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TOP SECRET
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SECURITY INFORMATION
SEC. III
THE LIGHT Delght D.
3. Actions in the Field of Propaganda and Covert Operations
a. Introduction: General Lemnitzer has outlined a political,
military and economic strategy to win the cold war in twelve years. I will
recommend action in the fields of two special techniques to support this
strategy.
b. Definitions:
(1) The first is "Propaganda", i.e., opinion-forming through
all means and media, from the most direct, factual information by the
Government officially, to the most subtle forms of "black" propaganda
made to issue from the mouths of our enemy.
(2) The second is "Covert Operations", i.e., all actions in
support of our overt programs in which it is desirable to mask the hand
of the United States.
c. Lessons of the Recent Past
(1) We feel that our propaganda and covert programs have,
on balance, failed to date principally for three reasons:
(a) First, the absence of an over-all political, military
and economic strategy designed to win the cold war;
(b) Second, lack of an organization to direct our
political, military and economic efforts with a single determination to win.
Instead the NSC adopted, in 1948, a covert policy to win (NSC 10/2 - 10/5
series and the 68 series), phrased in very much the same language as this
Alternative C. New mechanisms were also set up to employ the two special
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techniques (OPC and "p" Area of State). But these two techniques have no
valid application save as they serve a national political-military and
economic strategy. Since there was no such strategy designed to end the
cold war by winning it, our relatively isolated propaganda and covert efforts
tended to abort.
(c) The third principal reason for failures to date have
been faulty estimates of our own and our enemy's strengths and weaknesses.
We believe that we have consistently tended to overestimate the risk of
provoking our enemy into war by our acts at any time not of his own planning
and choosing. We believe we have tended to overestimate the degree to which
the masses of the enslaved people were oriented toward the Kremlin conspiracy.
We believe we have tended to underestimate the enemy's professional eminence
in the fields I am discussing--propaganda and covert warfare. Finally, we
believe we have underestimated the degree of willing support which could be
expected of the American people in an aggressive campaign to win the cold war.
d. Main Future Actions Dictated by Past Lessons
(1) From these lessons we deduce our first four recommenda-
tions for specific courses of action. (SEE CHART).
(a) First - Adopt Alternative C as the national political-
military-economic strategy to win the cold war.
(b) Second - Adopt a governmental organization (such as
that recommended by the Jackson Committee) for directing the implementation
of this strategy and insuring that our propaganda and covert efforts are
concentrated in direct support of it.
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(c) Third - Adopt a bold and aggressive propaganda line
and program of covert operations directed at the vulnerabilities of the
world-wide Kremlin conspiracy, uninhibited by fears of thus provoking our
enemy into overt war.
(d) Fourth - Schedule the covert war so that we concen-
trate first on areas outside the orbit (where our enemy's countermeasures
are least effective) while building up our covert apparatus for penetration
of the orbit to a level of professional competence capable of operations
where the enemy's countermeasures are most effective. If it takes 10 years
to build, as the experienced British and our own experts agree, then we
should have such a service about half built now. In another five years
(the end of our Phase I), we should have it all built. In the next 7 years
of our crucial Mid-term Phase it should begin to pay off. At the end of
this period it will be 17 years old and, as we move into the U.S.S.R.
proper, should hit the jackpot--if, and only if--we step up personnel
procurement and training programs now and don't cut them back for 12 years.
The same goes for research and development and for initiating of long-term
non-governmental cover (i.e., fronts for our agents abroad other than
official U.S. missions). In addition we must complete, with all dispatch,
a standby apparatus (admitting that most of its assets would have to be
outside the Curtain) capable of supporting the military in case of hot war
at any time not of our own choosing or of exploiting an unplanned but
promising uprising of one or all of the Satellites at any time not of
our own choosing.
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e. In terms of Geography and Time (SEE MAP 1-A) we should concen-
trate our efforts in Phase I on building up apparatusand resources for use
against the orbit proper in later phases. The bulk of active operations
during Phase I (as distinguished from building activities) should be concen-
trated on destroying the apparatus of the conspiracy in the free world,
especially in the hitherto "neglected" areas of Latin America, neutralist
Asia, and Sub-equatorial Africa. During this phase active covert opera-
tions against the orbit would be against tactical limited objectives,
well within our technical capabilities, designed directly to support the
political, military and economic moves scheduled for this phase. During
this phase also, we would concentrate heavily on espionage operations into
the orbit and limited penetrations for groundwork preparations for later
activist operations behind the Curtain. In Phase II (SEE MAP B) while
continuing the build-up against the Soviet Union, we would exploit our
covert assets in the European Satellites, and in driving a wedge between
Peiping-Moscow while merely holding our gains in the neutralist world. In
Phase III we would move heavily in from the Western and Southern peripheries
into the U.S.S.R. proper and seek to detach Red China from the U.S.S.R.
f. In general, our propaganda line must convince the world that
we will end the cold war by winning it. That we will employ all political
and economic means available to this end. That we will maintain a military
posture strong enough to give our political and economic measures sufficient
weight to win; strong enough to deter the U.S.S.R. from turning to declared
war as a solution, and strong enough to win if they do. The only end to
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the cold war acceptable to the United States is a free world with
self-government for all peoples.
g. Specifically, our propaganda line must convince the world
that:
(1) The Kremlin conspiracy plans to make every nation a slave
state and is waging the cold war to this end.
