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National Intelligence Estimate 11-4-56, Soviet Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses of Action Through 1961, Part 2 of 4
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National Intelligence Estimate 11-4-56, Soviet Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses of Action Through 1961, Part 2 of 4
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SECRET
NIE 11-4-56
III
Econ
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY
SOVIET ECONOMIC POLICY
26. Soviet economic policy continues to be directed toward the most
rapid possible growth of the economy. The aim, stated at the 20th Party
Congress, of overtaking the US in production, underscoros this policy and
projects it well beyond the period of this estimate. The USSR conceives of
this competition primarily in terms of heavy industrial output. Thus other
sectors of the economy tend to be developed only to the extent, that they
support or at least do not hamper the growth of heavy industry.
27. Post-Stalin Policies. While in this most basic respect the present
leaders have not altered Stalin's policy, they have apparontly decidod that
several aspects of this policy were producing dininishing returns or even
becoming self-defoating. First, agricultural stagnation in the face of
genoral population growth, and an even faster urban increase focused attention
upon the future adequacy of the food supply, upon the wasteful use of human
and other resources in agriculture, and upon the nood for a better dict.
Socondly, the docline which the Soviet leaders probably anticipated in numbers
of now industrial workers called: for strenuous efforts to increase individual
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC review
By HP
NLE Date 5/14/02
SECRET
productivity if planned economic growth was to be achieved. Policy
innovations since 1953 have concentrated upon resolving these problems
in order to insure further advances in heavy industry.
28. The Sixth Five-Year Plan. Soviet economic policy for nost of
the period of this estimate is outlined in the Sixth Five-Year Plan
(1956-1960), which was announced in January 1956 and approved by the
20th Party Congress in February. This lan, like its predecossers, stresses
industrial growth, calling for a 65 percent increase in in industrial output.
A high rate of invostment is to be maintained, still directed primarily
into heavy industry. This overriding claim upon Seviet resources, plus the
requirements of the defense program, means that the growth in consumption,
although it will probably be considerable, will continue to lag bohind the
growth in total output.
29. However, since future growth also depends upon agricultural
progress, the manifold attack on the agricultural problem will continue,
involving the Now Lands and corn schenes, better farming practices, higher
investment priority, improved income incontives for collective farmors, farms and
farmers, and stronger political controls. The increases in food and fiber
output likoly to be achieved should assist industry by raising worker moralo.
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However, increases in consumption on the scale currently pronised will
the USSR achieves
not occur until much more substantial increases in agricultural output than
we now estimate are achieved. Productivity gains will be sought primarily
to be likely
through further professional and worker training, now nethods of organization
and management, and introduction of the latest foreign and domestic technology,
including re-cquipment in some industries.
30. The policy of expanding trade with underdeveloped countries,
facilitated by offers of credit on easy terms, was accelerated sharply in
1955, and the USSR clearly intonds to press this policy vigorously. The
resont level of industrial output and that which we ostinato for the
next five years will permit considerable increases in the currently small
Soviet exports of capital equipment to countries outside the Bloc without
appreciably affecting domestic programs. This factor, coupled with the
-
availability of obsolescent materiel as a result of the Soviet requirment
program, would permit substanial increases in Soviet exports of military end.
items. By exporting capital goods and military end-itens, the USSR could
obtain foodstuffs and raw naterials in short suppl or costly to produce at
* The representative for the Deputy Director for Intelligenco, The Joint
Staff, believes that the phrase "will permit considerable increases"
should be replaced by "will probably permit some increases."
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home and expect economic gains as well as political advantages.
SOVIET ECONOMIC GROWTH
41
31. The gross national product of the USSR grow by an estimated 42
percent during the five-yoar period 1951-1955, an average annual increase of
about
73 percent. We ostimate that during the six-year period 1956-1961 Soviet
GNP will grew at nearly the same annual rate and in 1961 will be almost 50
percent higher than in 1955. This growth will come chiefly from a further
*
The representative of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
believes that the following sentences should be added to this paragraph:
"Any large-scale program of Soviet capital goods exports, however, would
compete directly with the parallel demands of forced industrialization
in the Bloc, and especially in Communist China. Soviet capabilities to
carry out such a program, thereforo, may indirectly depend on the avail-
ability to the Bloc, and especially to Communist China, of non-Bloc
sources of capital goods during the perioda"
**
The task of estimating Soviet GNP is conplicated not only by incomplete
data but by conceptual difficulties as well. The present ostimates have
benefitted from the increased statistical data made available in recent
Soviet announcements, although important gaps romain, particularly in
the military sector, as Appendix B indicates. Of the conceptual problems,
the most important relates to the composition of GNP by and use and
arises from the absence of rental payments and capital char es in Soviet
agriculture. This has been resolved by imputing a value from analogous
relationships in the US economy. Since this rough procedure accounts
for about 26 percent of our base-year estimate of Soviet consumption,
the results can make no claim to complete accuracy. Despite this and
other difficultios, however, we regard those estimates as a reasonably
correct statement of the size, composition, and growth of the Soviet
economy.
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rise in the alroady high rate of capital investment, rapid gains in productiv-
ity, and substantial although slightly dininishing additions to the labor force.
The rate of growth of industrial production will slack off somewhat, but
agricultural output will probably grow about twice as fast as in the 1951-
1955 period.
32. The growth rate estimated above is higher than that projected in
NIE 11-3-55. (19 May 55) Whereas the provious estinate foresaw an increase
of GNP of 42 percent in 1960 over 1954, with the growth rate falling to
slightly less than 5 percent in the final year, it now appears that the GNP
in 1960 will be about 50 percent above 1954, and that even in 1961 the growth
rate will still exceed 6 percent. This revision is based upon the considerable
amount of now data which has become available in recent months and which
has led us to revise upward our previous estimates of the growth of consumption
and therefore of GNP for the Fifth Five-Year Plan; upon the strong growth
trends observed during 1955; and, most importantly, upon an analysis of the
Sixth Five-Year Plan which persuades us that most of the major industrial
targots will be fulfilled. The planned reduction in the armed forces,
if largely carried out, will alloviate the most serious hindrance --
a possible shortage of labor --- to achievement of these goals.
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33. The growth rate of Soviet GNP is nearly twice that experienced
by the US economy during the past five years and anticipated in the coming
period. As a result, the relative size of the Soviet economy increased from
about one third of the US economy in 1950 to about 37 percent in 1955 and will
probably reach about 45 percent in 1961. However, the absolute gq between
the two economics will continue to widen over this period. Roughly similar
rolationships obtain between the total outputs of the US and the NATO countries
on the one hand and the Sino-Soviet Bloc on the other. (See Figuro 1.) Based
solely on a projection of present trends, the absolute gap between the Soviet
and US GNPs would reach its widest point in the second half of the 1960's
and would then begin to narrow.
