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National Intelligence Estimate 11-3-55, Soviet Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses of Action Through 1960, Part 5 of 5
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NIE - 11-3-55
17 May 1955
TOP SECRET
# 032459
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 11-3-55
SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE
SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION THROUGH 1960
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agen-
cy and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff,
and the Atomic Energy Commission.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
The LIBERTY DWIGHLD
on 17 May 1955. Concurring were the Special Assistant, In-
telligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelli-
gence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Di-
rector for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, and the Atomic En-
ergy Commission Representative to the IAC. The Assistant
to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained,
the subject being outside of its jurisdiction.
TOP SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
Authority MR 77-143 #1
By
bc NLE Date 3/16/78
TOP SECRET
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE PROBLEM
1
CONCLUSIONS
1
DISCUSSION
7
I. INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
7
Problem of Leadership
7
Relations Between the Soviet People and the Regime
8
II. THE USSR'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER COMMUNIST
BLOC STATES
9
Sino-Soviet Relations
9
Soviet-Satellite Relations
9
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY
11
Soviet Economic Policy
11
THE DWIGNI DEPARTMENT
Soviet Economic Growth
12
Developments in Soviet Industry
14
Developments in Soviet Agriculture
17
Soviet Consumption Levels
19
Developments in Soviet Foreign Trade
20
IV. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS
22
Magnitude of Scientific Assets - Policy and Priorities
22
Scientific Education and Manpower
23
Scientific and Technical Developments of Military Signifi-
cance
23
Nuclear Weapons
24
Guided Missiles
25
Electronics and Communications
25
Biological Warfare
27
Chemical Weapons
27
V. SINO-SOVIET BLOC MILITARY STRENGTH
28
Size of Forces, Scale of Effort, Trends
28
Soviet Forces
29
Eastern European Satellite Forces
33
Communist Chinese Forces
34
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
TABLE OF CONTENTS Continued
VI. MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE USSR
35
World Balance of Military Forces
35
Sino-Soviet Bloc Air Defense Capabilities
35
Offensive Capabilities
36
VII. SOVIET ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION
39
The Factor of Communist Ideology
39
The Postwar Background
39
The Soviet View of Current Developments
39
Probable Soviet Estimate of Future Developments
41
VIII. PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION
42
Present Soviet Objectives
42
Courses of Action — General
42
Courses of Action in Particular Areas
44
APPENDIX
Tables of Military Strength
49
LIBERTY
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE SOVIET
COURSES OF ACTION THROUGH 1960
THE PROBLEM
To examine the political, economic, scientific, and military strengths and weak-
nesses of the USSR and to estimate probable Soviet courses of action through 1960.
CONCLUSIONS
LIBITY
Political
estimate. The continuing dependence of
1. The totalitarian character of the So-
Communist China on the USSR for sup-
viet political system is unlikely to be al-
port of its military and economic pro-
tered in any important respect during the
grams gives the USSR great influence
period of this estimate. It appears that
over Chinese policy, but this would prob-
a struggle for personal power, probably in
ably not be decisive in matters which the
a context of differences over policy, has
Chinese believed involved their own vital
been going on within the small ruling
interests.¹ (Para. 32)
group and is as yet unresolved. Although
this struggle may be sharpened during
Economic
the period of this estimate, we continue
3. Soviet economic policy during the
to believe that it will be confined to the
period of this estimate will almost cer-
small group at the apex of the power
tainly be directed primarily toward a con-
structure, and will not result in open
tinued rapid growth of basic economic
violence involving the police or military
and military strengths and the mainte-
forces. (Paras. 22-26)
nance of high peacetime levels of military
2. The relations between the USSR and
Communist China are probably now con-
¹The Director of Naval Intelligence and the Dep-
uty Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff,
ducted as between allied powers having
consider that this paragraph overstates the de-
common interests and a common ideo-
gree of independence which Communist China
enjoys in matters of major policy. They believe,
logy, but also separate and potentially
therefore, that the last clause should be deleted,
conflicting national objectives. Despite
and the following substituted:
"We believe therefore that the Soviet leaders
the possibility of some frictions between
would almost certainly be able to apply sufficient
the two countries, they will almost cer-
pressure, including the curtailment, and if nec-
tainly maintain a relationship of close
essary the withdrawal, of economic and military
aid, in order to obtain Chinese conformity to
alliance throughout the period of this
Soviet views."
TOP SECRET
1
SHE
DWIGNED
TOP SECRET
LIBIRTY
2
production. Heavy industry will con-
ably continue to draw ahead in absolute
tinue to be the primary focus of Soviet
terms, the dollar gap between the two
economic activity. (Para. 41)
economies increasing from $228 billion to
4. The rate of growth of the Soviet econ-
about $269 billion. The USSR allocates
omy has been declining in recent years
an exceptionally large volume of re-
and will continue to decline during the
sources to investment and defense - in
period of this estimate. We estimate that
the case of investment about four-fifths
the annual increase in Soviet gross na-
and in defense about one-half the
tional product (GNP) by 1960 will prob-
amounts allocated to these sectors in the
ably be slightly less than five percent,
US economy. (Para. 42)
compared to a seven percent increase in
7. The Soviet regime will, in the pursuit
1954. Although absolute defense ex-
of its objectives, continue to face difficult
penditures apparently are to increase
choices in resource allocation. On the
markedly in 1955 over 1954, we believe
one hand, increasingly heavy investment
that they will probably increase hence-
outlays will be needed in order to main-
forth at a slower rate and will be about
tain high rates of economic growth. On
15 percent higher in 1960 than in 1955.
the other hand, military requirements
(Para. 43)
constitute the chief competitor for the
resources on which investment must
5. The expansion of agricultural produc-
tion and the procurement of foodstuffs
draw. Consequently, if the Soviet regime
for the cities are problems which will con-
should choose to increase military ex-
tinue to plague Soviet leaders during the
penditures at a rate substantially higher
period of this estimate. Some of the more
than we have estimated in paragraph 4
recent agricultural measures like the
above, a reduction in the rate of growth
of the economy as a whole and in con-
"new lands" program and the corn cul-
tivation campaign appear to be less realis-
sumption levels would result. (Paras. 43,
56)
tic than the measures announced earlier.
Although the results achieved will almost
Military
certainly fall far short of plans for a near-
ly 100 percent increase, we estimate that,
8. We believe that, generally speaking,
the personnel strength of Soviet and
with average weather conditions, there
other Bloc forces will remain substantial-
will be approximately a 30 percent in-
ly unchanged during the period of this
crease in agricultural production in 1960
estimate. However, the over-all effective-
over 1954. Per capita consumption will
ness of these forces will increase, mainly
probably rise, although at a rate far more
because of the following factors:
modest than that held out to the people
a. Introduction into the Soviet Air
in the government's statements of 1953.
Force during the present year of super-
(Paras. 57-62)
sonic interceptors, jet heavy bombers,
6. We estimate that in 1960 Soviet GNP
and four-engine turbo-prop aircraft,
will be roughly two-fifths that of the US,
probably heavy bombers; an increase in
as compared with about one-third in
the number of all-weather fighters and
1954; however, the US economy will prob-
jet medium bombers;
TOP SECRET
SEAL
TOP SECRET
3
LIBIRTY
b. A great increase in numbers of nu-
and improved techniques in counter-
clear weapons, and in the range of yields
measures, Soviet air defense capabilities
derived from these weapons;
will probably remain inadequate to pre-
C. A great increase in the number of
vent attacking forces from reaching criti-
long-range submarines;
cal target areas of the USSR. (Para.
d. Generally improved and modernized
137)
weapons available to Soviet ground forces,
11. The chief limitations on Soviet armed
together with changes in organization
forces are likely to arise from the vast
and tactics designed to adapt these forces
size of the USSR, the great distances from
to nuclear warfare.
main interior sources of supply to several
If the USSR in fact develops the guided
main operational areas, the relatively in-
missiles which we estimate to be within
adequate road and rail network, and the
its capabilities, these will provide a sig-
acute shortage of Bloc-registered ship-
nificant increment to over-all Soviet mili-
ping. The Soviet rail system would be
tary effectiveness. (Paras. 103, 144)
vulnerable to air attack in general war,
and Soviet armed forces would eventually
9. At present the main Soviet offensive
suffer logistical difficulties, especially
strength lies in the capability to mount
in operations in the Far East. Other de-
large-scale ground attacks against West-
ficiencies during the period of this esti-
ern Europe, together with air attacks
mate will probably be in experience and
against Western Europe and the UK and
training for long-range air operations,
an extensive submarine campaign to dis-
and in certain equipment for air defense,
rupt the flow of reinforcements and sup-
together with lack of capability for long-
plies from North America. During the
range amphibious and surface naval oper-
period of this estimate the additions to
ations. The questionable political relia-
Soviet air strength listed above will in-
bility and relatively low combat effective-
crease very markedly the ability of the
ness of many of the Satellite forces will
USSR to launch air attacks against dis-
continue to limit their usefulness to the
tant targets, including the continental
USSR, especially for offensive operations.
US. The growing submarine force will
(Paras. 103-104, 124)
also pose a greatly increased threat to
allied naval forces and shipping. (Paras.
Probable Courses of Action
133-134, 138)
12. We believe that the principal imme-
10. During the period of this estimate the
diate objectives of Soviet external policy
Bloc air defense system will probably be
during the period of this estimate will
substantially strengthened by greater
be: (a) to promote the political and eco-
operational experience and by the intro-
nomic instability of non-Communist
duction into operational units of new
states, and to render them incapable of
fighter types (including all-weather),
decisive action by fostering and exploit-
new antiaircraft weapons, improved early
ing neutralism and dissensions within
warning and GCI equipment, and guided
and among them; (b) to bring about the
missiles. However, in view of the in-
withdrawal of US power from its present
creasing capabilities of offensive weapons
advanced bases around the periphery of
TOP SECRET
Dwight
SEX
E
TOP SECRET
LIBIT
4
the Bloc; (c) to impede or offset the re-
climax of a series of actions and counter-
armament of West Germany and its
actions, initiated by either side, which
association with the Western Powers; and
neither side originally intended to lead
(d) to detach Japan from the sphere of
to general war. (Para. 159)
Western influence and encourage its
14. We believe that the USSR will, despite
closer association with the Sino-Soviet
the growth of its nuclear capability dur-
Bloc. At the same time the USSR will
ing the period of this estimate, continue
continue to pursue its fundamental aim
to try to avoid substantial risk of general
of expanding Communist influence and,
war, since the Soviet leaders will probably
as opportunities develop, of extending the
still not be confident that they could
area of Communist control. (Para. 158)
attack the US with nuclear weapons with-
13. The Soviet leaders probably now be-
out exposing the USSR to an even more
lieve (a) that general war would present
devastating counterblow. However, as
formidable hazards to the survival of
their nuclear capabilities grow, Soviet
their system, and (b) that they can make
leaders may come to estimate that the US,
progress toward their objectives by polit-
because of fear for itself or for its allies,
ical action, and in some cases by localized
or because of pressures exerted by its
military action. Therefore, we believe
allies, will be increasingly deterred from
that during the period of this estimate
initiating the devastation entailed in a
the Kremlin will try to avoid courses of
full-scale nuclear war. They may there-
action, and to deter Communist China
fore come to believe that local wars will
from courses of action, which in its judg-
be less likely than at present to expand
ment would clearly involve substantial
into general war, and thus that superior
risk of general war. The Soviet leaders
Bloc military capabilities in certain local
are unlikely to believe that Soviet, Com-
areas can be exercised without substan-
munist Chinese, or European Satellite
tial risk of provoking general war. (Para.
forces can be used in open attacks across
161)
recognized state frontiers during this
15. We believe that Soviet diplomacy dur-
period without running such a risk.
ing the period of this estimate will not be
However, the USSR or one of the Sino-
directed toward a general settlement be-
Soviet Bloc countries might engage
tween the USSR and the West. It will al-
in indirect aggression or take action
most certainly continue to combine moves
which would create a situation in which
intended to ease international tensions
the US or its allies, rather than yield an
with other moves which increase such
important position, would take counter-
tensions, and with political warfare pres-
action which could lead to general war.
sures calculated to play upon the non-
We believe, moreover, that the Kremlin
Communist world's fear of war. At pres-
would not be deterred by the risk of
ent the USSR is engaged in very active
general war from taking counteraction
diplomacy on a number of important
against a Western action which it con-
issues - Austria, disarmament, Yugo-
sidered an imminent threat to Soviet se-
slavia, Japan - and has made important
curity. Thus, general war might occur
concessions, though no apparent impor-
during the period of this estimate as the
tant sacrifices as yet. We believe that
TOP SECRET
PUL
TOP SECRET
LIBITY
JURGE
5
the current Soviet diplomatic efforts are
ment with its NATO partners, and under-
directed primarily toward preventing
mine unity of purpose within the NATO
the rearmament of Germany in close
alliance. The settlement of the Austrian
alliance with the West, and that the
problem, together with the recent Soviet
ground is being prepared for new So-
proposals on disarmament and the cur-
viet proposals on this subject, perhaps
rent advances to Yugoslavia, may indicate
at Four Power meetings during this sum-
a Soviet willingness, in the course of fur-
mer. We also believe that in connection
ther negotiations, to give up control of
with the forthcoming peace treaty nego-
East Germany in exchange for a guaran-
tiations with Japan the USSR is likely to
teed neutralization of a united Germany
make some concessions in the hope of pro-
and a Soviet share in international con-
moting frictions in the relations of Japan
trol over German armament. We believe
with the US and encouraging Japanese
that the chances of such a development
neutralism. (Para. 162)
are less than even.² (Paras. 166-167, 170)
16. It is possible, however, that the Soviet
18. If such measures did not, in the So-
leaders also desire a substantial and pro-
viet view, succeed in countering the de-
longed reduction in international ten-
veloping threat of West German rearma-
sions that would not only prevent German
ment, we believe that the USSR would
rearmament but also further their other
turn to more rigorous policies, including
objectives, including US withdrawal from
a sharp build-up of Soviet and Satel-
advanced bases and a reduction of the
lite military capabilities. It might also
incentive for the West to maintain its
adopt more threatening courses of ac-
present defense efforts. The Soviet lead-
tion against Berlin, or in the Far East,
ers may also feel that such a reduction
or elsewhere, with the purpose of arous-
of international tensions is desirable be-
ing fear of nuclear war in the West and
cause of the pressure of their own inter-
causing Western peoples to demand that
nal problems. (Para. 163)
their governments pursue a cautious poli-
17. The principal objective of Soviet poli-
cy. We believe that even at this stage
cy in Europe is to obtain a solution of the
the USSR would still avoid courses of ac-
German problem favorable to Soviet in-
tion which in its judgment clearly en-
terests. Prevention or slowing down of
tailed the probability of general war.
West German rearmament and blocking
(Para. 169)
the development of West Germany's ties
19. We believe that the USSR is in sub-
with the NATO powers have first priority.
stantial agreement with Chinese Commu-
To achieve these aims, Soviet policy will
nist objectives to destroy the Chinese Na-
almost certainly make great efforts to in-
tionalist Government and to gain control
fluence the situation in West Germany
itself. The Soviet leaders probably cal-
The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department
culate that by sedulous encouragement of
of State, believes that the estimate contained in
the last sentence of this paragraph should read:
German hopes for unification they can,
"We believe that the likelihood of such a de-
for a limited time, increase neutralist
velopment is small, primarily because it seems
to us that its uncertainties and disadvantages,
feeling in West Germany, complicate the
from the Soviet point of view, would far out-
relations of the West German Govern-
weigh its advantages."
TOP SECRET
The
DWIDEN
TOP SECRET
6
of all territory held by it. The primary
open intervention on their part sufficient
Soviet interest in issues arising in the
to save the Chinese regime would involve
area of the Formosa Strait is to exploit
extremely grave risk of general war with
them in such a way as to SOW distrust of
the US with its consequent threat to the
the US among neutral nations and to
survival of the Soviet system. In decid-
promote a maximum of discord between
ing upon a course of action, the Soviet
the US and its allies. We believe that
leaders would have to weigh the strengths
Moscow might see certain advantages in
which they could bring to bear in the
clashes between Chinese Communist and
struggle against those which would be
US forces, provided it believed that the
opposed to them, and the dangers to their
clashes would be limited and localized.
own regime of a possible global war with
However, we also believe that the USSR
the US against the strategic and psycho-
will seek to restrain Peiping from adopt-
logical consequences to them of destruc-
ing policies which in the Soviet view
tion of the Chinese Communist regime.
would carry grave risks of major hostili-
We believe, on balance, they would con-
ties between the US and Communist
clude that loss of the Chinese Communist
China, since the Soviet leaders probably
regime would be sufficiently damaging
believe that such hostilities would also
and final to cause them to resort to open
entail grave risk of Soviet involvement.
intervention to save that regime.³ (Para.
(Para. 173)
174)
20. The Soviet leaders probably consider
21. Southeast Asia will almost certainly
that if major hostilities between Commu-
appear to the USSR to be the most profit-
nist China and the US should occur, the
able field for the extension of Communist
USSR would be presented with extremely
influence, at least during the early period
grave choices. They would probably give
of this estimate. The Soviet leaders will
the Chinese Communists support in
probably continue, in concert with Com-
weapons and material, and the scale of
munist China, to support Communist
this aid would probably increase in pro-
subversive activities, and possibly local-
portion to the threat to the Chinese Com-
ized military action if circumstances are
munist regime. As hostilities expanded
favorable. (Para. 175)
and the threat to the Chinese Communist
regime increased, they would probably
The Director of Naval Intelligence, and the Dep-
engage Soviet forces in defensive opera-
uty Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, be-
lieve that the last sentence overstates the will-
tions, to the extent that they felt they
ingness of the Soviet leaders to risk their own
could plausibly deny such involvement.
regime and would substitute for the last sen-
tence:
Should the conflict progress so far that
"On balance, we believe that they would not
destruction of the Chinese Communist re-
consider the elimination of the Chinese Com-
gime appeared probable, we believe that
munist regime sufficiently damaging, or final,
to warrant the risk to their own regime which
the Soviet leaders would recognize that
open intervention would entail."
TOP SECRET
Dwight
the
TOP SECRET
7
LIBITY
DISCUSSION
I. INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
22. The Soviet political system continues to
revert to a personal dictatorship. This may
exhibit the essential features which it acquired
occur within the period of this estimate.
during the period of Stalin's ascendancy, even
though power appears now to be exercised by
24. The personal power struggle has probably
a small group rather than by a single man.
been taking place in a context of differences
Its totalitarian character, resting on the mo-
over policy. Strongest evidence of such dif-
nopoly of political power held by the small
ferences has appeared in connection with the
group composing the Communist Party Pre-
agricultural program, and in particular con-
sidium, remains unaltered by developments
cerning the most effective methods of increas-
since Stalin's death. We think it extremely
ing agricultural production. On other issues
unlikely that in the period through 1960, de-
the evidence of divergent views is far less
spite possible shifts in leadership and policies,
clear, but the Soviet leaders may also have
the nature of the Soviet political system will
disagreed among themselves concerning the
change in any important respect.
allocation of resources among the defense, in-
vestment, and consumption sectors of the
PROBLEM OF LEADERSHIP
economy. Except on agricultural problems,
however, the Soviet leadership has not pub-
23. Since Stalin's death there has clearly been
licly exhibited differences of view within its
an unstable situation at the top level of the
ranks.
Soviet power structure. The elimination of
Beria and the demotion of Malenkov, together
25. The struggle over power and policy may
with a number of similar actions against lesser
be exacerbated during the period of this esti-
personalities, indicate that the division of
mate, unless one of the leading figures suc-
power and influence posed a serious problem
ceeds in acquiring a clear dominance in the
for Stalin's heirs. It seems unlikely that
Party Presidium. As death or ill health thin
the ranks of the veteran members of the Pre-
this problem has yet been resolved, despite
Khrushchev's apparent rise to a position of
sidium, who have probably up to now been
primacy. It is not yet clear whether his posi-
able to check the rise of any aspirant to the
tion as Party First Secretary, the key position
full array of Stalin's power, the problem of co-
Stalin used to gain absolute power, will enable
opting younger proteges may become acute.
him to acquire a similar domination over his
Moreover, the issues of policy likely to develop
colleagues in the Party Presidium. Prime
during the period of this estimate will present
Minister Bulganin and other veteran members
hard choices, the resolution of which may
of this body like Molotov, Kaganovich, and
sharpen the struggle for personal power.
Mikoyan, all of whom hold high governmental
26. We continue to believe, however, that the
positions, are probably not eager to submit to
struggles over personal power and policy will
the renewed domination of one man. Align-
be confined to the small group at the apex
ments among the top leaders, their relative
of the power structure and will not result in
power and influence, or the following that
open violence involving the police or military
each may have within the Party and Govern-
forces. We do not believe that the police or
ment apparatus are unknown. For the pres-
military establishments are likely within the
ent, major personnel and policy decisions are
period of this estimate to participate as inde-
probably still subject to negotiation among
pendent factions in the contest over power
them. There may be factional jockeying for
and policy. They are effectively controlled by
some time, although we incline to the view
the Party, both openly and through penetra-
that sooner or later the Soviet system will
tion by agents, and their leaders are probably
TOP SECRET
THE
DWIENED
TOP SECRET
8
too involved in conflicting personal loyalties
gime will continue to be characterized more
and factions outside the professional group to
by apathy than by dissidence. It is unlikely
permit independent political action. How-
that the promises made in 1953 to raise living
ever, to the extent that issues affecting
standards, or even the limited fulfillment
spheres of activity of the army and police di-
which followed, have aroused demands and ex-
vide the top Soviet leadership, the bureaucrat-
pectations dangerous to the regime. The poli-
ic and professional point of view, particularly
cies of the regime are likely to be successfully
of the army, may have a greater influence on
calculated to allay active discontent and at
policy decisions.
the same time to check excessive demands.
