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Memoranda for the Intelligence Advisory Committee Regarding National Intelligence Estimate 11-4-54, Soviet Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses of Action Through Mid-1959, Part 2 of 3
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Memoranda for the Intelligence Advisory Committee Regarding National Intelligence Estimate 11-4-54, Soviet Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses of Action Through Mid-1959, Part 2 of 3
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TOP SECRET
IX. DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET AGRICULTURE*
55. The growth of Soviet agricultural production, particu-
larly of basic foodstuffs, has lagged conststently behind the growth
of Soviet industry throughout the postwar period, During the early
postway period, when agriculture was recovering from war damage,
gains were fairly easy to attain, but since 1950 agricultural
although
production has remained at approximately the prever level, though
now ten
than in 1940.
the population 1s,about - percent higher , The inability of Soviet
agriculture to advance over prevar Levels in the production or
foodstuffs has been due to several factors, chief smong which
ware: (a) teration and procurement policies which deprived broad
seguents of the rural population or incentives for greater
production; (b) inadequate capital investment, particularly
during 1950-1952 when the Korean Var caused a diversion of resources
to military production; (c) loss of adult males, particularly the
skilled, to other branches of the economy; and (a) temporary dis-
ruption accompanying the amalgamation of collective farms.
56. In response to this situation, the post-Stalin regime
has embarked on a program to strengthen what it now admits to be
* For graph showing trends in the 0388's production of selected
agricultural eommodities, see Appendix B, Figure 6.
- 38 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
a weak link in the Soviet economy. The regine is attempting to
increase agricultural output by: (a) providing greater incentives
to the peasant population in the form of goods and payments;
(b) changeling greater state investment to agriculture (75 percent
more in 1954 than 1a 1953) in the form of mechanical draft power,
mobinary, fertilizer, and building materials; (e) providing the
farms with a greater supply of labor and of qualified technicians;
(d) improving farm organization and practices; and (a) bringing
under cultivation vast areas of sermiarid virgin land, particularly
in Kuzakhstan and neighboring areas. This program 18 designed
to rectify scre of the more pronounced shorteczings of previous
agricultural policies, while leaving basically intact the
collectivized system of Soviet agriculture.
57. In view of the Kremlin's public conditments to increase
agricultural production, we believe that the Soviet regime will
almost cartainly continue the new program through 1955. Mareover,
since the goals nov set are unlikely to be achieved by 1956, the
regins will probably continue the present program through 1959.
However, the magnitude of resources allocated to agriculture will
be determined by the Kremlin's estimate of its immediate strategic
as 39 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
requirements, particularly by the amount of resources the regine
feels it necessary to allocate to the military establishment.
58. The response of the peasant population to the new program
will be an important factor in determining the degree of its
success. In attempting to stimulate the cooperation of the peasant
pogulation, the Soviet regist faces serious problems. as the am
hand, present concessions to the peasants may not provide suffi-
cient incentives to bring about appreciably increased production,
while further concessions might be considered by the regime as too
costly or as politically inadvisable. On the other hand, greater
reliance on discipline and coercion would tend to restore the conditions
which the current program vas intended to remedy and would probably
result in another period of passive peasant resistance, with adverse
consequences on agricultural production.
59. The expansion of cultivation In the semiarid steppe
regions places an additional strain on agricultural resources
which may affect unfavorably the implementation of other goals.
We believe that the plan goal of on additional 18 to 20 million
mtric tons of grain annually from the nevly reclaimed land is
most unlikely of achievement except under unusually favorable
weather conditions, and that a yearly average of scale 6 to 10 million
- 40 -
TOP SECRIT
TOK SECRET
metric tons, with wide annual fluctuations, is more likely during
the period or this estimate.
60. On balance, taking into account the program for both
old and new lands, we believe that agricultural production 1s
unlikely (assueing average weather) to increase by more than
about three parcent annually during the period 1954-1959, making
a total increase of 15 to 20 percent for tim whole period 1950-
1959 as contrasted with the Five Year Plan goal of about a
50 percent increase for the period 1950-1955. However, even the
15 to 20 percent increase would be large enough to achieve a
moderate rise in the per capita availability of foodstuffs and
textiles.
X.
DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE
Trade Within the Bloe
61. The most important development in Soviet foreign trade
since the end of the wax has been the extension of the basic
Soviet policy of autarky to cover the area of the Bloc as a whole.
As a result, Soriet trade with other Bloc states has steadily
expanded and by 1953 accounted for roughly 85 percent of total
Soviet foreign trade." The USSR is the largest trading
*
For trends in Soviet foreign trade, see Appendix B, Figure 7.
- 41 -
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TOP SECRET
partner of the other Bloc states, accounting for at least 25 per-
cent of each state's trade turnover. In three cases --- Bulgaria,
Communist China, and Rumanie -- Soviet trade in 1952 represented
more than half of the total. On the other hand, with the exception
of Communist China, no one Bloc state accounts for more than
20 percent of Soviet trade turnover. This situation has made it such
easier for the USSR to exert control over the economies of the
various Bloe states.
62. This vast reorientation of the trade of Bloc countries
has been the decisive factor in the postwar decline in East-West
trade. The Soviet-style programs of rapid industrialization in
the European Satellites have greatly increased requirements within
the Bloc for those industrial and agricultural rav materials which
formed a large part of Eastern Europe's traditional exports to the
West. It is unlikely that any short-term expansion in the volume
of trade between the Bloc and the West will alter the basic postwar
trend toward greater trade and closer economic ties between the
USSR and the Satellite economies.
*
As used here, the term "West" includes all countries outside the
Soviet Bloc.
me 42 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SPERET
63. Sino-Soviet trade has increased appreciably in the last
almost
four years, reaching about one-quarter of total Soviet trade turn-
over in 1953. The USSR will probably export an increasing volume
of capital goods and technical services to Communist China, partly
in connection with the announced Soviet intention to assist the
Chinese in constructing and equipping 91 new industrial installa-
tions and 50 installations already under construction. Military
equipment will probably continue to constitute a considerable
share of Soviet exports to Communist China. However, the USSR
probably will not grant substantial further credits to Communist
China, like the $300 million provided in the 1950-1954 agreement.
The USSR will probably insist on the financing of this trade,
except possibly for some military items, through current exports
to the USSR and European Satellites. Communist China's exports
of agricultural products and industrial raw materials to the USER
will contribute toward strengthening the economic base of the Soviet
Far East.
