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TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
July 30, 1953
PROJECT SOLARIUM
Predent
Summary of Basic Concepts of Task Forces
Task Force A
Assumes that time will be on our side, provided that we:
(1) Build up and maintain over a sustained period United States
military strength.
(2) Continue large-scale foreign assistance programs aimed at
increasing free world military strength and economic and
political stability, but with a more selective approach.
(3) Without materially increasing the risk of general war by
undertaking aggressive measures, continue exploitation of
Soviet bloc vulnerabilities in the hope of creating Satellite
dissension, reducing Soviet bloc capabilities, and changing
Soviet intentions, but not within a given time limit.
Task Force B
(1) Makes clear that the United States will undertake general war
against the Soviet bloc in the event of further military
aggression by any Soviet bloc nation.
This single course of action is designed to add a major deterrent
to Soviet aggression for the longest possible time.
Task Force C
(1) Assumes that under current policies, or under those of A and B,
time will be working against us to the point where the Soviet
threat will soon become unbearable and the survival of the
United States problematical.
(2) Provides a time schedule for aggressive action against the
Satellites in the short term and against the USSR in the long
term, to reduce progressively Soviet power to a level which
no longer threatens U. S. security.
(3) Proposes aggressive courses of action which involve greatly
increased risks of general war and correspondingly increased
U. S. security program expenditure.
MECLASSIFIED
MR89-209
UNITOP SECRET
BY
be
6/16/92
SECURITY INFORMATION
PROPOSED NEW BASIC CONCEPT
TOP
SECRET
SECURITY
INFORMATION
(1) To build and maintain U. S. capability for a strong retaliatory
offensive, a base for mobilization, and continental defense.
(2) To concentrate on creating strong, independent, and self-
sufficient groupings of nations friendly to the United States, centered
on Western Europe (including Germany) and on Japan in the Far East.
(3) To Confine future U.S. foreign assistance: (a) to supporting
the development of these regional groupings in Western Europe and the
Far East: and (b) to selective and limited military aid and technical
assistance to other free nations.
(4) To make publicly known, in an appropriate and unmistakable
fashion, the areas in which any clearly recognizable advance by Soviet
bloc military forces beyond present borders will be considered by the
United States as initiating general war between itself and the Soviet
bloc.
(5) To take selected aggressive actions of a limited scope,
involving moderately increased risks of general war, to eliminate
Soviet-dominated areas within the free world and to reduce Soviet power
in the Satellite periphery.
NOTE:
The foregoing policy -
(1) estimates the risk of general war resulting from
aggressive action directed at the Soviet bloc as
less grave at the present time than did Task Force
"A".
(2) accepts moderately increased risks of general war
by taking some of the aggressive actions against
the Satellites proposed by Task Force "C".
(3) aims during the near future to create a "climate of
victory", to bolster the morale and strength of the
free world while forcing the Soviet bloc on the
defensive.
TOP SECRET
BESUNITE INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
July 30, 1953
PROJECT SOLARIUM
Summary of Basic Consepts of Task Forces
UNCLA TOP SECRET
I
Task Force A
Assumes that time will be on our side, provided that we:
(1) Build up and maintain ever a sustained period United States
military strength.
(2) Continue large-scale foreign assistance programs aimed at
increasing free world military strength and economic and
political stability, but with a more selective approach.
(3) Without materially increasing the risk of general war by
undertaking aggressive measures, continue exploitation of
Soviet bloc vulnerabilities in the hope of creating Satellite
dissension, reducing Soviet bloc capabilities, and changing
Soviet intentions, but not within a given time limit.
Task Force B
(1) Makes clear that the United States will undertake general war
against the Soviet bloc in the event of further military
aggression by any Soviet bloc nation.
This single course of action is designed to add a major deterrent
to Soviet aggression for the longest possible time.
Task Force c
(1) Assumes that under current policies, or under those of A and B,
time will be working against us to the point where the Soviet
threat will soon become unbearable and the survival of the
United States problematical.
(2) Provides a time schedule for aggressive action against the
Satellites in the short term and against the USSR in the long
term, to reduce progressively Soviet power to a level which
no longer threatens U.S. security.
(3) Proposes aggressive courses of action which involve greatly
increased risks of general war and correspondingly increased
U. S. security program expenditure.
TOP SECRET
INFRAMATIVE
DECLASSIFIED
(b)
MR 89-209 #3
BY
be WE 6/16/92
PROPOSED NEW BASIC CONCEPT
UNCLAS SECURITY SECRETED INFORMATION 4 SECRET
(1) To build and maintain U. S. capability for a strong retaliatory
offensive, a base for mobilization, and continental defense.