Distribution of GNP
340 In utilizing its (rowing output, the USSR will continue to increase
the share devoted to investment. We estimate that investment allocations
will rise from about 26 percent of GNP in 1955 to about 31 percent in 1961.
(Soo Figure 2.) Because of the growth in GNP over this poriod, investment
will be about 78 percent larger in the later year. Consumption will probably
grow by about 40 percent, in part because of continued urbanization, though
its relative share of GNP will fall from about 58 to about 54 55 percent. (For
prospective increases in per capita consumption, see paragraph 54.) In
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contrast, the US in 1955 devoted about 66 percent of its GNP to consumption
and 20 percent to investment.
35. In US prices, Soviet investment in 1955 was about $38 billion,
or about 54 percent of US investment, while consumption was about$63 billion,
or 24 percent of US consumption and about one fifth on a per capita basis.
The dollar value of total defense expenditures in 1955 was about $37 billion,
or virtually 100 percent of US dofense expenditures.
36. An estimate of the rublecests of past and projected military
programs indicates that total defense expenditures will probably rise by about
37
35 percent between 1955 and 1961. Since GNP will probably grow at an even
III
higher rate (about 50 percent), the relative military burden on the aconomy
Para
36
should docline slightly over this period. The detailed study of defense
expenditures indicates that in 1955 not only was the dollar value of total
*
This estimate is based upon an inter-agency study, ** details of which
appear in Appendix B. As explained there, a reduction of 1.2 million men
in the armed forces would lower defense expenditures in 1961 by some 13-18
billion rubles; correspondingly, the incroase in defense expenditures
between 1955 and 1961 would fall to about 24 27 ercent. On the other
hand, expenditures for the guided missile program have almost certainly been
understated in the study. The combined result of these two factors cannot
be prodicted, but it is clear that they will offset each other to some
extent.
does
**
The representatives of ACSI and the Director of Naval Intolligonco do not
consider the costs derived in the inter-agency study to be a valid apprai-
sal of the overall costs of the Soviet military effort and do not concur
in the findings of the study (See footnote to Appondix B, paragraph 1).
See also the footnote by the DNI attached to appending.
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Seviet defense expenditures approxinately equal to US expenditures, but also
that the dollar value of Soviet hard goods procurement was -bout equal to
that of similar goods procured by the US.
37. That the Scviet Union by expending 14 percent of its GNP in rubles
can obtain defense goods and services equal in dollar value to those of the
US, which is expending for the same activities 10.6 percent of a GNP two
and one half times as large, is explained by two important economic conditions.
First, the average level of real pay and subsistence provided to Soviet
servicemen, like the general standard of living, is very much lower than in
the US. Secondly, the Soviet armament industry is one of the USSR's most
officient industrios. The dollar and ruble conparisons above do not
mean that the Soviet armanent industry is more efficient than the US arnament
industry. On the contrary, it is likely that productivity (production per
man) in the Soviet armament industry is lower than productivity in the
corresponding US industry. However, the Soviet armament industry is very
much more officient than Soviet agriculture and the consumer goods industries.
**
The roprosentativos of ACSI and the Director of Naval Intelligence do not
consider the costs derived in the inter-agency study to be a valid apprai-
sal of the overall costs of the Soviet nilitary offort and do not cencur
in the findings of the study (See footnote to Appendix B, paragraph 1).
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While productivity in Soviet armament industry approaches that of the US,
Soviet productivity in consumer goods is much lower and agriculture is only
about one-soventh that in the US. Consequently a ruble will buy only about
seven cents worth of goods and services when spend for consumption goods and
services but will purchase from 20 to 25 conts worth when spent for defense
purposes. Thus, for example, if each country transfers a worker from agricul-
ture to defense industry, the Soviet worker will produce nearly as much arma-
nents as the American worker, but the loss of his production in agriculture
is far less than the corresponding loss in the US and # the sacrifice
involved is less.
*
The representative of ACSI reserves his position on this paragraph.
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FIGURE I
COMPARISON OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCTS
(in Billion 1955 Dollars at Market Prices)
1950
1955
1961
876
Other
701
NATO
Other
392
574
NATO
Other
314
NATO
370
US
252
Ohina
US
484
76
258
387
US
China
56
Eu.Sats
180
322
China
Eu. Sats
79
35
57
Eu.Sats
USSR
47
USSR
215
USSR
145
104
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FIGURE 2
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT OF THE USSR
(By End Use in Billion 1953 Rubles at Factor Cost)
1950
1955
1961
1616
162.0
1086
Consumption
54.
1095
889
55%
876
Consumption
5T
632-
58%
623
Investment
Investment
284
26%
505
31%
772
Consumption
451
58%
Defense
Defense
Investment
151
14%
204
13%
178
23%
Defonse
Administration
110
14%
30
2%
Administration
29
3%
Administration
32
4%
NOTE: Details do not add to total because of rounding.
(Sli ght modifications will be made later of the ruble ancents for consumption
and total GNP in all years.)
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DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET INDUSTRY
38. Dospite the present size of Soviet industrial output, only a
nederate decline in its high growth rate is ostimated in the coming five years.
The major factors sustaining a continued high rate of growth, estimated at
over 10 percent per year during the period of this ostimate, will be contin-
uing heavy capital investment, increases in the number and productivity of
workers, and inprovenents in managorial and technical efficiency. We estimate
that total industrial output will probably increase by 65 percent or more in
the Sixth Plan as compared with 77 percent in the Fifth. Output in 1961 will
probably be 83 percent or more above the 1955 level. (See Table I for the
estimated output of selected industrial commoditios.)
39. Of particular interest is the trend in the output of heavy industry,
which is basic to future growth, nilitary strength, and capability to export
capital goods. In this sector, the increase during the Sixth Plan eriod will
probably amount to 70 percent or more as against 84 percent during the Fifth.
The rate of growth of heavy industry novertholess remains strikingly larger
than that of the US and will provide the USSR in 1960 with an output equivalent
to about 45 percent of US heavy industrial production.
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40. We estimate that most ann uncod Soviet targots for connodity out-
put in 1960 will be fulfillod, particularly in producer goods, and that
there will be a number of overfulfillments of production goals for najor products
The most doubtful eloments in heavy industry are the target for installing
now generating capacity, which will probably not be net, and the goals for
production of non-ferrous metals, which will be fulfilled only with consider-
able difficulty. Fulfillment of the plan for large increases in the produc-
tion of nachinory and equipment may require more than the additional capital
expenditures planned for this industry. Failure to reach overanbitious agri-
cultural goals will result in underfulfillments in light industry.