Soviet Trade Outside the Bloc
64. Soviet trade with the non-Communist world, as a result
of the USSR's basic policy of autarky, has followed a long-run
downward trend and reached its lowest point in 1950. In 1951-1952,
. 43 -
TOP SECRET
MAY SWIRT
however, the volume of Soviet trade with the West increased in
response to the increase in world demand for rev materials and
foodstuffs. In 1953, Soviet trade with the West again deelined,
and the USSR was faced temporarily with an unfavorable trade
balance, largely due to a sharp decline in Sovtet exports of
grain. In order to finance even its small import program, the
regime found it necessary late in 1953 to expand 1ts sales of
gold, and to sell increased quantities of precious metals and
petroleum to the non-Commenist world.
65. Despite the long period of rapid industrialization,
the commodity pattern of Soviet trade with the West remains
virtually unchanged. Grain, timber, and furs remain the principal
export items, although the USSR has attempted to substitute such
industrial cas materials as petroleum and mangenese for grain
in its more recent trade agreements. Capital equipment, merchant
vessels, and industrial raw materials have in the past constituted
the bulk of Soviet imports from the West, although the USSR has
recently contracted to purchase increased quantities of foodstuffs
and manufactured consumer goods for delivery during 1954 and 1955.
As in the past, there will probably continue to be spot increases
- 44 -
vor SECRET
TOP SECRET
in imports of selected consumer goods, but the composition of
probably
total Soviet trade will, retain through 1959 the traditional re-
lationship between capital and consumer goods.
66. The outlook for an expansion of Soviet trade with the
West depends on a number of factors. Even if Western export
controls are further relaxed the Bloc's policy of autarky will
almost certainly continue to prevent any large or lasting ex-
pansion in East-West trade. Nevertheless, the record number of
trade agreements concluded by the regime in 1953 points to an
increase in Soviet trade in 1954 and 1955 in both old and new
markets. Soviet officials have stated that the USSR could increase
1953 trade turnover with the West, estimated at about $800 million,
by almost four times in 1954, Such an increase, In Sovjet trade
with the West however, would place & tremendous burden on the
small number of exporting sectors of the Soviet economy and would
also require a major change in Soviet trade policy. To date there
16 no evidence that such & change is taking place or is likely
to take place. Moreover, the Bloe would encounter considerable
difficulties under normal economic conditions, in finding
markets in Western countries for substantially increased amounts
of its usual exports. In the light of all these factors, we
45 -
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101
believe that, even e the Scriet leaders are willing to expand
trade appreciably, the probable of Soviet trade with the
non-Commulat world for this period would probably be in the beigh-
bornood of $1.5 billion annually
67. An additional and exceptional factor - the level of
Bloc gold sales abroad -- might bring about a rise over current
levels of East-West trade during the period of this estimate. The
Bloc will probably continue to use gold to pay for an excess of
imports. In recent years Bloc gold sales have run at an estimated
annual rate of $60 to $80 million; in 1953, however, these sales
reached about $150 million and apparently continued at a high rate
during early 1954. At this rate receipts from gold sales enabled
the USSR to finance over one-third of its 1953 commodity imports
from the West. It appears that the increased gold sales were
occasioned by balance of payments considerations and especially
by a shortage of sterling within the Bloc. If the Bloc should decide
to increase its gold sales abroad in order to obtain desired imports,
then it has available gold reserves estimated at $3 to $5 billion
and a current production variously estimated at from $200 to $350
million annually. We believe it unlikely that the Bloc would use
any substantial portion of its gold reserves to raise the level of
its imports during the period of this estimate.
-46- -
TOP 1
GOT SECRET
XI. SCIENTIFIC AND TECNNICAL DEVELOPMENTS
68. Soviet scientiffc and tachnical capabilities have in-
creased rapidly since World Wer 11, and we believe that they will
continue to increase throughout the period of this estimate. The
USSR has given science and technology & high priority, emphasizing
particularly their contributions to basic industry and Kilitary
capabilities. This emphasis vill probably continue during this
period, although increased attention my be given to the application
of science to agriculture, health, and Light industry so long as
current programs for raising standards of living continue.
69. Soviet acientific and technological capabilities are
sufficiently well developed to provide effective support to industrial
and military research and development. At present, the scientific
assets of the USSR (the number and quality of trained personnel,
facilities, equipment, and (inancial support) are maller than those
of the us, and the assets of the Scriet Bloo are far smaller than
those of the West. However, with respect to scientists 05 the very
top rank, whose numbers are for in any country, the USSR probably
has in many fields sen who are an able as their counterparts in
Western countries. The USER provides the bulk of Bloe scientific
- 47 -
SUBTOTAL
TO: SECRET
monets, but East Germany and Caschoelovakia, and to a lesser
extent Poland and Hungary, contribute a substantial increment.
Communist China is unlikely to add significantly to Bloe scienti-
fie assets prior to 2960.
70. The USSR has a large number of organizations, laboratories,
institutes, etc., engaged in research in all fields of science.
Administration, control, and facilities appear in general to be
sufficient for effective utilization of Soviet scientific talent.
Althmigh the USSR continues to import SCHIP scientific instruments
from Western nations, it 1s now manufacturing or can obtain within
the Bloc practically all types of scientific instruments for labora-
tory research, and also industrial instruments for plant operations
and centrol. Complex research instruments and equipment are prob...
ably less readily available in the USSR than in the US or the UK.
Consequently, scase specialized research projects of Low priority
are probably delayed Longer this similar projects would be delayed
in the Western nations, but ve believe that high priority projecta
are not hindered by lack of adequate equipment or facilities.
71. Prior to World Yes II the general quality of Soviet higher
education and research in most scientific and technical fields vas
markedly below that of the US. In the postwar period, however, it
- 48 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
has been generally good, and has approached US standards. Only in
sceue areas of biology, particularly to the agricultural sciences,
done it appear that the present quality of Seviet education and
research 1. M decidedly below that of the US, but during this perial,
in view of the probable greater emphasis upon agricultural develop-
ment, this deficiency 1.a. likely to be reduced.
72. Nearly 1,400,000 Soviet citizens have scientific
or sechnical degrees from colleges and universities, of whom about
500,000 graduated in the postwar years." The mamber of university
or technical institute graduates employed 10 the scientific-
technical field in the USSR (1,035,000) compares closely with
that in the us. It is estimated that 155,000 Sortet scientists
are engaged in advanced research or teaching at higher level
institutions in the USSR, compared to about 240,000 so engaged in
the US. At this level, considering physical sciences alone, the
UGSR has 75,000 scientists, of whom 50,000 are estimated to be
engaged exclusively Ln research. In the US, there are about
185,000 physical scientista in higher lovel institutions, and
about 150,000 are engaged exclusively in research.
*
Mumerical estimates of Soviet scientific personnel are believed
to be correct to within plus or adous 10 percent. For is detailed
comparison of USSR and US scientific personnel, see Appendix C.
