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Draft report on U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe and Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities
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Draft report on U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe and Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities
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The President
TOP SECRET Copy No. 1
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MEMO FOR THE NSC TRANS. DRAFT NSC ACTION
TOP SECRET CONTROL FORM
RE: NSC 174 and NSC 5505/1
DATED: March 20, 1956
Library
SUL
JOHNSON
BY DIRECTION OF THE PRESIDENT, this form must be signed and completed by each
individual (1) who reads this document wholly or in part or (2) who personally
handles it and has access to its contents. Such access must be limited to those
individuals having a "need to know" and appropriate Top Secret clearance.
SIGNATURE
OFFICE
DATE
376
3-20-56
CoMinager
3-20-56
DRAFT
ACTION
RE
NSC 1744
5505/1
WARNING
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE ESP IONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMIS-
SION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
TOP SECRET
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESUNCLASSIFIED
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON
COPY NO. 1
March 20, 1956
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SUBJECT:
United States Policy Toward the Soviet
Satellites in Eastern Europe
and
STATE
SEAL
Exploitation of Soviet and European
Satellite Vulnerabilities
references:
A. Progress Report on NSC 174, dated
February 29, 1956
B. Progress Report on NBC 5505/1, dated
December 14, 1955
C. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary,
subject: "Review of NSC Policy on Soviet
European Satellites", dated October 20,
1955
After discussion of the reference Progress
Reports and of the recommendation in the enclosures to the
reference memorandum of October 20, 1955, the NSC Planning
Board recommends that the National Security Council adopt
the enclosed draft NSC Action in connection with its consid-
eration of the subject at its meeting on Thursday, March 22,
1956.
James Executive JAMES S. LAY, Secretary JR.
cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament
The Special Assistant to the President for Atomic Energy
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4 (b)
MR 86-339 #1
UNCLASSIFIED
BY DJH DATE 11/10/87
UNCLASSIFIED
DRAFT NSC ACTION
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET SATELLITES IN
EASTERN EUROPE
and
EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET AND EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES
(Progress Report on NSC 174, dated February 29, 1956; Progress
Report on NSC 5505/1, dated December 14, 1955; Memo for
NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Review of NSC
Policy on Soviet European Satellites", dated October 20, 1955)
a. Noted and discussed the reference Progress Reports
on the above subjects, and the recommendation in
the enclosures to the reference memorandum of
October 20, 1955, that the NSC Planning Board
review NSC 174 and NSC 5505/1 in the light of
and subsequent to revision of NSC 5501 (NSC 5501
superseded as of March 15, 1956, by NSC 5602/1).
SHI
b. Directed the NSC Planning Board in the light of
the discussion to prepare a revision of U.S.
Policy toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern
urope, to supersede NSC 174, with the understanding
that East Germany will be dealt with primarily in
relation to U.S. Policy toward Germany following
receipt of a forthcoming Progress Report by OCB on
Germany, including East Germany and Berlin.
c. Directed the NSC Planning Board to review NSC 5505/1
in the light of para. 6-c of NSC 5602/1 and submit
such policy recommendations with respect thereto
as may be appropriate.
DECLASSIFIED
Authority mR 86-339 #/
UNCLASSIFIED
By be NLE Date 11/10/87
The President
NNCI
TOP SECRET
Copy No. 1
MEMO FOR NSC RE "EXPLOITATION OF
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SOVIET AND DUROPEAN SATELLITE
VULNERABILITIES" Dated: October 20,
TOP SECRET CONTROL FORM
1955
Department SUL Library
BY DIRECTION OF THE PRESIDENT, this form must be signed and completed by each
individual (1) who reads this document wholly or in part or (2) who personally
handles it and has access to its contents. Such access must be limited to those
individuals having a "need to know" and appropriate Top Secret clearance.
SIGNATURE
OFFICE
DATE
376
10-20-55
3.70.56
OCB
MEMO
10
-20-5
WARNING
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE ESP IONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMIS-
SION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
UNUL
ICU
TOP SECRET
UNCI TOP SECRET
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON
COPY NO. 1
October 20, 1955
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SUBJECT:
Review of NSC Policy on Soviet European
Satellites
REFERENCES:
A. NSC 174
A
B. NSC 5505/1
C. NSC 5501/1
The enclosed memorandum from the Operations
Coordinating Board is submitted herewith for consideration
of the recommendation that the NSC Planning Board review
NSC 174 and NSC 5505/1 in light of and subsequent to:re-
vision of NSC 5501/1.
