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National Intelligence Estimate 11-3-55, Soviet Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses of Action Through 1960, Part 3 of 5
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National Intelligence Estimate 11-3-55, Soviet Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses of Action Through 1960, Part 3 of 5
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TOP BECRET
V. SINO-SOVIET BLOC MILITARY STRENGTH
SIZE OF FORCES, SCALE OF EFFORT, TRENDS
73. The USSR is both the foundation and arsenal of Communist Bloc
military strength, and thus the primary source of Bloc military capa-
bilities. The main contribution of the other Bloc states is manpower,
although industries in the Eastern European Satellites supply some military
equipment. Sino-Soviet Bloc forces-in-being now total about 8,000,000 men
(of which about 4,000,000 2. 400, 000 Clinese)
are Soviet) not including security forces. The
forces of the East European states, for all practical purposes, are under
direct control of the Kremlin. The Communist Chinese forces, while heavily
dependent upon Soviet aid, are outside direct Soviet control.
74. In the postwar period the USSR has produced armaments at a
relatively high rate, which has made possible an extensive re-equipment
program. Since 1950, Soviet production of armaments has been at an
average rate of roughly 25 percent of capacity. The levelling off of
as indicated in the
budgets
military expenditures/ 1953-1954/apparently resulted in a reduction
in output of some -
weapons, many of which were already stock-
piled in quantity. The announced increase in the military budget for 1955,
- 63-
DECLASSION RITH DELETIONS
CIA E95-0390
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Agency Case
WILE Case 95-300
By LRs NLE Date. 1/11/91
+
RAC review Ho 12/20/2000
TOP SECRET
however, suggests that the cutback in production was temporary and may
have reflected transition to the production of newer models, especially
aircraft.
75. Assuming no significant changes in the international situation,
we have estimated above (section III, Table 1) that Soviet military defense
espenditure after 1955 will probably show a relatively small annual
increase -- of the order of three or four percent per year on the
average. In view of the continuing rise in the unit cost of most major
weapons, and the probable introduction of increased quantities of new
weapons, this rate of increase will not permit simultaneous production
of all major weapons at the high levels reached during the period
1950-1952 when defense expenditures rose sharply, about 15 percent
annually. M reover, the already sizeable stockpiles of some major
weapons, and the introduction of new weapons, including guided missiles,
probably make it unnecessary to produce certain major conventional
weapons at the previous high rates.
76. During the period of this estimate the personnel strength of
Bloc forces-in-being will probably remain substantially unchanged.
However, the over-all effectiveness of these forces will almost certainly
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increase, primarily due to the improved weapons available to Soviet
forces, and to changes in organization, doctrine, and tactics designed
to adapt these forces to nuclear warfare. The major weapons changes will
be the increases in the numbers and types of nuclear weapons, in aircraft,
especially jet bombers and all-weather fighters, and in long-range sub-
marines. There will also be progressive modernization of weapons and
equipment, particularly those incorporating electronic guidance and con-
trol. Limitations on Bloc armed forces during the period of this estimate
will derive from: deficiencies in experience and training for long-range
air operations, and in certain equipment for air defense, together with
lack of capability for long-range amphibious and surface naval operations.
77. Logistical problems will continue to place a considerable
limitation upon the Sino-Soviet Bloc's capability to wage intensive
warfare over an extended period. These problems are due to the vast
size of the USSR, the great distances from main interior sources of
supply to several main operational areas, and the relatively inadequate
the road acute and rail shortage network of Bloc and registered merchant shippingio/
In order to offset these
disadvantages the USSR has maintained large forces and military stock-
piles in forward areas. Stockpiles of POL, ammunition, and other types
of supplies consumed at a relatively constant rate, are probably
10 / For a breakdown of the Sino-Soviet Bloc merchant fleet, see Appendix
Table
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sufficient to maintain a force of 300 line divisions together with air
and naval forces in Europe and Asia for an extended period (i.e., up to
six months depending upon the scale of conflict). During the period of
this estimate the Soviet logistical situation will probably improve as
a result of continued stockpiling and the development of a more flexible
and mobile transport system. However, logistical problems will probably
continue to be a considerable limitation upon capabilities for extended
offensive operations, especially in the Far East. If the USSR were sub-
jected to intensive nuclear attack, its capability to support extensive
military operations, especially outside S viet borders, would be markedly
curtailed both in magnitude and duration.
SOVIET MILITARY FORCES
Ground Forces
78. The Soviet Army has been reorganized and modernized since the
end of World War II, and now totals about 2,500,000 men. There are suf-
ficient trained reserves and stockpile equipment to expand the army to
11/ For detailed estimates of strengths and disposition of these forces,
see Appendix , Tables and 2.