- 49 - -
TOP SECRET
TO AMOUNT
73. During 1954 and 1955 the USSR will probably graduate
about 225,000 students of science, including about 140,000 In the
physical sciences and engineering, as compared with 135,000
graduates, including 65,000 in the physical sciences and engineering
in the US, We believe that during the period of this estimate the
Soviet acientific manyover pool will increase more rapidy than
that of the us, although at * declining rate after 1955. However,
In view of the increasing acientific demands within the Bloc, is
shortage of scientific and technical personnel, altbough
reduced, will probably continue throughout the period of this
estimate.
74. The USSR is not as well supplied with technicians,
mechanics, and unintenance as are the Western countries, where
broader sections of the population have acquired mechanical skills
over " considerably longer period. Standards of mintebance for
all himis of Bachanized equipment are probably considerably lower
then in Western countries and rates of deterioration higher. In
addition, the number of skilled amountics and technicians which
vould be available to the number forces in was 1s far sumiller than
in the Heat. However, Soviat engineers have sought to compensate
for these deficimentos by building machines and equipment which are
simple In design and easy to mulutain and repair.
- 50 -
TOP SHORET
TOP BECRKE
75. Soviet science and technology are subject to the sem:
centralized planning and control as are all other Seviet acti-
vities. Even though Soviet scientists are a privileged group,
their research is subject to many of the usual totalitarian res-
trictions. Some theories in chemistry, physics, and especially
biology, have been attacked on ideological grounds. Eowever,
the present veakonss in certain fields of biological science 10
probably due more to the beavy emphasis laid on other flelds
of research than to ideological restraints. There 18 no evidence
that ideology has seriously hampered the development of the
physical Neiences, especially in applications directly affecting
military vespons.
XII. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES IN PARTICULAR FIELDS
AFFECTING MILITARY CAPABILITIES
76. The capability of Soviet scientists and technicians In
most areas related to the development and production of weapons and
military aquipment is sufficient to insure modern ATTUS to Soviet
forces. We believe the USSR has the scientific and technological
capability necessry to develop nost weapons and military equipment
equivalent to, and in certain cases possibly better than, those
TS , 1
TOP SUBRET
TOP SECRET
of other nations. However HD believe that the USSR does not have
sufficient depth of scientific resources to program vigorous weapons
and equipment research simultaneously in all fields. Important
weapons developments which the USSR may achieve during the period of
this estimate are discussed below.*
Nuclear Weapons
77 By the end of 1953 the USSR had tested small, medium,
and large-yield nuclear weapons, and had employed thermonuclear
boosting principles to produce energy yields in the range of
the equivalent of a few thousand to at least one million tons of
TNT. By the end of 1953, moreover, the USSR had reached a point
in weapon technology at which it was capable of producing a wide
variety of weapon types, and nuclear warheads for weapons other
than bombs.
78. Within these technological capabilities, military
requirements will govern the allocation of available Soviet
fissionable material among various types and yields of weapons.
We believe that the USSR will stockpile weapons of large, medium,
and small yields; Column A in the Table which follows represents
one method of distributing the estimated Soviet stock of fissionable
material among them. Columns B and C show the total yields that
would be available if the same amount of fissionable material
were made up either into large and medium yield weapons only
(Column B), or into small-yield weapons only (Column C).
# The effects of these possible developments on Soviet military
capabilities are discussed in Section XVII.
TOP SECRET
Mid-1954
A
B
C
Large-yield weapons (1,000 KT each)
18
18
-
Medium-yield weapons (60 KT each)
85
170
1
Small-yield weapons (5 KT each)
250
-
725
Total vield (millions of tons of TNT)
24.3
28
3.6
In view of the range of error applicable to our estimate of Soviet
fissionable materials production, actual figures for numbers of
weapons may be as much as one-third lower or higher than the
figures given above.
79. The Soviet stockpile of fissionable materials will grow
during the period of this estimate. Assuming that the Soviet
weapons stockpile continues to consist of weapons of the general
characteristics and explosive powers of those tested through 1953,
the following table illustrates one way in which the weapons stock-
pile might be made up through 1957.
Mid-
Mid-
Mid-
Mid-
1954
1955
1956
1957
Large-yield weapons (1,000 KT each)
18
34
54
80
Medium-yield weapons (60 KT each)
85
125
175
235
Small-yield weapons (5 KT each)
250
375
525
700
Total vield (millions of tons of TNT)
24.3
4304
65.6
97.5
Our estimate of the total Soviet fissionable materials stockpile
becomes more uncertain as it is projected into the future, and the
TOP SECRET
actual figures for mid-1957 may be as low as one-half or as
high as twice the figures given in this table. Moreover, we
estimate that by 1957 the USSR will have nuclear weapons with
yields ranging from the equivalent of one-half a kiloton of
TNT to the equivalent of 10 megatons or more. Availability
of these weapons will introduce further possible variations
into the stockpile examples given above.
82. The/numbers of/weapons above are calculated from the most
probable size of the Soviet fissionable materials stockpile. However,
in view of the range of error applicable to the estimates of Soviet
fissionable material production, the actual figures for the end of 1953
may be as much as one-third lower or higher than the figures given above.
Uncertainty increases as estimates are projected into the future and
the actual figures for mid-1957 may be as low as one-half or as high as
twice the figures given in the tables.
82 The USSR will probably continue work on small-yield and
small dimonsion weapons, and further developments along these Lines
could be tested during 1954. In view of this, the USSR could develop
nuclear warheads for weapons other than bombs during the period of
this estimate The USSR will probably also continue work on the
development of weapons with energy yields well in excess of . million
tons of TNT. This program could possibly result in a test in 1954.
54-
TOP SECRET
Paragraphs 80 - 83 82 not insluded
TOP SECRET
83
80. There is no evidence available which indicates the course
that the Soviet atomic energy program will take during the period
1957 through 1959. Nor are there any specific factors which can
be considered as limiting on the growth of the program during this
period. Nevertheless, long-range «xtrapolations can be carried
out on the basis of assumptions of the growth pattern the program
might follow during the period in question. Alternate assumptions,
which indicate & range of growth capabilities, are:
2. No expansion of Soviet fissionable materials production
facilities after 1957; (Ig
b. Continued expansion of Soviet fissionable materials pro-
duction facilities after 1957 at the same rate as estimates
for the period 1954 to mid 1957, or
C. Expansion of the Soviel. program after 1957 at a rate which
will increase its requirements for uranium to approximately
7,000 to 10,000 tons par year by 1964.
