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Memoranda for the Intelligence Advisory Committee Regarding National Intelligence Estimate 11-4-54, Soviet Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses of Action Through Mid-1959, Part 3 of 3
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Memoranda for the Intelligence Advisory Committee Regarding National Intelligence Estimate 11-4-54, Soviet Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses of Action Through Mid-1959, Part 3 of 3
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European Satellite Air Forces
137. Development of Satellite air strength and effectiveness
is dependent primarily upon the Soviet estimate of the political
has
reliability of these forces. While substantial prograss have been
made in the build-up of Satellite air strength, the current
operational capabilities of these forces in required air roles exe
To date, the Police air Force probably ranks
unevenly developed. To date, the Polish Air Forts probably resks
first, followed by Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and
East Germany and Albania in order. Emphasis will probably be
placed on the strengthening of the Satellite fighter and light bomber
establishments. By the end of the period, the Satellite air forces
will constitute 8 significant increment to Soviet air power in Europe.
138. The Satellites will remain greatly dependent upon the USSR
for logistic support, and virtually all aircraft will be Soviet types.
The Satellites, primarily Czechoslovakia and Polandx will probably
increase their production of jet fighter and piston light bomber air-
craft, but total Satellite production will probably not exceed 15 per-
cent of Bloc production.
Communist Air Forces in China (CAFIC)
139. CAFIC is equipped primarily for defensive operations.
However, the acquisition of some medium and jet light bombers has
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given it some capability for offensive operations. The combat
effectiveness of CAFIC is only fair, but will probably improve some-
what throughout the period of this estimate, mainly through increased
proficiency of flying personnel and improved quality of aircraft.
However, since Communist China will probably not produce combat
aircraft during the period of this estimate, over-all effectiveness
will be largely determined by Soviet willingness to continue to
supply additional aircraft, especially jet fighters, jet light bombers
and medium bombers, together with the necessary parts and equipment.
Bloc Air Defense System
140. The Soviet air defense system includes the active air
defense elements of all military services under the operational con-
trol of & single air defense organization (PVO-Strany). The Europeen
Satellite and Chinese Communist air defenses are integrated with those
of the Soviet system. Soviet Bloc defense forces are not uniformly
distributed, and in general are more concentrated in the esstern and
western, and less in the northern and south central border areas. In-
terior defenses are stronger in the European UBSR than in areas east
of the Urala or in most of the inland area of this Soviet For East.
Soviet Civil Defense
and
141. The USSR has a largen complex, and well organized civil
defense system which is integrated into the over all Soriet air
- 85 MY
TOP
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defense organization. The system includes a full-tine civil defense
staff organization, but there is no evidence or present 1988 1 parts-
cipation in civil defense, or of & program of passive defense Insurance
specifically designed for stomic sttack. The potential effectiveness
of civil defense in the USSR 1a probably greater than that in any
other major country except perhaps the UK. The elaborate totalitarian
controls, the highly regimented character of the population and, to
some extent, the dispersal of population and industry, constitute
strong points of the system. However, MB believe civil defense operations
in the event of an air attack would be handicapped by a shortage of
transport facilities and materials.
IVII. MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET BLOC
General
142. During the postwar period a rough balance of additary power
has existed between the Soviet Bloe and the US-NATO coalition, Soviat
superiority in conventional forces-in-being having been generally off-
set by the Western possession of superior nuclear capabilities and
economic potential. Since 1951 the margin of Bloc mmmerical superiority
in forces-in-being and conventional ground and air armant has been
narrowed markedly. and in air armant may have been reversed. On
the other hand, while still inferior in miclear vespons production and
delivery capabilities, Soviet efforts to overcome these deficiencies
have greatly narrowed the gap.
8 86 -
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in addition, the increasing Bloc capability to interfive
with the flow of recoforcements and material from the
the relative military TOP strengths of the Bloc and the Western
OS to to allies overbead well be an injurtant factor in
cracition.
143. The development of nuclear weapons and of the ability
to deliver such veapons on target will probably in future be the
most decisive factor in determining the relative military strengths
of the Communist Bloc and the US-NATO coalition. During the period
of this estimate Soviet capabilities in the use of nuclear vespons
will continue to increase. At present, the USSR's highest cape-
bility for delivering nuclear weapons lies in open military attack
by aircraft. However, Soviet capabilities for nuclear attack by
means of guided missiles, including missiles launched from sub-
marines and aircraft, will increase, especially in the latter part
of this period., Nevertheless, provided there are no significant
alterations in present political alignments, ve believe that & rough
balance of military power between the Soviet Bloc and the West will
continue during the period of this estimate.
Offensive Capabilities*
is an
144. The core of Soviet offensive strength at present lies in
and the UA.
tibe ability to mount -an attacks against Western Europe, The USSR
could launch a surprise attack against Western Europe with the 25 to
30 Soviet ground divisions now in East Germany and Poland. By prior
concentration of forces west of the Oder-Neisse line, involving almost
certain loss of surprise, the USSR could attack with 50 to 60 divisions.