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about 300 line divisions plus supporting troops with a total strength
of 7,500,000 by M +30. The estimated maximum mobilization potential
is about 12,500,000 men. In the absence of general war, we believe that
the Soviet ground forces will remain at approximately their present size
and disposition through 1960. The concentration of Soviet ground forces
in East Germany, the Western USSR, the Caucasus, and the Far East pro-
vides for the defense and security of the most important and vulnerable
areas of the USSR, while facilitating administrative support.
79. The Soviet Army is well-trained, discipline is good, and morale
is almost certainly high. The 30 Soviet divisions located in East Germany
and the European Satellites are known to be well equipped. This force is
well-trained and combat ready, although its readiness is somewhat lowered
in the latefall of each year when new recruits have replaced trained men.
Intelligence concerning the remaining divisions, particularly those in the
interior of the USSR, is considerably less extensive. However, it is prob-
able that the latter are maintained at a stage of war readiness sufficient
to permit their early deployment to a combat theater.
80. During the last year the Soviet Army has placed considerable
emphasis upon training exercises to improve ground force defense against
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nuclear attack. There is also evidence that army offensive and de-
fensive tactics envisage the use of tactical atomic weapons by Soviet
forces. Emphasis is placed on mobility and maneuverability, greater
initiative, dispersion, deeper objectives, reconnaissance, and in-
dividual protective measures. Soviet offensive doctrine emphasizes
allocation of a substantial number of nuclear weapons for use against
enemy defensive positions, air facilities, reserves, atomic capabilities,
and encircled enemy units. The assault following a nuclear attack would
employ tanks and armored infantry in order to develop maximum speed of
exploitation. Doctrine for the defense emphasizes deep revetted trenches
and other protective construction, dispersion in width and depth, and
larger and more mobile reserves.
81. The Soviet Army is currently embarked on an extensive program
of improvement of its ground weapons systems which will greatly increase
its mobility, flexibility, and firepower. Armored cars and armored per-
sonnel carriers have been introduced. It is estimated that in East
Germany alone there are now about 2,000 armored personnel carriers, each capab
of transporting 15 men. General issue of new wedpons has included a medium tank
For a comparison of USSR and US production of major ground force weapons
for 1953 - 1954, see Appendix, Table 8.
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(T-54) mounting a 100-m gun, morters of 160-mn, and of 200 to 240-mm calibers,
a tr, -mounted rocket launcher, and a new 1 nily of antiaircraft guns,
and possibly a new heavy tank (JS-4). During this period the Soviet Army
will probably have new and improved heavy artillery of large enough caliber
to utilize nuclear projectiles, an infantry antitank guided missile, and
infrared night driving and firing aids. By mid-1960 it is estimated that
a new medium tank and a heavy tank, substantially superior to the current
T-54 and JS-3 (or JS-4), will be in operation.
82, During the period of this estimate, the combat readiness of
the Soviet Army will almost certainly continue to increase. The addition
of improved equipment and weapons, more flexibility in logistical opera-
tions, a considerable increase in mobility and changes designed to meet
the effectiveness of
requirements for nuclear warfare will improve/the Soviet Army for
a nuclear war and also increase its capabilities to engage in highly
mobile, conventional type actions.
83. Security Forces. Soviet internal security forces are controlled
by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and number about 400,000. These troops
are select group, well-trained and equipped, and provide a significant in-
crement to Soviet military strength in being. However, their primary
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responsibility for maintaining internal control would probably prevent
their becoming available for operations outside the USSR. About 150,000
are in the border troops, disposed along all accessible land and sea
frontiers. The remaining 250,000 include troops responsible for sup-
pressing any organized resistance in the country, for guarding shipments
of prisoners, strategic cargoes, and labor camps, and for meintaining
the security of high-level government and military communications.
Air Forces
84.
During the postwar period the USSR has continually improved
its air force both in size and quality. Although in World Wr II the
USSR gave primary emphasis to the ground support role of air forces, in
the postwar period increasing attention has been given to the development
of the interceptor and strategic bombing arms. We estimate that the
current over-all authorized (TO&E) air strength is about 20300 (21,000) including
10,400
3,200
about 10,700 jet fighters, 3,400 jet light bombers, 1,200 piston medium
and 20 jet heavy bombers.
bombers,
200 jet medium bombers/ Over-all actual strength is probably
3/ For strengths of the Soviet Air Forces in aircraft, personnel, and
by major combat components and geographic distribution, see Appendix
/
Jables',3,445.
4 70 -
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about 85 percent of authorized strength. We believe that replacement of
TU-4 aircraft by jet bomber types and growing numbers of all-weather
jet fighters will almost certainly be the most important developments in
the Soviet air forces during the period of this estimate. We estimate
that by 1960 the over-all authorized strength (TO&E) will have increased
to/22,000 aircraft, which will include about 11,200 10,900 jet fighters (about
about 21,400
40 percent all-weather), 3,100 3,400 jet light bombers, 900 jet medium bombers,
and 500 jet heavy bombers.
