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Report to the National Security Council by Project Solarium Task Force C - Part 3 of 9
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Report to the National Security Council by Project Solarium Task Force C - Part 3 of 9
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DECLASSIFIED
SEC. IV
SECURITY INFORMATION
881
pulght
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Authority NLE 2011-123
PART THREE
By MMK pp.71-105 PP. NLDDE Date 6/27/12
IV - THE TASK ASSIGNED
A. CLARIFICATION AND DIFFERENTIATION OF ALTERNATIVE C
1. Interpretation of Policy. Alternative C is a positive policy to
achieve victory in an all-out struggle between governments representing
peoples of the free world on the one hand and the masters of the controlled
world on the other. The phrase "create the maximum disruption and popular
resistance" is interpreted by this Task Force to mean to destroy the Communist
apparatus beyond the borders of the Soviet Union and reduce the militant,
aggressive attitude and power of the ruling Soviet regime. Three positive
policies are specifically to be considered:
a. To create quickly and maintain a posture of free world strength.
b. To "overthrow Peiping" or "separate Peiping" from the Moscow
regime.
C. To win clear-cut victories in areas of present aggression.
2. Risk.
a. Alternative C provides that a greater risk of war can be
accepted. The risk can be increased by decreasing our strength with no
change in policy toward the U.S.S.R. On the other hand, risks can be
increased by adopting a tougher attitude toward the Soviet Bloc and by
reducing the areas of dominance of the U.S.S.R. This latter risk, coupled
with greater strength on the part of the United States, is the point of
view adopted by Task Force C. Alternative A denies acceptance of greater
risk. Alternative B necessarily assumes a greater risk, although
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reservation of freedom of decision as to when and where aggression through
internal subversion will be resisted weakens an alternative that would
otherwise be adamant in the resistance it poses.
b. Alternative B, by "drawing the line," theoretically poses a
greater risk of general war and presumably adopts a greater posture of
strength to back up the threat thus posed. However, flexibility in meet-
ing and throwing back Soviet Bloc advances is lost, to a large degree.
3. Time.
a. Alternative A assumes that Soviet power, forced to subsist on
itself, will gradually decline. There is also an implied assumption that
Soviet intransigence may dissipate, permitting the two worlds to co-exist.
There is an implied acceptance of the possibility of additional advances by
the Soviet Bloc, although the United States may react against these advances
as it desires. There is no attempt to delimit the time in which the downfall
of the Soviet Bloc can be expected.
b. Alternative B differs very little from Alternative A with re-
spect to time. No time boundaries are set.
C. Alternative C directs that the strengthening of the free world
be accelerated. A positive policy toward the U.S.S.R. permits the time phas-
ing of the several courses of action advanced. At any given time the size
of the forces of freedom can be established within reasonable limits. Time
goals can be established to provide a firm foundation for the preparation of
both general and specific plans. The degree of aggressiveness toward the
Soviet Union for any given period remains subject to policy decision.
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4. Aims and Objectives.
a. Alternative A gives no end product of the present conflict.
Deterioration of power does not mean elimination of the ultimate threat.
There is no provision for meeting the threat of enemy subversive activity.
There is no measure of the degree of assistance to be rendered to Allies.
There is no definition of what areas are "vital" to the free world.
b. Alternative B provides an objective only in a negative way, by
denying further advances. This objective is not fixed, in that reaction to
Soviet Bloc aggression is not predetermined.
C. Alternative C provides a positive objective, destruction of the
Communist apparatus. Wide freedom of action is afforded in attaining the
objective. Predetermined courses of action in terms of commitment of forces
are not prescribed. Active courses of action are undertaken to bring about
the end result desired. Primarily, Alternative C places the United States
on the strategic offensive as opposed to the strategic defensive implicit in
Alternatives A and B.
B. BASIC REASONING SUPPORTING ALTERNATIVE C
1. Our concept of planned action requires that the United States seize
the political initiative and operate aggressively against the Soviet Union
by waging a political offensive. Such a strategy would, while not designed
to provoke war, accept a substantial risk of war, whenever justified by the
gains to be achieved. It should be made plain that our real enemy is the
leadership which exercises control over the Communist Party in the Soviet
Union. It has announced intentions to overthrow our government, subvert
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our institutions and absorb us into its system. (We have no reason to doubt
that it means just that.) In this contest we want victory and to achieve our
ends and frustrate theirs, we must proceed to bring about the political sub-
version and liquidation of the conspiracy against us.
2. In order that we achieve victory, renouncing stalemate, in this cold
war, the United States must set as its goal the same objectives (aims) that
we would require for an acceptable end to a "hot" war. These are set forth
clearly in NSC 153/1 and need not be enumerated here. Sufficient to say
that, if we could achieve these aims by political means, even combined with
minor military operations short of general war, we would have reduced this
threat and have secured the nation from the enemy.
3. Courses of action previously followed have at various times employed
the measures prescribed by Alternatives A and B. Task Force C believes that
restrictions imposed on such courses of action have greatly limited their
effectiveness. While results have been sometimes rewarding, the whole under-
lying philosophy is negative and defensive. Implied acceptance of the
status quo disqualifies both those alternatives as means to ultimate success.
Time has been working against us and still is. We must arrest, reverse the
trend by positive action. What is needed is dynamic, offensive political
action started now and progressively accelerated. We would proceed to the
attainment of definite middle-term goals but always with sustained and un-
relenting resolution to achieve our ultimate aim, the downfall of our enemy.
