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National Intelligence Estimate 11-4-56, Soviet Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses of Action Through 1961, Part 1 of 4
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TOP SECRET
NIE 11-4-56
2 August 1956
58
TS #102440-u
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 11-4-56
(Supersedes NIE 11-3-55)
Addre
H 75 S See
SOVIET CAPADILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES
OF ACTION THROUGH 1961
Air 110 , see
(Advance Conclusions)
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 2 August 1956. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intel-
ligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval
Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic
Energy Commission Representative to the IAC and the Assist-
ant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the
subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET
Authority RAC review
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NLE 5/14/02 Date
TOP SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2 August 1956
SUBJECT: NIE 11-4-56: SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF
ACTION THROUGH 1961
THE PROBLEM
To examine the political, economic, scientific, and military
strengths and weaknesses of the USSR and to estimate probable Soviet
courses of action through 1961.
CONCLUSIONS
General
A. The changes in Soviet internal and external policies
over the last three years have resulted from the effort of the
regime to cope with problems ignored or aggravated by Stalin's
arbitrary personal rule, and to develop tactics and methods which the
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DECLASSIFIED
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By Lb NLE 5/14/02 Date
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Soviet leaders deen better suited to advancing Soviet interests in a
changing world situation. It is not clear where this process of change
will ultimately lead; the current Soviet leaders are probably capable
of even more flexibility than they have already demonstrated. But
they have shown no inclination to depart from the totalitarian
character of the Soviet state or to abandon their ain of expanding
the Communist sphere of power and their ultimate objective of achieving
a Conmunist-dominated world.
B. We believe that the principal objectives of Soviet policy
over the next several years are: (1) to increase the economic
strength and military capabilities of the Sino-Soviet Bloc; (2) to
weaken the cohesion of the non-Conrunist world, and particularly to
disrupt NATO; (3) to cause a retraction of Western power and in-
fluence, and particularly to force withdrawal of US military power
from its present deployment around the periphery of the Bloc; and
(4) to expand Soviet influence throughout the world by political,
economic, and subversive means.
Probable Courses of Action
C.
In pursuing these objectives, the Soviet leaders probably
intend to maintain for a considerable period the general posture
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of "peaceful coexistence" with the non-Communist world which they
have been developing, especially since the spring of 1955. They will
continue the effort to identify Bloc policies with peace, anticolonialism
social and economic progress, and to label the Western Powers, especially
the US, as opponents of these causes. This effort is intended to end
the isolation of the USSR and the Communist parties which resulted
from Soviet postwar policy, to facilitate Communist political action
in popular fronts with democratic groups, and thus to increase Soviet
influence in the non-Communist world.
D.
The policy of peaceful coexistence reflects the Soviet
leaders' awareness of the dangers of nuclear war inherent in a
policy of aggression as well as their appreciation of the politi-
cal opportunities opened up by their present policy in many areas.
Accordingly, we believe that the USSR will try to avoid courses of
action which in its judgment would involve serious risk of general
war. Nevertheless, insurrection or aggression by local Communist
forces might occur if the Communists are presented with opportunities
which seem to them to involve minimal risk of large-scale conflict.
Such aggression might even become probable if the Communist judge the
political condition of the non-Conrunist world to be such that local
aggression would promote confusions and divisions rather than
stimulate renewed vigilance and determination.
- 3 -
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E.
The issues presented by the Chinese offshore islands and by
Indochina appear at present to offer the greatest possibility of a
Communist resort to armed action. On both issues the Communists
might hope to justify rescrt to military action on grounds that
would be accepted by considerable elements of world public opinion,
and moreover might expect that the US would be deterred from armed
intervention by the opposition of its allies and by the fear of alienating
some inportant states of Asia. For the present, however, the USSR
apparently intends to curb tensions surrounding both issues, while
encouraging by diplomacy and propaganda a gradual erosion of Western
resolve to oppose Communist expansion in these areas.
F.
The underdeveloped countries have energed in the last
year as particular targets of the new Soviet policy. We believe
that the USSR will vigorously pursue its recently expanded efforts to
establish wider economic as well as political relations with these
countries. Estimated Soviet industrial production would permit
considerable increases in exports of capital equipment and military
end items without appreciable adverse effect on internal Bloc programs,
and even with some economic advantage.