41. Investment. Of the total investment during the period 1955-1961,
two-thirds will be devoted to industry, the same share which this sector
received during the Fourth and Fifth Five-Year Plans. The division of this
investment between heavy and light industry will continue at a 10:1 ratiov.
Heavy capital requirements for increasing output of electric power, potroleun,
chenicals, notals, ospecially ferrous, and construction naterials, will
necessitate a reduction in the investment priority previously accorded to
the nachine building and notal-working sector, where increases in output
cutstripped all others during the 1951-1955 period. The proportion of total
investment devoted to transportation will be approximately the same as under the
Fifth Five-Year Plan, Due to the emphasis on investment toploride in more officient
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functioning of all forms of transport, we believe that the transport require-
ments of the Soviet economy will be not.
42. Labor Force. Because the effect of lowered wartine birth rates will
soon begin to be felt in fewer entrants to the labor force, the USSR can expect
population growth to provide fewer now workers, porhaps three million less,
during the Sixth Plan than during the Fifth. Armed forces reductions of the
size announced, however, would help to eliminate this difference. The increase
in the industrial labor force, which grew by 23 percent during the Fifth Plan,
will fall to perhaps 20 percent in the Sixth.
43. Productivity. Despite probable increases in the labor force
resulting from a reduction in the strongth of the armed forces, productivity
per worker will have to rise faster in the now plan than in the old if output
targets are to be not and shorter working hours granted. Although the USSR
*
The Sixth Five-Year Plan provides for an increase of only 10 percent
in the industrial labor force. Planned increases in the industrial labor
force appear to be customarily kept low in anticipation of gains in
productivity to be made. When these gains do not matorialize, labor
shortages are then relieved by above-plan allocations of labor. Thus,
though the Fifth Plan also called for only a 10 percent increase, in
fact some 1.5 million above-plan workers were assigned to industry during
the course of the plan. These were drawn largely from the collective
farms. Agriculture's higher priority probably will not permit similar
transfers during the Sixth Plan, ut armed force reductions would serve
as another source of industrial labor.
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recognizes that worker incentives influence productivity, immediate hopes
are placed upon supplying the labor force with a larger volume of modern
equipment. This policy is reflected in the investment program, which calls
for greater increases in expenditures for new capital equipment than in
expenditures for the construction of now plants, though the latter will still
absorb the najor share of investment funds. A considerable share of this
capital equipment will he used to replace obsolescent nachinery in existing
plants at a much more rapid rate than heretofore.
44. Just as Soviet pricrities have produced an economic structure
which appears lopsided in contrast with consumer-orientod economics, so they
have produced a pattern of technological progress which has been quite uneven
in comparison to that of Western nations. Military production has received
the most intensive dovelopment, and defense and defonso-rolated industries
have reached relatively advanced tochnological levels. In the making of
ordinary stools, the best Soviet plants are fully comparable to US plants,
although the industry as a whole is not. In metalcutting processes,
: .11
the USSR is on a par with or not far bohind the US in machinory dosign and process
nechanization, but it has only just begun the application of automated control
systems. Production processes are less advanced in netalforming machinory,
electric power generation, coal nining, and the chemicals industry; and they
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lag badly in the low-priority consumer industries. On an over-all basis, the
USSR's smaller quantity of modern equipment and lower level of technology are
probably the najor factors accounting for a labor productivity in heavy in-
dustry which is less than half that of the US.
45. This lag is also a rough measure of the USSR's potential for incroasing
industrial productivity. The Sixth Five Year Plan calls for a 50 percent
increase in productivity. However the government has since pronised a
reduction in working hours which would require a 71 percent incroase in pro-
ductivity per man-hour if this goal is to be reached. This we doubt can
e achieved, but we estimate that productivity will increase during the Sixth
Fivo-Yoar Plan more than the 44 percent which we ostimato was achieved during
the Fifth. Productivity gains will result chiefly from modernization of
plants and from introduction of advanced domestic and foreign technology.
The intensive efforts to improve planning, restore order to the wage system,
and raise efficiency through greater plant spocialization and better inter-
plant cooperation -- problems which have received little attention in the past--
are intended to accomplish a comprehensive referm of Soviet industry and to
make an important contribution to productivity. Enlargement of the area of
managerial initiative may also contributo to this result. On the other hand,
a more active party role in the operation of industry may limit the importance
of this factor.
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46. In summary, we believe that the USSR will meet its announced 1960
targets for total industrial output and for most important heavy industrial
commodities. Sufficient above-plan workers will probably be available to
compens, to for any failures to meet productivity goals, and the transition
to a 41-hour work week could be slowed down if necessary. Major shortfalls
are expected only in some branches of light industry, where plan fulfillment
will be prevented by insufficient supplies of agricultural raw matorials.
47. Regional Distribution of Industry. Soviet industry will probably
undergo a regional shift of considerable importance during the Sixth Five-
Year Plan, although the bulk will still be located in European Russia and
the Urals. About half of the new capital investment in 1956-1960 is scheduled
to occur in the Urals and eastward, and by 1961 this area is to produce more
iron and steel than did the entire USSR in 1950 and more electric power and
cement than did the whole country in 1954. (see Figure 3) A large share
of the new plants built in the next five years are to be located in this region,
leaving industry in European USSR to rely heavily on re-cquipment of existing
plants and other improvements in achieving planned increases in production.
The construction of new rail lines will also be concentrated east of the
Urals.
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48. The development of this rogion is based upon the harnessing of
the Siberian rivers with hydroelectric stations at Irkutsk, Novosibirsk,
and Bratsk, the exploitation of large iron and coal reserves, and develop-
ment of the large but mainly low-grade deposits of non-ferrous metals in
Kazakhstan. Movement to the interior may be in part intend ed to reduce the
stratogic vulnerability of Soviet industry, but considerations of future
economic growth are probably of greater importance, since tho little-developed
resources of this area offer greater long-run potential than further develop-
ment of the maturer regions of the European USSR.*
*
The rerresentative for the Director of Intelligence, USAF, reserves his
position on this sontonce.