However, if there should be such a conspic-
27. Serious and prolonged instability within
uous failure of current agricultural programs
the top leadership would probably impair the
as to lead to a decline in food supplies, or if
efficiency of the Party and State administra-
the regime should be obliged to resort to
tion. Insecurity and uncertainty might reach
greater pressures on the peasantry to extract
serious proportions if a rapid series of re-
the foodstuffs essential to feed the cities, a
movals, accompanied by charges of disloyalty
serious deterioration in public attitudes to-
and trials of those unseated, occurred within
ward the regime might result. Such a devel-
the top leadership. In this case the regime
opment during the period of this estimate
might have as much difficulty in carrying out
would be unlikely to threaten the security
as in reaching its policy decisions. However,
of the regime.
the Soviet leaders are certainly aware of these
problems of effective administration in their
30. The attitude of the Soviet people toward
totalitarian state and will be concerned to
the particular dangers of nuclear war is diffi-
prevent their personal struggle for power from
cult to gauge. Only within the last year has
degenerating into widespread purges which
the regime begun to make some information
might cause a deterioration in the administra-
available, and this has been for a limited,
tive apparatus. On balance, we think that
largely military, audience. For civil defense
the regime will surmount dangers of this kind.
purposes, an intensive public information pro-
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET
gram would appear to be necessary. Even if
PEOPLE AND THE REGIME
this is undertaken, popular fears are unlikely
to limit the freedom of action of the USSR
28. The post-Stalin leadership has clearly
in a diplomatic crisis in anything like the
given increased attention to the attitudes of
same degree as would be true for the Western
the Soviet people toward the regime, and in
Powers. Nevertheless, the desire to avoid war
particular it has been concerned to improve
morale and to cultivate more positive atti-
is strong and articulate in the Soviet people,
tudes toward its goals. Despite the decline
and the regime, despite its ability to distort
in emphasis on the consumer goods program,
and obscure the meaning of events by propa-
the regime has not explicitly repudiated the
ganda, must to some extent adapt its policies
promises made to Soviet citizens in 1953. It
to this attitude. It may be obliged to do so
will probably maintain the effort to raise living
in greater degree when the facts of nuclear
standards to the extent that current defense
warfare become better known to the Soviet
and investment programs permit. It prob-
people.4
ably still intends to limit arbitrary and ter-
roristic actions by the secret police as much as
'There will be a fuller discussion of the issues
it feels is compatible with safety.
raised in this paragraph in a forthcoming esti-
mate, NIE 100-5-55, "The Probable Effects of
29. During the period of this estimate, the
Increasing Nuclear Warfare Capabilities upon
attitude of the Soviet people toward the re-
the Policies of Selected Countries."
TOP SECRET
SECRET
USSR
INTEGRATION OF COMMUNIST PARTY (CPSU) AND SOVIET GOVERNMENT
15 MAY 1955
PARTY LEADERSHIP
GOVERNMENTAL LEADERSHIP
CENTRAL
CENTRAL
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
MINISTRIES,
COMMITTEE
COMMITTEE
COMMITTEES, AND
SECRETARIAT
PRESIDIUM
PRESIDIUM
AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY
MEMBERS
CHAIRMAN
KHRUSHCHEV
BULGANIN
BULGANIN
(First Secretary)
VOROSHILOV
1
FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMEN
POSPELOV
KAGANOVICH
KAGANOVICH
Transportation and Communications
SUSLOV
MALENKOV
SHATALIN
MIKOYAN
MIKOYAN
Trade
MOLOTOV
MOLOTOV
Foreign Affairs
PERVUKHIN
PERVUKHIN
Fuel and Chemical Industry
SABUROV
SABUROV
State Planning Committee
KHRUSHCHEV
2
DEPUTY CHAIRMEN
ZAVENYAGIN
CANDIDATE MEMBERS
Medium Machine Building
(Nuclear development)
KIRICHENKO 2,3
KOSYGIN
Consumers' Goods
PONOMARENKO 2,4
KUCHERENKO
State Construction Affairs-Committee
SHVERNIK 2
LOBANOV
Agriculture
MALENKOV
Electrical Power Stations
MALYSHEV
Machine Building Industries
TEVOSYAN
Metallurgical Industry
KHRUNICHEV
Aviation and/or Armament Industries
51 Other ministers
2 Other officials of ministerial rank
THE
1 Also Chairman of Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet
Dual Membership
2 Also member of Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet
Minister
3 Also First Secretary of Ukranian Central Committee
Probable area of responsibility
4 Also Ambassador to Poland
Listings are alphabetical (Russian alphabet), consequently Khrushchev,
now highest anking member of the Party Presidium, is listed last.
13394 9-54 (First Revision 5-55)
SECRET
BHL
TOP SECRET
LIBITY
9
II. THE USSR'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER COMMUNIST BLOC STATES
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
sell or grant military and capital goods to
China but will almost certainly not meet Chi-
31. Sino-Soviet relations within the last year
have been marked by a continuing enhance-
nese demands to the extent of overtaxing the
ment of Communist China's status within
Soviet economy. Soviet policy may take a
more cautious view than the Chinese of the
the Communist Bloc. This was shown by the
risks appropriate to the pursuit of Communist
visit of the Soviet delegation in September-
objectives in Asia. Some issues will probably
October 1954, by the agreements announced
cause hard bargaining between the two part-
in the 11 October communique restoring Port
ners, but not to the extent of endangering the
Arthur and certain joint enterprises to Chi-
alliance. The interests of both, as well as the
nese control, and by the more recent associa-
ideological gulf which separates both from the
tion of Communist China with Communist
non-Communist world, will continue to dic-
policy in Europe in opposition to West Ger-
tate policies of hostility against the West.
man rearmament. The trend toward greater
The contribution which each makes to the
Chinese independence from Soviet tutelage
military security of the other may assume
probably was inevitable in view of the grow-
even greater importance if the Western
ing power of the Chinese regime and the in-
alliance is able to add substantial military
ternational prestige it derived from the Ko-
power in Germany and Japan to its present
rean War and from Communist successes at
strength. These considerations, at least dur-
the Geneva Conference. Communist China
ing the period of this estimate, will almost
is coming to be accorded a formal status with-
certainly outweigh any frictions in the Sino-
in the Communist world more nearly equal
Soviet relationship.
to that of the USSR.
32. The relations between the USSR and Com-
SOVIET-SATELLITE RELATIONS
munist China are probably now conducted as
34. The USSR's relations with its Eastern
between allied powers having common inter-
European Satellites involve problems of con-
ests and a common ideology, but also separate
trol rather than of negotiation. Effective di-
and potentially conflicting national objectives.
Communist China continues to be dependent
"The Director of Naval Intelligence and the Dep-
on the USSR because only through Soviet aid
uty Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff,
can it maintain or expand a modern military
consider that this paragraph overstates the de-
establishment and because its industrializa-
gree of independence which Communist China
enjoys in matters of major policy. They be-
tion program is also geared to Soviet support.
lieve, therefore, that the following should be
This dependence gives the USSR great influ-
substituted for the last two sentences:
ence over Chinese policy, but it would prob-
"The continuing dependence of Communist
ably not be decisive in matters which the Chi-
China on the USSR for support of its military
nese believed involved their own vital inter-
and economic programs gives the USSR great
ests. The USSR probably would not apply so
influence over Chinese policy. Through ma-
nipulation of the various pressures which they
serious a sanction as withdrawal of economic
can exert, the Soviet leaders would probably be
and military aid in order to obtain Chinese
able to forestall any development in Chinese
conformity to Soviet views, since to do so
policy which they believed would involve a se-
would seriously threaten the relationship.5
rious conflict with Soviet vital interests. How-
ever, if such a conflict should arise, we believe
33. The USSR and Communist China will al-
that the Soviet leaders would be prepared to
most certainly maintain a relationship of close
apply these pressures to whatever extent they
deemed necessary, even to the point of with-
alliance throughout the period of this esti-
drawal of military and economic aid, in order
mate, despite the possibility of some frictions
to obtain Chinese conformity with Soviet
between them. The USSR will continue to
views."
TOP SECRET
OHL
DWIgnED
TOP SECRET
FIRST
10
rection and surveillance of the small corps of
ment of importance is the recently announced
Party careerists in each of the Satellite re-
collective defense and joint command struc-
gimes, together with the presence or proximity
ture which will replace the bilateral military
of Soviet military forces, have been enough to
arrangements the USSR has had with each
insure Soviet control. This system does not
of the Satellites. In both the economic and
appear to have lost any of its effectiveness de-
military fields therefore there is likely to be
spite the economic difficulties encountered in
during the period of this estimate a develop-
most of the Satellites during the last two
ment toward multilateral forms of organiza-
years, and despite the uncertainties Satellite
tion and planning. The result will probably
leaders have apparently felt about who among
be closer integration and more efficient Soviet
their Moscow preceptors might win the con-
direction and control of the Satellite area as
test for power going on there.
a whole.
35. There have been two developments of
36. Popular resistance of an organized and
purely external significance not affecting the
active kind is unlikely to appear in any of
substance of Soviet control, but which are
the Satellites during the period of this esti-
nevertheless suggestive of the form which
mate. Disaffection showing itself in nonco-
that control is likely to take in future. One
operation in economic fields and even passive
of these has been the withdrawal of the USSR
resistance might increase in some of the Satel-
from the direct forms of exploitation exem-
lites if there should be further serious de-
plified by the joint stock companies which held
terioration in living standards. The USSR
important economic assets in several of the
Satellites. To replace direct Soviet control
would intervene with force or by grants of
through bilateral arrangements it is intended
economic aid to check any development of
apparently to link all the Satellite economies
this kind which it believed threatened the
more closely with each other and with the
security of any Satellite regime. The USSR's
USSR by a greater degree of joint economic
actions in the Satellite area will be based on
planning in the new Five-Year Plan period
the assumption that effective Soviet control
1956-1960. The other organizational develop-
there is an essential security requirement.
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
S.
Dwight
11
LIBITY
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY
SOVIET ECONOMIC POLICY
vestment in agriculture indicate increases of
37. The fundamental characteristics of So-
as much as 10 percent over the record 1954
viet postwar economic policy have been em-
level. Nevertheless, total investment in the
phasis upon a rapid rate of capital accumula-
sectors of the economy related to consump-
tion, maintenance of high levels of military
tion will be reduced from the levels planned
expenditure, and the direction of the major
for 1954. These reductions will probably still
share of new capital to heavy industry. There
leave an investment program for these sectors
has recently been added a basic and probably
substantially above the 1953 outlay and in
enduring concern for the expansion of Soviet
most cases above the levels actually achieved
in 1954.
agricultural production, as a result of its con-
tinued failure to keep pace with the require-
39. The traditional Soviet policy of concen-
ments of population growth and industrial
trating economic decisions in the central
production. In 1953 marked attention was
party and government apparatus in Moscow
given to consumer welfare and to agricultural
was slightly modified during 1953, and has
problems. However, during 1954 and the
been further modified during 1954 and early
early months of 1955 there was a reduction of
1955. Although the central apparatus con-
emphasis on the numerous promises to raise
tinues to make the basic decisions in economic
standards of living which were made in offi-
planning, a large share of the detailed work
cial pronouncements in 1953, but the em-
necessary to implement plans has been trans-
phasis on agriculture, which was the keystone
ferred from Moscow to regional ministries and
of the 1953 plan revisions, has continued with
local plant managers in the case of manu-
increased intensity. There was also a re-
facturing, and to local (raion) committees in
affirmation of the central role of heavy in-
agriculture. Manufacturing and agricultural
dustry as the necessary foundation for the
enterprises have been given the responsibility,
entire Soviet economy, including the con-
and have even been encouraged, to use local
sumption sector. Reductions in explicit mili-
materials and techniques, and to make their
tary outlays in 1953 and 1954 are roughly re-
own arrangements for the purchase of these
stored to the 1952 level in the 1955 Soviet
materials. There have been large-scale reduc-
budget.⁶ This increase of military outlays
tions in reporting requirements and in cleri-
is apparently to be achieved by a reduction in
cal and administrative personnel of both the
the rate of growth of consumer goods activity
central and the local governmental apparatus.
and capital investment.
Individuals released from these positions have
been largely transferred to production re-
38. The 1955 budget gives little information
sponsibilities, particularly in agriculture.
on details of the current investment program,
but it does indicate that investment in heavy
40. The foreign economic policies of the USSR,
industry will increase about four percent and
although not significantly modified, have been
over-all investment expenditures will decrease
somewhat reoriented during 1953-1954. So-
about one percent from the level planned for
viet foreign trade has always been directed to
1954. Announcements of some aspects of in-
the expansion of Soviet influence and to the
long-run objective of achieving economic self-
"The explicit military expenditures in the Soviet
sufficiency. In the past, the Soviet economy
budget do not include the outlays for atomic
has not been in a position to accomplish much
energy and for most military research and de-
toward the former objective. At present, how-
velopment. Expenditures on military plant and
ever, the increased size and diversity of the
tooling in any given year also appear elsewhere
Soviet economy and the coordination of the
in the budget, but these expenditures are be-
lieved to be charged against defense outlays in
European Satellite economies gives the USSR
subsequent years.
a supply of goods and trained personnel with
TOP SECRET
BELL
TOP SECRET
12
LIBITY
which it may attempt to increase its economic
tural production. A slight increase over 1954
influence upon the free world. Increases in
levels of production of housing and other dur-
Soviet offers of technical assistance, particu-
able consumer goods is also likely in the period
larly in Asia, and extension of the geograph-
1955-1960. Consequently, a somewhat more
ical distribution of foreign trade in 1954 indi-
balanced production effort in terms of the en-
cate Soviet intent to use its industrial econo-
tire Soviet economy can be expected. Such
my to extend its political influence as well as
an effort would result in growth of per capita
to build up its own political, military, and
consumption of the Soviet people at a fairly
economic strength.
constant rate, although at a rate considerably
slower than that which will obtain for the
41. Assuming there is no war and in the So-
growth of the economy as a whole.
viet view no substantially increased danger of
war, Soviet economic policy in 1955-1960 will
SOVIET ECONOMIC GROWTH
be directed toward achieving a continued
rapid growth of basic economic and military
42. Soviet gross national product (GNP) in-
strength and at the same time, as far as is
creased by almost seven percent in 1954, as
compatible with this objective, a steady im-
compared with a gain in 1953 of about 3.5
provement in the well-being of the general
percent; the latter rate was abnormally low
population. This latter improvement will al-
for the USSR because of a poor crop year and
most certainly be at a rate far more modest
the plan revisions then taking place. The
than that held out to the people in the govern-
1954 level of Soviet output - - about $129 bil-
ment's statements of 1953. Heavy industry
lion — was approximately one-third that of
will continue to be the primary focus of Soviet
the US at $357 billion. A breakdown of Soviet
economic activity. Capital investment will
and US gross national product by end use
continue to absorb a slightly increasing share
is presented in Figure 1.9 From this figure
of Soviet output. Defense expenditures 7 will
it may be seen that, in dollar values, the USSR
probably increase moderately as the cost of
allocates to consumption only about one-fifth
development, production, and maintenance of
modern military equipment increases. A con-
"In order to compare Soviet GNP with that of
certed effort will be made to increase agricul-
the US, ruble estimates have been converted to
dollars by using appropriate ruble-dollar ratios
for the various sectors of the Soviet economy.
7 In this and the following paragraphs, Soviet
Only one set of GNP figures in dollars is present-
"defense expenditures" have been estimated on
ed in this estimate. It should be noted, however,
such a basis as to permit comparison with those
that the deficiencies in the basic data on the
of the US; i.e., they include explicit budgetary
USSR, the fact that different methods of valuing
appropriations to the Ministry of Defense, plus
output can be used with equal validity, and the
estimated outlays for research and development,
latitude of judgment involved in converting
atomic energy, MVD paramilitary forces, mili-
ruble figures into dollars permit alternative est-
tary education, and some military construction.
imates of the size and composition of Soviet
GNP. For instance, an alternative calculation
$ Figures for gross national product (GNP) pro-
of Soviet GNP gives the following results:
vide the most concise and convenient means of
describing the size and composition of the econ-
Billion 1954 Dollars
Percent
omy of a nation, and (in a rough way) of com-
Consumption
54.1
41.7
paring it with other national economies. How-
Investment
36.5
28.2
ever, considerable technical difficulties arise in
Defense
23.8
18.4
calculating the GNP of any country. In the
Administration
15.2
11.7
case of the USSR the limited nature of the
available data makes calculation and interpret-
Total
129.6
100.0
ation especially difficult. For these reasons the
quantitative estimates given in the following par-
Such differences as these do not materially affect
agraphs regarding GNP and its principal com-
either the discussion of economic growth pre-
ponents must be considered as approximations.
sented above or the general conclusions regard-
We believe nevertheless that they present a
ing the size and structure of the Soviet economy,
reasonably accurate index of general trends in
but they would affect the analysis and inter-
the Soviet economy.
pretation of some of its more detailed aspects.
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
13
Figure 1
US and USSR
OHL
DwightD.
COMPARISON OF
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCTS, 1954
LIQUIDITY
(By End Use)
USSR
US
129 Billion 1954 Dollars
357 Billion 1954 Dollars
Investment
Consumption
Investment
42
53
52
33%
15%
40%
22
Defense
13
17%
Consumption
43
10%
Defense
12%
250
Administration
70%
11 3%
Administration
NOTE: In interpreting the figures for Soviet and US defense expenditures,
it should be noted that the value data presented do not necessarily reflect
the volume of armaments production (in terms of physical units, fire power,
tonnage, etc.) and do not show the amounts or proportions of gross investment
which are indirectly related to military production.
13790 5-55
as much as the US, although its population
GNP by 1960 will probably be slightly less
is 30 percent larger. Moreover, while the USSR
than five percent, compared to the seven per-
devotes larger proportions of GNP to defense
cent increase in 1954. Accordingly, we esti-
and to investment than does the US, the ac-
mate that Soviet GNP in 1960 will be about
tual amounts thus allocated are considerably
$183 billion and US GNP about $452 billion.
less - in the case of defense about one-half,
To sustain this estimated rate of growth, in-
and in investment about four-fifths of the
vestment must increase as a proportion of
US figures. This manner of allocating re-
total product while consumption, defense, and
sources gives some indication of why the
administration decline. Although absolute
USSR, with its smaller national product, has
defense expenditures apparently are to in-
nevertheless been able to build a large indus-
crease markedly in 1955 over 1954, restoring
trial economy and military establishment
them to about the 1952 level, we believe that
within a relatively short period of time.
they will probably increase henceforth at a
slower rate, and will be about 15 percent high-
43. The rate of growth of Soviet GNP has
er in 1960 than in 1955. This figure com-
been declining in recent years largely because
pares with an increase of about 50 percent in
of the declining productivity of additional
investment and a GNP increase of about 35
units of capital investment in industry, but
percent. Soviet investment expenditure, con-
also because of the stagnation in agriculture
centrated as it is in the heavy and machine
and the heavy burden of military expenditure.
industries, constitutes in itself a direct sup-
We believe that increasing investment in So-
port for a future expansion of military effort.
viet agriculture, where the productivity of la-
bor is very low, a slowing down of investment
44. The estimated rate of economic growth
in consumer manufacturing industries, where
in the USSR implies an increase in the ratio
labor productivity is relatively high, and
of Soviet to US output. Soviet GNP in 1960
a reduction in the rate of increase in the labor
will probably be about 40 percent that of the
force will tend to continue the recent declines
US. However, the US economy will probably
in the rate of growth. We estimate, therefore,
continue to draw ahead in absolute terms,
that the average annual increase in Soviet
the dollar gap between the two economies in-
TOP SECRET
The
TOP SECRET
14
creasing from $228 billion to about $269 bil-
purposes. If the Bloc and the West continue
lion. (See Figure 2). There will be a similar
to maintain full employment, considerable
relationship between the gross outputs of the
changes in the composition of their respective
NATO countries taken as a whole and that
outputs would have little effect on their total
of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The absolute gap
volume of output in so short a period. Should
of $425 billion in 1954 will probably widen to
either fail to maintain full employment, the
about $509 billion in 1960.
volume of output would be considerably re-
duced.
45. Our estimates of Western product for
1960 are based upon historical patterns of
DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET INDUSTRY
economic growth in the West. Our estimates
46. Soviet total industrial production approxi-
for Sino-Soviet Bloc output in 1960 are based
mately doubled during the period 1948-1954,
on the assumption, which we believe reason-
and increased about nine percent during 1954.
able, that the Bloc will pursue a pattern of re-
The current and apparent long-run objectives
source allocation comparable to that present-
and limitations of Soviet industrial produc-
ly existing and apparently planned for the
tion indicate that the average annual real
future. Both the Western countries and the
rate of increase during 1955-1960 will be over
Sino-Soviet Bloc have the capability to alter
seven percent, and production in 1960 will be
the pattern of resource use drastically, and
about 55 percent greater than in 1954. The
thereby to alter the final composition and
substantial and continuing decline in the esti-
value of the product. The capability of the
mated rate of growth of industrial output is
West, and especially of the US, to do this is
essentially attributable to (a) a reduction in
greater than that of the Bloc because of the
the rate of growth of the industrial labor
higher Western product in proportion to pop-
force; and (b) a reduction in the average yield
ulation. However, large shifts in the pattern
of annual additions to industrial investment.
of resource use cannot be as quickly or as
The greatest production increases during the
easily made in the West as in the USSR where
1955-1960 period are expected to occur in
the economy is closely controlled and industry
chemicals, electric power, electrical equip-
is designed for maximum convertibility to war
ment, and manufactured consumer goods.
Figure 2
SOVIET BLOC AND WEST
COMPARISON OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCTS
(Billions of 1954 US Dollars)
796
European
636
NATO
308
European
493
NATO
250
Canada 36
European
NATO
178
Canada 29
Canada 23
287
Communist China
42
US
211
US
European Satellites
62
452
Communist China
33
357
140
US
European Satellites
49
292
Communist China
25
USSR
European Satellites
34
USSR
183
USSR
129
81
BLOC
WEST
BLOC
WEST
BLOC
WEST
1954
1960
1948
13793 5-55
TOP SECRET
Dwight
TOP SECRET
The
15
STREET
ment, and manufactured consumer goods.
tween 1950 and 1954. US expenditures for
The smallest production increases are ex-
military end-items, although less than Soviet
pected in the more established industries with
expenditures during the period 1946-1950, in-
relatively large current production, namely,
creased rapidly after 1951, reached a high in
manufactured food products, forest products,
1953, and have since slightly decreased. In
and defense industries.
terms of what Soviet armaments would have
TABLE 1
cost at US quantity-production prices, we esti-
ESTIMATED SOVIET INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION,
mate that the aggregate dollar value of So-
SELECTED YEARS 1948-1960¹
viet military production in 1951 was roughly
Indexes: 1954=100
50 percent more than the dollar value of US
1948
1953
1954
1955
1960
armament deliveries, whereas in 1954 the
Energy
52
91
100
111
172
aggregate dollar value of Soviet military pro-
Metals
45
90
100
108
146
duction would have amounted to a little less
Metalworking &
Machinery
41
88
100
114
169
than half that of US armament deliveries.
Chemicals
45
88
100
111
172
The value of Soviet military end-item produc-
Construction
Materials
tion will probably increase by a moderate
39
88
100
111
172
Forest Products
66
91
100
103
124
amount annually through the period of this
Food Products
63
96
100
104
134
estimate, assuming no significant change in
Manufactured
the level of international tensions. There will
Consumer Goods
45
90
100
115
169
Defense Industry
36
102
100
113
122-1322
be some shift in the relative outlay for various
Total Industry
49
92
100
110
155
types of weapons, in particular an increase in
1 The 1955-1960 estimates are projected from re-
expenditures for aircraft and naval vessels,
cent rates of growth, current investment pro-
and perhaps for nuclear weapons and guided
grams, and such Soviet plans as have been an-
missiles. We believe that it is within Soviet
nounced for this period.