G.
In particular, the USSR will almost certainly persist in
a vigorous effort to displace Western influence in the Middle Eastern
- 4 -
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and adjacent African states and to align them with the Bloc. The USSR
is using the Suez controversy and the Arab-Israeli conflict to enhance
its influence in the Arab world. We believe, however, that the Soviet
leaders recognize that vital Western interests are so deeply involved
in the area that the USSR would be courting major political and possibly
military risks if it supported the Arabs in violent courses of action
affecting either issue.
H.
In Europe the USSR will not relax its efforts to frustrate
West German rearmament and to weaken NATO ties and defense efforts.
On the central problem of Germany, we believe that for at least
the next several years the USSR will insist on maintaining the division
of the country. For some time to come the Soviet leaders will probably
consider that even neutralization would not provide sufficient assurance
against a reunified Germany's tacit alliance with the West.
Internal Political Developments
continuing
I.
At least for the time being, the problem of providing a /
effective leadership in the Soviet state to replace Stalin's one-man
rule has apparently been resolved. Despite the evident primacy of
Khrushchev, there seems to be a collective participation in policy
formulation by at least the small group in the Communist Party
- 5 -
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Presidium. A key feature of this "collective leadership" is
the apparent denial of control over the police power to any
single leader. No firm estimate can be made as to whether the
present apparent stability within the top leadership will continue
indefinitely or whether one or another figure will eventually emerge
in something like the absolute position held by Stalin. But even if
a struggle for power should occur, we believe that it would be resolved
without open violence and without basically weakening the regime's
control.
J.
The recent repudiation of Stalin marks a new phase in
the regime's attempt to convince the Soviet people, and world
opinion as well, that it has departed from the evils of Stalin's
rule. By providing greater security against police abuses, per-
mitting broader contact with the non-Soviet world, and other-
wise easing somewhat the conditions of life in the USSR, the regime
is attempting to cultivate more favorable attitudes towards itself
and its goals. It is particularly interested in soliciting initiative
on the part of the professional classes and party officials in order to
advance its current efforts for greater economic efficiency and producti-
vity. However, the attempt to strike a new balance between coercion
and freedom has not involved any weakening of the means of control,
including the police apparatus. We believe that the regime could
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return to Stalin's harsher discipline though at the cost of some
disillusionment which would hamper it in the achievement of its Coals.
Soviet Military Strength and Capabilities
K.
There will probably be a decrease in the personnel strength
of the USSR's active minitary establishment. The announced reduc-
tions, which we believe would affect principally the ground forces,
may reduce over-all active strength to about three million men,
and possibly somewhat lower. However, the over-all effectiveness
of Soviet forces for modern warfare will continue to increase,
primarily due to the improved weapons becoming available in quantity,
to changes in organization, and to adaptation of doctrine and tactics
designed to fit Soviet forces for nuclear warfare.
L.
Current and prospective military programs are likely
to result in the following principal developments affecting Soviet
military strength during the next five years:
(1) The USSR's nuclear stockpile, ranging from very
low-yield weapons to high-yield thermonuclear weapons,
*
will continue to grow rapidly. The upward revision
*
See the footnote by the Director of Naval Intelligence to Paragraph
75.
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of our estimates of Soviet fissionable materials produc-
tion and the Soviet test of a multimegaton weapon lead
us to conclude that the USSR now has a significant multi-
megaton capability and will soon have a major one.
(2) We estimate that the USSR now has about 1,300 aircraft
in its long-range air force, including 35 BISON jet
heavy bonbers, 30 BEAR turbo-prop heavies, 475
BADGER jet mediums, and 760 BULLS. Based on a judgment
as to what Soviet planners probably estimate their
requirements to be, and on recent increases in the
number of air regiments, we now estimate that the USSR
is building toward a force of about 1,500 modern bomber-
type aircraft by nid-1960. We also believe that in the
light of probable Soviet optimum requirements, including
those for attack on the continental US, a likely composi-
tion of this force would be about 800 jet and turbo-prop
heavy bombers and 700 jet medium bombers. Many unknown
factors, for example the degree of future Soviet success
in the guided missile field, could lead to Soviet decisions
which would alter both the size of this force and the
balance between types of aircraft. Long-Range Aviation
will probably acquire improved base and staging facilities
and a substantial inflight refueling capability. By 1961,
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a new medium bomber with "supersonic dash" capabilities
*
may be introduced.