It is time that we began to force the pace. The present situation cannot be
considered as an acceptable basis for a settlement.
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4. It should be realized that the fundamental danger in the situation
is due to a relative preponderance of power available to our enemy on the
Eurasian land mass coupled with his aggressive intentions. The power imbal-
ance has existed ever since the defeat of Germany and Japan and our precipi-
tate demobilization, together with our tardy and reluctant rearming, if this
word can be used to describe our efforts, since the outbreak of hostilities
in Korea, to build up our forces and our mobilization base. The evil inten-
tions of our adversary have been increasingly evident from the end of the war
and even the most sceptical observers were convinced by the subversion of
Czechoslovakia in 1948. Dr. Charles Malik has appropriately said, "So long
as the heart of Communism throbs with vigor in the Eurasian Continent, the
peoples in the periphery of that continent outside the immediate clutch of
Communism will never know peace, no matter how you
try to patch things up
from the outside. 11
5. Task Force C believes that there are not several principal threats
to our security but only one: the combination of "the formidable power and
aggressive policy of the Communist world led by the U.S.S.R." This threatens
many of our institutions including our economy, the political freedom of the
individual, our whole national manner of free life, but the primary threat is
certainly to our existence as a free and sovereign nation and the others
should, we believe, be considered as subsidiary to that and as stemming from
it.
6. The political strategist must form his own estimate of the risk in-
volved in each proposed action. Heretofore, this nation has shrunk away from
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desirable action against our adversary on many occasions in the belief that
he would have been easily provoked into general war against us. This is not
believed to be correct. It is believed, based on actions and attitudes in
the past, that only direct aggression against the U.S.S.R. would trigger
retaliatory action in the form of all-out war. In each case we must take the
action that would be advantageous to us relying on our growing military
strength and our determination, suppressing our exaggerated fears of war.
By being too fearful we will lose the contest piecemeal. The game is for
high stakes and must be played boldly.
7. It is estimated that the Soviet Union will not be satisfied with
maintaining a defensive posture in order to avoid risk of general war and
with the purpose of consolidating its present position but will accomplish
this purpose by continued aggressive pressure accepting some considerable
risk of general war, interspersed with active phases of "Peace Offensives."
This has been the pattern of its action and obviously indicates a policy
that it has followed with success. There seems to be every indication that
it will continue with variations to suit the times and in readiness to ex-
ploit opportunities.
8. We have played it safe. Our urge to action has always been blunted
by an underestimation of our own elements of strength, particularly potential
public support for a strong line. We have underestimated the strength of our
allies and the strength of the resistance to Communist rule in her Satellites.
We believe that we have consistently overestimated the war-making power of
the Communist enemy, both the U.S.S.R., the Satellites severally, and of the
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combination as a whole. Counsels of caution have too often prevailed.
9. We should adopt a more forward political strategy recognizing that
our political frontiers should be further advanced than the strategic front
where we have no alternative but to resort to arms in the event of enemy
aggression. We must be unafraid to use military, air, or naval forces in
token or in massive strength as a show of force or as an indication of the
sincerity and continuity of our interest.
10. We must not be content with our present position. Containment is
sterile as a continuing policy. Threat of retaliation by invoking general
war will not suffice to restrain our enemy from continued erosive action
against our world position. It is necessary that we create a climate of
victory by political action and such military (short of general war), para-
military, economic and covert operations as offer opportunity for favorable
results. Success will encourage our allies and cement them to us. It will
favorably influence friends and neutrals and make possible their adherence
to us. It will weaken our enemy and create defection in his Satellites and
unrest and deterioration in his state-structure. We can make no acceptable
lasting peace with the group in the Kremlin.
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V - METHOD OF ATTACK EMPLOYED
1. Three Approaches: Area; Function; and Time. Our analysis of the
problem revealed three basic approaches to the problem: by area, function,
and time. (See Chart 1.)
2. Area Approach - Eight Areas. Our basic approach is by area. The
key to understanding the nature of Soviet power is to recognize it as a
world-wide conspiracy. We found that no course of action applied to the
U.S.S.R. alone had real validity unless it was an integral part of a course
of action pursued globally. This requires an area-by-area analysis. The
areas we have selected to discuss separately are: Europe (first Free Europe,
including Northwest Africa as a necessary part of the NATO area, then the
European Satellites); China; U.S.S.R.; NE Asia; SE Asia; the Middle East and
NE Africa; Africa South of the Sahara and Latin America; and finally the
U.S.A.
This is, of course, an arbitrary categorization.
Many other combinations would serve equally well. However, our studies
tended to fall naturally into these areas and we are therefore presenting
the "main body" of our report (Part VII. B.) accordingly.
3. World-Wide Considerations. We hasten to caution that any compart-
mented approach to the menace of the world-wide Kremlin conspiracy is danger-
ous. Many basic problems are common to several or all of these areas, e.g.:
anti-colonialism; nationalism; racism; religion; the urge for individual and
economic betterment of backward peoples; the United Nations, etc. Similarly,
our functional approaches involve world-wide courses of action common to
several or all target areas (e.g., combatting Kremlin-controlled Communist
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METHOD OF ATTACK
LONG TERM AFTER
1965
MID TERM
1958 TO 1965
SHORT TERM 1953 TO 1958
POL.
MIL.
ECO.
PSY.
COV.