2 The lower figure - 122 - is calculated on the
capacity to increase present and estimated
assumption that during the period of this esti-
future outlays by three to three and a half
mate there will be some reduction of present
levels of production of some military end-items.
times in the event of war or international de-
The higher figure - 132 - assumes that present
velopments which the Soviet leaders might
production remains approximately constant, and
that new weapons and equipment programs are
believe required such increases.
added. It should be noted that the estimated
cost of the Soviet atomic energy program is not
49. The output of consumer goods and services
included in the figures for defense industry.
in 1954 exceeded that of 1953 by about seven
47. Soviet heavy industrial production has
percent, increasing at about the same rate as
been increasing at an average annual rate of
GNP, but at a slower rate than gross indus-
over 10 percent during the current Fifth Five-
trial production and at about two-thirds the
Year Plan. Official announcements indicate
rate of heavy industry. Durable consumer
that production plans for most nonferrous
goods, housing and appliances led the ad-
metals, petroleum, and certain capital equip-
vance, followed in order by clothing, trans-
ment are not being met, but that the over-
port, and other services. Production of food
all plan for heavy industry is generally being
was limited by continuing agricultural diffi-
met. Production of capital equipment for light
culties, and increased only about four per-
and processing industries has almost certain-
cent. Production of consumer goods is ex-
ly exceeded the original Fifth Five-Year Plan.
pected to continue to increase during the
Heavy industry will almost certainly con-
1955-1960 period, although at a lower average
tinue to dominate industrial production
rate than in 1954.
plans for the 1955-1960 period, although more
50. The announced Soviet intention to re-
attention will probably be devoted to housing
emphasize heavy industry will have the effect
and nonindustrial construction than in the
of arresting the 1953-1954 rates of increase
last six years.
in light industry, but will still permit some
48. Soviet armaments production almost
improvement in the position of the Soviet
doubled in value (though not in volume) be-
consumer. Increased emphasis on agriculture
TOP SECRET
The
DWISHLD
TOP SECRET
LIQUIDA
16
will probably provide an expanding output.
some 14 percent of Soviet industrial output,
Agricultural products are the material base
compared to 16 and 27 percent respectively in
for more than 80 percent of the Soviet con-
the Ukraine and the Central Industrial region
sumption pattern. Maintenance of capital
(including Moscow). Although industrial
investment in both light industry and housing
production east of the Urals has grown rapid-
at levels well above those of the 1953 plan
ly since World War II, the base from which
lends further support to the estimate that
it grew was small and much of the production
the Soviet consumer will not be deprived of
is highly specialized and dependent upon
the gains obtained in 1953-1954. The 1955
equipment and markets in other regions to
increases in military production, however, may
the west.
have the effect of slowing down increases in
the production of durable consumer goods.
53. Stockpiling. There was some evidence
that during 1953-1954 Soviet reserve stocks
51. Industrial Technology. The quality of
were drawn upon more freely than previously.
Soviet industrial technology as a whole is
The scale of stockpiling operations during
difficult to assess. Where a particular pro-
these years indicates that the Soviet stockpile
gram has been indispensable to the mainte-
will fail to meet the 100 percent expansion
nance of the Soviet power position in the
planned for 1951-1955. However, Bulganin's
world - for example, in connection with
February 1955 speech gives evidence that the
atomic development, in weapons, and in basic
USSR intends to apply renewed emphasis to
industry and construction - the USSR has
the stockpile program and to restrict the con-
mobilized its technical resources with great
ditions under which stockpiles may be used to
effectiveness. Because of the large number
support current production programs. An in-
of personnel, and the material and financial
crease in the scale of the stockpiling program
outlays required for such technical develop-
may deprive Soviet industry and Soviet con-
ments, major efforts such as these have taken
sumers of a portion of the increased flow of
a great share of the limited resources the
goods which would be expected from increased
USSR can devote to improving its technology.
production.
Soviet technology in lower priority enter-
54. Transportation. The transport facilities
prises ranges from the copying of Western de-
of the USSR continued to increase ton-miles
sign and technique in certain machine indus-
of freight at a rate well in advance of that
tries to admittedly archaic methods of pro-
required by the Fifth Five-Year Plan. The
duction in a vast majority of light industry
increase in rail freight turnover at the end
establishments. In many of the latter, efforts
of 1954 was 42 percent over 1950, compared to
are made to reduce production costs, but
an increase of only 35-40 percent planned for
these are largely local efforts made by plant
the period through 1955. These figures sug-
workers and managers who have relatively
gest that Soviet planners may have underesti-
little training and experience.
mated the transport requirements of their
52. Regional Concentrations. The regional
rapidly expanding economy. A rate of in-
distribution of industrial production shows
vestment higher than previously planned will
the impact of Soviet efforts to achieve greater
apparently be necessary to permit Soviet
balance between the several economic regions
transport to maintain growth necessary to
of the USSR, and to make these regions as far
support the future expansion of the economy.
as possible self-sufficient. However, produc-
Highway and waterway freight carriage have
tion continues to be relatively concentrated
also increased rapidly in recent years but not
in the long established industrial regions of
at a rate which will reduce the primary de-
northwest, center, and south. (See Figure 3
pendence of the economy upon rail trans-
on following page). The rapid prewar devel-
port, particularly in the areas served by the
opment of the Ural industrial complex based
Trans-Siberian Railway.
upon West Siberian coal has continued in the
55. Labor Force. A large proportion of the
postwar period, and the Urals now produce
recent growth in Soviet industrial output has
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our
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17
LIBIT
been achieved by increasing the size of the
56. A similar decline in the rate of entry to
industrial labor force rather than by increas-
the military manpower pool may be expected.
ing its efficiency. The 1951-1955 plan for in-
The decline in the annual entries into the in-
creases in the nonagricultural labor force
dustrial labor force in this period will require
was fulfilled by 1953. Planned increases in
continued emphasis on measures to increase
agricultural production - - particularly in live-
the productivity of labor. The trend since
stock and corn, both of which are labor in-
1948 of declining annual rates of increase in
tensive items - - and a significant reduction
labor productivity was arrested in 1954.
of the annual rate of entry into the labor
Maintenance of high levels of capital invest-
force during 1955-1960 will deny industrial
ment and reasonably improved per capita
production a labor force growth during this
consumption levels - - factors which are con-
period comparable to that obtained in the
sidered critical to Soviet labor productivity - -
preceding period. (See Table 2). In addition
therefore become essential to the achievement
to the labor requirements for agriculture,
of the estimated rates of over-all industrial
rates of increase in the industrial labor force
and economic growth.
will decline primarily because of the effects
of the low birth rate during World War II.
DEVELOPMENTS IN
TABLE 2
SOVIET AGRICULTURE
ESTIMATED LABOR FORCE OF THE USSR,
57. Soviet agriculture completed its first full
1938, 1947-1956, PROJECTED TO 1960
Yearly Averages in Millions of Workers
crop year under the new agricultural program
Total Excluding
Total
in 1954. It became clear: (a) that the So-
Non-
Military and
Labor
viet leaders were seriously intent upon in-
Agriculture
Agriculture
Forced Labor
Force
creasing agricultural production; (b) that the
1938
53.3
25.7
79.0
90.3
incentives contemplated in the 1953 program
1947
54.4
30.0
84.4
97.0
1948
53.8
31.0
84.8
98.0
had so far done little to improve rural produc-
1949
53.1
32.0
85.1
98.0
tive effort; and (c) that there had been an in-
1950
52.6
34.6
87.2
99.0
1951
51.8
36.2
88.0
100.0
crease in the size of the agricultural labor
1952
51.0
37.8
88.8
101.5
force and some improvement in the quality of
1953
51.8
38.1
89.9
101.5
1954
52.7
40.3
93.0
104.2
technical personnel. Owing in part to adverse
1955
54.1
41.6
95.7
106.5
weather conditions, 1954 agricultural output
1960
56.3
46.6
102.9
112.3
probably increased, but only about three per-
1 Total labor force estimates are subject to a con-
cent, and did not reach 1952 production levels.
siderable margin of error because of lack of data
on the amount of forced labor.
(See Table 3). The 1954 increase was
TABLE 3
ESTIMATED PRODUCTION OF MAJOR CROPS IN THE USSR
1938 AND 1950-1955
1938
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
FOOD CROPS
Million Metric Tons
Grain
88.6
85.0
80.0
92.0
83.0
87.0
Potatoes
73.8¹
72.3
59.5
69.7
66.4
67.2
FIBER CROPS
Thousand Metric Tons
Cotton (Ginned)
730
1,140
1,220
1,260
1,300
1,410
Flax (Scutched Basis)
600
540
480
400
350
400
Wool (Grease Basis)
130
190
205
225
230
235
ANIMAL CROPS
Million head 1 Jan.
Cattle
59.2
57.2
58.8
56.0
57.7
57.6
Swine
31.6
24.1
26.7
28.5
29.6
31.8
Sheep & goats
73.1
99.0
107.5
109.9
112.0
114.7
1 1933-1937 average.
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Dwight
PAY
TOP SECRET
STRINT
18
achieved largely as a result of favorable grow-
also increased local control over agricultural
ing conditions in the "new lands," since a
production and has undertaken a large pro-
severe drought struck the principal producing
gram to increase the stability and technical
regions in the Ukraine and Volga. On the
competence of the agricultural labor force.
other hand, agricultural investment in 1954
In April 1955 there was recruitment of some
increased almost 40 percent, in part by using
30,000 managers, largely from Party ranks,
the increased income of collective farms and
who would replace roughly one-third of the
also by large increases in state budget alloca-
existing collective farm managers.
tions. Crop acreage increased by six percent
as a result of overfulfillment of the "new
59. While the measures announced in the fall
lands" program. A return to average weather
of 1953 reflected a more realistic appraisal
conditions throughout the USSR during 1955
of material, natural, and human resource
would result in a sharp increase in agricul-
requirements, this cannot be said of the de-
tural output.
crees on virgin land and corn production
issued in 1954 and early 1955. A large part
58. Both 1954 and early 1955 saw additional
of the program approaches the climatic limits
changes in the 1953 agricultural program, all
of economic production for the land and crops
of which aimed at further expansion of out-
involved. Moreover, the strains and stresses
put. The "new lands" program, which is to
engendered by these campaigns will probably
add to the cultivated acreage of the USSR an
slow up the otherwise possible rate of growth
amount of land equal to the total cultivated
in the "old" regions. Thus the net results
acreage of Canada, moved forward ahead of
will almost certainly fall far short of plans,
schedule and with favorable crop yields in
though there will probably be some increases
1954. The early 1955 announcements outline
in production and in state control over agri-
what is apparently the essence of the Sixth
cultural output.
Five-Year Plan for agriculture, and despite
60. The principal problems posed by the agri-
the failure of the current plan, they establish
cultural program are: (a) the "new lands"
a series of agricultural goals for 1956-1960
scheme will draw many skilled people from
which are even more ambitious than those
established and more productive areas; (b)
set forth in the Fifth Five-Year Plan. (See
the combined "new lands" and corn and live-
Table 4).
stock programs will require very large addi-
tional outlays for machinery, construction,
TABLE 4
and fertilizer, as well as labor; and (c) cli-
OFFICIALLY PLANNED OUTPUT GOALS FOR
matic conditions in the "new lands" areas are
SOVIET AGRICULTURE
such as to produce frequent crop failures.
1960
Moreover, the apparent piecemeal manner in
Index: 1954=100
which the program has been instituted raises
Meat
200
considerable doubt as to whether the above
Milk
200
problems have been adequately assessed.
Eggs
200
Wool
180
61. All Soviet agriculture operates under sev-
Grain
188¹
eral inherent limitations. With few excep-
1 This is estimated from the officially announced
tions, the areas of adequate rainfall in the
goal of "not less than" 164 million tons by 1960,
and the estimated output of 87 million tons in
USSR are areas of poor soil and short grow-
1954.
ing seasons. Nearly all of the good soils lie
in an area of uncertain or deficient rainfall.
Meat and dairy products, both very costly to
There are no areas in the USSR comparable
produce, constitute the major objectives of the
to the US cotton belt or corn belt where soil,
1960 plan. To achieve the vast growth in
rainfall, and temperature are favorably com-
animal production, the USSR has embarked
bined over a large area to permit high pro-
on a large-scale program to get an eight-fold
duction response with conventional inputs.
increase in corn acreage. The Kremlin has
Less than 10 percent of arable land in the
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SEAL
Dwight D
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19
USSR will yield more than modest increases
percent. Per capita consumption of certain
in output without the addition of extremely
quality foods (whole milk) failed to increase
large amounts of fertilizer and machinery.
and some (meat) even declined. Improve-
Significant increases on most of the arable
ment in consumption in 1954, as in the period
land would require, in addition, even larger
since 1950, was not uniform for all income
investments in drainage or irrigation. Apart
groups; managers and skilled workers were
from these natural limitations, the institu-
the principal beneficiaries. Middle and lower
tional structure of Soviet agriculture, while
income groups derived only negligible benefit
permitting effective political control over the
from increased supplies of expensive fabrics
peasant population, fails to achieve operating
and appliances. For most families in these
efficiency and continues to produce peasant
income brackets, failure of food production to
antipathy.
do much more than keep pace with popula-
62. In view of these limitations we estimate
tion increases in a period of greater dispos-
that, even with average weather conditions,
able income has meant longer queues, extra
visits to the free market, and no improvement
agricultural production in 1960, instead of in-
in real consumption.
creasing by nearly 100 percent as planned,
will actually increase by only 30 percent. (See
Table 5).
TABLE 6
USSR: ESTIMATED INDEXES OF PER CAPITA
TABLE 5
CONSUMPTION
ESTIMATED SOVIET AGRICULTURAL
1948-1960
PRODUCTION: AN INDEX OF TEN
1954=100
MAJOR COMMODITIES
1948
1952
1953
1954
1955
1960
1938-1960
Food Products
76
97
98
100
103
116
1954=100
Clothing
50
82
91
100
112
153
1938
94
Manufactured
1948
80
Consumer Goods
36
73
83
100
117
160
1952
103
Transport and
1953
97
Communications
61
87
95
100
105
132
1954
100
Housing
95
98
99
100
102
109
1955
109
Urban
95
97
98
100
102
113
1960
130
Rural
94
98
99
100
101
105
Other Services
89
95
97
100
102
117
1 Bread grain, coarse and other grains, potatoes,
Total Consumer Goods
vegetables, meat, milk, cotton, wool, hemp, and
and Services
69
90
95
100
106
129
flax.
Further extension of capital investment and
64. Recent increases in real income through
labor might make possible additional growth
increased family income and price reductions
in agricultural output, but such additions
have not been matched by commensurate in-
would result in a reduction in the average rate
creases in the production of consumer goods.
of growth for the economy as a whole.
Price reductions in 1954 yielded a negligible
increase in the workers' food basket and
SOVIET CONSUMPTION LEVELS
failed, where preceding price cuts had suc-
63. Per capita Soviet consumption in 1954
ceeded, in reducing free market prices. The
rose somewhat more than five percent over
increased state loan in 1955 and the failure
the 1953 level, a rate of increase slightly
thus far in 1955 to provide the usual annual
higher than had been achieved in the first
reduction in consumer goods prices is evi-
year of the revised consumer goods program.
dence of a desire to reduce inflationary pres-
(See Table 6). Durable consumer goods other
sures.
than housing showed the most rapid increase,
about 20 percent on a per capita basis. Cloth-
65. We estimate that, given the probable rate
ing and textile consumption increased about
of increase in Soviet agricultural production
10 percent and food consumption by only two
for 1955-1960, aggregate Soviet consumption
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The
Dwight D
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LIVE
20
will probably increase by about 30 percent
The grossly inadequate rural transport and
during this period. However, food and hous-
market systems will continue to restrict the
ing, by far the major. components for the
ability of the Soviet government to eliminate
average Soviet consumer, will increase by less
private agricultural production in rural areas.
than 20 percent. There were indications in
They are also major blocks to the effective
late 1954 and early 1955 that some influential
exercise of the increased peasant purchasing
elements among Soviet planners were press-
power which was intended to provide the in-
ing for a higher rate of growth in consump-
centive to support the new agricultural pro-
tion than that called for in the 1953 plan.
gram.
Present agricultural plans indicate that the
present Soviet leadership hopes to increase
DEVELOPMENTS IN
consumption at a more rapid rate than we
SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE
have here estimated. However, the high cost
of agricultural expansion and the competing
67. Soviet foreign trade in 1954 increased al-
demands of other sectors of the Soviet econ-
most 20 percent over the preceding year. The
omy will probably combine to restrict a more
increase of $1.1 billion represents the largest
rapid growth in Soviet consumption levels.
absolute volume increase since the period
prior to the Korean War, and the highest
66. The disparity between rural and urban
trade level with the free world since before
scales of living has grown more pronounced
1948. (See Tables 7 and 8). Total Soviet
TABLE 7
ESTIMATED FOREIGN TRADE TURNOVER IN THE USSR
1951
1952
1953
1954
Trading Area
Value Percent
Value Percent
Value Percent
Value
Percent
Satellites (incl.
Communist China) 3.6
80
4.1
80
4.9
86
5.6
82
Free World
0.9
20
1.0
20
0.8
14
1.2
18
Total Trade
4.5
100
5.1
100
5.7
100
6.8
100
since the beginning of the Five-Year Plans.
foreign trade has increased at a rate more
Exact quantification of this difference is ex-
than twice that of GNP; the increase is
ceedingly difficult because the greater part of
attributable mainly to growing trade within
rural consumption is consumption in kind,
the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Trade with the free
but the disparity probably exercises a sub-
world has been increasing since the end of
stantial restraint upon peasant incentive and
1950 with the exception of 1953, but remains
interest in agricultural output. Despite the
below prewar volume.
fact that the peasants produce the major por-
68. Soviet trade with the free world was still
tion of the Soviet food supply, they eat less
well than city people, even though their cal-
primarily with Western Europe, although
oric intake is about equal. The city dweller
consumes about 50 percent more milk, two
TABLE 8
to three times as much meat, and appreciably
VOLUME INDEX OF SOVIET TRADE TURNOVER
more fish, vegetable oil, butter, eggs, and
(1948=100)
sugar. Housing quality is considerably better
Total
With the
With the
Year
Foreign Trade
Bloc
Free World
in the city although the average space per
1949
126
191
75
capita is greater in the country. An analysis
1950
189
347
64
of retail trade suggests that city people con-
1951
218
399
74
1952
256
464
sume three to four times as much manufac-
92
1953
298
577
77
tured consumer goods as do rural consumers.
1954
359
690
114
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The
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21
EJR1977
there was a considerable increase in trade
to underdeveloped countries of Asia. For the
with less highly developed areas of the world.
first time, there were actual movements of
The usual export surplus with Western Eu-
technicians and equipment (into Afghani-
rope declined slightly in 1954 and the USSR
stan), and a contract for the construction of
ran a large deficit with underdeveloped areas.
a steel mill in India was signed early in 1955.
It is estimated that the USSR ran a substan-
More overtures like these will probably be
tial commodity deficit with the free world;
made as the Soviet economy grows, especially
gold sales are estimated to have been $100-
if the USSR does not substantially increase
150 million in 1954. Traditional Soviet ex-
the scale of its military effort.
ports to the West have been limited by in-
creases in internal Soviet consumption and
71. The 1955-1960 pattern of Soviet foreign
by the substantial trade program within the
trade will be subject to so many conflicting
Sino-Soviet Bloc; this program has recently
factors that any forecast must be conditioned
included large shipments of grain from the
by possible changes in the international cli-
USSR to the European Satellites, which, tak-
mate and in the respective capabilities of the
en as a whole, were formerly a net grain-ex-
trading partners. The USSR is still suffi-
porting area. Although there was some in-
ciently behind Western technology to have
crease in Soviet imports of consumer goods
a continuing need for Western capital equip-
from the free world in 1954, there was little
ment. Although Soviet food supply is ade-
other change in the pattern of imports.
quate for the immediate future, failure to
Grain exports to the free world declined
increase present agricultural production
slightly from the postwar low in 1953, while
would eventually lead to additional require-
exports of petroleum and other mineral and
ments for food products from outside the
forest products increased. In late 1954 and
Bloc. The USSR has the capability at pres-
early 1955 there were some indications that
ent to expand export of certain raw materials
the USSR might decrease its imports from the
and is rapidly approaching a position in
West.
which it could export a substantial volume of
manufactured goods and capital equipment.
69. According to Soviet data foreign trade
Thus the capability for an increase in trade
turnover with other Bloc nations increased
with the West exists.
(in value) about 14 percent in 1954, compared
to a 50 percent increase with the West. In-
72. Soviet programs and policies, however,
asmuch as there was little change in the est-
will probably preclude any rapid expansion
imated volume or composition of Sino-Soviet
of trade with the West, and will probably
trade, most of the increase in Bloc trade prob-
confine any increase in this trade to a level
ably took place between the USSR and the
approximating over-all Soviet economic
European Satellites. The USSR apparently
growth. The level of trade within the Bloc
serves as an intermediary for much of intra-
will continue to increase, but at a somewhat
Bloc trade, and in part for this reason it is
lower rate than in the recent past. The
difficult to ascertain the real volume of in-
amount of trade within the Bloc would be
crease in trade among the various members.
greatly increased if the USSR encouraged a
70. Soviet technical assistance programs
greater degree of national specialization
within the Bloc continued to constitute an
among the Bloc states. We believe it more
integral part of Soviet political and economic
likely that the USSR will maintain a Bloc-
control. There was a further increase in the
wide division of labor not much changed from
intensity of Soviet propaganda and in nego-
the present structure and will continue to
tiations to extend the area of technical as-
restrict trade between its associates and the
sistance to non-Bloc countries, particularly
free world.
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The
DWIGNED
22
LIBITY
IV. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS
MAGNITUDE OF SCIENTIFIC ASSETS -
ties, is unlikely to contribute to Soviet Bloc
POLICY AND PRIORITIES
technical resources during the period of this
estimate.