(3) At present, the USSR could have a small number of ballistic
missiles with ranges up to 900 n.m. These could carry
small and medium-yield nuclear warheads, and in the period
1958-1959 could be fitted with high-yield nuclear warheads.
By 1958-1959, the USSR could also have a small number
of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (1,600 n.m.),
and by 1960-1961, a small number of intercontinental
ballistic missiles.
(4) The USSR will considerably strengthen its air defense
capability, including by 1961 a fighter force more than
50 percent equipped with all-weather types, improved
electronic equipment, and improved guided missiles and
warheads.
(5) A substantial increase will probably take place in Soviet
submarine strength, which is now estimated at 445 vessels,
about half of which are medium and long-range craft of
*
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army,
believes it unlikely that a force of this magnitude and composition
would be developed. See his footnote to Paragraph 110.
- 9 -
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postwar design. Submarine building rates will probably
continue to increase through 1957 but decrease in 1958
due in part to the inpact of the nuclear-powered sub-
marine program and the probable adaptation of present
submarines to missile weapons systems. If the estimate
1958 rate were maintained through the rest of the period,
this would result in a mid-1961 force of approximately
900 submarines of all types, including about 800 long and
medium range boats of postwar design. However, we have
no intelligence to indicate planned future Soviet sub-
marine strength. The Soviet Navy will probably also
acquire surface vessels equipped to launch guided
missiles.
(6) Soviet Army ground forces are being modernized to
achieve improved firepower, mobility, and combat
effectiveness for both nuclear and non-nuclear warfare.
They are being supplied with a wide variety of new
weapons and equipment, and will probably acquire guided
missiles and tactical nuclear weapons.
M.
The size and composition of the USSR's military estab-
lishment will be subject to further modification as the period
- 10 -
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advances and the Soviet leaders reappraise their military require-
ments and strategy in the light of the capabilities of the new
weapons, the world balance of military forces, and the international
political situation. We believe, however, that the Soviet leaders
will continue to maintain formidable military power as a basis for
their policy and to meet political and military contingencies. They
will almost certainly not submit their military programs to the
constraints of a comprehensive system of international inspection and
control. Soviet capabilities for nuclear or non-nuclear warfare
of large or small scale, including direct attack on the US, will increase
considerably by 1961.
Developments in the Soviet Economy
N.
We now estimate that the present high rate of Soviet
economic growth will decline only slightly by 1961, when it will
still exceed six percent per year. As a result, Soviet gross
national product (GNP) in 1961 will be nearly 50 percent above its
1955 level or about 45 percent as large as the projected US GNP;
in 1955 it was about 37 percent as large as the actual US GNP. Since
Soviet defense expenditures, despite the new weapons programs in
prospect, will probably increase less rapidly than GNP over this
- 11 -
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period, the relative military burden on the economy should decline
*
slightly.
O.
Present Soviet economic policy clearly envisages con-
tinued high priority for heavy industry, and we estimate that
such production will increase by 70 percent or more during the next
five years. The probable reduction in military manpower will
facilitate this growth by providing additions to the labor force.
Agricultural production will grow more slowly, probably increasing
by about one quarter; such growth would provide the basis for a
continued improvement in material welfare.
P.
Soviet scientific and technical capabilities continue
to expand rapidly. Soviet industrial technology has demonstrated
that it is able to adapt and introduce the most advanced methods
of production, although the average level of Soviet practices still
lags considerably behind that of the West. Moreover, the USSR
almost certainly has the scientific and technological capability
necessary to develop weapons and military equipment which are generally
equal to those of any other nation, and in the technological race
there are times when in certain fields the USSR may well be ahead of
the US and times when the US will outstrip the USSR.
*
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army,
does not concur in the cost study upon which this conclusion is based.
He does not believe that there is sufficient information available
to estimate the relative military burden on the Soviet economy. See
the footnote by the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Depart-
ment of the Army to Appendix B. See also the footnote by the Director
of Naval Intelligence, attached to Appendix B.