James Stay Executive JAMES S. LAY, Secretary Jr.
cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4 (b)
MR 86-476#1
BY His DATE 12/4/90
UNCLA
SCIFIED TOP SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET
OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.
October 19, 1955
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
SUBJECT: Review of NSC Policy on Soviet European Satellites
Attached is a memorandum dated September 30 from the
Chairman of the Planning Coordination Group requesting that
the Operations Coordinating Board recommend to the National
Security Council that the NSC Planning Board review NSC 174
and NSC 5505/1 in light of and subsequent to revision of
NSC 5501/1.
Library BUL
The Operations Coordinating Board concurred in this
memorandum on October 12, 1955.
Server starts
Elmer B. Staats
Executive Officer
Attachment:
Memo for the Chairman, OCB,
from Chairman, PCG, 9/30/55
UNCLASSIF SECRET
C
UNCLAS
TOP SECRET
O
THE WHITE HOUSE
P
Washington
Y
September 30, 1955
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
Subject: Review of NSC Policy on Soviet European Satellites
(NSC 174 and NSC 5505/1)
1. By NSC Action No. 1349-c, approved by the President,
March 12, 1955, the Planning Coordination Group was made responsible
for advising and assisting the responsible operating agencies in the
coordinated development of plans and programs to carry out NSC 5505/1,
"Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities."
2. By letter of March 23, 1955, recognizing that the future
implementation of NSC 174 was directly affected by the policies set
forth in NSC 5505/1, the Chairman of the OCB suggested that the Planning
Coordination Group be assigned responsibility for coordinating the
implementation of NSC 174. This assignment was accepted by my letter
of March 29.
3. At its meetings of August 10 and September 21, the OCB con-
sidered an"Outline Plan of Operations on NSC 174" and noted that the
policies set forth in NSC 5505/1 (based on the general strategy outlined
in NSC 5501/1, "Basic National Security Policy,' especially paragraph
26-c) reflect a somewhat subtler strategy and different emphasis than
the policy conclusions underlying NSC 174. Nevertheless, OCB issued the
outline plan, in view of the continuing validity of the objectives of
NSC 174 and the need for the plan in the field in the light of develop-
ments since the meeting of the heads of government in Geneva in July 1955.
4. The Planning Coordination Group believes that the policy con-
clusions underlying U.S. actions respecting the Soviet European satellites,
including actions to exploit vulnerabilities, should be consistent with
the policy and strategy outlined in basic national security policy,
currently under review by the NSC Planning Board.
5. Accordingly, the Planning Coordination Group requests that the
Chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board recommend to the National
Security Council that the NSC Planning Board review NSC 174 and
NSC 5505/1 in the light of and subsequent to revision of NSC 5501/1.
LICENSE
841
/s/ Nelson A. Rockefeller
(VRING
Nelson A. Rockefeller, Chairman
Planning Coordination Group
UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET
The President
TOP SECRET
COPY NO. 1
NSC 5505/1
January 31, 1955
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET AND
EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES
FILL
V Library
ATTENTION
THE ENCLOSED TOP SECRET CONTROL
FORM MUST BE COMPLETED BY EACH
INDIVIDUAL (1) WHO READS THIS
DOCUMENT WHOLLY OR IN PART OR
(2) WHO PERSONALLY HANDLES IT
AND HAS ACCESS TO ITS CONTENTS
NSC
55051
DECLASSIFIED
Authority MR 97-215
By the NLE 7/28/97 Date
TOP SECRET
DECLASSIFIED w/defletions TOP SECRET
COPY NO. 1
172
Progress Report on
Authority NLE 2005-
NSC 5505/1
By MMK NLDDE Date 2/15/06
December. 14, 1955
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
PROGRESS REPORT
on
is Librery BILL
EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET AND
EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES
by
THE PLANNING COORDINATION GROUP
ATTENTION
THE ENCLOSED TOP SECRET CONTROL
FORM MUST BE COMPLETED BY EACH
INDIVIDUAL (1) WHO READS THIS
DOCUMENT WHOLLY OR IN PART OR
(2) WHO PERSONALLY HANDLES IT
AND HAS ACCESS TO ITS CONTENTS
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
COPY
OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
January 14, 1956
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Through the National Security Council
Subject: Progress Report on NSC 5505/1
In compliance with the request of the Planning
Coordination Group (PCG), I am forwarding herewith the
Progress Report on NSC 5505/1 dated December 14, 1955.
You will note from General Parker's memorandum
dated December 16, 1955 that the PCG did not approve
but mercly "agreed to note and forward without comment
to the Chairman, OCB, the attached progress report on
NSC 5505/1 for transmission to the National Security
Council".