(2) The United States will not risk its future on a reckless
wager that this conspiracy will collapse of its own weight and any other
country that makes this bet is "rolling dice with destiny".
(3) While abhorring war, the United States will not shun it
should it ultimately prove to be the only course to achieve a free world.
In coldly objective terms, if such a war is inevitable, it is to the United
States' advantage to fight it now rather than five or ten years from now on
top of a staggering cost of military preparedness in the meantime. But,
the United States does not believe that such a war is inevitable. However,
we do believe that it can and will be avoided only in the one single cir-
cumstance that the free world, by aggressive cold war means, eliminates
the Kremlin world conspiracy.
h. With regard to the American propaganda machine itself, the
following suggestions are offered:
(1) Education of the American people on what is being
attempted through official propaganda, what it can be expected to do and
what we need not expect it to do.
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FREE WORLD VS KREMLIN ORIENTATION
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(2) Sharp delineation of the activities under headings of
overt and covert propaganda. The two must of course be complementary, but
the overt organization cannot and should not deal in covert operations.
(3) An organizational formula that will be maintained long
enough for the program to attain consistency and continuity. The almost
incredible series of reorganizations in the propaganda field since the
founding of O.W.I. has represented the greatest single handicap to the
program's success.
(4) Technical training of personnel, with specific schooling
in Americana, propaganda technique, residence abroad.
(5) Serious recruitment of first-rate personnel at the
formative level, with solid career inducements.
(6) Patient study by experienced personnel of possibilities
for allied cooperation in propaganda. This means the use, beyond any point
thus far seriously tried, of opportunities for "cross propaganda" through
combinations with friendly foreign propaganda systems and facilities.
(7) A stabilized budget permitting realization of programs
launched, without constant interruption of pace and change of magnitude.
(8) Evaluation of the program on a basis broader than United
States statistics or narrow, short-term United States interests. Organi-
zation, no matter how good, can do no more than solve the superficial
problems in propaganda. Only deep evaluation can guide a program of
long-range worth.
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i. Three specific modifications are suggested in the present
propaganda program, viz. (SEE CHART)
(1) Adoption of an "umbrella" theme, repeated over and over--
the dignity and worth of the individual, free in a free world. It must be
played in every realm of human progress, under the four freedoms, in
nationalist aspirations whenever they coincide with the United States' best
interest, in whatever context gives best results for any given area.
The catch phrase might be: "You are important."
(2) Adoption of the "pointed output" technique. Too much of
our tactical propaganda is still "shovelled" out on a world-wide basis. It
lacks pointed meaning for individual peoples. Even the phrases of
President Eisenhower need different propaganda handling, depending on
whether they are being transmitted to sophisticated Western Europeans or
interpreted to relatively puzzled South Asians. Quantity without quality
is sure to be dangerous. Three remedies are offered if "pointed output" is
to be achieved: (a) Closer working arrangements, in much more determined
vein, with local or indigenous propaganda services and private groups. We
should cooperate in the propaganda realm as in the military realm. No
other single effort could keep us more nearly on the right psychological
path in dealing with foreign audiences. (b) Better chosen and better
trained personnel should be sent to the field, in terms of knowledge and
understanding of the region in which they are assigned--including especially
Chiefs of Mission--and most especially in Latin America. They must know
languages and they must know people; if they don't we should not appoint
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them until they do. If it takes time America is to be here for a good
long time---unless we send too many unqualified people abroad.
(c) Personnel in Washington more knowledgeable of overseas problems. Too
many directives, too many pamphlets and movies and books, go out because
they are meaningful for Americans, but without any psychological or cultural
tie to the people for whom they are intended and with no consideration for
what foreigners are curious to learn or eager to have guidance on.
(3) A more virile handling of tactical propaganda is required
particularly as concerns the current world struggle. We are missing propa-
ganda opportunities every day. An aggressive propaganda drive would let
the slave peoples behind the Curtain know that their problem is understood.
It would reiterate to free world peoples our continuing determination to
stand behind our common principles and to help maintain them for our friends.
