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Report to the National Security Council by Project Solarium Task Force A - Part 7 of 7
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Report to the National Security Council by Project Solarium Task Force A - Part 7 of 7
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D4. THE MIDDLE EAST
1. Task Force A is impressed with the long term importance of creating
stability and moderate indigenous power in the strategically important
Middle East, but is able to comment only generally as to what may be done.
We have studied existing policy with respect to the Middle East and the
conditions which exist in the area and see, as included among the principal
complicating factors, these points:
a. The rapid breakdown of the nomadic or primitive feudal social
organization in the Arab countries before there has been developed a
responsible middle class capable of supporting any modern form of government
other than the authoritarian.
b. The implacable enmity between the Arabs and Israel, and the
widespread belief among the Arabs that the United States and United Kingdom
are responsible for the formation of modern Israel in disregard of the rights
of Palestinian Arabs and the security of neighboring Arab states.
c. A marked reduction of British prestige and strength in the area,
leaving a vacuum of leadership and power. This 1 SS is very much against the
security interest of the United States and the Free World and requires
effective action to stabilize and rebuild.
d. The extreme poverty of the mass of the populations, making the
struggle for bare existence the end-all of their efforts. The meagerness of
their production and consequent inability to find means to purchase consumer
goods makes the prospect of increased economic activity and higher standards
of living a very long term problem indeed.
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2. There are three serious major problems in the area involving high
international tensions and extreme national emotions -- the Arab-Israel,
Anglo-Egyptian, and Anglo-Iranian disputes. The first two of these are not
complicated by the problem of contiguous borders with the Soviet Union and
the possibility of absorption by the Soviets by default of non-Communist
leadership or temporary successes of internal Communist movements. They are
capable of solution in the absence of general war by wise and responsible
treatment. But time is running out in Iran for favorable prospects of
retention of national control by non-Communist regimes. Unless settlement
of the oil problem is quickly reached between Great Britain and Iran and
funds necessary for running the government and maintaining military forces
for internal security are soon provided, an internal political coup,
probably fronted by an extreme nationalist group, but providing dangerous
opportunities for the Communists, is very likely to occur within a year.
3. We have noted the existence of a near-vacuum in power in the Middle
East and the lack of Western forces available for deployment to that area in
the event of emergency. But we see no feasible means of providing adequate
indigenous military forces or of forming cohesive military defenses for the
general area until a favorable climate of intra-area political relations is
established and a considerable degree of Western prestige is regained. When
this is brought about, steps may be undertaken substantially to strengthen
the indigenous forces of the Middle East. Emphasis should be placed upon
Pakistan whose geographical location and excellent soldiery will be most
useful in any plans for the holding of Middle East oil in the event of war.
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Modest improvements can be made in the forces of Iran, Israel and the Arab
States to link Turkey and Pakistan.
4. Task Force A recommends in the face of this situation that U.S.
policy toward the Middle East include the following:
a. A greater content of reserve, impartiality and objectiveness
in our overt dealings with Middle East problems with a clear willingness to
assist where needed and when asked.
b. A greater effectiveness in advancing development, specifically
in the resettlement of the Arab refugees from Palestine, and on the Tigris-
Euphrates project. U.N. agencies, especially the World Bank, should be the
vehicles used, to allay local suspicions of direct American interference.
c. A relaxation of pressures to form the Middle East Defense
Organization until greater political maturity in the area is reached. Some
small arms aid to assist in the creation of forces to maintain internal
order may be provided, but should not be administered by large American
military missions.
d. Continuation of moderate assistance of the Point IV type to
such countries in the area where it can help the slow development of
political maturity and stability.
quote
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PREVENTION OF SOVIET EXPANSION
1. Previously in this report, Task Force A has indicated that it envis-
aged our integrated national strategy for coping with the Soviet threat to
be comprised of policies and courses of action in three major interrelated
and interacting fields. The first two of these fields, that concerning the
United States and that involving the rest of the Free World, have already been
discussed. This and the following section of this report concern themselves
with policies and actions primarily aimed at the Soviet-Communist system
itself.
2. In its broadest sense, the objective of preventing Soviet expansion
is implicit in all of the measures, domestic and foreign, discussed in this
report. The maintenance of the military and economic strength and the free
political institutions of the U.S.; the strengthening of the Free World; the
reduction of Soviet power; and the establishment of international order --
all of these are vital elements in countering one or another of the various
devices by which Soviet power might be expanded.
3. In recent years the U.S. has had to give much attention to the
threat of direct and indirect Soviet military pressure -- Iran, Greece, Berlin,
Korea, Indo-China. Because this form of Soviet threat has thus preoccupied
most of our thoughts and plans, there may now be a tendency to find it the
easiest to visualize and to prepare against. But care must be taken not to
base future plans upon the assumption that the next phase of Soviet policy
will be the same as the last. For the more the U.S. commits itself to
countering one form of Soviet expansion, the greater will be the Kremlin's
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temptation to switch to other forms. We must therefore remain constantly on
guard against the more subtle weapons in the Soviet arsenal -- diplomacy,
economic pressures and inducements, political warfare, Communist "front"
methods, coups d'etat, etc. We must recognize major tactical shifts in
Soviet policy designed to achieve a prolonged relaxation of world tension,
which might vastly enhance the effectiveness of these new weapons. But we
must not confuse such tactical shifts with basic changes in Soviet policy.