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TABLE I
ESTIMATED OUTPUT OF SELECTED INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
USSR 1950, 1955 and 1961:
US 1955
1950
1955
1961*
USSR
USSR
US
USSR
Electric Power (billion kwh)
90
170
655
363
Crude Petroleum (million tons)
38
71
335
150
Coal (million tons)
261
391
450
633
Crude Steel (million tons)
27
45
106
68
Refined Copper (thousand tons)
302
462
1,052
746
Aluminum (thousand tons)
210
588
1,497
1,240
Cement (million tons)
10
22
51
63
Machine Tools (thousand units)
79
105
80**
200
Freight Cars (thousand 2-axle
equivalent units)
85
69
71
100
Trucke (thousand units)
294
329
1,190
447
Synthetic Ammonia (thousand tons) ***
520
753
2,859
1,596
Cotton Fabrics (million meters)
3,900
5,904
8,950
7,500
Econ
Tble
Washing Machines (thousand units)
0.3
87
4,237
616
Meat (thousand tons, slaughter wgt.) 3,075
4,000
12,241
5,200
*
The 1961 estimates, except in the case of meat, are a one-year pro-
jection from the official 1960 targets, which we estimate will be
substantially achieved.
**
US production of machine tools, which are generally more complex
types than those of the USSR, fluctuates considerably from year to
year. The recent high was 110,000 units in 1952 and the peak output
was 307,000 units in 1942. Moreover, the propertion of heavy, complex
Used mostly for nitrogenous fertilizer.
****
The representative for the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The
is higher in U.S.
as pinpose tooks
Joint Staff, reserves his position on the inclusion of this item
in the table.
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DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET AGRICULTURE
49. Soviet agriculture in 1955 showed the first significant response
to the multiple programs for expanding output which were launched in the
preceding two years. Good yields were obtained in the Ukraine, and gains
resulting from a large expansion of acrenge in the New Lands area were
only partially offset by drought. These circumstances, in conjunction
with the corn program, raised grain and fodder production by about 15 per-
cent over 1954. Potato output declined, however, and technical crops
showed a mixed pattern, sugar beets and flax expanding rapidly but cotton
production falling. Livestock numbers increased only slowly and meat
production grow scarcely at all, but improved fodder supplies contri-
buted to an increase of about 10 percent in milk production.
50. Further growth in agricultural output will almost certainly
result from the higher priority accorded to agriculture since 1953 and
projected forward in the Sixth Five-Year Plan. State investment in this
sector during 1956-1960 is planned at twice the amount invested in 1951-
1955 and will require 12 percent of total state investments as against
only eight percent in 1952. Further adjustments in prices paid to
collective farms and farmers appear to be in prospect in the continuing
effort to provide the incentives which previous policies had neglected.
In contrast to the period 1928-1952, when agriculture was called upon
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to provide a continual flow of workers to industry, agriculture will receive
labor from the urban areas or at least hold its own. Most important of all,
solution of agricultural problems has been defined as the major task of
the party menbership.
51. Through local recruiting and transfers from urban areas, the
party has built up its rural strength from 1.7 million members in 1947 to
over three million in 1956. This reinforcement has groatly increased the
leadership's ability to execute its programs and may permit greater
flexibility in adapting these programs to local conditions, a notably weak
point in earlier agricultural campaigns. It has also made more fensible
a resumption of the drive against private farming, evidenced in higher
requirements for participation in communal labor and a decree "recommend-
ing" that collectives "voluntarily" reduce the private plots and livestock
holdings of their members. In contrast to Stalin's crude attacks, the
present campaign is lubricated by higher incontives for cormunal work and
is based on thorough political preparations. If it remains gradual, state
controls over agriculture will probably become more effective, but any
sudden acceleration runs the danger of provoking peasant resistance and a
decline in output. The key question in this program is whether the now
incentive reasures will elicit sufficient confidence among the peasants
to induce then to regard the collective farm rather than their private
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holdings as the means to a tolerable and improving standard of living. A
further pressure on the private sector is reflected in programs to increase
state farm output, particularly of connodities competitive with those sold
by individual pensants in the free market.
52. Prodiction is particularly hazardous in Soviet agriculture, but
an increase of about one-fourth in the total value of farm output appears
likely over the period 1955-1961 principally because of an increase in
quality products, such as meat, milk, and fibers. This rate of growth
is about double that achieved during the Fifth Five-Yoar Plan but far
below the Sixth's official target of 70 percent. Our estimate allows
some success to the New Lands and carn programs, despite climatic dangers
and high costs. Although some further acreage expansions can be expected,
nost of the gains in grain production will cone from the improved yields
which should result from a greater than twe-fold increase in the combine
park for small grains and, in the case of corn, from the use of hybrid
seeds, further machinery supplies, and an accumulation of experience. We
estimate that grain output in 1961 will probably be about 116 million tons
against an estimated 1955 harvest of 100 million tons and an official 1960
target of 180 rillion.
53. Because current Soviet agricultural policy focuses upon higher
outputs of livestock products, two-thirds of this increase will be in
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fodder grains, in which unripened corn harvested early in climatically in-
hospitable areas will play a major role. This program has already produced
good results in the higher nilk yields of COWS wintered on this feed in
1955-1956. Increases of 25-30 percent in meat and milk production over
the period 1955-1961 are expected to result primarily from higher pro-
ductivity per animal rather than from larger hords, although swine numbers
probably will grow significantly since they do not compete seriously with
cattle for the limited meadow and pasture areas. These increases, while
far below the official 1960 targets for a Coubling of production, will
nevertholess represent important gains.
DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVYET CONSUMPTION
54. Soviet per capita consumption rose at an average rate of about
5 percent per year during the Fifth Five-Year Plan and is expected to rise
at about 4 percent per year during the Sixth, raising the living standard
by over one quarter between 1955 and 1961. This is an appreciable improve-
ment in material welfare, even though part of it is more apparent than
real, reflecting meroly the shift, associated with urbanization, from the
consumption of goods made at home to purchase in the market. Although
this living standard will still be low by Western criteria, it probably
will not be a cause of serious dissatisfaction, since the Soviet citizen
will almost certainly continue to experience steady annual improverents
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in material welfare. Neither will Soviet living standards appear as a
mark against the Soviet system in the eyes of most Asians, Middle
Easterners, and Africans, accustomed to much lower per capita levels
of consumption.
55. The estimated gains in agricultural output will be the major
factor in improving the living standard since agriculture provides the
basis for about three-quarters of Soviet consumption. Per capita
supplies of food and clothing in 1961 are expected to be 24 and 43
percent, respectively, above 1955 levels.* The expansion of durable
consumer goods output will exceed these rates. However, production will
fall off from the high rates of 1953-1955, total output will be modest,
and these goods will remain available only to upper-income groups.
Historically, consumer goods production
has suffered whenever
industry has run short of resources, producer goods having a higher
priority. An important improvement will occur in urban housing,
where the very limited per capita space will rise by roughly one-quarter.