We can and should strike, strike and keep striking, with ideas and infor-
mation that ultimately must have a profound cumulative effect.
j. For example, a virile propaganda program would not wait for
enemy initiative. It would ask Russia all the questions and repeat the
questions even as the defensive answers are coming back, until all the
audience-world is asking the same questions:
"Why don't you
--let outsiders see your Russia, if it's the paradise you
say it is?
--let your young men visit the free world, if you are sure
of their loyalty?
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--let your people at least see movies of the free world?
--get out of Austria?
--give East Germany free elections, as you have promised?
--give East Germany something to eat, or are you trying
to keep them too weak to revolt again?
free wartime prisoners or are they all dead, starved,
and broken in your slave labor camps?"
"Why do you
--prove your "love for labor" by shooting workers down in
the streets and by your thousands of labor camps with
their millions of Russian slaves?
--stifle art and literature and music?
--kill off your most experienced leaders?
jam the radio-voice of truth-unless you are afraid of
your own people armed with facts?
--restrict the travel of accredited diplomats--are you
ashamed of your country? frightened? or just unsure?
--drive out, wherever you penetrate, all hope and all
future and all human kindness?
--promote totalitarianism instead of justice, force instead
of law, guns instead of butter, labor camps instead of
freedom, a mystique instead of a religion, greed instead
of devotion, war instead of peace?"
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This is the type of question we should be asking every day instead of
trying to "sell" the American standard of living as an advertising agency
would sell soap!
k. Covert missions should be: (SEE CHART)
(1) To destroy the secret apparatus of the Kremlin conspiracy
throughout the free world, with particular attention to elimination of all
Kremlin-dominated Communist Parties both overt and covert. (Phase I).
(2) To impair the U.S.S.R. capability to wage hot war. (All
phases).
(3) To build as rapidly as possible a stand-by apparatus
capable of supporting the military in hot war or of exploiting promising
unplanned uprisings in the slave world. (Phase I).
(4) To assist in the liberation of the European Satellites and
in driving a wedge between Peiping and Moscow. (Build in Phase I, exploit
in Phase II).
(5) To cause the maximum disruption within the borders of the
U.S.S.R. (Build in Phase I, develop in Phase II, exploit in Phase III).
(6) To assist in assuring continuing orientation toward the
free world in territories from which the U.S.S.R. withdraws or is expelled.
(All phases in which appropriate).
(7) Ultimately, to assist in confining the U.S.S.R. to its
own boundaries and rendering it internationally harmless. (Phase III et seq.).
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1. Specific courses of covert action:
(1) Make preparations for:
(a) Coups d'etat in Guatemala and Albania ostensibly
through third forces. (For implementation in 1954 or 1955).
(b) The seizure by Chinese Nationalists of the island
of Hainan and study the further feasibility of a northerly beachhead on
the Chinese mainland.
(c) Early build-up of covert bases in Latin America and
Sub-equatorial Africa for early expansion throughout the entire area into
a concerted drive to eliminate all Kremlin Communist Party apparatus by
1958. Give first priority to penetration and disruption of groups capable
of strategic sabotage in the event of war and make maximum efforts in
nationalist, racist, labor, student and religious groups.
(2) Build heavily on present and potential strong points
around the world, e.g.:
(a) Europe: New Southeast Balkan Entente (Turkey-
Greece-Yugoslavia), Spain, United Kingdom, Norway, West Germany.
(b) Asia: Japan, Philippines, Thailand, E. Pakistan.
(In this area also generate indigenous efforts to attain a federated
anti-Kremlin, anti-Peiping bloc of nations).
(c) Middle East: Turkey and West Pakistan.
(d) Africa: Union of South Africa, Ethiopia,
British West Africa.
(e) Latin America: Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela.
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(3) Give all encouragement and assistance to the new South-
east Balkan Entente in preparing for an early coup d'etat in Bulgaria
(perhaps to coincide in time with the one being prepared for Albania but
more probably in Phase II).
m. Conclusion
(1) In Summary I re-emphasize the following points: That we
have had a propaganda machine ever since O.W.I. Since 1948 we have had a
covert apparatus. To the extent these have failed, two deficiencies are
primarily responsible: (a) lack of a national strategy to end the cold
war by winning it, and (2) lack of a national "command post" to concentrate
our political, military and economic resources on winning.
(2) These two deficiencies will be met, we hope, as a result
of this exercise. Another deficiency has been immaturity of our covert
apparatus. Too much was asked of it too young. The schedule we set out
for winning the cold war allows it 17 years of growth. We feel that this
is a reasonable schedule backed by competent technical and professional
advice and not to be laughed aside by the timid as unrealistic or beyond
our national capacities.
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Colonel Goodpaster will now discuss problems of implementation
and will evaluate our program in the light of the specific questions
and basic issues raised by your Panel.