A build-up to 75 to 140 divisions could be accomplished by D-plus-90.
Air support for these operations could come from the approximately
No estimate of the success of the offensive operations describes in
this section can be made without considering the effects of the
actions of opposing forces.
87
air attacho of great weight and envolving
nuclear weapons could be launched with
little or no warning against any strength
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exposed in western Europe an the Ut.
2,200
2,500- Soviet aircraft presently stationed in East Dermany and the
with reinforcements available from the
Satellites, reinforced as necessary from the more than 8,200 aircraft
stationed in the Western USSR. In such any campaign against Western
Europe THE believe it unlikely that European Sate lite armies would be
used independently, except as security forces or to protect Soviet
lines of communication.
145. In a maximum single-lift operation the USSR also has the
capability of utilizing 32,000 well equipped and trained airborne
troops in an assault against the Western Zones of Cermany. These
troops could be assembled in 10 days, and could be delivered to Rhine
river crossing sites and nearby military installations by aircraft
utilizing bases in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Successive lifts would
be on a decreasing scale because of combat and operational attrition.
During a five-day maximm-effort we believe that the USSR could deliver
77, 000
approximately 70,000 troops. These capabilities will probably increase
through 1959 with the addition of new medium transports. and could be
further increased by utilizing civil transport.
146. In the Far East, Soviet capabilities for long-continued
full-scale war are somewhat limited by the capacity of the Trans-
Siberian railway, the only route by which supplies in large amounts
could be brought from other parts of the USSR. However, the USSR
has about 30 divisions in the For East, together with more than 5,000
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aircraft and a sizeable naval force. Stockpiles of supplies axist
sufficient for & considerable period of combat. These Boviet forces
could, in conjunction with Chinese Communist forces, renew hostilities
in Korea. They could launch an amphibious invasion of Japan, ve be-
lieve, with an initial assault strength of one airborne and two or
three waterborne divisions, with about six divisons supporting. These
attacks could be launched concurrently with campaigna in the Middle
East and in Western Europe.
147. The USSR is now capable of undertaking concurrent strategic
air operations against the US, the UK, continental Europe, the Middle
East, Japan, and the offshore island chain of Asia. Operations
against the US will, however, continue to be attended with great
difficulties.*
148. At the present time, it would be technically feasible for
the USSR to attack targets within the US with missiles Laurched from
long-range aircraft and from submarines; however, Vt have ao evidence
that the USSR has developed this capability either as to production
of the missiles or as to conversion of submarines to missile Launchers.
The USSR could at present have V-1 type missiles for launching from
submarines, and in 1955 could have for this purpose submonic turbo-jet
For detailed treatment of this subject, see SNIE 11-7-54, "Soviet
Gross Capabilities for Attacks On the US and Key Overseas Instal-
lations Through 1 July 1957," published 17 August 1954. Per
maps depicting Soviet long-range bomber capabilities fox antack
on the continental US, see Appendix D, Maps 1000
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powered pilotless aircraft missiles with a maximum range of 500 nautical
miles and a warhead of 3,000 pounds. We believe that it will not be with-
in Soviet capability within the period of this estimate to attack continental
United States with guided missiles launched from Soviet Hloc territory.
149. If the USSR in fact develops the guided missiles which we have
estimated to be within its capabilities, the following possibilities for
attack would exist during the period of this estimate:
20 At present, Soviet missiles launched from advanced bases in
Eastern Europe could reach targets in Western Germany and the south-
eastern portion of the Scandinavian peninsula.
b. In 1955, from advanced bases in Eastern Europe, targets could
be reached in Western Europe as far west as London, Paris, and Rome.
In the Far East, if launched from Soviet or North Korean territory,
and alaska;
these weapons could reach targets in western Japans 11 launched from
Chinese territory, they could reach targets in the Ryukyu Islanda.
Co In 1957, Soviet guided missiles could reach all of the UK,
France, Italy, Scandinavia, and Turkey. In the For East, if Lynnched
from Soviet or North Korean territory, these weapons could reach all
of the Japanese ielands, and it launched from China they could reach
all of Lison,
15th
do In 1958-60 Soviet missiles could reach US North African bases
in Tunisia, in addition to the targets listed above.
Air Force believes this date should be 1955. See footnots, page 58.
**
Air Force believes this date should be 1957. See footnote, page 58.
- 90 -
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150. During the period of this estimate Soviet offensive navel
capabilities will still be limited to undersea warfare, surface operations
involving vessels no larger than cruisers, and air operations utilizing
shore based naval aircraft. The Soviet submarine force will greatly increase
its capability to undertake offensive patrols and mining operations along
mont of the world's strategically situated sea Lanes, and possibly simultaneously
to launch guided missile attacks against targets on both the Atlentic and
Pacific seaboards of the US.* Major Soviet surface units and supporting
shore-based naval aircraft will probably continue to increase their capability
to undertake limited offensive operations in Bloc coastal areas, especially
in the Baltic and Black Seas, and to protect the seaward Plank of ground
campaigns. The Soviet Navy will almost certainly have no long-range
amphibious capability within the period of this estimate, but it will remain
capable of mounting short-range amphibious lifts in considerable force.