(2) To concentrate on creating strong, independent, and self-
sufficient groupings of nations friendly to the United States, centered
on Western Europe (including Germany) and on Japan in the Far East.
(3) To confine future U.S. foreign assistance: (a) to supporting
the development of these regional groupings in Western Europe and the
Far East: and (b) to selective and limited military aid and technical
assistance to other free nations.
(4) To make publicly known, in an appropriate and unmistakable
fashion, the areas in which any clearly recognisable advance by Soviet
bloc military forces beyond present borders will be considered by the
United States as initiating general war between itself and the Soviet
bloc.
(5) To take selected aggressive actions of a limited scope,
involving moderately increased risks of general var, to eliminate
Soviet-dominated areas within the free world and to reduce Soviet power
in the Satellite periphery.
NOTE: The foregoing policy -
(1) estimates the risk of general war resulting from
aggressive action directed at the Soviet bloe as
less grave at the present time than did Task Force
"A".
(2) accepts moderately increased risks of general var
by taking some of the aggressive actions against
the Satellites proposed by Task Force "0".
(3) aims during the near future to create a "climate of
victory", to bolster the morale and strength of the
free world while foreing the Soviet bloc on the
defensive.
TOP SECRET
ADOMMITY INFORMATION
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
SABUSITY INFORMATION
WASHINGTON
July 24, 1953
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
On July 22, 1953, the Vice President remarked on
a statement made during the Solarium presentation, to the
effect that U.S. prestige in the world is lower now than ever
before. The Vice President said that he had heard similar
statements from Congressional leaders, from Secretary Dulles
at a recent Council Meeting, and from travelers returning
from abroad.
The Vice President expressed concern that U.S.
prestige should be suffering abroad, despite the large amount
of economic assistance being furnished other nations. He
suggested that the causes for this situation should be in-
quired into, and a report made to the Council with recommenda-
tions for improving the existing situation.
It is suggested that the Council at its next Meeting
direct the Psychological Strategy Board to undertake a study
of this problem, with particular reference to the following
questions:
1. When did the decline in prestige commence?
2. What were major causes which contributed to the
decline, and their relative importance?
3. When did our prestige reach its lowest ebb?
4. Has our prestige in the world undergone any signif-
icant change in the last six months?
5. What action should the U.S. take to improve the
existing situation?
When the Psychological Strategy Board has completed
its study, it should submit a report to the Council.
ROBERT CUTLER
CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL
Special Assistant
to the President
DECLASSIFIED
INFORMATION
E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4 (b)
MR 82-345 # 1
BY 1/JH DATE 11/4/82
The President
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT TOP SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECURITY INFORMATION
WASHINGTON
COPY NO. 1
July 22, 1953
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SUBJECT:
Project Solarium
REFERENCE:
NSC Action No. 853-c
In accordance with NSC Action No. 853-c, summaries of
Project Solarium presentations and written reports, prepared
by the NSC staff and concurred in by Solarium Task Force
representatives, are submitted herewith as a basis for dis-
cussion by the Council at its meeting on July 30, together
with a summary of the principle points made during discussion
following the presentation to the National Security Council
on July 16, 1953.
As background, there follows a brief summary of the
instructions to the Task Forces defining the three alternative
policies which they were asked to develop:
Alternative "A". (p.1)
a. The policy of the United States, as elaborated
more fully in NSC 153/1, would be:
(1) To maintain over a sustained period armed
forces to provide for the security of the United
States and to assist in the defense of vital areas
of the free world;
(2) To continue to assist in building up the
economic and military strength and cohesion of the
free world; and
(3) Without materially incrasing the risk of
general war, to continue to exploit the vulnerabilities
of the Soviets and their satellites by political,
economic and psychological measures.
DECLASSIFIED
MR 89-211*)
Authority
- i -
Live
12/18/98
By
NLE Date
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
b. For purposes of analysis and study by the Task
Force, it is assumed that this policy would be interpreted
and administered on the following bases:
(1) Time can be used to the advantage of the
free world; if we can build up and maintain the
strength of the free world during a period of years,
Soviet power will deteriorate or relatively decline to
a point which no longer constitutes a threat to the
security of the United States and to world peace.
(2) In seeking to deter and oppose further ex-
pansion by the Soviet bloc, the policy would include
the utilization of military operations, as necessary
and feasible, even at the grave risk of general war.
However, an attempt would be made to localize such
military operations as far as possible.
