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DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET INDUSTRY
25. Soviet total industrial production approximately doubled
about
during the period 1948-1954, and increased/nine percent during 1954.
The current and apparent long-run objectives and limitations of
Soviet industrial production indicate that the average annual real
rate of increase during 1955-1960 will be over seven percent, and
production in 1960 will be about 55 percent greater than in 1954.
The substantial and continuing decline in the estimated rate of
growth of industrial output is essentially attributable to:
(a) a reduction in the rate of growth of the industrial labor
force; and (b) 0 reduction in the average yield of annual additions to
industrial investment. The greatest production increases during the
1955-1960 period are expected to occur in chemicals, electric power,
electrical equipment, and nanufactured consumer goods The smallest
production increases are expected in the more established industries
with relatively large current production, namely, nanufactured food
products, forest products, and defense industries.
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DECLASSIFIED
Authority MR 95-300
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By Lis
NLE Date 1/11/96
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Table 1
Estimated Coviet Industrial Production, Celected Years 1948-1960
Indexes: 1954=100
1948
1953
1954
1955
1960
Energy
52
91
100
111
172
Metals
45
90
100
108
146
Metalworking & Machinery
41
88
100
114
169
Chemicals
45
88
100
111
172
Construction Materials
39
88
100
111
172
Forest Products
66
91
100
103
124
Food Products
63
96
100
104
134
Nanufactured Consumer Goods
45
90
100
115
169
2
Defense Industry
36
102
100
113
122-132
Total Industry
49
92
100
110
155
The 1955-1960 estimates are projected from recent rates of growth,
current investment programs, and such Soviet plans as have been an-
nounced for this period.
2/
The lower figure--122--is calculated on the assumption that during
the period of this estimate there will be some reduction of present
levels of production of some military end-items (see paragraph 75)
The larger figure--132--assunes that present production remains ap-
proximately constant, and that new weapons and equipment programs are
added. It should be noted that the estimated cost of the Soviet atomic
energy program is not included in the figures for defense industry.
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26. Soviet heavy industrial production has been increasing
at an average annual rate of over 10 percent during the current
Fifth Five-Year Plan. Official announcements indicate that pro-
duction plans for most nonferrous metals, petroleum, and certain
capital equipment are not being met, but that the over-all plan
for heavy industry is generally being met. Production of capital
equipment for light and processing industries has almost certainly
exceeded the original Fifth Five-Year Plan. Heavy industry will
almost certainly continue to dominate industrial production plans
for the 1955-1960 period, although more attention will probably
be devoted to housing and nonindustrial construction than in the
last six years.
27. Soviet artaments production almost doubled in value
(though not in volume) between 1950 and 1954. US expenditures
for military end-items, although less than Soviet expenditures
during the period 1946-1950, increased rapidly after 1951, reached
a high in 1953, and have since slightly decreased. In terms of
what Soviet armaments would have cost at US quantity-production
prices, we estimate that the aggregate dollar value of Soviet military
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production in 1951 was roughly 50 percent more than the dollar value
of US armament deliveries, whereas in 1954 the aggregate dollar value
of Soviet military production would have amounted to a little less
than half that of US armament deliveries. The value of Soviet military
end-iten production will probably increase by a noderate amount annually
through the period of this estimate, assuming no significant change in
the level of international tensions. There will be some shift in the
relative outlay for various types of weapons, in particular on increase
in expenditures for aircraft and naval vessels, and perhaps for nuclear wea-
pons and guided missiles. We believe that it is within Soviet capacity to
increase present and estimated future outlays by three to three and
a half times in the event of war or international developments which
the Soviet leaders might believe required such increases.
28. The output of consumer goods and services in 1954
exceeded that of 1953 by about seven percent, increasing at about the
same rate as GNP, but at a slower rate than gross industrial pro-
duction and at about two-thirds the rate of heavy industry. Durable
consumer goods, housing and appliances led the advance, followed
in order by clothing, transport, and other services. Production of
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food was limited by continuing agricultural difficulties, and
increased only about four percent. Production of consumer goods
is expected to continue to increase during the 1955-1960 period,
although at a lower average rate than in 1954.
29. The announced Soviet intention to re-emphasize heavy
industry will have the effect of arresting the 1953-1954 rates of
increase in light industry, but will still permit some improvement
in the position of the Soviet consumer. Increased emphasis
on agriculture will probably provide an expanding output. Agricultural
products are the material base for more than 80 percent of the Soviet
consumption pattern. Maintenance of capital investment in both
light industry and housing at levels well above those of the 1953
plan lends further support to the estimate that the Soviet consumer will
not be deprived of the gains obtained in 1953-1954. The 1955 increases
in military production, however, may have the effect of slowing down
increases in the production of durable consumer goods.
30. Industrial Technology. The quality of Soviet industrial
technology as a whole is difficult to assess. Where a particular
program has been indispensable to the maintenance of the Soviet
power position in the world -- for example, in connection with atomic
development, in weapons, and in basic industry and construction -- the
USSR has mobilized its technical resources with great effectiveness.
Because of the large number of personnel, and the material and financial
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outlays required for such technical developments, najor efforts
such as these have taken a great share of the limited resources
the USSR can devote to improving its technology. Soviet technology
in lower priority enterprises ranges from the copying of Western
design and technique in certain machine industries to
admittedly archaic methods of production in a vast majority of light in-
dustry establishments. In many of the latter, efforts are made to reduce
production costs, but these are largely local efforts made by plant workers
and managers who have relatively little training and experience.
31. Regional Concentrations. The regional distribution of industrial
production shows the impoct of Soviet efforts to achieve greater balance
between the several economic regions of the USSR, and to make these regions
as far as possible self-sufficient. However, production continues to be
relatively concentrated in the long established industrial regions of north.
west, center, and south. (See Figure 3) The rapid prewar development of
the Ural industrial complex based upon West Siberian coal has continued
in the postwar period, and the Urals now produce some 14 percent of Soviet
industrial output, compared to 16 and 27 percent respectively in the
Ukraine and the Central Industrial region (including Mescow). Although
industrial production east of the Urals has grown rapidly since World War
II, the base from which it grew was small and much of the production is
highly specialized and dependent upon equipment and markets in other
regions to the west.
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32. Stockpiling. There was some evidence that during 1953-1954
Soviet reserve stocks were drawn upon more freely than previously. The
scale of stockpiling operations during these years indicates that the
Soviet stockpile will fail to meet the 100 percent expansion planned
for 1951-1955. However, Bulganin's February 1955 speech gives evidence
that the USSR intends to apply renewed emphasis to the stockpile program
and to restrict the conditions under which stockpiles may be used to sup-
port current production programs. An increase in the scale of the stock-
piling program may deprive Soviet industry and Soviet consumers of a
portion of the increased flow of goods which would be expected from in-
creased production.
33. Transportation. The transport facilities of the USSR con-
tinued to increase ton-miles of freight at a rate well in advance of
The
that required by the Fifth Five-Year Plan. / increase in rail freight
turnover at the end of 1954 was 42 percent over 1950, compared to an
increase of only 35-40 percent planned for the period through 1955.
These figures suggest that Soviet planners may have underestimated the
transport requirements of their rapidly expanding economy. A rate of
investment higher than previously planned will apparently be necessary
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to permit Soviet transport to maintain growth necessary to support
the future expansion of the economy. Highway and waterway freight car-
riage have also increased rapidly in recent years but not at a rate
which will reduce the primary dependence of the economy upon rail trans-
port particularly in the areas served by the Trans Railway. Siberian
34. Labor Force. A large proportion of the recent growth in
Soviet industrial output has been achieved by increasing the size of
the industrial labor force rather than by increasing its efficiency.
agricultural
The 1951-1955 plan for increases in the non-/
labor
force was fulfilled by 1953. Planned increases in agricultural pro-
duction -- particularly in livestock and corn, both of which are labor
intensive items -- and a significant reduction of the annual rate of
entry into the labor force during 1955-1960 will deny industrial pro-
duction a labor force growth during this period comparable to that ob-
tained in the preceding period. (See Table 2) In addition to the labor
requirements for agriculture, rates of increase in the industrial labor
force will decline primarily because of the effects of the low birth
rate during World War II.
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Table 2
Estimated Labor Force of the USSR, 1938, 1947-1956, Projected to 1960
Yearly Averages in Millions of Workers
Total Excluding
Total*
Military and
Labor
Agriculture
Non-Agriculture
Forced Labor
Force
1938
53.3
25.7
79.0
90.3
1947
54.4
30.0
84.4
97.0
1948
53.8
31.0
84.8
98.0
85.1
/
1949
53.1
32.0
86.0
98.0
1950
52.6
34.6
87.2
99.0
1951
51.8
36.2
88.0
100.0
1952
51.0
37.8
88.8
101.5
1953
51.8
38.1
89.9
101.5
1954
52.7
40.3
93.0
104.2
1955
54.1
41.6
95.7
106.5
1960
56.3
46.6
102.9
112.3
*
Total labor force estimates are subject to a considerable margin
of error because of lack of data on the amount of forced labor.
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35. A similar decline in the rate of entry to the military
manpower pool may be expected. The decline in the annual entries into
the industrial labor force in this period will require continued empha-
sis on measures to increase the productivity of labor. The trend since
1948 of declining annual rates of increase in labor productivity was
arrested in 1954. Maintenance of high levels of capital investment and
reasonably improved per capita consumption levels --- factors which are
considered critical to Soviet labor productivity -- therefore become
essential to the achievement of the estimated rates of over-all industrial
and economic growth.
DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET AGRICULTURE
36. Soviet agriculture completed its first full crop year under
the new agricultural program in 1954. It became clear: (a) that the
Soviet leaders were seriously intent upon increasing agricultural pro-
duction; (b) that the incentives contemplated in the 1953 program had
so far done little to improve rural productive effort; and (c) that there
had been an increase in the size of the agricultural labor force and
some improvement in the quality of technical personnel. Owing in part
to adverse weather conditions, 1954 agricultural output pritably increased only about
but
three percent, and did not reach 1952 production levels. (Sce Table 3)
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Table 3
Estemateg Production of Major Crops in the USSR
1938 and 1950-1955
1938
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
Food Crops Million
Netric Tons
Grain
$8.6
85.0
80.0
92.0
83.0
87.0
---
*
Potatoes
73.8
72.3
59.5
69.7
66.4
67.2
---
Fiber Crops Thousand
Metric Tons
Cotton (Ginned)
730
1,140
1,220
1,260
1,300
1,410
----
Flax (Scutched Basis)
600
540
480
400
350
400
---
Wool (Grease Basis)
130
190
205
225
230
235
-
Animal Crops Million head
1 Jan.
Cattle
59.2
------
57.2
58.8
56.0
57.7
57.6
Swine
31.6
-----
24.1
26.7
28.5
29.6
31.8
Sheep & goats
73.1
----
99.0
107.5
109.9
112.0
114.7
1933-1937 average.
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The 1954 increase was achieved largely as a result of favorable growing
conditions in the "new lands," since a severe drought struck the principal
producing regions in the Ukraine and Volga. On the other hand, agricultural
in 1954
investment/increased almost 40 percent, in part by using the increased
income of collective farms and also by large increases in state budget
allocations. Crop acreage increased by six percent as a result of over-
fulfillment of the "new lands" program. A return to average weather con-
throughout the USSR
ditions/ during 1955 would result in a sharp increase in agricultural output.