151. We estimate that the USSR now has 8. stock of over 500,000 mines
and the capability to employ them to interfere seriously with allied sea
communications. In the European area, this effort could include all the
ports and approaches of the VK and Western Europe. In the Far East, most
of the vital allied port areas and sea lanes around the perimeter of the
Bloc could be similarly attacked.
*
We believe the USSR canable of adapting submarines to this use,
but we have no evidence that such modifications have been made.
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Air Defense Capabilities
152. "e estimate that at present Bloc defensive capabilities against
air attack are insufficient to provide BUT adequate defense under the variety
of conditions which could be expected to prevail. Against daylight bomber
formations between 10,000 and 30,000 feet in clear weather the Bloo air
defense systems could probebly inflict severe loases against pieton beniere
and moderate Losses against jet boobers. Because of difficulties In
detection and tracking, anti-aircraft fire controls, and fighter
at higher altitudes, Sovies air defenses would be 1003 effectivaigastet
They would be
at altitudes above 30,000 feet. and markedly lass effective against boubers
or at very low altitudes.
above 40,000 feetx Againe multiple-pronged ponstrations utilizing altitude
stacking, diversionary tactics and electronics counter-messured, the or
defense system is subject to serious breakdowns which would teni progressively
to lessen its effectiveness. Because of inadequacies 10 equipment and
training for all-weather air defense operations, the system would be instrective
against air attacks conducted when visibility Le poor,
153. Through 1957 Bloc air defenses will probably 00 gradually
strengthened by the introduction into operational unite of TIGH fighter -
craft, new radar equipment, new anti-aircract wespons, and surface-to-air
guided missiles. All-weather fighters in limited quantities are probabily
already being introduced into operational units, but problems related to the
operation and maintenance of airborne intercept radar will probably take a
92
I
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mirdmum of 18-24 months to solve. The filtering phase of air raid
reporting (combat information control) is expected to continue to
\
be a major problem during the period of this estimate. However, the
gradual improvement of weapons, equipment, and training will be
sufficient by 1958 to provide a Bloc air defense system substantially
\
more effective than that now existing.
93 @ #
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XVIII. THE SOVIET ESTIMATE or THE WORLD SITUATION
154. The Seviet lenders view the world as as APRIM of
ceaflist between the Communist and non-Communist camps. Soriet
policy is therefore extramaly sensitive to changes in world power
relationships, and the Seviet Leaders' current detimate of the
capabilities, intentiens, and valmerabilities of the new-Soviet
world is a decisive factor is determising the equares of action
which the USSR will pursus during the period of this estimate.
Soriet Estimate of Non-Communist Capabilities
155. Soviet leaders have Long recegnized that the core of
non-Communist strength lay in the productive your of the US
and especially in its industrial capacity. Tasy recognize that
the US 1a seonomically cayable of supporting very powerful
military forces in time of peace, and of waging full-scale was
for & longer period than any other major power. They also under-
stand the economic power of the US to be a great political asset,
giving the US the capability of supporting and strengthesing the
military and political establisbments of its allies, and at the
case time of employing resources for pelitiesl use throughaut
the underdeveleped countries and areas of the non-Communist world.
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They recogaize the economic capabilities of the US and its allies
to be greatly superier to those of the USSR and the Bloe, but they
almost certainly believe that capitalist society will in the long
run inevitably deeny because of its own inherest centradietions,
and, therefore, that the US and its allies are incapable of mintaining
this superiority permanently.
156. The Seviet leaders almost certainly believe that
during the peried of this estimate the men-Communist world will
possess such strength in nejer equipoments of military power that
general war would involve not only the certainty of widespread
destruction within the USSR but the possibility of the destructism
of the Soviet system itself. They almost certainly believe that
the West has and will maintain through 1959 superior naval and
strategic air power, greater nuelear capability, and greater
industrial potential. Newever, they almest certainly believe that
the increase of their own suclear capabilities will, even if these
eapabilities remain inferier to those of the West, tend to mullify
the significance of the Western superiority.
157. The Seviet leaders probably recognize that if the #3
should use its muslear capability to the maximum in the event of
general war, the USSR would be unable to prevent destruction of
us 95 -
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major portions of the industrial and military strength of the
Seviet Union. They probably reesgnize that the possession by
the US of air bases encircling the USSR provides the West with
an advantage which probably could net be entirely oversome even
by surprise attacks upon these bases. The Seviet leaders almost
certainly believe that even if mest of these bases were demied
the US by aflitary or political action the US would still be
able to deliver severe attacks against the USSR.