73. The USSR has consistently given strong
support to the development of science and
75. The USSR has a large number of organ-
technology. As a consequence, Soviet scien-
izations, laboratories, institutes, etc., engaged
tific and technical capabilities have increased
in research in all fields of science. In gen-
at a rapid pace, especially since World War
eral, organizational control and laboratory
II. We believe that these capabilities will in-
facilities are sufficient for effective utilization
crease throughout this period, and will con-
of scientific talent. Important Soviet labo-
tinue to provide ample support for essential
ratories conducting high priority research
economic and military programs. However,
projects are adequately equipped. However,
there will continue to be limitations on Soviet
complex research instruments and equipment
scientific resources which will make careful
are somewhat less readily available in the
allocation mandatory and circumscribe the
USSR than in the United States or the UK.
number of major programs that the USSR
Consequently, some specialized lower priority
can undertake concurrently, especially in
research projects are probably delayed longer
view of the increasing scientific demands
than similar projects would be in Western
within the Bloc as a whole. Soviet military
nations. Although the USSR continues to
and heavy industrial requirements will prob-
import some scientific instruments from
ably continue to be the primary factors in-
Western nations, it is now manufacturing or
fluencing scientific planning and allocations
can obtain within the Bloc practically all
of technical resources, although increased at-
types of scientific instruments for laboratory
tention will probably be given to the applica-
research, and also limited numbers and types
tion of science to agriculture.
of industrial instruments for plant operations
and control. Research and development in
74. At present the scientific assets of the
electronics will dominate the science of in-
USSR (the number and quality of trained
strumentation within the USSR during the
personnel, facilities, and equipment) are
period of this estimate, with emphasis on bet-
smaller than those of the US, and the assets
ter recording and controlling instruments.
of the Sino-Soviet Bloc are far smaller than
those of the West. Soviet financial support
76. There is no evidence that Soviet ideology
for science, while increasing, remains con-
has seriously hampered the development of
siderably below that of the US, possibly about
the physical sciences, especially in applica-
one-half. However, with respect to scientists
tions directly affecting industrial and mili-
of the very top rank, whose numbers are few
tary capabilities. In certain fields of the
in any country, the USSR probably has in
biological sciences, however, officially spon-
many fields men who are as able as their
sored ideological doctrines have probably ex-
counterparts in Western countries. During
erted a retarding influence on research, al-
the period of this estimate the USSR will
though the present weakness in these fields
provide the great bulk of Bloc scientific assets,
is probably due more to the heavy official
and its proportionate share will continue to
grow. However, East Germany, Czechoslo-
emphasis laid on other fields of research than
vakia, and to a lesser extent Poland and Hun-
to ideological restraints. There are indica-
gary, will continue to contribute a substantial
tions that even in the biological field ideologi-
increment. On the other hand, Communist
cal restraints are likely to be of less conse-
China, because of an extreme shortage of
quence in the future than they have been in
scientific and technical manpower and facili-
the past.
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BUY
Dwight
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23
Library
SCIENTIFIC EDUCATION AND
longer period. Standards of maintenance for
MANPOWER
all kinds of mechanized equipment are in gen-
77. Prior to World War II the general quality
eral lower than in Western countries and
of Soviet higher education and research in
rates of deterioration higher. In addition,
most scientific and technical fields was mark-
the number of skilled mechanics and techni-
edly below that of the US. In the postwar
cians which would be available to the armed
period, however, it has been generally good,
forces in war is far smaller than in the West.
and has approached US standards. Only in
However, Soviet engineers have sought to
some areas of biology, particularly in the ag-
compensate for these deficiencies by building
ricultural sciences, does it appear that the
machines and equipment which are simple in
present quality of Soviet education and re-
design and easy to maintain and repair.
search may be decidedly below that of the US.
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL
However, by 1960, in view of the probable
greater emphasis upon agricultural develop-
DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY
ment, this deficiency is likely to be consider-
SIGNIFICANCE
ably reduced.
80. The capability of Soviet scientists and
78. About 1,560,000 Soviet citizens have scien-
technicians in those basic scientific fields (e.
tific or technical degrees from colleges and
g., physical sciences, mathematics) which are
universities, of whom about 785,000 are post-
related to the development and production of
war graduates. The number of university or
weapons and military equipment is sufficient
technical institute graduates employed in the
to insure the development of modern arms for
scientific-technical field in the USSR (1,240,-
Soviet forces. In response to new require-
000) compares closely with that in the US.¹⁰
ments and conditions created by the appli-
It is estimated that 175,000 scientists are en-
cation of advanced technology to war and war
gaged in advanced research or teaching at
preparations, the USSR appears to be placing
higher level institutions in the USSR, com-
great emphasis upon development of new
pared with about 265,000 so engaged in the
scientific fields and techniques to maximize
US. Because of the greater stress on the bio-
the return from Soviet resources, both human
logical and health sciences, however, the
and non-human (e.g., human engineering,
USSR has only an estimated 85,000 in the
mental conditioning, casualty therapy, com-
physical sciences, as compared with about
puter research, automation).
210,000 in the US. Soviet scientists in research
81. The USSR probably has the scientific and
and development in all fields of science (ex-
technological capability necessary to develop
cluding those primarily engaged in teaching)
most weapons and military equipment equiv-
number about 100,000, about one-half of the
alent to, and in a few cases possibly better
number similarly occupied in the US. Dur-
than, those of other nations. However, in a
ing the period of this estimate the Soviet
number of weapons categories, especially
scientific manpower pool will probably in-
crease considerably more rapidly than that of
those involving new and complex equipment,
the US.
the USSR lags behind the West. Moreover,
the USSR probably does not have sufficient
79. The USSR is not as well supplied with
scientific resources to program vigorous weap-
technicians, mechanics, and maintenance
men as are the Western countries, where
ons and equipment research simultaneously
broader sections of the population have ac-
in all fields, and this deficiency, while possi-
quired mechanical skills over a considerably
bly decreasing, will probably continue through
1960. Nevertheless, Soviet espionage poten-
10 Numerical estimates of Soviet scientific person-
tial, coupled with the free nations' inherent
nel are believed to be correct to within plus or
inability to guard their secrets, compensates
minus 10 percent. For a detailed comparison
of USSR and US scientific personnel, see graph-
in some degree for deficiencies in the Soviet
ics on following page.
scientific effort.
TOP SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
US AND USSR
COMPARISON OF MAJOR SCIENTIFIC GROUPS*
(In Thousands)
GRADUATES EMPLOYED IN SCIENTIFIC FIELDS
STREET
Mid-1955
Mid-1958
Mid-1960
1815
1575
Health Sciences
450
Health Sciences
1410
400
1320
1240
1175
Agricultural
Sciences
Health Sciences
Health Sciences
Agricultural
Health Sciences
335
510
330
Sciences
485
Health Sciences
285
450
Agricultural
Sciences
Agricultural
Agricultural
225
Sciences-215
Agricultural
Sciences 195
Physical
Sciences 165
Physical
Sciences and
Physical
Sciences and
Engineering
Physical
Sciences and
Engineering
Physical
1030
Engineering
Physical
Sciences and
Sciences and
890
Sciences and
685
Engineering
Engineering
Engineering
685
560
640
Soviet Union
United States
Soviet Union
United States
Soviet Union
United States
"SCIENTIFIC WORKERS"
SOVIET KANDIDATS AND
(Professional scientists in research institutions or
AMERICAN Ph.D.'s
teaching in higher educational institutions)
IN SCIENTIFIC FIELDS
Mid-1955
Mid-1955
70
265
Health Sciences
25
Health Sciences
Agricultural
20
55
Sciences-30
Health Sciences
9
175
Agricultural
Sciences
Agricultural
Health Sciences
15
Sciences
12
55
Physical
Sciences and
Engineering
Agricultural
210
Sciences-35
Physical
Physical
Sciences and
Sciences and
Engineering
Engineering
Physical
35
Sciences and
34
Engineering
85
Soviet Union
United States
Soviet Union
United States
*Numerical estimates of Soviet scientific personnel are be-
lieved to be correct to within plus or minus 10 percent.
13808 5-55
CONFIDENTIAL
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24
Nuclear Weapons¹¹
terial might become-more likely toward mid-
1958. The USSR will probably continue work
82. The Soviet atomic energy program, di-
on larger-yield weapons as well as on smaller-
rected primarily toward the production of nu-
yield and small-dimension weapons. We es-
clear weapons, will continue to receive special
timate that by mid-1956 the USSR could have
emphasis through 1958. The USSR had
weapons with ranges of yields from 0.5 KT to
tested by the end of 1953, small and medium
10,000 KT or more. Such developments would
yield weapons and has employed thermonu-
permit more flexibility in the use of nuclear
clear boosting principles to produce an ener-
weapons. Assuming such progress on the
gy yield up to 1,000 kilotons of TNT. The
part of the Soviets, and an increased alloca-
1954 test series showed stockpile types in the
tion of fissionable material to large-yield
medium yield range and extensive develop-
weapons, one of the ways in which their 1958
ment in the small yield ranges, but there was
weapons stockpile could be divided would be
no further development in the large yield
as follows:
range. During the immediate future, the
types of weapons stockpiled will probably
Large-yield weapons (500 to 10,000 KT)
230
Medium-yield weapons (5 to 500 KT)
440
have the general characteristics and explosive
Small-yield weapons (0.5 to 5 KT)
570
powers of weapons already tested although
the quantity of the large yield type that could
85. Soviet fissionable material production
be produced would probably be limited.
capabilities for the period beyond mid-1958
Within the limits of technological capabilities
are subject to even greater uncertainty than
as of the end of 1954, Soviet military require-
noted in footnote 12, because of the lack
ments will govern the allocation of available
of information on long-range plans and the
fissionable material to various types of weap-
unpredictability of new developments in this
ons, with consideration probably being given
field. However, long-range extrapolations
more to operational requirements than to the
can be carried out on the basis of assumptions
largest total energy yield attainable.
of the growth pattern the Soviet nuclear pro-
gram could follow during the period in ques-
83. In order to provide an example of Soviet
tion. Alternate assumptions, which indicate
stockpile capabilities, we have assumed that:
a range of growth capabilities, are:
(1) one-third of estimated uranium-235 is
(a) No expansion of Soviet fissionable ma-
utilized in large-yield weapons (500 to 1,000
terials production facilities after 1958 (As-
KT); (2) two-thirds is utilized in medium-
sumption A); or,
yield (70 KT) composite weapons; and (3)
(b) Continued expansion of Soviet fission-
the remaining plutonium is divided equally
able materials production facilities after 1958
between medium-yield (40 KT) and small-
at the same rate as estimates for the period
yield (5 KT) weapons. For purposes of com-
1949 to mid-1958 (Assumption B); or,
parison this allocation of fissionable material
(c) Expansion of the Soviet program after
is carried through mid-1958. If the Soviet
1958 at a rate which will increase its require-
stockpile were allocated in this manner it
ments for uranium to approximately 7,000 to
would be as follows¹⁹:
10,000 tons per year by 1964 (Assumption C).
Mid- Mid-
1955 1958
86. In view of the broad spectrum of weapon
Large-yield weapons (500-1,000 KT)
15
50
types which will probably be available to the
Medium-yield weapons (40-70 KT)
320
950
Small-yield weapons (5 KT)
155
250
12 In view of the range of error applicable to the
estimate of Soviet fissionable material produc-
tion, the actual figures for the end of 1955 may
84. However, due to continued Soviet nuclear
be as much as one-third lower or higher than
progress, other allocations of fissionable ma-
the figures given above. Uncertainty increases
as estimates are projected into the future and
11 See Nie 11-2-55, "The Soviet Atomic Energy Pro-
the actual figure for mid-1958 may be as low as
gram," Restricted Data, dated 25 April 1955 for
one-half or as high as twice the figures given
details of Soviet nuclear energy program.
in the table.
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25
USSR, it becomes increasingly difficult to
sidered in connection with Soviet capabilities
make specific estimates of the detailed make-
to produce explosions in the megaton range.
up of the Soviet stockpile as it is projected
into the future. The following example of a
Guided Missiles¹³
possible Soviet weapon stockpile will indicate
the general magnitude of the Soviet capability
89. We believe that the strategic requirements
under each of the three assumptions given
of the USSR would dictate a major effort in
above, utilizing the same percentage alloca-
the field of guided missiles, and the evidence
tion of fissionable material to large-, medium-,
which we have concerning the large number
and small-yield weapons as in paragraph 84
of personalities and activities believed to be
above.
involved in the current Soviet missile pro-
gram leads us to the conclusion that it is a
EXAMPLES OF POSSIBLE SOVIET NUCLEAR
large one. On the basis of our extensive
WEAPONS STOCKPILES - 1959-1960
knowledge of Soviet exploitation of the war-
Mid
Mid
time German missile experience and our esti-
Assumption A
1959
1960
mate of Soviet capabilities in related fields,
Large-Yield Weapons
280
340
(500-10,000 KT or more)
we believe that the USSR has the basic scien-
Intermediate-Yield Weapons
550
660
tific and technical capabilities to support a
(5-500 KT)
comprehensive missile research and develop-
Small-Yield Weapons
710
850
(0.5-5 KT)
ment program. The USSR also has an ade-
Assumption B
quate economic base for a sizeable production
Large-Yield Weapons
290
360
program. It is probable that the USSR now
(500-10,000 KT or more)
has some guided missiles in operational status,
Intermediate-Yield Weapons
560
700
and that a growing Soviet guided missile
(5-500 KT)
Small-Yield Weapons
720
900
capability will develop within the next several
(0.5-5 KT)
years. However, we have no firm current in-
Assumption C
telligence on what particular types of missiles
Large-Yield Weapons
320
450
the USSR is presently developing, or may now
(500-10,000 KT or more)
have in operational use.
Intermediate-Yield Weapons
630
880
(5-500 KT)
Small-Yield Weapons
810
1130
Electronics and Communications
(0.5-5 KT)
90. The USSR has made substantial progress
87. There is no direct information on the na-
toward catching up with the West in elec-
ture of the Soviet control organization and
tronics by expanding its manufacturing facili-
facilities for storage, handling, and distribu-
ties and adapting Western equipment. The
tion of nuclear weapons. However, we believe
magnitude, diversity, and past successes of
that Soviet nuclear weapons will be handled
the Soviet research and development program
by a special organization within the Ministry
in electronics indicate the probable develop-
of Defense and will be stored at both a few
ment of new and improved devices. Air de-
large reserve-stockpile storage sites and a
fense capabilities will probably be improved as
large number of smaller sites. These small
a consequence of significant advances in de-
sites will probably be located at or near air-
tection, warning, interception, and data-
fields, guided missile sites, and other delivery
handling equipment, which are expected dur-
vehicle installations in advanced areas.
13 For a discussion of Soviet guided missiles, in-
88. Radiological Warfare. It is most unlike-
cluding estimates of the dates at which various
ly, for technological reasons, that the USSR
types of missiles might appear in Soviet oper-
will be able to stockpile militarily significant
ational use, see NIE 11-6-54: "Soviet Capabilities
quantities of radiological warfare weapons
and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile
during the period of this estimate. However,
Field," published 5 October 1954. No evidence
has appeared, since the publications of that
the significance of radio-active fall-out follow-
estimate, which justifies a change in its con-
ing large nuclear explosions should be con-
clusions.
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26
ing the period of this estimate. Those aspects
tively can provide GCI data. We believe that
of communication theory which have a direct
by 1960 GCI coverage will be increased to the
bearing on communication techniques, radar,
order of 200 nautical miles; this will necessi-
computers, automatic guidance devices, and
tate the use of transponder beacons in inter-
telemetering are under continuing study by
ceptor aircraft. Maximum reliable altitude
Soviet scientists. Such research will result
coverage up to 60,000 feet, though at less than
in practical applications and may within the
maximum ranges, will be achieved by 1959.
period of this estimate lead to a communica-
tion network exceedingly difficult to intercept
93. Airborne Intercept Radar (AI) - There is
or jam. During the period of this estimate
confirmed evidence that the USSR now has
the USSR will improve its electronics capabili-
airborne intercept radar in at least limited
ties in the following categories.
operational use in widely separated geographic
areas. The equipment is probably compar-
91. Early Warning Radar (EW) - The USSR
able to existing Western types. It can prob-
has a large variety of EW radars in use. These
ably be installed on current types of Soviet
include World War II sets, native sets based
fighter aircraft. Within the period of this
on Western designs, and sets of purely native
estimate the Soviet air defense system will
design. Most of these will continue in use
probably have improved AI radar in general
through 1956 and will afford fairly reliable
operational use.
coverage against medium bombers at maxi-
mum ranges from 125 miles (up to 60,000 feet
94. Fire Control Radar - The WHIFF radar,
altitude) to 180 miles (up to 45,000 feet alti-
the Soviet version of the SCR-584, will almost
tude). Against fighters these maximum
certainly continue to be used in quantity.
ranges are from 85 miles (up to 45,000 feet
Meanwhile, development work on radar sets
altitude) to 135 miles (up to 30,000 feet alti-
with greater accuracies, range definitions, and
tude). Continued use of low-frequency radars
reduced vulnerability to jamming will proceed
(in the 72 mc/s region) through 1959 is indi-
during the period of this estimate, and new
cated. By 1958 the USSR will probably have
sets might appear at any time. The X-band
developed one or more EW radars capable of
probably will be used for newly developed fire
detecting an object the size of a medium
control radars.
bomber at 60,000 feet up to a distance of about
95. Blind Bombing and Navigational Radar -
200 nautical miles. The problem of low alti-
The USSR currently has in operational use
tude coverage will still exist but probably will
an X-band (three centimeter) set developed
be greatly lessened by the use of moving tar-
in the postwar period and capable of further
get indicators and gap-filler radars. By 1960
improvement. By the end of 1957, the best
the performance of the early warning radar
Soviet blind bombing and navigational radar
estimated to be introduced in 1958 will prob-
should be capable of operating at altitudes up
ably be increased somewhat.
to 50,000 feet and have a range of about 125
92. Ground Control Intercept Radar (GCI)-
nautical miles for navigation. Bombing and
We estimate that by 1958 the USSR will have
navigation equipment will permit accuracies
GCI radars of several types, including the
equivalent to those of present US equipment.
V-beam sets presently in use, which should be
The use of frequencies higher than X-band is
unlikely by mid-1956, but operational use of
capable of coverage on medium bombers at
maximum reliable ranges of 150-200 nautical
the higher frequency equipment may be
achieved by mid-1960.
miles and on fighters at maximum reliable
ranges of 55-85 nautical miles, depending on
96. Electromagnetic Warfare - The USSR
altitude, location, and other factors. More
presently has the capability of seriously dis-
recent than the excellent V-beam sets are
rupting Western long-range communications
the paired combinations of long-range azi-
and navigational systems. Soviet achieve-
muth indicating sets (GAGE) and height in-
ments in related electronic fields indicate that
dicating sets (PATTY CAKE), which collec-
the USSR is also able, by an intensive effort,
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Library
to develop electronic jamming equipment
livestock BW against the US need not be
which could be effective up through 12,000
large-scale to be effective. Anticrop BW
megacycles and possibly through 46,000 mega-
against the US would probably not substan-
cycles. It is estimated that by 1960 the USSR
tially affect US crop production unless car-
can have jamming equipment in operational
ried out on a very large scale and under favor-
use in frequency ranges up through 30,000
able seasonal and environmental conditions.
megacycles.
The USSR is probably capable of large-scale
97. Microwave Radio - Microwave communi-
production of antipersonnel BW weapons.
cation equipment is in wide use in East Ger-
99. Soviet capabilities for defense against BW
many, and fixed networks exist in the Soviet
are inferior to those of the US because of So-
Union. Based on the reported procurement
viet deficiencies in public health, sanitation,
of microwave relay equipment from both East
livestock management, and plant protection.
Germany and Hungary, the present inventory
Gradual progress will probably be made to cor-
of the Soviet Bloc is estimated at approxi-
rect these deficiencies during the period of
mately 3,000 sets. By 1960, mobile micro-
the estimate. Because widespread shipment
wave sets of eight channels will probably be
of livestock is not practiced in the USSR, So-
standard military issue to divisions and high-
viet vulnerability to small-scale antilivestock
er echelons. VHF equipment for ground-air,
attacks is probably less than that of the
ship-ship, and ship-shore communication, al-
United States.
ready in use, will find more widespread use
with increased numbers of channels and im-
proved reliability. Techniques such as "flash"
Chemical Weapons
transmissions will be used to transmit im-
100. During World War II, the Soviet Union
portant messages with a minimum suscepti-
is known to have produced most of the stand-
bility to countermeasures and maximum of
ard chemical warfare agents as well as the
message security.
necessary auxiliary equipment. The USSR
has the facilities and scientific knowledge nec-
Biological Warfare
essary to produce at least one of the nerve
98. Firm evidence on Soviet activity in the
gases and could employ these agents during
biological warfare field is exceedingly scanty,
the period of this estimate. Published Soviet
and is likely to remain so because of the rel-
research in fields closely allied to chemical
ative ease with which such a program can be
warfare - organophosphorus chemistry, aero-
concealed. The USSR has, however, the tech-
sol formation, cholinesterase, alkaloids, and
nical knowledge, trained personnel, and facili-
adsorption - - indicates a scientific capability
ties necessary for a program of research and
for the development of new or improved chem-
development in biological warfare, and such
ical agents, dissemination equipment, and
a program is probably in progress. The USSR
protective devices. We assume that the stock-
is capable of producing BW agents and dis-
pile of standard agents and munitions accum-
seminating devices suitable for small-scale
ulated during World War II has been main-
clandestine attacks against certain crops,
tained and that the facilities for CW agents
against livestock, and against personnel in
production are being maintained on a stand-
buildings or concentrated in relatively small
by basis or operated to produce other chemi-
areas. Soviet capabilities for large-scale
cals or materiel. The USSR is able to engage
attacks are more difficult to estimate. Anti-
in chemical warfare on a large scale.
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our
WIERED
V. SINO-SOVIET BLOC MILITARY STRENGTH
LIBITY
JUMBER
SIZE OF FORCES, SCALE OF
doctrine, and tactics designed to adapt these
EFFORT, TRENDS
forces to nuclear warfare. The major weap-
101. The USSR is both the foundation and
ons changes will be the increases in the num-
arsenal of Communist Bloc military strength,
bers and types of nuclear weapons, in air-
and thus the primary source of Bloc military
craft, especially bombers and all-weather
capabilities. The main contribution of the
fighters, and in long-range submarines.
other Bloc states is manpower, although in-
There will also be progressive modernization
dustries in the Eastern European Satellites
of weapons and equipment, particularly those
supply some military equipment. Sino-Soviet
incorporating electronic guidance and control.