Since this is not an approved Progross Report, it
would not appear to commit the OCB or any of its member
agencies, including the Department of State. The views
of the Department of State on materials in this report
will be available in the usual manner when the report
is under consideration in the NSC Planning Board.
/s/ Herbert Hoover, Jr.
Herbert Hoover, Jr.
Chairman
Attachment:
Memorandum from Gen. T. W. Parker,
transmitting Progress Report on
NSC 5505/1 (Copy 1).
- 1 -
TOP SECRET
COPY
TOP SICRET
PLANNING CCORDINATION GROUP
Washington, D.C.
December 16, 1955
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Operations Coordinating Board
SUBJECT: Progress Report on NSC 5505/1
At its meeting of December 14, 1955, the Planning
Coordination Group agreed to note and forward without comment
to the Chairman, OCB, the attached progress report on NSC 5505/1
for transmission to the National Security Council.
/s/ T.W. PARKER
T. W. Parker
Brigadier General, USA
Executive Secretary
Attachment
Copies 1, 2 and 3 of subject
Progress Report, Dec 14, 1955.
- 2 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
PLANNING COORDINATION GROUP
December 14, 1955
PROGRESS REPORT ON NSC 5505/1, "EXPLOITATION
OF SOVIET AND EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES'
SUMMARY
A. Actions and Executions of Policy:
1. The Planning Coordination Group has developed
an agreed working list of Soviet bloc vulnerabilities*, which
is included in the detailed supplementary report. This list
also includes vulnerabilities of the European satellites.
Since actions taken to exploit European satellite vulnera-
bilities are reported on separately in connection with NSC 174,
and since a full and balanced consideration of the vulnera-
bilities of the world-wide communist effort must take account
of many free world factors beyond the scope of this report,
primary emphasis has been placed on problems of inducing
favorable evolutionary trends in the USSR.
2. Using the agreed list, the member departments
and agencies (USIA was invited to participate in the develop-
ment of this progress report) here report on the actions they
have taken to exploit these vulnerabilities during the period
January 31, 1955, to December 1, 1955.
3. Analysis of U. S. actions taken to exploit Soviet
vulnerabilities reveals that their effect appears to have
been modest and for the most part marginal, despite a sub-
stantial covert effort designed to exploit virtually every
vulnerability cited. U. S. agencies concerned likewise have
recognized that, for the foreseeable future, U. S. efforts
in this direction will probably continue to be marginal in
their impact. Lack of prospects for immediate sucess should
not lead to the conclusion that the U.S. must abandon efforts
to create conditions which will lead to the favorable evolu-
tion of the Soviet system.
*Definition as contained in NSC 5505/1, "An exploitable vul-
nerability exists in a foreign society only if three elements
are present: (a) a 'weakness' to be exploited, (b) a U.S. ob-
jective, and (c) a U.S. capability we can employ or develop
to exploit the weakness in a way which will advance the bjective
**General comment on covert operations will be found in the
detailed report. A more extended report on covert actions
taken to exploit the listed vulnerabilities will be made
directly to the PCG and the NSC.
- 3 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
4. Certain U. S. actions may have somewhat en-
couraged evolutionary development in the character and
policies of the Soviet Government, such as the following:
a. Exercise of influence or pressure by U.S.
participation in International Conferences with the
Soviet Union.
b. Exchanges of delegations with the Soviet
Union; first steps have been taken towards planning
an integrated program of exchanges for which State would
attempt to get Soviet approval.
c. Continuing pressures, particularly at the
second Geneva Conference, on the Soviet Government to
allow expanded contacts and freer communication with
the Soviet people.
d. Presentation through information media of
comment on Soviet developments; however, the bulk of
overt U.S. information output to the USSR is and should
be concerned with presenting U.S. and free world
policies, explaining U.S. objectives and conveying a
picture of U.S. society.
5. Implicit in this report is recognition that
effective U.S. action taken to deter Soviet external ex-
pansion and to increase free world strength and cohesion
has been and will continue to be essential for progress
towards inducing favorable evolutionary developments in
the Soviet Union.
B. Evaluation of Progress in Implementing NSC 5505/1
1. A re-examination of agreed Soviet vulnerabilities
indicates that most of them are not subject to overt ex-
ploitation (1) because of the.lack of current capability or
(2) because such exploitation would not serve over-all U. S.
policy requirements. For example, overt exploitation of
Soviet nationality problems appears undesirable as long as
the main groups which the U.S. seeks to influence are the
bureaucracy and the intelligentsia, which are largely Great
Russian. Likewise, overt U.S. criticism of Soviet internal
economic and political developments would appear very marginal
in most cases in stimulating evolutionary changes. Such
criticism would probably be resented by the people the U.S.
seeks to influence as interference in domestic Soviet affairs.
