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Report to the National Security Council by Project Solarium Task Force C - Part 4 of 9
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Report to the National Security Council by Project Solarium Task Force C - Part 4 of 9
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SHINTI
2. Military
a, The policy assigned to Task Force C is designed to develop
more vigorous and aggressive courses of action accepting the possibility
that they may involve a substantial risk of general war, Accordingly, we
believe that the United States and its Allies should, as a preliminary
step, strengthen their military posture, both offensively and defensively,
to carry out the military operations contemplated under the policy and,
at the same time, be prepared to meet any risks of general war generated
by those actions. This will involve the mobilization of additional ready
forces and taking other actions designed to improve our over-all military
readiness. Among some of the more important actions required in this
regard are as follows:
(1) Organize, train and equip the additional ready forces
required.
(2) Develop mobilization plans for reinforcing units to be
brought up to date and capable of being promptly carried out.
(3) Deploy additional forces to sensitive areas to meet our
commitments (as in the case of NATO) and our D-day requirements in those
areas.
(4) Take immediate action to improve and attain at the
earliest practicable date an air defense of the continental United States
that will provide a reasonable defense against atomic attacks (delivered
by aircraft or by missiles launched from submarines) thus assuring the
security and availability of this industrial and mobilization base which
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is vital to the free world waging and winning a general war. Every improve-
ment in our defense reduces the amount of damage the Soviets can inflict
at any time and decreases the risk of war. Improving our continental
defenses will sharpen our awareness of danger and help the United States
face the greater risks involved in the application of the policy assigned
to Task Force C. In addition, improving our continental defense will have
an important impact on the Soviet mind and create doubts as to their ability
to deliver a decisive atomic attack on the United States, thereby lessening
the likelihood of their launching such an attack. Steps to be taken include:
(a) Develop an improved early warning capability and
more effective means of utilizing early warning data to establish posi-
tive recognition and interception of hostile flights.
(b) Accelerate development and implementation of a
coordinated plan for the air defense of the United States. This plan
should be thoroughly coordinated with Canadian plans for air defense.
(c) Expedite research, development and early produc-
tion of new and more effective equipment and weapons required for air
defense, particularly in the early warning field.
(d) Augment our present interceptor and anti-aircraft
forces to improve the "kill" potential of our air defense system.
(e) Develop a sound civil defense program that concen-
trates on areas most likely to be attacked and avoids the needless expendi-
tures of funds and effort on areas that do not contain important military,
industrial or population targets.
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(5) Atomic weapons
(a) Insure that our counter-air-strike capability can be
mounted without any delay whatsoever. This will require that all forces,
equipment and weapons required, at least for the initial effort, be lo-
cated in the areas from which the strikes are to be launched and the weapons
required readily available to the forces scheduled to deliver those strikes.
In this connection, we should immodiately clear up with the U.K. and other
nations in which strike bases are located, any restrictions that may be
imposed on our utilizing those bases for atomic strikes. The present sit-
uation of consulting the governments concerned before launching atomic
strikes is likely to cause delays which could be disastrous to the effec-
tiveness of our entire plan.
(b) Develop repidly a U.S. potential for the tactical
employment of atomic weapons by air and ground forces against the massive
Soviet land-air threat in Central Europe and other areas. This is of the
greatest importance. However, before our present growing atomic power
can be fully realized in this regard, several major actions are required.
The first relates to policy decisions and agreements necessary to enable
these weapons to be employed promptly. Early agreement to this effect
should be reached with our Allies. We should avoid making commitments to
our Allies which would enable them either to veto or delay employment of
these weapons in support, at least, of U.S. forces and preferably in
support of all Allied forces. The second action required is the develop-
ment of a logistical capability to provide a flow of these weapons to the
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points where and when needed to include storage, maintenance, local
security and timely delivery to tactical units. The third action required
is the development of operational procedures and organization for the
effective employment of these weapons by air forces against airfields and
interdiction targets and by air and ground forces in close support missions,
particularly against fleeting ground targets.
(6) Prompt build-up of our equipment and supply reserve to
meet our combat requirements until such time as our production can fully
support those requirements. Adequate stockpiles should be established
overseas to meet requirements during periods of initial transportation
deficiencies.
(7) The build-up and readiness of the armed forces of our
Allies depends in large measure on availability of equipment furnished under
the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. The unprogrammed demands of the
Korean War have seriously affected delivery plans which, in many instances,
are as much as a year or more behind schedule. Prompt and vigorous action
will be required to accelerate deliveries of this equipment so as to
liquidate all unfilled past commitments and improve future delivery
schedules.
(8) In view of the manpower resources available to the
enemy, our relative military posture and state of readiness requires that
we maintain, through a vigorous research and development program, our
technological lead over the Soviet Bloc in the weapon field--indeed, we
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regard it as the key to the survival of the free world,
(9) While we should mobilize the forces required to meet
effectively every aggression in peripheral areas, we do not, however,
regard that it is essential that we always react where the enemy acts,
We should reserve freedom of action in this regard to taking action when,
where, and in the strength that best contributes to attainment of our
over-all objectives.
(10) We recommend that the United States minimize its parti-
cipation in disarmament discussions in the United Nations and announce
that henceforth we shall employ any weapon in our arsenal, when we consider
it in our interests to do so,
(11) We recommend the adoption by the United States of a
basic system of universal training and service that provides a more perma-
nent, stable and equitable system of military service than we now have.
It will be more effective and economical and would have a profound effect
on our friends and enemy alike,
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3. Economic
a. General. This evaluation will concern itself with three main
areas of consideration; the United States as the staunch economic bulwark
of the free world, Allies of the United States, and enemies of the United
States. A fourth category of nations, those in neither the controlled
nor the free world orbit, will be borne in mind but will not be misidered
separately.
b. United States
(1) The first requisite of a positive, aggressive policy on
the part of the United States is a strong, expanding economy based on the
private enterprise system. This requisite immediately raises the question
as to the proportion of the national effort that can be channeled into the
field of national security without jeopardizing economic progress. There
is no true measure of the proportion of the effort that can be devoted to
the security of the nation. This proportion is inextricably interwoven
with that intangible and indefinable "temper of the American people".