Bloc forces-in-being now total more than
Limitations on Bloc armed forces during the
period of this estimate will derive from: de-
8,000,000 men (of which about 4,000,000 are
Soviet and 2,400,000 Chinese) not including
ficiencies in experience and training for long-
security forces. The forces of the East Euro-
range air operations, and in certain equip-
ment for air defense, together with lack of
pean states, for all practical purposes, are un-
der direct control of the Kremlin. The Com-
capability for long-range amphibious and sur-
face naval operations.
munist Chinese forces, while heavily depend-
ent upon Soviet aid, are outside direct Soviet
104. Logistical problems will continue to place
control.
a considerable limitation upon the Sino-So-
102. In the postwar period the USSR has pro-
viet Bloc's capability to wage intensive war-
duced armaments at a relatively high rate,
fare over an extended period. These prob-
which has made possible an extensive re-
lems are due to the vast size of the USSR,
equipment program. Since 1950, Soviet pro-
the great distances from main interior sources
duction of armaments has been at an average
of supply to several main operational areas,
rate of roughly 25 percent of capacity. The
and the relatively inadequate road and rail
levelling off of military expenditures as in-
network and the acute shortage of Bloc-regis-
dicated in the 1953-1954 budgets apparently
tered shipping.¹⁴ In order to offset these dis-
resulted in a reduction in output of some
advantages the USSR has maintained large
weapons, many of which were already stock-
forces and military stockpiles in forward
piled in quantity. The announced increase
areas. Stockpiles of POL, ammunition, and
in the military budget for 1955, however, sug-
other types of supplies consumed at a rela-
gests that the cutback in production was tem-
tively constant rate, are probably sufficient to
porary and may have reflected transition to
maintain a force of 300 line divisions together
the production of newer models, especially
with air and naval forces in Europe and Asia
aircraft. Assuming no significant changes in
for an extended period (i.e., up to six months
the international situation, we have estimated
depending upon the scale of conflict). Dur-
above that Soviet defense expenditure after
ing the period of this estimate the Soviet
1955 will probably show a relatively small an-
logistical situation will probably improve as
nual increase - of the order of three percent
a result of continued stockpiling and the de-
per year on the average.
velopment of a more flexible and mobile trans-
port system. However, logistical problems
103. During the period of this estimate the
will probably continue to be a considerable
personnel strength of Bloc forces-in-being will
limitation upon capabilities for extended
probably remain substantially unchanged.
offensive operations, especially in the Far
However, the over-all effectiveness of these
East. If the USSR were subjected to inten-
forces will almost certainly increase, primari-
ly due to the improved weapons available to
14 For a breakdown of the Sino-Soviet Bloc mer-
Soviet forces, and to changes in organization,
chant fleet, see Appendix, Table11.
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29
sive nuclear attack, its capability to support
ty and maneuverability, greater initiative,
extensive military operations, especially out-
dispersion, deeper objectives, reconnaissance,
side Soviet borders, would be markedly cur-
and individual protective measures. Soviet
tailed both in magnitude and duration.
offensive doctrine emphasizes allocation of a
substantial number of nuclear weapons for
SOVIET MILITARY FORCES
use against enemy defensive positions, air
Ground Forces¹⁵
facilities, reserves, atomic capabilities, and en-
circled enemy units. The assault following
105. The Soviet Army has been reorganized
a nuclear attack would employ tanks and
and modernized since the end of World War
armored infantry in order to develop maxi-
II, and now totals about 2,500,000 men. There
mum speed of exploitation. Doctrine for the
are sufficient trained reserves and stockpiles
defense emphasizes deep revetted trenches
of equipment to expand the army to about 300
and other protective construction, dispersion
line divisions plus supporting troops with a
in width and depth, and larger and more
total strength of 7,500,000 by M+30. The
mobile reserves.
estimated maximum mobilization potential
is about 12,500,000 men. In the absence of
108. The Soviet Army is currently embarked
general war, we believe that the Soviet ground
on an extensive program of improvement of
forces will remain at approximately their
its ground weapons systems which will great-
present size and disposition through 1960.
ly increase its mobility, flexibility, and fire-
The concentration of Soviet ground forces in
power.¹⁶ Armored cars and armored person-
East Germany, the Western USSR, the Cau-
nel carriers have been introduced. It is esti-
casus, and the Far East provides for the de-
mated that in East Germany alone there are
fense and security of the most important and
now about 2,000 armored personnel carriers,
vulnerable areas of the USSR, while facilita-
each capable of transporting 15 men. Gen-
ting administrative support.
eral issue of new weapons has included a
medium tank (T-54) mounting a 100-mm
106. The Soviet Army is well-trained, disci-
gun, mortars of 160-mm, and of 200 to 240
pline is good, and morale is almost certainly
mm calibers, a track-mounted rocket launch-
high. The 30 Soviet divisions located in East
er, and a new family of antiaircraft guns, and
Germany and the European Satellites are
possibly a new heavy tank (JS-4). During
known to be well equipped. This force is
this period the Soviet Army will probably
well trained and combat ready, although its
have new and improved heavy artillery of
readiness is somewhat lowered in the late fall
large enough caliber to utilize nuclear projec-
of each year when new recruits have replaced
tiles, an infantry antitank guided missile, and
trained men. Intelligence concerning the re-
infrared night driving and firing aids. By
maining divisions, particularly those in the
mid-1960 it is estimated that a new medium
interior of the USSR, is considerably less ex-
tank and a heavy tank, substantially superior
tensive. However, it is probable that the
to the current T-54 and JS-3 (or JS-4), will
latter are maintained at a stage of war read-
be in operation.
iness sufficient to permit their early deploy-
ment to a combat theater.
109. During the period of this estimate, the
combat readiness of the Soviet Army will al-
107. During the last year the Soviet Army
most certainly continue to increase. The
has placed considerable emphasis upon train-
addition of improved equipment and weapons,
ing exercises to improve ground force defense
more flexibility in logistical operations, a con-
against nuclear attack. There is also evidence
siderable increase in mobility and changes
that army offensive and defensive tactics en-
designed to meet requirements for nuclear
visage the use of tactical atomic weapons by
warfare will improve the effectiveness of the
Soviet forces. Emphasis is placed on mobili-
16 For a comparison of Soviet and US production
15 For detailed estimates of strength and disposi-
of major ground force weapons for 1953-1954,
tion of these forces, see Appendix, Tables 1 and 2.
see Appendix, Table 8.
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Soviet Army for a nuclear war and also in-
include about 10,900 jet fighters (about 40
crease its capabilities to engage in highly
percent all-weather), 3,100 jet light bombers,
mobile, conventional type actions.
700 jet medium bombers, and 400 jet and 300
110. Security Forces. Soviet internal security
turbo-prop heavy bombers.
forces are controlled by the Ministry of Inter-
112. The Soviet aircraft industry has account-
nal Affairs and number about 400,000. These
ed for about 95 percent of total Bloc aircraft
troops are a select group, well trained and
production in the postwar period. Estimated
equipped, and provide a significant increment
Bloc production of fighter and bomber air-
to Soviet military strength-in-being. How-
craft during the period 1946-1954 has been
ever, their primary responsibility for main-
roughly equal to that of the NATO countries
taining internal control would probably pre-
in numbers of aircraft, although substantially
vent their becoming available for operations
below that of NATO in terms of total airframe
outside the USSR. About 150,000 are in the
weight.¹⁸ During the latter part of this period
border troops, disposed along all accessible
(1952-1954) Soviet Bloc production of fighters
land and sea frontiers. The remaining 250,-
and bombers, both in numbers and weight,
000 include troops responsible for suppressing
was considerably below that of NATO. Dur-
any organized resistance in the country, for
ing 1954 the Soviet aircraft industry was
guarding shipments of prisoners, strategic
operating at about 25 percent of capacity, and
cargoes, and labor camps, and for maintain-
produced about 8,500 to 9,000 aircraft, includ-
ing the security of high-level government and
ing about 5,300 fighters and bombers. We
military communications.
believe that during the period of this estimate
it will operate at about 25-30 percent of capa-
Air Forces¹⁷
city, with annual production at about 9,000-
10,000 aircraft, including about 5,000 to 6,000
111. During the postwar period the USSR has
fighters and bombers. Aero-engine industries
continually improved its air force both in size
will probably continue to operate at about 35
and quality. Although in World War II the
percent of capacity, with a total output of
USSR gave primary emphasis to the ground
about 30,000 to 35,000 engines. In view of
support role of air forces, in the postwar peri-
the requirements of the operating forces,
od increasing attention has been given to the
these rates of production are insufficient to
development of the interceptor and strategic
permit any significant stockpiling of the
bombing arms. We estimate that the cur-
latest aircraft types, aircraft engines, and
rent over-all authorized (TO&E) air strength
electronic devices. Conversion of the air-
is about 20,300, including about 10,400 jet
craft industry to full capacity production
fighters, 3,200 jet light bombers, 1,160 piston
would probably require 18-24 months.
medium bombers, 200 jet medium bombers,
and 20 jet and 20 turbo-prop heavy bombers.
113. Airfield development in the USSR and
Over-all actual strength is probably about 85
the European Satellites during the postwar
percent of authorized strength. We believe
period has generally kept pace with demands
that replacement of TU-4 aircraft by jet
created by the introduction of new aircraft
bomber types and growing numbers of all-
into operational units. The principal excep-
weather jet fighters will almost certainly be
tion is in Northeastern Siberia opposite Alas-
the most important developments in the So-
ka and along the Northern Arctic coast. In
viet air forces during the period of this esti-
these areas air operations would at present be
mate. We estimate that by 1960 the over-all
limited by relatively undeveloped base facili-
authorized strength (TO&E) will have in-
ties and by logistical difficulties even though
creased to about 21,400 aircraft, which will
airfield construction and development has
been in progress there for some time. Under
17 For strengths of the Soviet Air Forces in aircraft,
its airfield development program the USSR
personnel, and by major combat components and
has created an interlocking network of air-
geographic distribution, see Appendix, Tables 1,
3, 4, and 5.
10 For detailed comparisons, see Appendix, Table 9.
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31
fields along perimeter areas in Europe and
probably entered series production. We esti-
internal approach lines within the USSR.
mate that these new jet types will rapidly re-
We believe that during the period of this esti-
place the TU-4 medium bomber and that the
mate the Soviet airfield construction program
authorized bomber strength of Soviet long-
will be continued, and will receive special em-
range aviation throughout the period will be
phasis in the Far East and possibly in Soviet
as follows: 19
Arctic areas.
Aircraft
Mid
Mid
Mid
Mid
Mid
Mid
114. Combat effectiveness of Soviet military
Type
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
aviation is, on the whole, below that of the
TU-4
1,160
840
400
100
0
0
US. The chief limiting factors have been
Type 39
200
400
650
700
700
700
lower average aircrew proficiency, lower
Type 37
20
80
200
350
400
400
standards of maintenance and training, and
Turbo-prop
20
80
150
250
300
300
lack of certain aircraft types. During this
There is no firm intelligence on the planned
period the introduction into operational units
balance between the types and categories of
of new jet types, including a supersonic in-
long-range aircraft or on their future au-
terceptor, an all-weather fighter, and medium
thorized organizational aircraft strengths;
and heavy bombers, plus a four-engine turbo-
the above figures represent our estimate of
prop aircraft, together with the training ap-
the most probable way in which Soviet Long-
propriate to these types, will lead to a signifi-
Range Aviation would be proportioned during
cant increase of combat effectiveness. How-
the period and is predicated on the assumption
ever, assuming that the US maintains its
(a) that no change will occur in the total au-
present standards, over-all Soviet air combat
thorized number of aircraft in long-range
effectiveness will almost certainly remain be-
units; (b) that the Bear turbo-prop heavy
low that of the US during this period, especial-
bomber is currently in series production; and
ly in night and all-weather operations and in
(c) that the USSR is devoting a major air-
long-range operations.
craft production effort to the development of
115. The MIG-15 (Falcon) and MIG-17
a massive intercontinental air attack capabili-
(Fresco) are now standard equipment of So-
ty.
viet Fighter Aviation of Air Defense as of
Naval Forces²
other components of the Soviet Air Force.
The MIG-17, which began to replace the
117. During recent years the Soviet Navy has
MIG-15 in 1953 and now constitutes nearly
been greatly strengthened by an intense and
half of fighter aircraft, is estimated to have
rapid building program; this program has
a maximum speed of 635 knots at sea level,
not included aircraft rriers, battleships, or
and a combat ceiling of 58,000 feet. We be-
heavy cruisers, but has concentrated on light
lieve the USSR will have a supersonic inter-
cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. The So-
ceptor in operational use early in the period.
viet submarine fleet is now the largest in the
Aircraft with AI radar have been introduced
world and is still growing; about half its
into operational units, and by 1960 all-weather
strength consists of long-range craft of which
fighters will probably make up about 40 per-
a significant and increasing proportion are
cent of the whole fighter force.
modern types. Most of the major surface
vessels and all of the modern submarines will
116. The TU-4 (BULL) medium bomber is
now obsolescent, but remains for the present
probably be kept active, but the present rate
the principal aircraft of the Soviet long-range
19 For estimates of the performance characteristics
aviation. However, series production of a
of Soviet long-range aircraft, see Appendix,
twin-jet medium bomber, the Type 39 (BAD-
Table 6.
GER) is now under way, and a four-engine
20 For strength and disposition of Sino-Soviet naval
forces, see Appendix, Table 7. For strength of
jet heavy bomber, the Type 37 (BISON), and
the Soviet Naval Air Force by aircraft type, see
a turbo-prop heavy bomber (BEAR) have
Appendix, Table 5.
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32
LIBITY
of new construction is such that the Soviets
type, 6,700 nautical miles. By early 1955,
might elect to create a substantial reserve fleet
107 (including 20 "Z" type) of these had
of submarines. It is believed that all such
joined the fleet; the present building rate is
reserve or inactive units could be activated by
estimated as 75 (including 15-20 "Z" type)
M+180.
per year. The Soviets have the technical
118. Soviet Naval Aviation, comprising nearly
capability for modifying either of these types
20 percent of the total strength of Soviet mil-
for launching guided missiles. The USSR is
itary aviation, has converted completely to
known to have continued development of the
jet aircraft in the fighter and light bomber
Walther closed-cycle engine for submarine
categories. The number of jet reconnais-
propulsion, and an experimental submarine
sance aircraft in service has also increased,
powered by such an engine could be opera-
but attack and transport aircraft continue
tional now. It is also possible that, during
to be piston engine types. During the period
the period of this estimate, nuclear propul-
of this estimate, Soviet Naval Aviation is ex-
sion for Soviet submarines will have been
pected to remain approximately constant in
developed. However, there is no evidence
strength, while continuing its program of
that the USSR is constructing submarines
modernization of equipment. Improved all-
equipped with either of these types of pro-
weather jet fighters will probably be intro-
pulsion.
duced, and possibly jet medium bombers for
121. Soviet naval capabilities can be expected
attack, reconnaissance, and airsubmarine op-
to improve throughout the period due to the
erations.
building program, technological development,
119. We estimate that in mid-1955 the main
and intensive training. While the operation-
strength of the Soviet Navy will consist of 31
al efficiency of the Soviet Navy is still below
cruisers, 142 destroyers, and 374 submarines,
that of the navies of the major Western Pow-
including 13 light cruisers, 85 fleet destroyers,
ers, it will continue to improve during this
and about 150 long range submarines of post-
period. Little is known of the operating effi-
war design. Naval construction in the USSR
ciency of the submarine force. It is probably
is presently estimated at about 175,000 NSDT
still inferior to that of US and German forces
which represents about one-third Soviet ca-
of World War II, but performance standards
pacity and one-fifth total Bloc capacity.
will probably rise steadily during this period.
Battleships and carriers could be built in all
Personnel of the submarine force are the pick
fleet areas except the Far East. Presently
of the Soviet Navy, and their morale is high.
one "capital ship" of unknown type is believed
122. The principal weakness of the Soviet
to be under construction in the Baltic area
Navy derives from the wide separation of the
and possibly one in the Black Sea area, and
sea frontiers of the USSR, and from its in
these vessels may become operational during
ability to control the sea routes between these
the period of this estimate. It appears, how-
areas. The USSR is thus deprived of the
ever, that the USSR will continue to place
strategic mobility traditionally enjoyed by
primary emphasis upon the construction of
naval powers, and is compelled to maintain
long-range submarines, while continuing the
four separate fleets together with their sup-
construction of cruiser and destroyer types."
porting facilities. The inland waterway sys-
120. The Soviet Navy is now concentrating on
tem connecting the White and Baltic now
the construction of two long-range submarine
permits the interchange of vessels up to the
types developed since World War II. These
size of small destroyers and including all
are equipped with snorkel. The "W" type
current submarine types. During this per-
has an operating radius under combat condi-
iod, possibly by 1957, improvements in the
tions of about 4,700 nautical miles; the "Z"
system will extend this interchange capabil-
ity to include the Black Sea. However, parts
21 For estimated Soviet production of major vessels,
of the waterway system are open only on an
1955-1960, see Appendix, Table 10.
average of five months a year because of
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UNITED
33
weather conditions. Increased use of the
these forces to the Soviets, especially for of-
Northern Sea Route, which is open for a six
fensive operations.
to eight week period in the summer, may also
improve the situation. The lack of adequate
Ground Forces
supply lines to the Northern and Far Eastern
areas is an additional handicap. Limitations
125. The Satellite ground forces' present
on sustained offensive operations derive from
strength is about 1,085,000 men, organized
the land-locked position of the fleets in the
into 81 line divisions. In general, the Satel-
Baltic and Black Seas (containing roughly 60
lite ground forces (not including those of
percent of Soviet naval strength), the exits
East Germany) have probably reached the
from which are controlled by the NATO Pow-
desired peacetime strength level. By 1957,
ers, and from the lack of advanced bases.
primarily through an increase of East Ger-
The long-range capabilities of the Soviet Navy
man forces, Satellite ground personnel will
are further reduced by lack of aircraft car-
probably increase to about 1,200,000, a figure
riers, long-range reconnaissance aircraft,
that probably will not change significantly
auxiliary vessels suitable for underway lo-
through 1960. The Satellite armies, which
gistic support, forward bases, and by the lack
are presently equipped largely with Soviet
of experience in long-range operations.
World War II material of good quality, will
continue to be largely dependent upon the
123. There is no force in the Soviet Navy com-
USSR for major items of equipment, particu-
parable to the amphibious forces of the US
larly tanks, self-propelled guns, and medium
Navy, although the naval infantry compo-
to heavy artillery.
nents have received some training in amphib-
ious warfare. While capable of mounting
Air Forces
short range lifts in considerable force in the
Baltic and Black Seas and in the Sea of Ja-
126. The Satellite air forces now have an esti-
pan, the Soviet Navy does not possess suffi-
mated TO&E strength of 3,850 aircraft (ap-
cient amphibious craft to launch and sustain
proximately 2,700 actual), and during this
long-haul amphibious operations.
period their TO&E will probably increase to
about 4,800 aircraft. During this period em-
EASTERN EUROPEAN SATELLITE
phasis will probably be placed on the
MILITARY FORCES²²
strengthening of the Satellite fighter and
124. Soviet control of the Satellites has in ef-
light bomber establishments, and the further
fect moved the Soviet military frontier into
integration of the Satellite air forces into the
Central Europe, and the USSR has given a
Soviet air defense system. The Satellites will
high priority to the development of this area
continue to be greatly dependent upon the
for military operations. The Satellite ground
USSR for logistic support, and virtually all
and air forces now constitute a substantial
aircraft will be Soviet types. Satellite pro-
element in the balance of military power in
duction, almost exclusively Polish and Czech-
Europe. However, their over-all effectiveness
oslovak, while growing, will probably not ex-
is only fair, and the political reliability of
some national units is questionable. During
ceed 15 percent of the Bloc total.
the period of this estimate the over-all capa-
Naval Forces
bilities and usefulness to the USSR of the
Satellite forces will probably increase. How-
127. Owing to their small size, their meager
ever, many of the current deficiencies will
equipment, and the unreliability of personnel,
continue to limit the military usefulness of
the Satellite navies provide only a minor con-
tribution to Soviet naval strength. However,
"For detailed strength figures by country, see Ap-
ports and bases in some of the Satellites pro-
pendix, Tables 1, 2, 3, and 7. See also NIE 12-54,
vide the USSR with a considerable extension
"Probable Developments in the European Sat-
ellites through Mid-1956," dated 24 August 1954.
of naval logistic and operational facilities.
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34
COMMUNIST CHINESE
vehicles, artillery above 70-mm, and POL.
MILITARY FORCES23
The combat readiness of the Chinese Com-
128. The military forces of Communist China
munist ground forces will continue to increase
constitute the most formidable Asiatic fight-
during this period, primarily due to the re-
ing force. The Kremlin exercises no direct
equipment program, to standardization of
control over these forces. However, the na-
equipment, and to improved combat and serv-
ture of Sino-Soviet relations, especially the
ice support.
dependence of Communist China upon the
Air Forces
USSR military support in weapons and sup-
plies, provides the Kremlin with considerable
130. The Communist Chinese Air Force now
leverage for influencing Chinese military de-
has a TO&E strength of about 2,400 aircraft
velopments and policy. As a consequence
(about 1,700 actual). It is equipped primar-
the military frontiers of the USSR, in a prac-
ily for defensive operations, but the acquisi-
tical sense, have been extended deep into the
tion of some piston medium and jet light
Asian land mass, a factor which greatly in-
bombers has given it a limited capability for
creases the Soviet power base and potential.
offensive operations. The combat effective-
ness of the CCAF is only fair, but it will prob-
Ground Forces
ably improve somewhat throughout the peri-
od of this estimate, mainly through increased
129. The Chinese Communist Army is well
proficiency of flying personnel, improved
adapted by tradition, training, and the char-
quality of aircraft, and more numerous and
acteristics of its individual soldiers to the
improved air facilities. However, since Com-
type of warfare likely to be encountered in
munist China will probably not produce com-
the extremes of weather and terrain of the
bat aircraft during the period of this esti-
Asian region. These forces now number
mate, over-all effectiveness will be largely de-
about 2,300,000 men organized into 37 armies
termined by Soviet willingness to continue
and 125 line divisions plus supporting troops.
to supply additional aircraft, especially jet
Any expansion during this period would be
fighters, jet light bombers, and medium
dependent upon the acquisition of weapons
bombers, together with the necessary parts
and equipment from sources outside China.
and equipment.
The Chinese Communist forces have been
primarily infantry, equipped with a hetero-
Naval Forces
geneous assortment of foreign-made weapons.
131. Communist major vessel strength prob-
A recent extensive reorganization and re-
ably now consists of two destroyers and 5-7
equipment program has reduced the number
submarines (2-4 long-range and three coastal
of divisions, increased the number of combat
types). These were obtained from the USSR,
and service units, and is standardizing equip-
most of them probably during the last year.
ment to that of Soviet and Chinese manu-
There are also at least 55 torpedo boats, 56
facture. Communist China now produces its
landing craft (LST, LSM, LSIL), 17 frigates,
own requirements of clothing, food, small-
and several hundred small patrol craft. The
arms, rocket launchers, recoilless rifles, and
certain types of ammunition, and progress is
Soviet Far Eastern naval forces are providing
being made toward self-sufficiency in sub-
training, advisors, and logistic support to the
machine guns, light machine guns, and mor-
Chinese Communist naval forces. The USSR
tars. It will continue to be dependent upon
will probably add modestly to the Chinese
the Soviet Union for heavy equipment, motor
Communist naval strength during the period
of this estimate.
23 For strengths and dispositions, see Appendix,
Tables 1, 2, 3, and 7. For strengths of additional
24 In addition there are 25 landing craft of these
Bloc forces in Asia, see figures for North Korean
types operating in the Chinese Communist mer-
and Viet Minh forces given in Tables 1 and 2.
chant marine.