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4. Implementation
a. You have now heard from Admiral Conolly the objectives of our
program and from General Lemnitzer and Mr. Johnston specific courses of
action. The program has one further element which is this: the United States
Government must take the steps necessary, in terms of organization and pro-
cedures, to attain the ability to prosecute effectively this new, stepped-up,
more projective type of program and policy.
b. There are three major requirements:
(1) Speed of action.
(2) Continuity in policy and programs.
(3) Security of operations.
Present organization and procedures would not suffice to implement Alterna-
tive C successfully. The reason may be briefly stated. What is proposed
is an aggressive manner and tempo of waging the world struggle. This will
involve the use of conceptions and techniques of international action--such
as subversion, pressure and threat of force--previously foreign to us.
Present methods of operation of our Government are keyed to a very dif-
ferent--a much more restrained--manner of dealings among nations. The
recommendations of the Jackson Committee appear to provide the basis for
acting more rapidly and more powerfully along the lines we propose.
C. The first requirement is speed. To seize and hold the initia-
tive we must beat the Soviets to the punch. At the same time our actions
must be coordinated, and concentrated on key issues and targets for maximum
impact. Broad policy directions must be formulated and periodically
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extended at the highest policy level. In the operating departments a careful
balance must be struck between over-planning which destroys flexibility, and
under-planning which results in too little too late where long-lead time is
involved, for example in the development of military forces. There must be
coordination and leadership which subordinates lesser objectives to greater
ones--agency interests and habits to the national effort.
d. The second major requirement is for continuity in policy and
programs. It takes ten years to build a covert apparatus. Basic shifts in
balance of military forces reflecting new weapons, such as guided missiles,
may take years between conception and actuality. Moreover, an essential
feature of Alternative C is the development of a momentum which comes from
the steady application of pressure on our enemies and influence on our Allies
toward constant ends with maximum continuity of specific programs and policies.
Over-fluctuation and inability to set a line of policy and hold to it, particu-
larly in military preparedness and propaganda, can be extremely wasteful, and
could vitiate Alternative C.
e. A third major requirement is for security of operations. A
careful program of time-phased disclosure of our operations and objectives
is an essential feature of our proposal. Only in this way can we gain the
advantage of tactical deception. The implications in terms of covert opera-
tions and apparatus are obvious. One lapse could destroy years of work. Ours
is a policy of the initiative. If we disclose the content of our policy and
program to the Soviets or to our Allies, we will have surrendered the
initiative.
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f. These three requirements are basic. In our opinion,
Alternative C cannot work without them. They can in large part be met by
actions within the Executive Branch. Certain aspects, however, involve
the Legislative Branch, and specifically the linkage between the Executive
and the Legislative. For Alternative C to succeed, this linkage must
permit the speed, continuity and security that are essential.
C.
OVER-ALL EVALUATION
1. Analysis of Soviet Reactions and Evaluation of Risk
a. We turn next to an evaluation of our course of action. Our
directive posed to us some twenty basic questions for specific considera-
tion, evaluation and comment. We take them up in the following sections
on possible Soviet reactions; the risks run by the U.S.; the results
expected; and costs, legislative action, public opinion, and reactions
of our Allies.
b. No evaluation of Soviet reactions can neglect the so-called
"Peace Offensive" going on at this very moment. Its meaning is unclear,
but its very obscurity tells us one thing--that we must not close our
minds to any line of action open to the Soviets.
c. There are two points, though, that are basic and are not at
all obscure: First, the Soviet Union is not likely to renounce its basic
aims. The Soviets retain a mortal hostility, immutable and insatiable,
toward the West. Second, the Soviet military capability to inflict massive
damage on the United States is on a rising gradient, and will probably pass
the critical mark within a decade.
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d. Soviet variations and turn-abouts do not alter these two
fundamentals. The Soviets have four principal lines of international action
available to them: general war; aggressive pressure; passive defense; and
peaceful behavior. With adoption by the United States of Alternative C,
they may react in the following principal ways: (SEE CHART--"Risks")
(1) They may accept the consequences of our actions, thus
either appeasing or disregarding our efforts.
(2) They may actively oppose our line of action by initiating
general war.
(3) They may oppose us by attempting to weaken the free world,
including the United States, by a policy similar to our Alternative C in
reverse.
(4) They may oppose us by attempting to frustrate our efforts
when and where they occur, by a policy of "containment".
e. The first line of possible Soviet reaction--acceptance of our
efforts--would involve essentially no risk to us at all. We believe,
however, that the Scviets would soon have to oppose us more actively if
we continued to press forward under Alternative C.
f. Should the U.S.S.R. resort to general war, the probability of
our ultimate defeat appears quite small, if the military posture proposed
by Task Force C has been adopted, but costs would be tremendously great
and would include:
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(1) Damage of the continental United States, losses of per-
sonnel, and expenditures of effort and materiel, with money cost to the
United States reaching perhaps a thousand billion dollars.