85. The Soviet aircraft industry has accounted for about 95 percent
of total Bloc aircraft production in the postwar period. Estimated Bloc
production of fighter and bomber aircraft during the period 1946-1954 has
been roughly equal to that of the NATO countries in numbers of aircraft,
although substantially below that of NATO in terms of total airframe
weight.
During the latter part of this period (1952-1954) Soviet Bloc
production of fighters and bombers, both in numbers and weight, was con-
siderably below that of NATO. During 1954 the Soviet aircraft industry
was operating at about 25 percent of capacity, and produced about 8,500
to 9,000 aircraft, including about 5,300 fighters and bombers. We believe
4/ For detail, see Appendix Latle9
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this estimate it
that during the period = operate at about
25-30 percent of capacity, with annual production at about 9,000-10,000
aircraft, including about 5,000 to 6,000 fighters and bombers. Aero-
engine industries will probably continue to operate at about 35 percent
of capacity, with a total output of about 30,000 to 35,000 engines. In
view of the requirements of the operating forces, these rates of pro-
duction are insufficient to permit any significant stockpiling of the
latest aircraft types, aircraft engines, and electronic devices. Con-
version of the aircraft industry to full enpacity production would prob-
ably require 18-24 months.
86. Airfield development in the USSR and the European Satellites
during the postwar period has generally kept pace with demands created
by the introduction of new aircraft into operational units. The
principal exception is in Northeastern Siberia opposite Alaska and
along the Northern Arctic coast. In these areas air operations would
at present be limited logistical
by relatively inadequately undeveloped developed bases base and facilities by
difficulties even though airfield construction and development has
been in progress there for some time. Under its airfield development
program the USSR has created an interlocking network of airfields along
perimeter areas in Europe and internal approach lines within the USSR.
We believe that during the period of this estimate the Soviet airfield
construction program will be continued, and will receive especial
emphasis in the Far East and possibly in Soviet Arctic areas.
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87.
Combat effectiveness of Soviet military aviation is, on the
whole, below that of the US. The chief limiting factors have been lower
average aircrew proficiency, lower standards of maintenance and training,
and lack of certain aircraft types. During this period the introduction
into operational units of new jet types, including a supersonic
interceptor, an all-weather fighter, and medium and heavy bombers,
plus a four-engine turbo-prop aircraft, together with the training
appropriate to these types, will lead to a significant increase
of combat effectiveness. However, assuming that the US maintains
its present standards, over-all Soviet air combat effectiveness will
almost certainly remain below that of the US
during this period,
especially in night and all-wecther operations and in long-range
operations.
88. The MIG-15 (Falcon) and MIG-17 (Fresco) are now standard
equipment of Soviet Fighter Aviation of Air Defense as of other com-
ponents of the Soviet Air Force. The MIG-17, which began to replace
the MIG-15 in 1953 and now constitutes nearly half of fighter aircraft,
is estimated to have a maximum speed of 635 knots at sea level, and
a combat ceiling of 58,000 feet. We believe the USSR will have a
supersonic interceptor in operational use early in the period.
Limited numbers of dircraft with AI radar have been introduced into
operational units, and by 1960 all-weather fighters will probably
make up about 40 percent of the whole fighter force.
73 -
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GEORET
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89.
The TU-4 (BULL) medium bomber is now obsolescent, but
remains for the present the principal aircraft of the Soviet long-
range aviation. However, series production of a twin-jet medium
bomber, the Type 39 (BADGER) is now under way: and a four-engine
jet heavy bomber, the Type 37 (BISON), has probably entered
series production. We estimate that these new jet types will rapidly
replace the TU-4 medium bomber and that the authorized bomber strength
of Soviet long-range aviation throughout the period will be as follows:
Aircraft
Mid
Mid
Mid
Mid
Mid
Mid
Type
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
TU-4
1,180
920
550
250
0
0
Type 39
200
400
650
800
900
900
Type 37
20
80
200
350
500
500
These estimates do not include consideration of the new four-engine turbo-
prop aircraft, nine and possibly twelve of which have been sighted. The
estimates of the number of jet medium and jet heavy bombers are tentative,
pending detailed analyses of recent sightings of these aircraft. Since
there is no firm intelligence on Soviet production plans or on the planned
ratio of medium to heavy bombers which the USSR might adopt, estimates for
future years are provided as the most likely way in which Soviet Long Range
Aviation might be proportioned.
Table 6.
For estimates of the performance of Soviet Long Range Aircraft see Appendix,
TOP SECRET
74-
TOP SECRET.