There is general agreement both among the political leadership and among
the general populace that an external threat exists. However, there is no
agreement upon the degree of threat or the whole nature of the threat.
This Task Force is convinced that the threat is designed to engulf the free
world, that it is working to that end now, and that all measures including
recourse to war, if that be necessary, must be taken to destroy the founda-
tions of power of that threat. This Task Force does not advocate total
mobilization, nor yet a degree of mobilization that would require the
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imposition of severe controls over our economy. It does advocate the allo-
cation of sufficient resources to the security effort to ensure the safety
of the United States. This Task Force feels that a considerably greater
portion of our resources can be devoted to our security effort without
endangering our economy. We concur in the conclusions of Task Force A
whose analysis is enclosed to add to the completeness of this report.
(Enclosure 2).
(2) The people of the United States, with a high level of
living, tend toward overemphasizing economic measures as a weapon. Our
people tend to believe that an unhealthy economy with a low level of living
breeds Communism. There is a strong tendency on the part of ur people
to believe that economic measures can cure political ills. A first step
in the pursuit of an aggressive policy is the re-evaluation of the relation-
ship of economic measures to military and political measures in the prosecu-
tion of a cold war in which there is a minimum expenditure of the usual
munitions of war. To this end policies relating to mutual aid, customs
procedures, domestic tariffs, inter-orbit trade, and domestic economic
self-sufficiency require examination.
(3) We view the present conflict as basically political
warfare. Therefore, economic and military actions will be measured with
respect to the accomplishment of political objectives. With the present
enemy, political actions have little meaning unless backed up by a suitable
military strength. We are convinced that our nation has the necessary
economic and domestic political capability to perform that function.
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(4) There is ample evidence available as the result of the
study of the Paley Commission that this nation is dependent upon resour
beyond our shores for the development of an expanding economy. We do not
have a domestic economic self-sufficiency. At the same time, our defici-
encies are not SO great that we are at the complete mercy of any single
outside source of supply. Thus, there is no material limitation on this
country's conduct of economic affairs, other than domestic political factors.
(5) In a number of vital ways, world trade is essential to
the economic well-being of the United States. At the present time there is
an imbalance between the United States and the rest of the nations of the
free world, created in large measure because of the intensive effort to
strengthen free world defense. To the extent that the defense of our
Allies contributes to the defense of the United States it is in our
interest to contribute to the economic well-being of those Allies, either
through loans or through other devices such as off-shore procurement,
technical assistance and the other programs now in effect. These programs
have important by-products, as well, including the reduction of drain on
United States natural resources and reduction of industrial effort required
for military end-items which makes available a considerable capacity for the
production of consumer goods. There is a persistent demand to reduce this
aid. Yet it must be pointed out that a complete elimination is not
desirable in any period under consideration by this Task Force. The
imbalance can be corrected to a degree through increasing our imports or
reducing our exports. Since an expanding economy makes the greatest
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progress through increased imports and exports, the preferred course of
action is to expand our trade connections without aiding our enemies.
(6) One method of accomplishing this end is to adjust tariff
barriers. This adjustment should be made on a selective basis, especially
favoring those countries that are making the greatest contribution to the
common defense. At the same time we cannot ignore the essentially neutralist
elements of the world, for our purpose in those areas is to prevent any
movement toward the Soviet orbit. In conjunction with a reduction of teriff
barriers, but pursued separately, must come a program for simplifying customs
procedures so that our friends may have ready access to the markets of the
United States. Furthermore, this program should be developed without strict
provisos requiring concessions from our Allies for each concession that we
make. Where such reciprocal arrangements might militate against an important
industry of our Allies, we must be cautious in demanding concessions. Within
our own framework, the only exceptions where protection might prevail should
be in the field of industry essential to defense, and in this field direct
subsidy on the part of our own government might be better than restrictive
tariffs against the products of our Allies. Other fields of endeavor must
survive the struggles implicit in a free enterprise economy.
(7) While this Task Force is aware of and concurs in the
desirability of reducing mutual aid funds, we face up to the fact that
certain areas of the free world will recuire assistance as long as armed
forces are required in the current political struggle. There is a particular
need for this aid in those cases where complex items of equipment are
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provided to arm forces in a country where there will never be & complete
capability to provide the necessary maintenance parts. This is true in
the areas of jet engines and tanks. There is no prospect of self-sufficiency
in either Turkey or Greece. We believe that any force raised in the Middle
East will require material support for as long as we can project our course
into the future. To a lesser degree Italy will require support, as well as
Southeast Asia. It is our aim to make Japan the principal support of the
countries of the Far East, but the interim gap must be filled by the United
States. Thus we can envisage a diminishing amount of aid, but never a com-
plete cessation, until the Soviet menace has been destroyed.
(8) At the same time as we take positive measures to strengthen
our position for prosecution of the cold war, we must take steps to improve
the economic aspects of our security structure. These steps include the con-
tinuation of stock-piling of critical materials, exploration and development
of natural resources coupled with suitable conservation and substitution where
feasible. Specific measures employed should be the subject of further study.
In the area of facilities and controls, there should be continued study of the
requirements for reserve plants and tools, bearing in mind that extensive dam-
age from enemy action is a likelihood. Requirements for educational orders to
ensure the immediate capability of expansion to meet the war effort must be
reviewed continuously. This Task Force urges the enactment of legislation,
on a stand-by basis, to provide an orderly transition from peacetime condi-
tions to wartime controls so that the economy of the nation will suffer the
minimum disturbance.
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C. Allies of the United States.
