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National Intelligence Estimate 11-3-55, Soviet Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses of Action Through 1960, Part 4 of 5
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National Intelligence Estimate 11-3-55, Soviet Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses of Action Through 1960, Part 4 of 5
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TOP SECRET
VII. SOVIET ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION
THE FACTOR OF COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY
120. The policy of any state is conditioned by the particular view
which its leaders have of the world situation and of the dangers and op-
portunities which it presents to them. The Soviet leaders' view of the
world situation is affected by their Communist ideology and by their iso-
lation from the general currents of world opinion. It is of particular
importance in estimating Soviet courses of action, therefore, to take into
account the fact that events outside the Communist Orbit or developments
in relations between the USSR and the West may frequently have for the
Soviet leaders a meaning quite different from that which they have for
non-Communist statesmen.
121. The ideblogical heritage of the 1917 revolution remains a
principal determinant of the Soviet view of developments in the world sit-
untion. The Soviet leaders still view world developments in terms of an
irreconcilable conflict between the "camps" of Communism and capitalism
which will continue until Communism has triumphed throughout the world. In
large part, this view both determines their long-term objectives and colors
their interpretations of Western actions and developments. We believe that
- 97 -
DECLASSIFIED
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Authority MR95-300
By fin NLE/Date 1/11/96
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the validity of the guiding principles of Communist ideology has in Soviet
eyes been confirmed in the main by the course of events in the war and
postwar periods.
THE POSTWAR BACKGROUND
122. Soviet leaders recognized towards the end of World War II
that a situation favorable to Communist expansion existed in a large
part of the non-Communist world. Hence they pursued their advantage as
fast and as far as they could in expanding the Communist sphere and ex-
tending Soviet influence. After some time their progress slowed down,
especially in Europe, and ran against increasing opposition as the non-
Communist world gradually re-established stability. The Soviet leaders
are probably aware that it was the advance of Soviet power in Central
Europe and in Asia that called forth an increasingly stubborn Western
counteraction and consolidated Western opposition. Beginning in 1947,
and at an accelerated rate after 1950, the Western nations build up their
power and cohesion to the point where further Communist expansion in
Europe, and even in some parts of Asia, could no longer be accomplished
without risk of general war. At the same time, and accomodation with
the West, even if the USSR had wished it, came to depend upon concessions
- 98 -
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so costly to the USSR's power position that the Soviet leaders clearly
regarded them as unacceptable.
123. Faced with a world situation increasingly inhospitable to
their aims, the Soviet leaders have sought to find a middle way between
the alternatives of war or accomodation at unacceptable cost. They have
proceeded on the assumption that both Western fear of war and hope for
peace could be manipulated to advance Soviet objectives. Consequently,
a policy of alternating menace and conciliation was adopted to encourage
the view in the West that Soviet expansionist aims would be moderated
if the Western Powers refrained from measures in their own defense which
the USSR portrayed as provocative. This policy required no abandonment
of expansionist aims nor any cessation of Communist aggression, at least
where such aggression could be carried out without grave risk of general
war. In the period after Stalin's death, however, Soviet policy began
to place relatively more emphasis on the element of conciliation, pos-
sibly in some degree because of the pressure of Soviet internal problems,
but apparently mainly in the belief that for an interin period at least
such tactics were more likely to weaken :Western opposition.
- 99 -
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THE SOVIET VIEW OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
124. The Soviet leaders probably believe that the US remains
firm in its intention to oppose Communist expansion, and that it means
to persist in its effort to bring all important strategic areas peripheral
to the Bloc into closer linkage with the US defense systen. They probably
also estimate that the US is unlikely deliberately to initiate general war
during the next few years. The Soviet leaders probably believe that, due
to their increasing nuclear capability, a situation is appreaching in
which a general war involving use by both sides of nuclear weapons would
bring about such extensive destruction as to threaten the survival of
both Western civilization and the Soviet system. They probably estimate
that a situation of mutual deterrence could develop in which each side
would be strongly inhibited from initiating general war or taking
actions which it regarded as materially increasing the risk of general
war. However, they probably estimate that the US would not be deterred,
by fear of the consequences of general war, from using its full military
capabilities if it believed that its security was imminently threatened.