4. The threat of local military aggression under Soviet or satellite
direction must also be reckoned with. Taking into account what has been
said earlier regarding the risk of general war, the U.S. must seek to con-
vince the Kremlin that (a) it cannot pursue its aims by local or piecemeal
military aggression without incurring grave risk of general war, and (b) any
such aggression will be likely to meet with swift, sure and successful Free
World counteraction in local situations.
5. Any threat of direct U.S. intervention as a deterrent to Soviet
expansion must be applied with skill and subtlety. In particular, such
threat must not be pressed to the point of (a) persuading the Kremlin that
we plan unprovoked aggression against the Orbit, or that we are pursuing a
course leading to the creation of intolerable dangers to Soviet security;
and (b) persuading our allies and other free nations that our conduct is dan-
gerous and irresponsible. But within these limits it is, we believe, possible
to create in the minds of Soviet leaders an image of U.S. posture and policy
which will discourage Soviet foreign ventures. A number of useful techniques
might be applied to this purpose: carefully planted intelligence information;
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discreet revelations to neutral diplomats; appropriate public or secret com-
mitments guaranteeing the security of certain threatened areas; and appro-
priate official communications to the Soviet Government.
6. The U.S. should be prepared, within the limits of prudent self-
interest, to intervene effectively in such Communist-inspired peripheral wars
and local or internal disturbances as may threaten vital areas of the Free
World, and should achieve and preserve the military flexibility necessary
for this purpose.
7. Our analysis elsewhere in this report has pointed to our estimate
that the courses of action we are recommending should reduce the prospects of
peripheral wars, It also reflects our belief that the locale of most likely
incidence of such war will be in the states bordering on Red China. In the
event that circumstances force the direct participation of the United States
in a future peripheral war we recommend that, having committed U.S. prestige,
the war be pressed wi th all necessary vigor and force to the end that U.S.
prestige emerges enhanced, not diminished, and that major U.S. interests and
objectives are strengthened and won. Once the determinations are made with
respect to the risks of general war involved in the decision to participate
with U.S. military forces, the additional risks attendant upon sound opera-
tional action should not, except in the gravest and most exceptional circum-
stances, deter us from taking the steps necessary to win, and win decisively.
Nothing succeeds like success.
8. The development of indigenous military strength in areas vulnerable
to armed Communist aggression can also do much to check Soviet expansion.
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But in any U.S. undertaking to this end, we must take care to examine each
particular situation to see that the indigenous forces to which we lend sup-
port show promise of remaining under responsible and anti-Communist leadership.
9. More important than any of the foregoing military measures, however,
must be the broader picture of the U.S. and the other free nations presented
by the combination of strong and healthy physical ingredients of power, plus
a clear and unflinching determination to apply this power to the full extent
necessary to counter Communist aggression. We must endeavor to retain such
posture and flexibility as will enable us, where circumstances warrant, to
react swiftly, vigorously and effectively to any form of Soviet or Communist
expansion. We must leave no room for Soviet blackmail, pressures, probes and
possibly disastrous miscalculations.
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F.
REDUCTION OF SOVIET POWER
1. Under the broad objective of reducing Soviet power, stated in
NSC 153/1, lie the dual aims of reducing both the ability and the intent of
the Kremlin to exercise this power so as to threaten Free World security.
While complete success in achieving either of these aims would accomplish
our purpose, we have no assurance that such success can be achieved. We
must therefore pursue both aims simultaneously, and we must try to make them
mutually supporting. We believe that by reducing the Kremlin's capabilities
we will thereby discourage, and bring about a modification of, its aims; and
that by causing a modification cf its aims we will lead it to relax in the
development and exercise of its capabilities.