(1) An immediate requisite in economic relations with our
Allies is recognition that we stand to suffer grave political and propaganda
set-backs from an unwarranted use of economic measures as a weapon against
our friends. We can expect general support for our world-wide aims and objec-
tives in return for our aid, but it is too much to expect support for those
measures that are considered unfavorable to the national interest of the
nation concerned. Our primary concern should be the political stability and
economic strength of our Allies, coupled with the necessary military strength
to provide an adequate defense against aggression, either alone in some eases,
or in conjunction with others where the threat is so great that it is beyond
the capability of an individual nation to deal with it.
(2) A pattern of mutual aid has been established. The ability
of the several countries to absorb military aid from the U.S. and Canada to
build up forces in the security interest of all has been established. Con-
tinuing study should be made as to determination of the minimum aid that will
maintain in various countries an acceptable posture of strength and relia-
bility.
d. Soviet Bloc.
(1) In our struggle with the Soviet world, we are seeking
weapons to employ in bringing about the desired reduction of power. To date,
the economic measures have been employed with little skill. Through the
adoption of rigid economic policies, we have lost all freedom of action.
In addition, we have adopted rigid policies that are not capable of enforce-
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ment without increasing materially our strength in being and endangering our
relationships with our Allies. The foremost weapon employed today is the
embargo on trade to the Soviet Bloc. This weapon has proved to be weak in
that agreement with our Allies has not been reached on what constitutes stra-
tegic materials. In addition, we are not consistent in pursuit of the policy
of embargo. Of 83 lend-lease vessels in the hands of the Soviet Union, 72
constitute the backbone of the Soviet long-haul fleet. Beyond infrequent
gestures, we have made no concerted effort to regain control of this ship-
ping. 1,500,000 gross registered tons of free world shipping are engaged in
transport for the Soviet Bloc, either in trade between the two worlds or be-
tween Soviet Bloc ports. During 1952, 61 Soviet Bloc ships underwent 30 or
more days of repair each in free world yards, while the evidence indicates
that Soviet yards are engaged in building toward the expansion of the Soviet
Fleet. There is also a serious question as to the degree of injury we are
inflicting on the Soviet economic capability through maintenance of the
embargo.
(2) NIE 59 states, "Severance (of East-West trade) could not
have a significant effect upon the general level of economic activity of
either the Bloc or the West.' 11 While numbers have no real meaning without
examination of separate items of trade, about 1% of the gross national pro-
duct of each side is involved in the issue. Of all of the international
trade of the free world only 2.5% reaches the Soviet Bloc. In addition, if
all trade relations were severed and enforced, it is estimated that the
Soviet Bloc could be self-sufficient in items of present deficiency within
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4 years with the exception of electronic tubes and natural rubber.
(3) On the other side of the question of embargo is the impact
on the Soviet Bloc economic system of a policy of denial. A deficiency
exists in the fields of:
Electronic tubes and components
Certain chemicals
Certain types of machinery and equipment with spare parts
Tin
Natural Rubber
Copper
Zinc
Cork
Current estimates indicate that while complete denial of these items would
create bottlenecks, they would exist for only a limited period of time.
Furthermore, it is believed that the greatest adjustment to denial will fall
on the several Satellites, with a consequent lesser impact on the Soviet
Union economy. Since this adjustment falls on the Satellites, it will be
profitable to examine the Satellite contribution to the Bloc economy.
(4) About 20% of the Soviet Bloc gross national product is con-
tributed by the Satellites. Of this percentage certain critical items far
surpass the over-all average:
Uranium
63% (40% from East Germany)
Heavy industrial products
20 to 40% depending upon the items
Petroleum
20%
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Steel
20%
Synthetic Fuel
80%
Zinc
49%
Lead
35%
Rayon
75%
Bauxite
66%
In addition there is a high level of technical skill in some of the Satel-
lites, notably East Germany and Czechoslovakia, that adds an indeterminate
quantity to the benefits that accrue to the Soviet Union proper.
(5) In the light of an extensive contribution to the Soviet
economy, the Satellites appear as the best target for economic measures. In
the light of recent disturbances in the Satellites, attributed in large part
to lower levels of living, these prospective targets take on more signifi-
cance. While an analysis of trade might indicate that resumption of trade
on a large scale would have little impact on the total economy of the Satel-
lites and China, there are positive indications that denials and repressions
of the people of these countries has aroused a high degree of resentment
that has flared into open rebellion in some cases. In China famine is cur-
rently taking a heavy toll. While playing on the hardships and miseries of
peoples is repugnant to the American sense of fair play, it is imperative
that we use firm tactics where substantial gains tend to accrue to the side
of the free world. To this end, we require an examination of our current
trade policy. With regard to China there can be no doubt. As long as it is
engaged in hostilities with us, we must treat it as an enemy country. Every
effort must be made to tighten the blockade through pressure applied on our
shipping industry, through pressure on our Allies, and by assisting the
Chinese Nationalists in developing the capability of establishing and
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maintaining a close blockade. Indirect actions as well as direct must be
adopted. We must prevent the provision of services to Soviet Bloc shipping.
This will throw an additional burden on yards that are inadequate already.
With regard to the Satellites we must get agreement on what constitutes stra-
tegic materials. Then any relaxing of non-strategic material trading must
be accompanied by concessions to the free world that make the end result of
the transaction favorable to the free world. This course may expand our
opportunities to penetrate the Iron Curtain. It should slow the drive toward
self-sufficiency. Most important of all, it should afford a positive example
of the benefits to be gained from alignment with the free world.
(6) The Soviet Bloc suffers from transportation deficiencies.
This deficiency results in a mal-distribution of manufactured products and
food-stuffs and in difficulties in moving raw materials to processing sites.
For example, there is a petroleum deficiency in the Soviet Far East, with
only a limited capability of moving crude or finished stocks over the Trans-
Siberian railroad. The Soviet Bloc also suffers a tanker deficiency. Suit-
able action to limit participation of the free world in inter-orbit or intra-
orbit shipping, particularly with regard to ankers, will have a marked
effect. Similar areas of deficiency or weakness are subject to tactical
attack and should be so exploited. These several areas should be the sub-
ject of special studies.