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35
LIBIT
VI. MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE USSR
WORLD BALANCE OF MILITARY FORCES
zation of additional units to augment their
132. During the postwar period a rough bal-
already strong ground forces. These develop-
ance of military power has existed between
ments, along with other increasing Soviet
the Communist Bloc and the Western coali-
strengths such as a significant increase in nu-
tion. During most of this period the USSR's
clear weapons would reduce the significance
main military assets have been a marked
of the Western nuclear and logistics superior-
superiority in organized military manpower
ity, and possibly reduce the military value of
and in conventional weapons, and the ability,
the superior western economic potential.
because of the strategic advantage of its
134. The development of nuclear weapons
"heartland" position, to concentrate these
and of the ability to deliver such weapons on
forces against such strategically vital areas
target will probably be the most decisive
as Western Europe and the Middle East. At
single factor that could alter the relative mil-
the same time the principal offsetting
itary power of the Communist Bloc and the
strengths of the West have been its greater
US-NATO coalition. At present, the USSR's
economic potential and its nuclear capabili-
principal capability for delivering nuclear
ties. The effectiveness of the latter has been
weapons lies in attack by aircraft; the im-
greatly contributed to by the development of
proved new bombers becoming operational
bases around the periphery of the Sino-Soviet
during the period will greatly increase this
Bloc. Since 1951 the margin of Bloc numeri-
capability. In addition, although specific
cal superiority in forces-in-being and conven-
evidence is lacking on the types of guided
tional ground and air armaments has been
missiles under priority development in the
narrowed markedly; in fact Western strength
USSR, Soviet capabilities for nuclear attack
in modern aircraft is now greater than that
by means of guided missiles will probably be-
of the Soviet Bloc. On the other hand, al-
come significant, especially in the period 1958-
though the West has greatly increased its nu-
1960. Nevertheless, provided there are no
clear weapons production and delivery capa-
significant alterations in present political
bilities, the growing Soviet capabilities in
alignments or US-NATO military programs,
these respects are progressively reducing the
the USSR almost certainly will not achieve by
significance of the superiority.
1960 any such gains in relative military pow-
133. During tl. period of this estimate the
er as would permit it to launch general war
West will probably continue to maintain its
with assurance of success. While trends in
lead in the development and introduction of
weapons developments will increasingly give
new weapons. The West will also retain its
an advantage to a power capable of launch-
sizable lead in trained air and naval person-
ing a massive surprise attack, the USSR will
nel, and to the extent that West German and
almost certainly not be able, during the peri-
possibly Japanese rearmament take place, the
od of this estimate, to launch such an attack
Soviet superiority in ground forces-in-being
with assurance of escaping an even more dev-
may be reduced. On the other hand improv-
astating retaliatory attack.
ing air strengths will give the USSR a greatly
increased capability to conduct long-range air
SINO-SOVIET BLOC
operations against the West, probably includ-
AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES²⁵
ing two-way refueled missions to the US. Its
135. The air forces of the Sino-Soviet Bloc are
modern long-range submarine fleet will pose
capable of attacking the US and Allied bases,
an increasing threat to Allied naval forces and
to shipping carrying supplies and reinforce-
25 NIE 11-5-55, "Bloc Air Defense Capabilities,
ments to Allied forces. Trained reserves, plus
1955-1960," scheduled for publication in July,
stockpiled equipment, permit a rapid mobili-
will provide a detailed treatment of this subject.
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The Dwigne
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36
especially those on the periphery of the Bloc,
c. Against air attacks conducted under
or the carrier task forces from which Western
poor visibility conditions the Soviet Bloc air
air operations could be launched against the
defense system is capable of offering only lim-
Bloc. In a strictly defensive sense, the air
ited resistance, owing to inadequacy of equip-
defense system of the USSR provides for the
ment and training for all-weather operations.
potential employment of virtually all Soviet
and Satellite fighters — about 14,000 aircraft,
137. During the period of this estimate the
including 3,700 fighters in the Soviet Aviation
Bloc air defense system will probably be sub-
of Air Defense — (PVO). In addition, the
stantially strengthened by greater operation-
Chinese and North Korean Communists have
al experience and by the introduction into
about 900 jet fighters which to some de-
operational units of new fighter types, new
gree contribute to the defense of the Soviet
antiaircraft weapons, improved early warning
Far East. The assignment of an air defense
and GCI equipment, and guided missiles.
role to the fighter forces does not cancel their
However, in view of the increasing capabili-
other missions and responsibilities, but re-
ties of offensive weapons and improved tech-
sults in a "multiple mission" for most fighter
niques in counter measures, Soviet air de-
forces.
fense capabilities will probably remain inade-
quate to prevent attacking forces from reach-
136. The capabilities estimated below are sub-
ing critical target areas of the USSR.
stantially limited to the areas of dense air de-
OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES²⁶
fense concentration (European USSR, East-
138. The main Soviet offensive strength at
ern Europe, and the Maritime-South Man-
present lies in the ability to mount attacks
churia area of the Far East). Air defense
against Western Europe and the UK. Air
capabilities in other areas would probably be
attacks of great weight involving nuclear
considerably less than indicated below and
weapons could be launched with little or no
virtually nonexistent in the North Siberian
warning. Submarines could be employed in
area, the greater part of China, Indochina,
an extensive effort to disrupt reinforcements
and Albania.
and supplies from North America. With its
a. Against daylight bomber formations be-
ground forces the USSR could launch a sur-
tween 10,000 and 30,000 feet in clear weather
prise attack against Western Europe using
the Soviet Bloc air defense system is believed
25 to 30 Soviet ground divisions now in East-
capable of inflicting severe losses against pis-
ern Europe. By prior concentration of great-
ton bombers and moderate losses against
er forces west of the Oder-Neisse Line, involv-
high-speed jet bombers. Above 30,000 feet
ing almost certain loss of surprise, the USSR
altitude this capability would begin to dimin-
could attack with 50 to 60 divisions. A build-
ish, and above 40,000 feet would fall off
up to 75 to 140 divisions could be accom-
markedly, due to problems of target detection
plished by D+ 90. Satellite units could be
and tracking, loss of AAA effectiveness, and
used to reinforce the above attacks, but it is
reduced GCI capabilities. Under certain cir-
unlikely that European Satellite armies
cumstances, such as persistent visible con-
would be used independently, except as se-
trails, these capabilities would, of course, be
curity forces or to protect Soviet lines of com-
markedly increased. Primary limitations
munication, or in isolated cases against tra-
would then be the numbers and individual
ditional enemies (e.g., Bulgaria vs. Yugoslav-
capabilities of fighter interceptor aircraft
ia).
available.
139. Air support of land campaigns in West-
b. Against multiple-pronged penetrations
ern Europe could come from the approxi-
utilizing altitude stacking, diversionary tac-
mately 2,200 aircraft presently stationed in
tics, and electronic countermeasures, the So-
viet Bloc air defense system is subject to seri-
26 No estimate of the success of the offensive op-
erations described in this section can be made
ous breakdowns which would tend to degrade
without considering the effects of the actions of
its effectiveness progressively.
opposing forces.
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The
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STRIBT
37
East Germany and the Satellites, with rein-
Chinese Communist forces, renew hostilities
forcements available from the nearly 5,000
in Korea. They could probably launch an
aircraft stationed in the Western USSR.
invasion of Japan with an initial assault
However, a large proportion of these aircraft
strength of one airborne and two or three
are fighter interceptor types in units which
waterborne divisions, with about six divisions
currently have an air defense responsibility
supporting. These attacks could be launched
as well as a tactical support role. This re-
concurrently with campaigns in the Middle
sponsibility would to some degree limit com-
East and in Western Europe.
mitment of fighter aircraft to participate in
land campaigns. The probable increase in
142. The USSR is now capable of undertak-
satellite air defense capabilities during this
ing concurrent air bombardment operations
period may reduce this limitation.
against strengths located in the US, the UK,
continental Europe, the Middle East, Japan,
140. Utilizing only those aircraft belonging
and the island chain of Asia. This capability
to the Aviation of Airborne Troops, the USSR
will improve considerably during the period
could lift about 9,000 well-equipped and well-
of this estimate with the introduction of new
trained troops with one drop on D-Day or
jet medium and heavy bombers. Present So-
about 14,00 with two drops. These troops
viet capabilities for air attack on the conti-
could be assembled in ten days, and could be
nental US are limited by the relatively small
delivered to Rhine River crossing sites and
numbers of operational heavy bombers and
nearby military installations by aircraft using
by the relatively undeveloped base facilities
bases in Poland and Czechoslovakia. For a
in forward areas. They are also probably
five-day operation the Aviation of Airborne
limited by the lack of a developed inflight
Troops could lift approximately 23,000-25,000
refueling capability. The forward base capac-
troops depending on whether one or two drops
ity and the performance characteristics of
were executed on D-Day. This lift capacity
aircraft estimated to be available to the So-
could be increased by an average of 1,800
viets will continue to impose limits upon the
troops for every 100 transports borrowed from
number of strike aircraft which can be
the 3,500 transports of the military air forces
launched at one time in a intercontinental
and civil air fleet. However, at least during
attack upon the United States. However, the
the early period of the estimate nearly all of
these forces would have to be carried in the
increase in numbers of heavy bombers, and
low performance transport Li-2 (approximate-
continued Long-Range Aviation training pro-
ly C-47 characteristics), and this would place
grams, together with the probable develop
a significant limitation upon the effectiveness
ment of an inflight refueling capability and
of such an operation. Soviet airlift capabili-
extensive improvement of the forward staging
ties will probably increase through 1960, but
areas would result in a substantial increase in
the lack of a large force of modern transport
Soviet capabilities for attack on the United
aircraft will probably continue to be a limita-
States, during the period of this estimate.²
tion.
143. At the present time, it would be techni-
141. In the Far East, Soviet capabilities for
cally feasible for the USSR to attack targets
long-continued full-scale war are considerably
within the US with missiles launched from
limited by the capacity of the Trans-Siberian
long-range aircraft and from submarines.
railway, the only route by which supplies in
The USSR could at present have V-1 type mis-
large amounts could be brought from other
siles with nuclear warheads for launching
parts of the USSR. However, the USSR has
from submarines, and by late 1955 could have
about 30 divisions in the Far East, together
with more than 5,000 aircraft and a sizable
27 For a full discussion see NIE 11-7-55, "Soviet
naval force. There are stockpiles of supplies
Gross Capabilities for Attacks on the US and
sufficient for a considerable period of combat.
Key Overseas Installations and Forces Through
These Soviet forces could, in conjunction with
1 July 1958," dated 17 May 1955.
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38
for this purpose a subsonic guided missile with
c. In 1958-1960,28 Soviet missiles could
a maximum range of 500 nautical miles. We
reach US North African bases in Tunisia, in
believe that it will not be within Soviet capa-
addition to the targets listed above.
bility within the period of this estimate to
145. During the period of this estimate Soviet
attack continental United States with guided
offensive naval capabilities will still be limited
missiles launched from Soviet Bloc territory.
to undersea warfare, surface operations in-
144. If the USSR in fact develops the guided
volving vessels no larger than cruisers, and
missiles which we have estimated to be within
air operations utilizing shore-based naval air-
its capabilities, the following possibilities for
craft. The Soviet submarine force will great-
attack would exist during the period of this
ly increase its capability to undertake offen-
estimate:
sive patrols and mining operations along
most of the world's strategically situated sea
a. At present, from advanced bases in East-
lanes, and possibly to launch guided missile
ern Europe, targets could be reached in West-
attacks against targets on both the Atlantic
ern Europe as far west as London, Paris, and
and Pacific seaboards of the US. Major So-
Rome, and in the southern half of the Scan-
viet surface units and supporting shore-based
dinavian peninsula. In the Far East, if
naval aircraft will probably continue to in-
launched from Soviet or North Korean terri-
crease their capability to undertake offensive
tory, these weapons could reach targets in
operations in Bloc coastal areas, especially in
western Japan and Alaska; if launched from
the Baltic and Black Seas, and to protect the
Chinese territory, they could reach targets in
seaward flank of ground campaigns. The So-
viet Navy will almost have no long-range am-
the Ryukyu Islands and Formosa.
phibious capability within the period of this
b. In 1957, Soviet guided missiles could
estimate, but it will remain capable of mount-
reach all of the UK, France, Italy, Scandina-
ing short-range amphibious lifts in consider-
via, and Turkey. In the Far East, if launched
able force.
from Soviet or North Korean territory, these
146. We estimate that the USSR now has a
weapons could reach all of the Japanese is-
stock of over 500,000 mines and has the capa-
lands, and if launched from China they could
bility to employ mine warfare to interfere
reach all of Luzon.
seriously with allied sea communications. In
the European area, this effort could include all
28 These have been estimated to be the earliest
the ports and approaches of the UK and
probable dates of the availability of the missiles
Western Europe. In the Far East, most of
described; it is possible that the date might be
the vital allied port areas and sea lanes around
still earlier. See NIE 11-6-54 "Sow
Capabili-
ties and Probable Programs in the uided Mis-
the perimeter of the Bloc could be similarly
sile Field," dated 5 October 1954.
attacked.
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39
LIBIT
VII. SOVIET ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION
THE FACTOR OF
the advance of Soviet power in Central Europe
COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY
and in Asia that called forth an increasingly
stubborn Western counteraction and consoli-
147. The policy of any state is conditioned by
dated Western opposition. Beginning in 1947,
the particular view which its leaders have of
and at an accelerated rate after 1950, the
the world situation and of the dangers and
Western nations built up their power and
opportunities which it presents to them. The
cohesion to the point where further Commu-
Soviet leaders' view of the world situation is
nist expansion in Europe, and even in some
affected by their Communist ideology and by
parts of Asia, could no longer be accomplished
their isolation from the general currents of
without risk of general war. At the same
world opinion. It is of particular importance
time, an accommodation with the West, even
in estimating Soviet courses of action, there-
if the USSR had wished it, came to depend
fore, to take into account the fact that events
upon concessions so costly to the USSR's
outside the Communist Orbit or developments
power position that the Soviet leaders clearly
in relations between the USSR and the West
regarded them as unacceptable.
may frequently have for the Soviet leaders
a meaning quite different from that which
150. Faced with a world situation increasing-
they have for non-Communist statesmen.
ly inhospitable to their aims, the Soviet lead-
ers have sought to find a middle way between
148. The ideological heritage of the 1917 rev-
the alternatives of war or accommodation at
olution remains a principal determinant of
unacceptable cost. They have proceeded on
the Soviet view of developments in the world
the assumption that both Western fear of war
situation. The Soviet leaders still view world
and hope for peace could be manipulated to
developments in terms of an irreconcilable
advance Soviet objectives. Consequently, a
conflict between the "camps" of Communism
policy of alternating menace and conciliation
and Capitalism which will continue until
was adopted to encourage the view in the West
Communism has triumphed throughout the
that Soviet expansionist aims would be moder-
world. In large part, this view both deter-
ated if the Western Powers refrained from
mines their long-term objectives and colors
measures in their own defense which the
their interpretations of Western actions and
USSR portrayed as provocative. This policy
developments. We believe that the validity
required no abandonment of expansionist
of the guiding principles of Communist ideol-
aims nor any cessation of Communist aggres-
ogy has in Soviet eyes been confirmed in the
sion, at least where such aggression could be
main by the course of events in the war and
carried out without grave risk of general war.
postwar periods.
In the period after Stalin's death, however,
THE POSTWAR BACKGROUND
Soviet policy began to place relatively more
emphasis on the element of conciliation, pos-
149. Soviet leaders recognized towards the
sibly in some degree because of the pressure
end of World War II that a situation favor-
of Soviet internal problems, but apparently
able to Communist expansion existed in a
mainly in the belief that for an interim period
large part of the non-Communist world.
at least such tactics were more likely to weak-
Hence they pursued their advantage as fast
en Western opposition.
and as far as they could in expanding the
Communist sphere and extending Soviet influ-
THE SOVIET VIEW OF
ence. After some time their progress slowed
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
down, especially in Europe, and ran against
increasing opposition as the non-Communist
151. The Soviet leaders probably believe that
world gradually re-established stability. The
the US remains firm in its intention to oppose
Soviet leaders are probably aware that it was
Communist expansion, and that it means to
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40
FIRST
persist in its effort to bring all important
Soviet leaders a decline in US ability to main-
strategic areas peripheral to the Bloc into
tain such cohesion. They probably believe
closer linkage with the US defense system.
that the influence of India will continue to
They probably also estimate that the US is
grow, and that it may become the leader of a
unlikely deliberately to initiate general war
group of states capable of an independent role
during the next few years. The Soviet leaders
in world affairs. They may also believe that
probably believe that, due to their increasing
Germany and Japan will become increasingly
nuclear capability, a situation is approaching
capable of taking an independent position. On
in which a general war involving use by both
the other hand, they probably now recognize
sides of nuclear weapons would bring about
that certain aggressive actions by the Sino-
such extensive destruction as to threaten the
Soviet Bloc tend to increase the willingness of
survival of both Western civilization and the
the non-Communists to follow US leadership.
Soviet system. They probably estimate that
At the same time they probably estimate that
a situation of mutual deterrence could develop
there are areas and problems in which such
in which each side would be strongly inhibited
actions would have the opposite effect. While
from initiating general war or taking actions
they may not expect during the next few years
which it regarded as materially increasing the
to accomplish the defection of any states for-
risk of general war. However, they probably
mally allied with the US, they probably believe
estimate that the US would not be deterred,
that their own policies can encourage frictions
by fear of the consequences of general war,
within the Western alliance, undermine the
from using its full military capabilities if it
willingness of US allies to support the US in
believed that its security was imminently
policies of firmness, and weaken US influence
threatened. The Soviet leaders almost cer-
among uncommitted states.
tainly believe that overt armed aggression by
Bloc forces against any state formally allied
153. The Soviet leaders probably believe that
with the US would result in the employment
trends in the development of Western mili-
of US military power as necessary to counter
tary strength do not present them with any
immediate threat, either of war or of a weak-
such aggression. They probably also estimate
that such aggression against a state not for-
ening of their position in negotiations. While
mally allied to the US would involve risk of US
Western nuclear capabilities will continue to
military reaction, but that the degree of this
improve, this development will not alter es-
risk, and the dimensions of the US reaction,
sentially the situation which the USSR has
would depend upon the importance to the US
faced throughout the postwar period. More-
over, the West's advantage in this respect is
of the country attacked, the circumstances
of the attack, and the political situation with-
being reduced as the USSR develops its own
nuclear capabilities. The Soviet leaders prob-
in the US and non-Communist world general-
ably recognize that the present rough balance
ly.
of military power could be altered in favor of
152. The Soviet leaders probably recognize
the West by the appearance of major military
that the success of the US effort to prevent
power in West Germany and Japan, but they
further Communist expansion depends heavi-
probably now believe that German or Japa-
ly upon the ability of the US to establish and
nese rearmament is not likely to take place on
maintain cohesion in the non-Communist
a significant scale during the next two or
world. Some developments of the last year,
three years at least. The Soviet leaders will
such as the failure of the Western Powers to
have noted that the declining trend in West-
present a united front at the Geneva Confer-
ern military expenditures has continued de-
ence, their subsequent inability to associate
spite the recent increase in their own mili-
more Asian states with the defense of South-
tary budget. Therefore, they are probably
east Asia, and the unwillingness of most West-
quite confident that Western military power,
ern and Asian states to support US policy to-
although remaining formidable, is not now
ward Communist China, may indicate to the
being developed at a rate which will permit
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The
41
LISTED
the application of substantially increased mili-
the Soviet leaders probably believe that they
tary pressure on the USSR.
can rely primarily upon political means, and
154. The Soviet leaders have always reckoned
in some cases military action by local forces,
heavily on a deterioration of "capitalist" econ-
to carry on their struggle against the non-
Communist world.
omies to undermine non-Communist strength
and to produce "imperialist contradictions"
156. However, the Soviet leaders almost cer-
which would range the Western Powers
tainly recognize that developments may occur
against each other. Despite the continuing
during the period of this estimate which
vigor of the economies of Western Europe
would require a revision of this judgment.
and the failure of the long-awaited US de-
Some of the problems which presently con-
pression to materialize the Soviet leaders are
cern Soviet policy-makers could develop in
unlikely to have been shaken in their view
such a way as to present a direct threat to So-
that long-term trends point to eventual eco-
viet security interests. Others might take a
nomic crisis in capitalist countries. They are
course which, while not involving Soviet se-
aware, moreover, that the economies of some
curity interests directly, could heighten in-
states of critical importance to the Western
ternational tensions, engage the prestige of
alliance, such as Germany and Japan, would
the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and cause the USSR to
probably prove vulnerable in the event of even
revise its estimate of Western intentions.
a moderately serious decline in levels of trade.
Possible developments which might lead the
The latter they probably regard as a possibili-
Soviet leaders to make such a revision would
ty even in the short term, and one which, if it
include the following: (a) a rate or scale of
did develop, might produce a political situa-
West German rearmament greater than that
tion which they could exploit.
presently foreseen, or aggressive NATO poli-
cies in Europe as a result of influence exer-
PROBABLE SOVIET ESTIMATE OF
cised within NATO by a rearmed West Ger-
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
many; (b) actions by Communist China which
led to hostilities or imminent danger of hos-
155. On balance, the Soviet leaders probably
tilities between Communist China and the
estimate that there is at present no critical
threat to their security, and that there may be
US; (c) rearmament of Japan on a major
renewed opportunities for Communist expan-
scale, including the acquisition of offensive
sion by means short of general war. They
weapons by Japanese forces; and (d) commit-
probably estimate that Western power and
ment of SEATO forces in Indochina to pre-
unity are vulnerable to Soviet political action,
vent the Communists from gaining control of
and may become increasingly so. Therefore,
the country by military action.
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42
OHL
FIRTH
VIII. PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION
PRESENT SOVIET OBJECTIVES
b. To promote the political and economic
157. We believe that the developments within
instability of non-Communist states, and to
the sphere of Soviet power and the Soviet esti-
render them incapable of decisive action by
mate of the world situation which have been
fostering and exploiting dissensions within
discussed in the foregoing sections have led
and among them;
the Soviet leaders to assess their own situa-
C. To effect a degree of disarmament, in-
tion somewhat as follows: the balance of mil-
cluding the outlawing of nuclear weapons,
itary power in the world and the increasing
under conditions favorable to the Commu-
destructiveness of nuclear weapons are such
nists;
that general war would involve very heavy
d. To bring about the withdrawal of US
risks to the Communist sphere, extending
power from its present advanced bases around
possibly to the destruction of the Soviet re-
the periphery of the Bloc;
gime. On the other hand, non-Communist
e. To impede or offset the rearmament of
strength is not so great nor the intentions of
West Germany and its association with the
the non-Communist powers so menacing as to
Western Powers;
make withdrawals from the present advanced
f. To detach Japan from® the sphere of
positions in Europe and Asia seem necessary.