84
sto The Soviet fissionable materials stockpile estimated for 1959
above
on the basis of the/ assumptions could be congarted into weapons of the
following types, based on the principles tested through 1953. Examples
of such conversion follows
-55-
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
1959
Assumption
Assumption
Assumption
A
B
C
a) Unboosted weapons
40 KT each
1250
1355
1700
Total yield (million
tons TNT)
50
54
68
or
b) Boosted U=235 1000 KT each
132
145
168
Boosted Pu 60 KT each
350
375
510
Boosted Pu 5 KT each
1050
1125
1525
Total yield (million tons TNT)
158
172
206
by
The alternate assumptions on which the above table is based
do not consider the possibility of rapid technological advances in the
production of fissionable materials, nor do they reflect major advances
in weapons development which must be anticipated. Developments in
thermonuclear weapons with yields well in excess of one million tons
of TNT, which could possibly be tested during 1954, could increase the
total yield obtainable from the Soviet fissionable material stockpile
by a factor of five to twenty-five over the figures given in Paragraph
840 In addition, Soviet nuclear capabilities may be increased by
weapon developments which will permit the adaptation of nuclear
warheads to many delivery systems.
- 56 a
TO P SECRET
TOP SECRET
Guided Missiles*
8
6
83. Indications are that after World War II exploitation of
German developments in guided missiles led to the Soviets acquiring
by 1948 a thorough familiarity with German program and by 1950 8
capability for continuing work independently, except possibly in
advanced developments of guidance and control systems. It is known
that an independent Soviet research and development program is under-
way. However, evidence is insufficient for an estimate of the
priority which this program may enjoy as compared with other weapons
development programs, or of the priorities accorded the various guided
missile categories within the program. It is well within Soviet capa-
bilities to develop numerous types of missiles within the period of
little
this estimate, but at present we have no information as to which types
the USSR may be developing.em & priority basis:
87
St. We believe that the USBR could now have an improved version
of the German V-1 pulse-jet winged missile with ranges up to 200 neutical
miles, a warhead of 2,000-3,000 pounds and a CEP of 2 to 3 nautical
miles. The USSR could also have now an improved version of the
German V-2 with ranges up to 350 nautical miles, a warheed of 2,000 pounds,
and & CEP of 2 to 3 nautical miles. We have no firm evidence that the
USSR has these weapons in operational quantities.
The following paragraphs Pall types of must quided be considered musiles and tentative.
* Detailed studies of this subject are currently in progress and
will provide the basis of NIE 11-6-54 "Soviet Capabilities and
Probable Programs in the Field of Guided Missiles," scheduled for
production in the third quarter of 1954.
- 57 -
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TOP SECRET
88
85. During the period of this estimate we believe that the
following surface-to-surface missiles could be brought by the USSR
into limited operational use -- 1.e., into & stage of development
where small quantities of guided missile systems have been produced
and are in the hands of trained personnel of at least one operational
unit. It should be realized that subsequent large-scale production
and troop-training may require several additional years. The dates
assumption
given are the earliest probable dates, and are based on the estimate
that a concerted and continuous effort started by 1948.
8.
In 1955 the USSR could have an improved V-2 type
missile with a range of 500 nautical miles, a war-
head of 3,000 pounds, and & CEP of 2 to 3 nautical
miles. Subsonic, turbo-jet powered pilotless aircraft
missiles with a maximum range of 500 nautical miles and
a warhead of 3,000 pounds could also become available
in 1955.
b. In 1957,* the USSR could have single stage ballistic
missiles capable of ranges up to 900 nautical miles,
carrying 3,000 pound warheads, and achieving a CEP of
3 to 4 nautical miles.
Director of Intelligence, USAF believes this missile
could be available in limited operational quantities in 1955,
and that a ballistic missile with a range of about 1300 nomo
could be available in limited operational quantities in 1957.
This belief is based on intelligence of early Soviet exploita-
tion in Germany, on Soviet interest in guided missiles up
through 1952, and the demonstrated ability to follow a concerted
development program as witnessed by rapid developments in
aircraft, armament, and electronics in the past 8 years. It
18 also possible that accuracies better than those quoted will
be within Soviet capability.
-58-
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C.
In 1958-1960," the USSR could have a two stage ballistic
mautical
missile capable of ranges up to 1,300,miles carrying a
3,000 pound warhead and achieving a CEP of 3 to 4 nau-
tical miles.
89
85. Our estimate of probable Soviet military requirements
suggests that the priority accorded by the Soviets to development of
a surface air missile would be at least has high as that given
development of a surface to surface missile. We believe that the USSR
could now have a surface-to-air missile representing an improved
version of the German Wasserfall missile, and having an effective
range of 20,000 to 25,000 yards at fifty thousand feet. & Fader
a
command technique or proximity fuze could be employed with a warhead
of approximately 600 pounds. There is no evidence that such & weapon
has been produced in operational quantities.
90
87
so. In estimating future Soviet capabilities in surface-to-
air missiles, the projects undertaken by Germans while in the USSR
offer the only basis for extrapolating into the future. On this
foundation, the following possibilities exist:
a.
In 1955, a further improved Wasserfall missile with
effective accuracy at 35,000 yards, the maximum range
of the missile.
Footnote on preceding page.
- 59 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SHORTS
b. In 1957-1958, a new type missile should begin to re-
place the Wasserfall, with a maximum effective range
of 50,000 yards at 60,000 feet altitude and a war-
head of of about 500 pounds. This missile would
incorporate terminal homing.
Aireraft
88
$1. The USSR will probably continue to give high priority to
the development of new aircraft, especially jet types. During the
period of this estimate Ve believe that the Soviet aircraft industry
will be technically capable of completing development and placing in
series production an all-weather jet fighter (1954), a turbo-prop
heavy bomber (1954), a jet ground-attack aircraft (1955), and a turbo-
jet heavy bomber (1957). Moreover, improvement of certain aircraft
estimated to be entering production at present, including the recently
introduced jet medium bonber, will result as modificatious are made
and as more advanced electronic equipment, and improved turbo-jet
engines become available during this period.*
Electronics
92
88
92. The USSR has made substantial progress in expanding its
electronics industry and in adapting Western equipment. The industry
*
See paragraphs 132-136 for a discussion of Soviet aircraft currently
in operational use or in various stages of development.
- 60 8
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
is now capable of independent research and development, and electronic
equipment of modern design is being produced. We believe that during
the period of this estimate the USSR will have the capability of
developing new or improved versions of radars for early warning,
ground control intercept, airborne intercept, and blind bombing and
navigation.