(7) Preclusive Buying. Generally speaking, preclusive buying
can prove to be an expensive weapon, particularly under conditions of cold
war. However, resort to preclusive buying on a spot basis and in selected
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areas can be a telling weapon where such buying will not materially disturb
the world price balance. For example, in conjunction with Soviet oil defi-
ciencies indicated previously, measures could be adopted on a temporary basis
to buy up oil convenient to the Soviet Far East, resulting in forcing the
Soviet Union to undertake long hauls in limited shipping to meet their re-
quirements. The same selective buying could be undertaken in special cases
where it would suit propaganda purposes or where commercial cover might be
required for covert operations.
(8) At the time that any relaxations are adopted, the propa-
ganda aspects must be developed to demonstrate the willingness of the free
world to enter into trade relationships with the Soviet orbit. At the same
time, Soviet intransigence should be played up.
(9) We emphasize that only those items in which the net result
is favorable to the free world will be relaxed.
e. Conclusions. In the last analysis we want to employ economic
measures as a real weapon of political warfare. Methods that are profitable
in a general war when there are extensive expenditures of munitions do not
have the same application in political warfare. In the tempo of the current
conflict the following courses of action are recommended specifically:
(1) Provide for selective expansion of free world-Soviet Orbit
trade under conditions that favor the free world.
(2) Regain control of shipping lend-leased to the Soviet Union,
through legal seizure where feasible.
(3) Revise tariffs on a selective basis and simplify customs
procedures.
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The following studies are suggested:
(1) Analysis of Baruch proposals for industrial mobilization
readiness.
(2) Preclusive buying in conjunction with selective trading.
(3) Determination of minimum aid requirements for adequate
strength among our Allies, with particular reference to maintenance require-
ments over the twelve-year period considered by this Task Force as essential
to the success of Alternative C.
4. Propaganda and Education
a. Propaganda is a tool of over-all national policy, and is there-
fore a tactical weapon as the execution of policy unfolds. In other words,
it explains to the outside world actions or decisions already taken by the
U.S. Government.
b. Propaganda is a cover for actions about to be taken, so that a
minimum of explanation may be necessary when they are taken. It was an im-
portant cover in the past when only the vaguest policy for the future was
planned; it will be more important in this respect as policy for the future
becomes more definite and precise.
C. Propaganda gives an assurance to foreign peoples of the perma-
nence and stability of the United States. As such, its continuing message
must be carefully planned and simply stated, designed to permit a variety of
interpretations of the general, enduring theme, which never changes.
d. Under these latter two purposes propaganda is strategic as well
as tactical.
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e. These guiding purposes indicate both what good propaganda is
not, and what it should be.
f. Good propaganda is not merely a selling job for America; it
should be an interpretation of America to people abroad who must know
America better if the best interests of the United States are to be served
and if friendly foreign elements are to help fight America's battles.
g. Good propaganda is not a bludgeoning of real and potential
friends in a frenzied effort to make them do what is considered to be re-
quired of them; it should be an explanation, in simple, direct terms, by the
U.S. as the leading power in kindred forces promoting mutual progress and
enduring security.
h. Good propaganda is not a mere denial of Soviet accusations; it
should be a hard-hitting presentation of facts which refute false Soviet
accusations forcefully, because these facts are directed at something beyond
refutation as part of an over-all program with positive goals.
i. Worthwhile propaganda is the overt expression of the national
spirit, the national will, the national aspiration, presented to peoples
abroad for the furtherance of national objectives.
j. Outside this framework "propaganda" is meaningless, or wasteful,
or dangerous.
(1) Requisities for a Meaningful Propaganda for the U.S.
(a) U.S. propaganda must attain a stature commensurate
with its subject. This country can no longer afford an amateur operation in
a field so important to its welfare. Experimentation has been necessary, and
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often profitable, in the past; but we have now had a dozen years of experi-
mentation, and the program from here on must demonstrate lessons learned.
It must be a mature, studied performance.
(b) To bring this about, the following needs are basic:
i. Education of the American people on what is being
attempted through official propaganda, what it can be expected to do and
what one need not expect it to do. Employees actively engaged in propaganda
ought to be encouraged to appear more often before the American public, with
full explanations of the program's purpose and accomplishments. By no other
means can adequate public support of the program be obtained.
ii. Sharp delineation of the field of propaganda
operation, as distinct from covert activity. Overt propaganda is not a
cloak-and-dagger operation. It does of course coordinate with the covert
program and the two must be mutually complementary.
iii. An organizational formula that will be maintained
long enough for the program to attain consistency and continuity. The almost
incredible series of reorganizations in the propaganda field since the found-
ing of OWI has represented the greatest single handicap to the program's
success.
iv. Development of a propaganda technique tailored to
the area where impact is desired. A general criterion might be: "If they
don't repeat it, it's no good. Thus far, we have not met that criterion
often enough.
V. Solid training of personnel, with specific schooling
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in Americana, propaganda technique, residence abroad. Armchair propagandists
are as irresponsible to the country as armchair military strategists. They
must not longer be given responsibility for the program or its execution.
vi. Serious recruitment of personnel at the formative
level, with solid career inducements. Best results in this field can be
obtained only through use of exceptionally good individuals.
vii. Patient study by experienced personnel of possi-
bilities for allied cooperation in propaganda. This does not mean that we
relinquish desirable independence in the execution of our own propaganda. It
does mean that we use, beyond any point thus far seriously tried, opportuni-
ties for "cross propaganda" through combinations of friendly foreign propa-
ganda systems and facilities.
viii. A stabilized budget permitting realization of
programs launched, without constant interruption of pace and change of magni-
tude. The ups and downs of budgetary level of recent years has harmfully
affected the program's success.
ix. Evaluation of the program on a basis broader than
U.S. statistics or narrow, short-term U.S. interests. Organization, no mat-
ter how good, can do no more than solve the superficial problems in propa-
ganda. Only deep evaluation can guide a program of long-range worth.