56. In the distribution of personal income, the higher agricultural
prices paid since 1953 have narrowed somewhat the gap between rural and
urban incomes and will continue to do so during the coming five years.
* The rise in the value of per capita consumption of agricultural
products will run ahead of the increase in total agricultural output
because of increases in the value added by processing and packaging.
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The lowest pension and W ge rates are to be raised, and higher pension
rates are to be cut. hese measures will tend to reduce somewhat the
extreme class differentiations which Stalin's economic and social
policies had produced.
DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE
57. The expansion of Soviet foreign trade, which has been fairly
rapid in recent years, leveled off in 1955 at about $6.3 billion dollars,
due primarily to the fact that trade with Sino-Soviet Bloc partners,
which accounts for about four-fifths of the total, remained virturally
unchanged. (See Table II) New increases in trade within the Bloc are
expected to result from Communist China's continuing need for Soviet
assistance in its industrialization program and the increasing coordination
of the Soviet and East European Satellite economies.
TABLE II
INDEX OF VOLUME OF SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE
(1951 is 100)
Year
Bloc
Non-Bloc
Total
1948
38
146
59
1949
55
110
66
1950
89
81
88
1951
100
100
100
1952
117
114
117
1953
141
120
136
1954
146
166
150
1955
148
172
152
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58. In its trade with the Free World in 1955, the USSR substantially
increased its exports as compared with 1954 and reduced its imports,
notably of foodstuffs, thus converting a deficit into a rough balance of
trade. Western Europe's share of Soviet trade with the Free World rose
slightly to over four-fifths. The share of manufactured goods in Soviet
exports continued to increase, and while the USSR remains a large net
importer of capital goods in its Free World trade, its own capital exports
are rising. We estimate that Soviet trade withnon Bloc countries will rise
during the next five years, with developed countries continuing to account
for the major share.
59. The most important development in Soviet foreign economic
relations in 1955 was the rapid acceleration of the USSR's compaign to
establish the claim that it can be a major source of economic assistance
to underdeveloped countries, although the volume of trade with these
countries does not yet loom large in total Soviet trade, The most
dramatic feature of this campaign, in which Communist China and the
European Satellites are also participating, is Bloc offers of capital
equipment, military goods, and related technical services. These offers
include deferred payment at low interest rates, frequently in local
currencies or exportable surpluses which the underdeveloped countries
find unsalable in other markets at satisfactory prices. Bloc offers of
medium and long-term credit now exceed one billion dollars, and credit
agreements tobaling more than $800 million have been reached with
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12 countries, including Yugoslavia ($299 million), India ($158 million),
Egypt ($175 million), and Afghanistan ($122 million).
60. During the coming five years, Soviet trade with underdeveloped
countries will probably exceed the 1955 level of about $200 million by
several times, with a substantial share financed by credit. In the 1930s
the USSR, seeking to industrialize rapidly, exchanged its low-cost
foodstuffs and raw materials for capital equipment from Western Europe
and the US. A quarter century of industrial growth, agricultural neglect,
and exploitation of the most high grade and accessible raw materials
has so reduced the cost of manufactured goods relative to those of food
and raw materials in the Soviet Union that it is now economically profitable
to export capital equipment in return for the food and raw materials of
other countries now seeking to industrialize. In addition to economic
considerations, this stage of development coincides with a period in
which the USSR can also profit politically from such trade. In addition
to cost considerations, the USSR's success in industrial development as
against its poorer agricultural record and prospects provides further
motivation for this kind of trade policy.
61. Soviet economic capabilities are adequate to support a consider-
able expansion of Soviet trade and credit programs with underdeveloped
countries in the next several years
* The representative for the Deputy Director for Intelligence, the Joint
Staff, wishes to change "Considerable to "some" and to add: "despite the
demands of Bloc programs of forced industrialization."
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Soviet shipments of capital goods and arms to all countries have more than
doubled since 1950. Credit extensions by the USSR to non-Bloc countries
amount at present to less than $500 million, or about one-third of one
percent of Soviet GNP. The USSR has a capability for expanding exports
of capital goods which is large relative to the probable requirements of
these countries, and the estimated 80 percent increase in production of
machinery and equipment during the Sixth Five-Year Plan will further
increase this capability. In addition, central planning and a state
monopoly of trade provide the USSR with an advantage over capitalist
countries in the coordination of internal and external policies, giving
it great freedom in directing its foreign trade for maximum political
as well as economic advantage
62. While past pdicy has severely limited foreign trade, historic
Soviet fears of losing economic independence through reliance on foreign
sources appear to have been reduced by the strength of the Soviet economy
and by the creation of the Bloc market. The Soviet leaders apparently
realize that a marginal degree of reliance upon non-Bloc sources of supply,
especially products of advanced technology for certain foods, and for some
raw materials, is preferable to a more rigid policy of atarky , since it
offers the promise of more rapid rates of economic growth. In addition,
* The representative for the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, reserves his opinion on this sentence.
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they see opportunities in such trade programs for promoting neutralism
in the underdeveloped countries and encouraging political attitudes
favorable to the USSR and its economic achievements under Communism.
The future size of the trade and credit program with underdeveloped
countries is likely to depend as much on conditions in and the policies of
these countries as on Soviet willingness and ability to expand these
exchanges. (For more detailed assessment, see NIE 100-3-56, especially
paragraphs 23-35.)
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3658
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
27 June 1956
MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: NIE 11-4-56: SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND COURSES OF ACTION
(Part IV)
The attached part of the draft estimate has been approved
by the Board of National Estimates pursuant to a consideration of it
by the IAC representatives.
William P. Bundy
WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates
Distribution "A"
DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC reinew
SECRET
By Lis NLE 5/14/02 Date
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NIE 11-4-56
IV. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS*
Scientific Resources and Policy
IV
S&T
63. Soviet scientific and technical capabilities continue to
expand rapidly. Although total Soviet scientific resources remain
smaller than those of the US, and assets of the Sino-Soviet Bloc far
smaller than those of the West, the USSR has been able to achieve near
parity with the US in areas of critical military and industrial
significance. By increasing the emphasis on science and technology
and by controlling the allocation of scientific manpower and facilities,
the Soviet regime has developed from a small original base augmented by
past exploitation of Western science enough competence to provide expert
scientific support for priority military and economic programs.
64. Trained Manpower: We estimate that the USSR as of mid-1956
has about 1,690,000 graduates of scientific and technical curricula
given at the university level; about 915,000 of these are post-World
War II graduates. The number of these graduates actually employed in
* NIE 11-6-56, "Capabilities and Trends in Soviet Science and
Technology" is scheduled for early publication.