The Soviet leaders almost certainly believe that overt armed aggression
by Bloc forces against any state formally allied with the US would result
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in the employment of US military power as necessary to counter such
aggression. They probably also estimate that such aggression against
a state not formally allied to the US would involve risk of US military
reaction, but that the degree of this risk, and the dimensions of the US
reaction, would depend upon the importance to the US of the country at-
tacked, the circumstances of the attack, and the political situation
within the US and non-Corrunist world generally.
125. The Seviet leaders probably recognize that the success of
the US effort to prevent further Communist expansion depends heavily
upon the ability of the US to establish and maintain cohesion in the
non-Communist world. Some developments of the last year, such as the
failure of the Western Powers to present a united front at the Geneva
Conference, their subsequent inability to associate more Asian states
with the defense of Southeast Asia, and the unwillingness of most
Western and Asian states to support US policy toward Cormunist China,
may indicate to the Soviet leaders a decline in US ability to maintain
such cohesion. They probably believe that the influence of India will
continue to grow, and that it may become the leader of a group of states
capable of an independent role in world affairs. They may also believe
that Germany and Japan will become increasingly capable of taking an
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independent position. On the other hand, they probably now recognize
that certain aggressive actions by the Sino-Soviet Bloc tend to in-
crease the willingness of the non-Communists to follow US leadership.
At the same time they probably estimate that there are areas and problems
in which such actions would have the opposite effect. While they may not
expect during the next few years to accomplish the defection of any states
formerly allied with the US, they probably believe that their own policies
can encourage frictions within the Western alliance, undermine the willing-
ness of US allies to support the US in policies of firmess and weaken US
influence among uncommitted states.
126. The Soviet lenders probably believe that trends in the develop-
ment of Western military strength do not present them with any irmediate
threat, either of war or of a weakening of their position in negotiations.
While Western Nuclear capabilities will continue to improve, this
development will not alter essentially the situation which the USSR has
faced throughout the postwar period. Moreover the West's advantage
in this respect is being reduced as the USSR.
- 102 -
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develops its own nuclear capabilities. The Soviet leaders probably reco-
gnize that the present rough balance of military power could be altered
in favor of the West by the appearance of major military power in West
Germany and Japan, but they probably now believe that German or Japanese
rearmament is not likely to take place on a significant scale during the
next two or three years at least. The Soviet leaders will have noted
that the declining trend in Western military expenditures has continued
despite the recent increase in their own military budget. Therefore, they
are probably quite confident that Western military power, although re-
maining formidable, is not now being developed at a rate which will permit
the application of substantially increased military pressure on the USSR.
127. The Soviet leaders have always reckoned heavily on a deterio-
ration of "capitalist" economies to undermine non-Communist strength and
to produce "imperialist contraditions" which would range the Western
Powers against each other. Despite the continuing vigor of the economies
of Western Europe and the failure of the long-awaited US depression to
materialize the Soviet leaders are unlikely to have been shaken in their
view that long-term trends point to eventual economic crisis in capitalist
countries. They are aware, moreover, that the economies of some states
- 103 -
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of critical importance to the Western alliance, such as Germany and
Japan, would probably prove vulnerable in the event of even a moderately
serious decline in levels of trade. The latter they probably regard as
a possibility even in the short term, and one which, if it did develop,
might produce a political situation which they could exploit.
PROBABLE SOVIET ESTIMATE OF FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
128. On balance, the Soviet leaders probably estimate that there
is at present no critical threat to their security, and that there may be re-
newed opportunities for Communist expansion by means short of general war.
They probably estimate that Western power and unity are vulnerable to
Soviet political action, and may become increasingly SO. Therefore,
the Soviet leaders probably believe that they can rely primarily upon
political means, and in some cases military action by local forces, to
carry on their struggle against the non-Communist world.