1 EUROPE
2 CHINA
3 U.S.S.R.
4 N.E. ASIA
5 S.E. ASIA - MID-EAST
6 N.E. AFRICA- S. AFRICA
7 LATIN AMERICA
8 U.S.A.
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Parties everywhere). Therefore, we will present our Basic Premises, Prin-
ciples and Objectives (Part VI) and the general world-wide courses of action
proposed (in Part VII. A.) before discussing the courses of action proposed
within a given area or country (Part VII. B.).
4. Functional Approach - Five Functions. We identified the nature of
the so-called "cold war" as being essentially an undeclared total war in
which all means available are being used (saving only such a clash of the
formally constituted armed forces of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. as would be
tantamount to openly declared general war). This war, as other wars, is
essentially politico-military-economic in nature. In this war, as in other
wars, propaganda both true and false is used to undermine the enemy and to
influence friends and neutrals. In this war, as in other wars, espionage,
sabotage, guerrilla warfare, underground resistance and other covert and
clandestine techniques are used to support the politico-military-economic
strategy of the war. However, in its current stage of pseudo-"peace" between
the main contestants, a greater emphasis is placed on the psychological and
covert techniques than has been common in wars of recent centuries. The con-
spiratorial nature of the Kremlin government and its world-wide Communist
apparatus not only dictates the nature of the warfare it is waging upon us,
but to a marked degree dictates the nature of the methods of defense and
attack we must employ to defeat them in this war. Therefore, while stress-
ing the fact that propaganda and covert operations are but special "techniques"
of political warfare, of military warfare and of economic warfare, respec-
tively, they are such an essential part of the "cold war" being waged against
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us, that we single them out as functional categories added to the three
classic functions of war. Therefore we discuss five functions: Political;
Military; Economic; Propaganda; and Covert Operations.
5. Time Approach - Three Phases. In approaching the time question we
found that while we would like to end this creeping Communist conquest of the
world by crushing it with one blow, we do not now have the power to do so
with sufficient certainty of success. We also found that any such approach
would be tantamount to declaring a preventive war or to issuing an ulti-
matum -- both of which were beyond our terms of reference. As we further
analyzed the problem, we found that, while certain courses of action could
be made operational very shortly and thus constituted a First Phase or Short-
Term Course of Action (in which it is possible to delineate specific tasks
as well as general courses of action), others could only be instituted after
a reasonable period of build-up and preparation requiring perhaps seven to
ten years and thus constituting a Second Phase or Mid-Term Course of Action.
(In this Phase we found we could not this far in advance identify specific
tasks but only general courses of action.) Finally, we found that the actual
attaining of our final long-range objectives (frustration of the Kremlin con-
spiracy within the U.S.S.R.) could not reasonably be scheduled as susceptible
of attainment until after the completion of the Second Phase. Thus a Third
Phase or Long-Term Course of Action was dictated. (In this Final Phase --
being so remote -- we found we could not dictate either tasks or very specific
courses of action but only restate our ultimate objectives.) Therefore, we
approach the problem in three time-phases over a period of 10 to 12 years.
(This Schedule is set out in detail in Part IX.)
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6. Schedule may at any Time be Radically Foreshortened by Radical
Successes. Need for "Crash Programs." However, at any time during this
decade a startling success on the part of this aggressive U.S. strategy may
start a trend toward world-wide support in crushing the Kremlin conspiracy.
The effect of successes sooner than we schedule will be to foreshorten the
time interval. Successes early in Phase I may so affect the free world and
our enemy as to make our final objective attainable before the four years
allotted to Phase I are over. Thus we would need no Phase II and would win
on a four or five year plan. But we felt that we must plan and schedule for
the long hard pull without assuming any "windfalls." However, we do believe
and do urge that all national planning make specific provision for "crash"
operations to exploit successes which come earlier than scheduled or which
tend to snowball from local successes (as scheduled) to general successes
(way ahead of schedule).
7. Integrated Approach by Area, Function, and Time -- "Climbing to
Victory." Each area analysis is made by examining possible courses of action
in each functional field Political, Military, Economic, Propaganda and
Covert Operations. Then a general course of action is proposed for that area
in three time-phases. Within each area we recommend (for each function and
time-phase) those specific courses of action peculiarly pertinent to that
area. A synthesis of these actions is presented in Section IX.
8. Implementation. Having set out our program (in Parts VI., VII. A.
and VII. B.) we proceed to discuss problems of actual implementation (in
Part VII. c.).
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9. Analysis and Evaluation. In Part VII we attempt objectively to
analyze our own recommended Program for Attainment of Alternative C in terms
of risk of war, Soviet capabilities and intentions, results, and costs. In
Part VIII. D. we give special attention to an analysis and evaluation of
those questions raised specifically by the "Solarium" Panel in Section III. 2.
of the Panel Report and in the appended paper "Basic Issues."
10. Summary, Timetable, Conclusions and Recommendations. Finally we sum-
marize in Section IX. Specific Conclusions and Recommendations are set forth
in Part One.
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VI - PLAN IN BROADEST TERMS
A. BASIC PREMISES
1. The only assumptions which operate as limitations on Task Force C's
proposed action are contained in the Panel's directive which excludes:
(1) one which would rest upon a drastic reduction of our armed strength
(in the absence of effective international regulation) and a determination
not to fight except in the event of invasion of U.S. territory; (2) one which
would, as a deliberate choice, rely solely upon the economic and military
strength of the United States; (3) one which would involve a major change in
the structure of international organization; and (4) one which would contem-
plate the launching of a preventive war against the Soviet Union on our own
initiative.