(2) Destruction of the fibre of the free world, particularly
Western Europe, measured for example in the difficulties of establishing
a viable world order after such a war.
(3) Unlikelihood that a Russia could be created with which
the United States could be at stable peace after such a war.
g. Should the Soviets elect to adopt their third line of action--
to seek to weaken us, without recourse to general war--they would be doing
no more than they have been doing over the past years. If not barred by
United States use or threat of force, they could possibly subvert Iran,
possibly overwhelm Japan in time, and possibly move by successive stages
southeastward through Southeast Asia and the East Indies. They could
reduce Finland to the status of a eatellite. They are unlikely to be able
of themselves to subvert any of the countries of Western Europe in the face
of our efforts under Alternative C. However, they could certainly intensify
the strains on the cohesion of the Western Allies. We doubt that they
could thereby force us to abandon Alternative C.
h. The fourth and final line of action available to the Soviets--
to meet our efforts at the point of contact, combat them, and seek to
frustrate them--is likely to be widely used, particularly in our early phase
when we must take preparatory steps in East Germany, Austria, Korea, and
Indo-China. The Soviets can seriously limit what we achieve, and probably
in some cases entirely block us.
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1. The U.S.S.R. is likely to utilize all these lines of action--
except general war--in combination. They will combine acceptance of less
important United States efforts with attempts to frustrate the more impor-
tant, and with attempts to weaken the free world, concentrating particularly
on the Allies of the United States.
j. With respect to general war, experience following outbreak of
the Korean War indicates an area within which the United States could move
with some assurance. While the West was still at its all-time weakest,
the U.S. reacted strongly, defeating both North Koreans and Chinese in
Korea by mid-1951, and moving four additional divisions into Europe. These
actions challenged the Soviet predominance but the Soviet Union did not
consider them as adequate cause for resort to general war. The threshhold
of provocation, we judge from this, is a relatively high one. When and
if the Soviets decide to initiate general war, they will do all in their
power to make it at a time and over an issue of their own choosing.
k. There are, moreover, powerful deterrents against deliberate
resort to war in the near future working on the Soviets. The first is
their inability--which they cannot fail to recognize--to launch and sustain
a war against the United States with any real hope of ultimate success.
The Soviets withdrew from Iran and did not press the war in Greece or
their threats to Turkey once United States involvement was made clear.
Until the Soviet industrial base is stronger in relation to that of the
United States, and until the great United States superiority in atomic
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capability has been offset, the Soviets are strongly deterred from outright
challenge. To the Soviet Union, the greatest provocation is weakness.
1. United States adoption of Alternative C may cause a shift
in present Soviet policy. If their present policy, still highly obscure,
is in fact "passive containment" or even "true peace", Alternative C would
tend to force them to revert to a more aggressive line, unless stresses
and strains within the Soviet orbit prevent this. But if the present Soviet
policy is really one of aggressive pressure, with merely a temporary tactical
lull for purposes of deception, there is good reason for them to continue
what they are doing, at least for a short time. The tactic of temporary
lull--the "Peace Offensive"--may be an extremely effective way for the
Soviets to seduce the Allies of the United States from cooperating in an
Alternative C program; they themselves have repeatedly advertised the use
of exactly such a tactic.
m. Comparatively, Alternative C brings the Soviet Union closer
to the threshold of war than does Alternative A. Comparison with
Alternative B is more difficult, since major risk of war in Alternative B
would appear to arise, not from Soviet resort to war, but from U.S. resort
to war because of the breaching by the Soviets of a security line desig-
nated and safeguarded by the United States.
n. These considerations all apply to the short term. In the
longer term, if Alternative C achieves the results for which it aims,
there should be a substantial reduction in the risk of war and in the
destruction and loss arising from such a war, if it should occur.
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2.
Evaluation of Results
a. Viewing Alternative C as a "mission" assigned to the operating
departments of our Government, we have assessed the extent to which our
program is likely to accomplish this mission.
b. To develop concrete courses of action, Task Force C has woven
into policy Alternative C a time-scale of concrete required achievements.
This action makes the policy considerably more definitive and at the same
time more ambitious. Hence, even if some of our programmed objectives are
not met in full or on time, the broad policy may still be satisfied. We
believe our ambitious schedule establishes a wide bracket on the scale
between "containment" and "liberation", within which you may assess the
respective merits and costs of various security policies.