(2) Modifications Necessary for a Worthwhile Propaganda Program
(a) In order to measure up to the task, the U.S. propa-
ganda program needs drastic modification in three aspects:
i. The "umbrella" theme. We need an over-all theme
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expressing our spirit and philosophy as a people, that will encourage our
friends and allies, entice the fence-sitters to positive action for our side,
and confound the "revolt-of-the masses" theme of the enemy. Such a theme
must be presented in simple, direct terms to which any temporary treatment
of current events or American tactics can be tied. It must come out of the
American articles of faith --- the Declaration of Independence, the Preamble
to the Constitution, the United Nations Charter -- so that it has solid
foundation in the past as well as in the present; and it must point the way
of hope and optimism to the future. Our entire cultural and educational pro-
gram should be enlisted in translating it as the very core of American belief.
Suggested theme: the dignity and worth of the individual, free in a free
world. It must be played in every realm of human progress, under the four
freedoms, in nationalist aspirations whenever they coincide with U.S. best
interests, in whatever context gives best results for any given region. The
catch phrase should be, "You are important!" and it should be addressed to
those who have forgotten that fact as well as to those who are just beginning
to learn it. It must be repeated over and over, until those hearing it in
one part of the world come to feel some real link to others hearing it else-
where and to Americans who believe it with such conviction and such faith that
they keep on expressing it. For this simple "umbrella" theme is the basic
explanation of the only end to the cold war acceptable to the American people -
a free world with self-determination for all peoples.
(b) Pointed output. Too much of our tactical propaganda
is still shovelled out on a world-wide basis. It lacks pointed meaning for
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individual peoples. Even the phrases of President Eisenhower need different
propaganda handling, depending upon whether they are being transmitted to
sophisticated Western Europeans or interpreted to puzzled and less percep-
tive South Asians. In the past, we have said that we could not afford such
tailored propaganda if we were to keep up the necessary volume of output.
It may have been proper to get before the world such material as we then had
at our disposal. But in the future, quantity without quality is sure to be
dangerous. Three remedies need immediate attention:
i. Closer working arrangements, in much more serious
vein, with local or indigenous propaganda services and private groups. We
cooperate in the military realm, why not in the propaganda realm? No other
single effort could keep us more nearly on the right psychological path in
dealing with foreign audiences.
ii. Better chosen and better trained personnel in the
field, in terms of knowledge and understanding of the region in which they
are assigned. They must know languages and they must know people; if they
don't we must not appoint them until they do. Training will certainly take
time but experience has proven that it is preferable to wait for trained
personnel than to send unqualified people to represent America abroad.
iii. Personnel in Washington that are more knowl-
edgeable. Too many directives, too many pamphlets and movies and books, go
out because they are meaningful for Americans, without any psychological or
cultural tie to the people for whom they are intended and with no considera-
tion for what foreigners are curious to learn or eager to have guidance on.
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Almost by definition, propaganda tailored properly to Americans is tailored
improperly to foreigners; but only personnel with sound foreign experience
can be aware of the concrete meaning of this fact. The importance of this
point is heightened in the case of material, oral (i.e., by radio) or printed,
intended for areas in the world to which we are not permitted to send propa-
ganda personnel and in which the inhabitants have almost no means of evalu-
ating current news. In this respect, we must in reality conduct two foreign
propaganda programs -- one for the free world, with its relative freedom of
information, and one for the totalitarian world, with its restrictions and
distortions. Mistakes in the former are bad, but can be mitigated somewhat
by the other free world information available to the listener or reader;
mistakes in the latter are well-nigh irreparable, and therefore must not be
made in the first place.
(c) A more virile handling of tactical propaganda, particu-
larly as concerns the current world struggle. Being constantly on the defen-
sive in the propaganda war, as we have been, affects opinion, not only in the
free world but in its reactions on the anonymous masses behind the Iron
Curtain. We are missing propaganda opportunities every day. Recently there
have been several cases where front page headlines cited Communist allega-
tions and charges at the top and denials by U.S. Government spokesmen beneath
in small captions. Each case was a fertile field for truthful condemnation
on our part -- prompt reprobation based on truth which would not only have
informed and influenced Western peoples, but would have seeped through the
Curtain to the wretched inhabitants on the other side. An aggressive
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propaganda drive would gradually let the depressed people behind the Curtain
know that their problem is being appreciated. Rioters in Eastern Germany
and Czechoslovakia would gain encouragement; peoples in other Satellites
would consider the possibilities of revolt. Instead of denying that we
encouraged riots in Eastern Germany we should have widely and vigorously
condemned the regime that is exploiting people beyond human endurance and
linked the riots io the need for freedom from the Soviet yoke. Cur condem-
nation of the reprisal executions in Eastern Germany have been feeble and
uncertain. In the chaos of the prisoner release in Korea, we assumed an
apologetic attitude toward the Communists, but no one made any significant
statement concerning the Communists' disposition of our prisoners or, indeed,
of their failure to release hundreds of thousands of prisoners still in their
hands from World War II. We missed a great opportunity following Stalin's
death. When the edict was issued by the Kremlin following this dramatic
event, announcing the new governmental line-up, it was prefaced in unmis-
takably clear type on the front page of Pravda by the words, 11
In order
to
prevent panic ". This was a clear sign that revealed the lack of con-
fidence with which the current leadership has faced its task. We can and
should strike, strike and keep striking with ideas and information that may
have a profound effect. We should reject any thought that lack of appropri-
ations prevents such action.
(d) A virile propaganda program must not wait for enemy
initiative to be guided in its output. It must ask Soviet Russia all the
questions, wait for none of the answers, repeat the questions even as the
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defensive answers are coming back, until all the audience-world is asking
the same questions:
"Why don't you
- let outsiders see your Russia, if it's the paradise you say it is?"
- let your young men visit the outside world, if you are sure of
their loyalty?"
- let your people see movies of the free world?"
- get out of Austria?"
- give East Germany free elections, as you have promised?"
- give East Germany something to eat -- or are you trying to keep
them too weak to revolt again?"