158. Under the most optimistic assumptions, the Soriet
leaders might believe that US nuclear capabilities could be
at least temporarily neutralised by political arrangements or
by threat of Soviet retaliatory power upon the US or its allies.
Under such conditions, the Soviet leaders would prebably estimate
that present Western capabilities would be insufficient to prevent
considerable initial Soviet successes including the overrunaing
of Western Europs. They would probably believe, however, that
the war would not be ended with these original successes and that
grave danger would remain that the full US anclear capability would
in the end be employed. The Seviet leaders prebably believe,
therefere, that during the period of this estimate Western
capabilities will remain sufficient to make the suteomo of general
war extremely hasardous and uneertain for the USSR.
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Soviet Estimate of Non-Communist Intentions
159. Seviet leaders probably estimate that the US is un-
likely deliberately to initiate general var during the next few
years. They prebably estimate however, that the US would not
be deterred, by fear of the consequences of general war, from
using its full military capabilities if it believed that its
security was issinently threatened. The Seviet leaders almost
certainly believe that the US would consider as such a threat
any evert armed aggression by Bloe forces against any country
formally allied with the us. They probably also estimate that
such aggression against a state not formally allied to the US
would involve risk of US wilitary reaction, but that the degree
of this risk, and the dimensions of the US reaction, would depend
upon the importance to the US of the country attacked, the
circumstances of the attack, and the political situation within
the us and the non-Communist world generally. Soviet leaders
almost certainly estimate that extensive Communist political
warfare vill be unlikely to provoke large-scale US military re-
action, and they prebably believe that the US would. be unlikely
to initiate general var against the USSR even 11 the activities
of political warfare should lead to the establishment of Communist
governments in countries presently nen-Communist.
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160. The USSR probably estimates that the US will continue
its development of overseas military bases, and it probably views
this development with genuine and profound suspicion of US notives.
These suspicious are probably increased by such apparently hostile
indications as the undisguised discussion in the US press of the
vulnerability of Soviet cities to air attack, the reports that the
US is storing awelear veapons at everseas installations, and the
widely discussed "nov look" in US defense policy emphasizing
"massive retaliatery pewer." Many US defensive measures prob-
ably appear to the Kremlin to be aggressively-mstivated. We
believe the USSR ecasiders the US military base pregram a
serious throat to its own security, but we also believe its
estimate of the imminence of the threat will depend upon its
view of the world political situation rather than upon the existence
of the bases thomselves.
161. In Europe the Soviet leaders probably expect the US
to persist in its efferts to bring about ratification of ZDC or
some other arrangement that would bring a rearmed West Germany
into alliance with the West. We believe that the Kremlin considers
the prospect or a rearwed West Germany, closely allied with the
West, as one of the most serious potential long-range threats
to Bloe security. The Kremlin almost certainly estimated that the
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US will agree to the unification of Germany only if it 1s confident
that a reunited Germany will not fall under Communist domination,
and probably only if it believes that Germany will be Lisked
with the West. The Soviet Leaders probably estimate that the B
1a unlikely to press for & revision of the Oder Neisse Brundary.
162. The Seviet leaders almost certainly believe that the
US intends to maintain treops in Burope imdefinitely, and will
support with force its posities in Barlin. They clearly recognize
the great political advantages which the possession of West
Berlin prevides the allies, and they slmest certainly estimate
that the US would accept the risk of var rather than relinquish
Kremlin
Berlin under Seviet pressure. Nevertheless, the Seviet Union
may estimate that the other Western Powers would be less disposed
than in 1948 to resist harassment of the Western position in
Berlin, especially if unde to appear an East German rather than
at Seviet action.
163. The Seviet estimate of US intentions in the Far East
is probably less confident than that for any other area of the werld
at the present time. This uncertainty probably arises because of
the cemflicting manifestations of opinion within the us, the apparent
conflict of policies azong the Western nations revealed during
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the Indechina crises, and the apparent reluctance of the D3 to
adopt courses of action in the Far Dest which would alleasta
the newtral nations of Asia or threaten the harmony at the
Western alliance. At the same time, the Seviet leaders NEW
aware of many statements by US leaders indienting determination
to resist the further expansion of Communism 1a the Far Last,
including thedefens 8 Formosa and the Pescadered.
164. Accordingly, the Seviet leaders probably believe that
the US will seek to avoid courses action carrying grate
risk of general war or seriously alienating its allies, but
will attempt to prevent the consolidation of present Communist
gains and to resist further Communist advances. Purtheracro, they
almost certainly estimate that the US will attampt to bring the
policies of Western and Asian nations into harmony with those or
the US during the period of this estimate and will push forward
with the development of an Asian defense arrangement similar to
NATO.
Soviet Estimates of Non-Communist Valserabilities
165. In the Kremlin view, the ability of the Western Pewers
to give effect to their intentions during the peried of this estimate
will be limited by a number of political and economic factors which
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will operate to woaken the Western alliance and undersing its cap-
abilities. The factors discussed below are probably these which
the Seviet leaders believe constitute the principal vulsarabilities
of the men-Communist world.