C. We think our program will satisfy the primary policy objective
assigned-- of disrupting, disturbing and weakening the Soviets and turning
their attention to holding what they have rather than attempting to expand
further. We are much less sure of our second objective--to accelerate the
consolidation of allied strength at a high level. If this goal is carefully
and cleverly pursued, however, we believe it too can be attained.
d. In Central Europe, we do not have the means to assure the maxi-
mum goals we seek. Results might, however, include withdrawal of Soviet
forces and unification of Germany with perhaps only limited rearmament
permitted and perhaps neutralization of the Eastern area, together with
some reduction in allied military forces. In the Satellites the scale of
the impact we can achieve suggests the strong possibility of defection of
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Albania and Bulgaria in the first phase. Barring spontaneous revolts so
successful as to engender uprisings en masse, other Satellites will continue
their subservience to Moscow with, however, ever stronger currents of
dissension and unrest.
e. In Northeast Asia, if the war in Korea is resumed, we believe
that under our program the Chinese armies will have been destroyed, and UN
military control up to the Korean waist established. If a truce is in
effect, we believe there will probably be simply a military occupation of
a divided Korea.
f. In Indo-China, it would appear that increased French coopera-
tion should be possible to obtain, and that the proposed allied efforts
should be sufficient to secure the northern borders and reduce the Viet
Minh operations to confined areas.
g. In China, it does not appear that the measures proposed give
material prospect during Phase I of definitively splitting Red China from
the U.S.S.R., or of overthrowing the Communist regime. Nationalist control
may be re-established over Hainan and other areas beyond those now held.
Efforts may well be sufficient to cause increasingly difficult Soviet-Red
Chinese negotiations, with concomitant strains and recriminations.
h. In the Middle East, progress in establishing organized poli-
tical and military relationships should be evident, notably in the Middle
East Defense Organization, and will probably include organizations connected
with aid programs, the formation of a Planning Group, and perhaps the
association of certain Arab States with it.
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i. The U.S.S.R. will be burdened and troubled by ever increasing
United States actions directed against it, and its international apparatus
impaired. However, it would appear that during the first phase such actions
must be quite limited in their impact in relation to the internal stability
and power of the Kremlin clique in the Soviet regime. The proposed efforts
will not, of themselves, be adequate materially to weaken or disrupt the
Soviet Union; they could exploit and deepen any internal dissension.
j. The emergence of a "climate of victory" in this period would
depend chiefly upon success obtained in Korea, Hainan, Indo-China, the
defection of Albania, and especially any Soviet withdrawal from East Germany.
These successes should suffice to preserve U.S. leadership in the first phase
and to keep the psychological initiative in the free world. We feel that a
sense of vigor will pervade our policy-making and planning echelons, and
that there will develop a more dynamic posture better conforming to the
times in which we live.
k. In our opinion, United States and allied security against defeat
in war, given the measures we recommend, will be secure throughout this first
phase.
1. We were also invited to consider the problems that might result
from failure of our efforts. Complete failure would probably be the result
of opposition by our allies to our efforts. The major result of failure would
be to further the tendency on the part of our allies to oppose the U.S.
leadership and to open added opportunity for the Soviets to weaken the
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cohesion of the free world and to strengthen their influence within France,
Italy and probably the U.K., as well as throughout the Asiatic world.
m. The principal problem likely to arise from major successes of
our efforts in the first phase will probably be the difficulties of
achieving and maintaining internal harmony in Western Europe--especially
between Germany and France, once an independent, unified Germany begins
to be rearmed. This is a difficulty and a risk in our program, but we
believe the same difficulty will be met in any other program which
includes the rearming of Germany.
n. We point out also the possibility of early successes in the
first phase of our program, launching us into the second phase ahead of
schedule and radically foreshortening our winning of the Cold War.
3. Costs
a. We turn now to a consideration of major factors which limit
the scale of our operations. costs, legislative requirements, public
opinion, and allied reactions.
b. We have considered costs under two headings:
(1) What are the likely peacetime costs of a security
program under Alternative C?
(2) To what degree can the United States stand such costs,
in physical, financial, fiscal, social, and political/psychological terms?
C. We have devoted a great deal of time and effort to an attempt
to assess the possible order of magnitude of peacetime costs. We have
estimated what might be the aggregate of expenditures for all national
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security programs under Alternative C. These would include: Military,
Mobilization, MSA, Civil Defense, Stockpiling, Propaganda, Internal Security,
Atomic Energy. Specific increases occur in the fields of Continental
Defense, Covert Activities, Propaganda, Economic Aid, the Freedom Corps,
Reserve Components, additional deployed forces, Civil Defense, added
Vietnam forces, Japanese forces, the Hainan operation and blockade of Red
China, and increased war reserves of equipment. Expenditures to carry out
Alternative C would, we estimate, be of the order of $60 billion in Fiscal
Year 1954 and 1955 (as against $53 billion in comparable expenditures in
Fiscal Year 1953, just ended). Expenditures decline to below $45 billion
by Fiscal Year 1958, and continue at that level thereafter until the Soviet
threat is reduced by the actions we propose. If fighting is resumed in
Korea, and the operations we propose are conducted there, the figures for
Fiscal Year 1954 and 1955 would be between $60 and $65 billion. These
figures do not include whatever might be spent on preclusive buying. This
would be additional, but such buying would be highly selective and limited.