2. The Soviet Orbit is subject to a number of actual or potential
weaknesses which may be aggravated and exploited by the Free World. The
Soviet system is highly dependent on its rigid, centralized control
machinery. It relies heavily on the elaborate facade of political and
economic progress at home, of enlightened and high-minded policies abroad,
of invincible economic and military power, and of the infallibility of
Communist doctrine and Soviet leadership. The disruption of this control
machinery and the discrediting of the myths out of which this facade is
built may do grave damage to Soviet political capabilities abroad and may
weaken the Soviet system at home. Particular Soviet Bloc vulnerabilities
include the following:
a. Bitter personal and factional rivalries which produce bloody
struggles for power at the top, and deep friction, fear and suspicion
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throughout the lower levels of the government and party bureaucracy;
b. Substantial popular disillusionment and resentment over the
exactions, repressions and personal helplessness and insecurity suffered
by the human cogs in the Soviet machine;
c. Resentment of the rural population over official agricultural
policy;
d. Hostility between minority Soviet nationalities and the Great
Russians;
e. The fear and suspicion aroused by ever-present party and police
surveillance, which tends to stifle initiative and create deep mutual
distrust among virtually all elements of the population;
f. Resentment of the Satellite peoples and leaders over domination
and exploitation by the U.S.S.R., and especially over the severe regimentation
and the heavy economic pressures which Soviet-dictated policies have imposed
on the Satellite populations;
g. The highly centralized nature of official control machinery,
which presents a concentrated target for disruption, which might become a
serious bottleneck in time of major crisis, and which tends to destroy local
incentive and responsibility;
h. The gradual stratification of the Soviet political hierarchy,
which tends to discourage the upward flow of new blood and new ideas and to
isolate the Kremlin from the realities not only of the outside world but of
its own empire;
i. Soviet methods of seizing and maintai ning control over the
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Satellites, exposure of which can serve as a powerful incentive for other
small nations to resist Soviet overtures or Communist penetration;
j. Latent jealousies, rivalries and suspicions between the U.S.S.R.
and Communist China.
3. Task Force A is aware of a number of U.S. plans and programs for
exploiting the foregoing conditions by both overt and covert means. Although
we do not feel competent to discuss these in detail, we believe that, if
shrewdly and subtly carried out, these programs may in time do grave damage
to Soviet power. In doing this, however, we believe that certain basic
realities must be recognized and certain broad principles observed:
a. Successful political warfare and covert operations usually
require many years of organization and preparation. Except in special
circumstances, major victories cannot be won by hasty, improvised or
"one-shot" operations. Moreover, attempts to move too quickly, to commit
personnel and organizations thout sufficient training and preparation, to
seek objectives before the proper conditions have matured, or to win
spectacular tactical victories which do not contribute to long-range
strategic purposes, all are likely to result only in the dissipation of
our resources, the forewarning of our adversaries and the alarming of our
allies.
b. Once we have, through the exercise of the necessary perseverance
and patience, established sound covert facilities the precise timing and
circumstances of their commitment must be calculated with the utmost care.
As suggested above, the Soviet system offers many attractive targets for
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covert operations. But the success of attacks upon these targets is
dependent upon highly flexible and opportunistic tactics which will permit
us swiftly to seize upon any sudden opportunities which may arise.
c. If we are to avoid seriously jeopardizing our operations and
embarrassing our allies, it is essential that our clandestine activities be
cloaked in the utmost secrecy. Disclosure of dramatic and intriguing
aspects of our operations may arouse popular interest within the U.S. but
it will be likely to foredoom to failure our success abroad.
d. In certain types of covert operations, especially those
involving large groups of foreign personnel or emigre organizations, there
is constant danger of security breaches or headstrong ventures which may
gravely discredit U.S. prestige or seriously involve U.S. interests in
explosive situations. Such risks must carefully be guarded against.
e. Certainly one major element in reducing Soviet power concerns
the liberation of the Satellites. In this a number of covert devices might
be employed. But beyond these, emphasis must be given to the broader
objective of convincing Satellite peoples, and certain Satellite leaders,
that if they can break away from Moscow domination they can find a secure
and respected place in the Free World community which will afford them the
full opportunity for pursuing their legitimate national aspirations.
4. Overt and covert political warfare may in time undermine the
effectiveness of Kremlin control over the Soviet Orbit and sap the strength
of the Soviet power machine. It may, in certain circumstances, bring the
liberation of some of the Satellites from Soviet domination. It may place
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severe burdens on the Communist regime in China and perhaps even contribute
to a serious split between Peiping and Moscow. While all of these objectives
are desirable in themselves, and while they probably fully justify the
efforts involved, they should not be pursued without regard for the more
remote, but ultimately the more important, objective of bringing about an
alteration in basic Soviet aims.
5. To achieve this latter objective, the U.S. should seek to convince
the men in the Kremlin of the fallacy of the fundamental concepts upon which
their policies are based, and without which these policies are neither
intelligent nor intelligible. We should try to persuade them, by our words
and our deeds, that their delusions regarding world economic and political
affairs have already led them into absurd follies and will lead them into
personal and national disaster. In particular, we must seek, by carrying
out our own domestic and foreign policy along the lines suggested earlier in
this report, to disprove their beliefs concerning us and to demonstrate that
the world situation in general, and Western civilization in particular, have
not conformed and will not conform to Communist prophecies. We must try to
make them realize that in seeking to undermine and destroy the Free World,
they are in fact steadily incurring burdens and risks which sooner or later
will undermine and destroy Soviet Communism. We must try to stimulate within
their minds a growing and gnawing awareness that the theories which have
enslaved them are not only morally evil, but are historically outmoded,
scientifically unsound, and practically unworkable.
6. On the other hand, we must simultaneously try to persuade the Soviet
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leaders that it is not too late to turn back from their present course. We
must try to convince them that they can still save themselves and such
elements of their material and ideological empire as are consistent with an
international system based on freedom and justice, as contemplated in the
Charter of the U.N. We must impress upon them that we and the rest of the
Free World remain willing to accept them as respected members of an inter-
national community based upon this common denominator.