/
Neval Forces
During recent years the Soviet Navy has been greatly strengthened
90.
by on intense and rapid building program; this program has not included
aircraft carriers, battleships, or heavy cruisers, but has concentrated
on light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. The Soviet submarine fleet
is now the largest in the world and is still growing; about half its
strength consists of long-range craft of which a significant and increasing
proportion are modern types. Most of the major surface vessels and all of
the modern submarines will probably be kept active, but the present rate
of new construction & reserve fleet
is such will permit that the the creation Saviets of substantial to create
of submarines. It is believed that all such reserve or inactive units
could be activated by M + 180.
14 / For strength in ships and personnel as well as dispositions, see
Appendix 111' Table 7. For strength of the Soviet Naval Air
Force by aircraft type, see Appendix / Lable 5.
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91. Soviet Naval Aviation, comprising nearly 20 percent of the
total strength of Soviet military aviation, has converted completely
to jet aircraft in the fighter and light bomber categories. The number
of jet reconnaissance aircraft in service has also increased, but attack
and transport aircraft continue to be piston engine types. During the
period of this estimate, Soviet Naval Aviation is expected to remain
approximately constant in strength, while continuing its program of
modernization of equipment. Improved all-weather jet fighters will
probably be introduced, and possibly jet medium bambers for attack, re-
connaissance, and airsubmarine operations.
92. We estin to that in nid-1955 the min strength of the Soviet
Navy will C noist f 31 cruisers, 142 destr yers, and 374 356 submarines, includ-
inc 13 li It cruisers, 85 fleet dest yers, and about 150 line range
submarines of postwar design. Naval construction in the USSR is
presently estimated at about 175,000 NSDT which represents about one-
third Soviet capacity, and one-fifth total Bloc capacity. Battleships
and carriers could be build in all fleet areas except the F r East.
Presently one "capital ship" of unknown type is believed to be under
construction in the B ltic area and possibly one in the Black Sea area,
and these vessels may become operational during the period of this
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estimate. It appears, however, that the USSR will continue to place
primary emphasis upon the construction of long-range submarines, while
continuing the construction of cruiser and destroyer types.
The Soviet Navy is now concentrating on the construction of
93.
two long-range submarine types developed since World War II. These
are equipped with snorkel. The "W" type has in perating radius under
miles
C mbst C nliti ns f about 4,700 nautical miles; the "2" type, 6,700 noutical/
By early 1955, 107 (including 20 "Z" type) of these had jointed the
The type) fleet; these Same per the year. present have The building USSR the is rate known is to estimated have capability continued as 75. (including development for modifying 15-20 of the "Z" either
W lther closed-cycle engine for submarine propulsion, and an experimental
submarine powered by such an engine could be operational now. It is also
possible that, during the period of this estimate, nuclear propulsion for
Soviet submarines will have been developed. However, there is no evidence
that the USSR is construction submarines equipped with either of these
types of propulsion.
Soviet naval capabilities can be expected to improve throughout
94.
the period due to the building program, technological development, and
15/ For Detail see Appendix Lable10.
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intensive training. While the operational efficiency of the Soviet
Navy is still below that of the navies of the major Western Powers,
it will continue to improve during this period. Little is known of
the operating efficiency of the submarine force. It is probably still
inferior to that of US and German forces of World War II, but performance
standards will probably rise steadily during this period. Personnel of
the submarine force are the pick of the Soviet Navy, and their morale
is high.
The principal weakness of the Soviet Navy derives from the wide
separation of the sea frontiers of the USSR, and from its inability to
control the sea routes between these areas. The USSR is thus deprived
of the strategic mobility traditionally enjoyed by naval powers, and is
compelled to maintain four separate fleets together with their supporting
facilities. The inland waterway system connecting the White and Baltic
now permits the interchange of vessels up to the size of small destroyers
and including all current submarine types. During this period, possibly
by 1957, improvements in the Black Sea canal system will extend this interchange
capability to include the Black Sea. However, parts of the waterway system
are open only an average of five months a year, because of weather conditions.
Increased use of the Northern Sea Route, which is open for a six to eight
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week period in the summer, may also improve the situation. The lack
of adequate supply lines to the Norther and Far Eastern areas is an
additional handicap. Limitations on sustained offensive operations
derive from the land-locked position of the fleets in the Baltic and Black Sea.
(containing roughly 60 percent of Soviet naval strength), the exists
exits from of
which are controlled by the NATO Powers, and from the lack of advanced
bases. The long-range capabilities of the Soviet Navy are further re-
duced by lack of aircraft carriers, long-range reconmaissance aircraft,
auxiliary vessels suitable for underway logistic support, forward bases,
and by the lack of experience in long-range operations.