With this exception, we believe that all our action-proposals have been taken
into account in the figures just cited.
d. Peacetime costs under this program will, we believe, be higher
in the short-term than under Alternatives A or B, and higher also than
presently proposed programs. In some cases a net increase is involved. In
others, an acceleration to provide planned increases sooner is required.
In the long-term, costs should be substantially lower when we have won the
cold war.
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e. The next question relates to the capacity of the U.S. to pro-
vide and finance these resources requirements. We are generally in accord
with the views expressed by Task Force A on this matter. We would like to
present a few figures as dimensions which show the boundaries of the problem,
but by no means its detailed solution.
f. The United States, in Fiscal Year 1953, devoted 14.6% of its
Gross National Product to security programs and 20.6% to total federal
government programs. It financed through revenue about 88% of the govern-
mental expenditures during that fiscal year, which represents about 18.1%
of the total Gross National Production.
g. We have considered the total annual security costs under
Alternative C against the background of an expanding economy generally
expected to increase steadily at a rate between 3.5 and 4% per year over
the next decade.
h. Under Alternative C a larger percentage of our physical output
would be used for security in Fiscal Year 1954 and Fiscal Year 1955 than in
Fiscal Year 1953--approximately 15.5% as against 14.6%. If taxes were to
stay at the same percentage of Gross National Product in Fiscal Year 1954
and Fiscal Year 1955 as in Fiscal Year 1953, and if non-defense expenditures
were to stay constant, a total deficit of $10 to $12 billion in each year
might be expected. (From Fiscal Year 1957 onward, the resources and
finances required for security programs would be below the percentages
actually devoted to security in Fiscal Year 1953.)
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i. We have the impression that the physical and financial problems
involved in meeting the costs of security under Alternative C would be
manageable. The next question is whether problems of maintaining existing
tax rates are manageable in terms of budgetary and legislative actions,
and conformity to the political tendencies of our country. It is in these
areas, in fact, that our group believes the determinants of meeting the costs
of Alternative C would be found, rather than in the size and tempo of the
physical economy or in the area of financial policy and problems. We con-
sider that these questions are of a different character, falling in the
general field of political affairs rather than administration, and can
only state here our firm conviction that our people, when they understand
that their nation's security depends primarily upon their readiness and
willingness to provide support through taxation, will not fail to do SO.
4. Legislative Requirements
a. We consider next legislative problems and requirements. First
is the need for specific legislation, which would include:
(1) Appropriations covering the increased program costs just
described.
(2) Tax legislation consistent with these appropriations.
(3) Reduction of tariffs, and simplification of customs
procedures which impede trade with our Allies,
(4) Stand-by legislation for wartime economic controls.
(5) A basic system of universal military training and service.
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(6) Increased latitude with respect to immigration.
b. A second major field of legislative problems was mentioned
earlier in connection with "Implementation of the Program".
(1) Steps to give greater continuity to security policies and
programs will be required. Actions might include executive leadership
which continually encourages bipartisanship in Congress in these matters,
and continued efforts in behalf of the closest possible Executive-Congres-
sional consultation within constitutional limits. Congressional resolu-
tions and committee "policy positions" indicating the intent of the
Congress may give added stability.
(2) The need for secrecy raises a similar problem. To recon-
cile security of sensitive types of operations with the need for Congres-
sional understanding, support, and appropriations, certain special
arrangements may be required. For covert operations, for example, a
highly secure select joint committee, similar to the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, may be the only effective solution.
C. Our specific recommendations in these fields are necessarily
limited. We do have confidence, however, that the resourcefulness and
flexibility of our system and our leadership are such that these problems
can be successfully solved.
5. Public Opinion
2. Alternative C makes unusual demands for enlightened public
opinion, resolute and responsive to new and changing problems and situations.
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For example, a change in the trend toward tax reduction would be required
to provide for the higher costs of the initial phase. Such a new course
could only be brought about through successful presentation to the American
public of the basic factors of the security problem and need for the proposed
actions. A major item of information would be the significance of the
atomic arms race, and, specifically, the impact on U.S. security of the
growing Soviet atomic capability.
b. The American people have always in the past risen and met any
challenge to their independence and security. The series of crises, from
Iran through Turkey, Greece, and Berlin, to Korea, all bear testimony to
this fact. There is no reason to think they will fail to do so again.
The requirement is that the necessity and rightness of the policy adopted
be fully and explicitly conveyed to them.