Also, the U.S. frequently does not have the necessary detailed
information on such developments to insure effective criticism.
- 4 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
2. The actions outlined above, which were taken
during the past year, may have contributed to eventual
changes in Soviet policy. Special attention should be
given to the role played by recent international conferences
in this regard. The unity and determination of the Western
nations at the two Geneva Conferences doubtless impressed
the Soviet leaders. These leaders may also have come to
recognize, to a greater degree than before, that Western
defense policies did not represent a threat to Soviet
security. These intangibles, although hard to measure,
are no less important than the publicized Conference
discussions.
3. During the past year the Soviet Government has
allowed more Americans to visit the Soviet Union. More
important in the longer run perhaps has been the Poviet
willingness to facilitate exchanges of delegations with
non-communist groups in the Free World. But an increase
in officially sanctioned exchanges is not an unmixed blessing.
Aside from the possible security risk and apart from Soviet
technological gains, there is the danger that increased
contacts could be interpreted at home and abroad as a re-
laxation of U.S. vigilance against communism. On balance,
however, increased two-way movement of Soviet and American
citizens may aid eventually in changing the outlook of the
Soviet intelligentsia and bureaucracy towards their society
and the role which they might play in the development of
their country. Likewise, the contacts between influential
Americans and the Soviet leaders should lead to a greater
degree of realism about conditions in the two countries,
thereby counteracting certain mutual misconceptions.
4. The same rigid and extensive controls which make
it so difficult to influence the Soviet Union also largely
prevent us from learning the result of our efforts. It is
impossible to evaluate with precision the impact to date
of greater contacts. Only a relatively few Soviet citizens
have been involved and in fact no mass program of exchange
is currently contemplated or would appear to be feasible.
Yet, unless the level of contacts eventually becomes much
greater, their over-all impact will probably remain low.
However, the present Soviet leaders did have their first
significant contacts with American leaders other than
diplomats during the past year and there is reason to be-
lieve that they acquired, as a result, a clearer picture of
American international intentions and capabilities.
- 5 -
TOP SEC RET
TOP SECRET
5. It is difficult to evaluate the effect of overt
U.S. information efforts. The Voice of America appears
to have reached a significant number of the Soviet
bureaucracy and intelligentsia, the major U.S. target
group, and the picture projected by the Voice of America
of U.S. attitudes and institutions has probably been a
factor in keeping alive certain doubts about the Soviet
system. This in turn should serve as a direct if marginal
contribution to stimulating evolutionary tendencies.
However, any real success in this field will depend in the
long run on reaching the Soviet target group more effectively.
Western attacks on the Soviet "iron curtain" have shown
that the Soviet Government is most sensitive to this
issue. These continuing attacks combined with other
factors were probably responsible for the slight lowering of
barriers which has taken place.
6. Despite the difficulties referred to in para-
graph 4, some progress has been made during the past year
toward determining the effectiveness of covert activities
directed against the Soviet orbit.
There is still very little hard evidence
of reaction within the USSR, but most of the indications
we do have are encouraging. At least a small measure of
success has been achieved
in countering the massive Soviet effort to block the free
flow of ideas and information.
7. In looking at the Soviet system, however,
there are as yet no indications of substantial evolution
in a direction favorable to the U. S. Certain evidence
is perhaps hopeful. For example, there has been some re-
duction in the powers of the secret police. The managerial
class seems to want less political interference in business
operations. There also seems to be a growing realization
on the part of the Soviet leadership that in this thermo-
nuclear age total war is unacceptable as an instrument of
national policy. Nevertheless the Soviet Government
remains a monolithic communist state, committed to its
long-range objectives, hostile to the U.S. and determined
to combat U.S. moves to strengthen the unity of the
Free World.
- 6 -
TOP SEC RET
TOP SECRET
8. As previously stated, lack of prospects for
immediate success should not lead to the conclusion that
the U.S. must abandon efforts to create conditions which
will lead to the favorable evolution of the Soviet system.
Since preventive warfare is unacceptable to the U.S.
as an instrument of national policy and since the promotion
of revolutionary changes appears to be beyond our
national capabilities, the promotion of evolutionary
changes appears to offer the most acceptable course for
the U.S. and the Free World to follow.