129. However, the Soviet leaders almost certainly recognize that
developments may occur during the period of this estimate which would
require a revision of this judgment. Some of the problems which presently
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concern Soviet policy-makers could develop in such a way as to present
direct threat to Soviet security interests. Others might take a course
which, while not involving Soviet security interests directly, could
heighten international tensions, engage the prestige of the Sino-
Soviet Bloc, and cause the USSR to revise its estimate of Western in-
tentions. Possible developments which might lead to Soviet leaders to
make such a revision would include the following: (a) a rate or scale
of West German rearmament greater than that presently foreseen, or
aggressive NATO policies in Europe as a result of influence exercised
within NATO by a rearmed West Germany, (b) actions by Communist China
which led to hostilities or imminent danger of hostilities between
Communist China and the US; (c) rearmament of Japan on a major scale,
including the acquistion of offensive weapons by Japanese forces; and (a)
commitment of SEATO forces in Indochina to prevent the Communists from
gaining control of the country by military action.
-105-
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VIII. PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION
23/
PRESENT SOVIET OBJECTIVES
130. We believe that the developments within the sphere of
Soviet power and the Soviet estimate of the world situation
which have been discussed in the foregoing sections have led the
Soviet leaders to assess their own situation somewhat as follows:
the balance of military power in the world and the increasing
destructiveness of nuclear weapons are such that general war would
involve very heavy risks to the Communist sphere, extending pos-
sibly to the destruction of the Soviet regime. On the other hand,
non-Communist strength is not so great nor the intentions of the
non-Communist powers so menacing as to make withdrawals from the
present advanced positions in Europe and Asia seem necessary.
Moreover, in view of the growing military capabilities of the Bloc
23/ This section deals with Soviet external courses of action. Soviet
intentions with respect to various internal developments are
treated in preceding sections of the paper. In the summary of
Soviet objectives contained in the first two paragraphs of this
section, however, objectives internal to the USSR and to the Sino-
Soviet Bloc are included.
- 106 -
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and the frictions within the non-Communist world, the Communists
probably estimate that they can make progress toward their objectives
through political action, or in some cases by localized military action.
The Soviet Bloc faces serious internal problems which include the
correction of certain weaknesses in the Bloc economy, particularly in
agricultural production, and the necessity to build up economic power
in the Bloc as a step toward balancing the vastly greater economic
potential of the West. These problems do not imply a weakness which
requires neglect of opportunities for expansion under circumstances
of limited risk.
131. We believe that the Soviet leaders will concentrate on the
following principal objectives during the period of this estimate:
a. To increase the economic and military strength of the
Sino-Soviet Bloc;
b. To promote the political and economic instability of
non-Communist states, and to render them incapable of
decisive action by fostering and exploiting dissensions
within and among them;
c. To effect a degree of disarmament, including the outlawing
of nuclear weapons, under conditions favorable to the Communists;
- 107 -
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To bring about the withdrawal of US power from its
present advanced bases around the periphery of the
Bloc;
To impede or offset the rearmament of West Germany
and its association with the Western Powers;
To detach Japan from the sphere of Western influence
and encourage its closer association with the Sino-
Soviet Bloc;
To expand Communist influence and, as opportunities
develop, to extend the area of. Communist control.
COURSES OF ACTION - GENERAL
Military
132. In foregoing sections of this paper it was estimated
that the Soviet leaders probably now believe (a) that general war
would present formidable hazards to the survival of their system,
and (b) that they can advance toward their objectives by actions
short of general war. Therefore, we believe that during the period
of this estimate the Kremlin will try to avoid courses of action,
and to deter Communist China from courses of action, which in its
- 108 -
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judgment would clearly involve substantial risk of general war.
The Soviet leaders are unlikely to believe that Soviet, Communist
Chinese, or European Satellite forces can be used in open attacks
across state frontiers during this period without running such a
risk. However, the USSR or one of the Sino-Soviet Bloc countries
might engage in indirect aggression or take action such as attacking
Formosa or the offshore islands, which would create a situation in
which the US or its allies, rather than yield an important position,
would take counteraction which could lead to general war. We believe,
moreover, that the Kremlin would not be deterred by the risk of general
war from taking counteraction against a Western action which it con-
sidered an imminent threat to Soviet security. Thus, general war might
occur during the period of this estimate as the climax of a series of
actions and counteractions, initiated by either side, which neither side
originally intended to lead to general war.