- free wartime prisoners -- or are they all dead, starved, and
broken in your slave labor camps?"
"Why do you
- prove your "love" for labor by shooting workers in the streets
and by your thousands of labor camps with their millions of
prisoners?"
- stifle art and literature and music?"
- kill off your most experienced leaders?"
- jam the radio-voice of truth -- unless you are afraid of your own
people armed with the facts?"
- restrict the travel of foreigners -- are you ashamed of your
country? frightened? or just unsure?"
- drive out, wherever you penetrate, all hope and all future and all
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human kindness?"
- promote totalitarianism instead of justice, force instead of
law, guns instead of butter, labor camps instead of freedom,
a mystique instead of a religion, greed instead of devotion,
war instead of peace?"
Our virile tactical propaganda must drop the sacrosanct tone, the defensive
waiting for developments, the long, reasoned arguments in answer to those
made against us outside of all reason or respect for truth. We must stop
taking ourselves so seriously that no one cares any more to listen. It must
now be our turn to point the finger in a real propaganda offensive, with all
the ridicule and sarcasm and hard-hitting facts we can muster.
5. Covert Operations
a. Approach. In this section we attempt, by analysis of the back-
ground of past covert operations and of the political, military, economic
and propaganda sections of this report, to evolve recommendations for a world-
wide course of action or Program for Covert Operations which will support
Alternative C and which will avoid the errors of the past.
b. Background.
(1) Definition. For the purposes of this exercise the term
"covert operations" is meant to include all those political, military (or
"para-military"), economic, propaganda and other actions designed to advance
U.S. interests and defeat the Kremlin conspiracy, which must be conducted in
such a manner as to mask the official hand of the United States. Thus, covert
operations are only the "black" or unrevealed side of all other functions in
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the undeclared war.
(2) The Covert Program must be an integral part of a total
national strategy - not a separate "Covert or Psychological Strategy."
The success or failure of a covert program depends on the skill with which
the totality of functions and weapons available to us are integrated and
directed against the heart of the Kremlin conspiracy. It not only cannot
win alone, it cannot even exist alone. For example, it is not possible
successfully to wage decisive covert economic warfare in the absence of an
approved national objective, concept, policy, plan and course of action for
national economic warfare. While it is possible for covert tactics to
diverge from national tactics -- indeed this is one of the greatest advan-
tages of the covert technique -- it is not possible for covert strategy to
diverge from national strategy for long without damaging the national
interest.
(3) Lack of a National Strategy to end the Cold War by winning
it has so far frustrated attempts at Covert Warfare. Since 1948 (NSC 10/2,
68 etc.) we have had an aggressive covert policy -- couched in much the same
language as the Panel Directive on Alternative C of this Project Solarium.
Many covert operations have been conducted under this policy. Some have been
successful -- others failures. There never has been a cohesive national
strategy (governing the national diplomatic, military, economic and propa-
ganda program) sufficiently aggressive to embrace an aggressive covert
strategic program. Attempts to design a strategy for covert warfare apart
from such a national strategy have failed precisely for this reason (See:
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PSB-D-31. 26 Nov. 1952).
(4) Lack of Strategy has especially impeded creation of an
adequate Covert Apparatus. As a result of tactical failures and the absence
of a national strategy realistically geared to the covert objective (i.e.,
overthrow of the Kremlin world-wide conspiracy) CIA has not so far been able
successfully to build a covert apparatus capable of accomplishing its stag-
gering objective. The national policy has consistently demanded the develop-
ment (see NSC 68 and 10/5) of such an apparatus but the absence of a national
strategy contemplating its actual employment has caused successive Directors
of CIA to move with caution in building up an organization of the magnitude
required, when the question of its ultimate usefulness remained so in doubt.
The PSB (in D-31, 26 Nov. 1952) took the position that the physical apparatus
should nevertheless be built with the utmost dispatch (consistent with tech-
nical requirements of security and training) despite the absence of a long-
range strategy and despite the difficulties now confronting CIA in physical
penetrations of the Iron Curtain. CIA was also urged to increase the scope,
pace and magnitude of its research program to overcome these technical diffi-
culties. The uncertainties introduced by a change in administration and
waiting for the report of the President's Committee on International Informa-
tion Activities (Jackson Committee) have delayed implementation of these
recommendations even further.
(5) Provision for Building Covert Apparatus. Firm determina-
tion is needed to build up a truly professional covert apparatus with a scope,
pace and magnitude commensurate with its task and with the full support and
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participation of the political, military, economic and propaganda arms of
the government under an approved and positive Long-Range National Strategy
and program of action. Only on the platform of such a strategy could CIA
reasonably be expected to undertake the 5 to 10 years program required to
train the technical experts, lay on the necessary long-term deep non-
governmental "cover" and develop the logistical and technical support
mechanisms which are the very sinews of covert warfare.
(6) The Error of Failing to Build a Stand-by Apparatus even
while not capable of Full Penetration is Fully Demonstrated by our Inability
Fully to Exploit the East German Uprising.
(a) Prudence requires that a stand-by apparatus be built
to support the military in the event of war and to exploit unrest in the
absence of war even if we are not presently capable of building U.S. control-
led underground resistance movements in the Satellites.
(b) Under our terms of reference, a war, if it comes, will
not come on our initiative. In any such war the need of the military for
covert support will be immediately obvious. The joint plans of CIA and JCS
recognize this need and make planning provision for the requisite apparatus.
But there is a seriously wide gap between these blueprints and actual per-
formance. The various ceilings and cut-backs on the personnel and materiel
programs in support of this stand-by apparatus are resulting in a steady
widening of this gap between requirement and performance. When it is fully
understood that the stand-by apparatus which the military will require on
D-Day is the same apparatus required to exploit targets of opportunity such
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as the recent uprisings in East Germany, the tragic consequences of this gap
become readily apparent.