37. Both 1954 and early 1955 saw additional changes in the 1953
agricultural program, all of which aimed at further expansion of output.
The new lands program, which is to add to the cultivated acreage of the
USSR an amount of land equal to the total cultivated acreage of Canada,
moved forward ahead of schedule and with favorable crop yields in 1954.
The early 1955 announcements outline what is apparently the essence of the
Sixth Five-Year Plan for agriculture, and despite the failure of the cur-
rent plan, they establish a series of agricultural goals for 1956-1960 which
are even more ambitious than those set forth in the Fifth Five-Year Plan.
(See T ble 4)
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Table 4
Officially Planned Output Goals for Soviet agriculture
1960
Index: 1954=100
Meat
200
Milk
200
Eggs
200
Wool
180
Grain
188*
*
This is estimated from the officially announced goal of "not less
than" 164 million tons by 1960, and the estimated output of 87
million tons in 1954.
Meat and dairy products, both very costly to produce, constitute the
major objectives of the 1960 plan. To achieve the vast growth in animal
production, the USSR has enbarked on a large-scale program to get an
eight-fold increase in corn acreage. The Kremlin has also increased
local control over agricultural production and has undertaken a large
program to increase the stability and technical competence of the agri-
cultural lubor force. In April 1955 there was recruitment of
some 30,000 managers, largely from Party ranks, who would replace
roughly one-third of the existing collective farm managers.
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38. While the measures announced in the fall of 1953 reflected
& more realistic appraisal of material, natural, and human resources
requirements, this cannot be said of the decrees on virgin land and
corn production issued in 1954 and early 1955. A large part of the
program approaches the climatic limits of economic production for the
land and crops involved. Moreover, the strains and stresses engendered
by these campaigns will probably slow up the otherwise possible rate of
growth in the "old" regions. Thus the net results will almost certainly
far
fall/short of plans, though there will probably be some increases
in production and in state control over agricultural output.
39. The principal problems posed by the agricultural program are:
(a) the "new lands" scheme will draw many skilled people from established
and more productive areas; (b) the combined "new lands" and corn and live-
stock programs will require very large additional outlays for machinery,
construction, and fertilizer, as well CS labor; and (c) climatic con-
-
ditions in the new lands areas are such as to produce frequent crop failures.
Moreover, the apparent pieceneal manner in which the program has been insti-
tuted raises considerable doubt as to whether the above problems have been
adequately assessed.
40. All Soviet agriculture operates under several inherent limitations.
With few exceptions, the areas of adequate rainfall in the USSR are areas of
poor soil and short growing seasons. Nearly all of the good soils lie in an
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area of uncertain or deficient rainfall. There are no areas in the USSR
comparable to the US cotton belt or corn belt where soil, rainfall, and
temperature are favorably combined over a large area to permit high pro-
duction response with conventional inputs. Less than 10 percent of arable
land in the USSR will yield more than modest increases in output without
the addition of extremely large amounts of fertilizer and machinery. Sig-
nificant increases on most of the arable land would require, in addition,
even larger investments in drainage or irrigation. Apart from these natural
limitations, the institutional structure of Soviet agriculture, while permitti:
effective political control over the peasant population, fails to achieve
operating efficiency and continues to produce peasant antipathy.
41. In view of these limitations we estimate that, even with average
weather conditions, agricultural production in 1960, instead of increasing
by nearly 100 percent as planned, will actually increase by only 30 percent.
(See Table 5)
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Table 5
Estimated Soviet Agricultural Production: An Index of
Ten Major Commodities*
1938-1960
1938
94
1948
80
1952
103
1953
97
1954
100
1955
109
1960
130
* Bread grain, coarse and sther grains, potation, vegetables, meat,
...
milk, cotton, wool, hemp, and flax.
Further extension of capital investment and labor might make possible addi-
tional growth in agricultural output, but such additions would result in a
reduction in the average rate of growth for the economy as a whole.
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SOVIET CONSUMPTION LEVELS
42. Per capita Soviet consumption in 1954 rose somewhat more than 5
percent over the 1953 level, a rate of increase slightly higher than had
been achieved in the first year of the revised consumer goods program. (see
Table 6) Durable consumer goods other than housing showed the most rapid
increase, about 20 percent on a per capita basis. Clothing and textile
consumption increased about 10 percent and food consumption by only 2 por-
cent. Per capita consumption of certain quality foods (whele milk) failed
to incroase and same mest even declined. Impr venent in consumption in
1954, as in the period since 1950, was not uniform for all income groups,
managers and skilled workers were the principal beneficiaries. Middle
and lower income groups derived only negligible benefit from increased sup-
plies of expensive fabrics and appliances. For most families in these in-
come brackets, failure of food production to do much more than keep pace
with population increases in a period of greater disposable income has
meant longer queues, extra visits to the free market, and no improvement
in real consumption.
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Table 6
USSR: Estimated Indexes of Per Capita Consumption
1948-1960
1954 = 100
1948 1952 1953 1954 1955 1960
Food Products
76
97
98
100
103
116
Clothing
50
82
91
100
112
153
Manufactured
Consumer Goods
36
73
83
100
117
160
Transport and
Communications
61
87
95
100
105
132
Housing
95
98
99
100
102
109
Urban
95
97
98
100
102
113
Rural
94
98
99
100
101
105
Other Services
89
95
97
100
102
117
Total Consumer Goods
and Services
69
90
95
100
106
129
43. Recent increases in real income through increased family income and
price reductions have not been matched by commensurate increases in the pro-
duction of consumer goods. Price reductions in 1954 yielded a negligible
increase in the workers' food basket and failed, where precoding price
cuts had succeeded, in reducing free market prices. The increased state
loan in 1955 and the failure thus far in 1955 to provide the usual annual
reduction in consumer goods prices is evidence of a desire to reduce infla-
tionary pressures.
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44. We estimate that, given the probable rate of increase in Soviet
agricultural production for 1955-1960, aggregate Soviet consumption will
probably increase by about 30 percent during this period. However, food and
housing, by far the major components for the average Soviet consumer, will
increase by less than 20 percent. There were indications in late 1954 and
early 1955 that some influential elements among Soviet planners were pressing
for a higher rate of growth in consumption than that called for in the 1953
plan. Present agricultural plans indicate that the present Soviet leader-
ship hopes to increase consumption at a more rapid rate than we have here
estimated. However, the high cost of agricultural expansion and the competing
demands of other sectors of the Soviet economy will probably combine to re-
strict a more rapid growth in Soviet consumption levels.
45. The disparity between rural and urban scales of living has grown
more pronounced since the beginning of the Five-Year Plans. Exact quanti-
fication of this difference is exceedingly difficult because the greater
part of rural consumption is consumption in kind, but the disparity probably
exercises a substantial restraint upon peasant incontive and interest in
agricultural output. Despite the fact that the peasants produce the major
portion of the Soviet food supply, they eat less well than city people, even
though their caloric intake is about equal. The city dwoller consumes about
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50 percent more milk, two to three times as much meat, and appreciably
more fish, vegetable oil, butter, eggs, and sugar. Housing quality is
considerably better in the city although the average space per capita is
greater in the country. An analysis of retail trade suggests that city
people consume three to four times as much manufactured consumer goods as
do rural consumers. The grossly inadequate rural transport and market
systems will continue to restrict the ability of the Soviet government to
eliminate private agricultural production in rural areas. They are also
major blocks to the effective exercise of the increased peasant purchasing
power which was intended to provide the incentive to support the new agri-
cultural program.
DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE
46. Soviet foreign trade in 1954 increased almost 20 percent over the
preceding year. The increase of $1.1 billion represents the largest abso-
lute volume increase since the period prior to the Korean War, and the
highest trade level with the free world since before 1948. (See Tables 7
and 8) Total Soviet foreign trade has increased at a rate more than twice
the increase is
that of GNP;/ attributable mainly to growing trade within the Sino-Soviet
Bloc. Trade with the free world has been increasing since the end of 1950
with the exception of 1953, but remains below prewar volume.
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Table 7
Estimated Foreign Trade Turnover in the USSR
1951
1952
1953
1954
Trading Area
Value Percent
Value Percent
Value Percent
Value Percent
Satellites (incl.
Communist China)
3.6
so
4.1
SO
4.9
86
5.6
82
Free World
0.9
20
1.0
20
0.8
14
1.2
18
Total Trade
4.5
100
5.1
100
5.7
100
6.8
100
Table 8
Volume Index of Soviet Trade Turnover
(1948=100)
Year
Vith the Bloc
Vith the Free World
Total Foreign Trade
1949
191
75
126
1950
347
64
189
1951
399
74
218
1952
464
92
256
1953
577
77
298
1954
690
114
359
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47. Soviet trade with the free world was still primarily with Western
Europe although there was a considerable increase in trade with less highly
developed areas of the world. The usual export surplus with Western Europe
declined slightly in 1954 and the USSR ran a large deficit with under-
developed areas. It is estimated that the USSR ran a substantial commodity
deficit with the free world; gold sales are estimated to have been $100-150
millions in 1954. Traditional Soviet exports to the West have been limited
by increases in internal Soviet consumption and by the substantial trade
program within the Sino-Soviet Bloc; this program has recently included
large shipments of grain from the USSR to the European Satellites, which,
taken as a whole, were formerly a net grain-exporting area. Although
there was some increase in Soviet imports of consumer goods from the free
world in 1954, there was little other change in the pattern of imports.
Grain exports to the free world declined slightly from the postwer low in
1953, while exports of petroleum and other mineral and forest products
increased. In late 1954 and early 1955 there crere was some indications that
the USSR might decrease its imports from the West.
48. According to Soviet data foreign trade turnover with other Bloc
nations increased (in value) about 14 percent in 1954, compared to a 50
percent increase with the West. Inasmuch as there was little change in the
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estimated volume or composition of Sino-Soviet trade, most of the increase
in Bloc trade probably took place between the USSR and the European
Satellites. The USSR apparently serves as an intermediary for much of
intra-Bloc trade, and in part for this reason it is difficult to ascer-
tain the real volume of increase in trade among the various members.
49. Soviet technical assistance programs within the Bloc continued
to constitute on integral part of Soviet political and economic control.
There was a further increase in the intensity of Soviet propaganda and
in
negotiations to extend the area of technical assistance to non-Bloc
countries, porticularly to underdeveloped countries of Asia. For the
first time, there were actual movements of technicans and equipment
(into Afgranistan) and contract for the construction of a steel mill
in India was signed early in 1955. More overtures like these will be.
probably be made as the oviet economy grows, especially if the USSR does
not substantially increase the scale of its military offort.
50. The 1955-1960 pattern of Soviet foreign trade will be subject
to so many conflicting factors that any forecast must be conditioned
by possible changes in the international climate and in the respective
capabilities of the trading partners. The USSR is still sufficiently
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behind Western technology to have a continuing need for Vestern capital
equipment. Although Soviet food supply is adequate for the immediate
future, failure to increase present agricultural production would
oventually load to additional requirements for food products from out-
side the Bloc. The USSR has the capability at present to expand export
of certain raw materials and is rapidly approaching a position in which
it could export a substantial volume of manufactured goods and capital
equipment. Thus the capability for an increase in trade with the West
exists.
