staff. After the development of a
general plan for the defense of the Middle East, all the other governments in
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the area, including Pakistan, would be informed of the existence and purpose
of the Group and would be cordially invited to participate.
(b) No pressure whatsoever would be employed to
induce membership. It would be made clear that our aid to member nations
would be directly proportioned to their needs for internal security and their
ability to contribute toward the general defense of the area. We would not
permit traditional feuds, such as those between the Arabs and the Israelis
or between India and Pakistan, to influence either the amount of nature of
the aid provided any nation.
(4)
In the Far East considerable early action would be
required under our policy.
(a) As to Indo-China, we would,
(1) Upon reaching a position within the U.S.
Government as the result of General O'Daniel's mission to Indo-China, press
for a high-level conference to be held in Paris to arrive at a complete un-
derstanding with the French for vigorous prosecution of the war in Indo-China.
(2) We would press the French to announce
their intention of granting full independence - that is, dominion status -
to the Associated States by early 1954 and, at war's end, to permit them to
vote on membership in the French Union if they so desire.
(3) We would urge the election of a Viet Nam
National Assembly at an early date.
(4) We would press the French Government to
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clearly define the status of their nationals centinuing to live in Indo-China.
(5) We would expand the native forces and
adopt U.S. training methods; we would press for the organization of units of
division-size. They would be equipped to operate under the special conditions
existing in Indo-China. We would press the French to accelerate the training
of native officers, non-commissioned officers and technicians.
(6) As a basis for continued U.S. military
aid, we would insist on closer collaboration between French and U.S. military
authorities and a more vigorous and aggressive conduct of military operations
in Indo-China to include driving to and sealing off the Tonkin frontier at
an early date and effectively blockading all other Viet Minh supply routes.
(b) As to Communist China, we believe that the
greatest problem facing the Chinese Communists in consolidating their hold
on the Chinese people is that of convincing the Chinese millions of their
ability to improve China politically and economically. Under our policy, we-
recommend actions that would isolate Communist China politically and prevent
her being seated in the United Nations or any other international body. We
would take every feasible means to weaken her economy. To that end we would
maintain an embargo on trade with Communist China and induce our allies to
do the same. If fighting continues in Korea we would, with the assistance of
the Chinese Nationalists, blockade the Chinese Coast. If a cease-fire agree-
ment is reached in Korea we would utilize the war between the Chinese Com-
munists and Nationalists as a basis for a blockade, provide the Nationalists
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Nan-ning
Lao Kay
TONKIN
Lang
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BURMA
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Haiphong
Nam
Dinh
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MEKONG RIVER
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HAINAN
VIENTIANE
Thakhek
Dong Ho
THAILAND
Hue
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ANNAM
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RAILROAD (Operable)
RAILROAD (Partially operable)
Pakse
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with the means to blockade the Chinese coast and thus augment the effective-
ness of our embargo. If, as threatened, Britain escorts her shipping, we
would widely expose her actions in this regard.
(c) As to Nationalist China.
(1) Under our policy we recommend that forces
of the Nationalist Government be employed for conducting active military opera-
tions against the Chinese Communists. Despite the increased military assist-
ance and logistic support required, we believe that the time has now come to
make greater use of those forces. They have been relatively inactive for five
years. They need combat experience, particularly a victory over the Communists
to bolster their morale and give them confidence.
(2) We recommend that before risking sub-
stantial operations against the mainland, these forces be first employed to
recapture the island of Hainan. It is not strongly held nor can it be easily
or promptly reinforced. A successful operation against Hainan would be the
beginning of a "march back" and would have a profound effect on the Chinese
people. It would also assist materially in interrupting sea traffic support-
ing Viet Minh forces in Indo-China.
(3)
Furthermore, it would enable us to test
and evaluate the Chinese Nationalist forces and determine whether they have
the capability of being developed into an effective military force capable
of operating against the Communists on the mainland or whether their capa-
bilities are limited to the defense of Formosa, in which case the materiel
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support we provide them in the future would be tailored to fit that task.
(d) With regard to Japan, we agree with the analy-
sis of the situation and the actions recommended by Task Force A. It seems
to us, however, that under our policy the United States would have to take a
much stronger hand in pressing the Japanese to remove their present obstruc-
tions, such as constitutional restrictions, political excuses and general
indifference, in developing, with our material aid, their 10-division
National Safety Force by June 1954 as originally scheduled. Certainly with
our help they have the resources to do so and have the industrial capacity
to support such a force.
(e) Korea.
(1) We are uncertain as to what situation
will face us in Korea in the immediate future. If the Communists are willing
to go through with the cease-fire it is a clear indication that they are find-
ing it increasingly difficult to support combat operations in Korea and are
desirous of ending this costly venture so that they can consolidate their
position or concentrate their effort elsewhere. We believe, however, t hat
they have not changed nor will they abandon their original objective of es-
tablishing a unified Communist state on the Korean peninsula.
(2) Under Task Force C's policy, if a cease-
fire agreement is reached in Korea, our position at the political conference
would demand the establishment of a unified, independent and non-Communist
Korea. We would not agree to withdrawal of U.N. forces from Korea in exchange
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MUKDEN
AN-TUNG
CHONG CHON
HUNGNAM
SINANJU
SUNAN
KANG
WONSAN
-DONG
PYONGYANG
CHINNAMPO
KOSONG
SARIWON
SINMAK
CHORWON
38°
38°
HAEJU
INCHON
SEOUL
with
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for withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces north of the Yalu. The strategic
advantage which they would enjoy from such withdrawal is obvious. We would
suggest, in the interest of avoiding future frictions, that a 10-mile demili-
tarized border zone (five miles north and five miles south of the Yalu and
the present border) be established and observed by a neutral commission.
(3) If no cease-fire agreement is reached
or if a political conference fails and fighting is resumed in Korea, our
policy would require that the U.N. promptly take advantage of its sea and
air superiority and intensify military operations. These would include naval
and air action against Communist China and Manchuria. When the additional
forces could be made available in Korea we would launch a coordinated air-
borne, amphibious and land offensive to:
(i.) Seize a position across the waist
of Korea.
(ii.) Capture or destroy maximum enemy
forces and equipment, and
(iii.) Create conditions that would force
the enemy to accept a settlement favorable to the U.N.
We believe this operation would be required to restore our prestige in Asia.
We would employ atomic weapons in these expanded and intensified operations.
While casualties and costs would be high, particularly during the actual
conduct of the operations, we regard this action preferable to continued
stalemate in which, over a long period, casualties and costs also mount to
high totals but no important results are achieved - a situation that is totally
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E
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LIBERTY
inconsistent with the objectives of our assigned policy.
(4) Finally, a brief word about economic aid
for Korea. We believe that under our policy Korea represents a very important
symbol. The eyes of the world, particularly in Asia, are focused on Korea to
see how it fares in its association with the Free World. If, in observing
the situation, they are led to believe that resistance by them to Communist
aggression will result in their obtaining strong military, moral and economic
support from the Free World, they also will be more inclined to associate
themselves with us and resist aggression - if not, they will, in the face of
similar aggression, lose their will to resist and their desire to remain free.
Therefore, we believe that an effective United Nations economic and rehabili-
tation program in Korea is absolutely essential to the attainment of the ob-
jectives of Task Force C's policy in the Far East.
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