- 12 -
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
adopted on
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26 June 1956
MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
SUBJECT:
NIE 11-4-56= SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND COURSES OF ACTION
(Parts I & II)
1. The attached parts of the draft estimate have been approved by
the Board of National Estimates pursuant to a consideration of it by the
IAC representatives.
2. This estimate has been placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting
scheduled for 10:45 Tuesday, 3 July.
William P Burdy
WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates
k
Distribution "A"
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Authority RAC reinow
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SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
25 June 1956
SUBJECT: NIE 11-4-56: SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE
SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION THROUGH
1961
THE PROBLEM
To examine the political, economic, scientific, and
military strengths and weaknesses of the USSR and to estimate
probable Soviet courses of action through 1961.
Introduction - Soviet Developments in Perspective
1. The three years since the death of Stalin have seen much
change on the Soviet scene. The men who succeeded him have adopted
external policies which they deem to be better calculated to advance
Soviet world interests, and internal policies which they consider
more adroit for maintaining the Communist Party's control of the
DECLASSIFIED
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By
Hb
NLE 5/14/02 Date
SECRET
governmental machinery and of the population. This development
has reflected their awareness of a changing world si tuation which
had outmoded some of the tactics and policies pursued in the postwar
period. In part, also, this process has probably been a consequence
change in the 455R
of long-term trends related to rapid industrialization, the spread
of general education, and the creation of new social classes. The
present leaders have sought to release Soviet domestic and foreign
policy from the more rigid mold in which Stalin had cast it. Their
modifications in his system have caused the Soviet scene to lose some
of the static character it had acquired under the former dictator.
It is not yet clear where this new Soviet flexibility will ultimately
lead, but the fact of its emergence has become evident. To assess the
problems confronting US policy it has become as important to focus
on what is changing as on what is constant in the Soviet challenge.
2. Stalin's successors were confronted with the urgent problem
of governing effectively a totalitarian empire whose whole functioning
was based upon the absolute power of one man. In addition, they
were confronted with a number of problems in both internal and
foreign policy which Stalin had either ignored or aggravated. Though
- 2 -
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the resulting process of review and adjustment is likely to continue,
an important stage in that process was reached at the Twentieth Party
Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956, where the
new leaders presented their policies and programs in comprehensive
fashion. They also demonstrated their intention to effect changes by
their move to discredit many aspects of Stalin's regime and to reduce
drastically his historical stature. As will be evident from the
different sections of this paper which follow, the effort to correct
abuses and errors in Stalin's system has affected almost every aspect
of Soviet internal and external policy.
3. To date, however, the post-Stalin leaders have shown
no inclination to depart from the totalitarian character of the
Soviet state. Rather they are seeking to organize and develop the
power of the system more effectively and to adapt it to changing
conditions. Nor has the present leadership departed from the Communist
conviction that the struggle between the Communist and non-Communist
worlds will continue. It adheres to the fundamental Communist
objectives of destroying free states and expanding the Communist sphere
of power. Although the Soviet leaders are now relying more upon
political and economic action than upon force or the explicit threat
- 3 -
(Revised 25 July 1956)
SECRET
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of force, they are pursuing their goals with undiminished vigor and
apparently with high confidence. None of the changes that have come
about on the Soviet scene since Stalin's death, important as these
have been, suggest that the threat which Soviet and Communist power
and purposes pose to the free world is likely to diminish during the
period of this estimate.
3a. It has been suggested that the recent changes in political
tactics and controls combined with the cumulative effects of
industrialization might of)
and education over a period transform well beyond the character the tim of Soviet this estimate
society in such a way as to deprive it of its ideologically aggressive
motivation. This view suggests that there might be, if not a
"liberalization," at least a greater degree of moderation in both
internal and external Soviet policy. We believe that some such line
of development is one historical possibility, but there can be no
assurance that it will occur; if it did occur, it would require a
very long period. There are no true historical precedents which permit
a judgment as to how a modern totalitarian state, and in particular
Intro
the Communist version of this unique phenomenon in world history, may
3a
transform itself over time. It can be argued that the imperatives
which govern the behavior of those who wield power in such a state
prohibit its changing according to the hypothesis suggested above, or
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(Revised 25 July 1956
SECRET
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indeed in wholesome direction. Jany event Mereover, in the
any even absence of
the Communist ideological motivation, the combination of Russian
nationalism and the great material power of the Soviet state would
still present a potential threat. We believe that there is at this
time no basis for judging that the USSR will not continue indefinitely
to be a danger to the security of the US and the free world.