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC review
By His NLE 5/14/02 Date
SECRET
scientific and technical fields in the USSR (1,360,000) compares
closely with that in the US. However, the USSR is now graduating
substantially more trained scientists and engineers annually than the
US. If present trends continue, by mid-1961 the USSR will have more
graduates employed in scientific and technical fields than the US and
about 60 percent more in physical sciences and engineering.
65. In the postwar period the quality of Soviet scientific training
has been generally good and has approached and in some cases surpassed
US levels. However, the number engaged in research and teaching in the
physical sciences and engineering is substantially smaller in the USSR
than in the US.2/ Moreover, the practical and experimental aspects of
engineering training have been traditionally weak, although efforts are
being made to overcome this. Weaknesses in scientific training will not,
however, affect Soviet ability to achieve technological objectives to
which priority is attached.
1/ Numerical estimates of Soviet scientific personnel are believed to
be correct within plus or minus 10 percent. For detailed comparison
of USSR and US scientific personnel, see graphics on following page.
2/ See the category "Scientific Workers" in the graphics on the following
page.
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66. Scientific Facilities: Financial support, organizational
direction, and the quality of laboratories are generally adequate for
the effective utilization of scientific talent. Although complex
research instruments are probably in shorter supply than in the US or
UK, we believe that present Soviet research and development programs of
major importance are hampered only slightly by shortages or non-availability
of scientific instruments and equipment. On the other hand, programs
of lower priority are probably hampered to a greater extent. We
believe that by 1961 the USSR will have made further substantial progress
in research and development in electronics, which is basic to instrumen-
tation, and will have achieved near equality with the US in research
instrumente.
67. Basic Research: The quality of Soviet basic research in most
fields of mathematics is believed about equal
and physics, in and fields chemistry of
to that of the US. New evidence indicates striking progress over the
past few years in such important fields as nuclear physics, geophysics,
high-speed digital computors, high-temperature alloys, and the theory
of automation. Further progress is likely in these fields; for example,
it appears likely that by 1961 the USSR will have achieved near equality
with the United States in nuclear physics.
The representative of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The
Joint Staff, reserves his position on this sentence.
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68. Ideological obstacles to scientific research and development --
never of importance in the major industrial or war-supporting fields --
will probably diminish in consequence of the repudiation of both past
doctrinal rigidity and an outwardly contemptuous attitude towards Western
technology. Recognition of their retarding effects in certain phases of
biological and agricultural sciences was implicit in the recent demotion
of Lysenko and in Soviet purchases of US hybrid corn. Weakness in these
fields (and in agricultural machinery) were probably caused, however,
more by official emphasis on other areas of research and development
than by ideological restraints, and will probably be partly remedied
by 1961. Agricultural research is now more intelligently directed than
in the past toward solving the essential problems of increasing per
acre crop yields and livestock production. There is an evident
intention to profit from US experience in such fields of current Soviet
emphasis as mineral fertilizers, chemicals to control crop and livestock
pests, and crop breeding.
69. The Satellite scientific contribution to Soviet technological
development is largely in optics, electronics, communication equipment,
synthetic fibers, and pharmaceuticals. Its relative importance will
probably diminish during the next five years because of increasing
Soviet capabilities in these fields.
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70. Nonprofessional technicians: The USSR is not as well supplied
with technicians, mechanics, and maintenance men as are the Western
industrial countries, where broader sections of the population have
acquired mechanical skills over a longer period. Standards of maintenance
are also generally lower than in these countries. However, Soviet engineers
have partly compensated for these deficiencies by building machines and
equipment which are simple in design and easy to maintain and repair.
Considerable progress has been made during the last decade in increasing
the supply of nonprofessional technical personnel, and the present emphasis
on specialized training after lower school should significantly increase
the number available by 1961. The 10-year lower school program of the
USSR, which is gradually replacing the former seven-year curriculum, also
includes a high proportion of scientific and technical subjects of use
in training nonprofessional technicians.
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SEGRET
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS
OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE
71. Soviet technology in heavy industry has demonstrated a famili-
arity with the most advanced skills and a capability for adapting and
introducing modern techniques, whether self-developed or borrowed,
into their rapidly expanding industrial base. However, Soviet practices
were initially backward, and the introduction of new techniques has
often been slowed by reluctance to replace obsolete but still workable
equipment. Thus, while the best Soviet practices in many industries
can be generally considered equivalent to those of the West, the average
level of Soviet practices still lags considerably behind that of the
West.
72. The USSR plans to increase greatly the emphasis on automation
in industrial technology during the current five year plan although
progress in this sphere will probably be less than in simple mechaniza-
tion and re-equipment. In the technology of chemical production the
USSR generally lags well behind US practice, but the USSR is now
making a major effort to develop new techniques in petrochemistry.
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In the metals industry, advances in rolling and finishing technology
have lagged badly behind advances in most other divisions, although
further progress is likely during the period of this estimate. Soviet
ability to design metal-cutting machinery is believed to be comparable
to that of the US, and with respect to ceramic tools for high-speed
cutting the USSR is superior to the US.
73. Soviet medical science is generally advanced, but behind that
of the major Western countries in some areas of basic microbiological
research. Clinical research and practices are nearly comparable to
Western standards, and Soviet work in biochemistry, hematology, and
physiology has been outstanding. Accomplishments in the latter field
continue to be applied to mental and physical conditioning, and there
has been a partial rehabilitation of the science of psychology from
the rigid doctrinal bonds of the Stalin era.
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE
74. The USSR almost certainly has the scientific and technologi-
cal capability necessary to develop weapons and military equipment
which are generally equal to, and sometimes better than, those of
other nations. Though the USSR probably cannot carry out parallel
programs simultaneously in all fields, its scientific resources are
7
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adequate to press vigorously programs in a variety of priority areas.
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TS #102440-0
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR PARAGRAPHS FOR NIE 11-4-56
75
1/
71. Nuclear Weapons. As a result of new evidence we have
revised upward by a factor of about four our previous estimates of
past and future Soviet production of U-235. The element of uncertainty
in our current estimate of past production is very large, but the error
2/3/
probably does not exceed plus or minus 50 percent.
Our estimate of
future U-235 production is subject to further variables, such production
IV
Para
being dependent primarily on Soviet plans and decisions and is therefore
75
less reliable than the estimate of 1956 cumulative production.