Alternative "B". (p. 19)
The policy of the United States would be:
(1) To complete the line now drawn in the
NATO area and the Western Pacific so as to form a
continuous line around the Soviet bloc beyond which
the U.S. will not permit Soviet or satellite military
forces to advance without general war;
(2) To make clear to the Soviet rulers in an
appropriate and unmistakable way that the U.S. has
established and is determined to carry out this
policy; and
(3) To reserve freedom of action, in the event
of indigenous Communist seizure of power in countries
on our side of the line, to take all measures necessary
to re-establish a situation compatible with the
security interests of the U.S. and its allies.
Alternative "C". (p.24)
a. The policy of the United States would be:
(1) To increase efforts to disturb and weaken
the Soviet bloc and to accelerate the consolidation
and strengthening of the free world to enable it to
assume the greater risks involved; and
(2) To create the maximum disruption and
popular resistance throughout the Soviet bloc.
- ii -
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SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRE
SECURITY INFORMATION
b. The purpose of this policy would be to force
the Soviets to shift their efforts to holding what they
already have rather than concentrating on gaining control
of additional territories and peoples and, at the same
time, to produce a climate of victory encouraging to the
free world. While this policy is not designed to provoke
a war with the Soviet Union, it involves a substantial
risk of general war which will vary according to the
nature and timing of the steps taken to implement it.
JAMES S. LAY, Jr.
Executive Secretary
cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director of Central Intelligence
- iii -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
TASK FORCE A
1. Mission
a. As directed, the policy of the U. S. would be:
(1) To maintain over a sustained period armed forces to
provide for the security of the United States and to assist
in the defense of vital areas of the free world;
(2) To continue to assist in building up the economic
and military strength and cohesion of the free world; and
(3) Without materially increasing the risk of general
war, to continue to exploit the vulnerabilities of the
Soviets and their satellites by political, economic and
psychological measures.
b. For purposes of analysis and study by the Task Force, it
is assumed that this policy would be interpreted and administered
on the following bases:
(1) Time can be used to the advantage of the free world;
if we can build up and maintain the strength of the free
world during a period of years, Soviet power will deteriorate
or relatively decline to a point which no longer constitutes
a threat to the security of the United States and to world
peace.
(2) In seeking to deter and oppose further expansion
by the Soviet bloc, the policy would include the utiliza-
tion of military operations, as necessary and feasible,
even at the grave risk of general war. However, an attempt
would be made to localize such military operations as far
as possible.
2. Method of Approach
Task Force A arrived at the conclusion that there are areas
in which significant improvements could be made within the frame-
work of NSC 153/1. The Task Force believed that we have reached
a critical point in the application of our grand strategy, and
in the Soviet situation, which marks a phase line. Task Force
A believes the U. S. is today in a position to assume the strategic
offensive in its conflict with Soviet Communism. The U. S.
should move forward from today's phase line to rectify imperfec-
tions in our strategy; give it new confidence, boldness and
constructiveness; recapture flexibility; effect better integra-
tion; and improve implementation. It is felt that the policy
thus revised would give the greatest assurance as against other
possible alternatives for the successful disintegration of the
Soviet threat without recourse to general war, and without
increasing the risk of general war.
- 1 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
3. Analysis of the Soviet Threat
The Soviet union has developed a strong and dangerous
military posture serving political leadership we recognize as
hostile, resentful of American power, dedicated to aims in-
compatible with our security. The threatening quality of this
military posture arises from the strength and disposition of
these forces, coupled with the attitude of the Soviet political
leaders, and above all, their ideological commitment to the
destruction of western capitalism in processes which involve
at some point the use of violence. Soviet predominance in
eastern and central Europe makes impossible a restoration of
normal conditions of full stability to Europe as a whole, and
has contributed extensively to the development of the military
posture we find disturbing. Furthermore, the possibility exists
that additional nations will be brought under communist control
through the activities of indigenous communist factions, acting
with or without overt support from Moscow. In addition to the
military threat posed by conventional Soviet armaments there
is increasing evidence that the Soviet union is developing a
strong capability in the field of weapons of mass destruction.
If this process continues unimpeded, the Soviet leaders will
soon have it in their power to inflict massive damage on the
cities, industries and facilities of this country and its
major allies, although presumably not without suffering re-
taliation in kind.
4. Basic Objectives of U. S. Policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Threat
a. Assure the security of our country in the light of the
Soviet military posture.
b. Prevent further Soviet expansion through seizure of
additional countries by local communist minorities.
C. Reduce the area under Soviet control, first and foremost
in the satellite area in central and eastern Europe. In addi-
tion, in the long term, bring about a situation in which China
would no longer be dominated by a regime allied with Moscow
in a framework of ideology hostile to the U. S.