7. All of this can, of course, be described as a "psychological
warfare" campaign aimed directly at Soviet leaders. But in this, as in any
other such campaign, our deeds will be far more effective than our words.
The aim must be to confront the Kremlin with facts -- which, as Lenin said,
"are stubborn things". In doing so, we must seek to demonstrate beyond
doubt that:
a. Free economic systems can avoid periodic crises, large-scale
unemployment, inequitable living standards, and destructive rivalries; they
can, in fact, provide infinitely greater abundance, stability, national
strength, and human welfare and security than has ever been visualized by
the Marxists or can ever be realized by Communism. And they can and will
devote to their defense whatever economic effort is necessary to insure their
survival and to counter all forms of Soviet aggression.
b. The free nations can avoid "imperialist" conflict and "colonial"
expansion and exploitation. They can maintain stable, peaceful and mutually
profitable relations with each other, and can at the same time develop
orderly processes for according increasing sovereignty to their former
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colonies and dependencies.
8. It is emphasized that the effective employment of the various
methods described above must depend largely on more and better information
on conditions within the Soviet Orbit. Moreover, even if we have the benefit
of such information we cannot promise early and decisive results in any of
these undertakings. But facts already available clearly indicate that there
are, and probably will continue to be, serious strains and difficulties
throughout the Kremlin empire. We are justified in believing that an
intelligent and persistent program to exploit these conditions may, in time,
do grave damage to Soviet power and influence. Because these methods are
relatively safer and cheaper than other possible methods of achieving our
purpose, they should not be abandoned in favor of alternative courses unless
it should become clear that they no longer promise significant results.
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G.
ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER
I. The first objective of NSC 153/1 under this heading is stated:
"46. Continue active participation and leadership in the
United Nations for realization of the principles and purposes
of the Charter."
2. The Task Force considers that in furtherance of this objective the
United States should continue to take an active and helpful part in all U.N.
proceedings, while avoiding the involvement of the U.N. in questions beyond
its capacity to solve and taking care not to overplay its importance and pos-
sibilities as a weapon in the cold war. We should make maximum use of the
U.N. Community in New York as a channel for association and communication on
the d'plomatic level. The U.S. delegation should be headed and staffed by
persons of eminence and prestige in the U.S. who are well versed in the
practical requirements of U.S. national interest. Senior career officers
should be assigned to the delegation to assist those officers in the mainten-
ance of diplomatic contacts and to brief them on national policy and current
thinking so that they may speak with confidence and authority.
3. The Task Force considers that our participation in the U.N. in recent
years has been marked by over-selling and an excess of zeal with too little
recognition of world realities. This tendency has had two seriously unfortun-
ate results. First, by involving the U.N. in questions beyond its capacity
to solve, we have aroused disillusionment and resentment against the organi-
zation within the American public. Secondly, by endeavoring to enlist the
support of the General Assembly in matters of International Security as a
means of by-passing the Soviet veto in the Security Council, we have involved
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a wide circle of other governments in the handling of highly important matters
of immediate security interest to the United States, thereby reducing our
own area of maneuver and complicating the solution of serious international
questions. This tendency has been exemplified in the "Uniting for Peace"
resolution.
The Development of Sound Negotiating Positions
4. The second objective listed in NSC 153/1 under this heading, "Estab-
lishment of International Order," is expressed as follows:
"Develop sound negotiating positions and be prepared to enter
into negotiations with the USSR if they offer promise of
achieving acceptable modus vivendi, or if, for other reasons,
they appear to be desirable; but recognize that only enforce-
able agreements are meaningful and that the value of negotiation
in the foreseeable future may be primarily to influence world
opinion."
5. The Task Force submits that what we do or do not do in pursuit of
this objective has increased greatly in importance in recent months by virtue
of several factors, notably the changes in Soviet behavior following the
death of Stalin, the present high state of interest among our allies in the
possibility of negotiation with the U.S.S.R., the development of the Korean
situation, and, finally, the recent evidences of confusion in the U.S.S.R.
and unrest in Eastern Europe.
6. It is necessary to recognize that the various changes of policy
recently effected by the new leadership in the Soviet Union, while mostly
not individually of major importance, have represented in their entirety a
very considerable modification of Soviet behavior in the direction of better
relations with the Western World and have created an important impression in
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the minds of many other governments. We have in mind here such things as
the following:
liberalization of the travel restrictions on foreigners in the
Soviet Union;
granting of exit visas to wives of American officials and
journalists;
amnesty to foreign prisoners under the general amnesty measures;
relaxation of barriers to association of Soviet officials with
foreigners;
removal of road controls and other measures of relaxation in
Austria;
readiness to exchange ambassadors with Yugoslavia;
move toward the settlement of Greek-Bulgarian border difficulties;
relinquishment of territorial claims against Turkey and of demand
for bases on the Dardenelles;
marked reduction of anti-American (biological warfare, etc.) propa-
ganda;
evident use of Soviet influence for achievement of truce in Korea.