State, nany, air and Jaint staff 3a reserve asa
their positions one Paragraph
whole.
- 4a -
(Revised 25 July 1956)
SECRET
I
Int.
Pol.
SECRET
I. INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
"Collective Leadership"
4. Stalin's power had become so absolute that all organs of
party and state were subject to his personal control. Upon his death,
his successors were confronted with the problem of reconstituting
the supreme authority in the Soviet structure of power. The
Presidium of the Communist Party Central Committee became the
repository of the dictatorship. This 11-man body continues to
exercise absolute power, and despite the more frequent meetings of
the 133-man Central Committee and other Party bodies, the Presidium
is clearly the initiator of policy and the final focus of decision.
Although the Soviet system is no longer a personal dictatorship, it
remains nevertheless a dictatorship.
5. The Soviet leaders describe the arrangements which obtain
at the highest level of power in the Presidium as "collective leadership."
We have little specific information on the relationships among the
highest Soviet leaders, but it is clear that these men are not of equal
and
stature and authority. Khrushchev's public prominence, his hold on
- 5 -
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the key position of Party First Secretary, by means of which he has
apparently been able to assign many of his proteges to important party
and state posts, suggest that he is the dominant figure. For the
present, however, whether as the result of a balance of forces among
the top leaders or of a voluntary agreement among them, there do
appear to be limits to Khrushchev's power, and there is apparently
collective participation in policy making.
formulation.
6. A key feature of the relationship among the top leaders is
the apparent subjection of the police power to collective control.
Such an arrangement would be plausible, since it was Stalin's
manipulation of the police power which enabled him to physically
liquidate his opponents and brought about the excesses of the purge
period. The present leaders, out of concern for the continuity and
stability of the Soviet state itself, as well as for their individual
safety, would probably not wish to see such a period return. The very
great stress given at the Twentieth Congress to the "collective leader-
ship" formula as the original and correct party doctrine, which
Stalin's "cult of personality" had allowed to fall into neglect,
surgests that forces are at work to prevent the re-emergence of one-
man rule.
- 6 -
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7. We cannot estimate with firmness whether the present apparent
stability within the top leadership will continue or whether one or
another figure will emerge again in something like the absolute
position held by Stalin. Even with collective centrol of the police
power, there will almost certainly continue to be factional divisions,
intrigues for position and influence, and disputes over policy.
"Collective leadership" might break down over a fundamental divergence
of view on some issue deemed crucial to the security or development
of the Soviet state, or as the result of an attempt by one or a few
members to acquire supreme power. Even if a struggle for supreme power
should occur, we believe that it would be resolved (asin the elimination
of Beria and the demotion of Malenkov) without open violence involving
large-scale use of police or military organs, and without weakening
the regime's control.
8. The members of the Presidium not only appear to be sharing
the policy-making power, but apparently are trying to bring to bear on
their problems greater realism and more expert knowledge. They have
apparently broadened the circle of consultation, at least concerning
the technical and practical aspects of policy. We believe that Soviet
foreign policy, economic planning, and military programs are now more
strongly influenced than formerly by the advice of specialists in these
- 7 -
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fields. This apparent freer participation and greater responsibility
of professionals and experts has been one of the strengths of the
post-Stalin regime. This development has probably greatly improved
the morale of higher officials in the Party, government, and armed forces.
Party Reform
9. Beyond the stabilization of power at the very top level, one
of the most important objectives of the new leadership has been to
restore function and vitality to the whole structure of the Communist
Party itself. The new leaders have apparently felt that Stalin's
personal absolutism was causing the Party to degenerate into-bureaucratic
ineffectiveness. They regarded a revival of Party activism as
necessary to make the Party a more effective instrument of policy
implementation and mass persuasion, as well as to place themselves
in closer touch with popular attitudes. Accordingly, the-Central
Committee and Party Congress are meeting at intervals prescribed by
Party statutes. Local Party organizations are required to meet
regularly and to adopt the "collective leadership" practiced at the
top. There is renewed emphasis on practical criticism from below.