2. In winning the cold war we do not exclude the use of the device
proposed by the terms of reference of Alternative B as a possible course of
action in case of serious threat to our position in areas we consider vital
to our security. These are: The whole of NATO; Indonesia; Middle East;
Japan, Philippines and Western Pacific; Western Hemisphere.
3. We have accepted the National Intelligence Estimate No. 65 which
sets forth Soviet capabilities. We estimate that the U.S.S.R. will have by
1955 a considerable stock pile of atomic weapons and a capability of deliver-
ing it against vital targets in the Continental United States. This threat,
if not effectively countered, would, within a few years, dangerously imperil
our ability to wage a general war against the U.S.S.R. The rapid development
of defensive measures therefore is imperative. It is necessary that we
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prosecute our intensified campaign during the period when our atomic super-
iority is significant and to reach a decision before our enemy has achieved
the "enough" point.
4. The requirements which would serve as a foundation for our more
ambitious aims, our stronger political position and our more positive pro-
grams of action are: First, convinced vigorous political leadership that
will secure the support and devotion of our own people, sustain the resolu-
tion of our allies, lend hope to enslaved peoples, and attract wavering neu-
tralists to our side. Second, military policy which would provide a secure
and adequate base for fighting a general war of global scope; together with
military, air and naval establishments with forces in being that would be
capable both of withstanding the shock of the start of a war and of then
being expanded so as to win it.
5. The machinery for executing an intensified form of the cold war must
provide for prompt action in an operational sense to meet the requirements of
changing situations. This does not mean merely the "handling" of a case and
decision-making at the top levels, but provision for rapid formulation of
directives and transmission of orders by the responsible executive agents.
It means implementation, follow-through and coordinated but early resulting
action (in hours not weeks). We would require an organization capable of
capitalizing on tactical breaks and of exploiting strategic breakthroughs.
We understand that such an organization is being created. It can be con-
sidered as absolutely essential to prosecuting a program such as that pro-
posed by Alternative C.
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B.
PRINCIPLES OF AGGRESSIVE COLD WAR
1. Certain general principles of aggressive cold war have emerged in
our study, development and evaluation of Alternative C. A brief review of
these may be useful as background for the more specific and concrete discus-
sion in later sections. Six such principles are set forth in following para-
graphs:
a. Action.
b. Successive limited objectives.
C. Exploitation of Outside Forces.
d. Time.
e. Calculation.
f. Speed and Mass.
2. For Alternative C the first and distinguishing principle is ACTION --
purposeful action on U.S. initiative to reduce the threat posed by the Soviet
Union through weakening its power and reducing its militancy. All means of
action to this end -- short of "preventive" war --- are available under this
Alternative. The impact of U.S. efforts would be centered on the Soviet
Union.
3. This distinctive principle imposes distinctive requirements. Certain
of the normal characteristics of international intercourse assume particular
importance under Alternative C. Among these are:
a. The marginal influence which any one nation -- specifically the
U.S. in this case -- has on the affairs of other sovereign nations, and the
corollary, the relative independence of much of the action of the latter.
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b. The requirement for the employment or expenditure of resources
in order to achieve such influence as is within our capability at any particu-
lar moment of time, and the availability of such resources.
C. The continuing process of change, constantly modifying the nature
and dimensions of the problems confronting the U.S. and the possibilities for
meeting them.
d. The great area of uncertainty in any attempt to estimate events,
situations and possibilities even a few years in the future.
4. These factors greatly complicate the conversion of policy Alterna-
tive C into the program of action it contemplates. Only with difficulty is
it possible to achieve an approach which acceptably reconciles them. The
difficulty is inherent in the Alternative, we believe, and should be clearly
understood. On the one hand, actions must be coordinated for maximum impact
and economy of means, planned in advance, and controlled during execution.
At the same time, the approach must permit flexibility -- response to the
independent actions and reactions of the other nations with whom we will be
dealing -- including our Allies, Soviet Satellites, and the Soviet Union --
whose actions and reactions are not predictable with precision. Morcover,
we must not so crystallize our actions as to substitute certainty for uncer-
tainty on the part of the Soviets, and thus deny ourselves the benefits of
deception, which will be essential to success in this struggle.
5. Two objections, normally stated as generalizations, need to be dealt
with. It is asserted by some that to plan and to coordinate operations is to
lose flexibility, and thus to limit action-possibilities. There is of course
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a large element of truth in this, but the contrary is likewise true. Failure
to plan results in unpreparedness, and thus limits action-possibilities, par-
ticularly when the action involves resources with a long lead-time. For the
world struggle in which the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are now engaged, it need
only be noted that all planning decisions -- including most decisions not to
plan -- amount to vetoing or passing future action-possibilities. Our choice
is not whether to plan, but what to plan.
6. Another general objection may be more briefly disposed of. It is
argued that, since we cannot know which one of several choices an enemy will
make until he has made it, it is not possible to plan for it. While this
argument has a certain weight -- more perhaps when the enemy has the initia-
tive than when we do -- there are highly-developed and fruitful techniques
for contingency planning and preparations which could be employed, and must
be employed if Alternative C is to be successfully carried out.