51. Soviet programs and policies, however, will probably preclude
any rapid expansion of trade with the West, and will probably confine
any increase in this trade to a level approximating over-all Soviet
economic growth. The level of trade within the loc will continue to
increase, but at a somewhat lower rate than in the recent past. The
amount of trade within the Bloc would be greatly increased if the U SR
encouraged a greater degree of national specialization among the Bloc
states. We believe it more likely that the USSR will maintain a Bloc-
wide division of labor not much changed from the present structure and
will continue to restrict trade between its associates and the free
world.
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IV. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS
MAGNITUDE OF SCIENTIFIC ASSETS -- POLICY AND PRIORITIES
52. The USSR has consistently given strong support tothe development
of science and technology. As a consequence, Soviet scientific and technical
capabilities have increased at a rapid pace, especially since World War II.
We believe that these capabilities will increase throughout this period, and
will continue to provide ample support for essential economic and military
programs. However, there will continue to be limitations on Soviet
scientific resources which will make careful allocation mandatory and cir-
cumscribe the number of major programs that the USSR can undertake con-
currently, especially in view of the increasing scientific demands within
the Bloc as a whole. Soviet military and heavy industrial requirements
will probably continue to be the primary factors influencing scientific
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planning and allocations of technical resources, although increased at-
tention will probably be given to the application of science to agri-
culture.
53. At present the scientific assets of the USSR (the number and
quality of trained personnel, facilities, and equipment) are smaller
than those of the US, and the assets of the Sino-Soviet Bloc are far
smaller than those of the West. Soviet financial support for science,
while increasing, remains considerably below that of the US, possibly
about one-half. However, with respect to scientists of the very top
rank, whose numbers are few in any country, the USSR probably has in
many fields men who are as able as their counterparts in Western countries.
During the period of this estimate the USSR will provide the great bulk of
Bloc scientific assets, and its proportionate share will continue to grow.
However, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and to a lesser extent Poland and
Hungary, will continue to contribute a substantial increment. On the
other hand, Communist China, because of an extreme shortage of scientific
and technical manpower and facilities, is unlikely to contribute to
Soviet Bloc technical resources during the period of this estimate.
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54. The USSR has alarge number of organizations, laboratories,
institutes, etc., engaged in research in all fields of science. In
general, organizational control and laboratory facilities are sufficient
for effective utilization of scientific talent. Important Soviet laboratories
conducting high priority research projects are adequately equipped. However,
complex research instruments and equipment are somewhat less readily
available in the USSR than in the United States or the UK. Consequently,
some specialized lower priority research projects are probably delayed
longer than similar projects would be in Western nations. Although the
USSR continues to import some scientific instruments from Western nations,
it is now manufacturing or can obtain within the Bloc practically all
types of scientific instruments for laboratory research, also in-
limited and and types
dustrial instruments for plant operations and control. Research and
development in electronics will dominate the science of instrumentation
within the USSR during the period of this estimate, with emphasis on
better recording and controlling instruments.
55. There is no evidence that Soviet ideology has seriously
hampered the development of the physical sciences, especially in appli-
cations directly affecting industrial and military capabilities. In
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certain fields of the biological sciences, however, officially sponsored
ideological doctrines have probably exerted a retarding influence on re-
search, although the present weakness in these fields is probably due
more to the heavy official emphasis laid on other fields of research
than to ideological restraints. There are indications that even in the
biological field ideological restraints are likely to be of less conse-
quence in the future than they have been in the past.
SCIENTIFIC EDUCATION AND MANPOWER
56. Prior to World War II the general quality of Soviet higher
education and research in most scientific and technical fields was
markedly below that of the US. In the postwar period, however, it has
been generally good, and has approached US standards. Only in some areas
of biology, particularly in the agricultural sciences, does it appear
that the present quality of Soviet education and research may be decidedly
below that of the US. However by 1960, in view of the probable greater
emphasis upon agricultural development, this deficiency is likely to be
considerably reduced.
57. About 1,560,000 Soviet citizens have scientific or technical
degrees from colleges and universities, of whom about 785,000 are postwar
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graduates. The number of university or technical institute graduates
employed in the scientific-technical field in the USSR (1,240,000)
I/
compares closely with that in the US. It is estimated that 175,000
scientists are engaged in advanced research or teaching at higher
level institutions in the USSR, compared with about 265,000 so engaged
in the US. Because of the greater stress on the biological and health
sciences, however, the USSR has only an estimated 85,000 in the physical
sciences, as compared with about 210,000 in the US. Soviet scientists
in research and development in all fields of science (excluding those
primarily engaged in teaching) number about 100,000, about one-half of
the number similarly occupied in the US. During the period of this estimate
the Soviet scientific manpower pool will probably increase considerably
more rapidly than that of the US.
58. The USSR is not as well supplied with technicians, mechanics,
and maintenance men as are the Western countries, where broader sections
of the population have acquired mechanical skills over a considerably
longer period. Standards of maintenance for all kinds of mechanized
2./
Numerical estimates of Soviet scientific personnel are believed to
be correct to within plus or minus 10 percent. For a detaile d com-
parison of USSR and US scientific personnel, see (rephics on
following page.
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equipment are in general lower than in Western countries and rates of
deterioration higher. In addition, the number of skilled mechanics and
technicians which would be available to the armed forces in war is far
smaller than in the West. However, Soviet engineers have sought to com-
pensate for these deficiencies by building machines and equipment which
are simple in design and easy to máintain and repair.
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE
59. The capability of Soviet scientists and tochnicians in those
basic scientific fields (e.g., physical sciences, mathematics) which are
related to the development and production of weapons and military equip-
ment is sufficient to insure the development of modern arms for Soviet
forces. In response to new requirements and conditions created by the applic
tion of advance technology to war and war preparations, the US.R appears
to be placing great emphasis upon development of new scientific fields and
techniques to maximize the return from Soviet resources, both human and non-
human (e.g., human engineering, mental conditioning, casualty therapy, comput
research, automation).
60. The USSR probably has the scientific and technological capa-
bility necessary to develop most weapons and military equipment equivalent
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to, and in a few cases possibly better than, those of other nations.
However, in a number of weapons categories, especially those involving new
and complex equipment, the USSR lags behind the West. Moreover, the
USSR probably does not have sufficient scientific resources to program
vigorous weapons and equipment research simultaneously in all fields, and
this deficiency, while possibly decreasing, will probably continue through
1960. Nevertheless, Soviet espionage potential, coupled with the free
nations' inherent inability to guard their secrets, probably compensates in
some degree for deficiencies in the Soviet scientific effort.
Nuclear Weapons 8/ See fallowing pages
(Paragraphs to be inserted)
81 For a fuller treatment of this subject see NIE - (JAEIC estimate).
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Nuclear Weapons
60a. The Soviet atomic energy program, directed primarily
toward the production of nuclear weapons, will continue to receive
special emphasis through 1958. The USSR had tested by the end of
1953, small and medium yield weapons and has employed thermonuclear
boosting principles to produce an energy yield up to 1,000 kilotons
of TNT. The 1954 test series showed stockpile types in the medium
yield range and extensive development in the small yield ranges,
but there was no further development in the large yield range. During
the immediate future, the types of weapons stockpiled will probably
have the general characteristics and explosive powers of weapons already
tested although the quantity of the large yield type that could be
produced would probably be limited. Within the limits of techno-
logical capabilities as of the end of 1954, Soviet military require-
ments will govern the allocation of available fissionable material
to various types of weapons, with consideration probably being given
1/ See NIE 11-2-55, "The Soviet Atomic Energy Program, Restricted
Data, dated 25 April 1955 for details of Soviet nuclear energy
program.
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more to operational requirements than to the largest total energy
yield attainable.
60b. In order to provide an example of Soviet stockpile
capabilities, we have assumed that: (1) one-third of estimated
uranium-235 is utilized in large yield weapons (500 to 1,000 KT);
(2) two-thirds is utilized in medium-yield (70 KT) connosite
weapons; and (3) the remaining plutonium is divided equally between
medium-yield (40 KT) and small-yield (5 KT) weapons. For purposes
of comparison this allocation of fissionable material is carried
through mid-1958. If the Soviet stockpile were allocated in this
manner it would be as follows:
Mid-
Mid-
1955
1958
Large-yield weapons (500-1,000 KT)
15
50
Medium-yield weapons (40-70 KT)
320
950
Small-yield weapons (5 KT)
155
250
60c. However, due to continued Soviet nuclear progress,
other allocations of fissionable material might become more
1/
In view of the range of error applicable to the estimate of
Soviet fissionable material production, the actual figures
for the end of 1955 may be as much as one-third lower or higher
than the figures given above. Uncertainty increases as esti-
mates are projected into the future and the actual figure
for mid-1958 may be as low as one-half or as high as twice
the figures given in the table.
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likely toward mid-1958. The USSR will probably continue work on
larger yield weapons as well as on smaller-yield and small-dimension
weapons. We estimate that by mid-1956 the USSR could have weapons
with ranges of yields from 0.5 KT to 10,000 KT or more. Such de-
volopments would permit more flexibility in the use of nuclear
weapons. Assuming such progress on the part of the Soviets, one
of the ways in which their 1958 weapons stockpile could be divided
would be as follows:
Large-yield weapons (500 to 10,000 KT)
230
Medium-yield weapons (5 to 500 KT)
440
Small-yield weapons (0.5 to 5 KT)
570
60d. Longer-range extrapolations can be carried out on the
basis of assumptions of the growth pattern the Soviet nuclear program
could follow during the period in question. Alternate assumptions,
which indicate a range of growth capabilities, are:
(1) No expansion of Soviet fissionable materials production
facilities after 1958 (Assumption A); or,
(2) Continued expansion of Soviet fissionable materials
production facilities after 1958 at the same rate as estimates for
the period 1949 to mid-1958 (Assumption B); or,
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(3) Expansion of the Soviet program after 1958 at
a rate which will increase its requirements for uranium to approx-
imately 7,000 to 10,000 tons per year by 1964 (Assumption c).
60e. In view of the broad spectrum of weapon types which
will probably be available to the USSR, it becomes increasingly
difficult to make specific estimates of the detailed make-up of
the Soviet stockpile as it is projected into the future. The
following example of a possible Soviet weapon stockpile will
indicate the general magnitude of the Soviet capability under each
of the three assumptions given above.
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TOP SECRET
TABLE
EXAMPLES OF POSSIBLE SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILES - 1959-1960
Mid
Mid
Assumption A
1959
1960
Large Yield Weapons
280
340
(500-10,000 KT or more)
Intermediate Yield Weapons
550
660
(5 - 500 KT)
Small Yield Weapons
710
850
(0.5 - 5 KT)
Assumption B
Large Yield Weapons
290
360
(500-10,000 KT or more)
Internediate Yield Weapons
560
700
(5 - 500 KT)
Small Yield Weapons
720
900
(0.5 - 5 KT)
Assumption C
Large Yield Weapons
320
450
(500-10,000 KT or more)
Intermediate Yield Weapons
630
880
(5 - 500 KT)
Small Yield Weapons
810
1130
(0.5 - 5 KT)
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60f. There is no direct information on the nature of the
Soviet control organization and facilities for storage, handling,
and distribution of nuclear weapons. However, we believe that
Soviet nuclear weapons will be handled by a special organization
within the Ministry of Defense and will be stored at both a few
large reserve-stockpile storage sites and a large number of smaller
sites. These small sites will probably be located at or near air-
fields, guided missile sites, and other delivery vehicle installa-
tions in advanced areas.