CONCLUSIONS
9. If we accept this factor and if we take note
frankly of the marginal U.S. potential in that direction,
what general conclusions can we draw?
a. To induce the evolution of the Soviet
system in a direction more compatible with U.S.
interests. the U.S. must not only convince the Soviet
Government that its national security is not threatened
by the U.S., but it must also demonstrate that no
scope for further expansion of Soviet control exists.
Only if these conditions are satisfied would the
regime be stimulated to concentrate on internal
There
development. Development of major U.S. deterrent
powers and increased efforts to achieve free world
unity and stability as well as to neutralize the
forces of communism within the Free World assume a
key importance in this effort.
b. Evolution in the Soviet system will be
slow, so slow that it may be difficult to detect.
c. The U.S. probably can do little more in
the near future than create an atmosphere favorable
to such change. This can be accomplished chiefly
by projecting to the Soviet intelligentsia and
bureaucracy a picture of a U.S. strong and confident in
its determination to preserve and strengthen the free
world without being provocatively hostile toward
the Soviet Union. The public statements of top
executive, legislative and military leaders will
play an important positive or negative role in this
regard, according to their contents, and an in-
creased awareness of these possible positive or
negative effects must continually be sought.
- 7 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
10. Within this general framework, the following
specific conclusions emerge:
a. It is generally recognized that the
efforts of the Soviet bureaucracy and intelligentsia
to achieve a more rewarding life and a greater
measure of self-expression offer the best hope for
accomplishing the central aim of NSC 5505/1. U. S.
effectiveness in influencing the course of such
a development depends in the first instance upon
our ability to reach this group. However, the
effectiveness as well as the scope of our main in-
strumentalities for accomplishing this purpose (radio,
publications exchange, exchange of persons and personal
contacts) are limited, in large part because of Soviet
obstructions. Continuing free world pressure must
be devoted to reducing these obstructions.
b. There appear to be new opportunities for
influencing the direction of Soviet development through
even the minimal efforts of the Soviet Government to
increase trade with the United States. For example,
the acquisition of technology for producing consumer
goods or the direct acquisition of these goods could
conceivably have the effect of producing rising demands
for a better life in the USSR.
Library
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
11. The foregoing suggests that while NSC 5505/1
is adequate in its core concept (that favorable evolutionary
developments must be encouraged), it should be revised:
a. To recognize the marginal character of
U.S. capabilities in this field, and the long time
required to achieve success in this endeavor.
b. To enumerate the major U.S. policy ob-
jectives towards the Soviet Union, with particular
emphasis on those objectives toward which efforts
to stimulate evolutionary trends should be directed.
c. To point more closely to the target
groups which the U. S. must reach.
- 8 -
TCP SEC RET
TOP SECRET
12. Perhaps the major inadequacy of NSC 5505/1
is its single concentration on the vulnerabilities concept.
Concentration of overt actions on the exploitation of
discontents would, if followed, prevent giving a forward-
looking, constructive tone to our public statements and
informational output; USIA and State have recognized this fa ctor
and have worked on the assumption that open U.S. criticism
of internal Soviet developments would have a largely
negative effect on the target group on which the U. S.
must concentrate its efforts.
13. This does not mean that there should be no
criticism of Soviet internal developments. Rather it
means that overt criticism, if it is to nourish evolutionary
trends, must be selective, subtle, and designed to support
the realistic hopes and tendencies of the target group.
On the other hand, covert and unattributed attacks on
the fundamental concepts of communism as outmoded and
self-contradictory should continue.
Theaty
C. Emerging Problems and Future Actions
Approved
1. General
The following problems with regard to NSC 5505/1
need particular attention in the coming year:
a. We need to study more carefully our
objectives and our potential for aiding an evolution
of the Soviet system in the light of our most
recent experience and information. Thinking about
the evolution of the Soviet system has to date been
along lines of the direction in which the U.S. would
like to see the USSR evolve. We should give more
attention to the direction in which the USSR is likely
to evolve. Only by so doing can we determine whether
there are favorable trends which could be stimulated,
if only marginally, by U.S. actions.
b. In the light of the above and of the
conclusions in Section B, We need to revise NSC 5505/1.
(The FCG has previously recommended that the NSC
Planning Board review NSC 174 and NSC 5505/1 in the
light of an subsequent to revision of NSC 5501.) The
scope of NSC 5505/1 tends to be too broad to allow it
to act as a guide to operations. Consideration might
be given therefore to the desirability of including
the key ideas in NSC 5505/1 in papers on the following
subjects (or in new papers to be written) and according
to the priority in which they are listed:
- 9 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
(1) The satellite states - increased
flexibility in this area suggests that NSC 174
be revised, pointing up the special problems
of and potential for U.S. influence in Eastern
Europe. Separate country papers in this area
may also be desirable.