93
89
-93. Early Warning Radar (EW). The USSR has a large variety of
EW radars in use. These include World War II sets, native sets based
on Western designs, and sets of purely native design. It is believed
that most of these sets will continue in use through 1956. Continued
use of low-frequency radars (in the 72 me/s region) through 1959 is
indicated. It is estimated that, by 1958, the USSR will have several
types of EW radar capable of affording fairly reliable range coverage
up to altitudes of the order of 60,000 feet. These radars should be
capable of detecting medium bonbers and fighters at meximum ranges of
about 200 and 100 nautical miles respectively, although specific range
performances will vary with altitude and with individual equipment
and installation. Low angle coverage will still be a problem, although
current use of SCR-682 type radar for such coverage in coastal areas
may be expected to expand. The filtering phase of air raid reporting
(sombat information control) is expected to continue to be & major
problem during the period of this estimate.
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94
go
94. Ground Control Intercept Radar (GCI). It is estimated that
by 1958, the USER will have GCI radars of several types, including
the V-beam sets presently in use, which should be capable of coverage
on medium bombers at maximum reliable ranges of 150-200 nautical
miles and on fighters at maximum reliable ranges of 55 to 85 nautical
miles depending on altitude, location, and other factors. The use
of transponder beacons in Soviet interceptor aircraft, a development
of which the USSR is capable, would increase range and altitude coverage
for controlled interception. Maximum reliable altitude coverage up
to 60,000 feet, though at less than maximum ranges, can be expected
by 1959.
95
H
95. Airborne Intercept Radar (AI). The USSR acquired World
War II airborne intercept radar equipment from the Germans and through
lend-lease. The USSR has the technical knowledge and production capa-
bility to produce AI redar superior to World War II types, as well as
passive detection equipment of electronic, infrared, and possibly
sonic types. We believe that the USSR has begun to introduce limited
quantities of AI equipment into operational use, and it is estimated
that AI equipment will be in general operational use by mid-1956.
96
96. Blind Bombing and Navigational Radar. The USSR is
making operational use of an X-band set and has the capability of
improving this type of equipment. Its best blind bombing and navi-
gational radar in use by the end of 1957 will probably be capable of
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operating at altitudes up to 50,000 feet and will have a range of
about 125 nautical miles for navigation. The performance of bombing
and navigation equipment will be about equivalent to that of present
Western equipment. The use of frequencies higher than X-band is
unlikely before mid-1956, but might have operational significance
by-1959.
Electromagnetic Weapons
m
The TISSR now has the canability
22 97
The USSR now has the capability of seriously disrupting
Western long-range radio communications and certain navigation
systems. On the basis of known or reported Soviet production of
magnetrons, we believe that the USSR can now produce ground-based,
shipborne, and airborne jamming equipment to cover frequencies
through 10,000 megacycles per second. However, Soviet capabilities
in related electronics fields indicate that the USSR could develop
equipment for jamming frequencies up through 30,000 megacycles
per second. We believe that such equipment will probably be in
use during the period of this estimate.
achieve some success in electronic camouflage. Effective devices
similar to WINDOW and other reflectors-could be in operational use.
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Biological Weapons
98
94
98. The USSR has the technical knowledge, trained personnel,
and facilities necessary for a program. of research and development
in biological warfare, and we believe that such & program is almost
certainly in progress. Firm evidence on the subject is, however,
exceedingly scanty, and is likely to remain so because of the rela-
tive ease with which such a program can be concealed. Our estimates
must be almost exclusively of what the USSR is capable of accomplishing
in this field, rather than of what is has in fact accomplished.
99
75
-99. The USSR is capable of produc:ng BW agents and disseminating
devices suitable for clandestine attacks against certain crops,
against livestock, and against personnel in buildings or concentrated
in relatively small areas. We estimate that, if the USSR in fact
develops this capability, such attacks could be highly effective
against livestock, moderately effective against humans, and possibly
damaging against crops under favorable environmental conditions.
100
96
100. Soviet capabilities for ove:t or large-scale attacks
with biological weapons are more difficult to estimate. Against
livestock, attacks whether overt or :landestine need not be of
large-scale to be effective, since vell-planned small-scale operations
at several points against the US would probably result in widespread
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epidemics. Anti-crop BW against the us, employing disease-producing
agents, would probably not substantially affect U. crop production
unless carried out on a very large scale and unde: favorable seasonal
and environmental conditions. The USSR is probably capable of pro-
ducing at least one type of agent, cereal rust, in amounts needed for
such an attempt. For attacks against personne' the USSR is probably
capable of producing BW weapons for operations on & large scale, but
- are unable to estimate whether the effect of such operations, if
carried out, would be likely to be significant.
of
101
AT
101. Soviet capabilities for defense agrinst BW are believed
inferior to those of the US because of Soviet deficiencies in public
health, sanitation, livestock management, and plant protection.
Present information indicates emphasis on corection of these de-
ficiencies, and itris estimated that gradual rogress in this
probably
direction will, be makde during the period of :his estimate. However,
because widespread shipment of livestock is not practiced in the
USSR, Soviet vulnerability to small-scale ant: livestock attacks is
probably less than that of the US.
Chemical Weapons
10298
102. During World War II, the Soviet Union is known to have
produced most of the standard chemical warfere agents as well as the
necessary suxiliary equipment. The USSR has the facilities and
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scientific knowledge necessary to produce at least one of the nerve
gases and could employ these agents during the period of this esti-
mate. Published Soviet research in fields closely allied to
chemical warfare -- organophosphorus chemistry, aerosol formation,
cholinesterase, alkaloids, and adsorption - indicates & scientific
capability for the development of new or improved chemical agents,
dissemination equipment, and protective devices. We assume that the
stockpile of standard agents and munitions accumulated during World
War II has been maintained and that the facilities for CW agent
production are being maintained on a stand-by basis or operated to
produce other chemicals or materiel. The USSR is probably able to
engage in chemical warfare on . large scale.
Radiological Weapons
103 29
103. It is most unlikely, for technological reasons, that
the USSR will be able to stockpile militarily significant quantities
of radiological warfare weapons during the period of this estimate.
Although not strictly within the category of radiological warfare,
the significance of radioactive fall-out following large nuclear
explosions becomes greater as the yield of nuclear weapons increases.
This factor should be considered in connection with Soviet capabilities
to produce explosions in the megaton range.
XIII. SOVIET BLOC MILITARY STRENGTH
General
TOO
104 204. In the postwar period the USSR has maintained its armed
forces at a high level of strength and combat readiness. Since
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1945, the forces of the East European states under Soviet control,
together with the forces of Communist China, have been added to
the military resources available to the Soviet leaders. Soviet
about 8,000, 8, 000
Bloe forces-in-being nov total nearly 9,000,000 men.*
105
for
103. As a result of the levelling off military expenditures
in 1953, selective cutbacks are probably taking place in the pro-
duction of some conventional armaments, many types of which are
already stockpiled in quantity. Nevertheless, military procurement,
even at the estimated 1953-1955 rate, would still permit the main-
tenance of the Soviet armed forces at present high levels and would
allow continuous qualitative improvement in weapons and equipmen'.