60g. Radiological Warfare. It is most unlikely, for
technological reasons, that the USSR will be able to stockpile
militarily significant quantities of radiological warfare weapons
during the period of this estimate. However, the significance of
radio-active fall-out following large nuclear explosions should
be considered in connection with Soviet capabilities to produce
explosions in the megaton range.
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TOP SECRET
Guided Missiles
9/
61.
We believe that the strategic requirements of the USSR
would dictate a major effort in the field of guided missiles, and
the evidence which we have concerning the large number of personalities
and activities believed to be involved in the current Soviet missile
program leads us to the conclusion that it is a large one. On the
basis of our extensive knowledge of Soviet exploitation of the
wartime German missile experience and our estimate of Soviet capa-
bilities in related fields, we believe that the USSR has the basic
scientific and technical capabilities to support a comprehensive
missile research and development program. The USSR also has an
adequate economic base for a sizeable production program. It is
probable that the USSR now has some guided missiles noperational
status, and that a growing Soviet guided missile capability threat will develop
within the next several years. However, we have no firm current
intelligence on what particular types of missiles the USSR is presently
developing, or may now have in operational use.
91
For a discussion of Soviet guided missiles, including estimates of
the dates at which various types of missiles might appear in Soviet
operational use, see NIE 11-6-54: "Soviet Capabilities and Probable
Programs in the Guided Missile Field," published 5 October 1954.
No evidence has appeared, since the publication of that estimate,
which justifies a change in its conclusions.
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Electronics and Communications
62.
The USSR has made substantial progress toward catching up with
the West in electronics by expanding its manufacturing facilities and
adapting Western equipment. The magnitude, diversity, and past successes
of the Soviet research and development program in electronics indicate the
probable development of new and improved devices. Air defense capabilities
will probably be improved as a consequence of significant advances in de-
tection, warning, interception, md data-handling equipment, which are
expected during the period of this estimate. Those aspects of communication
theory which have a direct bearing on communication techniques, radar,
computers, automatic guidance devices, and telemetering are under continuing
study by Soviet scientists. Such research will result in practical applica-
tions and may within the period of this estimate lead to a communication
network exceedingly difficult to intercept or jam. During the period of
this estimate the USSR will improve its electronics capabilities in the
following categories.
63.
Early Warning Radar (EW) - The US R has a large variety of EW
radars in use. These include World War II sets, native sets based on
Western designs, and sets of purely native design. Most of these will con-
tinue in use through 1956 and will afford fairly reliable coverage against
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TOP SECRET
maximum ranges from
medium bombers at/125 miles (up to 60,000 feet altitude) to 180 miles (up
to 45,000 feet altitude). Against fighters these naximum ranges are
fr n 85 miles (up t 45,000 feet altitude) to 135 miles (up to t 30,000 feet alt
this). Continued use of low-frequency radars (in the 72 nc/s region) through 19
is indicated. By 1958 the USSR will probably have developed one or more
EW radars capable of detecting an object the size of a medium bomber at 60,000
feet up to a distance of about 200 nautical miles. The problem of low altitude
coverage will still exist but probably will be greatly lessened by the use
of moving target indicators and gap-filler radars. By 1960 the performance
of the early warning radar estimated to be introduced in 1958 will probably
be increased somewhat.
64.
Ground Control Intercept Radar (GCI) - We estimate that by
1958 the USSR will have GCI radars of several types, including the V-beam
sets presently in use, which should be capable of coverage on medium
bombers at maximum reliable ranges of 150-200 nautical miles and on
fighters at maximum roliable ranges of 55-85 nautical miles, depending
on altitude, location, and other factors. More recent than the excellent
V-beam sets are the paired combinations of long-range azimuth indicating
sets (GAGE) and height indicating sets (PATTY CAKE), which collectively
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TOP SECRET
can provide GCI data. We believe that by 1960 GCI coverage will be increased
to the order of 200 nautical miles; this will necessitate the use of trans-
ponder beacons in interceptor aircraft. Maximum reliable altitude coverage
up to 60,000 feet, though at less than maximum ranges, will be achieved by
1959.
65. Airborne Intercept Radar - There is confirmed evidence that
the USSR now has airborne intercept radar, in at least limited operational
use in widely separated geographic areas. The equipment is probably
comparable to existing Western types. It can probably installed be placed on current
types of Soviet fighter aircraft. Within the period of this estimate
the Soviet air defense system will probably have improved AI radar in
general operational use.
66. Fire Control Rader - The WHIFF radar, the Soviet version of
the SCR-584, will almost certainly continue to be used in quantity. Mean-
while, development work on radar sets with greater accuracies, range
definitions, and reduced vulnerability to jamming will proceed during the
newsets
period of this estimate and might appear at any time. The X-band probably
will be used for newly developed fire control radars.
= 58 -
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TOP SECRET
67.
Blind Bombing and Navigational Radar - The USSR currently has
in operational use an X-band (three centimeter) set developed in the post-
war period and capable of further improvement. By the end of 1957, the
best Soviet blind bombing and navigational radar should be capable of
operating at altitudes up to 50,000 feet and should have a range of about
125 nautical miles for navigation.
Bombing and naviga-
tion equipment will permit accuracies equivalent to those of present
US equipment. The use of frequencies higher than X-band is unlikely by
mid-1956, but operational use of the higher frequency equipment may be
achieved by mid-1960.
68.
Electromagnetic Warfare - The USSR presently has the capability
of seriously disrupting Western long-range communications and navigational
systems. Soviet achievements in related electronic fields indicate that
the USSR is also able, by an intensive effort, to develop electronic jamming
equipment which could be effective up through 12,000 megacycles and possibly
through 46,000 megacycles. It is estimated that by 1960 the USSR can have
jamming equipment in operational use in frequency ranges up through 30,000
megacycles.
69.
Microwave Radio - Microwave communication equipment is in
wide use in East Germany, and fixed networks exist in the Soviet Union.
- 59 -
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TOP SECRET
Based on the reported procurement of microwave relay equipment from both
East Germany and Hungary, the present inventory of the Soviet Bloc is
estimated at approximately 3,000 sets. By 1960, mobile nicrowave sets
of eight channels will probably be standard military issue to divisions and
higher echelons. VHF equipment for ground-air, ship-ship, and ship-shore
communication, already in use, will find more widespread use with increased
numbers of channels and improved reliability. Techniques such as "flash"
transmissions will be used to transmit important messages with a minimum
susceptibility to countermeasures and maximum of message security.
Biological Warfare
70.
Firm evidence on Soviet activity in the biological warfare
field is exceedingly scanty, and is likely to remain so because of the
relative ease with which such a program can be concealed. The USSR has,
however, the technical knowledge, trained personnel, and facilities neces-
sary for a program of research and development in biological warfare,
and such a program is probably in progress. The USSR is capable
of producing BW agents 1 disseminating devices suitable for small-scale
clandestine attacks against certain crops, against livestock, and against
personnel in buildings or concentrated in relatively small areas. Soviet
capabilities for large-scale attacks are more difficult to estimate.
Antilivestock BW against the US need not be large-scale to be effective.
- 60 -
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TOP SECRET
Anticrop BW against the US would probably not substantially affect US
crop production unless carried out on a very large scale and under favor-
able seasonal and environmental conditions. The USSR is probably capable
of large-scale production of antipersonnel BW weapons.
71.
Soviet capabilities for defense aggainst BW are inferior to those
of the US because of Soviet deficiencies in public health, sanitation, live-
stock management, and plant protection. Gradual progress will probably be
made to correct these deficiencies during the period of the estimate. Be-
cause widespread shipment of livestock is not practiced in the USSR, Soviet
vulnerability to small-scale antilivestock attacks is probably less than
that of the United States.
Chemical Weapons
72.
During World War II, the Soviet Union is known to have produced
most of the standard chemical warfare agents as well as the necessary
auxiliary equipment. The USSR has the facilities and scientific knowledge
necessary to produce at least one of the nerve gases and could employ
these agents during the period of this estimate. Published Soviet research
- 61 -
TO S CRET
TOP SECRET
in fields closely allied to chemical wa fare -- organophosphorus chemistry,
acrosol formation, cholinesterase, alkaloids, and adsorption -- indicates a
scientific capability for the development of new or improved chemical agents,
dissemination equipment, and protective devices, We assume that the stock-
pile of standard agents and munitions accumulated during World War II has
been maintained and that the facilities for CW agents production are being
maintained on a standby basis or operated to produce other chemicals or
materiel. The USSR is able to engage in chemical warfare on a large scale.