5. Suggested U. S. Policy with regard to the USSR
"With the assistance of Allies to achieve through progressive
steps and without undue risk of war, but recognizing that
the threat of war must not inhibit our unfolding courses of
action, a stop to Soviet expansion; the diminution and
progressive retraction of Soviet control over its east
European Satellites and Red China; the discrediting of
Soviet power and Communist ideology as effective instruments
- 2 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
of Soviet foreign policy; and a maximum contribution to
the increase in internal stresses and conflicts within the
Soviet system; to the end that the Soviet rulers will be
forced to accept the necessity of adjusting their objectives
to those of peaceful co-existence with the free world."
6. Other elements in the World Situation
There are two other basic factors in the situation which
must be considered. One is the rising discontent and resentment
against the West, particularly in Asia, and the demands for
rapid social and economic change which characterize the so-
called socio-economic "revolution" which exists throughout the
world. This exists quite apart from Soviet-Communist threat
but is effectively exploited by Communism. The second is the
reduction of the bi-polarity which has dominated the world
situation since 1945, and is indicated by a decline in U. S.
prestige and leadership during the past several years, growing
independence of action by other free nations and, on the Soviet
side, developments which have had a somewhat comparable effect
in weakening Moscow's range of influence. Both of these
considerations must be met with positive and constructive policies
which utilize, rather than oppose them. They point to the
crucial importance which may attach to courses of U. S. action
in the immediately forthcoming period. Thus Task Force A sees,
in this regard:
a. As the first principle, the U. S. to avoid policies
which give impression it is solely pursuing aims which
have essentially wartime objectives and that it feels war
is inevitable;
b. As the second principle, the U. S. to create the
impression of steadiness and reliability in formulation and
implementation of foreign policy; and
c. As the third principle, the positive emphasis of
U. S. policy to be placed on strengthening U. S. position
with other free world countries and in the creation of
strength and confidence in free world.
7. Courses of Action Proposed
a. Maintenance of U. S. strength
The risk of general war is not high. Acceptance, how-
ever, of a calculated risk that the Soviet union will not
resort to war, which would lead to a reduction in our
- 3 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
defense establishment cannot be accepted. Our military
program should continue to be related to Soviet military
capabilities for general war, and not become captive to the
zigzags of Soviet political policy. The Task Force came to
the tentative conclusion in regard to present mobilization
plans that the portion of the economy proposed for alloca-
tion to the war effort in the event of full mobilization
is too high to be realistic (a peak of 66 percent of the
gross national product) and recommended study by the
responsible agencies.
b. Peripheral war may be increasingly unlikely in the near
and mid-term future. However, U. S. efforts to prepare military,
political and psychological deterrents to aggression should
include:
(1) Considering the question of announcing that the
U. S. will feel free to use atomic weapons in case
of local aggression in the future and,
(2) Emphasizing the development of indigenous forces
capable of maintaining internal order within
countries which are likely targets.
c. There is need to generate increased public understanding
on the vital importance today of military power as an instru-
ment of policy for peace, its deterrent value and its confidence
building aspects.
d. NSC 153/1 courses of action to support the objectives
of military preparedness are accepted in general with the
following additional recommendationss
(1) It will be necessary to commit resources not yet
programmed for security purposes in order to build
up the continental defense of the U. S. rapidly.
(2) The possibility that our governmental processes
may inhibit a policy of immediate retaliatory
action in an atomic war should be studied.
(3) The external political-military aspect, with
particular reference to western Europe, of the
effect of Soviet possession of a massive destructive
capability in time of tension approaching a war
crisis should be studied.
(4) The danger of disruption of our civilian population
through mass exodus from target areas in time of
rising tension with Russia should be investigated.
- 4 -
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TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
(5) A new over-all look should be taken at the whole
impact of special weapons on our security program
(Including mobilization base, manpower reserves,
civilian defense, etc.) from the standpoint of
5 or more years from now.
(6) NSC 153/1 is defective in providing a human resources
policy. Such should be given status by the NSC of
the same order as policy concerning industrial
resources.
(7) NSC 153/1 is unclear as to the extent the U. S.
security program and policies depend on allies.
(8) Study should be initiated to include:
a. Clearer determination of the extent of the
dependence of our over-all security program
on allies.
b. Continuation of the stress in our forward
strategy of collective security.
c. Recognition of, and establishment of U. S.
policy regarding, the dependence of our
allies upon us for maintenance and replacement
of equipment in peacetime.
d. Face up to the very substantial logistical
dependence of our allies on the U. S. in case
war should come and a balancing of our programs
and plans accordingly.