96. There is no force in the Soviet Navy comparable to the amphi-
bious forces of the US Navy, although the naval infantry components have
received some training in amphibi us warfare. While capable of mounting short
range lifts in C nciderable free in the Baltic and Black Seas and in the Sea
f J -100, the S vict N.vy loes not possess sufficient amphibious craft to
launch and sustain long-haul amphibious operations.
16/
EASTERN EUROPEAN SATELLITE FORCES
97. Soviet control of the Satellites has in effect moved the
Soviet military frontier into Central Europe, and the USSR has given a
16/ For detailed strength figures by country, see Appendix
Tables/737. See also NIE 12-54, "Probable Developments in the
European Satellites through Mid-1956," dated 24 August 1954.
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high priority to the development of this area for military operations.
The Satellite ground and air forces now constitute a substantial element
in the balance of military power in Europe. However, their over-all
effectiveness is only fair, and the political reliability of some national
units is questionable. During the period of this estimate the over-all
capabilities and usefulness to the USSR of the Satellite forces will
probably increase. However, many of the current deficiencies will con-
tinue to limit the military usefulness of these forces to the Soviets,
especially for offensive operations.
Ground Forces. The Satellite ground forces' present strength
98.
is about 1,085,000 men, organized into 81 line divisions. In general,
those of
the Satellite ground forces (not including/East Germany) have probably
reached the desired peacetime strength level. By 1957, primarily
through an increase of East German Forces, Sutellite ground personnel
will probably increase to about 1,200,000, a figure that probably will
not change significantly through 1960. The Satellite armies, which are
presently equipped largely with Soviet World War II material of good
quality, will continue to be largely dependent upon the USSR for major
items of equipment, particularly tanks, self-propelled guns, and medium
to heavy artillery.
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99. Air Forces. The Satellite air forces now have an estimated
TO&E strength of 3,850 aircraft (approximately 2,700 2,500 actual), and during
4800
this period their TO&E will probably increase to about 5,000 aircraft.
During this period emphasis will probably be placed on the strengthening
of the Satellite fighter and light bomber establishments, and the further
integration of the Satellite air forces into the Soviet air defense
system. The Satellites will continue to be greatly dependent upon the
USSR for logistic support, and virtually all aircraft will be Soviet
types. Satellite production, almost exclusively Polish and Czechoslovak,
while growing, will probably not exceed 15 percent of the Bloc total.
100. Naval Forces. Owing to their small size, their meager equip-
ment, and the unreliability of personnel, the Satellite navies provide
only a minor contribution to Soviet naval strength. However, ports and
bases in some of the Satellites provide the USSR with a considerable
extension of naval logistic and operational facilities.
COMMUNIST CHINESE MILITARY FORCES
The military forces of Communist China constitute the most
101.
formidable Asiatic fighting force. The Kremlin exercises no direct
17/ For strengths and dispositions, see Appendix HH' Table r,37.
For strengths of additional Bloc forces in Asia, see figures for
North Korean and Viet Minh forces given in the same tables 1 and
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control over these forces. However, the nature of Sino-Soviet relations,
especially the dependence of Communist China upon the USSR military sup-
port in weapons and supplies, provides the Kremlin with considerable
leverage for influencing Chinese military developments and policy. As
a consequence the military frontiers of the USSR, in a practical sense,
have been extended deep into the Asian land mass, a factor which greatly
increases the Soviet power base and potential.
102. Ground Forces. The Chinese Communist Army is well adapted by
tradition, training, and the characteristics of its individual soldiers
to the type of warfare likely to be encountered in the extremes of weather
and terrain of the Asian region. These forces now number about 2,300,000
men organized into 37 armies and 123 line divisions plus supporting troops.'
Any expansion during this period would be dependent upon the acquisition of
weapons and equipment from sources outside China. The Chinese Communist
forces have been primarily infantry, equipped with a heterogeneous assort-
ment of foreign-made weapons. A recent extensive reorganization and re-
equipment program has reduced the number of divisions, increased the number
of combat and service units, and is standardizing equipment to that of
Soviet and Chinese manufacture. Communist China now produces its own re-
clothing,
quirements of/food, small-arms, rocket launchers, recoilless rifles and
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certain types of ammunition, and progress is being made toward self-
sufficiency in submachine guns, light machine guns, and mortars. It
will continue to be dependent upon the Soviet Union for heavy equipment,
motor vehicles, artillery above 70-mm, and POL. The combat readiness
of the Chinese Communist ground forces will continue to increase during
this period, primarily due to the re-equipment program to standardization
of equipment, and to improved combut and service support.
Air Forces. The Communist Chinese Air Force now has/about 2,300 2,400
103. (about 1,700 actual)
aircraft. It is equipped primarily for defensive operations, but the
piston
acquisition of some/medium and jet light bombers has given it a limited
capability for offensive operations. The combat effectiveness of the CCAF
is only fair, but it will probably improve somewhat throughout the period
of this estimate, mainly through increased proficiency of flying personnel,
improved quality of aircraft, and more numerous and improved air facilities.