- 62 -
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"ocrText": "TOP SECRET\nDEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET INDUSTRY\n25. Soviet total industrial production approximately doubled\nabout\nduring the period 1948-1954, and increased/nine percent during 1954.\nThe current and apparent long-run objectives and limitations of\nSoviet industrial production indicate that the average annual real\nrate of increase during 1955-1960 will be over seven percent, and\nproduction in 1960 will be about 55 percent greater than in 1954.\nThe substantial and continuing decline in the estimated rate of\ngrowth of industrial output is essentially attributable to:\n(a) a reduction in the rate of growth of the industrial labor\nforce; and (b) 0 reduction in the average yield of annual additions to\nindustrial investment. The greatest production increases during the\n1955-1960 period are expected to occur in chemicals, electric power,\nelectrical equipment, and nanufactured consumer goods The smallest\nproduction increases are expected in the more established industries\nwith relatively large current production, namely, nanufactured food\nproducts, forest products, and defense industries.\n- 24 -\nDECLASSIFIED\nAuthority MR 95-300\nTOP SECRET\nBy Lis\nNLE Date 1/11/96\nTOP SECRET\nTable 1\nEstimated Coviet Industrial Production, Celected Years 1948-1960\nIndexes: 1954=100\n1948\n1953\n1954\n1955\n1960\nEnergy\n52\n91\n100\n111\n172\nMetals\n45\n90\n100\n108\n146\nMetalworking & Machinery\n41\n88\n100\n114\n169\nChemicals\n45\n88\n100\n111\n172\nConstruction Materials\n39\n88\n100\n111\n172\nForest Products\n66\n91\n100\n103\n124\nFood Products\n63\n96\n100\n104\n134\nNanufactured Consumer Goods\n45\n90\n100\n115\n169\n2\nDefense Industry\n36\n102\n100\n113\n122-132\nTotal Industry\n49\n92\n100\n110\n155\nThe 1955-1960 estimates are projected from recent rates of growth,\ncurrent investment programs, and such Soviet plans as have been an-\nnounced for this period.\n2/\nThe lower figure--122--is calculated on the assumption that during\nthe period of this estimate there will be some reduction of present\nlevels of production of some military end-items (see paragraph 75)\nThe larger figure--132--assunes that present production remains ap-\nproximately constant, and that new weapons and equipment programs are\nadded. It should be noted that the estimated cost of the Soviet atomic\nenergy program is not included in the figures for defense industry.\n- 25 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n26. Soviet heavy industrial production has been increasing\nat an average annual rate of over 10 percent during the current\nFifth Five-Year Plan. Official announcements indicate that pro-\nduction plans for most nonferrous metals, petroleum, and certain\ncapital equipment are not being met, but that the over-all plan\nfor heavy industry is generally being met. Production of capital\nequipment for light and processing industries has almost certainly\nexceeded the original Fifth Five-Year Plan. Heavy industry will\nalmost certainly continue to dominate industrial production plans\nfor the 1955-1960 period, although more attention will probably\nbe devoted to housing and nonindustrial construction than in the\nlast six years.\n27. Soviet artaments production almost doubled in value\n(though not in volume) between 1950 and 1954. US expenditures\nfor military end-items, although less than Soviet expenditures\nduring the period 1946-1950, increased rapidly after 1951, reached\na high in 1953, and have since slightly decreased. In terms of\nwhat Soviet armaments would have cost at US quantity-production\nprices, we estimate that the aggregate dollar value of Soviet military\n- 26 -\nTOP SECRET-\nTOP SECRET\nproduction in 1951 was roughly 50 percent more than the dollar value\nof US armament deliveries, whereas in 1954 the aggregate dollar value\nof Soviet military production would have amounted to a little less\nthan half that of US armament deliveries. The value of Soviet military\nend-iten production will probably increase by a noderate amount annually\nthrough the period of this estimate, assuming no significant change in\nthe level of international tensions. There will be some shift in the\nrelative outlay for various types of weapons, in particular on increase\nin expenditures for aircraft and naval vessels, and perhaps for nuclear wea-\npons and guided missiles. We believe that it is within Soviet capacity to\nincrease present and estimated future outlays by three to three and\na half times in the event of war or international developments which\nthe Soviet leaders might believe required such increases.\n28. The output of consumer goods and services in 1954\nexceeded that of 1953 by about seven percent, increasing at about the\nsame rate as GNP, but at a slower rate than gross industrial pro-\nduction and at about two-thirds the rate of heavy industry. Durable\nconsumer goods, housing and appliances led the advance, followed\nin order by clothing, transport, and other services. Production of\n- 27 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nfood was limited by continuing agricultural difficulties, and\nincreased only about four percent. Production of consumer goods\nis expected to continue to increase during the 1955-1960 period,\nalthough at a lower average rate than in 1954.\n29. The announced Soviet intention to re-emphasize heavy\nindustry will have the effect of arresting the 1953-1954 rates of\nincrease in light industry, but will still permit some improvement\nin the position of the Soviet consumer. Increased emphasis\non agriculture will probably provide an expanding output. Agricultural\nproducts are the material base for more than 80 percent of the Soviet\nconsumption pattern. Maintenance of capital investment in both\nlight industry and housing at levels well above those of the 1953\nplan lends further support to the estimate that the Soviet consumer will\nnot be deprived of the gains obtained in 1953-1954. The 1955 increases\nin military production, however, may have the effect of slowing down\nincreases in the production of durable consumer goods.\n30. Industrial Technology. The quality of Soviet industrial\ntechnology as a whole is difficult to assess. Where a particular\nprogram has been indispensable to the maintenance of the Soviet\npower position in the world -- for example, in connection with atomic\ndevelopment, in weapons, and in basic industry and construction -- the\nUSSR has mobilized its technical resources with great effectiveness.\nBecause of the large number of personnel, and the material and financial\n- 28 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\noutlays required for such technical developments, najor efforts\nsuch as these have taken a great share of the limited resources\nthe USSR can devote to improving its technology. Soviet technology\nin lower priority enterprises ranges from the copying of Western\ndesign and technique in certain machine industries to\nadmittedly archaic methods of production in a vast majority of light in-\ndustry establishments. In many of the latter, efforts are made to reduce\nproduction costs, but these are largely local efforts made by plant workers\nand managers who have relatively little training and experience.\n31. Regional Concentrations. The regional distribution of industrial\nproduction shows the impoct of Soviet efforts to achieve greater balance\nbetween the several economic regions of the USSR, and to make these regions\nas far as possible self-sufficient. However, production continues to be\nrelatively concentrated in the long established industrial regions of north.\nwest, center, and south. (See Figure 3) The rapid prewar development of\nthe Ural industrial complex based upon West Siberian coal has continued\nin the postwar period, and the Urals now produce some 14 percent of Soviet\nindustrial output, compared to 16 and 27 percent respectively in the\nUkraine and the Central Industrial region (including Mescow). Although\nindustrial production east of the Urals has grown rapidly since World War\nII, the base from which it grew was small and much of the production is\nhighly specialized and dependent upon equipment and markets in other\nregions to the west.\n- 29 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n32. Stockpiling. There was some evidence that during 1953-1954\nSoviet reserve stocks were drawn upon more freely than previously. The\nscale of stockpiling operations during these years indicates that the\nSoviet stockpile will fail to meet the 100 percent expansion planned\nfor 1951-1955. However, Bulganin's February 1955 speech gives evidence\nthat the USSR intends to apply renewed emphasis to the stockpile program\nand to restrict the conditions under which stockpiles may be used to sup-\nport current production programs. An increase in the scale of the stock-\npiling program may deprive Soviet industry and Soviet consumers of a\nportion of the increased flow of goods which would be expected from in-\ncreased production.\n33. Transportation. The transport facilities of the USSR con-\ntinued to increase ton-miles of freight at a rate well in advance of\nThe\nthat required by the Fifth Five-Year Plan. / increase in rail freight\nturnover at the end of 1954 was 42 percent over 1950, compared to an\nincrease of only 35-40 percent planned for the period through 1955.\nThese figures suggest that Soviet planners may have underestimated the\ntransport requirements of their rapidly expanding economy. A rate of\ninvestment higher than previously planned will apparently be necessary\n- 30 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nto permit Soviet transport to maintain growth necessary to support\nthe future expansion of the economy. Highway and waterway freight car-\nriage have also increased rapidly in recent years but not at a rate\nwhich will reduce the primary dependence of the economy upon rail trans-\nport particularly in the areas served by the Trans Railway. Siberian\n34. Labor Force. A large proportion of the recent growth in\nSoviet industrial output has been achieved by increasing the size of\nthe industrial labor force rather than by increasing its efficiency.\nagricultural\nThe 1951-1955 plan for increases in the non-/\nlabor\nforce was fulfilled by 1953. Planned increases in agricultural pro-\nduction -- particularly in livestock and corn, both of which are labor\nintensive items -- and a significant reduction of the annual rate of\nentry into the labor force during 1955-1960 will deny industrial pro-\nduction a labor force growth during this period comparable to that ob-\ntained in the preceding period. (See Table 2) In addition to the labor\nrequirements for agriculture, rates of increase in the industrial labor\nforce will decline primarily because of the effects of the low birth\nrate during World War II.\n- 31 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nTable 2\nEstimated Labor Force of the USSR, 1938, 1947-1956, Projected to 1960\nYearly Averages in Millions of Workers\nTotal Excluding\nTotal*\nMilitary and\nLabor\nAgriculture\nNon-Agriculture\nForced Labor\nForce\n1938\n53.3\n25.7\n79.0\n90.3\n1947\n54.4\n30.0\n84.4\n97.0\n1948\n53.8\n31.0\n84.8\n98.0\n85.1\n/\n1949\n53.1\n32.0\n86.0\n98.0\n1950\n52.6\n34.6\n87.2\n99.0\n1951\n51.8\n36.2\n88.0\n100.0\n1952\n51.0\n37.8\n88.8\n101.5\n1953\n51.8\n38.1\n89.9\n101.5\n1954\n52.7\n40.3\n93.0\n104.2\n1955\n54.1\n41.6\n95.7\n106.5\n1960\n56.3\n46.6\n102.9\n112.3\n*\nTotal labor force estimates are subject to a considerable margin\nof error because of lack of data on the amount of forced labor.\n- 32 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n35. A similar decline in the rate of entry to the military\nmanpower pool may be expected. The decline in the annual entries into\nthe industrial labor force in this period will require continued empha-\nsis on measures to increase the productivity of labor. The trend since\n1948 of declining annual rates of increase in labor productivity was\narrested in 1954. Maintenance of high levels of capital investment and\nreasonably improved per capita consumption levels --- factors which are\nconsidered critical to Soviet labor productivity -- therefore become\nessential to the achievement of the estimated rates of over-all industrial\nand economic growth.\nDEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET AGRICULTURE\n36. Soviet agriculture completed its first full crop year under\nthe new agricultural program in 1954. It became clear: (a) that the\nSoviet leaders were seriously intent upon increasing agricultural pro-\nduction; (b) that the incentives contemplated in the 1953 program had\nso far done little to improve rural productive effort; and (c) that there\nhad been an increase in the size of the agricultural labor force and\nsome improvement in the quality of technical personnel. Owing in part\nto adverse weather conditions, 1954 agricultural output pritably increased only about\nbut\nthree percent, and did not reach 1952 production levels. (Sce Table 3)\n- 33 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nTable 3\nEstemateg Production of Major Crops in the USSR\n1938 and 1950-1955\n1938\n1950\n1951\n1952\n1953\n1954\n1955\nFood Crops Million\nNetric Tons\nGrain\n$8.6\n85.0\n80.0\n92.0\n83.0\n87.0\n---\n*\nPotatoes\n73.8\n72.3\n59.5\n69.7\n66.4\n67.2\n---\nFiber Crops Thousand\nMetric Tons\nCotton (Ginned)\n730\n1,140\n1,220\n1,260\n1,300\n1,410\n----\nFlax (Scutched Basis)\n600\n540\n480\n400\n350\n400\n---\nWool (Grease Basis)\n130\n190\n205\n225\n230\n235\n-\nAnimal Crops Million head\n1 Jan.