71a 76 A highly significant development during the past year was the
airburst on 22 November 1955 of a thermonuclear weapon which yielded about
1.6 megatons. This test, together with the above revision in our
Nuclea
1/ See NIE 11-2-56, The Soviet Atomic Energy Program,
8 June 1956 (RESTRICTED DATA) for fuller details and dissents.
2/ The Director of Naval Intelligence believes these estimates of
U-235 production to be too high. He believes that for planning
purposes a more practical magnitude would be in a range below that
of the minus 50 percent lower limit of this estimate.
3/ The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff believes that
the new intelligence does not adequately support the estimate of
U-235 cumulative production. A more practical figure for planning
would be one in the lower range of uncertainty approaching the
minus 50 percent lower limit given for 1955.
TOP SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC virew
By 41b
NLE 5/14/02 Date
TOP SECRET
fissionable materials estimate, leads us to estimate that the USSR now has
a significant multimegaton weapons capability and will have a major capability
in the near future. The USSR could have begun developing an emergency
capability stockpile, and have perhaps as many as 75 weapons of the 22
November 1955 type by 1 July 1956 if it did not encounter fabrication
difficulties. About this time, it could be in full-scale production SC
that it could have converted a major portion of its U-235 stockpile by
about 1 January 1957.
77 71b The USSR is now capable of increasing the yield of the 22
November 1955 type weapons to about 10 MT by further developmental
advances. Future developments will probably lead to increasing the
nuclear efficiency, yields, and deliverability of high yield weapons.
We estimate that prototypes of high yield missile warheads (though
with yields substantially smaller than 10 MT) will be tested by 1957-1958.
71c. 78 Soviet interest in low-yield, small dimension weapons is
well established by Soviet their military doctrine and by the large proportion
of low-yield weapons or devices detonated in the test series of 1953-
1956. It is estimated that the USSR now has a small diameter warhead
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using an implosion system of relatively low efficiency, with yields
in the range from 10 kilotons to less than one kiloton. Improved
efficiencies, which will permit more widespread use for air defense, are
expected by 1959.
T8a.
71d. The Soviets conducted their first underwater atomic test
near Novaya Zemlya on 21 September 1955, which opens new vistas
into the development of atomic weapons for a variety of naval uses,
resulting in a significant increase in the over-all Soviet nuclear
warfare capability.
T8F
71e. Available evidence indicates that the USSR is presently
stockpiling and will continue to stockpile a versatile family of
nuclear weapons, ranging from very low yield warheads to high yield
thermonuclear weapons. We cannot determine with any degree of
certainty the probable number of nuclear weapons of each type since
this will depend on strategic and other factors. However, in order
to provide an appreciation of Soviet stockpile capabilities a few
arbitrary illustrative stockpiles under varying strategic assumptions
are given below. It is emphasized that these are purely illustrative,
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as the Soviets can utilize their fissionable material in any nubber of
weapons combinations.
Arbitrary Examples of Soviet Stockpile Allocations as of Mid-1956.
(1) Assuming overriding priority to high yield weapons for attack
on allied retaliatory strength and relatively less emphasis on various
types of medium and low yield weapons:
High Yield (200kt to 10 MT)
475
Medium Yield (5 to 70kt)
570
Low Yield (.5 to 20kt)
100
(2) Assuming roughly equal priority to high yield and to various
types of medium and low yield weapons:
High Yield (200kt to 10 MT)
275
Medium Yield (5 to 70kt)
510
Low Yield (.5 to 20kt)
495
For analysis of these various alternatives and the reasoning behind
them, as well as for methods of calculating other alternative stock-
piles, see NIE 11-2-56. It should also be noted that the dissents of
the Director of Naval Intelligence and the Deputy Director, Joint
Staff also apply to these stockpile quantities.
5/ By this date only 75 could be weapons of the 22 November 1955 type.
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Arbitrary Examples of Soviet Stockpile Allocations as of Mid-1961.
(1) Assuming close to maximum emphasis on high yield weapons;
limited requirement for medium yield; considerable requirement for low
yield weapons, primarily for air defense.
High Yield (500kt to 20 MT)
1,750
Medium Yield (5 to 70kt)
745
Low Yield (.5 to 4 kt)
2,900
(2) Assuming roughly equal priority to high, medium and low yield
weapons, the latter primarily for air defense.
High Yield (500kt to 20 MT)
1,050
Medium Yield (5 to 70kt)
2,650
Low Yield (.5 to 4kt)
2,700
78c. 71f. Nuclear Power.
The Soviets have displayed considerable
progress in nuclear electric power reactor development. We estimate
they are capable of meeting the ambitious goals of the Sixth Five
Year Plan for 2000-2500 MW of installed capacity by the end of 1960,
but this achievement will require a very high priority effort.
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78d 71g. Nuclear Propulsion. The state of Soviet reactor technology
also indicates that the USSR is capable of developing propulsion
applications. We estimate it could produce a reactor suitable for
submarine or surface ship application by 1956-1957. The Soviet
aircraft propulsion program probably will not progress beyond the research
phase prior to 1958.
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programs simultaneously in all fields, its scientific resources are
adequate to press vigorously programs in a variety of priority areas.
78. Nuclear Weapons. (to be added) See tab "Nuclear"
for paras75-78d
79. Guided Missiles.* We believe that the strategic requirements
of the USSR have dictated a major effort in the field of guided missiles.
From the evidence of a large number of personalities and activities
associated with missile development, recent statements of Soviet
leaders observed air defense sites around Moscow, and other material,
we have concluded that the USSR is engaged in an extensive guided
missile program on a high priority. The USSR has an adequate economic
base for a sizeable production program; and we are convinced -- from
our knowledge of Soviet exploitation of German missile experience
and evidence of Soviet capabilities in related fields was that the USSR
has the basic scientific and technical capability to support a compre-
hensive research and development program. We believe that the USSR now
has surface-to-air guided missiles in at least limited operational
status, and could have guided missiles in limited operational status in
**
For fuller discussion of Soviet guided missiles, including estimates
of the dates when various types of missiles might appear in oper-
ational use, see NIE 11-12-55, "Soviet Guided Missile Capabilities
and Probable Programs," published 20 December 1955. This will be
superseded by NIE 11-5-56, "Soviet Guided Missile Capabilities and
Probable Program," to be published in October 1956.