Western influence and encourage its closer
Moreover, in view of the growing military
association with the Sino-Soviet Bloc;
capabilities of the Bloc and the frictions with-
g. To expand Communist influence and, as
in the non-Communist world, the Commu-
opportunities develop, to extend the area of
nists probably estimate that they can make
Communist control.
progress toward their objectives through po-
litical action, or in some cases by localized
COURSES OF ACTION GENERAL
military action. The Soviet Bloc faces serious
internal problems which include the correc-
Military
tion of certain weaknesses in the Bloc econo-
159. In foregoing sections of this paper it was
my, particularly in agricultural production,
estimated that the Soviet leaders probably
and the necessity to build up economic power
now believe (a) that general war would pre-
in the Bloc as a step toward balancing the
sent formidable hazards to the survival of
vastly greater economic potential of the West.
their system, and (b) that they can advance
These problems do not imply a weakness
toward their objectives by actions short of
which requires neglect of opportunities for
general war. Therefore, we believe that dur-
expansion under circumstances of limited
ing the period of this estimate the Kremlin
risk.
will try to avoid courses of action, and to de-
158. We believe that the Soviet leaders will
ter Communist China from courses of action,
concentrate on the following principal objec-
which in its judgment would clearly involve
tives during the period of this estimate:
substantial risk of general war. The Soviet
a. To increase the economic and military
leaders are unlikely to believe that Soviet,
strength of the Sino-Soviet Bloc;
Communist Chinese or European Satellite
forces can be used in open attacks across rec-
29 This section deals with Soviet external courses
ognized state frontiers during this period
of action. Soviet intentions with respect to
without running such a risk. However, the
various internal developments are treated in
USSR or one of the Sino-Soviet Bloc countries
preceding sections of the paper. In the sum-
might engage in indirect aggression or take
mary of Soviet objectives contained in the first
action which would create a situation in
two paragraphs of this section, however, ob-
jectives internal to the USSR and to the Sino-
which the US or its allies, rather than yield
Soviet Bloc are included.
an important position, would take counter-
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UNIVERED.
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43
action which could lead to general war. We
without substantial risk of provoking general
believe, moreover, that the Kremlin would not
war. In diplomatic negotiations the Soviet
be deterred by the risk of general war from
leaders will almost certainly try to take ad-
taking counteraction against a Western
vantage of the increased urgency with which
action which it considered an imminent
Western governments, pressed by their bet-
threat to Soviet security. Thus, general war
ter-informed public opinion, will strive to es-
might occur during the period of this esti-
cape nuclear war through peaceful solutions.
mate as the climax of a series of actions and
We believe it unlikely, however, that in a sit-
counteractions, initiated by either side, which
uation of sharp and general international
neither side originally intended to lead to
crisis the USSR would seek to break Western
general war.
determination by direct and open threats of
nuclear attack. The Soviet leaders would
160. It is possible that at some time during
probably fear that such tactics would bring
the period of this estimate the USSR might
about a situation in which war would become
come to believe that world developments had
unavoidable, and they might even fear that
taken a turn that would ultimately lead to a
they would provoke a preventive attack by the
serious impairment of Soviet security. Such
US.
a belief might develop, for example, as a result
of developments in Germany or in connection
Diplomacy and Propaganda
with an armed conflict between the US and
162. We believe that Soviet diplomacy during
Communist China. In such a situation the
the period of this estimate will not be directed
USSR might feel impelled to undertake local
toward a general settlement between the
military action in order to forestall an in-
USSR and the West. It will almost certainly
evitable deterioration of its security position,
continue to combine moves intended to ease
even though such action would entail height-
international tensions with other moves
ened risk of general war. We believe, how-
which increase such tensions, and with politi-
ever, that even under these circumstances the
cal warfare pressures calculated to play upon
USSR would seek to keep any resulting con-
the non-Communist world's fear of war. At
flict localized and to avoid general war.
present the USSR is engaged in very active
161. By the end of the period of this estimate
diplomacy on a number of important issues
the USSR will have a greatly increased ca-
- Austria, disarmament, Yugoslavia, Japan
pability to inflict destruction with nuclear
- and has made important concessions,
weapons, particularly on the US itself. Nev-
though no apparent important sacrifices as
ertheless, the Soviet leaders will probably still
yet. We believe that the current Soviet dip-
lomatic efforts are directed primarily toward
not be confident that they could attack the
US with nuclear weapons without exposing
preventing the rearmament of Germany in
close alliance with the West, and that the
the USSR to an even more devastating coun-
terblow. We believe, therefore, that the
ground is being prepared for new Soviet pro-
USSR will continue to try to avoid substantial
posals on this subject, perhaps at Four Power
meetings during this summer. We also be-
risks of general war despite the increase of
lieve that in connection with the forthcoming
its nuclear capabilities. However, as these
peace treaty negotiations with Japan the
capabilities grow, Soviet leaders may come to
USSR is likely to make some concessions in
estimate that the US, because of fear for itself
or for its allies, or because of pressure by its
the hope of promoting frictions in the rela-
tions of Japan with the US and encouraging
allies, will be increasingly deterred from ini-
tiating the devastation entailed in a full-scale
Japanese neutralism.
nuclear war. They may therefore come to
163. It is possible, however, that the Soviet
believe that local wars will be less likely than
leaders also desire a substantial and prolonged
at present to expand into general war, and
reduction in international tensions that would
thus that superior Soviet Bloc military capa-
not only prevent German rearmament but
bilities in certain local areas can be exercised
also further their other objectives, including
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44
US withdrawal from advanced bases and a
through technical assistance or the sponsor-
reduction of the incentive for the West to
ship of development programs. In some cases
maintain its present defense efforts. The So-
these programs could take the form of techni-
viet leaders may also feel that such a reduc-
cal training missions or the sponsorship of
tion of international tensions is desirable be-
training programs for foreign technicians
cause of the pressure of their own internal
within the USSR and could consequently be
problems.
carried out at small cost.
164. We believe that the USSR will place con-
tinuing emphasis in its diplomacy and propa-
COURSES OF ACTION IN
ganda upon proposals for the control or aboli-
PARTICULAR AREAS
tion of nuclear weapons. The Soviet leaders
will probably try by such maneuvers to hold
Europe
out to the non-Communist world the prospect
166. The principal objective of Soviet policy
of release from the threat of nuclear warfare,
in Europe during the period of this estimate
and, by seeking to place upon the US the
will be to obtain a solution of the German
blame for failure to achieve workable control
problem favorable to Soviet interests. Pre-
arrangements, to stimulate doubts about the
vention or slowing down of West German re-
reasonableness and moderation of US policies
armament and blocking the development of
in this field. We believe it highly unlikely that
West Germany's ties with the NATO powers
the USSR during the period of this estimate
have first priority. The Soviet leaders prob-
will agree to any plan which would involve
ably recognize that the three principal West-
inspection within the USSR under provisions
ern Powers are committed to West German re-
acceptable to the Western Powers. Soviet pro-
armament at present, and probably estimate
posals regarding the control of nuclear weap-
that any direct Soviet attempt to foster differ-
ons will probably be designed primarily to
ences among them with the aim of halting
erect political, psychological, and moral bar-
the implementation of the Paris Agreements
riers to US freedom of action in the use of
would fail. They recognize that Franco-Ger-
nuclear weapons.
man differences and, in particular, French
apprehension concerning German rearma-
Trade and Technical Assistance
ment, will remain and may even sharpen dur-
165. Basic Soviet economic philosophy, and
ing the next few years, but they know that
the shortages of commodities which the non-
France alone does not have the power to stop
Communist world is willing to accept from
West German rearmament once it has begun.
the Bloc will continue to act as deterrents to
The West Germans themselves, however, do
any major change in the present Soviet trade
have this power, and the Soviet leaders prob-
pattern. Nevertheless, the Communists
b-
ably believe that the continuing desire for
ably estimate that political dividends can 3
unity will make West Germany susceptible to
earned from even small increases in their cur-
influences within the power of Soviet policy to
rent volumes of trade with individual non-
apply.
Communist states. The countries most vul-
167. Consequently, the USSR will almost cer-
nerable to this form of political warfare, in the
tainly make great efforts to influence the sit-
Soviet view, would probably be in underdevel-
uation in West Germany itself. It will al-
oped areas. Moreover, the Soviet leaders
most certainly increase propaganda and po-
might be willing to accept certain economic
litical warfare measures designed to encour-
losses for political gains in areas of prime
age the existing anti-rearmament sentiment
strategic significance, such as Germany or
in West Germany. Beyond this, the USSR
Japan. In any case, they will almost certain-
will probably seek to increase points of con-
ly seek to increase trade with these countries
tact on trade and other matters between it-
during the course of this estimate. The So-
self and the West German government. These
viet leaders will probably also try to expand
contacts could be used to prepare for the re-
Soviet economic influence in selected areas
sumption of diplomatic relations and could
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45
be represented by propaganda as leading to
causing Western peoples to demand that their
the possibility of direct political negotiations
governments follow a cautious policy. We be-
on German reunification. The Soviet leaders
lieve that, even at this stage, the USSR would
probably calculate that a sedulous encourage-
still avoid courses of action which in its judg-
ment of German hopes for unification will,
ment clearly entailed the probability of gen-
over the course of time, increase neutralist
eral war.
feeling in West Germany, greatly complicate
170. It is also possible that the Soviet leaders
the relations of the West German government
might offer to withdraw from East Germany
with its NATO partners, and undermine unity
in exchange for a guaranteed neutralization
of purpose within the NATO alliance. More-
and armament control of a unified Germany.
over, they may calculate that with the passing
Such a policy could offer the advantages of
of Adenauer from the scene, the internal po-
halting German rearmament, reducing the
litical balance in Germany will change, and
strength of US forces in Europe, and, together
that consequently a political climate will de-
with an Austrian settlement, creating in
velop which would be more favorable to
effect a neutralized zone in Central Europe.
attempts to detach West Germany from its
We believe that the chances of such a develop-
ties to the NATO powers.
ment are less than even.³⁰ It might be adopt-
168. While increasing its efforts to undermine
ed, however, if the Soviet leaders believed that
West German support for rearmament, the
it offered the only means, short of general
USSR will not relax its efforts to weaken West-
war, to prevent the development of a critical
ern unity by playing upon fears and hopes
threat to the security of the USSR.
elsewhere in Western Europe. Soviet propa-
171. The USSR will probably increase its
ganda and diplomacy will be designed to pro-
mote French confidence in the USSR's peace-
efforts during the course of this estimate to
ful intentions and in the reasonableness of
detach neutral states from the sphere of West-
Soviet proposals, to stimulate French fears
ern influence. In Europe, the states most
of future German aggression, and to SOW re-
likely to be subjected to Soviet pressure or
sentment of US policy. It Italy, as in France,
inducements are Finland and Yugoslavia. In
the USSR possesses a powerful weapon in the
Finland the USSR will probably continue to
large native Communist party, and Italy will
use pressures to increase Finland's economic
probably continue to be an important target
dependence upon the USSR. It might even,
in the Soviet campaign to alienate Western
in the event that developments in Germany
Europe from the US and undermine NATO.
made such a course appear desirable, invoke
169. If such measures did not, in the Soviet
the terms of the Soviet-Finnish Mutual Assist-
view, succeed in countering the developing
ance Treaty of 6 April 1948.3¹ The USSR will
threat of West German rearmament, it is
persist in its aim to wean Yugoslavia away
possible that the Soviet leaders would accom-
from its present ties with the West and might
modate themselves to the situation of in-
make additional concessions to accomplish
creased Western strength, and would pursue
a cautious and nonprovocative policy. We be-
30 The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department
of State, believes that the estimate contained
lieve it more likely, however, that they would
in this sentence should read as follows:
take rigorous measures in an attempt to off-
"We believe that the likelihood of such a de-
set the accretion to the strength of the West.
velopment is small, primarily because it seems
to us that its uncertainties and disadvantages,
These measures would include a sharp build-
from the Soviet point of view, would far out-
up of Soviet and Satellite military capabilities,
weigh its advantages."
and might also include more threatening
31 The terms of the treaty require Finland to join
courses of action against Berlin, or in the
the USSR in resisting aggression by Germany or
any power allied with Germany, and to "con-
Far East, or elsewhere, with the purpose of
sult" with the USSR in the event of "threat" of
arousing fear of nuclear war in the West and
such aggression.
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LIBITY
46
this. Any internal crisis in Yugoslavia, such
as to SOW distrust of the US among neutral
as might follow the death of Tito for example,
nations and to promote a maximum of dis-
would probably see an intensification of these
cord between the US and its allies. Moscow
efforts.
almost certainly does not consider that its
vital national interests are involved in issues
Asia
32
arising in the Formosa Strait. We believe
172. In Northeast Asia the principal objective
that Moscow might see certain advantages in
of Soviet policy during the course of this esti-
clashes between Chinese Communist and US
mate almost certainly will be to detach Japan
forces, provided it believed that the clashes
from the sphere of US influence. The Soviet
would be limited and localized. However, we
leaders probably believe that the political in-
also believe that the USSR will seek to pre-
stability of Japan will render it increasingly
vent a situation from arising in the Formosa
vulnerable to Communist pressures, including
Strait which in its view would carry grave
that which the Japanese Communist Party
risks of major hostilities between the US and
exerts through its influence in other political
Communist China, since the Soviet leaders
organizations. Most importantly, in the So-
probably believe that such hostilities would
viet view, Japan's critical need for markets
also entail grave risk of Soviet involvement.
and for raw materials will make Communist
174. The Soviet leaders probably consider that
trade solicitations increasingly more attrac-
if major hostilities between Communist China
tive, and create frictions beween Japan and
and the US should occur the USSR would be
the West. The USSR almost certainly in-
presented with extremely grave choices. They
tends, in concert with Communist China, to
would probably give the Chinese Communists
employ these weapons of political warfare
support in weapons and material, and the
vigorously during the course of this estimate,
scale of this aid would probably increase in
and probably believes that with the normaliza-
proportion to the threat to the Chinese Com-
tion of relations with Japan which would fol-
munist regime. As hostilities expanded and
low the signing of a peace treaty, its oppor-
the threat to the Chinese Communist regime
tunities to detach Japan from US influence
increased, they would probably engage Soviet
would be greatly enhanced.
forces in defensive operations, to the extent
173. We believe that the USSR is in substan-
that they felt they could plausibly deny such
tial agreement with Chinese Communist ob-
involvement. Should the conflict progress so
jectives to destroy the Chinese Nationalist
far that destruction of the Chinese Commu-
Government and to gain control of all terri-
nist regime appeared probable, we believe that
tory held by it, but is concerned to restrain
the Soviet leaders would recognize that open
Peiping from adopting policies which would
intervention on their part sufficient to save
clearly involve substantial risk of general
the Chinese regime would involve extremely
war. The Soviet leaders probably believe they
grave risk of general war with the US with
can derive advantage from issues in the For-
its consequent threat to the survival of the
mosa Strait by combining public advocacy of
Soviet system. In deciding upon a course of
Peiping's claims with a conciliatory posture
calculated to impress the world with the sin-
action, the Soviet leaders would have to weigh
cerity of Soviet efforts to reach a peaceful
the strengths which they could bring to bear
settlement. The primary Soviet motivation
in the struggle against those which would
in this is to exploit the issue in such a way
be opposed to them, and the dangers to their
own regime of a possible global war with the
32 See NIE 10-7-54, "Communist Courses of Action
US against the strategic and psychological
in Asia Through 1957," 23 November 1954, which
consequences to them of destruction of the
deals with Chinese Communist as well as Soviet
Chinese Communist regime. We believe, on
intentions in Asia. A separate NIE on Chinese
Communist capabilities and courses of action
balance, they would conclude that loss of the
will appear later in 1955.
Chinese Communist regime would be suffi-
TOP SECRET
Dwights
THE
TOP SECRET
47
STRIBT
ciently damaging and final to cause them to
means, the USSR would still regard Commu-
resort to open intervention to save that re-
nist opportunities for expansion through sub-
gime.⁸³
version as good. It would probably support
military action by local guerrillas and infil-
175. Southeast Asia will almost certainly ap-
trated Viet Minh military elements, but would
pear to the USSR to be the most profitable
probably seek to restrain the Viet Minh from
field for the extension of Communist influence,
openly crossing the demarcation line with
at least during the early period of this esti-
mate. The Soviet leaders will probably con-
large organized forces, at least as long as
tinue, in concert with Communist China, to
military intervention by the Manila Pact
powers seemed likely to result.
support Communist subversive activities, and
possibly localized military action if circum-
177. The principal concern of Soviet policy
stances are favorable. However, if the ac-
in South Asia will be to encourage and exploit
tivities of local Communist groups stimulate
the neutralism already present in the area.
anti-Communist attitudes within Asian states
The Soviet leaders probably hope thereby to
or tend to unite these states in joint resistance
promote differences within the British Com-
with Western powers, the Kremlin may choose
monwealth over ways of dealing with Commu-
to exercise its influence to hold local Com-
nism in Asia. They would expect such differ-
munist movements in check. The USSR will
ences to affect Anglo-American relations ad-
consider the interests and possible gains of
versely, and to render difficult the efforts of
local Communist movements as subordinate
the Western powers to enlist the support of
to the broader purpose of Soviet strategy in
Asian peoples in effective oposition to further
the world conflict.
Communist advances in Asia. India in par-
176. The Soviet leaders almost certainly be-
ticular is likely to receive increasing attention
and consideration in the USSR's conduct of
lieve that the US will make substantial efforts
to prevent South Vietnam from falling under
the world struggle.
Communist control. In attempting to frus-
Middle East
trate such efforts, Soviet policy will be guided
by the concern to avoid actions which would
178. The USSR has devoted increased atten-
consolidate the Western allies on the Indo-
tion to the countries of this area during the
china issue and bring them wider support in
last year. It has settled long-standing border
Asia. The Soviet leaders probably believe that
and financial issues with Iran, and has
the US will accede to the initiation of nego-
achieved a growing influence over the econ-
tiations in preparation for the elections in
omy of Afghanistan, mainly through expand-
1956, but will cause conditions and issues to
ed trade and economic development pro-
be introduced with a view to obstructing the
grams. The USSR has attempted through
negotiations and preventing or delaying the
propaganda and diplomacy to prevent the
elections. If the US succeeds in postponing
extension of Middle East defense plans, and
the elections, or if it adopts measures which
in particular has warned Iran of the undesir-
seriously reduce Communist capabilities for
able consequences that would stem from for-
further expansion in Indochina through legal
mal Iranian adherence to any non-Soviet mili-
tary bloc. If Iran moves openly to take such
33 The Director of Naval Intelligence, and the Dep-
a step, the USSR would almost certainly adopt
uty Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff,
a more truculent attitude, and would probably
believe that the last sentence overstates the
willingness of the Soviet leaders to risk their
threaten to invoke its 1921 treaty agreements
own regime and would substitute for the last
with Iran, which provide for Soviet occupa-
sentence:
tion of northern Iran under certain circum-
"On balance, we believe that they would not
stances. We believe, however, that the USSR
consider the elimination of the Chinese Com-
would not openly intervene in Iran with mili-
munist regime sufficiently damaging, or final,
to warrant the risk to their own regime which
tary force unless it had decided for reasons
open intervention would entail."
of policy unrelated to Iran to accept substan-
TOP SECRET
DWIGHT
TOP SECRET
LIBER the
48
tial risk of general war. The USSR will prob-
the US. The type of political action the Com-
ably step up its activities throughout the
munists pursued in Guatemala, where a small
Middle East in proportion to the success of
Communist element was able to obtain a de-
present Western efforts to build toward a sit-
cisive influence over policy by operating
uation of strength through regional alliance
through front groups, will be the most likely
and external military support. The USSR
pattern of Communist tactics in Latin Ameri-
will probably in any case press its present
ca. Communist strength is insufficient to at-
effort to gain a controlling position in Afghan-
tempt open seizures of power or to run the
istan.
risk of intervention by other American states.
At present, Soviet aims are probably limited to
Latin America
promoting policies calculated to disrupt the
Organization of American States and to dam-
179. The USSR will continue its efforts
age US prestige. The Bloc will probably try
through local Communist parties and front
to increase its trade with Latin America. In
groups, appealing particularly to labor, stu-
addition to providing a source of needed raw
dents, and intellectuals, to promote anti-US
materials, such trade might be calculated to
sentiment, to embarrass US business interests,
contribute to the softening of inter-American
and to obstruct economic and military coop-
solidarity and to the creation of a more re-
eration of Latin American governments with
ceptive atmosphere for Bloc propaganda.
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
49
SEAL
Dwighto
APPENDIX
Tables of Military Strength
TOP SECRET
SECRET
TABLE 1
ESTIMATED T/O STRENGTH OF BLOC ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL
MID-1955 AND MID-1960
Totals
Country
Mid-1955
Mid-1960
(Not including
Security)
Army
Air Force
Navy
Security
Army
Air Force
Navy
Security
Mid-'55
Mid-'60
USSR (Total)
2,500,000
800,000 1
695,000 2
400,000
2,500,000
840,000¹
750,000 ²
400,000
3,995,000
4,190,000
EE Satellites (Total)
1,085,000
92,700
34,800
306,000
1,210,000
115,000 ᵃ
48,500
326,000
1,212,500
1,373,500
Albania
30,000
200
800
10,000
30,000
1,000
10,000
31,000
Bulgaria
170,000
18,500
5,500
45,000
170,000
7,500
45,000
194,000
Czechoslovakia
170,000
18,000
40,000
170,000
40,000
188,000
East Germany
100,000
7,000
9,000
30,000
225,000
15,000
50,000
116,000
Hungary
150,000
12,000
38,000
150,000
38,000
162,000
Poland
250,000
25,000 ³
11,500
65,000
250,000
15,000
4
65,000
286,500
Rumania
215,000
12,000
8,000
78,000
215,000
10,000
78,000
235,000
Communist Asia (Total)
2,894,000
94,500
43,000
1,015,000
2,947,000
117,000
53,000
1,015,500
3,031,500
3,117,000
Communist China
2,300,000
78,500
32,000
1,000,000
2,300,000
95,000
37,000
1,000,000
2,410,500
2,432,000
North Korea
317,000
16,000
11,000
15,500
357,000
22,000
15,000
15,500
344,000
394,000
Viet Minh
277,000
290,000
1,000
277,000
291,000
BLOC TOTALS
6,479,000
987,200
772,800
1,721,000
6,657,000
1,072,000
851,500
1,741,500
8,239,000
8,680,500
1 Including 95,000 naval aviation personnel. Included in the 800,000 are 466,000 in operational air units and 334,000 in nonoperational categories.