7. Consideration of this range of factors has led us to a second
principle that of SUCCESSIVE LIMITED OBJECTIVES. We are of the opinion
that a strategy of successively-established, limited, time-phased objectives
of an operational nature, leading in the direction of generally-defined dis-
tant objectives is most appropriate to our situation.
8. A strategy of limited objectives does not mean that we set an arbi-
trary limit now as to what changes we wish to bring about in the general
Soviet position, including its influence and domination over outside coun-
tries, and its ability to obstruct U.S. interests in the "in-between world."
(We do, however, accept the limitations in the statement of "War Objectives"
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in the Annex to NSC 153/1.) We may, and should, conceive of a progression
of objective-goals which the U.S. will seek in sequence, the culmination of
one providing the "line of departure" for the next. But the objectives
toward which, at any particular time, actions are applied, and which tend
to be visible or discernible to the Soviets, will be limited -- and accord-
ingly can be so chosen as to be feasible.
9. Below these "objectives of current action" there should be a stratum
of mid-term and long-term aims, less limited in nature, posing a deeper chal-
lenge to the U.S.S.R., concealed from public disclosure and, to the maximum
extent possible, from Soviet discernment. Longer term aims should generally
guide the formulation of the short-term courses of action. No attempt is
made to time-phase them precisely; instead, there is a general indication as
to the number of years within which the situation depicted might reasonably
be expected to be brought into existence.
10. There is no reason why "changes" of policy, adding new objectives
to old ones as the latter near attainment, could not be made under this con-
cept. In fact, there appears to be merit in taking special measures of
deception to allay Soviet suspicions as to the depth and extent of our
challenge by timely reassurances. The latter can be re-interpreted once
the current set of limited goals have been attained and a new phase of
limited objectives is being formulated.
11. We have found it advisable to observe certain further principles
in the development of working objectives. The first of these is the prin-
ciple of EXPLOITATION OF OUTSIDE FORCES. The marginal nature of U.S.
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influence means that to oppose great secular forces and changes such as Arab
nationalism, "Asia for the Asiatics," industrialization, or yearning for
liberation, would probably be fruitless. Any longer-range policies proposed
should first be checked to assure that they are not inconsistent with such
forces in areas where they are running strong. There must also be positive
efforts to link such forces to our policies. In this, we shall be competing
with the Soviet Union, which has gained many years of experience in this
process. Failure to do so can only lead us into a blind alley of long-term
frustration, and short-term confusion if our improvised short-term actions
are at odds with longer-term objectives.
12. Our action-objectives of intermediate-term may best be linked to
more concrete developments and trends such as industrialization, assertion
of national independence, and deepening resistance to land-collectivization.
Unstable situations such as German defenselessness, Italian population pres-
sure, Japanese need for markets, should be recognized and exploited. Simi-
larly, where shifts of power in government are in progress, preparations must
be made to ally with the winning side, if a basis compatible with U.S. vital
interests can be found.
13. The trend of atomic technology, and of the stock-piling of destruc-
tive power, has a special significance. The next principle of Alternative C
is TIME. Time is running heavily against both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in
this field. Each homeland is becoming more vulnerable to atomic attack by
the other. A major element in the rationale of Alternative C is to halt
this trend insofar as the U.S. is concerned. Our objectives must be so
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designed as to implement the underlying proposition of Alternative C, which
might be stated as follows: By initiative and choice of tempo at which we
wish to act, we should be able to enhance the probability of weakening Soviet
power and militancy, before the Soviets cross the threshold of ability to
inflict critical damage on the U.S. As a result we should save many times
over, in future peacetime costs and wartime cost expectations, what this extra
effort and risk cost us now.
14. The next principle of major importance is that of CALCULATION.
Alternative C involves extra risks, and part of the calculation is a scru-
pulous assessment of capabilities, limitations and costs. Results of action
are difficult to estimate, and the limitations on influence easy to overlook.
Likewise peacetime costs and the increased short-term probabilities of war
and its costs tend to be disregarded. There is no point to random or purpose-
less actions which cost us resources or the support of our Allies. If we are
to avoid great risks and costs for little or no gains, these difficult calcu-
lations must be made. Once made, they can be weighed against the costs of
failing to make the attempt to roll back Soviet power. Rational action-
planning requires these determinations.
15. The final principle is the dual one of SPEED AND MASS -- the essential
constituents of impact. The Soviet Union and Red China are relatively imper-
vious to U.S. pressures. All available means of pressure must be concentrated
for successive limited, short-term objectives. The U.S. should project that
pressure with the greatest of energy. When a particular object for the "war
of nerves" has been chosen, there should be repeated representations,
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maneuvers, and positive actions, at all levels and of all types, in its sup-
port. Failure to do so allows initiative to slip to the Soviets -- to call
the time, place, and subjects of moves in the cold war. As brought out
later, the need for speed and mass poses special problems for the mode of
U.S. Government operations.
C.
GENERAL OBJECTIVES AND OVER-ALL CONCEPT
1. General Objectives. For policy Alternative C, we suggest the follow-
ing as an appropriate formulation of general objectives comparable to those
contained in paragraphs 7 and 8 of NSC 153/1:
GENERAL OBJECTIVES
a. One purpose underlies every national security policy: to main-
tain the fundamental moral values and institutions of the United States, which
rest on the essential dignity and worth of the individual in a free society.
b. To achieve this fundamental purpose, in view of the threat facing
us, we set the following objectives:
(1) To create and maintain sufficient strength, both military
and non-military, to provide for the security of the United States, assist
in the defense of vital areas of the free world, prevent or counter aggres-
sion, deter general war, protect the continental United States, and provide
the basis for winning a general war if one should be forced on us.