8. Costs
a. The main internal threat seen by Task Force 11 is the
danger of lack of constancy in our security program. A creeping
disarmament might prove even more dangerous than was the outcome
of post World War II demobilization. Positive actions must be
initiated to draw public support so as to link various components
of the Soviet threat with the services, sacrifices, tax-payments,
etc., which the U. S. people need to provide to meet that threat.
b. It is difficult to see how the military build-up of
ourselves and our allies programmed until the end of last year
can in fact be effected under current forward budget planning.
- 5 -
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SECURITY INFORMATION
C. Out of a summation of those factors which are likely to
add up to an increase, it is estimated that the cost of Task
Force A's course of national policy will exceed during the
build-up period the funds allocated to the security program
as currently contemplated in the most recent budget planning.
d. In the long run the Task Force program will cost not
materially less than about 40 billion annually and may be some-
what higher. There appears no other realistic solution than to
maintain a see-through constancy of preparedness until we have
had a long continued demonstration that the spirit and intent
of Soviet communism has changed - or even longer, until we
effectively regulate armaments.
9. Maintenance of the Economy
a. After studying the ability of the economy to sustain
the security load, Task Force A concludes that there is no
question that our country has the economic capacity to provide
a high plateau of preparedness - certainly the program envisaged
by Task Force 11 - over a sustained period (interpreted as 10
years or more).
b. The real threat from the economic standpoint, arises
not so much from the absolute cost of security as from other
dangers which include:
(1) The effect on adequate legislative action of the
unprecedented absolute cost of the peacetime security
program.
(2) The effect of possible economic recession.
(3) Lack of economic readiness for mobilization, general
war, and atomic attack on the U. S.
C. NSC 153/1 fails to provide directives or policy guidance
for those preparatory economic and industrial mobilization
arrangements within the executive branch which are consistent
with its stated policy of military readiness.
d. On the national debt, the main question is whether it is
likely to become so high as to be a threat to the strength of
the U. S., but any likely threat existent in the debt does not
seem comparable to the Soviet threat.
e. It is seriously questioned that in the face of an
unbalanced budget and the current security need in an economy
operating at around full normal capacity, there is any urgent
economic argument for reducing the total of federal taxes.
- 6 -
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SECURITY INFORMATION
The continuation of taxes at the present or higher levels is
recommended. The U. S. seems certainly to have the tax struc-
ture, debt situation, and general fiscal capability to sustain
the security load which seems likely under the program of Task
Force A. The tax problem appears to be prinarily a political
and psychological problem. This makes it part of the problem
of gaining public support for an adequate program for security.
f. It is questioned that the economic policy expressed in
NSC 153/1 is based on a completely correct estimate of the true
nature of the economic threat to the U. S. way of life under
the policy contained in that paper. It is recommended that the
economic portions of NSC 153/1 be restudied.
10. Maintenance of Free Political Institutions
a. U. S. objectives in this field should continue to be:
(1) The assurance of the vitality and soundness of our
own institutions.
(2) The creation of adequate public understanding and
support for our policies with relation to Soviet
power, and
(3) The provision of appropriate safe-guards against
subversion through methods consistent with the
maintenance of a vital and democratic system.
b. There is considerable apprehension abroad that American
governmental processes and public life are falling extensively
under the influence of psychological and political trends which
Europeans regard as totalitarian in nature. It is felt that the
full significance of this development has not yet been generally
appreciated by our government and public. Unless a drastic
reversal of this impression can be achieved the long-term
psychological consequences must be expected to be extremely
serious; so much so as to nullify a good portion of whatever
positive measures the U. S. Government may take to offset the
Soviet danger.
11. Strengthening the Free World
a. Success in strengthening the free world is of an especially
great significance in the case of the national policy supported
by Task Force Lg because there is much less of the element of
unilateral U. S. action involved than in the suggestions made
by other Task Forces.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
b. Task Force A's case rests on a proposition that the free
world can construct a system far superior than that of our
enemies. If it is done while maintaining the necessary posture
of military strength, the back of the Soviet problem will be
broken.
c. Major Courses of Action:
(1) A strong drive to develop a greater sense of common
purpose and mutual interest with countries outside
the Soviet Orbit.
(a) Repose an increasing degree of responsibility on
our NATO allies to determine what they are pre-
pared to do for their own defense.
(b) Promote economic expansion by trade liberaliza-
tion in western Europe, off-shore procurement
of military end items, interchange of technical
know-how, stimulation of American private
investment, and maximum use of the International
Bank and the Export-Import Bank.