166. Foar of Nuclear Warfare. The Soviet leaders probably
calculate that increasing Seviet maslear capabilities will have is
growing influence as the policies of men-Cassurist states. They
probably estimate that no government will villingly run (Paye rinks
of was unless interests are at stake which 1t considers vital,
and that the threat of nuclear veapens will almost certainly
tend to BARTON the range of interests that any government will
consider vital.. They apparently estimate that the tespor at
world opinion is such that latent fears in the non-Comment
world can be stimulated to encourage neutralist sentiments,
shake confidence in the stability, mederation, and maturity
of US policy, and undersine US ability to lead the non-Communist
world.
167. Mereover, the Soviet leaders probably estimate
that groving aversion to general var with muclear vergons will
cause beth the US and its allies to show increasing eoncorn to
deal with lecal aggressium without reserting to asts which ad.girt
load to general war. The Kremlin probably estimates, therefore,
" 101 .
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that opportunities may arise in certain local situations to
employ limited military action without running serious risk of
general war.
168. Political Comflicts. Clashes of interest and policy
among European states are probably expected by the Soviet Leaders
to hamper US efforts to maintain MM effective alliance daring
the peried of this estimte. They apparently believe the following
issues are particularly divisive: the EDC treaty and the general
problem of General rearnament; problems of East-West trade controls;
Far Instern problems, including the issue of resegnition of
Communist Claimas problems of melear weapsus control. In the
long run, Moseow apparently calculates that differences of
attitude toward these and related issues will produce vider
schisms among nen-Communist countries.
169. The Soviet leaders probably estimate that French
and Italian social cleavages, economic preblems, and political
weaknesses will remin the mest serious obstacles to the building
of a strong and stable Europe. They probably estimate also that
the French may centinue to voto West Germany's rearmanent and admission
to the Western alliance, and that as a result the Been Government
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may medify its presently strong pro-Western policy. Even the
differences which on occasion agitate Anglo-American relations
may be calculated by the Kyemlin to carry the possibility of
future estrangement between the two strongest countries in the
anti-Communist allianee.
170. The Soviet leaders probably estimate that serious
continue
differences among non-Commentst countries will arise ever pelicies
in the Far East, and they presably hope that these differences over
the next few years will result 1a an increasing iselation of the
US from the other countries of the non-Communist world. They
almost certainly believe that the armistice in Indechisa has
improved Communist capabilities for further advances, further
undermined Western prestige in Asia, and weakened Western
capabilities to mebilize local opposition to Comminism. U On
the other hand they probably recognise the chance that a too
aggressive Communist policy in Asia might tend to catalyse re-
sistance in the nen-Communist countries of Asia, and contribute
to the development of & strong anti-Communist alliance in the
area. In any event, the Kremlin probably believes that the US
will continue to face complex problems, during the peried of this
estimate, in harmonizing its policies in the Far East with those
of its allies and the non-Communist mations of Asiz.
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171. Economic Conflicts. The Soviet Leaders probably expect
economic problems to assume greater promineaee, during the period
of this estimate, and to test the strength and cobeston of the
Western alliance. They prefess to believe that the capitalist
economy is afflicted by a deepening and irremediable crisis.
In particular, the Communist leaders state that the capitalist
world market has been fatally constricted by the expansien of the
Communist sphere, and that the re-emargence of Germany and Japan
will produce critical conflicts of oconomic interest.
172. Auticelonialiss and Nationalism in Underdeveloped
Areas. The Seviet leaders have long estimated that cenditions
in the underdeveleped areas of the nen-Cessmunist world constitute
vulmerabilities for the West. They pretably believe that in
some countries of the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia,
Communist oppertunities are enhanced by political immaturity,
economic and social grievances, imadequate material and
technological resources, recentment of Western imperialism,
and extreme nationalism. The Communists are aware that these
areas are undergoing a social and economic revelution which is
conducive to political instability. The Kremlia probably estimates
that US econemic aid and military assistance will not wholly over-
come anti-Western attitudes and that prospects for the esecurage-
ment of anti-Westernism will continue to be good.
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173. Popular Aspirations. The weaknesses of the non-
Communist world are intensified and complicated, in the Krealia
view, by the pressures of disesstented populatiess upon governments
which are sensitive to popular desires and incapable of totalitarian
political controls adequate to suppress popular demands. Demands
for an improved scale of living, for economic security and
secial welfare, for greater political freedem, for independence
in colomial areas all serve, from Moscow's viewpoint, to create
disunity and instability within non-Communist countries. The
Kramlin probably believes that acese governments in the AGR-
Communist world will be increasingly subjected to unrealistic
demands far beyend the expacities of the governments to grant,
and that the stability of such governments will be sufficiently
disturbed to produce weaknesses in the non-Communist world.