(2) To maintain a sound and strong U.S. economy based on free
enterprise.
(3) To maintain free U.S. political institutions supported by
an informed public opinion.
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(4) To strengthen the will and ability of other nations of the
free world, individually and collectively, to achieve internal stability, to
prevent Communist domination short of war, to deter Communist recourse to war,
and to undertake military operations against the Soviets to the limit of their
capabilities should war occur.
(5) To prevent further expansion of Soviet Bloc power.
(6) To reduce Soviet power and influence to a point which no
longer constitutes a threat to our security, without initiating general war.
(7) To establish an international system based on freedom and
justice as contemplated in the Charter of the United Nations.
(8) To continue in effect U.S. objectives vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R.
in the event of war, as set forth in the Annex to NSC 153/1.
2. The more detailed courses of action defined in paragraph 9 and sub-
sequent paragraphs of NSC 153/1 in order to be made applicable to Alterna-
tive C would require amendment to be consistent with the foregoing. The pro-
visions relative to reduction of Soviet power (paras. 44 and 45 of NSC 153/1)
would be augmented by the principal elements of the U.S. objectives vis-a-vis
the U.S.S.R. in the event of war, with certain revisions. The following
formulation for the section on reduction of Soviet Power under Alternative C
is suggested:
REDUCTION OF SOVIET POWER
(In addition to relevant courses of action in other sections)
a. Place maximum strain on Soviet-Satellite relations and exert
effort to weaken Soviet control over the Satellite countries.
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b. Utilize political, economic, propaganda, and para-military
operations, including controls on trade, against the U.S.S.R. and the
Soviet Orbit, in order to prevent the consolidation of Soviet Bloc power,
stimulate internal conflicts and reduce the Soviet Bloc military and
economic potential.
c. Eliminate Soviet Russian domination outside traditional
Russian borders.
d. Destroy the structure of relationships by which leaders of the
All-Union Communist Party have been able to exert moral or disciplinary
authority over individual citizens, or groups of citizens, in countries
not under Communist control.
e. Establish a situation such that the regime governing Russia:
(1) Does not have sufficient power to wage aggressive war.
(2) Maintains nothing resembling the present Iron Curtain
over contacts with the outside world.
f. In addition, if there is any bolshevik regime, additional to
the regime referred to above, left in any part of the Soviet Union, take
necessary action to prevent it from controlling enough of the military-
industrial potential of the Soviet Union to enable it to wage war on
comparable terms with any other regime or regimes which may exist on
traditional Russian territory.
3. Over-all Concept of Operations for Carrying out Alternative C:
To conduct a coordinated, time-phased series of political, military,
economic, propaganda and covert operations to accomplish the foregoing
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objectives. Specifically during the first phase:
a. Seek to obtain a settlement in Central Europe on terms as
set out in Section VII.B.1 and 4. (This settlement to remove Soviet troops
from Germany and Austria, permit free elections and unification in Germany
and permit the close association of both countries with the West.)
b. Seek to obtain a settlement in Northeast Asia on terms as set
out in Section VII.B.7.
C. Establish military control of Indo-China, and thereafter seek
to establish a settlement in the Southeast Asia area including provisions
as set out in Section VII.B.8.
d. Maintain active hostility to China, utilizing all types of
action other than general war, and emphasizing those which tend to require
Chinese negotiation with the U.S.S.R., as a means for attaining a split
between Moscow and Peiping.
e. Establish at least a rudimentary basis of organized political
relationships in the Middle East and rudiments of a military structure.
Continue present United States policy which attaches special importance
to security of the Iranian-Soviet frontier.
f. With respect to the U.S.S.R., initiate a series of proposals,
feints, demonstrations, propaganda campaigns, and security maneuvers
designed to involve Soviet and Satellite security and economic policy and
the sales-appeal of the Communist line, and to strike fear into Satellite
regimes and Communist Parties abroad, and thus press the Soviets to formu-
late or revise major policies. Do not identify these moves to the Soviets
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as an active campaign of cold war, and do not disclose their purpose.
Conceal the extent of our intentions pertaining to reduction of Soviet
power and authority within Russia or over policies and actions of Satellites
affecting Soviet security. Attack Communist apparatus wherever found
throughout the free world. Take repeated actions to create and then
exploit issues involving Soviet police and political control over the
peoples of Satellite countries. Overload the Kremlin bureaucracy and
sabotage the internal control machine.
g. Consolidate and give logistical depth to NATO defense forces
at a general level of strength consistent with the "maximum politico-
economic" capabilities of the non-U.S. members.
h. Maintain, at minimum vulnerability, the atomic strategic
striking power of the U.S. While avoiding active provocation, continue by
publicized flights and exercises to keep this capability apparent to both
friendly and hostile governments.
i. Maintain a U.S. military power-base, including deployed
forces-in-being and mobilization base, which provides the elements, addi-
tional to U.S. Continental Defense and the strategic striking force,
required to provide the capability of winning general war if it should
occur, and which also provides such further elements as may be required
for military participation in "cold war" operations.
j. Build and maintain a defense system for the continental U.S.
which will maintain a major portion of U.S. war power in operation despite
Soviet atomic attack on the U.S.