The redefinition of Party doctrines and tactics at the Twentieth
- 8 -
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SECRE
Party Congress in closer conformity with political realities, internal
and external, was probably also designed to contribute to a revival of
Party spirit.
10. The drive to revitalize the Party has taken place under the
slogan of a return to "Leninist norms of Party life." The myth
surrounding the name of Lenin, to which the new leaders have
particularly attached themselves, probably in part to establish
the legitimacy of their succession and in part to justify the changes
being made in Stalin's system, has come to include the assertion that
there was genuine "Party democracy" in Lenin's time. There was in
fact freer discussion within the Party while Lenin lived and for a
few years thereafter. But even under Lenin "Party democracy" meant that
debate and criticism was combined with strict discipline from the top.
The new leadership, in dealing with the Leninist concept of "Party
democracy," has indicated that it will not permit criticism to impair
discipline.
Relaxation of Internal Tensions
11. The claim of the leadership that it is reviving Party
democracy reflects an acute awareness of one of the serious problems
- 9 -
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facing the regime. The new leaders evidently believe that Stalin's
policies of coercion and unpredictable terror, even against the Party
itself, had done much to paralyze active participation and initiative.
This was true not only within the Party but also within the government
and economie administration and in the fields of art and science as
well. Coercion was no longer believed to be the best way of achieving
the regime's goals and Stalin's death provided an opportunity to
alter his methods of obtaining compliance. The size and complexity
of the Soviet economy and the problems of increasing productivity
and improving technology called for more responsibility and initiative
on the part of managers, bureaucrats, and Party officials, as well as
more cooperative positive attitudes on the part of the general population.
12. Behind many of the regime's moves in the post-Stalin
period lies an attempt to strike a new balance between coercion
and initiative, between discipline and freedom, more conducive to
the attainment of the goals of the Soviet state. These moves have
included the amnesty of many persons sentenced to labor camps, an
easing in some degree of the forced labor system, increased security
of the citizen against arbitrary arrest, broader cultural exchanges
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with the West, and measures designed to continue a gradual rise in
standards of living. Industrial managers, scientists, intellectuals,
and professional people of all kinds have been the principal beneficiaries
of these developments. But there are also signs that the Soviet
people as a whole may be acquiring a more favorable attitude toward
the regime as a result of slowly improving material conditions and
the increase in personal security. There is apparently a widely held
opinion among the Soviet people that their lot is improving. This
probably represents a considerable psychological gain for the regime
as compared with Stalin's last years, and eases the task of the Soviet
leaders in solving their current internal problems.
13. On the other hand, the regime has not lost freedom of
action vis-a-vis the Soviet people. It has control of the whole
apparatus of police power, although this apparatus has been moved
somewhat into the background. It has not made any irretrievable con-
cessions andcould impose on the Soviet people any course that it chose.
But the mere fact that the new Soviet leaders have made gestures
toward appeasing the Soviet eople is a source of Dossible future
difficulty. While they would not need to anticipate anything approaching
a loss of control over the Soviet people if they returned to Stalin's
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harsher discipline, they could do so only at the cost of a measure
of disillusionment and alienation which would hamper them in the
achievement of their goals. The cost in these terms of such a
reversion would probably increase the longer the present milder
policy was continued.
The Anti-Stalin Campaign
14. The intention to reduce the Stalin myth in some degree was
manifest throughout the three-year period following the dictator's death.
It was evidenced by emphasis on collectivity in leadership, by efforts
to rebuild Lenin as the greater figure, and by growing attacks on the
"cult of personality." This campaign led finally at the Twentieth
Party Congress to attacks on Stalin himself, both implicit and explicit.
We believe that this was the result of a deliberate decision by the
leadership.
15. There were probably several motives behind this decision.
The Soviet leaders probably believed that the move would advance their
current foreign policy in many respects. The attacks on Stalin were
intended to blur the image of aggression and subversion which had
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become associated with Soviet policy and to give the Soviet regime
an appearance of respectability. The Soviet leaders probably estimated
that the effects would be felt not only in neutralist countries but
even in states belonging to the western alliance.