174. In summary, the Seriet leaders prebably believe that
present world treads are net unfaverable to Seviet strategie
interests. They my expect that the next few years will see
a deterieration in relations among the Western allies and &
gradual isolation of the US from the rest of the nen-Cummunist
world. They almost certainly believe that the US will face in-
creasingly complex problems in dealing with its allies and with
the other states that make up the non-Seviet world. They prob-
ably estimate that developments which will take place within
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and meang the states of the non-Commamiet world during the peried
of this estimate will exhance Seviet oppartumities for further
expansien, and will reduce the likelikeed of concerted Western
counteruction.
XIX. PROBABLE SEVIET COURSES or ACTION
Present Seviet Objectives
175. We believe that the developments within the sphere of
Soviet power and the Soviet estimate of the world situation which
have been discussed in the foregoing sections have lad the Seviet
leaders to assess their cana situation somewhat as follows: the
and increasing destructiveness 8 nuclear weapongare
balance of military power in the world such that open silitary
general war
aggression would involve vary beavy risks to the Communist sphere,
extending
destruction 8 the
and possibly to the Seviet system itself. an the other band, non-
Communist strength power is net so Menacing great that withdrawals from the present
advanced pesitions in Europe and Asia seea necessary. Mereover, the
prospects pursbably DOOR good that the inerease of Bloe military
capabilities, together with political defections or disumity of
the non-Commentst side, will gradually shift the balance of
power in faver of the Seviet Bloe. Im the meantime, the Blee has
a full agenda of internal preblems which, while they de not imply a
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weakness requiring abandonment of expansionist aims or even the neglect
of opportunities for expansion under circumstances of limited risk, do
oal 1 for attention during the next five years at least. These problems
include the conselidation of Communist power in the European Satellites
the Bloc
and China, the further buildup of economic power in these countries and
the USSR as a step toward balancing the vastly greater economic potential
of the West, and the correction of certain weaknesses in the Bloc economy,
particularly in agricultural production.
176. We therefore believe that the Soviet leaders will concentrate
on the following principal objectives during the period of this estimate:
a. To expand Soviet economic potentials
b. To maintain a high level of military readiness and to
improve the capabilities of the Soviet armed forces,
emphasizing the development of greater nuclear capabilityş
Co To increase the political and economic instability of
non-Communi.st states, and to render them incapable of
decisive action by fostering and exploiting dissensions
within and among them;
d. To weaken and disrupt the mutual defense arrangements of
non-Communist states, and in particular to prevent the
rearmament of West Germany in close association with the
Western alliance;
8. To isolate the US from its allies in Europe and Asia;
f. To expand the area of Communist control in southeast Asia.
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External Courses of Action
177. General Mar. We believe that the Krealin will, during the
period of this estimate, try to avoid course of action which in its
judgment would clearly involve substantial risk of general war.
Nevertheless, the USSR or one of the Povist Eloc countries uight take
action creating 8 situation in which the us or its allies, rather
than yield an importent position, would decide to take counteraction -
involving grave risk of general war with the USSR. Horsover, are
believe that the Krealin would not be deterred by the risk of general
war from taking counteraction against B Western action which it
considered on inminent threat to Soviet security. Thus general war
might occur during the period of this extimate 88 the clinax of 8
series of actions and counteractions, initiated by either sice, which
neither side originally intended to lead to general WET,
178. The Soviet leaders almost certainly believe that ES Soviet
nuclear capabilities increase, the unwellingress evorsion of the US and its allies
risk
to, general war will correspondingly increase, and that the Krealin will
therefore have greater freedom of action to promote its objectives
without running substantial risk of general war. As the period of tide
estimate progresses, the USSR will probably be increasingly ready
to apply hourier heavy pressure on the non-Communist world upon any signs of major
dissension or weakness among the US and its allies. On the other hand,
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we believe that the Kremlin w. 11 continue to be extremely reluctant
expect to
to precipitate a contest in which the USSR would De subjected to
nuclear attack. No believe that the extent to which the Brealin UBOB
the increased freedom of action which its increased nuclear capabilities
appear to give it, and the success which it achieves, will depend
primarily upon the determination, strength, and cohesiveness of the
non-Communist world.
179. Diplomacy and Propaganda. We believe that the USSR during
the period of this estimate will almost certainly be unwilling to
settle any East-West differences at the cost of major concessions.
Nevertheless, the USSR will probably seek to continue discussions
of major issues, and may make proposals for settlements which will
be plausible to some non-Comunist nations but unacceptable to the us.
The Soviet leaders probably hope that such tactics will carry an
implication to the non-Communist world of Soviet willingness to
negotiate outstanding issues, and stimulate doubts in the non-Commmist
world regarding the reasonableness of US leadership. Moves spearently
intended to ease international tension will probably be alternated,
however, with political warfare pressures calculated to play upon the
non-Communist world's fear of war.