(c) Develop a dramatic concept, inspiring to both
industrialized and underdeveloped countries,
and involving private initiative, to establish
programs for the economic development of materials
and markets in underdeveloped areas.
(d) Review and revise East-West Trade policies.
Substantially the same course is recommended
as that outlined in Alternative 4 of NSC 152
except as to the policy to be applied to
communist China.
(e) Make a major effort to reduce and liberalize
barriers to imports into the U. S.
(2) A more selective approach to building strength in
the Far East and the Middle East.
(a) Many of the countries in these areas do not
possess the ingredients from which strength
can be built.
(b) A few of them do possess the necessary potential.
We should therefore concentrate on making the
most of the potentialities of such countries.
(3) A vigorous attack on the most troublesome situations
which are blocking progress to strengthen the free
world.
- 8 -
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(a) Free Europe. An integrated foreign policy
with regard to Western Europe is recommended as a
vital component of an effective national strategy
for the U. S. to meet and thwart Soviet designs.
(b) Germany. The future of Germany is, in a large part,
the determinant of the future of Europe. A new
approach to the problem of German reunification is
recommended which can exploit and intensify present
Soviet internal stresses and achieve, in due course,
the first major roll back of Soviet hegemony over
Eastern Europe. Specifically, the Task Force pro-
poses the following course of action, in three parts:
i. As first part, the preparation, as a matter of
urgency, of a strong and plausible U. S. negotiat-
ing position on the reunification of Germany
in which our stated negotiating objectives are:
(A) A reunified, sovereign, independent Germany
with a democratic form of government.
(B) The provision of realistic safeguards to
prevent the Soviet-Communists from holding
any abnormal advantages over the West
in respect to Germany.
(C) The provision for Germany to have military
forces except for any form of atomic or
other weapons of mass destruction.
(D) As a maximum position, the removal of all
foreign occupation forces from Germany, or
as a minimum position the concentration of
foreign forces in enclaves capable of direct
supply by sea.
(E) Discussion of and conclusion if possible
of an Austrian peace treaty (with its
implications for the Soviet military posi-
tion in Hungary and Roumania) and discussion
aimed at withdrawal of Soviet forces in
Poland.
(F) Intention to maintain closest contact with
West German opinion and to have West and
East German representatives participate
in the negotiations among the four powers.
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ii. As the second part, the disclosure and advocacy
of this position, first with the British and
French Governments, next with the German Govern-
ment and leaders of important parties, and
finally, with the Soviet Government at the
coming Four Power Meeting this autumn.
iii. As third part, independent of but concurrent
with the steps regarding reunification, efforts
to effect the early and direct rearmament of
West Germany. In order not to prejudice
negotiations for reunification, this rearmament
should take place outside the EDC and outside
NATO, but with the concurrence of the NATO
Council.
(c) France. The weakness and unsatisfactory performance
of France lies at the root of many of most serious
problems faced by the U. S. in Europe. This has
not been adequately faced by the Government in
the past. As a major and urgent recommendation,
it is suggested that U. S. policy should be to
repose responsibility on France, and to initiate
this policy by removing, progressively and tact-
fully, the support from the U. S. to which she now
looks to bail her out of perennial crises. There
should be a carefully worked out course which
focuses world opinion as French responsibilities;
informs France of our intent gradually to cease
supporting French overcommitments; makes clear
our intent to regain independence of U. S. action
now inhibited by French fears; but stresses our
intent to continue to help France in situations
she cannot realistically meet alone. High level
discussions are needed.
(d) Weakening of U. S. Prestige and Leadership in
Europe. In order to correct and alleviate the
following is recommended:
i. Continuity of U. S. actions which fit into a
plausible and persuasive totality of policy
or national strategy.
ii. Greater emphasis put by the U. S. Government
on prior discussion with interested European
Governments before taking specific actions
affecting them (though not compromising any
essential U. S. positions).
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iii. Clarify worries as to future U. S. intentions.
iv. Reduce direct interference by the U. S.
in European National affairs by involving
ourselves directly in only the major and
vitally important problems and dealing with
them on a high level.
V. Reduce U. S. technical staffs and missions.
vi. Understand the divergent assessments of the
Soviet threat made by Western Europe and
avoid pressing for a rate of military build-
up in Furope which too greatly exceeds the
natural intentions or capabilities of
Europeans.