7. It is impossible totell how enduring these changes will be, partic-
ularly since the purge of Beria. But they have represented, over a certain
period, and have at least demonstrated the possibility of significant fluctua-
tions of Soviet policy in the direction of a more disarming posture. In par-
ticular, these measures, whatever we may think of their motivation, have been
sufficient in their entirety (as the Soviet leaders were probably well aware)
to create in the minds of other peoples and governments the impression that
the Soviet regime is evincing a distinctly greater readiness than heretofore
to consider the composing of important East-West differences by means of
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peaceful negotiation. This impression has not been substantially mitigated
by the failure of the Soviet Government to respond by other and more spectac-
ular "deeds" to the President's speech of April 16. It will be generally
considered abroad that the Soviet leaders would not be inclined to make such
concessions in the advance of discussion and in the absence of assurance that
counter-concessions would be forthcoming.
8. This situation imposes on us two obligations: one minor and one
major one. The minor obligation is to be careful how we treat such relaxa-
tions of the Soviet attitude in our official utterances and positions: To
take care, that is, that we do not show ourselves upset by them and unrespon-
sive to the hopeful elements in them. Just at a time when the Soviet leaders
are creating the impression of a readiness to relax the East-West tension,
if only in small degree, it is extremely important that we do not show our-
selves as people afraid to have such a relaxation, people who want the cold
war to continue, or people who lag behind the Soviet leaders in their readi-
ness to seek the solution of outstanding problems by negotiation.
9, It should be noted that this is not a question of the likelihood of
success in negotiation, nor one of our belief in the good faith of the Soviet
leaders. The Task Force is not attempting to argue that there are immediate
favorable prospects for negotiation with the Soviet Union (although it does
not exclude the possibility that certain problems might at least be amelior-
ated in this manner). It is a question of the effectiveness of our stance
with relation to this problem, i.e., of the way we appear in the eyes of the
world as we face it. We must remember that many people in other countries
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already suspect that we do not genuinely desire a relaxation of the cold war
or a settlement of specific problems with the U.S.S.R., that our eyes are
riveted on an eventual military settlement, that we have for ulterior reasons
exaggerated the danger of war, etc. This impression was dangerous enough
even prior to Stalin's death. Today, in the light of changes in Soviet
behavior that have made 3. deep impression on peoples and governments else-
where thirsting for a respite from the nightmare fear of another world con-
flict, it becomes absolutely essential that we do not appear in the posture of
people who have in their own minds locked the door to the possibility of a
negotiated settlement and thrown away the key.
10. Actually, the siguificance of the American stance in relation to
these problems is by no means confined to the considerations just set forth.
If it is our aim to bring about the eventual retraction of Soviet power and
the liberation of peoples in the Soviet Orbit from their situations of sub-
servience tc Moscow, then our stance with regard to the major outstanding
problems in the East-West conflict must be such a one as to facilitate rather
than complicate the process in question. This means that for the present
satellite peoples we must hold out some prospect of a world in which they
could recover an independent status without placing themselves in a state of
dangerous military antagonism to the U.S.S.R. If the only visible means of
exit from the Soviet Orbit are either liberation by force in the course of a
general war or an abrupt attempt to switch to association with a military
coalition whose only aims vis-a-vis Moscow, in peace as in war, are those of
unconditional surrender -- a coalition, in other words, which is committed to
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the destruction of Soviet power and is not prepared to make any serious con-
cessions to Soviet interests -- then it is going to be vastly more difficult
for any of the satellites to contemplate the peaceful transition than it
would be if the Western World showed a readiness to contemplate broader and
more liberal settlements, in which some respect for Soviet prestige and
Soviel, interests was observed. In these circumstances, the satellite peoples
end governments-in-exile will continue to place their hopes on another
general war (which might actually be their undoing) and despair of all pos-
sibility of freeing themselves by other means. Thus an extreme and uncom-
promising American position toward matters in dispute between this Government
and the U.S.S.R. -- based on demands the Soviet Government could never really
be expected to accept unless it had reconciled itself to its own early polit-
ical demise -- is actually going to complicate the resolution or amelioration
of East-West differences by any process other than general war.
11, Finally -- and in this lies the major U.S. obligation referred to
above - there is the bald fact that any conceivable progress toward a more
peaceful world will actually require at some points and in some respects for-
mal agreemento with the Soviet Union. This is not true of all outstanding
differences. Certain of these elements of tension can be alleviated by uni-
lateral actions on both sides in an identical direction, and in some fields
this approach is more promising than any agreement on mutual obligation.
But it is true of some of these differences, particularly those relating to
the Soviet positions in Germany and Austria. To the extent that the U.S.