(7) Reasons and Excuses for Lack of an Adequate Apparatus are
Considered Invalid. We realize the magnitude and difficulty of the task in-
volved in building an adequate apparatus. We appreciate the difficulties of
penetrating an orbit defended by the world's most efficient Security-Police
and Counterespionage Service. We sympathize with the concern of clandestine
intelligence professionals over the dangers inherent to the espionage system
in aggressive covert operations. We are aware that it takes years to train
professional covert personnel and to develop the long-range, non-governmental
cover mechanisms required to be prepared. We know that the lead-times for
the research, development, procurement and distribution of special material
on a covert basis is even longer than the unconscionable lead-time required
for even overt logistical development. But all of these hazards and
obstacles to the development of an adequate covert apparatus are the most
compelling reasons in the world for getting on with the job of overcoming
them with the utmost dispatch.
(8) Our Covert Operations in the Past have tended to Attempt
too Much, too Soon where our capabilities were weakest, especially vs. the
European Satellites and China, while tending, relatively, to neglect the
attainment of necessary objectives within our power. Specifically, the re-
cruitment and training of personnel on a scope required by our eventual task
is within our power to do. The initiation and development of long-range
non-governmental cover is within our power. The rapid development of a truly
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comprehensive and aggressive research program into covert techniques and
materiel is within our power. The development of a stand-by apparatus, even
though most of its assets must be outside the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, is
within our power. The wrecking of Kremlin-controlled Communist apparatus
outside the Curtain is within our power. But unfortunately, although a start
has been made on most of these things, they are not as advanced over the past
five years as they could and should have been, had they been aggressively
initiated and prosecuted. Instead, "overriding priorities" to attain at
once targets beyond our grasp in Korea, China and the European Satellites,
delayed and delayed again efforts to get on with the programs outlined above,
which are absolutely essential to the attainment of our ultimate objectives.
Then, as these premature efforts aborted -- as they were bound to do -- an
unhealthy reaction of defeatism set in which tended further to delay initia-
tion of vigorous prosecution of these basic essentials to ultimate success.
(9) So much for Lessons from the Past. If we turn to the future
we find that covert operations should be designed to support the political,
military, economic and propaganda strategy to end the cold war by winning it
as set out in the rest of Section VII. A. of this report.
C. Basic Covert Strategy.
(1) General. The basic world-wide covert strategy over the
next decade should supplement the National Strategy by building up rapidly
for a showdown in the Soviet Orbit where our covert resources are now meager
and our enemy's strength greatest. This means that, for the next five years,
we would only be on a limited tactical covert offensive outside the Soviet Orbit
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/
while maintaining the strategic defensive in that area. While in South Americ
(our own backyard), in Africa south of the Sahara and in Neutralist Asia, we
should adopt a vigorous short-term strategic and tactical offensive against
the Kremlin conspiracy so that these areas will have the maximum possible
anti-Kremlin orientation before we shift to the final offensive against the
Soviet Orbit. During this period we would continue, as we have in the past,
to strengthen and assist our friends and allies in Western Europe and in the
Far East.
(2) Africa and Latin America. The Kremlin is only beginning to
make a really strong effort in these under-developed areas. As it goes on
the defensive in Europe, it is stepping up these efforts sharply. Riding the
waves of racism and nationalism the conspiracy proposes to make showy gains
in these two non-white continents with a minimum effort and with maximum
blows to our prestige in the eyes of neutralist Asiatics. Therefore, if we
are to produce a climate of victory, if we are to attract friends and enhance
our leadership by successes, we must look soon and sharply to these two huge
continents of the Southern Hemisphere. Then, as we focus on the defeat of
the Kremlin in its own orbit we can feel sure in our own rear and on our
southern flank. This can and should be done rapidly and comparatively
cheaply, if we face up to the dilemmas presented by the adverse colonial
policies of our Western Allies and the adverse policies of our own private
commercial enterprises in these areas. The situations of Communist strength
in Guatemala and British Guiana and a Communist African GHQ in Addis Ababa
should receive particular attention.
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(3) Neutralist Asia. The basic covert strategy for this "prize
area" in the cold war, dictated by the basic national strategy proposed, is
to seek to restore the power equilibrium unbalanced by Red China. This can
best be done by spilling the Communists off the surfboard on which they are
here also riding the waves of racism, nationalism and economic depression.
It is a field in which anti-Westernism (or anti-white-ism) is such a basic,
atavistic and probably uncorrectable adverse factor that the hand of the U.S.
must be most carefully hidden in this effort. Thus it is a field peculiarly
demanding covert operations. We must develop Asiatics as the principal tools
of Covert Warfare. Japanese, South Koreans, Filipinos, Nationalist and
"Third Force" Chinese, Thais and Pakistani offer the best possibilities --
especially the Japanese. Here again (as in Africa) we must face up to the
problem presented by the remnants of "colonial imporialism" and "white
supremacy" influencing our Western Allies, especially the French in Indo-
China. We must represent ourselves to these people as champions of self-
government.
(4) With regard to Red China proper, the covert strategy sup-
ports the basic strategy of fomenting discord between Peiping and Moscow by
harassment and divisionism looking toward an ultimate splitting off of Mao
from the Kremlin with a possible defection of Eastern Soviet Republics to
the Mao camp. Throughout the Mohammedan, Hindu and Buddhist world we must,
through indigenous leaders and subtle covert operations, make clear the
antithetical nature of Kremlin Communism to the point of causing disgust
and revulsion against Communist aims.
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(5) In Europe We Propose to Step Up the Tactical Covert
Offensive While Maintaining the Strategic Covert Defensive Until a Covert
Apparatus is Built Capable of Causing Significant Defections of Satellites
and Significant Penetrations of the U.S.S.R. Proper. The presence of large
Communist minorities in Western Europe (especially in France and Italy),
growing "neutralism," and recent demonstrations of widespread disaffection
in East Germany and the European Satellites ll.require a short-term stepping
up of covert activities on both sides of the Curtain in Europe. Furthermore,
the possibility of general war at any time (not of our own choosing) requires
that at least a "crash program" of covert operations, to support the military,
be converted rapidly from the paper planning stage to a stand-by covert
apparatus in being commensurate with the magnitude of this task. Above all
the possibility of a rising en masse of the captive peoples of Europe requires
the existence in being of such a stand-by apparatus.