133. It is possible that at some time during the period of
this estimate the USSR might come to believe that world developments
had taken a turn that would ultimately lead to a serious impairment
of Soviet security. Such a belief might develop, for example, as
- 109 -
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a result of developments in Germany or in connection with an
armed conflict between the US and Communist China. In such a
situation the USSR might feel impelled to undertake
local military action
in order to forestall an
inevitable deterioration of its security position, even though
such action would entail heightened risk of general war. "e
believe, however, that even under these circumstances the USSR
would seek to keep any resulting conflict localized and to avoid
general war.
134. By the end of the period of this estimate the USSR will
have a greatly increased capability to inflict destruction with
particularly
nuclear weapons, / on the US itself. Nevertheless, the Soviet
leaders will probably still not be confident that they could attack
the US with nuclear weapons without exposing the USSR to an even
more devastating counterblow. We believe, therefore, that the USSR
will continue to try to avoid substantial risks of general war
despite the increase of its nuclear capabilities. However, as
these capabilities grow, Soviet leaders may come to estimate that
the US, because of fear for itself or for its allies, will
be as pressure
hylis allies,
increasingly deterred from initiating the devastation entailed in
110 -
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a full-scale nuclear war. They may therefore come to believe that
local wars will be less likely than at present to expand into
general war, and thus that superior Soviet Bloc military capa-
bilities in certain local areas can be exercised without substantial
risk of provoking general war. In diplomatic negotiations the Soviet
leaders will almost certainly try to take advantage of the increased
urgency with which Western governments, pressed by their better-
informed public opinion, will strive to escape nuclear war through
peaceful solutions. We believe it unlikely, however, that in a
situation of sharp and general international crisis the USSR would
seek to break Testern determination by direct and open threats of
nuclear attack. The Soviet leaders would probably fear that such
tactics would bring about a situation in which war would become
unavoidable, and they might even fear that they would provoke a
preventive attack by the US.
Dip] omacy and Propaganda
We believe that Soviet diplomacy during the period of this
estimate will not be directed toward a general settlement between
the USSR and the West. It will almost certainly continue to combine
moves intended to ease international tensions with other moves which
increase such tensions, and with political warfare pressures calculated
TOP SECRET
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make concessions on some local issues, and the recent moves
toward an Austrian treaty may prove to be such a case. They may
also make proposals for settlements which will be plausible to
some non-Communist nations but unacceptable to others. The Soviet
leaders probably hope that such tactics will carry an implication
to the non-Communist world of Soviet willingness to settle major
outstanding issues, and stimulate doubts in the non-Communist
world regarding the reasonableness of US leadership. Moves
apparently intended to ease international tension will probably be
alternated with political warfare pressures calculated to play
upon the non-Communist world's fear of war.
136. We believe that the USSR will place continuing emphasis
in its diplomacy and propaganda upon proposals for the control or
abolition of nuclear weapons. The Soviet leaders will probably
try by such maneuvers to hold out to the non-Communist world the
prospect of release from the threat of nuclear warfare, and, by
seeking to place upon the US the blame for failure to achieve
workable control arrangements, to stimulate doubts about the rea-
sonableness and moderation of US policies in this field. We believe
it highly unlikely that the USSR during the period of this estimate
1 112 -
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will agree to any plan which would involve inspection within the
USSR under provisions acceptable to the Western Powers. Soviet
proposals regarding the control of nuclear weapons will probably
be designed primarily to erect political, psychological, and moral
barriers to US freedom of action in the use of nuclear weapons.
Trade and Technical Assistance
137.
Basic Soviet economic philosophy, and the shortages
of commodities which the non-Communist world is willing to accept
from the Bloc will continue to act as deterrents to any major
nevertheless
change in the present Soviet trade pattern./the Communist probably
estimate that political dividends can be earned from even small
increases in their current volumes of trade with individual non-
Communist states. The countries most vulnerable to this form of
political warfare, in the Soviet view, would probably be in under-
developed areas. Moreover, the Soviet leaders might be willing to
accept certain economic losses for political gains in areas of
prime strategic significance, such as Germany or Japan. In any
case, they will almost certainly seek to increase trade with these
14 113 -
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TOP SEGRET
countries during the course of this estimate. The Soviet leaders
will probably also try to expand Soviet economic influence in
selected areas through technical assistance or the sponsorship
of development programs. In some cases these programs could take
the form of technical training missions or the sponsorship of
training programs for foreign technicans within the USSR and
could consequently be carried out at small cost.