Government does not have negotiating positions which hold out at least some
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realistic elements of hope for acceptance by the Soviet Government, it will
not be making real progress toward a relaxation of world tensions. It is
good to "build positions of strength" as a background for negotiation with
the Soviet Union; but if these positions are built up in such a way as to
represent overriding commitments for this Government and to leave no further
leeway for negotiation, they have defeated their own purpose. The building
of these present positions was originally undertaken to some extent for bar-
gaining purposes; and while no sensible person would suggest that they be
bargained away entirely for no appreciable return, it is idle to expect that
concessions will not have to be made at some point to Soviet interests and
that these concessions will not proceed to some extent at the expense of the
very positions of strength we have built, although not at the expense of our
over-all position of strength, It is essential, therefore, that we preserve
maximum flexibility and freedom of maneuver in all matters that involve, or
may in future involve, negotiation with the Soviet Union, and that we contrive
to hold before the world an image of American desiderata that can realistic-
ally be portrayed as possible of achievement on some basis other than the
complete and sudden capitulation of Soviet power.
12. Its means that we must not nail our flag to the mast of rigid posi-
tions with regard to any of the great outstanding problems of our relations
with the Communist Bloc, no matter how great the subjective appeal of such
positions. To do so means not only to jeopardize such support as we can find
in a middle-world becoming constantly stronger, mare independent, and more
important to the accomplishment. of our purposes; it also means to decrease
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greatly the actual possibility of avoiding a war, and -- in the bargain --
to reduce the likelihood that such a war, if it should come, could end in
anything less than disaster for this country and its allies.
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IV - COSTS
1. Task Force A's principal discussion of the costs of our program is
contained in the description of Cost of the Military Program in Section IIIA,
Maintenance of U.S. Strength, of this report.
2. During the first time period -- the next three or four years --
the build-up of military power including a material increment of continental
defense should be completed and the Indo-China war and Korean situation should
be resolved. Task Force A believes that the implementation of its program
during this period will cost more than current budgetary planning provides.
We do not provide an estimate of how much more it might cost. The next two
paragraphs explain our reason for not doing SO.
3. In order to make a numerical determination on the point of cost, it
is necessary to make a specific judgment on the matter of military build-up
including military inventory. The required military build-up is in part
represented by the present carry-over of unexpended appropriations. This
carry-over represents a considerable portion of the modernization and equip-
ment inventory of our own forces as well as of our Allies. Task Force A
considered that a judgment on the need for part or all of this indicated
build-up would have to be based on either (1) technical studies. of extreme
difficulty and not possible in the time available, or (2) acceptance without
question of the programs developed during the past years.
4. If studies along the line of those envisaged in paragraph 16 of
Section IIIA do show the carry-overs representing, in whole or in part, the
requirements for carrying out the policy, then it seems certain that further
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funds above those now planned would need to be provided. There will almost
certainly be additional costs for continental defense. Even though the new
equipment is provided through stretching out the expenditure of the carry-
overs, the currently proposed level of expenditures must result in a reduction
of the total inventory proposed or a reduction in operational strength and
efficiency, or both. We would still be below that plateau of military strength
estimated thus far as necessary for ourselves and our Allies.
5. As to costs other than military during the next period of three to
four years, Task Force A considers that they would be not materially higher
than the current annual program presented to the Congress by the Executive
Branch and may be lower.
6. As to the second period, starting three or iour years from now, the
Task Force considered that its program would not vary significantly (not
more than an amount of the order of ten percent, which is as likely to be
upward as downward) from the current budget planning projection. This pro-
jection we understand is about 40 billion dollars for military expenditures,
foreign aid and the atomic energy program. we have listed under Cost of the
Military Program in Section IIIA, the way we see that current cost estimates
may be affected by implementation of further studies.
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V. - REVIEW OF CONCLUSIONS IN LIGHT
OF THREE ALTERNATIVE LINES OF SOVIET ACTION
1. Task Force A is asked to analyze the course of action assigned to
it with reference to three alternative courses of Soviet action: Resort to
general war; aggressive pressures; and the adoption of a defensive posture in
order to consolidate the present position of the Soviet Bloc.
2. We are, however, forced to question the wisdom of perceiving future
Soviet policy in terms of such rigid and clear-cut alternatives. First, we
believe that the Kremlin's choice of a line of action, and its decisions
regarding the combination and interplay of several lines of action, will be
governed largely by the policies of the West. Second, we note that Soviet
policy has, from time to time in the past, displayed considerable flexibility
and opportunism. The new Kremlin le adership shows signs of seeking, and
may achieve, this flexibility in the future. If so, it would be foolish and
dangerous to anticipate Soviet policy in terms of any sharp and protracted
alternatives. For the more we tend to assume, and to prepare for, one line
of Soviet policy, the more likely will be the Kremlin to alter its course
and confroct us with a new line of policy.