16. However, considerations relating to internal developments
were almost certainly primary. The new leaders wished to repudiate
Stalin's use of terror against the Soviet people and especially
against the Party, to set up obstacles to a return to one-man rule,
and to confirm the ascendancy of the Party as an institution. More-
over, they apparently found it desirable to eliminate the absolute
authority attached to Stalin's past pronouncements in order to attain
the desired flexibility in carrying out their new programs. The
leadership probably hopes by these means to give the regime continuity
and stability, and to free it from the hazards of a struggle for
power to which a totalitarian state is subject.
17. Beyond this, there were probably motives which related to
the attempt to improve the relationship between the regime and the
people, by relying less on coercion and more on a voluntary response
to attain the regime's oals. Probably the leaders felt that a dramatic
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demonstration such as the direct attack on Stalin was necessary to
win confidence in the genuineness of their intention to solicit
initiative, eliminate the abuses of Stalin's system of terror, and
improve the material lot of the Soviet people,
18. There are clearly some risks for the regime in the reduction
as
of soauthoritative a myth/that surrounding Stalin. These arise from
the implication that Communist authority, including that embodied in
the present leaders, lacks the integrity and omniscience which it has
always claimed for itself. The present emphasis given to the Party
as the real embodiment of authority and wisdom is intended to counter
this danger. The essence of Stalin's errors is said to be that he
placed himself above the Party. Among the population generally and
especially among youth this rationalization has apparently failed to
carry complete conviction and there has been some disillusionment
though this is probably temporary. On the other hand, there are
millions of ordinary Soviet people who have personal knowled e of the
injustices practiced in the Stalin era and who can be persuaded of
Stalin's responsibility even though many my not absolve the present
leaders of complicity. Among elite groups such as higher Party
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members, economic managers, government officials, and the professional
military the move is likely to be approved, partly because they have
intimate knowledge of Stalin's abuses and partly because they will
welcome the promise of greater professional opportunities and enhanced
security under the new leadership.
19. We believe that over the long run the regime will continue
to be confronted with the problem of obtaining the benefits of a
greater measure of individual initiative and responsibility within
the framework of a totalitarian system. It will probably not be
willing to depart very far from the methods which Stalin developed
for the manipulation of power in the Soviet state. Probably the
attempt to strike a new balance between discipline and initiative will
either fall short of winning sufficient response or it will evoke
trends which the regime will regard as unacceptable and r equiring
new measures of coercion.
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II
USSR
II. THE USSR'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER COMMUNIST BLOC STATES
Rel.
20. The unique authority of Stalin as a "world historical person-
ality" was a factor in the close integration of the Communist Bloc. His
death probably required some redefinition of relations between the Bloc
states on a less personal basis, although this was certainly less true
of the USSR's relations with Communist China than of its relations with
the East European regimes. We believe that despite some friction and
confusion, especially in the European Satellites, the transition will be
completed without serious disruption. Throughout the period of this
estimate the Sino-Soviet Bloc will probably maintain its solidarity of
interest and coordination of policy.
Sino-Soviet Relations
21. The concert of action between the USSR and Communist China has
remained strong during the last year. Close coordination has been evidenced
in the campaign for increasing friendship and economic relations with non-
Bloc nations. The intensity of Communist China's campaign to "liberate
Taiwan" has been moderated, probably in accordance with Soviet tactics
to "reduce international tensions." The Chinese Communists have frequently
not followed the Soviet model on aspects of internal policy, but we believe
that these divergences will not impair Sino-Soviet relations. The
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Chinese Communists continue to acknowledge frankly their dependence on
Soviet aid and advice. The Soviet commitment to aid China's high priority
program of industrialization was recently extended wëll into China's
Second Five-Year Plan (1958-1962) at about the same annual level that has
prevailed for the last five years.
22. We believe that the USSR and Communist China will continue to
be closely linked not only by ideological bonds, but by common hostility
to the US, by an interdependence involving Communist China's manpower
and strategic location and the USSR's industrial and technical capabilities,
and by the advantages of concerted diplomatic and economic activities.
There probably are and will continue to be points of friction in the
relationship, but not of such importance to either party as to over-
balance their joint interest in maintaining it, or to permit outside
influence to affect it basically. Peiping's continued dependence on
Moscow for arms, industrial resources, and technical assistance will
probably give Moscow's views the greater weight on major questions of
global policy. But Peiping's growing strength and prestige as an Asian
power will probably give it increasing potential for influencing Moscow
on Asian issues.