- 114 -
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COURSES OF ACTION IN PARTICULAR AREAS
Europe
138. The principal objective of Soviet policy in Europe during the
period of this estimate will be to obtain a solution of the German problem
favorable to Soviet interests. Prevention or slowing down of West German
rearmament and blocking the development of West Germany's ties with the
NATO powers have first priority. The Soviet leaders probably recognize
that the three principal Western Powers are committed to West German rearm-
ament at present, and probably estimate that any direct Soviet attempt
to foster differences among them with the aim of halting the im-
plementation of the Paris Agreements would fail. They recognize
and, in particular, French apprehension concerning German re-
that Franco-German differences/will remain and may even sharpen armament,
during the next few years, but they know that France alone does not
have the power to stop West German rearmament once it has begun.
The West Germans themselves, however, do have this power, and the
Soviet leaders probably believe that the continuing desire for unity
will make West Germany susceptible to influences within the power
of Soviet policy to apply.
Consequently, the USSR will almost certainly make great effort
139.
Consequently, Soviet policy will probably tend increasingly
to influence the situation in West Germany itself. It will almost
to concentrate directly on West Germany for the achievement of its
certainly in-
objectives. Included in this policy will almost certainly be in-
creased propaganda and political warfare measures designed to
encourage the existing anti-rearmament sentiment in West Germany.
- 115 -
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Beyond this, the USSR will probably seek to increase points of
contact on trade and other matters between itself and the West
German government. These contacts could be used to prepare for
the resumption of diplomatic relations and could be represented by
propaganda as leading to the possibility of direct political ne-
gotiations on German reunification. The Soviet leaders probably
calculate that a sedulous encouragement of German hopes for uni-
fication will, over the course of tire, increase neutralist feel-
ing in West Germany, reatly complicate the relations of the West
German government with its NATO partners, and undermine the unity
of purpose that has hitherto obtained within the NATO alliance.
Moreover, they may calculate that with the passing of Adenauer from
the scene, the internal political balance in Germany will change,
and that consequently a political climate will develop which would
be more favorable to attempts to detach West Germany from its ties
to the NATO powers.
140. While increasing its efforts to undermine West German
support for rearmament, the USSR will not relax its efforts to
weaken Western unity by playing upon fears and hopes elsewhere in
Western Europe. Soviet propaganda and diplomacy will be designed
to promote French confidence in the USSR's peaceful intentions and
- 116 -
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in the rensonableness of Soviet proposals, to stimulate French fears
of future German aggression, and to SOW resentment of US policy. In
Itely, as in France, the USSR possesses a powerful weapon in the large
native Communist party, and Italy will probably continue to be an important
target in the Soviet campaign to alienate Western Europe from the US and
undermine NATO.
141 If such measures did not, in the Soviet view, succeed in
countering the developing threat of West German rearmament, it is possible
that the Soviet leaders would accommodate themselves to the situation of
increased Western strength, and would pursue a cautious and nonprovocative
policy. We believe it more likely, however, that they would take rigorous
measures in an attempt to offset the accretion to the strength of the
West. These measures would include a sharp build-up of Soviet and
Satellite military capabilities, and might also include more threatening
courses of action against Berlin, or in the Far East, or elsewhere, with
the purpose of arousing fear of nuclear war in the West and causing Western
peoples to demand that their governments follow a cautious policy. We
believe that, even at this stage, the USSR would still avoid courses
of action which in its judgment clearly entailed the probability of
general war
142 It is also possible that the Soviet lenders might offer to
withdraw from East Germany in exchange for 2 guaranteed neutralization
-117
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and armament control of a unified Germany. Such a policy could offer
the advantages of halting German rearmament, reducing the strength
of US forces in Europe, and, together with an Austrian settlement,
creating in effect a neutralized zone in Central Europe. We be-
lieve that the chances likelinood of such a development is small, primarily
are lesothan even. 2/
because it seems to us that its uncertainties and disadvantages,
from the Soviet point of view, would far outweigh its advantages.