3. In these circumstances, Task Force A believes that the primary ad-
vantage of Course A over Courses B and C is that it provides the freedom of
action t.c adjust to, to counter, and in certain cases to exploit, whatever
lines of action the Kremlin may pursue. If the U.S. adopts Course A, we
can always move on to embrace some or all of the elements of Courses B or C
if circumstances require. But if we embark upon B or C before the next phase
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of Soviet policy has become clear, difficulties may be encountered in trying
to shift to different courses later. Moreover, Courses B or C might, if
adopted in present circumstances, provide the Kremlin with an ideal oppor-
tunity to turn aside our apparent wrath with gestures of sweet reasonable-
ness, and to persuade many of the peoples of the Free World, and even of
the U.S., that U.S. policy was stubbornly committed to a course involving
entirely unnecessary costs and risks, and that our impatient and irrespons-
ible action was about to destroy permanently any lingering hope for a peace-
ful solution to world problems. In the face of such popular misgivings at
home and abroad, it is difficult to see how courses B or C could be carried
out with the vigor and persistence necessary for their ultimate success.
4. With these considerations in mind, we turn to the three suggested
lines of Soviet action.
Soviet Resort to General War
5. Although we do not believe that the Kremlin would, in the near
future, be likely to react to any of the three proposed U.S. courses of
action by launching general war, we believe that the danger of its doing
might be materially increased by the adoption of Courses B or C. If confront-
ed with Course B, it might sooner or later conclude that U.S. policy was be-
coming so rigidly committed as to eliminate all alternatives to eventual war,
and it might thereafter proceed upon the assumption that war would be desir-
able as soon as relative Soviet capabilities could be developed to their
maximum. Should the U.S. adopt Course C, and should this course show promise
of achieving the results intended for it, the Kremlin might in time perceive
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such threats to its essential security interests as would make general war
appear the least undesirable of alternatives.
6. We therefore believe that Course A will be the least likely to re-
sult in Soviet initiation of general war. In addition, we believe that
Course A will be least likely to provide the Kremlin with the moral and
psychological support at home and abroad which it would desire in the event
of war. Course A provides, moreover, for the maintenance of sufficient U.S.
strength to deter war, to assist in the defense of vital areas of the Free
world, to protect the continental U.S., and to serve as the basis for winning
general war if it should be forced upon us. In addition, Course A allows
us flexibility to maneuver to reduce or retard a growing risk of general war
should such risk arise in circumstances seriously to U.S. disadvantage, and
to prevent the enemy from forcing upon us a casus belli at a time and place
entirely of his own choosing.
Soviet Aggressive Pressure, Interspersed with "Peace Offensives"
7. In the event of Soviet action along these lines, we believe that
Course A would be at least as effective as, and considerably less costly
and risky than, Courses B or C. Course A leaves open to us, for countering
Soviet pressures, any measures which at the time may seem necessary to assist
in the defense of vital areas of the Free World. Moreover, we believe that
in meeting periodic Soviet "Peace Offensives," only Course A can provide the
freedom of action necessary to counter with peace proposals of our own, and
to exploit Soviet overtures by demonstrating the hypocrisy with which they
are advanced. The adoption by the U.S. of Courses B or C would, we believe,
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vastly increase the impact of any Soviet "peace" proposals throughout much
of the Free World, and even within the U.S.
Soviet Defensive Posture Designed to Permit Consolidation of Orbit and
Encouragement of Divisive Forces in Free World.
8. Should the Kremlin adopt this alternative, we believe that sooner
or later it would become unfeasible for the U.S. to persist in Courses B or
C to the point of achieving lasting results. If, despite a prolonged ces-
sation of Soviet pressure, we continued to adhere to unyielding policies
involving threats and pressures against the Soviet Orbit, we would be likely
to find ourselves increasingly isolated, and our purposes under growing
suspicion by other free peoples and governments. Divisive forces in the
Free World would thus be stimulated, and we would eventually find ourselves
in the position of insisting upon defending those who felt no need or desire
for our support, and who believed that such threats as might exist were
largely of our own making.
9. We, therefore, conclude that, as between the three courses of U.S.
action under consideration, Course A will: (1) Be the least likely to in-
crease the possibility of general war; (2) provide the soundest moral and
material basis for winning such war if it should be forced upon us; and (3)
be most likely to provide us with the freedom of action necessary for check-
ing, countering and exploiting Soviet moves short of war.
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VI - COMMENTS REGARDING QUESTIONS IN
SECTION III.2 OF PROJECT PAPER
1. The Specific Instructions in part III, para. 2, of Project Solarium
posed sixteen questions to be considered by each Task Force in the preparation
of its report. To the extent they are relevant, these questions have been
taken into account in the treatment of the various subjects contained in this
report. For purposes of ready identification, however, there are listed
below the recommendations growing out of the consideration of the questions
which suggest actions by the Government in the areas of Congressional legis-
lation and proposed further studies.
2. Recommended Congressional actions:
a. A tax program yielding revenues at about the fiscal 1953 level.
b. Modification of existing tariff laws to liberalize restrictions
upon imports into the U.S.
c. Passage of proposed legislation for the simplification of
customs regulations.
d. Standby legislation, at an appropriate time, for economic
mobilization.