\nCattle\n59.2\n------\n57.2\n58.8\n56.0\n57.7\n57.6\nSwine\n31.6\n-----\n24.1\n26.7\n28.5\n29.6\n31.8\nSheep & goats\n73.1\n----\n99.0\n107.5\n109.9\n112.0\n114.7\n1933-1937 average.\n- 34 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nThe 1954 increase was achieved largely as a result of favorable growing\nconditions in the \"new lands,\" since a severe drought struck the principal\nproducing regions in the Ukraine and Volga. On the other hand, agricultural\nin 1954\ninvestment/increased almost 40 percent, in part by using the increased\nincome of collective farms and also by large increases in state budget\nallocations. Crop acreage increased by six percent as a result of over-\nfulfillment of the \"new lands\" program. A return to average weather con-\nthroughout the USSR\nditions/ during 1955 would result in a sharp increase in agricultural output.\n37. Both 1954 and early 1955 saw additional changes in the 1953\nagricultural program, all of which aimed at further expansion of output.\nThe new lands program, which is to add to the cultivated acreage of the\nUSSR an amount of land equal to the total cultivated acreage of Canada,\nmoved forward ahead of schedule and with favorable crop yields in 1954.\nThe early 1955 announcements outline what is apparently the essence of the\nSixth Five-Year Plan for agriculture, and despite the failure of the cur-\nrent plan, they establish a series of agricultural goals for 1956-1960 which\nare even more ambitious than those set forth in the Fifth Five-Year Plan.\n(See T ble 4)\nan 35 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nTable 4\nOfficially Planned Output Goals for Soviet agriculture\n1960\nIndex: 1954=100\nMeat\n200\nMilk\n200\nEggs\n200\nWool\n180\nGrain\n188*\n*\nThis is estimated from the officially announced goal of \"not less\nthan\" 164 million tons by 1960, and the estimated output of 87\nmillion tons in 1954.\nMeat and dairy products, both very costly to produce, constitute the\nmajor objectives of the 1960 plan. To achieve the vast growth in animal\nproduction, the USSR has enbarked on a large-scale program to get an\neight-fold increase in corn acreage. The Kremlin has also increased\nlocal control over agricultural production and has undertaken a large\nprogram to increase the stability and technical competence of the agri-\ncultural lubor force. In April 1955 there was recruitment of\nsome 30,000 managers, largely from Party ranks, who would replace\nroughly one-third of the existing collective farm managers.\n-- 36 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n38. While the measures announced in the fall of 1953 reflected\n& more realistic appraisal of material, natural, and human resources\nrequirements, this cannot be said of the decrees on virgin land and\ncorn production issued in 1954 and early 1955. A large part of the\nprogram approaches the climatic limits of economic production for the\nland and crops involved. Moreover, the strains and stresses engendered\nby these campaigns will probably slow up the otherwise possible rate of\ngrowth in the \"old\" regions. Thus the net results will almost certainly\nfar\nfall/short of plans, though there will probably be some increases\nin production and in state control over agricultural output.\n39. The principal problems posed by the agricultural program are:\n(a) the \"new lands\" scheme will draw many skilled people from established\nand more productive areas; (b) the combined \"new lands\" and corn and live-\nstock programs will require very large additional outlays for machinery,\nconstruction, and fertilizer, as well CS labor; and (c) climatic con-\n-\nditions in the new lands areas are such as to produce frequent crop failures.\nMoreover, the apparent pieceneal manner in which the program has been insti-\ntuted raises considerable doubt as to whether the above problems have been\nadequately assessed.\n40. All Soviet agriculture operates under several inherent limitations.\nWith few exceptions, the areas of adequate rainfall in the USSR are areas of\npoor soil and short growing seasons. Nearly all of the good soils lie in an\n- 37 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\narea of uncertain or deficient rainfall. There are no areas in the USSR\ncomparable to the US cotton belt or corn belt where soil, rainfall, and\ntemperature are favorably combined over a large area to permit high pro-\nduction response with conventional inputs. Less than 10 percent of arable\nland in the USSR will yield more than modest increases in output without\nthe addition of extremely large amounts of fertilizer and machinery. Sig-\nnificant increases on most of the arable land would require, in addition,\neven larger investments in drainage or irrigation. Apart from these natural\nlimitations, the institutional structure of Soviet agriculture, while permitti:\neffective political control over the peasant population, fails to achieve\noperating efficiency and continues to produce peasant antipathy.\n41. In view of these limitations we estimate that, even with average\nweather conditions, agricultural production in 1960, instead of increasing\nby nearly 100 percent as planned, will actually increase by only 30 percent.\n(See Table 5)\n- 38 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nTable 5\nEstimated Soviet Agricultural Production: An Index of\nTen Major Commodities*\n1938-1960\n1938\n94\n1948\n80\n1952\n103\n1953\n97\n1954\n100\n1955\n109\n1960\n130\n* Bread grain, coarse and sther grains, potation, vegetables, meat,\n...\nmilk, cotton, wool, hemp, and flax.\nFurther extension of capital investment and labor might make possible addi-\ntional growth in agricultural output, but such additions would result in a\nreduction in the average rate of growth for the economy as a whole.\n- 39 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSOVIET CONSUMPTION LEVELS\n42. Per capita Soviet consumption in 1954 rose somewhat more than 5\npercent over the 1953 level, a rate of increase slightly higher than had\nbeen achieved in the first year of the revised consumer goods program. (see\nTable 6) Durable consumer goods other than housing showed the most rapid\nincrease, about 20 percent on a per capita basis. Clothing and textile\nconsumption increased about 10 percent and food consumption by only 2 por-\ncent. Per capita consumption of certain quality foods (whele milk) failed\nto incroase and same mest even declined. Impr venent in consumption in\n1954, as in the period since 1950, was not uniform for all income groups,\nmanagers and skilled workers were the principal beneficiaries. Middle\nand lower income groups derived only negligible benefit from increased sup-\nplies of expensive fabrics and appliances. For most families in these in-\ncome brackets, failure of food production to do much more than keep pace\nwith population increases in a period of greater disposable income has\nmeant longer queues, extra visits to the free market, and no improvement\nin real consumption.\n- 40 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nTable 6\nUSSR: Estimated Indexes of Per Capita Consumption\n1948-1960\n1954 = 100\n1948 1952 1953 1954 1955 1960\nFood Products\n76\n97\n98\n100\n103\n116\nClothing\n50\n82\n91\n100\n112\n153\nManufactured\nConsumer Goods\n36\n73\n83\n100\n117\n160\nTransport and\nCommunications\n61\n87\n95\n100\n105\n132\nHousing\n95\n98\n99\n100\n102\n109\nUrban\n95\n97\n98\n100\n102\n113\nRural\n94\n98\n99\n100\n101\n105\nOther Services\n89\n95\n97\n100\n102\n117\nTotal Consumer Goods\nand Services\n69\n90\n95\n100\n106\n129\n43. Recent increases in real income through increased family income and\nprice reductions have not been matched by commensurate increases in the pro-\nduction of consumer goods. Price reductions in 1954 yielded a negligible\nincrease in the workers' food basket and failed, where precoding price\ncuts had succeeded, in reducing free market prices. The increased state\nloan in 1955 and the failure thus far in 1955 to provide the usual annual\nreduction in consumer goods prices is evidence of a desire to reduce infla-\ntionary pressures.\n- 41 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n44. We estimate that, given the probable rate of increase in Soviet\nagricultural production for 1955-1960, aggregate Soviet consumption will\nprobably increase by about 30 percent during this period. However, food and\nhousing, by far the major components for the average Soviet consumer, will\nincrease by less than 20 percent. There were indications in late 1954 and\nearly 1955 that some influential elements among Soviet planners were pressing\nfor a higher rate of growth in consumption than that called for in the 1953\nplan. Present agricultural plans indicate that the present Soviet leader-\nship hopes to increase consumption at a more rapid rate than we have here\nestimated. However, the high cost of agricultural expansion and the competing\ndemands of other sectors of the Soviet economy will probably combine to re-\nstrict a more rapid growth in Soviet consumption levels.\n45. The disparity between rural and urban scales of living has grown\nmore pronounced since the beginning of the Five-Year Plans. Exact quanti-\nfication of this difference is exceedingly difficult because the greater\npart of rural consumption is consumption in kind, but the disparity probably\nexercises a substantial restraint upon peasant incontive and interest in\nagricultural output. Despite the fact that the peasants produce the major\nportion of the Soviet food supply, they eat less well than city people, even\nthough their caloric intake is about equal. The city dwoller consumes about\n- 42 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n50 percent more milk, two to three times as much meat, and appreciably\nmore fish, vegetable oil, butter, eggs, and sugar. Housing quality is\nconsiderably better in the city although the average space per capita is\ngreater in the country. An analysis of retail trade suggests that city\npeople consume three to four times as much manufactured consumer goods as\ndo rural consumers. The grossly inadequate rural transport and market\nsystems will continue to restrict the ability of the Soviet government to\neliminate private agricultural production in rural areas. They are also\nmajor blocks to the effective exercise of the increased peasant purchasing\npower which was intended to provide the incentive to support the new agri-\ncultural program.\nDEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE\n46. Soviet foreign trade in 1954 increased almost 20 percent over the\npreceding year. The increase of $1.1 billion represents the largest abso-\nlute volume increase since the period prior to the Korean War, and the\nhighest trade level with the free world since before 1948. (See Tables 7\nand 8) Total Soviet foreign trade has increased at a rate more than twice\nthe increase is\nthat of GNP;/ attributable mainly to growing trade within the Sino-Soviet\nBloc. Trade with the free world has been increasing since the end of 1950\nwith the exception of 1953, but remains below prewar volume.\n- 43 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nTable 7\nEstimated Foreign Trade Turnover in the USSR\n1951\n1952\n1953\n1954\nTrading Area\nValue Percent\nValue Percent\nValue Percent\nValue Percent\nSatellites (incl.\nCommunist China)\n3.6\nso\n4.1\nSO\n4.9\n86\n5.6\n82\nFree World\n0.9\n20\n1.0\n20\n0.8\n14\n1.2\n18\nTotal Trade\n4.5\n100\n5.1\n100\n5.7\n100\n6.8\n100\nTable 8\nVolume Index of Soviet Trade Turnover\n(1948=100)\nYear\nVith the Bloc\nVith the Free World\nTotal Foreign Trade\n1949\n191\n75\n126\n1950\n347\n64\n189\n1951\n399\n74\n218\n1952\n464\n92\n256\n1953\n577\n77\n298\n1954\n690\n114\n359\n- 44\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n47. Soviet trade with the free world was still primarily with Western\nEurope although there was a considerable increase in trade with less highly\ndeveloped areas of the world. The usual export surplus with Western Europe\ndeclined slightly in 1954 and the USSR ran a large deficit with under-\ndeveloped areas. It is estimated that the USSR ran a substantial commodity\ndeficit with the free world; gold sales are estimated to have been $100-150\nmillions in 1954. Traditional Soviet exports to the West have been limited\nby increases in internal Soviet consumption and by the substantial trade\nprogram within the Sino-Soviet Bloc; this program has recently included\nlarge shipments of grain from the USSR to the European Satellites, which,\ntaken as a whole, were formerly a net grain-exporting area. Although\nthere was some increase in Soviet imports of consumer goods from the free\nworld in 1954, there was little other change in the pattern of imports.\nGrain exports to the free world declined slightly from the postwer low in\n1953, while exports of petroleum and other mineral and forest products\nincreased. In late 1954 and early 1955 there crere was some indications that\nthe USSR might decrease its imports from the West.\n48. According to Soviet data foreign trade turnover with other Bloc\nnations increased (in value) about 14 percent in 1954, compared to a 50\npercent increase with the West. Inasmuch as there was little change in the\n- 45 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nestimated volume or composition of Sino-Soviet trade, most of the increase\nin Bloc trade probably took place between the USSR and the European\nSatellites. The USSR apparently serves as an intermediary for much of\nintra-Bloc trade, and in part for this reason it is difficult to ascer-\ntain the real volume of increase in trade among the various members.\n49. Soviet technical assistance programs within the Bloc continued\nto constitute on integral part of Soviet political and economic control.