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k. Announce that in the event of Soviet or Soviet-Bloc aggres-
sion, the United States reserves full discretion (over and above its
formal obligations) whether to meet the aggression locally or at its
sources, or both, and to employ any and every separate weapon in its
arsenal.
1. Employ negotiations as a means for exploiting favorable devel-
opments and improving our political position but bar those in which the
United States would be on the defensive or which could risk loss of
certain vital elements of strength and position. We should retain at all
times the maximum diplomatic flexibility.
4. In applying this concept:
a. Concentrate our force in time and space by working against
defined, concrete, limited objectives during defined, limited time periods.
b. Maximize the impact of our activities through speed of
reaction and of decision, and through massive effect achieved from use of
every available kind and instrumentality of action short of general war.
c. Employ maximum deception and concealment of our intentions
and of the significance of our actions.
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VII - MAIN COURSES OF ACTION
A.
FUNCTIONAL ACTIONS
1.
Political and Diplomatic
a. The policy assigned to Task Force C involves a forward political
strategy which will require great political and diplomatic determination and
skill to implement. Both at home and abroad it presents a challenge to the
people and Government of the United States unparallelled in the peacetime
history of the country and in fact will require their recognition that the
traditional concepts of war and peace are not applicable to the situation
in which this country and the free world finds itself today.
b. At home it presents the requirement for a more rapid build-up
of our military establishment than at present contemplated. It calls for
continuing Congressional and popular support both in the financial aspect
of the program and for the positive and sometimes dangerous political posi-
tions which will have to be taken in the international field. United States
foreign policy has come a long way from the day when it did not encompass
even an expression of bed-side sympathy on the occasion of Hitler's destruc-
tion of an independent Austria. Yet our approach to political events in
the outside world is still somewhat colored by an understandable hope that
our new and unsought position of world leadership will not entail continuing
responsibility of exactly the character necessary here. The popular demand
is for less tension in the world and a return to "normalcy". The burden
this policy will place upon the nation's leadership is great and will be
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made more difficult by the fact that at the outset at least it will be
impossible to reveal the full depth of the proposed policy.
c. Toward the Soviet Union and the Satellite governments there
must be an increased tempo of diplomatic activity. In general we should
not only be prepared to enter negotiations with the U.S.S.R. when they offer
promise of an advance in our position, but we should keep continually on
the alert with respect to those issues which represent our immediate objec-
tives with a view to inducing negotiations and exploiting any break or
favorable development in the situation. To this end we should seek to
retain the maximum tactical flexibility. Primary objectives such as
securing the unification of Germany and the withdrawal of Soviet forces
from that country and from Austria will require the maintenance of persis-
tent pressure on the Soviet Government. Where direct negotiations run into
obstacles raised by the adversary or are converted into propaganda
exchanges, they should be broken off and other means of negotiating the
basic issues sought, unless of course continuing this propaganda battle
offers clear advantages to be gained by our side. In this case we should
make a relentless propaganda battle supporting our point of view.
d. The UN and other available international platforms should be
used to keep the Soviet Government publicly on the defensive under
increasing world pressure on all profitable issues. Every effort should
be made to expose to world censure Moscow's relationship to its satellites
and every opportunity to increase the strain on Soviet-satellite relations
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exploited. This policy will require a new and accelerated tempo of official
reaction to obtain full value from favorable events abroad such as the
recent East German riots. It will require a full realization on the part
of the American people and Government that Soviet policy operates as a
global whole; that a victory against Communist aggression in one sector
is not unrelated to a defeat in another; that in the long run one cannot
convince the Kremlin of one's determination to thwart its over-all aims by
blocking Communist advances in one place and retreating elscwhere in what
may be a more vital area.
e. Allies are a source of both strongth and weakness in this
undertaking. They are an element of the growing defensive strength of
the free world. Yet at present reading there can be little doubt that they
would draw back in terror at the thought of an irrevocable decision on the
part of the United States to set about destroying the Soviet threat. They
will take heart at every advance and deplore each retroat, but with few
exceptions they are not by any means ready themselves to join in such an
aggressive policy. Indeed they will undoubtedly seck to block any move
on our part which in their estimate exposes them to any increased risk
of war. This as much as any other reason makes mandatory an initial period
devoted to the strengthening and consolidation of the free world.
f. It is essential that this more aggressive policy not be
revealed to our Allies in its true depth until they have developed stronger
stomachs and we have laid the foundations for our new course. They have
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made progress in this direction of increased self-confidence and strength
in the last three years and the trend must be continued. The psychological
importance in this connection of getting Soviet troops out of Germany and
Austria is stressed elsewhere in this report. The first step for the United
States in this direction is the actual fulfillment of recently amended
military force goals, both for ourselves and our Allies. We must resist
every tendency on their part to further revise these goals downward on the
grounds that the Soviet threat is lessening or that new and wonderful
weapons will reduce the requirements for forces to employ them. Every
impartial study made in this regard has failed to support such a thesis.