(e) The Unification of Western Europe.
i. U. S. policy on this is unclear. A study
by the Executive Branch is recommended to
formulate guidance on the broad form and scope
of the future politico-economic systems in
Europe which would be most desirable from
the standpoint of the U. S. national interest.
ii. Greater progress toward European unity and
cohesion can now be best achieved by relaxa-
tion of direct and overt U. S. pressures
to such an end.
(f) Economic Expansion
i. Considerable economic expansion within
Europe and in world trade backed by expanding
markets is an essential element to building
strength in Europe. This may be aided by
certain careful relaxations of certain East-
West trade policies.
ii. Of even greater importance is the energetic
development of alternative sources of raw
materials within the free world. Specific
projects to this end should be pushed and
supported.
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(g) Colonialism. The U. S. finds itself in the
anomalous position of being identified in Asia
as imperialist and the supporter of Western
European colonialism and in Europe as hastening
the break-up of colonial relationships. This
necessitates increasing coordination within the
U. S. Government to assure that each pertinent
decision to take a specific action reflects
wise and comprehensive evaluation of both aspects
of the colonial problem.
(h) China
i. A major objective of the U. S. is to bring
about changes in China to eliminate its
present threat to free world security, with
the ultimate objective of the development
in China of an independent government
friendly to the U. S. and the free world.
The following general polities are proposed:
(A) Regard Communist China consistently as
a hostile power and maintain political
and economic pressures short of out-
right military intervention against her
until Korea and Indochina are settled
to our satisfaction.
(B) Maintain the island chain off the East
Asian mainland within U. S. strategic
defenses.
(C) Foster the prestige and power growth
of Japan as a dominant power in Asia
friendly to the U. S.
(D) Continue support of Formosa, to provide
not only for its self defense, but, for
the existence of an effective strategic
reserve for possible offensive action
in an expanded war situation in the Far
East.
(E) Hold South Korea and support its in-
digenous forces while seeking the politi-
cal unification of Korea.
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(F) In Southeast Asia, provide major assist-
ance to France and Indochina to effect
a favorable solution to the Indochinese
war.
(G) Concentrate our major aid and political
efforts on helping build strength in
selected countries where a basis for such
development already exists, and restrict-
ing our assistance to others to a very
moderate effort aimed at assisting in
creating the basic elements of political
maturity.
ii. An interim post-armistice policy toward
China would involve:
(A) No recognition or treatment of Communist
China as other than a hostile power by
the U. S. until settlement of Korea and
Indochina.
(B) Continuance of U. S. total embargo on
trade until Korea and Indochina are
settled.
(C) Every feasible effort to secure continu-
ance of present restrictions on trade
and other relations by other free nations
until Korea is settled.
(D) Keep issues out of UN insofar as possible,
with a flat stand of no discussion of
China's entry into UN until Korea and
Indochina are settled.
(i) Japan
i. Our policy should be directed toward making
that country a main bulwark of free world
in the western Pacific. It is necessary
that a program be developed which will enable
Japan to make her way in the world after
U. S. extraordinary expenditures there are
greatly reduced. We shall have to be pre-
pared to give substantial economic aid if
the Korean war should end before such a
program is developed.
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ii. Further policies include: Promotion of
Japanese trade in the Southeast Asia area,
recognition of the necessity that Japan
must trade actively with the mainland of
China if she is to maintain economic strength,
and removal of barriers to imports of
Japanese goods into the U. S. and other free
world nations.
(j) India and Pakistan. It is possibly unwise to
attempt to build up substantial military strength
in this area. Stepped up special economic aid
of a development nature would have a most
important psychological effect.
(k) Indochina
i. Communist control of Southeast Asia would
critically endanger U. S. and free world
security interests. The immediate key to
retraction of communist strength in the area
is Indochina. This problem involves as much
our policy problems with France as our
opposition to Communist advance. We must at
the highest political level seek the follow-
ing commitments from France:
(A) To make specific announcement regarding
the future relationship of the Associated
States with the French Union in order to
promote popular support and leadership
within Indochina for the war effort.
(B) To recognize and fulfill her obligations
for the successful defense of Indochina
as a crucial front in the struggle of
the West against Communist advance.
(C) To regain the military initiative against
the Viet Minh with revitalized and aggres-
sive military and political leadership.
(D) To provide sufficient French forces in
addition to creating effective indigenous
forces to bring the Indochina war to an
early conclusion, with the recognition
that she will not be able to function as
the keystone of NATO as long as Indochina
remains a drain on her resources.
(E) To permit the U. S. to take an active
part in the development and training of
the indigenous forces.
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ii. There is great danger that France, contemplat-
ing the eventual loss of her present position
in Indochina, will lose the will to continue
that costly war. We should therefore under-
take the support of a substantial part of the
cost of stepping up action. In return we
should insist that France and the Associated
States contribute to the maximum extent of
their capabilities.