\nThere was a further increase in the intensity of Soviet propaganda and\nin\nnegotiations to extend the area of technical assistance to non-Bloc\ncountries, porticularly to underdeveloped countries of Asia. For the\nfirst time, there were actual movements of technicans and equipment\n(into Afgranistan) and contract for the construction of a steel mill\nin India was signed early in 1955. More overtures like these will be.\nprobably be made as the oviet economy grows, especially if the USSR does\nnot substantially increase the scale of its military offort.\n50. The 1955-1960 pattern of Soviet foreign trade will be subject\nto so many conflicting factors that any forecast must be conditioned\nby possible changes in the international climate and in the respective\ncapabilities of the trading partners. The USSR is still sufficiently\n- 46 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nbehind Western technology to have a continuing need for Vestern capital\nequipment. Although Soviet food supply is adequate for the immediate\nfuture, failure to increase present agricultural production would\noventually load to additional requirements for food products from out-\nside the Bloc. The USSR has the capability at present to expand export\nof certain raw materials and is rapidly approaching a position in which\nit could export a substantial volume of manufactured goods and capital\nequipment. Thus the capability for an increase in trade with the West\nexists.\n51. Soviet programs and policies, however, will probably preclude\nany rapid expansion of trade with the West, and will probably confine\nany increase in this trade to a level approximating over-all Soviet\neconomic growth. The level of trade within the loc will continue to\nincrease, but at a somewhat lower rate than in the recent past. The\namount of trade within the Bloc would be greatly increased if the U SR\nencouraged a greater degree of national specialization among the Bloc\nstates. We believe it more likely that the USSR will maintain a Bloc-\nwide division of labor not much changed from the present structure and\nwill continue to restrict trade between its associates and the free\nworld.\n-47 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECR T\nIV. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS\nMAGNITUDE OF SCIENTIFIC ASSETS -- POLICY AND PRIORITIES\n52. The USSR has consistently given strong support tothe development\nof science and technology. As a consequence, Soviet scientific and technical\ncapabilities have increased at a rapid pace, especially since World War II.\nWe believe that these capabilities will increase throughout this period, and\nwill continue to provide ample support for essential economic and military\nprograms. However, there will continue to be limitations on Soviet\nscientific resources which will make careful allocation mandatory and cir-\ncumscribe the number of major programs that the USSR can undertake con-\ncurrently, especially in view of the increasing scientific demands within\nthe Bloc as a whole. Soviet military and heavy industrial requirements\nwill probably continue to be the primary factors influencing scientific\n- 48 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nplanning and allocations of technical resources, although increased at-\ntention will probably be given to the application of science to agri-\nculture.\n53. At present the scientific assets of the USSR (the number and\nquality of trained personnel, facilities, and equipment) are smaller\nthan those of the US, and the assets of the Sino-Soviet Bloc are far\nsmaller than those of the West. Soviet financial support for science,\nwhile increasing, remains considerably below that of the US, possibly\nabout one-half. However, with respect to scientists of the very top\nrank, whose numbers are few in any country, the USSR probably has in\nmany fields men who are as able as their counterparts in Western countries.\nDuring the period of this estimate the USSR will provide the great bulk of\nBloc scientific assets, and its proportionate share will continue to grow.\nHowever, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and to a lesser extent Poland and\nHungary, will continue to contribute a substantial increment. On the\nother hand, Communist China, because of an extreme shortage of scientific\nand technical manpower and facilities, is unlikely to contribute to\nSoviet Bloc technical resources during the period of this estimate.\n- 49 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n54. The USSR has alarge number of organizations, laboratories,\ninstitutes, etc., engaged in research in all fields of science. In\ngeneral, organizational control and laboratory facilities are sufficient\nfor effective utilization of scientific talent. Important Soviet laboratories\nconducting high priority research projects are adequately equipped. However,\ncomplex research instruments and equipment are somewhat less readily\navailable in the USSR than in the United States or the UK. Consequently,\nsome specialized lower priority research projects are probably delayed\nlonger than similar projects would be in Western nations. Although the\nUSSR continues to import some scientific instruments from Western nations,\nit is now manufacturing or can obtain within the Bloc practically all\ntypes of scientific instruments for laboratory research, also in-\nlimited and and types\ndustrial instruments for plant operations and control. Research and\ndevelopment in electronics will dominate the science of instrumentation\nwithin the USSR during the period of this estimate, with emphasis on\nbetter recording and controlling instruments.\n55. There is no evidence that Soviet ideology has seriously\nhampered the development of the physical sciences, especially in appli-\ncations directly affecting industrial and military capabilities. In\n- 50 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\ncertain fields of the biological sciences, however, officially sponsored\nideological doctrines have probably exerted a retarding influence on re-\nsearch, although the present weakness in these fields is probably due\nmore to the heavy official emphasis laid on other fields of research\nthan to ideological restraints. There are indications that even in the\nbiological field ideological restraints are likely to be of less conse-\nquence in the future than they have been in the past.\nSCIENTIFIC EDUCATION AND MANPOWER\n56. Prior to World War II the general quality of Soviet higher\neducation and research in most scientific and technical fields was\nmarkedly below that of the US. In the postwar period, however, it has\nbeen generally good, and has approached US standards. Only in some areas\nof biology, particularly in the agricultural sciences, does it appear\nthat the present quality of Soviet education and research may be decidedly\nbelow that of the US. However by 1960, in view of the probable greater\nemphasis upon agricultural development, this deficiency is likely to be\nconsiderably reduced.\n57. About 1,560,000 Soviet citizens have scientific or technical\ndegrees from colleges and universities, of whom about 785,000 are postwar\n- 51-\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\ngraduates. The number of university or technical institute graduates\nemployed in the scientific-technical field in the USSR (1,240,000)\nI/\ncompares closely with that in the US. It is estimated that 175,000\nscientists are engaged in advanced research or teaching at higher\nlevel institutions in the USSR, compared with about 265,000 so engaged\nin the US. Because of the greater stress on the biological and health\nsciences, however, the USSR has only an estimated 85,000 in the physical\nsciences, as compared with about 210,000 in the US. Soviet scientists\nin research and development in all fields of science (excluding those\nprimarily engaged in teaching) number about 100,000, about one-half of\nthe number similarly occupied in the US. During the period of this estimate\nthe Soviet scientific manpower pool will probably increase considerably\nmore rapidly than that of the US.\n58. The USSR is not as well supplied with technicians, mechanics,\nand maintenance men as are the Western countries, where broader sections\nof the population have acquired mechanical skills over a considerably\nlonger period. Standards of maintenance for all kinds of mechanized\n2./\nNumerical estimates of Soviet scientific personnel are believed to\nbe correct to within plus or minus 10 percent. For a detaile d com-\nparison of USSR and US scientific personnel, see (rephics on\nfollowing page.\n- 52 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nequipment are in general lower than in Western countries and rates of\ndeterioration higher. In addition, the number of skilled mechanics and\ntechnicians which would be available to the armed forces in war is far\nsmaller than in the West. However, Soviet engineers have sought to com-\npensate for these deficiencies by building machines and equipment which\nare simple in design and easy to máintain and repair.\nSCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE\n59. The capability of Soviet scientists and tochnicians in those\nbasic scientific fields (e.g., physical sciences, mathematics) which are\nrelated to the development and production of weapons and military equip-\nment is sufficient to insure the development of modern arms for Soviet\nforces. In response to new requirements and conditions created by the applic\ntion of advance technology to war and war preparations, the US.R appears\nto be placing great emphasis upon development of new scientific fields and\ntechniques to maximize the return from Soviet resources, both human and non-\nhuman (e.g., human engineering, mental conditioning, casualty therapy, comput\nresearch, automation).\n60. The USSR probably has the scientific and technological capa-\nbility necessary to develop most weapons and military equipment equivalent\n- 53 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nto, and in a few cases possibly better than, those of other nations.\nHowever, in a number of weapons categories, especially those involving new\nand complex equipment, the USSR lags behind the West. Moreover, the\nUSSR probably does not have sufficient scientific resources to program\nvigorous weapons and equipment research simultaneously in all fields, and\nthis deficiency, while possibly decreasing, will probably continue through\n1960. Nevertheless, Soviet espionage potential, coupled with the free\nnations' inherent inability to guard their secrets, probably compensates in\nsome degree for deficiencies in the Soviet scientific effort.\nNuclear Weapons 8/ See fallowing pages\n(Paragraphs to be inserted)\n81 For a fuller treatment of this subject see NIE - (JAEIC estimate).\n- 54 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nNuclear Weapons\n60a. The Soviet atomic energy program, directed primarily\ntoward the production of nuclear weapons, will continue to receive\nspecial emphasis through 1958. The USSR had tested by the end of\n1953, small and medium yield weapons and has employed thermonuclear\nboosting principles to produce an energy yield up to 1,000 kilotons\nof TNT. The 1954 test series showed stockpile types in the medium\nyield range and extensive development in the small yield ranges,\nbut there was no further development in the large yield range. During\nthe immediate future, the types of weapons stockpiled will probably\nhave the general characteristics and explosive powers of weapons already\ntested although the quantity of the large yield type that could be\nproduced would probably be limited. Within the limits of techno-\nlogical capabilities as of the end of 1954, Soviet military require-\nments will govern the allocation of available fissionable material\nto various types of weapons, with consideration probably being given\n1/ See NIE 11-2-55, \"The Soviet Atomic Energy Program, Restricted\nData, dated 25 April 1955 for details of Soviet nuclear energy\nprogram.\n- 54a -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nmore to operational requirements than to the largest total energy\nyield attainable.\n60b. In order to provide an example of Soviet stockpile\ncapabilities, we have assumed that: (1) one-third of estimated\nuranium-235 is utilized in large yield weapons (500 to 1,000 KT);\n(2) two-thirds is utilized in medium-yield (70 KT) connosite\nweapons; and (3) the remaining plutonium is divided equally between\nmedium-yield (40 KT) and small-yield (5 KT) weapons. For purposes\nof comparison this allocation of fissionable material is carried\nthrough mid-1958. If the Soviet stockpile were allocated in this\nmanner it would be as follows:\nMid-\nMid-\n1955\n1958\nLarge-yield weapons (500-1,000 KT)\n15\n50\nMedium-yield weapons (40-70 KT)\n320\n950\nSmall-yield weapons (5 KT)\n155\n250\n60c. However, due to continued Soviet nuclear progress,\nother allocations of fissionable material might become more\n1/\nIn view of the range of error applicable to the estimate of\nSoviet fissionable material production, the actual figures\nfor the end of 1955 may be as much as one-third lower or higher\nthan the figures given above. Uncertainty increases as esti-\nmates are projected into the future and the actual figure\nfor mid-1958 may be as low as one-half or as high as twice\nthe figures given in the table.