180. We believe that the USSR will place emphasis in its
diplomacy and propaganda, during the period of this estimate, upon
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proposals for the cortrol or abolition of nuclear невроти. The
Scriet leaders will probably try by such manumers to hold out to
the non-Commurist world the prospect of release from the threat or
nuclear warfare and, by seeking -0 place upon the US the blass for
the failure to a chievo workable control arrangements, to stimulate
doubts about the reasonableness and moderation of US policies in this
field.
181. No believe = highly unlikely that the USSR during the
period of this estimate a gree to 8. system of nuclear wespons
control which would involve inspection within the USSR under provisions
acceptable to the Western Powers. Poviet proposals regarding the control of
nuclear weapons will probably be designed primarily to great political
and moral barriers to US freedom of action in the use of nuclear waspons.
182. Trade. The USSR will probably seek to support its
propaganda and rd. th now overtures indicating vd. llingness
to expend its trade with non-Communist states. Soviet trade with
the non-Communist world will probably increase somewhat during
the period of this estimate, but this trade will continue to be and
in proportion to intra-Bloc trade. Dies trade agreements will
probably be intended not only to octain desired imports but 0100
to weaken the economic ties of non-Communist states with the 10,
and to make strategic trade controls a subject of controversy
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between these states and the us. while the Soviet Union *dll not
be able to bring about a major shift in present trade patterns, the
Communists probably estimate that political dividends can 08 earned
.rom even small increases in their current volumes of trade with
individual non-Communist states.
183. Europe. We believe that in Europe the Kremlin will continue
to pursue its general objective ofmakening Western governments
and impeding Western defense. It will continue its campaign against
the present form of NATO and against American bases in Europe.
The Kremlin's immediate aim remains to prevent the rearmament of
West Germany and its alliance with the West. France mill probably
remain the principal target of Soviet policy designed to schieve
this end. Poviet propaganda a. and diplomacy vill be designed to
strengthen French confidence in the USSR's peaceful intentions and
in the reasonableness of Soviet proposals, to stimulate French fears
In
of future German aggression, and to 5 ow resentment of US policy. a Italy
wherey as in France, the USSR possesses a powerful weapon in the
and staly
existence of large native Communist party, will probably continue
to be an important target in the Soviet campaign to alienate Western
the
undermine
Europe from US leadership and present NATO defense concepts.
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184. If the Soviet leaders come to believe that there is little
prospect for French approval of EDC or any other formula for the admission
of West Germany to the Western defense system, they will probably
shift their main diplomatic and propaganda effort to West Germany.
This would be in accordance with their present aims, first to deny
Germany to the Western defense system and ultimately to bring it
within the orbit of Soviet influence. A major effort will probably be
undertaken to develop cultural and esonomic relations between East and
West Bermany aimed at direct political negotiations between the two
for German unity, Attractive trade offers are likely to be employed
to undermine support in powerful industrial circles for present Western-
oriented policies.
economic relations between East and West Ger any almod at-direct
political negotiations between the two for German unity.
185. If EDG should be ratified, OF if West Germany should
be rearmed and brought into the Western alliance under BODO other
formila, we believe that Soviet leaders would estimate that this
development involved potentially a substantial threat to the
security to the Bloc. In particular, they would probably fear
that a rearmed West Germany might ultimately dominate the EDC-NATO
structure and might, in the future, influence the Western alliance
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to adopt a more aggressive policy towards the Soviet Noc. lowever,
the Soviet le aders would probably estimate that considerable time
would elapse before the threat to Bloc security through German
rearmament became critical, and that during the interim the German
question might create serious dissension within the Western coalition.
Accordingly, we believe that the Kruulin would react to the beginning
of German rearmament mainly be intensified efforts to divide and
destroy the Western alliance. These efforts might include a new
proposal for German unification which would appear to satisfy the
principal conditions which the Western powers have maintained on
this issue. If these efforts should fail, and if the threat to
Bloc security appeared to the Kremlin to be markedly increasing by
reason of the growth of West German armed forces, the Soviet leaders
would probably increase the scale of their own defense effort. A
step=up in the armaments race might therefore develop, accompanied
by an increase in international tension.
186. Asiao We believe that the USSR regards the situation
in Northeast Asia as stabilized for the present. We believe the
Communist leaders will not renew hostilities in Korea, or agree
to a political settlement which would endanger Communist control of
North Korea. Soviet policy toward Japan is probably based on the
assumption that Japan is at present effectively under US influence.
However, Soviet diplomacy and propaganda will attempt to distrab
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US=Japanese relations and to prevent any substantial contribution
by Japan to US military power. The Japanese Communist Party, whose
propaganda impact is disproportionate to its size, is an important
for
instrument to this purpose. In their intent ultimately to detach
Japan entirely from US influence, the Soviet leaders probably count
on the long-run effect of possible further Communist gains in Agia,
on Japanese political instability, and on the urgent Japanese need
for markets.
187. Southeast Asia almost certainly appears to the Kremlin
to be the most profitable field for Communist subversion and armed
revolt during the period of this estimate. The Soviet leaders
will probable continue to give covert support to such activities.