106
1020
106. During the period of this estimate we believe that the
size of Bloc forces-in-being and expenditures for wayons pr duction
will remain substantially unchanged. However, the over-all affective-
Soviet armed forces
ness of Bloe ground, naval, and air forces- will almost certainly con-
mainly because of
tinue to increase during the period of this estimate as a roult of
the following factors: an increase in the mumbers and types of
nuclear weepons; and increase in the numbers of modern aircraft,
especially bombers and all-weather fighters; an increase in the Long-
range submarine forces; progressive modernization and stantardization
For detail on strengths of UBSR armed forces and those of other
members of the Soviet Bloe, see Appendix D, Table 1.
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of wespons and equipment, particularly those incorporating electronic
guidance and control; increasing combat efficiency of the European
Satellite and Chinese Communist forces; and some improvement of the
Bloe logistical position including facilities and possibly stocks of
essential war material.
10705
109. The principal limitations of Bloe armed forces during the
period of this estimate will be: deficiencies in experience, training,
and equipment for long-range air operations and air defense; lack of
capability to conduct long-range amphibious and naval operations and
the logistic problems, especially for operations in the Far East,
arising from the size of Bloc territory and the relatively insdequate
road end rail network and merchant fleet. The ecubat effectiveness
of the Eastern European Satellite and Chinese Communist forces VII
remain inferior to that of Soviet forces.
XIV. BLOC GROUND FORCES
Soviet Army
,08
104
108. The Soviet Army has been recrganized and modernized since
the end of World War II. We estimate that the Soviet ground forces
now total about 2,500,000 men. The estimated maximum mobilization
potential is about 12,500,000 men. In the absence of general var
we believe that the Soviet ground forces will remain at approximately
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their present size and disposition through mid-1959.1/ The concen-
tration of Scviet ground forces in East Germany, the Western USSR,
the Caucasus, and the Far East provides for the defense and security
of the most important and vulnerable areas of the USSR.
109/s
109. The Soviet Army probably has a sufficient stockpile of
weapons and equipment, ammunition, and supplies (except POL) to main-
tain a force of 175 line divisions in Europe and Asia for an extended
period (1.e., up to one year, depending upon the intensity of the
combat). POL stockpiles are probably sufficient to maintain operations
from four to six months. The USSR is DCM marufacturing substantial
quantities of all types of basic ground force weapons During the
period of this estimate production of ground force veapons is not
expected to increase, and may decline somevhat. Conversion to full-
scale production of these weapons could probably be effected quickly
and efficiently.
110
106
110. The combat effectiveness of the Soviet Army is high.
Its senior command is able and experienced; Junior officers can be
expected to execute orders faithfully; the individual soldiers are
courageous, and have good physical stemine. Discipline is good and
morale almost certainly high. Current Soviet line divisions possess
For detailed estimates of strengths and dispositions of these
forces, see Appendix D, Tables 1 and 2.
2/ For estimated 1953 production of tanks and artillery, see
Appendix D, Table 5.
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good equipment, generally of World War II design, in adequate
quantity. The combat support services -- artillery and engineers --
are comparable to the quality of the Soviet Army as a whole.
Mobilization would lower individual unit efficiency but the rapid
increase in the numbers of units would tend to offset this even in
the short term.
111. During the period of this estimate the readiness of Soviet
ground forces for sustained combat will continue to grow, largely
maneuverability
because of the increase in arnament, mobility, and numbers of competent
and
The USSR will probably also develop changes in the equipmentation Du
technicians., Thirty Soviet divisions are located in East Germany and
ground
the European Satellites. It 1s known that these units are well-equipped, a
well-trained, and combat ready. Intelligence concerning the remaining
their unprove
my
in
divisions, particularly those in the interior of the USSR, is not as
worfare. mucker
extensive. However, ve believe that the latter are not significantly
inferior in effectiveness to the Soviet forces in East Germany and
the Satellites.
112. Certain weaknesses of the Soviet Army will continue to
limit its potential under full war requirements during the period of
this estimate. The great extent of Soviet territory and the 11nd-
tations of the road and rail networks present difficult logistic
problems, especially for operations in the Far East. The Army
lacks experience in large-scale combined amphibious operations, and
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it has never conducted successful large-scale airborne operations
in wartime. The Army would suffer from a shortage of technicians
in the event of full mobilization.
Somet Security Frees
113. Soviet internal security forces are controlled by the
Ministry of Internal Affairs. We estimate that these forces number
about 400,000 uniformed men organized in military units. About
150,000 of these are in the border troops, disposed along all acces-
sible land and sea frontiers. The remaining 250,000 include: troops
responsible for suppressing any organized resistance in the country,
for guarding shipments of prisoners and strategic cargoes, and for
maintaining the security of high-level government and military
communications. These troops are a select group, well-trained and
equipped, and politically loyal to the regime.
European Satellite Armies*
114. Satellite ground forces, now composed of 1,115,000 men
organized in 82 line divisions, constitute a substantial addition
to Soviet military strength in Europe. During the period of this
estimate Satellite ground personnel strength will probably increase
to about 1,265,000. The Satellites are almost completely dependent
on the USSR for major equipment items, including tanks, self-propelled
*
For detailed strength figures by country see Appendix D, Tables
1 and 2.
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gune, heavy artillery, and some light artillery. No substantial
var reserve stocks of undern equipment have been made available
to the Satellite countries. By mid-1956 the Satellite armies will
be almost completely equipped with equipment of Soviet origin and
design, mostly of Soviet World War II standard. Although some
quantitative and qualitative improvement of weapons inventories
will probably cecur during the period of this estimate, major defi-
ciencies in motor transport, heavy armor, artillery, and CORMU-
nications equijment will probably continue.
115. During the postwar period the Satellite forces have been
TV:OT Tanized to conform to the Soviet pattern. However, the national
units whibit market differences in training, equipment, and morale,
and the.r combat effectiveness is greatly inferior to that of equi-
valent Nov et units. The Bulgarian Army is considered the best of
the Satellit forces, followed by those of Hungary, Czechoslovakia,
Poland, humani, East Gerasny, and Albania. The combat effectiveness
of Satellite force will improve, but It 1s unlikely that many of the
will remain only fair.
It is unlikely that many of its
divisions would be uitable for offensive operations. Moreover, in
case of var the SateRite forces would be dependent upon the USSR for
logistical support.