However, since Communist China will probably not produce combat aircraft
during the period of this estimate, over-all effectiveness will be largely
determined by Soviet willingness to continue to supply additional air-
craft, especially jet fighters, jet light bombers, and medium bonbers,
together with the necessary parts and equipment.
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Naval Forces. Communist major vessel strength probably now
104.
consists of two destroyers and 5-7 submarines (2-4 long-range and three
coastal types). The destroyers and most of the submarines these were ob-
tained from the USSR mooth them probably during the last year. There are also
at least 55 torpedo boats, (56 1 nding craft (LST, LSM, LSIL) 18, 7frigates
and several hundred-small patrol craft. The Soviet Far Eastern naval
forces are providing training, advisors, and logistic support to the Chinese
Communist naval forces. The USSR will probably add modestly to Chinese
Communist naval strength during the period of this estimate.
18/
In addition there are 25 landing craft of these types operating in
the Chinese Communist merchant marine.
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VI. MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE USSR
WORLD BALANCE OF MILITARY FORCES
105. During the postwar period a rough balance of military
power has existed between the Communist Bloc and the Western
coalition. During most of this period the USSR's main military
assets have been a marked superiority in organized military man-
power and in conventional weapons, and the ability, because of
the strategic advantage of its "heartland" position, to concentrate
these forces against such strategically vital areas as Western Europe
and the Middle East. At the same time the principal offsetting
strengths of the West have been its greater economic potential and
its nuclear capabilities. The effectiveness of the latter has been
greatly contributed to by the development of bases around the
periphery of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Since 1951 the margin of Bloc
numerical superiority in forces-in-being and conventional ground
and air armaments has been narrowed markedly; in fact Western
strength in modern aircraft is now greater than that of the Soviet
Bloc. On the other hand, although the West has greatly increased
its nuclear weapons production and delivery capabilities, the growing
Soviet capabilities in these respects are progressively reducing the
significance of the superiority.
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106. During the period of this estimate the West will probably con-
tinue to maintain its lead in the development and introduction of new
weapons. The West will also retain its sizable lead in trained air and
naval personnel, and to the extent that West German and possibly Japanese
rearnament take place, the Soviet superiority in ground forces-in-being
may be reduced. On the other hand improving air strengths will give the
USSR a greatly increased capability to conduct long-range air operations
against the West, probably including two-way refueled missions to the US.
Their Its modern long-range submarine fleet will pose an increasing threat to
Allied raval forces and to shipping carrying supplies and reinforcements to
Allied forces. Trained reserves, plus stockpiled equipment permit a rapid
mobilization of additional units to augment their already strong ground
forces. These developments, along with other increasing Soviet strengths
such as a significant increase in nuclear weapons would reduce the
significance of the Western nuclear and logistics superiority, and possibly
reduce the military value of the superior western economic potential.
107. The development of nuclear weapons and of the ability to
deliver such weapons on target will probably be the most decisive
single factor that could alter the relative military power of the
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Communist Bloc and the US-NATO coalition. At present, the USSR's
principal capability for delivering nuclear weapons lies in attack
by aircraft; the improved new bombers becoming operational during the
period will greatly increase this capability. In addition, although
specific evidence is lacking on the types of guided missiles under
priority development in the USSR, Soviet capabilities for nuclear
attack by means of guided missiles will probably become significant,
especially in the period 1958-1960. Nevertheless, provided there
are no significant alterations in present political alignments or
US-NATO military programs, the USSR almost certainly will not achieve
by 1960 any such gains in relative military power as would permit it
to launch general war with assurance of success. While trends in
weapons developments will increasingly give an advantage to a power
capable of launching a massive surprise attack, the USSR will almost
certainly not be able, during the period of this estimate, to launch
such an attack with assurance of escaping an even more devastating
retaliatory attack.
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SINO-SOVIET BLOC AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES 19/
108. The air forces of the Sino-Soviet Bloc are capable of
US and Allied
attacking the/bases, especially those on the periphery of the Bloc,
task forces
or the carrier / from which Western air operations could be launched
against the Bloc. In a strictly defensive sense, the air defense
system of the USSR provides for the potential employment of virtually
all Soviet and Satellite fighters- about 14,000 aircraft, including
3,700 fighters in the Soviet Aviation of Air Defense (PVO). In
North Dorean
addition, the Chinese Communists have about 900 jet fighters
contribute tothe
which are to some degree integrated with defenses in of the Soviet
Far East. The assignment of an air defense role to the fighter
forces does not cancel their other missions and responsibilities,
but results in a "multiple mission" for most fighter forces.