However, if the activities of local Communist groups stimulate
anti-Communist attitudes within these Asian states or tend to unite
these states in a program of joint resistance with Western powers,
the Kremlin may chose to hold local Communist movements in check.
The principal concern of Soviet policy in South Asia will be to
encourage and exploit the neutralism already present in the area.
The Soviet leaders probably hope thereby to promote differences
within the British Commonwealth over ways of dealing with Communism
in Asia. They would expect such differences to affect Anglo-American
relations adversely, and to render difficult the efforts of the
Western powers to enlist the support of Asian peoples in effective
opposition to further Communist advances in Asia.
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188. We believe the Chinese Communist leaders in general
share Soviet views about the world situation and about opportunities
and methods of advancing Communist interests in Asia. During the
period of this estimate, Communist China will probably be reluctant
to undertako courses of action which it considers might involve
substantial risk of provoking unlimited war with a major power.
The major deterrents will bes (a) Communist China needa time to
consolidate the Communist state as well as to modernize its economy;
(b) its strong ground forces are limited in service and support
units, its expanding air force has certain limitations, its navy
has extremely limited capabilities, and it will remain militarily
dependent upon the USSR for logistical, air, and navel support;
(c) its industrial centers will be vulnerable; and (d) the margin of
available resources over minimm domestic requirements will be narrow,
In apile angreober of there limitations and deterrents, the prosibility cannot be epaleded
However, Communist China will probably counter with military force, that Communest the chines
may, at sorry
to the full extent of its capability, any action which it
time during
the geriod 8
considers tobe a military threat to its borders or to constitute
this estimate
well attempt
an imminent threat to its vital interests, accepting the risks of
to carry out
recent threats
to "liberate "
war inherent in such action.*
Former and
the Pessodore.
189. Chinese Communist leaders probably share the Soviet
view that Southeast Asia offers the most favorable opportunities
for Communist expansion, not only because of the vulnerability of
The Director of Intelligence, USAP, balieves that paragraph 188
should read as follows:
"Mo believe that Chinase Communist leaders in general share these
Seriet views bout the world situation and about opportunities and
methods of advancing Communist interests. Communist China will prob-
ably net choose knowingly any course of action likely to exposs its
fundamental national strengths in war with 5. major power, Howaver, WV
believe that Communist Chica's strength for conducting various Mads
or verfare are such, and the motives and judgment of its leaders are
such KS to wake Communist Chima's courses of action dangerously 123/-
predictable under outside pressure of any appraciable angaitude."
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the states in the area, but banongo 11 the the possibility of exploiting
disagreements between the US and its allies. The Communists will
almost certainly attempt to extend their gains in Indochina, and
will probably expand their efforts to subvert neighboring countries
by political infiltration and covert support of local insurrections.
The aggressiveness with which such a policy is pursued will depend
upon the vigor and effectiveness of non-Communist reaction. We do
we believe its unlikely
not believe, however, that the Communists will attempt to secure
their objectives in southeast Asia by the commitment of identifiable
combat units of Chinese Communist armed forces, at least during the
early period 8 this islemate
the vigor and effectiveness of non Comminist reaction.
190. Middle East. Since its withdrawal from Azerbaijan in 1946
the USSR has apparently, not given low high priority to Communist activities
in the Middle East. This may have been due to such factors as Soviet
preoccupation with more important theaters elsewhere, the weakness
of local Communist cadres in the area, and the fact that even without
Soviet initiative the trends in the area were already unfavorable
to the West. In recent months, however, there have been signs of
increased Communist activity in the area. To the extent that the
Western powers succeed in reversing the trends unfavorable to them
and in building toward a situation of strength in this area, we be-
lieve that the USSR will increase its activities. If, for example,
progress is made in the development of the "northern tier" plan for
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Middle East regional defense, the USSR will probably increase its
efforts to arouse anti-Western feelings and influence the states of
the area against cooperation with the West.
USSR
191. Latin America. The Soviet Union will continue its efforts
through local Communist parties and front groups, appealing particu-
larly to labor, students, and intellectuals, to promote anti-US senti-
ment, to embarrass US business interests, and to obstruct economic and
military cooperation of Latin American governments with the US. The
type of political action the Communists pursued in Guatemala, where a
small Communist element was able to obtain a decisive influence over
policy by operating through front groups, will be the most likely
pattern of Communist tactics in Latin America. Communist strength
is insufficient to attempt open seizures of power or to run the risk
of interventions by other American states. At present, Soviet aims
are probably limited to establishing governments which would pursue
policies calculated to disrupt the Organization of American States
Bloc
and to damage US prestige. The Soviet Union will probably try to
increase its trade with Latin America. In addition to providing a
source of needed raw materials, such trade might be calculated to
contribute to the softening of inter-American solidarity and to the
creation of a more receptive atmosphere for Bloc propaganda,
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