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the other three categories (air-to-surface, air-to-air, and surface-to-
surface). Soviet missile capabilities will continue to grow during
the period of this estimate. However, we have little firm information
on the specific characteristics of the missile models the USSR is
presently developing, or may how have in operational use.*
80. Electronics. The magnitude, diversity, and past success of
the Soviet research and development program in electronics indicate
the probable development of new and improved electronic devices during
the period of this estimate. Soviet air defense capabilities will
probably be enhanced by continuing improvements in detection, warning,
interception, and data-handling equipment. Air offensive capabilities
are likely to be improved by an increase in accuracy of Soviet
navigational equipment and bombing radars, which will probably be
comparable in performance to Western equipment. Soviet research on
communication theory will probably result in improvements in communication
techniques, radar, computers, automatic guidance devices, and telemetering,
and could lead over the next five years to development of a communication
network exceedingly difficult to intercept or jam.
*
For estimates of the capabilities of Soviet forces to employ guided
missiles, see Section VI.
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a. Early Warning Radar (EW). -- The USSR has a large variety of
EW radars in use, including World War II sets, native sets based on
Western designs, and sets of purely native design. Most of the older
sets will probably be replaced by the end of 1956. Soviet radar coverage
is estimated to be fairly reliable against jet medium bombers at maximum
ranges from 125 miles (up to 60,000 feet altitude) to 180 miles (up to
45,000 feet altitude). By 1958 the USSR will probably have developed
one or more EW radars capable of detecting jet medium bombers at
65,000 feet up to a distance of about 200 miles, or under certain
circumstances to as much as 300. The problem of low altitude coverage
will still exist, but probably will be greatly lessened by the use of
moving target indicators and gap-filler radars.
b. Ground-Control Intercept Radar (GCI). -- We estimate that
by 1958 the USSR will have GCI radars of new types as well as the
following types now in use: (1) the V-beam sets presently in use, which
are probably capable of coverage on jet medium bombers at meximum reliable
ranges of 75-110 nautical miles, and (2) the paired paried combinations of
long-range azimuth indicating sets (GAGE) and height indicating sets
(PATTY CAKE), which collectively can provide GCI data. We believe that
by 1961 GCI coverage will be increased to the order of 200 miles and
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perhaps beyond. Ranges of this sort would require the use of transponder
By 1959,
beacons not now known to be installed in interceptor aircraft. Reliable
will be achieved
altitude coverage/up to a maximum of 60,000 feet, will be achieved by
at
1959, though less than maximum ranges.
C. Airborne Intercept Radar (AI). Airborne intercept radar is now
in extensive use. The best equipment expected to be available during
the next five years may have maximum ranges against medium bombers of
about 30 nautical miles for search and 20 for tracking, with range
accuracy of plus or minus 25 yards and angular accuracy of plus or minus
one degree. The best of the equipment currently available may approxi-
mate this performance.
d. Blind Bombing and Navigational Radar. -- The USSR has
operational an X-band (three centimeter) set, which will probably be
improved. By the end of 1957 we estimate that the best Soviet blind
bombing and navigational radar will be capable of operating at altitudes
up to 60,000 feet, and will have a range of about 125 nautical miles
for navigation. Bombing and navigation accuracies will be about
equivalent to those of Western equipment. The use of frequencies higher
than X-band is unlikely for the present, but may be achieved by mid-1960.
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e, Fire Control Radar. -- The WHIFF radar, the Soviet version
of the SCR-584, will continue to be used in quantity, and a new set,
FIRE CAN, is coming into quantity use. Radar sets with even greater
accuracies, range definitions, and reduced vulnerability to jamming
might appear at any time. The X-band will probably be used for newly
developed fire control radars.
f. Electromagnetic Warfare. -- The USSR presently has the capa-
bility of seriously disrupting Western long-range radio communications
and electronic navigational systems. Capabilities in related electronic
fields indicate that the USSR is probably capable of electronic
jamming at frequencies through 12,000 megacycles, and possibly considerably
higher. By 1960 the USSR may have jamming equipment in operational
use in frequency ranges through 30,000 megacycles. Evidence indicates
that the USSR is now training in the use of CHAFF.
g. Microwave Communications. -- Microwave communication equipment
is in wide use in East Germany, and we believe that existing fixed net-
works in the Soviet Union and some other Bloc areas are expanding. A
recent marked decrease in Soviet orders for microwave relay sets from the
Satellites probably indicates that Soviet expansion of microwave communica-
tions will be accomplished largely with Soviet equipment. By 1960, the
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estimated minimum channel capacity for long distance civil circuits will
be 24, and the equipment will be suitable for relaying a signal many
times without serious degradation. Soviet research in semiconductors
indicates that by 1960 transistors will be used extensively in communica-
tion equipment, which will thus be much lighter and less power-consuming
than present-day counterparts.
81. Biological Warfare. The USSR has the technical knowledge,
trained personnel, and facilities necessary for conducting an extensive
program in BW research and development. Accumulated evidence indicates
that the USSR is almost certainly engaged in such a program, probably
including antipersonnel, antilivestock, and possibly anticrop agents.
The scope and magnitude of the program cannot be judged from the informa-
tion available, but the organisms of at least four human diseases
(anthrax, tuleremia, plague, and brucellosis) and two animal diseases
(foot-mouth and rinderpest) are believed to have been investigated as
BW agents.
82. The USSR also has the facilities, personnel, and materials
needed for the large-scale production of BW agents, although we have
no evidence of such production at present. We believe that they have a
current capability for clandestine BW operations against personnel,
livestock, and certain crops, and a BW defensive capability generally
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comparable with that of Western countries. Soviet capabilities for
clandestine and possibly for overt employment of BW agents will probably
continue to be expanded, and defensive capabilities improved.
83. Chemical Warfare. During World War II, the USSR produced
most of the standard chemical agents and auxiliary equipment for
chemical warfare. The USSR is believed to have maintained some of
its wartime toxic munitions stockpiles and continued some peacetime
production of toxic CW agents. While present production figures
are not known, the USSR has the materials and skills available to
produce some 40,000 to 60,000 tons of toxic agents per year. These
agents would consist primarily of mustard gas and such nerve gases as
GA (Tabun) and, in small quantity, GB (Sarin). Soviet CW armament
reserves are believed sufficient to sustain large-scale operations for
several months. Soviet defensive capabilities are believed comparable
to those of Western countries. During the period of this estimate, the
USSR will probably conduct research on new types of toxic agents, including
the "V" agents and possibly certain psychogenic agents.
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#102440-q
CENTRAL INTEELIGENCE AGENCY
24 July 1956
MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
SUBJECT:
NIE 11-4-56: SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND COURSES OF ACTION
(Parts V & VI)
The attached parts of the draft estimate have been approved by
the Board of National Estimates pursuant to a consideration of them by
the IAC representatives.
hölbaw Buily
WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates
Distribution "A"
DECLASSIFIED
Authority
RAC leinew
By Lis NLE 5/14/02 Date
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