The NATO nations have already interpreted the downward revision of these
targets as revealing a downward revision on the part of the United States
of its estimate of the gravity of the Soviet threat. Their evaluation of
our attitude is based more on our acts than on our words.
g. Yet there is much that can be done within the limitations set
by our Allies. There are sectors of the world outside their real area of
interest, while within an area such as that of NATO the test must not be
the measure of an ally's enthusiasm for a given course of action, but
the measure of risk such action runs of really doing irreparable damage
to the fabric of the alliance. A successful handling of such a case
involved the attitude of Italy to the recently negotiated Greek-Turkish-
Yugoslav friendship pact and the relationship developed by NATO to the
important defensive military planning now being undertaken by the parties
to that pact. Italy's objections were strong and real and well known to
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the North Atlantic Council, but they were not permitted to stand in the way
of progress and Italy did not take herself out of NATO. The confidence of
our Allies will grow with every successful step forward, but it must be
recognized that at best they will be a continuing brake on the implementation
of our courses of action, particularly as we move into the second and more
dangerous phase. It is beyond the realm of possibility to estimate the
psychological, philosophical and ideological intangibles which will influence
the attitude of our friends and allies at each step of the proposed program,
but there can be little doubt of the cumulative positive effect of each
solid achievement along the charted course.
h. Since 1945 the relations of the free world with the Soviet
Union have been conducted under the shadow of fear of Soviet power. For the
future the attitude must be one of confidence in the success of our enter-
prise and that without the necessity of general war. Both at home and
abroad the U.S. Government will need to develop a habitual air of calm,
unhurried and unified purpose. It must be recognized that most of the pro-
posed courses of action will require the cooperation of one or more allies
or friends for their implementation. This will pose a never-ending series
of delicate and serious problems to deal with which will require the most
skillful use of encouragement, pressure and even on occasion carefully
devised sanctions of a benign but compolling nature.
i. The Communist apparatus must be attacked throughout the world.
As an initial step it should be outlawed in the United States. In addition,
our ultimate aim is outlawing it world-wide, with specific steps taken
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toward this goal in France and Italy progressively as circumstances
permit.
j. The United States has from time to time in its history used
the deployment of military forces in peacetime as instruments of national
policy to achieve diplomatic objectives. The presence in a given area
of military force-in-being gives visible proof of national interest and
influence there. The implementation of Alternative C will require a fuller
and more studied use of this element of power. Important effects can be
produced by means of token forces deployed near sensitive areas, by show
of force, demonstration of continued presence of forces in a given area
and in extreme cases by threat or implied threat of its use. Examples
of the far-reaching effects produced in recent years by the presence or
absence of token forces at moments of critical decision may be seen in
the cases of Trieste and Korea.
k. Recent experience has stressed another relationship in the
diplomatic and military fields, particularly in dealing with Communist
forces with whom one has been engaged in actual hostilities. This is the
importance of not suspending the tempo of hostilities preliminary to a
cease-fire or political settlement unless in full control of the military
situation and in a position to maintain such control throughout the nego-
tiating period.
1. We note a recent tendency in the United States to criticize
and play down nationalism as something undesirable. We regard this as a
mistake. We believe that in many areas the forces of nationalism offer
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a strong and effective weapon against international Communism and Soviet
ambition and should be exploited wherever possible.
m. An essential element in the political field is that this more
aggressive policy in the conduct of our foreign relations must never come
to appear to the other members of the free world as a policy of aggression.
From beginning to end such open applications of force as we will have to
make must always be in response to a request for assistance from people
struggling for freedom and independence. The keystone of our policy must
be our support of these two principles as marking the only true path
toward a more stable and equitable international world order. This
element will be fundamental in our relations with the United Nations and
with the free world at large.
n. Finally, passing mention should be made of the dangers which
will grow with success. As we gather relative strength, so in general will
our Allies and the neutrals as well. A marked shift in our favor of the
world balance of power and against the Soviet power bloc will stimulate
forces tending to create a third and independent power center in the world.
That is a possibility which must always be kept in view.
O. In moving forward on this more aggressive line of action,
the United States must not sacrifice present positions of relative
strength in a gamble for possible improved positions elsewhere. It is a
basic political reality that despite its weaknesses and internal tensions,
the only center of power outside the United States and the Soviet Bloc
which comprises resources of comparable magnitude is Western Europe.
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The loss of this area to the Soviet Bloc would be an enormous gain for
Soviet power and a grave loss to the free world, with extremely serious
implications. Conversely, any strengthening of this area provides an
improvement in the present power relationship. It follows that initial
courses of political action must be directed to removing the weaknesses
in Western Europe which are a major vulnerability of the non-Soviet world
and a principal target in Moscow's continuing campaign to divide and frag-
ment that world. Within that area Germany presents the most serious problem
and the key to the future. A united Germany ranged on the side of the West
is the most significant single contribution that can be made to improving
our position as a base for future moves against the power of the U.S.S.R.
It should be a first priority.
p. On the side of our friends, France poses the greatest indi-
vidual political problem, both because of internal instability and because
of its intimate relationship to and the role it must play in the resolution
of such key issues as the German question in Europe and Indo-China in
Southeast Asia. On the secondary plane is France's involvement in the
colonial problem especially in North Africa. The degree to which France
can be induced, cajoled, even impelled, to move forward with these matters
cannot be predicted here, but the implementation of Alternative C will
require a maximum effort on the part of the United States in this regard
within the limitations imposed by our alliance and the principle of
strengthening the free world as a basis for more aggressive action against
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Soviet power. Success in this field is a prerequisite to future courses
of action.
q. As a general principle, the United States should continue
its support of international organizations such as the United Nations
and the regional security pacts of which it is a member, as well as of
any others which are a source of strength for the non-Soviet world.
Active participation in these organizations is a continuing demonstration
of United States determination to advance international order as well
as a measure of insurance against the development of unfriendly or even
hostile coalitions among states of the non-Soviet world.
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