3. Recommended further studies:
a. Restudy mobilization plans with a view to bringing estimates of
the proportion of the economy which can be diverted to prosecution of global
war realistically into line with what U.S. economy under full controls can
provide.
b. Appraise the defense program as viewed from five years hence
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anticipating the changes in our defense programs which will be occasioned by
new weapons, techniques and tactics, and ensuring that they are taken into
account back through the logistical chain into the mobilization base.
c. Manpower policy and plans to give better assurance of provision
of quantity and calibre of personnel required and to assure, for a period of
full mobilization, that the manpower program is consistent with industrial
program and program for continental and civil defense.
d. A study of the future maintenance costs of allied military
equipment and a program of aid by the U.S. to meet the costs not capable of
being borne by certain of our allies.
e. A study of the logistical dependence of allies upon the U.S.
in time of war, and provision for their needs in U.S. plans.
f. Development of an economic program for Japan to assist in
restoring that country to economic stability after present extraordinary
expenditures by the U.S. in connection with the Korean war are greatly reduced.
g. A new policy and plans for the reunification of Germany,
including military plans for changed requirements for the deployment of U.S.
forces in Europe.
h. A study of the extent of dependence of our military program on
allies and the relationship of this dependence to priorities in allocation
of resources.
i. Suggestions for inclusion of added topics in studies now being
undertaken concerning U.S. continental defense.
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VII - SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING STATEMENT
1. The world stands today at a major turning-point in international
affairs. The great changes in leadership that have occurred in both the
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the past year have coincided roughly in time with
the exhaustion of the effectiveness of many of the devices and approaches
resorted to by both sides in the immediate post-hostilities period. The
prostration or weakness from which the ex-enemy countries and other "in-
between" entities suffered in the immediate post-hostilities period has
now been largely overcome in a process of recuperation that has generally
reached its climax in the past year or two. The "bipolarity" which dis-
tinguished the immediate post-hostilities period has thus lost much of its
rationale, and is obviously giving place to a more complex and fluid inter-
national situation, in which many national entities are going to play an
important part.
2. It is plain that these circumstances make it incumbent upon the
United States to review and clarify the basic principles and objectives of
its foreign policy and having done so to carry them out with a high degree
of flexibility and maneuverability, a sensitive attentiveness to the under-
lying trends of world feeling, and a readiness to work with rather than
against such trends in the interests of the achievement of a more stable
world. The year 1953 still finds the U.S. encumbered with serious elements
of rigidity in its national policies: With commitments to various approaches
which had their justification in the immediate post-hostilities period but
have now largely lost it, with inhibitions flowing from the ponderousness
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of its policy-forming processes, with deep commitments to currents of
domestic opinion that represent understandable but nevertheless impatient
and emotional reactions to the great disillusionments and dangers following
so unexpectedly from the outcome of the last world war. Unless these ele-
ments of rigidity in the American position can be overcome, there is great
danger ahead. For a national strategy unable to free itself from these
elements has little chance of encompassing directly the overthrow of Soviet
power but a very good chance of forfeiting generally for the United States
its leadership among the countries outside the Soviet Orbit, with attendant
loss of influence over the development of some of the most important com-
ponents of our national security.
3. In the above report, the members of Task Force A have attempted
to suggest the lines of approach by which this urgently needed adjustment
of our national strategy could be effected. It will be seen that they do
not by any means suggest that the menacing nature of international Communism
be ignored, or the grave military realities be left out of account. On the
contrary, they urge no relaxation in our defense program, and no diminution
in the United States military posture. But they do warn against too cramped
and exclusive a pre-occupation with the problem of international Communism;
and in particular against lines of conduct that give the world the impression
we have dedicated our thoughts and efforts exclusively to the essentially
negative and defensive task of the destruction of Soviet power. Much of the
outside world views such an undertaking with skepticism and dismay, but be-
cause it thinks success unlikely in the short term and feels that the effort
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may involve general disaster to the structure of civilization. Contrary
to the feelings of many of our people, a large portion of the outside
world holds the dangers of a continued effort to co-exist with Communist
power to be less than the dangers attendant on a direct effort to destroy
it at this time. Whatever our own feelings may be, our international situa-
tion is such as to require us, in the view of this Task Force, to adjust
to this basic condition of world opinion.
4. The members of the Task Force have no doubt that the suggestions
put forward above are imperfect in many respects. They are confident that
these suggestions can all be usefully refined and improved by the regular
planning agencies of government, equipped as these latter are with a broader
background of detailed information and with better facilities for consulting
the experience and current reactions of the many U.S. Government agencies
occupied with the matters in question.
5. The members of the Task Force are also aware that these suggestions
imply at many points the heaviest sort of demand on executive leadership.
They would like to emphasize that they have not been unaware of the burden
they have imputed to others, with respect to the moulding and leading of
public and Congressional opinion, in coming forward with suggestions of this
tenor.
6. Nevertheless, they would like to emphasize, in concluding this report,
that what began, by definition, as an exercise in the advocacy of a line of
national policy selected for them by others has ended in a sincere conviction
on the part of all of them that the policy they have evaluated, as developed
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by them in the body of the report, represents a general line of national
strategy plainly preferable to the major alternatives that have been sug-
gested. They feel that this is a strategy essential to the requirements
of our national security, and one which cannot safely be rejected.
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