109. The capabilities estimated below are substantially
limited to the areas of dense air defense concentration (European
USSR, Eastern Europe, and the Maritime-South Manchuria area of the
Far East). Air defense capabilities in other areas would probably
19/ NIE 11-5-55, "Bloc Air Defense Capabilities, 1955-1960'," scheduled
for publication in July, will provide a detailed treatment of
this subject.
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be considerably less than indicated below and virtually nonexistent
in the North Siberian area, the greater part of China, Indochina,
and Albania.
a. Against daylight bomber formations between 10,000
and 30,000 feet in clear weather the Soviet Bloc air
defense system is believed capable of inflicting
severe losses against piston bombers and moderate
losses against high-speed jet bombers. Above 30,000
feet altitude this capability would begin to diminish,
and above 40,000 feet would fall off markedly, due
loss of MA effectiveness
to problems of target detection and tracking,/and
reduced GCI capabilities. Under certain circumstances,
such as persistent visible contrails, these capabilities
would, of course, be markedly increased. Primary
limitations would then be the numbers and individual
capabilities of fighter interceptor aircraft available.
b. Against multiple-pronged penetrations utilizing
altitude stacking, diversionary tactics, and
electronics countermeasures, the Soviet Bloc air
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defense system is subject to serious breakdowns
which would tend to degrade its effectiveress
progressively.
c. Against air attacks conducted under poor visibility
conditions the Soviet Bloc air defense system is
capable of offering only limited resistance, wing
to inadequacy of equipment and training for all-
weather operations.
110. During the period of this estimate the Bloc air defense
system will probably be substantially strengthened by greater operational
experience and by the intr duction into operational units of new fighter
types, new antiaircraft weapors, improved early warning and GCI equipment,
and surface to air guided missiles. However, in view of the increasing
1
capabilities of offersive weapons and improved techniques in counter
measures, Soviet air defense capabilities will probably rennin inadequate
to prevent attacking forces from reaching critical target areas of the
USSR in effective numbers.
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20
OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES
111. The main core of Soviet offensive strength at present is on ability
his the
to mount attacks against Western Europe and the UK. Air attacks of great
weight involving nuclear weapons could be launched with little or no
warning. Submarines could be employed in an extensive effort to disrupt
reinforcements and supplies from North America. With its ground forces
the USSR could launch a surprise attack against Western Europe using 25 to
30 Soviet ground divisions now in Eastern Europe. By prior concentration
of greater forces west of the Oder-Neisse line, involving almost certain
loss of surprise, the USSR could attack with 50 to 60 divisions. A
build-up to 75 to 140 divisions could be accomplished by D-plus 90.
Satellite units could be used to reinforce the above attacks, but it is
unlikely that European Satellite armies would be used independently,
except as security forces or to protect Soviet lines of communication,
or in isolated cases against traditional enemies (e.g., Bulgaria VS.
Yugoslavia).
20
No estimate of the success of the offensive operations described
in this action can be made without considering the effects of the
actions of opposing forces.
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112. Air support of land campaigns in Western Europe could come
from approximately 2,200 aircraft presently stationed in East Germany
and the Satellites, with reinforcements available from the nearly 5,000
aircraft stationed in the Western USSR. However, a large proportion of
these aircraft are fighter interceptor types in units which currently have
an air defense responsibility as well as a tactical support role. This
responsibility would to some degree limit commitment of fighter aircraft to
participate in land campaigns. The probable increase in satellite air
defense capabilities during this period may reduce this limitation.
113. Utilizing only those aircraft belonging to the Aviation of
Airborne Troops, the USSR could lift about 9,000 well-equipped and
well-trained troops with one drop on D-Day or about 14,000 with two drops.
These troops could be assembled in ten days, and could be delivered to
Rhine River crossing sites and nearby military installations by aircraft
using bases in Poland and Czechoslovakia For a five-day operation the
Aviation of Airborne Troops could lift approximately 23,000 - 25,000
troops depending on whether one or two drops were executed on D-Day.
This lift capacity could be increased by an average of 1800 troops for
every 100 transports borrowed from the 3,500 transports of the military
air forces and civil air fleet. However, at least during the early period
of the estimate nearly all of these forces would have to be carried in
the low performance transport Li-2 (approximately C.47 characteristics),
and this would place a significant limitation upon the effectiveness of
such an operation. Soviet airlift capabilities will probably increase
through 1960, but the lack of a large force of modern transport aircraft
will probably continue to be a limitation.
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five-day maximum effort, we believe that the USSR could deliver
approximately 55,000 troops. This lift capacity could be increased by
about 2,000 troops for every 100 transports borrowed from the 3,500
transports of the military air forces and civil air fleet. However, at
least during the early period of the estimate, nearly all of these forces
would have to be carried in the low performance transport Li-2 (approxi-
nately C-47 characteristics), and this would place a significant
limitation upon the effectiveness of such an operation: Soviet airlift
capabilities will probably increase through 1960, but the lack of a large
force of modern transport aircraft will probably continue to be a
linitation.