(6) Orbit. With regard to the long-term build-up of an apparatu
capable of significant physical penetrations and the build-up of anti-Kremlin
resistance organizations behind the Curtain, all experts agree on the physical
political and technical difficulties involved. But, as previously stated, we
reject the view that a task should be given a low priority because it is
difficult. If it is not commenced and pushed with highest priority it will
never be accomplished in time to be effective in any program to end the cold
war.
(7) As our capacity to penetrate the Orbit and build up resist-
ance, conduct subtle sabotage and cause defections and divisions increases
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(or as spontaneous eruptions within the Orbit present opportunities), we will
be ready on an ever-increasing scale to go over to the strategic covert
offensive in Eastern Europe and eventually be in a position to cause or
nourish major upheaveals within the U.S.S.R.
d. Over-all Covert Missions Dictated by National Strategy Are:
(1) To destroy the secret apparatus of the Kremlin conspiracy
throughout the free world, with particular attention to elimination of all
Kremlin-dominated Communist Parties both overt and covert. (Phase I.)
(In this regard we would suggest that the cynical divorce-
ment of the Communist World Conspiracy (secret parties) from the
Official Government of the U.S.S.R. should be turned against
the Kremlin so that our attack on this apparatus is overt as
well as covert. The clandestine nature of the apparatus will
require covert treatment of certain aspects in all countries.
We should assume the attitude that attacks on secret apparatus,
seeking the overthrow of free governments, is not an attack on
the U.S.S.R., in violation of any diplomatic or moral standards
of ethics of conduct between nations.)
(2) To impair the U.S.S.R. capability to wage hot war. (All
Phases.)
(3) To build as rapidly as possible a stand-by apparatus capable
of supporting the military in hot war or of exploiting promising unplanned up-
risings in the Satellites. (Phase I.)
(4) To assist in the liberation of the European Satellites and
in driving a wedge between Peiping and Moscow. (Build in Phase I, exploit in
Phase II.)
(5) To cause the maximum disruption within the borders of the
U.S.S.R. (Build in Phase I, develop in Phase II, exploit in Phase III.)
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(6) To assist in assuring continuing orientation toward the
free world in territories from which the U.S.S.R. withdraws or is expelled.
(All phases in which appropriate.)
(7) Ultimately, to assist in confining the U.S.S.R. to its own
boundaries and rendering it internationally harmless. (Phase III, et seq.)
e. Specific Courses of Action for Covert Operations.
(1) Support through vigorous covert operations the comprehensive
national strategy and course of action proposed by Alternative C to defeat the
Kremlin World-Wide Conspiracy.
(2) Create a "Command Post" for the prosecution of this strategy
such as the Operations Committee of the NSC (recommended by the Jackson Com-
mittee) to insure coordination of covert efforts with the political, military,
economic and propaganda efforts in support of this same strategy.
(3) Provide for a twelve year build-up of a long-range covert
apparatus in CIA through increased efforts of personnel procurement, technical
training, technical research, logistical preparation and preparation of long-
term non-governmental cover mechanisms directed toward a showdown with and
within the Soviet Orbit in the period 1958-1965 and following.
(4) Insure that this build-up is not interrupted by arbitrary
ceilings and cut-backs of personnel and budgets as official sentiment blows
hot or cold on the immediate short-term prospects of startling successes or
failures in current covert warfare efforts.
(5) Create a center of Soviet intelligence where all informa-
tion is pooled. (Situation Room for Cold War.)
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(6) Insure that the Intelligence Technicians, in their proper
zeal to build a secure long-term information gathering apparatus, do not
block swift progress toward a covert stand-by activist apparatus capable of:
(a) Supporting the military through sabotage, resistance,
etc., in the event of overt war at any time, not of our
own choosing.
(b) Supporting promising spontaneous uprisings in the
Satellites at any time, not of our own choosing.
(7) Provide for:
(a) Insuring that the Congress does not "blow" the U.S.
covert war to our friends and enemies.
(b) Conditioning the U.S. public to the facts of life of
the true ruthless nature of the threat to their existence by the Kremlin con-
spiracy and the ruthless measures which must be taken to stamp out this
threat, so that, as our covert actions become overt, through design or acci-
dent, they will not be shocked to the point of non-support.
(8) In the First Phase concentrate covert efforts on:
(a) Insuring against further Communist encroachments in
the free world by strengthening present efforts in Western Europe and the
Middle East-Mediterranean area and initiating priority efforts in Latin
America, Sub-Equitorial Africa and Neutralist Asia (including preparation
for an early coup d'etat in Guatemala).
(b) Limited tactical penetrations of the Orbit for in-
telligence purposes and for preparation of later activist activities except
for East Germany, Soviet Austria, Albania and Bulgaria where specific
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operations should be planned in support of the proposed national strategy for
those areas including plans for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the first
two and for the defection of the last two.
(c) Build on present strengths in the Far East and S.E.
Asia, particularly Japan, Formosa, the Philippines and Thailand and initiate
build-up of a strong point in Pakistan. Covertly support planned CHINAT
seizure of Hainan and other islands and prepare for possible later mainland
beachhead. Initiate moves to split Poking-Hoscow.
(9) In the Second Phase
(a) Hold gains in Latin America, Sub-Equatorial Africa and
Neutralist Asia.
(b) Exploit strengths built up in Western Europe, Near East
Far East and S.E. Asia by moving in on European Satellites seeking to break
them off from the Kremlin Bloc and driving a wedge between Peiping-Moscow.
(c) Continue and expand penetrations of the U.S.S.R. proper
and step up operations to overload and harass the bureaucracy and exploit the
other vulnerabilities identified in the CENIS reports.
(10) In the Third Phase -- Assist in operations directed to
ultimate objectives.
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