It might be adopted, however, if the Soviet leaders believed that
it offered the only means, short of general war, to prevent the de-
velopment of a critical threat to the security of the USSR.
143. The USSR will probably increase its efforts during the
course of this estimate to detach neutral states from the sphere
of Western influence. In Europe, the states most likely to be sub-
jected to Soviet pressure or inducements are Finland and Yugoslavia.
In Finland the USSR will probably continue to use pressures to in-
crease Finland's economic dependence upon the USSR. It might even,
in the event that developments in Germany made such a course appear
desirable, invoke the terms of the Soviet-Finnish Mutual Assistance
Treaty of 6 April 1948. 24/ The USSR will persist in its aim to wean
24 The terms of the treaty require Finland to join the USSR in re-
sisting aggression by Germany or any power allied with Germany,
and to "consult" with the USSR in the event of "threat" of such
aggression.
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The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, believes
that the estimate contained in this sentence should read: "We
believe that the likelihood of such a development is small, primarily
because it seems to us that its uncertainties and disadvantages, from
the Soviet point of view, would far outweigh its advantages
TOP SECRET
Yugoslavia away from its present ties with the West and might make
additional concessions to accomplish this. Any internal crisis
in Yugoslavia, such as might follow the death of Tito for example,
would probably see an intensification of these efforts.
Asia 25/
144. In Northeast Asia the principal objective of Soviet policy
during the course of this estimate almost certainly will be to de-
tach Japan from the sphere of US influence. The Soviet leaders
probably believe that the political instability of Japan will render
it increasingly vulnerable to Communist pressures, including that
which the Japanese Communist Party exerts through its influence in
other political organizations. Most importantly, in the Soviet
view, Japan's critical need for markets and for raw materials will
make Communist trade solicitations increasingly more attractive,
and create frictions between Japan and the West. The USSR almost
certainly intends, in concert with Communist China, to employ these
weapons of political warfare vigorously during the course of this
estimate, and probably believes that with the normalization of
25 / See NIE 10-7-54, "Communist Courses of Action in Asia Through 1957",
23 November 1954, which deals with Chinese Communist as well as
Soviet intentions in Asia. A separate NIE on Chinese Communist
capabilities and courses of action will appear later in 1955.
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relations with Japan which would follow the signing of a peace
treaty, its opportunities to detach Japan from US influence would
be greatly enhanced.
145. We believe that the USSR is in substantial agreement
with Chinese Communist objectives to destroy the Chinese Nationalist
Government and to gain control of all territory held by it, but is
concerned to restrain Peiping from adopting policies which would
clearly involve substantial risk of general war. The Soviet leaders
probably believe they can derive advantage from issues in the Formosa
Strait by combining public advocacy of Peiping's claims with a con-
ciliatory posture calculated to impress the world with the sincerity
of Soviet efforts to reach a peaceful settlement. The primary
Soviet motivation in this is to exploit the issue in such a way as
to SOW distrust of the US among neutral nations and to promote a maxi-
mum of discord between the US and its allies. Moscow almost cer-
tainly does not consider that its vital national interests are in-
volved in issues arising in the Formosa Strait. We believe that
Moscow might see certain advantages in clashes between Chinese
Communist and US forces, provided it believed that the clashes would
be limited and localized. However, we also believe that the USSR
will seek to prevent a situation from arising in the Formosa Strait
which in its view would carry grave risks of major hostilities between
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the US and Communist China, since the Soviet leaders probably believe
that such hostilities would also entail grave risk of Soviet involvement.
146. The Soviet lenders probably consider that if major hostilities
between Communist China and the US should occur, the USSR would be
presented with extremely grave choices They would probably give the
Chinese Communists support in weapons and material, and the scale of
this aid would probably increase in proportion to the threat to the
Chinese Communist regime
As hostilities expanded and the threat to
the Chinese Communist regime increased, they would probably engage Soviet
forces in defensive operations, to the extent that they felt they could
plausibly deny such involvement Should the conflict progress so far
that destruction of the Chinese Communist regime appeared probable, we
believe that the Soviet leaders would recognize that open intervention on
their part sufficient to save the Chinese regime would involve extremely
grave risk of general war with the US with its consequent threat to the
survival of the Soviet system In deciding upon c. course of action, the
Soviet lenders would have to weigh the strenghts which they could bring
to bear in the struggle against those which would be opposed to them, and
the dangers to their own regime of a possible global war with the US
-121.