6. Allies
a. The reaction of our allies will tend to be a brake on our
prosecution of Alternative C. Our system of alliances is an essential
element in the consolidation of the strength of the free world incident to
Alternative C, but the prosecution of the more aggressive phases of
Alternative C will strain our alliances. It should by no means destroy
them, however. The Soviet Government will undoubtedly employ all possible
kinds of inducements to weaken our alliances and obtain the support of our
allies in relieving the pressure on itself. We cite the effectiveness of
recent Soviet gestures on public opinion and on the firmness of allied
foreign policy. Foreign concern over our impetuosity and skepticism of
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our capacity for constancy in foreign policy are further adverse factors.
Like our own public opinion, however, our allies will respond to constancy
of purpose, and to successes as they begin to be achieved.
b. The reactions of our European NATO allies should be considered
in light of the economic and military strengthening which has by now been
achieved. A kind of phase-line is probably just now being reached--the
attainment of a limited military shield and an economic foundation, which
is of the greatest significance to their psychology and their political
attitudes. On the one hand, United States influence tends to decrease
as Europe begins to achieve the goal toward which the United States has
been aiding them--a situation and a feeling of independence and national
strength within a collective security framework. At the same time, the
United States need is no longer so acute for them to take positive
measures--such as they took three years ago when they initially adopted
and began to prosecute a policy of security and build-up of defense forces.
Exceptions are in Indo-China and in need for positive French action to
ratify EDC if that solution to German rearmament is retained.
c.
These points suggest that the United States, while maintaining
its general friendship and readiness to cooperate, and participating
closely in measures within the scope of the NATO commitment, can and
should be less solicitous of specific internal problems of the Western
European countries, and can and should feel less constrained to subject
its actions outside the scope of the NATO commitment to the veto of our
NATO partners, specifically France and the United Kingdom.
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d. Although problems and difficulties will be great, we believe
it should be possible to maintain satisfactory relations with the other
nations of the free world under Alternative C.
e. We had intended at this point to present individual views
and dissents concerning our proposals. However, we have been able to agree
on our program as a generally valid and feasible means of carrying
Alternative C into effect, subject of course to continuing refinement and
adjustment of particular proposals. While there are individual reservations
over details and particulars, a general consensus has been reached on the
program as a whole.
f. This completes our evaluation of our proposed course of
action, including consideration of the specific questions posed to us in our
directive. Admiral Conolly will now present our conclusions and recommen-
dations.
D. CONCLUSION
1. The courses of action which we would pursue are shown objectively
"(Chart)"
by this timetable chart/. We recommend this program and schedule. The
effects of successes won sooner than scheduled would telescope this diagram.
2. The results we expect to obtain are illustrated by this map. (Map c)
We believe that these results would fully justify the costs and the effort.
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3. We have presented what we believe to be a coherent long-term plan
of action to undermine our enemy and bring about his downfall. Only by
this means do we believe that we can safeguard our own security and establish
real and lasting peace in the world. We have stated our ultimate aims,
with the policies or guidelines for our action, and presented a concrete
program of action starting now. In order to provide requisite flexibility,
the latter is subject to change, within our policies, as to timing and
sequence.
4. We have made careful review of the crucial questions listed in
the Panel's "Memorandum on Basic Issues". These questions have been
covered in this presentation by direct treatment of the problems from
which they arise.
5. We realize that our task is a formidable one but we believe that the
effects of our action will be cumulative. Successes will compound themselves
by creating additional unrest and generating more uprisings in the Satel-
lites and eventually within the various strata of the Soviet Union. The
whole enemy power structure, dominated as it is by a dictatorial minority,
is basically unstable. But it can be upset only by sustained and progres-
sively intensified attack against it. Success will draw our allies closer
to us, attract new friends (now neutral) and give our own people confidence
and increased self respect. We must be prepared to develop fully our local
successes which critically damage the power structure of the Kremlin con-
spiracy and to exploit the final breakdown of our enemy.
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6.
Task Force C is supremely confident that the United States has
the financial and physical capacity to provide for security without
damaging social effects. This is the cheapest program in the long run for
it seeks to end the cold war as quickly as possible without fighting a hot
one. Surely the country can stand the cost of our program to avoid the
colossal cost of a hot war. Especially since our program offers real hope
that early successes may attract such overwhelming free world support that
the whole schedule may be compressed into a much shorter period.
7. When we hark back to the early months following our entry into
World War II, the prospects for success seemed hazy and far off. Yet once
we seized the strategic initiative and began to operate on a large
scale with boldness and determination against our formidable and seemingly
invincible enemies, we achieved spectacular and even startling success.
8. So it is now and we can have victory if we seek it--an end to
world terror. The way to avoid a hot war is to win the cold war. The way
to end the cold war is to win it. The alternative program presented by
Task Force C is a true American Crusade.
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