116. Possible policil - reliability within of the Satellite
The questimable
armies significant their military usefulness.
armed forces places 8, lim :ation upon Bloe military capabilities. At
present the Kremlin could robably not rely upon the majority of the
72 (i)
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Satellite armies in a general war except for employment in secondary
roles or in a defensive capacity. However, against traditional
enamies (e.g., Poles and Czechs against Germans; Bulgarians against yugralavs,
Greeks, and Turks) Satellite arades would probably fight well, at
least as long as victory appeared likely.
Chinese Communist Army*
117. During the period of this estimate the Chinese Communist
2,012,000
Field Forces, which now number an estimated 2,041,000 men, will
probably increase to about 2,385,000. Chinese Public Security Forces
total approximately 1,000,000 men. However, the wide dispersion of
these forces on security duty, their light equipment, and lack of unit
training limit their combat potential to employment as local auxiliaries
to the field forces. Communist China has no system of organized re-
serves and the estimated 6,000,000 to 20,000,000 men in the militia
cannot le classed as trained reserves since they receive little mili-
tary training and have almost no equipment. Further mobilization of
Chinese forces would be largely dependent upon acquisition of veapons
and equipment.
118. The Chinese Communist forces are basically infentry not
their waspons are a haterogensous assortment of European, American,
- For details as to strengths and disposition, see Appendix D, Tables
1 and 2. For strengths of additional Bloc forces in Asia, see
figures for North Korean and Viet Ninh armies given in the BEEN tables.
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Japanese, and Soviet navufacture. Extensive Soviet equipment of
Chinese forces has taken place since the beginning of the Korea War,
but this aid, vidle continuing, bas probably liminished since
hostilities certify The marked disparity between the equipment of
average Chinese Communist and Scriet divisions will probably not
be reduced significantly during this period. Moreover, in came of
var the Chinese Communists will continue to be heavily dependent
upon Soviet logistic support and technical nid.
119. The Chinese Communist Arwy is well adapted by tradition,
training, and the characteristics of its individual soldiers to was
type of warfare likely to be encountered in the extremes of wether
and terrain of the Asian region. Morale within the Chinese
nist forces appears to be high. The conbut effectiveness of the
troops which fought in Korea (over 50 percent of total Chinese forces)
vas fairly high despite major deficiencies in logistics, communications,
and combined-arms technique. During the period of this estimate combat
effectiveness will probably increase. However, deficiencies in training,
equipment, and logistical support, and dependence upon outside aid
will continue to be major limiting factors upon the full exploitation
of the organized Chinese mempower strength.
XV. BLCC NAVAL FORCES*
Soviet Havy
120. In comparison with two of the YIS the Soviet surface
fleet during the period of this estimate will remain 1 deficient
4 For strengths in ships and personnel ES well as disponitions ISS
Appendix D, Tablas 1 and 3.
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in capital ships, and almost certainly without aircraft carriers.
However, the Soviet submarine fleet is large and growing, containing
many long-range craft of which a significant and increasing proportion
are of modern types. Most of the major surface vessels and all of the
modern submarines will probably be kept active, and the present rate of
new construction will permit the creation of a substantial reserve
fleet. It is believed that all such reserve or inactive units could
be activated. by M + 180.
121. The Soviet Naval Air For st, comprising approximately
18
# percent of the total strength of Soviet military evintion, 28
equipped with modern Jet aircraft of the fighter N/A 11gm bother
88 well as piston engined attack, mine nac torpedo, not
type aircraft. This force is expected to remain approctantaly codetent
in strength throughout the period of this estimate: however, improved
all-weather Jet fighters will probably be introduced.
122. Since 1946, 9 light cruisers, 75 fleet destroyers, and
65 long-range submarines, all of postwar construction, have been ideas
to the fleet. Naval construction 11 the USSR is presently estimated
at about 175,000 NSDT which represents about one-third Sordet especity,
and one-fifth total Bloe capacity. Battleships not carriers could be
built in all fleet areas except the Far East.
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There are a few indications of the construction of a ship larger than
a cruiser, and such a vessel could become operational during the period
of this estimate. We believe, however, that the USSR will place primary
emphasis upon the construction of destroyer types and long-range
submarines.
123. The Soviet Navy is apparently concentrating on the con-
struction of two long-range submarine types developed since World
War II. These are equipped with snorkel and have operating radii
of about 4,700 and 6,700 miles respectively. By early 1954, 47 of
these had joined the fleet and the present building rate is estimated
as 46 per year. The Soviets are known to have continued development
of the Walther closed-cycle engine for submarine propulsion and an
experimental submarine powered by such an engine could be operational
during the period of this estimate,
DOW. It is also possible that, by mid-1959, nuclear propulsion for
submarines will have been developed by the USSR. However, there is
that the USSR is constructing
no evidence of Soviet development of submarines equipped with either
of these types of propulsion.
124. Soviet naval. capabilities can be expected to improve
throughout the period due to the building program, technological
development, and intensive training. While the operational effi-
ciency of the Soviet Havy is still below that of the navies of the
major Western Powers, it will continue to improve during this period.
Little is known of the operating efficiency of the Soviet submarine
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force. It is probably still inferior in proficiency to the us and
German forces of World War II, but performance standards should
steadily rise during this period. Personnel of the submarine force
are the pick of the Soviet Ravy, and their morale in high.
125. The principal weakness-of the Soviet Navy derives from the
wide physical separation of the sea frontiers of the USSR. The inability
of the USSR to control the water routes between these areas forces it
to maintain four separate fleets and supporting facilities. This
seriously complicates administrative control, logistic support, and
strategic mobility, although the development of the inland waterway
system and the increased use of the Northern Sea Route now permits
some interchange of vessels by routes under Soviet control. The lack
of adequate supply lines to the Northern and Far Eastern areas is an
additional handicap Other weaknesses derive from the land-locked
positions of the Baltic and Blck Sea fleets, which make egress to the
world sea-lanes difficult for both surface and underwater units, and
the lack of advanced submarine bases to provide support for long-range
boats. The long-range capabilities of the Soviet Navy are also hampered
and
by lack of aircraft carriers, modern capital ships,/auxiliary vessels
suitable for underway logistic support, and by lack of operating and
combat experience in long-range operations.
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126. There is no force in the Soviet Navy comparable to the
amphibious forces of the US Navy, although the naval infantry compo-
nents have received some training in amphibious warfare. While
capable of mounting short-range lifts in considerable force, the
Soviet Navy does not possess sufficient modern amphibious craft to
launch and sustain long-haul amphibious operations.