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against the strategic and psychological consequences to them of destruction
of the Chinese Communist regime We believe, on balance, they would
conclude that loss of the Chinese Communist regime would be sufficiently
damaging and final to cause them to resort to open intervention to save
that regime
3/
147 Southerst Asia will almost certainly appear to the USSR to be
the most profitable field for the extension of Communist influence, at
least during the carly period of this estimate The Soviet leaders
will probably continue, in concert with Communist
The Director of Naval Intelligence, and the Deputy Director for
Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believe that the last sentence over-
states the willingness of the Soviet leaders to risk their own regime
and would substitute for the last sentence:
"On balance, we believe that they would not consider the
elimination of the Chinese Communist regime sufficiently damaging,
or final, to warrant the risk to their own regime which open
intervention would entail."
-121A-
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China, to support Communist subversive activities, and possibly
armed revolt if local circumstances are favorable. However, if
the activities of local Communist groups stimulate anti-Communist
attitudes within Asian states or tend to unite these states in
joint resistance with Western powers, the Kremlin may choose to
exercise its influence to hold local Communist movements in check.
The USSR will consider the interests and possible gains of local
Communist movements as subordinate to the broader purpose of Soviet
strategy in the world conflict.
148. The Soviet leaders almost certainly believe that the US
will make substantial efforts to prevent South Vietnam from falling
under Communist control. In attempting to frustrate such efforts,
Soviet policy will be guided by the concern to avoid actions which would
consolidate the Western allies on the Indochina issue and bring
them wider support in Asia. The Soviet leaders probably believe
that the US will accede to the initiation of negotiations in prepara-
tion for the elections in 1956, but will cause conditions and issues
to be introduced with a view to obstructing the negotiations and
preventing or delaying theelections. If the US succeeds in postponing
the elections, or if it adopts measures which seriously reduce
Communist capabilities for further expansion in Indochina through
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legal means, the USSR would still regard Communist opportunities
for expansion through subversion as good. It would probably support
military action by local guerrillas and infiltrated Viet Minh mili-
tary elements, but would probably seek to restrain the Viet Minh
from openly crossing the demarcation line with large organized
forces, at least as long as military intervention by the Manila
Pact powers seemed likely to result.
149. The principal concern of Soviet policy in South Asia
will be to encourage and exploit the neutralism already present in
the area. The Soviet leaders probably hope thereby to promote
differences within the British Commonwealth over ways of dealing with
Communism in Asia. They would expect such differences to affect
Anglo-American relations adversely, and to render difficult the
efforts of the Western powers to enlist the support of Asian peoples
in effective opposition to further Communist advances in Asia.
India in particular is likely to receive increasing attention and
consideration in the USSR's conduct of the world struggle,
Middle East
150. The USSR has devoted increased attention to the countries
of this area during the last year. It has settled long-standing
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border and financial issues with Iran and has achieved a growing
influence over the economy of Afghanistan, mainly through ex-
panded trade and economic development programs. The USSR has
attempted through propaganda and diplomacy to prevent the exten-
sion of Middle East defense plans, and in particular has warned
Iran of the undesirable consequences that would stem from formal
Iranian adherence to any non-Soviet military bloc. If Iran moves
openly to take such a step, the USSR would almost certainly adopt
a more truculent attitude, and would probably threaten to invoke
1921
its treaty agreements with Iran, which provide for Soviet occupa-
tion of northern Iran under certain circumstances. We believe,
however, that the USSR would not openly intervene in Iran with
military force unless it had decided for reasons of policy unrelated
to Iran to accept substantial risk of general war. The USSR will
probably step up its activities throughout the Middle East in pro-
portion to the success of present Western efforts to build toward
a situation of strength through regional alliance and external
military support. The USSR will probably in any case press its
present effort to gain a controlling position in Afghanistan.
Latin America
151. The USSR will continue its efforts through local Com-
munist parties and front groups, appealing particularly to labor,
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