2 Excluding 95,000 naval aviation personnel in 1955 (98,000 in 1960) and 125,000 MVD naval frontier guards who become part of the Navy during wartime.
These are included separately under the security forces.
3 Includes naval air arm.
4 Excluding 1,070 naval aviation personnel in 1955 (1,250 in 1960).
5 Excluding 4,000 naval aviation personnel in 1955 (7,000 in 1960).
Library
our
1971mg
.
SECRET
SECRET
TABLE 2
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF BLOC GROUND FORCES AND TRAINED RESERVES, MID-1955,
AND MID-1960, AND ESTIMATED GROUND MOBILIZATION POTENTIAL, MID-1955
Trained
Ground Mobilization Capacity
Line Divisions
Ground Reserves
Mid-1955
By Type Mid-1955
Total 2
Mid-
Mid-
M+30
M+360
COUNTRY
Rifle
Mech
Tank
Cav
1955
1960
1955
1960
Personnel
Divisions
Personnel
Divisions
USSR (Total)¹
105
45
20
5
175
175
6,250,000
8,000,000
8,750,000
300
12,500,000
500 5
Occupied Europe
5
16
9
30
30
NW USSR
13
1
14
14
W USSR
30
15
6
2
53
53
W Central USSR
16
2
2
20
20
Caucasus
10
2
2
14
14
E Central USSR
10
3
1
14
14
Far East
21
7
2
30
30
Satellites (Total)
61
13
6
1
81
93
2,650,000
4,475,000
2,905,000
118
4,800,000
188
Albania
3
3
3
45,000
Bulgaria
75,000
80,000
4
100,000
6
12
2
1
15
15
475,000
700,000
500,000
20
Czech
700,000
28
8
4
2
14
14
515,000
800,000
500,000
20
E. Germany
1,000,000
40
4
3
7
14
50,000
Hungary
350,000
175,000
9
250,000
12
9
1
1
11
13
375,000
Poland
600,000
450,000
18
650,000
25
12
5
17
18
Rumania
660,000
1,100,000
650,000
25
1,100,000
42
13
1
14
16
530,000
850,000
550,000
22
900,000
35
Com. Asia (Total)
147
3
4
154
164
6
6
2,867,000
157
3,082,000
170
China
118
3
4
125
125
2,300,000
125
2,500,000
135
Korea
27
27
27
Northeast
13
1
2
16
16
North
12
1
2
14
14
Northwest
7
7
7
E. China
29
1
30
30
Central/South
20
20
20
Southwest
10
10
10
Unlocated
1
1
North Korea
19
19
24
332,000
19
332,000
19
Viet Minh
10
10
15
235,000
13
250,000
16
BLOC TOTALS
313
58
29
10
410
432
8,900,000
12,475,000
14,522,000
575
20,382,000
858
1 It is estimated that Soviet line divisions are generally at about 70 percent of their average wartime T/O strength of about 12,000 men.
2 Airborne and Mountain Divisions are included in the Rifle Division total; at least 20 Artillery and 25 AAA Divisions, however, are additional to the line
divisions shown.
8 In East Germany: 415,000 men; 22 divisions.
THE
4 It is estimated that Chinese Communist divisions have a wartime T/O strength of about 8,000-10,000 men.
5 Of these 500 divisions 300 could probably be equipped from stockpiles. The remaining 200 divisions would be equipped from current production and
would probably be used primarily to provide replacement units or individual replacements.
6 Communist Asian forces have no system of organized reserves. The Communist Chinese have an estimated 6,000,000-20,000,000 men in the militia, but
as presently consituted these forces cannot be classed as trained reserves since they receive little military training and have almost no equipment. With
the institution of a formal military system, expected to be adopted by mid-1956, it is probable that Chinese personnel who complete a term of military
service will form the trained reserve available for mobilization.
7 Communist Asian forces are considered virtually fully mobilized. Mobilization of additional units would require substantially increased amounts of
equipment from the USSR.
SECRET
SECRET
TABLE 3
ESTIMATED AUTHORIZED (TO&E) STRENGTH OF BLOC AIR UNITS
MID-1955 - MID-1960 1
Mid-1955
Mid-1956
Mid-1957
Mid-1958
Mid-1959
Mid-1960
CCAF/
CCAF/
CCAF/
USSR
EE SAT
NKAF
USSR
USSR
EE SAT
NKAF
USSR
USSR
USSR
EE SAT
NKAF
Fighter: Jet (Day)
10,100
2,200
1,550
9,500
8,100
2,500
1,850
6,900
6,300
6,100
2,000
1,700
Jet (All-Weather)
300
1,000
2,500
3,800
4,500
4,800
500
200
Attack:
Jet2
300
600
950
220
40
1,300
1,600
1,900
500
160
Piston
1,600
880
360
1,300
1,050
740
400
700
400
100
500
280
Light Bomber: Jet
3,250
120
400
3,250
3,250
420
640
3,150
3,100
3,100
700
740
Piston
300
280
290
80
Medium Bomber:8 Jet
200
400
650
700
700
700
Piston
1,160
30
840
400
90
100
100
Heavy Bomber: Jet
20
80
200
350
400
400
Turbo-prop
20
80
150
250
300
300
Transport: Medium
50
100
200
400
500
Light
1,900
160
130
1,850
1,800
220
190
1,700
1,500
1,400
270
200
Helicopters:
300
500
600
600
600
600
Reconnaissance:
Jet Fighters
100
20
30
200
400
170
80
400
400
400
200
80
Jet Light
Bombers
850
850
850
850
850
850
Prop
200
170
10
200
200
130
10
200
250
250
100
10
Tankers
TOTALS
20,300
3,850
2,790
20,700
21,200
4,690
3,380
21,200
21,300
21,400
4,770
3,470
BLOC TOTAL (TO&E)
26,940
29,270
29,640
JETS (TO&E)
19,540
22,730
25,330
TOTAL (ACTUAL) 1
20,500
JETS (ACTUAL)
15,000
1 Estimated actual strength of Soviet air units has usually been less than estimated TO&E strength; however, based on present re-equipment trends, it is
estimated that the actual strength of the over-all establishment will be close to the total authorized (TO&E) strength by mid-1956, although many of the
units would be equipped with a combination of old and new types of aircraft.
2 It is estimated that jet attack aircraft will be one-third light bombers and two-thirds fighter types.
3 There is no firm intelligence on the planned balance between the types and categories of long-range aircraft or on their future authorized organiza-
tional aircraft strengths; the above figures represent our estimate of the most probable way in which Soviet Long-Range Aviation would be proportioned
during the period and is predicated on the assumptions (1) that no change will occur in the total authorized number of aircraft in long-range units,
(2) that the BEAR turbo-prop heavy bomber is currently in series productions, and (3) that the USSR is devoting a major aircraft production effort to
the development of a massive intercontinental air attack capability.
4 It is estimated that in addition to transports there are 250 gliders in organized glider regiments.
5 These do not include liaison type helicopters.
6 Tankers are not shown in specific numbers since they have not been identified in operational units nor have inflight refueling techniques been de-
tected. However, employment of tanker aircraft is considered to be within Soviet capabilities and production capacity is estimated to be capable of sup-
porting production of tanker aircraft in required numbers.
SECRET
Library
OHL
SECRET
Dwighto
The
Lights
JOHN
TABLE 4
ESTIMATED GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET AIR STRENGTH BY AIRCRAFT TYPE
MID-1955
North-
West
East
Eastern
western
Western
Central
Caucasus
Central
Aircraft Type
Europe (1)
USSR (2)
USSR (3)
USSR (4)
USSR (5)
USSR (6)
Far East (7) Total
Fighter: Day
1,260
1,370
2,270
1,220
1,310
550
2,120
A/W
10,100
40
30
30
130
40
30
300
1,300
1,400
2,300
1,350
1,350
550
2,150
10,400
Attack: Jet
100
100
100
300
Piston
440
250
250
80
80
500
1,600
540
250
350
80
80
600
1,900
Light Bomber: Jet
230
450
1,150
160
300
160
800
3,250
Medium Bomber: Jet
170
30
200
Piston
200
650
90
220
1,160
200
820
120
220
1,360
Heavy Bomber: Jet
20
20
Turbo-prop
20
20
Transport: Medium
Light
130
150
500
420
70
70
560
1,900
130
150
500
420
70
70
560
1,900
Helicopters
50
100
50
100
300
Reconnaissance:
Jet Fighter
100
100
Jet Light Bomber
100
90
280
30
30
30
290
850
Prop
60
60
80
200
200
150
340
30
30
30
370
1,150
2,450
2,700
5,550
2,080
1,830
890
4,800
20,300
Areas referred to in Geographic Distribution of Soviet Air Strength by Aircraft Type are:
(1)
Includes E. Germany, Poland, Austria, Hungary, and Rumania.
(2)
Includes Arkhangelsk M.D., Leningrad M.D., and White Sea M.D.
(3)
Includes Baltic M.D., Belorussian M.D., Carpathian M.D., Kiev M.D., Odessa M.D., and Tauric M.D.
(4)
Includes Gorki M.D., Moscow M.D., South Ural M.D., Volga M.D., Voronezh M.D., and Ural M.D.
(5)
Includes North Caucasus M.D. and Transcaucasus M.D.
(6)
Includes East Siberian M.D., Turkestan M.D., and West Siberian M.D.
(7)
Includes Far East M.D., Maritime M.D., Transbaikal M.D., and Port Arthur/Dairen Area.
SECRET
SECRET
TABLE 5
ESTIMATED SOVIET AIRCRAFT STRENGTH BY ROLE WITHIN MAJOR COMPONENTS
MID-1955, MID-1960
MID-1955
MID-1960
Air Force of
Soviet Army
Fighter Aviation
of Air Defense
Long Range
Aviation
Naval
Aviation
Aviation of
Airborne Troops
Totals
Air Force of
Soviet Army
Fighter Aviation
of Air Defense
Long Range
Aviation
Naval
Aviation
Aviation of
Airborne Troops
Totals
Fighter: Day
4,480
3,630
1,990
10,100
3,420
1,660
1,320
6,100
A/W
70
170
60
300
1,680
2,340
780
4,800
Total
4,550
3,800
2,050
10,400
4,800
4,000
2,100
10,900
Attack: Jet
300
300
1,800
100
1,900
Piston
1,500
100
1,600
100
100
Total
1,800
100
1,900
1,900
100
2,000
Light Bomber: Jet
2,370
30
850
3,250
2,220
30
850
3,100
Medium Bomber: Jet
200
200
700
700
Piston
1,160
1,180
Total
1,360
1,380
700
700
Heavy Bomber: Jet
20
20
400
400
Turbo-prop
20
20
300
300
Total
40
40
700
700
Library The
Transport: Medium
50
100
50
300
500
Light
850
120
190
190
550
1,900
800
120
90
140
250
1,400
Total
850
120
190
190
550
1,900
850
120
190
190
550
1,900
Helicopters
30
20
250
300
100
100
400
600
Reconnaissance: Jet Fighters
100
100
400
400
Jet Light Bombers
600
250
850
600
250
850
Prop
200
200
250
250
Total
700
450
1,150
1,000
500
1,500
TOTALS
10,300
3,950
1,590
3,660
800
20,300
10,870
4,150
1,590
3,840
950
21,400
SECRET
Dwight D.
The
SECRET
TABLE 6
ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET LONG-RANGE AIRCRAFT
(Calculated in accordance with US military mission profiles)
MODIFIED
IMPROVED
BISON
BULL
BULL
BADGER
BADGER
TURBO
(Type 37)
Conditions
(TU-4)
(TU-4)'
(Type 39)
1957 4
PROP
5
1957⁶
Combat Radius/
Range (NM)
a. 10,000 lb. load
1,700/3,100
2,000/3,600
1,500/2,900
1,900/3,700
3,700/7,000
2,750/5,300
one refuel a
2,400/4,300
2,800/5,000
2,100/4,000
2,660/5,180
5,200/9,800
3,800/7,300
b. 3,000 lb. load
1,950/3,500
2,300/4,100
1,700/3,300
2,100/4,200
2,850/5,500
one refuel
2,750/4,900
3,200/5,700
2,400/4,600
2,940/5,880
3,900/7,500
Speed/Altitude
(kn/ft)
a. Max. speed
350/30,000
360/30,000
535/15,000
550/12,500
470/35,000
535/19,000
b. Target speed
350/30,000
360/30,000
475/41,000
470/43,000
445/40,000
475/44,500
Combat Ceiling
(ft)
36,500
37,500
43,500
43,500
40,000
48,000
ESTIMATED MAXIMUM SOVIET LONG-RANGE AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE
UNDER A MODIFIED MISSION PROFILE
(Calculated in accordance with a maximum US military mission profiles except
that fuel reserves are reduced to permit 30 minutes loiter at sea level, and aircraft
operate at altitudes permitting maximum radius/range.)
MODIFIED
IMPROVED
TUR-
BISON
BULL
BULL
BADGER
BADGER
Bo
(Type 37)
Conditions
(TU-4)
(TU-4)¹
(Type 39)
1957
4
PROP
5
1957 ᵉ
Combat/Radius
Range (NM)
a. 10,000 lb. load
1,800/3,300
2,150/4,000
1,600/3,100
2,050/4,000
3,100/6,100
one refuel 3
2,500/4,500
3,000/5,600
2,200/4,300
2,870/5,600
4,300/8,100
b. 3,000 lb. load
2,050/3,700
2,450/4,600
1,850/3,700
2,300/4,500
3,200/6,400
one refuel
2,850/5,100
3,450/6,450
2,250/5,000
3,220/6,300
4,300/8,200
Speed/Altitude
(kn/ft)
a. Max. speed
350/30,000
360/30,000
535/15,000
550/12,500
535/19,000
b. Target speed
350/30,000
360/30,000
475/42,000
470/43,500
475/45,500
Combat Ceiling 2
(ft)
36,500
37,500
43,500
43,500
48,000
ESTIMATED BISON AND BADGER MAXIMUM TARGET ALTITUDES
(Calculated on the basis of 100 ft/min. rate of climb, one-way missions, one hour
of fuel remaining, bombload aboard, and with maximum power.)
BISON
BADGER
IMPROVED BADGER
Bombload (lbs.)
(Altitude Ft.)
(Altitude Ft.)
(Altitude Ft.)
20,000
55,100
10,000
56,300
49,500
51,500
3,000
57,200
51,000
53,000
1 The TU-4 could be modified in a manner similar to the US B-29B conversion to increase its range.
However, = we have no indications that this has been or will be done.
2 The altitude at which rate of climb of 500 ft/min. can be maintained at the end of the given combat
radius of the aircraft.
3 Refueling radius/range estimates based upon the use of compatible tankers.
4 The improved Badger performance is based upon installation of higher thrust engines.
5
The figures in this column are tentative and incomplete Air Force estimates. Coordination with other
agencies has been deferred, pending further analysis of available data.
6 Based upon estimated installation of 20,000 lb. thrust engines. Previous estimates indicated these en-
gines would not be available until 1957. The USAF now believes they are available at the present time.
Analysis leading to a re-estimate is now in progress.
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TABLE 7
ESTIMATED BLOC NAVAL FORCES, MID-1955, MID-1960
MODERN VESSELS¹
BLOC
FLEET
BALTIC
NORTHERN
BLACK SEA
PACIFIC
TOTALS
TOTAL
Satellites
COUNTRY
Comm.
& Comm.
U.S.S.R.
Satellites
U.S.S.R.
U.S.S.R.
Satellites
U.S.S.R.
China
U.S.S.R.
China
SHIPS
'55
'60
'55
'60
'55
'60
'55
'60
'55
'60
55
'60
'55
'60
'55
'60
'55
'60
'55
'60
MAJOR SURFACE VESSELS
Capital Ships
0
10000010000000
2
0
0
0
2
Heavy Cruisers
2
0
0
0
0
0
2
1
0
0
2
2
0
0
6
3
0
0
6
3
Light Cruisers
10
10
0
0
4
4
6
6
0
0
0
0
1
0
20
202
1
0
21
20°
Destroyers
46
46
1
0
26
22
23
18
1
1
32
23
2
2
127
109
4
3
131
112
Escort Destroyers
16
33
0
4
4
4
16
31
0
0
20
35
0
0
56
103
0
4
56
107
TOTAL (Major)
74
90
1
4
34
30
47
57
1
1
54
60
3
2
209
237
5
7
214
244
MINOR SURFACE VESSELS
1,018
1,018
66
140
211
211
215
215
94
94
412
412
166
166
1,856
1,856
326
400
(TOTAL)
2,182
2,256
SUBMARINES
Long Range
43
83
0
0
60
169
31
71
0
0
15
120
0
0
149
443
0
0
149
443
(new construction)
Long Range
17
6
0
0
11
0
3
0
0
0
12
1
0
0
43
7
0
0
43
7
Medium Range
10
5
0
0
0
0
5
0
2
0
7
0
0
0
22
5
2
0
24
5
Short Range
33
29
4
4
3
0
14
3
0
0
30
20
2
2
80
52
6
6
86
58
TOTAL (Submarines)
103
123
4
4
74
169
53
74
2
0
64
141
2
2
294
507
8
6
302
513
OVERAGE VESSELS 1
Battleships/Monitors
2
2
0
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
4
0
0
4
4
Heavy Cruisers
0
2
0
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
4
0
0
1
4
Light Cruisers
1
1
0
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
1
3
3
0
1
3
4
Destroyers
0
10
0
1
3
7
2
7
4
4
2
11
0
0
7
35
4
5
11
40
TOTAL (Overage Major
Vessels)
3
15
0
1
3
7
7
13
4
4
2
11
0
1
15
46
4
6
19
52
Long Range
7
13
0
0
11
16
4
3
0
0
6
14
2
0
28
46
2
0
30
46
Medium Range
4
6
3
1
0
0
3
5
1
2
14
13
0
0
21
24
4
3
The
25
27
Short Range
11
4
0
0
2
3
10
16
0
0
8
14
0
0
31
37
0
0
31
37
LIBTRA
TOTAL (Overage
Submarines)
22
23
3
1
13
19
17
24
1
2
28
41
2
0
80
107
6
3
86
110
1 Modern vessels include surface ships 20 years of age and less (from date of completion), and submarines 14 years of age and less. Overage vessels
include surface ships more than 20 years of age, and submarines 15-20 years of age. Submarines are excluded entirely from the estimated future
Order of Battle at 20 years, while surface vessels are not excluded because of age. These are included until it becomes apparent that they are no longer
fulfilling type assignments, at which time they are assigned to the Miscellaneous Auxiliary (AG) category.
2 Present indications are that the current cruiser program may be substantially completed with mid-1955 deliveries. No new hulls have yet been laid
down, in the Leningrad area at least, for the 1956-1957 program, and information on construction outside the Leningrad area is usually delayed for a
considerable period. We estimate that additional cruiser-type vessels will be constructed in the Soviet Union during the period, but until some evi-
dence to confirm this is received, no additional cruisers will be added to the over-all strength figures after 1955.
3
Construction rates of minor combatant vessels are uncertain and probably will be limited to only slightly more vessels than will be needed to fulfill
replacement needs.
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THE Light Dwight D
TABLE 8
ESTIMATED PRODUCTION OF MAJOR ARMY WEAPONS 1953-1954
(USSR and US)
ITEM
USSR
TOTAL
US
TOTAL
1953
1954
1953
1954
Heavy Tanks
700
700
1,400
195
104
299
(over 50 tons)
Medium Tanks
3,700
3,700
7,400
7,816
2,956
10,772
(35-50 tons)
Light Tanks
1,123
667
1,780
SP Guns
1,600
1,600
3,200
....
....
Artillery Pieces
11,300
11,300
22,600
3,042
2,987
6,029
(75 mm & above)
TABLE 9
ESTIMATED POSTWAR PRODUCTION OF AIRCRAFT
(Soviet Bloc and NATO)¹
ITEM
SOVIET BLOC
NATO
1946-51
1952-54
Postwar Total
1946-51
1952-54
Postwar Total
Fighters and Bombers
28,800
19,050
47,850
18,000
21,935
39,935
(Units)
Production of Other
28,190
11,450
39,640
100,000
29,787
129,787
Aircraft (units)
Total Aircraft
311
210
521
329
484
813
Production
(million lbs)
1 BLOC and NATO production combined account for about 95 percent of world production. The major
contributions to NATO have been roughly: US, 65-70 percent; UK, 20-25 percent; other, about 10-15
percent. However, the Eastern European share has gradually increased and in 1954 Eastern European
production, primarily Czech and Polish, accounted for about 15 percent of the Bloc total. The USSR
has accounted for virtually all of the Bloc aircraft production.
2 Trainers are included in this category.
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Dwighto
The
TABLE 10
LIBERTY
ESTIMATED TOTAL USSR NAVAL PRODUCTION, 1955-1960
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
Major Surface Vessels
Cruisers¹
0-2
0-2
0-2
0-2
0-2
0-3
Destroyers 2
2
2-4
2-6
2-8
2-8
2-8
Escort Destroyers
12
10
9
9
9
9
Minor Surface Vessels
Submarines (Long Range)
75
80
80
40
40
40
1 Present indications are that the current cruiser program may be substantially completed with mid-
1955 deliveries. No new hulls have yet been laid down, in the Leningrad area at least, for the 1956-57
program, and information on construction outside the Leningrad area is usually delayed for a con-
siderable period. We estimate that additional cruiser-type vessels will be constructed in the Soviet
Union during the period, but until some evidence to confirm this is received, no additional cruisers
will be added to the over-all strength figures (Table 7) after 1955.
2 This estimate is based upon the assumption that the construction of destroyers/escort destroyers in the
future will once again be expanded to the approximate level of activity which was reached during the
years 1950-1953.
3 It is unrealistic to estimate the future building rate of minor surface vessels, but it will be adequate to
replace existing units as they become obsolete or are transferred to the Satellites or Chinese Commu-
nists. Building activity in the smaller yards is constant and indicates a gradual future build-up of
minor surface vessels in the Soviet Navy.
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TABLE 11
ESTIMATED COMPOSITION OF BLOC MERCHANT FLEETS
MID-1955, MID-1960
(Vessels 1000 GRT. and upward
In thousands of gross tons)
MID-1955
MID-1960
Non-
Non-
Tankers¹
Tankers
Total
Tankers 1
Tankers
Total
No.
GRT
No.
GRT
No.
GRT
No.
GRT
No.
GRT
No.
GRT
U.S.S.R.
635
2,083
57
266
692
2,349
947
3,037
130
656
1,077
3,693
Satellites (total)
95
357
2
12
97
369
183
731
2
12
185
743
Communist China
101
264
10
14
111
278
141
374
25
57
166
431
BLOC TOTALS
831
2,704
69
292
900
2,996
1,271
4,142
157
725
1,428
4,867
1 Includes passenger ships, freighters, and miscellaneous types such as crab canneries, fish factories, trawlers, and hydrographic ships.
The Lights Dwight D.
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