Satellite and Chinese Communist Navies
127. The Satellite and Chinese Communist Havies, including
their naval air forces, during the period of this estimate will
remain small. The naval forces of the Satellites will probably be
capable of aiding the Soviet Navy in minesweeping, minelaying,
escort, and coastal defense duties. The Chinese Communist Navy,
although small and ill-equipped, is capable of short-haul amphibious
operations, coastal mining, notor tarpedo attacks, limited escort work,
and minor ganfire support. The Soviet Far Eastern naval forces are
providing training, advisors, and logistic support to this force.
XVI. BLOC AIR FORCESX
Soviet Air Force
128. During the postwer period the USSR has maintained and
continually improved its large air force. Although in World War II
For strengths of Bloo air forces in aircraft and personnel, see
Appendix D, Tables 1 and 4.
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the USSR VALUE giving primary emphasis to the ground support role of
air forces, in the postwar period increasing attention blue been given
to the development of the interceptor nod strategic bombing arms. Ro-
equipment with jet fighter types proceeded rapidly 10 the period
1950-1953 and 10 now virtually completed. Replacement of the 20-4
aircraft by more modern types in the long-range bonber force, and
the growing numbers of all-weather jet fighters will almost cartainly
be the most important developments in the Soviet air forces during the
period of this estimate.
129. The Soviet aircraft industry has accounted for about
95 percent of total Bloe aircraft production in the postwar pariod.
Estimated Bloe production of fighter and bother aircraft during the
period 1946-1953 has been roughly equal to that of the SATO countries
1a numbers of aircraft, although substantially balow that 05 NATO in
terms of total airframe weight.* During 1952-1953 Soviet Bloo pro-
duction of fighters and bombers, both in numbers nod vasialit, Most
considerably below that of NATO. During the period of this estimate
Soviet aircraft industries will probably continue to operate at
about 30 percent of capacity, with BE: anoual production of sbout
5,500 6,500
10,000 to 12,000 aircraft, including about 5,000 to 6,000 combat
aircraft. Aero-engine industries will probably continue to 30,000- operate
35
36- 35,000
at about 30 30 percent of capacity with a total output of about 40,000
* See Appendix D, Table 6.
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engines, including about 15,000 combat types In view 08 the factor
of obsolescence and of the high requirements of the operating forces,
these rates of production are insufficient to permit any significant
stockpiling of aircraft, engines, and electronic devices.
130. Airfield development in the USSR and the European Satellites
during the postwar period has kept pace with demands created by the
introduction of jet aircraft and medium bombers into operational units.
The USSR, under this program, has created an interlocking network of
airfields along perimeter areas in Europe and internal approach lines
within the USSR. During the period of this estimate, the sirfield
construction program in the Far East and in the Sovlet Arctic will
probably be accelerated.
131. Combat effectiveness of Soviet military aviation 10, on
the whole, not as high as that of the air forces of the US and UK.
The chief limiting factors have been lower average aircrew pro-
ficiency, lower standards of maintenance and training, and lack of
certain modern aircraft types. During this periol the continued replace.
ment of piston by jet types and the introduction into operational
units of new jet types including an all-weatber fighter, and madium
and heavy bombers, together with the training appropriate to these
types, will lead to a significant increase of combet effectiveness.
However, the Soviet log in producing many of the latest aircraft types,
and the operating problems accompanying the introduction of advanced
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and complex equipment in new aircraft, indicate that over-all Sortat
air combat effectiveness will remain below that of the US and UX
during this period, especially in night and all-wenther operations
and in long-range operations.
132. The MIG-15 and MIG-17 are now standard equipment of Soviet
Fighter Aviation of Air Defense as of other components of the Soviet
Air Force. The USSR is also believed to be developing an interceptor
with performance characteristics superior to those of the MIG-15 and
MIG-17. Limited numbers of aircraft with AI radar have probably board
introduced into operational units. We believe that the USSR vi.1).
have about 200 all-weather fighters by mid-1955, about 1,000 by mid-1957,
and about 2,100 by mid-1959.
133. Soviet long-range eviation is now based on the TU-4 medium
bomber, which was copied from the American B-29. This is the only bomber
USSR
available to t be Soviets in large numbers and capable of carrying nuclear
weapons to distant targets. As of 1 July 1954, a total of about 1,100
11/4's was estimated to be available in operational units. (Table of
Equipment Strength of Soviet air regiments known to be equipped with or
in process of being equipped with TU-4 aircraft totals 1,340 but the
10-4 regiments are currently estimated to be at only about 85 percent
of T/E strength.) As of 1 July 1954 approximately 210 TU-4's (eight
regiments with a T/E strength of 260) were located in the Soviet Far
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East. It is believed that deliveries of TU-4's to operational units
have virtually ceased and that with the gradual phasing out of these
aircraft as new jet models become available only 700 will remain in
operational units by mid-1957, and 100 by mid-1959.
134. In the past four months there have been conclusive indications
that a jet medium bomber equipment program has been initiated in Soviet
Long-Range Aviation. During the 1954 Soviet May Day fly-by and the
rehearsals preceding it, 9-11 twin jet medium bombers, designated by
allied intelligence as the Type 39, participated. Subsequent intelligence
has associated this type with a known Soviet Long-Range Aviation unit.
We estimate that as of 1 July 1954 at least two regiments of Soviet
Long-Range Aviation with a T/E strength of 60 aircraft were in process
of equipment with Type 39 jet medium bombers. Total actual strength
of these units is estimated at approximately 20 aircraft. Series
production of the Type 39 is estimated to have begun in mid-1953, and
total production as of 1 July 1954 is estimated at about 40 aircraft.
It is estimated that Soviet Long-Range Aviation will contain an actual
strength of 650 jet medium bombers by mid-1957, and 1,050 by mid-1959.
* For radii-ranges and other performance characteristics of these
aircraft, see Appendix D Tables 5 and 6 o
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135. The Type 37, which was initially observed on 30 July 1953
and later observed in flight on seven different occasions in connection
with the 1954 May Day celebration, is a swept wing, four-engine, jet
heavy bomber with an estimated gross weight of 365,000 pounds. The
aircraft, considered presently to be in the prototype stage, is
expected to appear in operational units by the end of 1956 building up
to an actual strength of about 50 aircraft by mid-1957 and 250
by mid-1959.
136. There has been some evidence of the existence of a large
bomber designated the Type 31. On the basis of present evidence, 1t is
highly doubtful that any substantial re-squipment of Long-Range Aviation
units with Type 31 class aircraft has occurred to date, though possibly
15 or 20 may have been introduced. The Long-Range Aviation re-equipment
program to replace the TU-4 is more likely to be accomplished by in-
troduction of the jet bomber aircraft which have now appeared, and the
Type 31 class probably will not be introduced in numbers.
* For radii-ranges and other performance characteristics of these
aircraft, see Appendix D Tables 5 and 6 .
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