(2) Communist China, including possibly
a revision of NSC 5429/5, with particular emphasis
on internal Chinese developments.
(3) The Soviet Union - to include the
major portions of NSC 5505/1.
(4) International Communism -- although
exploiting foreign dominance of the Communist
movement in particular countries depends on
local factors, International communism operates
through a world-wide mechanism. Its integrated
campaign cannot be defeated by improvised counter-
attacks alone. We require a globally conceived
strategy executed on a regional or country basis.
After examining guidance available in other
policy papers it may be found desirable to develop
a U.S. policy statement regarding International
Communism.
C. We need to continue our efforts to
acquire more knowledge about Soviet institutions and
LIBERTY
attitudes as a basis for further operations in this
field. Efforts to acquire such information continue
to be given high priority. the limitations imposed
by the Soviet Iron Curtain still remain formidable.
d. We need to create better means of getting
to the Soviet bureaucracy and intelligentsia: (1)
through promoting more effective person-to-person
contacts: (2) through breaking down barriers to other
means of communications. Both phases of this problem
were thoroughly discussed prior to the Geneva
conference and a number of proposals were made to the
Soviet government at that conference. The answer to
these proposals was a sharp attack on the West for
bringing up the embarrassing problem of the Soviet
peoples' lack of freedom of contact with the outside
world and tacit expressions of content with present
Soviet policies on exchange of persons and tourism.
It is quite apparent, however, that in the technical
and scientific fields the Soviet government wants to
expand contacts with the Free World and particularly
with the U.S. This desire should be used as a lever to:
- 10 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
(1) break down barriers to communications;
(2) establish a broad integrated infor-
mation and cultural program;
(3) create the kind of exchange of
persons program which will advance the long-range
factors considered under NSC 5505/1.
2. The Need for Continuing Efforts to Obtain
Soviet Acceptance of an Information and Cultural Program.
In the long run, a carefully planned information
and cultural program, aimed at extending knowledge of
the United States among Soviet citizens and particularly
emphasizing increased and freer personal contacts, seems
to offer useful possibilities for the promotion of de-
sirable evolutionary changes within the Soviet system. We
should seek to establish such an integrated program through
bilateral negotiations with the USSR. This program might
include distribution in the USSR of an official Russian
language magazine, sponsorship of exhibits, the introduction
of American films, and a larger publications exchange.
SIGNA
3. The Need for Continuing Efforts to Establish
a Controlled Contacts Program.
3
a. Freer person-to-person contacts could play
a major role in aiding the process of a slow evolution
of the Soviet system. Some types of contacts will move
forward by their own momentum. Visits by tourists
to the Soviet Union will continue to increase but
will probably, for the present, be nominal in effect
because of the language barrier and the conducted-
tour nature of travel there. Controlled contacts
between U.S. and Soviet diplomats have been expanded.
Soviet diplomats are having more contacts with the
peoples of the countries to which they are accredited.
Likewise, U.S. diplomats in Moscow are beginning
to have wider contacts there. Casual contacts between
businessmen and journalists resident in or visiting the
Soviet Union are becoming more common and freer. This
type of influence will be haphazard and difficult to
judge for effect in the short run.
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This influence, however, will be effective
only to the degree that American travelers are aware
of political problems which they will meet in the
Soviet Union and of how they can best react to them.
Despite difficulties inherent in "political indoctrina-
tion" of private American travelers, an effort should
be made to find acceptable ways of informally briefing
American citizens traveling to the Soviet Union.
b. The objective of the development of a
planned, integrated exchange of persons program with
the Soviet bloc at a level and in areas acceptable
to the U.S. must be pursued if the Soviet Government
is not to retain the propaganda and intelligence initia-
tive in this field. State has undertaken in close con-
junction with CIA to develop such a program.
Special attention is at present being given to the
possibilities for exchanges in the fields of agri-
culture (with the Department of Agriculture),
medicine (with the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare), mining and smelting (with the ne-
partment of Interior), and general industry (with
the Department of Commerce). No exchanges of labor
delegations are presently planned. This initial
planning is designed not to create a high level of
exchange but to insure that U.S. interests are
maximized. Since the level of person-tc-person
1
contacts will probably remain small the over-all
impact on the evolution of the USSR will be limited.
The present informal framework for interdepartmental
coordination of such exchanges appears to be adequate.