114. In the Far East, Soviet capabilities for long-continued full-
scale war are considerably limited by the capacity of the Trans-Siberian
railway, the only route by which supplies in large amounts could be brought
from other parts of the USSR. However, the USSR has about 30 divisions in
the Far East, together with more than 5,000 aircraft and a sizable naval
force. There are stockpiles of supplies sufficient for a considerable
period of combat. These Soviet forces could, in conjunction with Chinese
Communist forces, renew hostilities in Korea. They could probably launch
an invasion of Japan with an initial assault strength of one airborne and
+
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two or three waterborne divisions, with about six divisions supporting.
These attacks could be launched concurrently with campaigns in the
Middle East and in Western Europe.
115. The USSR is now capable of undertaking concurrent air bombardment
operations against strengths located in the US, the UK, continental Europe,
the Middle East, Japan, and the island chain of Asia This capability
will improve considerably during the period of this estimate with the
introduction of new jet medium and heavy bombers Present Soviet
capabilities for air attack on the continental US are limited by the
relatively small numbers of operational heavy bombers and by the
relatively undeveloped base facilities in forward areas They are
also probably limited by the lack of a developed inflight refueling
capability The forward base capacity and the performance characteristics
of aircraft estimated to be available to the Soviets will continue to
impose limits upon the number of strike aircraft which can be launched
at one time in an intercontinental attack upon the United States. However,
the increase in numbers of the BISON heavy jet bomber, and continued
Long-Range Aviation training programs, together with the probable
development of an inflight refueling capability and extensive improvement
of the forward staging areas would result in a substantial increase in
Soviet capabilities for attack on the United States, during the period of
this estimate. 21/
21/ For a full discussion see NIE 11-7-55, "Soviet Gross Capabilities
for Attacks on the US and Key Overseas Installations and Forces
through 1 July 1958" dated May 17, 1955
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116. At the present time, it would be technically feasible for the
USSR to attack targets within the US with missiles launched from long-
range aircraft and from submarines. The USSR could at present have V-1
type missiles with nuclear warheads for launching from submarines, and
by late 1955 could have for this purpose a subsonic guided missile with
a maximum range of 500 nautical miles We believe that it will not be
within Soviet capability within the period of this estimate to attack
continental United States with guided missiles launched from Soviet
Bloc territory
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117. If the USSR in fact develops the guided missiles which
we have estimated to be within its capabilities, the following
possibilities for attack would exist during the period of this
estimate:
C. At present, from advanced bases in Eastern Europe,
targets could be reached in Western Europe as far
west as London, Paris, and Rome, and in the southern
half of the Scandinavian peninsula. In the Far
East, if launched from Soviet or North Korean territory,
these weapons could reach targets in western Japan
and Alaska; if launched from Chinese territory, they
could reach targets in the Ryukyu Islands and Jormosa
22/
b. In 1957, Soviet guided missiles could reach all of
the UK, France, Italy, Scandinavia, and Turkey. In
the Far East, if launched from Soviet or North
Korean territory, these weapons could reach all of
the Japanese islands, and if launched from China they
could reach all of Luzon.
22/
C. In 1958-1960, Soviet missiles could reach US North
African bases in Tunisia, in addition to the targets
listed above.
22 These have been estimated to be the earliest probable dates of the
availability of the missiles described; it is possible that the
date might be still earlier. See NIE 11-6-54 "Probable Warning of
Soviet Attack on the US Through Mid-1958", for a fuller discussion
of this point.
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118. During the period of this estimate Soviet offensive naval
capabilities will still be limited to undersea warfare, surface
operations involving vessels no larger than cruisers, and air
operations utilizing shore-based naval aircraft. The Soviet sub-
marine force will greatly increase its capability to undertake offen-
sive patrols and mining operations along most of the world's strategi-
cally situated sea lanes, and possibly to launch guided missiles attacks
against targets on both the Atlantic and Pacific seaboards of the US.
Major Soviet surface units and supporting shore-based naval aircraft
will probably continue to increase their capability to undertake offensive
operations in Bloc coastal areas, especially in the Baltic and Black Seas,
and to protect the seawar flank of ground campaigns. The Soviet Navy
will almost certainly have no long-range amphibious capability within
the period of this estimate, but it will remain capable of mounting
short-range amphibious lifts in considerable force.
119. We estimate that the USSR now has C. stock of over 500,000
mines and has the capability to employ mine warfare to interfere seriously
with allied sea communications. In the European area, this effort could
include all the ports and approaches of the UK and Western Europe. In
the Far East, most of the vital allied port areas and sea lanes around
the perimeter of the Bloc could be similarly attacked.
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