(1) The Middle East. Task Force A recommends the
following:
i. A greater content of reserve, impartiality
and objectiveness in our overt dealings with
Middle East problems with a clear willingness
to assist where needed and when asked.
ii. A greater effectiveness in advancing economic
development, specifically in the resettle-
ment of the Arab refugees from Palestine, and
on the Tigris-Euphrates project. UN agencies,
especially the World Bank, should be the
vehicles used, to allay local suspicions of
direct American interference.
iii. A relaxation of pressures to form the Middle
East Defense Organization until greater
political maturity in the area is reached.
Some small arms aid to assist in the creation
of forces to maintain internal order may be
provided, but should not be administered by
large American military missions.
iv. Continuation of moderate assistance to the
Point IV type to such countries in the area
where it can help the slow development of
political maturity and stability.
(4) A continuation of our foreign aid programs.
12. Reduction of Soviet Power
Under the broad objective of reducing Soviet power, stated
in NSC 153/1, lie the dual aims of reducing both the ability
and the intent of the Kremlin to exercise this power so as to
threaten free world security. These aims must be pursued
simultaneously. Vulnerabilities of the Soviet Bloc should be
exploited by various covert and overt means. The U. S. should
seek to convince the Kremlin of the fallacy of the fundamental
concepts upon which their policies are based, while simultaneously
trying to persuade the Soviet leaders that it is not too late to
turn back from their present course.
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13. Establishment of International Order
The UN should continue to take an active and helpful part
in all UN proceedings. Our participation in the U. S. in recent
years has been marked by an excessive zeal with too little
recognition of world realities. This tendency should be
corrected.
14. The Development of Sound Negotiating Positions with the USSR
Various changes in the Soviet Union policy demonstrate
significant fluctuations of Soviet policy in the direction of a
more disarming posture. The U. S. must be careful how we treat
such relaxations of the Soviet attitude. It is extremely
important that we do not appear to show ourselves as the people
who want the cold war to continue or the people who appear to
lag behind the Soviet leaders in their readiness to effect the
solution of outstanding problems by negotiation. We must have
an effective stance with relation to the problem of negotiation.
Any conceivable progress toward a more peaceful world will
actually require at some point, and in some respects, formal
agreement with the Soviet Union. Positions of strength as a
background for negotiation must be built with the understanding
that some concessions may be necessary to achieve results,
although not at the expense of our overall position of strength.
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APPENDIX
Summary of suggested actions by the Government in areas
of Congressional legislation and proposed further studies.
1. Recommended Congressional actions:
a. A tax program yielding revenues at about the
fiscal 1953 level.
b. Modification of existing tariff laws to liberalize
restrictions upon imports into the U. S.
c. Passage of proposed legislation for the simplifica-
tion of customs regulations.
d. Standby legislation, at an appropriate time, for
economic stabilization.
2. Recommended further studies:
a. Restudy industrial mobilization plans with a view
to bringing estimates of the proportion of the
economy which can be diverted to prosecution of
global war realistically into line with what
U. S. economy under full wartime mobilization
controls can provide.
b. Appraise the defense program as viewed from five
years hence anticipating the changes in our
defense programs which will be occasioned by new
weapons, techniques and tactics, and ensuring
that they are taken into account back through
the logistical chain into the mobilization base.
c. Manpower policy and plans to give better assurance
of provision of quantity and caliber of personnel
required and to assure, for a period of full
mobilization, that the manpower program is con-
sistent with the industrial program and the
program for continental and civil defense.
d. A study of the future maintenance costs of allied
military equipment and a program of aid by the
U. S. to meet the costs not capable of being
borne by certain of our allies.
e. A study of the logistical dependence of allies
upon the U. S. in time of war, and provision
for their needs in U. S. plans.
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f. Development of an economic program for Japan
to assist in restoring that country to economic
stability after present extraordinary expenditures
by the U. S. in connection with the Korean war
are greatly reduced.
g. A new policy and plans for the reunification of
Germany, including military plans for changed
requirements for the deployment of U. S. forces
in Europe.
h. A study of the extent of dependence of our military
program on allies and the relationship of this
dependence to priorities in allocation of resources.
i. Suggestions for inclusion of added topics in
studies now being undertaken concerning U. S.
continental defense.
j. A study as to the mid-term or long-term systems
of political and economic organizations in
Europe best meeting U. S. interests and providing
a context into which liberated satellites may
fit. This study is to provide long range
guidance for U. S. policies.
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