C. The chief difficulty faced by State is the
lack of personnel to carry out the detailed planning
for each trip, to negotiate the necessary details with
the Soviet bloc government, and to backstop the super-
vision of each Soviet group coming to the U.S. The
present budgetary estimates also do not provide for
meeting certain necessary program costs which must
usually be incurred over the above-mentioned adminis-
trative support; chiefly the payment of salary and
trip expenses for "tour directors" and translators.
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d. The policy directives given in NSC 5508/1
for the exchange program are in general adequate but
need minor revisions. Liberalization of that policy
in order to allow for the admission of Soviet citizens
for a longer period as exchange students should be
considered at this time. Many problems not en-
visioned at the time of the approval of NSC 5508/1
have subsequently arisen. For example: the need to
admit as officials all Soviets visiting the United
States, since the Soviet Government has refused
to allow its. citizens to be fingerprinted; the
lack of reciprocity involved in business trips; and
the methods of handling exchanges in sensitive
industrial fields. These problems have been solved,
however, within the bounds of that policy and such
developments can probably be covered in the progress
report on that paper. More complicated machinery or
limitations in action should not be written into
that paper.
4. All of the foregoing measure will require a
higher degree of Congressional and public awareness of the
problems and prospects for contacts with the Poviet peoples
as an instrument for accomplishing the purposes of
NSC 5505/1. State and other agencies concerned should
undertake to discuss these problems with Congressional
leaders. Thereafter what may be needed is a clear statement
by a high administration official, preferably the President,
defining our hopes, our prospects, and the ground rules
under which we must operate.
D. Future Plans
A tentative outline plan designed to effect
greater coordination of U.S. effort with reference to the
exploitation of the agreed list of vulnerabilities has
been developed. This tentative outline plan was transmitted
to the member agencies of the FCG on October 7. It
provides an initial basis for inter-agency planning in this
field. Further implementation of this policy depends upon
a greater flow of ideas, in part through increased
contact, between the U.S. and the USSR.
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PLANNING COORDINATION GROUP
PROGRESS REPORT ON NSC 5505/1, "EXPLOITATION OF
SOVIET AND EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES'
DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT
A. List of Vulnerabilities:
1. The Planning Coordination Group developed a working
compilation of Soviet bloc vulncrabilities (See TAB A), which
was, after several submissions and reviews of the member de-
partments and agencies, accepted as a statement of exploitable
vuinerabilities within the Soviet bloc.
2. Based on this list, the member departments and agen-
cies (USIA was invited to participate in the development of
this progress report) reported on the actions they have taken
to exploit these vulnerabilities during the period of this
reports.
LIDTATE
B. General Comments of the Departments and Agencies
1. State: The chief program for which the Department of
State is responsible, concerning the exploitation of Soviet
vulnerabilities, is the program for expanded contacts with the
Soviet Union. The advantages and disadvantages of pursuing a
broader program of contacts has been under active discussion
all during the past year. Beginning with NSC 5508/1, and per-
haps more realistically with the Soviet expressions of the
desire to expand exchanges, the Department of State has taken
active measures to develop a positive program of its own. The
results of this would be to channel all requests by govern-
mental and private organizations for visits of Soviet groups
through State. Likewise, a limited U. S. initiative in regard
to visits in certain categories is under active discussion
with
Departments of Defense, Justice, Agriculture,
Commerce and Interior.
2. Defense: While most of the vulnerabilities are not
such as to lend themselves to full exploitation by the Defense
Department, there are i number of Defense programs which con-
tribute to the exploitation of certain vulnerabilities. All
of the military departments are participating actively in pro-
grams designed to encourage and induce defections among the
Soviet and Satellite populations, including military personnel.
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3. USIA: USIA at present is limited almost exclusively
to the medium of radio for reaching the peoples of the USSR.
VOA programs are on the air in the Soviet Union for 22 hours
a day and consist of Russian language programs and programs
in Armenian, Georgian and Ukrainian, as well as Estonian,
Latvian and Lithuanian. The Russian language programs include
two hours of original programming from the U.S. and 45 minutes
of original programming from Munich. They are on the air in
the USSR (except in the Far East) for 20 hours, including re-
peats and relays. The other languages, which comprise 3 -1/2
hours of original programming from the U.S. and 1 hour from
Munich, are on the air in the USSR for 15 hours. A one-hour
English language program, "Panorama USA", originated in
Washington and relayed from Munich, was inaugurated on
October 31, 1955 as an additional means of increasing VOA's
audience in East European countries and the western part of
the USSR.
The Agency also reaches the USSR with a two-hour daily
program of popular music and jazz, called "Music USA" which,
while ostensibly beamed to Scandinavia, aims at gaining an
audience among Soviet youth. USIA intends at a later date to
include a limited amount of news and possibly commentary in
English which would be worked out with the interests and
libits
curiosity of Soviet youth in mind.