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Soviet-Satellite Relations
23. The current Soviet leaders apparently believe that Stalin's
policy of dictation from Moscow of virtually all aspects of Satellite
affairs was not to the over-all advantage of the USSR. They apparently
blame the excessive rigidity of Moscow's control under Stalin for
Yugoslavia's loss to the Bloc, although they probably believe that no
other Satellite would be able to follow Yugoslavia's course. They
apparently feel that a somewhat looser rein in internal matters which
takes account of national differences and local problems will result
in a sounder and more effective relationship. At the same time, such
actions as the dissolution of the Cominform and the rehabilitation of
Satellite leaders purged for nationalist deviation, which had the effect
of depicting the Satellite regimes in an apparently more independent
role, are useful steps in support of the USSR's current tactics in
foreign policy. The appearance of a relaxation of Soviet control in the
Satellites not only suits the general "relaxation of tensions" theme,
but it bears directly on the campaign to bring Yugoslavia back into
the Bloc and on the effort to obtain contact and ultimately a "popular
front" alliance with Socialist parties throughout the world.
The Representative of the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department
of State, reserves his position on this paragraph.
1
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24. The general direction in which the redefinition of the Soviet-
Satellite relationship is moving now appears somewhat more clearly.
There is apparently to be a much greater degree of inter-Satellite
cooperation, although inter-Satellite arrangements will still be under
Moscow's ultimate control. The Satellite regimes are being permitted
to expand economic relations with the West, thus increasing their own
industrial and trading effectiveness. Concessions are also being
made to Satellite national sentiment. They are no longer obliged to
sacrifice their own prestige by applauding all things Soviet. Recent
changes in Satellite leadership, the new, though discreet, emphasis
on the existence of "separate national roads to socialism," and the
withdrawal of the charges of deviation against Yugoslavia are further
steps in this direction. The picture which emerges, if present trends
continue throughout the period of the estimate, is one in which the
Satellite regimes will enjoy a real if limited autonomy in domestic
affairs and one which their dependence on Moscow will be more
effectively masked.
25. There are some risks for the USSR in this post-Stalin course,
particularly in the possibility of exaggerated expectations among
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NIE 11-4-56
Section II
in the Satellites. By permitting an atmosphere of expectant change
to develop, Bloc leaders will probably stimulate new nationalist
and reformist sentiment, even within the Satellite parties themselves,
which could exceed the level that they anticipated or could safely
allow. In the course of reversing Stalinist policies, particularly
toward Yugoslavia, the USSR has weakened and in some cases destroyed
the position of competent and dependable leaders. On the other
hand, by seeking to maintain in power many of the leaders who were
identified with Stalinist policies, the USSR risks disillusioning
those who believed in its promises of greater independence and
respect for national differences. Finally, the new policies will
introduce a new element of complexity in Soviet-Satellite relations,
with age-old controversies in Eastern Europe and differences in
National tradition and temperament almost certainly increasing in
importance.
25a. Nevertheless, the basic instruments of Soviet domination --
a core of Communist careerists whose first loyalty is to Moscow, the
functioning of Soviet advisers at key points in the Satellite armies
and police systems, the substantial economic dependence of the
Satellites on the USSR imposed by Soviet-directed economic plans,
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and the presence or proximity of Soviet armed force -- will remain.
Dissatisfaction among the Satellite populations will continue and,
in the short run, may even increase and dramatize itself in spora-
dic protest movements. Over the longer run, if the regimes find it
possible to combine somewhat less stringent economic policies with
effective discipline, an increasingly resigned and accommodating
attitude may emerge among the Satellite populations. However, if
active opposition should increase, we believe that the regimes
would employ whatever measures were necessary to maintain themselves
in power even at the cost of abandoning their current effort to con-
ciliate the populations under their control.
(Revised 25 July 1956)
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3679
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
28 June 1956
MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
SUBJECT:
NIE 11-4-56: SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND COURSES OF ACTION
(Part III)
The attached part of the draft estimate has been approved by
the Board of National Estimates pursuant to a consideration of it by
the IAC represent atives.
Aillian P Bud,
WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates
Distribution "A"
DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC revord
By yrs NLE 5/14/02 Date
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