\n- 54b -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nlikely toward mid-1958. The USSR will probably continue work on\nlarger yield weapons as well as on smaller-yield and small-dimension\nweapons. We estimate that by mid-1956 the USSR could have weapons\nwith ranges of yields from 0.5 KT to 10,000 KT or more. Such de-\nvolopments would permit more flexibility in the use of nuclear\nweapons. Assuming such progress on the part of the Soviets, one\nof the ways in which their 1958 weapons stockpile could be divided\nwould be as follows:\nLarge-yield weapons (500 to 10,000 KT)\n230\nMedium-yield weapons (5 to 500 KT)\n440\nSmall-yield weapons (0.5 to 5 KT)\n570\n60d. Longer-range extrapolations can be carried out on the\nbasis of assumptions of the growth pattern the Soviet nuclear program\ncould follow during the period in question. Alternate assumptions,\nwhich indicate a range of growth capabilities, are:\n(1) No expansion of Soviet fissionable materials production\nfacilities after 1958 (Assumption A); or,\n(2) Continued expansion of Soviet fissionable materials\nproduction facilities after 1958 at the same rate as estimates for\nthe period 1949 to mid-1958 (Assumption B); or,\n- 54c -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n(3) Expansion of the Soviet program after 1958 at\na rate which will increase its requirements for uranium to approx-\nimately 7,000 to 10,000 tons per year by 1964 (Assumption c).\n60e. In view of the broad spectrum of weapon types which\nwill probably be available to the USSR, it becomes increasingly\ndifficult to make specific estimates of the detailed make-up of\nthe Soviet stockpile as it is projected into the future. The\nfollowing example of a possible Soviet weapon stockpile will\nindicate the general magnitude of the Soviet capability under each\nof the three assumptions given above.\n- 54d -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nTABLE\nEXAMPLES OF POSSIBLE SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILES - 1959-1960\nMid\nMid\nAssumption A\n1959\n1960\nLarge Yield Weapons\n280\n340\n(500-10,000 KT or more)\nIntermediate Yield Weapons\n550\n660\n(5 - 500 KT)\nSmall Yield Weapons\n710\n850\n(0.5 - 5 KT)\nAssumption B\nLarge Yield Weapons\n290\n360\n(500-10,000 KT or more)\nInternediate Yield Weapons\n560\n700\n(5 - 500 KT)\nSmall Yield Weapons\n720\n900\n(0.5 - 5 KT)\nAssumption C\nLarge Yield Weapons\n320\n450\n(500-10,000 KT or more)\nIntermediate Yield Weapons\n630\n880\n(5 - 500 KT)\nSmall Yield Weapons\n810\n1130\n(0.5 - 5 KT)\n- 54e -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n60f. There is no direct information on the nature of the\nSoviet control organization and facilities for storage, handling,\nand distribution of nuclear weapons. However, we believe that\nSoviet nuclear weapons will be handled by a special organization\nwithin the Ministry of Defense and will be stored at both a few\nlarge reserve-stockpile storage sites and a large number of smaller\nsites. These small sites will probably be located at or near air-\nfields, guided missile sites, and other delivery vehicle installa-\ntions in advanced areas.\n60g. Radiological Warfare. It is most unlikely, for\ntechnological reasons, that the USSR will be able to stockpile\nmilitarily significant quantities of radiological warfare weapons\nduring the period of this estimate. However, the significance of\nradio-active fall-out following large nuclear explosions should\nbe considered in connection with Soviet capabilities to produce\nexplosions in the megaton range.\n- 54f -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nGuided Missiles\n9/\n61.\nWe believe that the strategic requirements of the USSR\nwould dictate a major effort in the field of guided missiles, and\nthe evidence which we have concerning the large number of personalities\nand activities believed to be involved in the current Soviet missile\nprogram leads us to the conclusion that it is a large one. On the\nbasis of our extensive knowledge of Soviet exploitation of the\nwartime German missile experience and our estimate of Soviet capa-\nbilities in related fields, we believe that the USSR has the basic\nscientific and technical capabilities to support a comprehensive\nmissile research and development program. The USSR also has an\nadequate economic base for a sizeable production program. It is\nprobable that the USSR now has some guided missiles noperational\nstatus, and that a growing Soviet guided missile capability threat will develop\nwithin the next several years. However, we have no firm current\nintelligence on what particular types of missiles the USSR is presently\ndeveloping, or may now have in operational use.\n91\nFor a discussion of Soviet guided missiles, including estimates of\nthe dates at which various types of missiles might appear in Soviet\noperational use, see NIE 11-6-54: \"Soviet Capabilities and Probable\nPrograms in the Guided Missile Field,\" published 5 October 1954.\nNo evidence has appeared, since the publication of that estimate,\nwhich justifies a change in its conclusions.\n- 55 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nElectronics and Communications\n62.\nThe USSR has made substantial progress toward catching up with\nthe West in electronics by expanding its manufacturing facilities and\nadapting Western equipment. The magnitude, diversity, and past successes\nof the Soviet research and development program in electronics indicate the\nprobable development of new and improved devices. Air defense capabilities\nwill probably be improved as a consequence of significant advances in de-\ntection, warning, interception, md data-handling equipment, which are\nexpected during the period of this estimate. Those aspects of communication\ntheory which have a direct bearing on communication techniques, radar,\ncomputers, automatic guidance devices, and telemetering are under continuing\nstudy by Soviet scientists. Such research will result in practical applica-\ntions and may within the period of this estimate lead to a communication\nnetwork exceedingly difficult to intercept or jam. During the period of\nthis estimate the USSR will improve its electronics capabilities in the\nfollowing categories.\n63.\nEarly Warning Radar (EW) - The US R has a large variety of EW\nradars in use. These include World War II sets, native sets based on\nWestern designs, and sets of purely native design. Most of these will con-\ntinue in use through 1956 and will afford fairly reliable coverage against\n- 56 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nmaximum ranges from\nmedium bombers at/125 miles (up to 60,000 feet altitude) to 180 miles (up\nto 45,000 feet altitude). Against fighters these naximum ranges are\nfr n 85 miles (up t 45,000 feet altitude) to 135 miles (up to t 30,000 feet alt\nthis). Continued use of low-frequency radars (in the 72 nc/s region) through 19\nis indicated. By 1958 the USSR will probably have developed one or more\nEW radars capable of detecting an object the size of a medium bomber at 60,000\nfeet up to a distance of about 200 nautical miles. The problem of low altitude\ncoverage will still exist but probably will be greatly lessened by the use\nof moving target indicators and gap-filler radars. By 1960 the performance\nof the early warning radar estimated to be introduced in 1958 will probably\nbe increased somewhat.\n64.\nGround Control Intercept Radar (GCI) - We estimate that by\n1958 the USSR will have GCI radars of several types, including the V-beam\nsets presently in use, which should be capable of coverage on medium\nbombers at maximum reliable ranges of 150-200 nautical miles and on\nfighters at maximum roliable ranges of 55-85 nautical miles, depending\non altitude, location, and other factors. More recent than the excellent\nV-beam sets are the paired combinations of long-range azimuth indicating\nsets (GAGE) and height indicating sets (PATTY CAKE), which collectively\n- 57 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\ncan provide GCI data. We believe that by 1960 GCI coverage will be increased\nto the order of 200 nautical miles; this will necessitate the use of trans-\nponder beacons in interceptor aircraft. Maximum reliable altitude coverage\nup to 60,000 feet, though at less than maximum ranges, will be achieved by\n1959.\n65. Airborne Intercept Radar - There is confirmed evidence that\nthe USSR now has airborne intercept radar, in at least limited operational\nuse in widely separated geographic areas. The equipment is probably\ncomparable to existing Western types. It can probably installed be placed on current\ntypes of Soviet fighter aircraft. Within the period of this estimate\nthe Soviet air defense system will probably have improved AI radar in\ngeneral operational use.\n66. Fire Control Rader - The WHIFF radar, the Soviet version of\nthe SCR-584, will almost certainly continue to be used in quantity. Mean-\nwhile, development work on radar sets with greater accuracies, range\ndefinitions, and reduced vulnerability to jamming will proceed during the\nnewsets\nperiod of this estimate and might appear at any time. The X-band probably\nwill be used for newly developed fire control radars.\n= 58 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n67.\nBlind Bombing and Navigational Radar - The USSR currently has\nin operational use an X-band (three centimeter) set developed in the post-\nwar period and capable of further improvement. By the end of 1957, the\nbest Soviet blind bombing and navigational radar should be capable of\noperating at altitudes up to 50,000 feet and should have a range of about\n125 nautical miles for navigation.\nBombing and naviga-\ntion equipment will permit accuracies equivalent to those of present\nUS equipment. The use of frequencies higher than X-band is unlikely by\nmid-1956, but operational use of the higher frequency equipment may be\nachieved by mid-1960.\n68.\nElectromagnetic Warfare - The USSR presently has the capability\nof seriously disrupting Western long-range communications and navigational\nsystems. Soviet achievements in related electronic fields indicate that\nthe USSR is also able, by an intensive effort, to develop electronic jamming\nequipment which could be effective up through 12,000 megacycles and possibly\nthrough 46,000 megacycles. It is estimated that by 1960 the USSR can have\njamming equipment in operational use in frequency ranges up through 30,000\nmegacycles.\n69.\nMicrowave Radio - Microwave communication equipment is in\nwide use in East Germany, and fixed networks exist in the Soviet Union.\n- 59 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nBased on the reported procurement of microwave relay equipment from both\nEast Germany and Hungary, the present inventory of the Soviet Bloc is\nestimated at approximately 3,000 sets. By 1960, mobile nicrowave sets\nof eight channels will probably be standard military issue to divisions and\nhigher echelons. VHF equipment for ground-air, ship-ship, and ship-shore\ncommunication, already in use, will find more widespread use with increased\nnumbers of channels and improved reliability. Techniques such as \"flash\"\ntransmissions will be used to transmit important messages with a minimum\nsusceptibility to countermeasures and maximum of message security.\nBiological Warfare\n70.\nFirm evidence on Soviet activity in the biological warfare\nfield is exceedingly scanty, and is likely to remain so because of the\nrelative ease with which such a program can be concealed. The USSR has,\nhowever, the technical knowledge, trained personnel, and facilities neces-\nsary for a program of research and development in biological warfare,\nand such a program is probably in progress. The USSR is capable\nof producing BW agents 1 disseminating devices suitable for small-scale\nclandestine attacks against certain crops, against livestock, and against\npersonnel in buildings or concentrated in relatively small areas. Soviet\ncapabilities for large-scale attacks are more difficult to estimate.\nAntilivestock BW against the US need not be large-scale to be effective.\n- 60 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nAnticrop BW against the US would probably not substantially affect US\ncrop production unless carried out on a very large scale and under favor-\nable seasonal and environmental conditions. The USSR is probably capable\nof large-scale production of antipersonnel BW weapons.\n71.\nSoviet capabilities for defense aggainst BW are inferior to those\nof the US because of Soviet deficiencies in public health, sanitation, live-\nstock management, and plant protection. Gradual progress will probably be\nmade to correct these deficiencies during the period of the estimate. Be-\ncause widespread shipment of livestock is not practiced in the USSR, Soviet\nvulnerability to small-scale antilivestock attacks is probably less than\nthat of the United States.\nChemical Weapons\n72.\nDuring World War II, the Soviet Union is known to have produced\nmost of the standard chemical warfare agents as well as the necessary\nauxiliary equipment. The USSR has the facilities and scientific knowledge\nnecessary to produce at least one of the nerve gases and could employ\nthese agents during the period of this estimate. Published Soviet research\n- 61 -\nTO S CRET\nTOP SECRET\nin fields closely allied to chemical wa fare -- organophosphorus chemistry,\nacrosol formation, cholinesterase, alkaloids, and adsorption -- indicates a\nscientific capability for the development of new or improved chemical agents,\ndissemination equipment, and protective devices, We assume that the stock-\npile of standard agents and munitions accumulated during World War II has\nbeen maintained and that the facilities for CW agents production are being\nmaintained on a standby basis or operated to produce other chemicals or\nmateriel. The USSR is able to engage in chemical warfare on a large scale.\n- 62 -\nTOP SECRET"
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