In the medium of television, USIA is providing materials
and offering suggestions for subject matter to be included in
an American commercial firm's exchange of television films
with the USSR.
The general scope and nature of possible exploitation of
Soviet vulnerabilities by USIA's radio output to the USSR are
determined by two NSC resolutions of October 22, 1953. The
first, setting forth the mission of USIA, places considerable
emphasis upon:
(a) explanation and interpretation of U.S. policies
and objectives,
(b) depicting their correlation with the legitimate
aspirations of other peoples, and
(c) delineation of important aspects of U.S. life
and culture which facilitate understanding of U.S.
policies and objectives. The second ,NSC resolution,
based on Recommendation No. 2 of the Jackson Report,
states that VOA broadcasts should consist primarily
of objective factual news supplemented by commentary.
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In accordance with the forugoing. radio output to the
USSR has been designed primarily to provide Soviet listeners
with an understanding of U.S. and free world objectives, and
essential information about U.S. policies and culture con-
cealed from them by the Soviet Government. To a far lesser
extent, news and commentary in the form of features and
analyses have been presented on topics suggested by specific
events or developments within the Soviet Union, the Sovict
orbit or the international sphere. Exploitation of Soviet
vulnorabilities has therefore been limited to (1) an indirect
approach through the selections of nows items and commentary
on free world (especially U.S.) achievements and methods de-
signed to engender certain conclusions in the listener's mind
regarding comparative Soviet performances and conditions known
to him, and (2) a somewhat more direct approach through the
careful preparation of commentary upon events and developments
within the Soviet orbit.
4.
Some of our operations against the satellites have, of
course, an additional impact on the USSR itself and particu-
larly on the Soviet leadership. For example, during the dis-
cussions of the exchange problem by the Foreign Ministers,
Molotov on 1: November specifically attacked Radio Free Europe
with such oitterness as to suggest that RFE is a real obstacle
to the maintenance of Soviet controls in Eastern Europe.
We also have numerous ways of attacking the vulnerabili-
ties of the Communist international apparatus in the free
world, and some of our action in this regard at the same time
serves indirectly to exploit Soviet vulnerabilitics. An ex-
tensive effort is made to expose, harass, and discredit
Communist elements in all areas, especially where they repre-
sent an active threat to the security and stability of free
governments.
Taken altogether, these actions involve a considerable in-
vestment in funds, skilled manpower, and operational resources.
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A word of precaution is necessary with respect to
exploitation of the vulnerabilities themselves
U.S. assumptions as to what
constitute Soviet-Communist vulnerabilities must be kept under
continuing critical review. Many of the items cited in the
agreed list remain to be confirmed as truly exploitable vul-
nerabilities, in terms of the agreed definition of this
STATE
phrase. The answer will of course lie in slowly and pain-
fully acquired knowledge as to the kind of reaction which is
is
induced by calculated U.S. cold war action, and as to whether
this reaction does indeed serve to satisfy the requirements
of national strategy as defined in NSC 5501 or any future re-
vision thereof. Lacking enough of this knowledge despite our
increasingly intensive efforts to obtain it, we must often
fall back on two certainties: (1) it is clearly worthwhile to
break through the communications barrier; (2) we must maintain
communications' channels
against
a day when they may be vital to our national security.
Nothwithstanding reservations about the vulnerabilities,
the present concepts and language of NSC 5501 and NSC 5505/1
are satisfactory
related planning have for some time past been
proceeding within the framework formalized in these two policy
documents, and their effect has been to lend assurance that
we are on the right track. While, in any revision of these
policy papers, we would subscribe to an acknowledgment of the
modest character of what the U.S. Government can hope to ac-
complish in its day-to-day efforts to exploit the Soviet-
Communist vulnerabilities cited, we feel that these vulnera-
bilities probably are, in the main, valid for the long haul
and that we should continue
to take advantage of them.
C. Statement of Action
So that actions with respect to identical vulncrabilities
may be compared, selected illustrative actions are indicated
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in instances where at least two agencies have reported on
them:
1. The failure of Communist ideology to capture the
minds and determine the ideals and goals of many Soviet youth.
State: State has given approval in principle to requests of
reputable American youth organizations, the ASA* and the
Young Adult's Council, to invite several small groups of
Soviet youth to the U.S. in the coming year. In order not to
give Communist youth groups extra prestige or to take action
counter to our interests in strengthening free world anti-
Communist youth groups, these invitations will not be extended
to the Komsomol. State is also suggesting to the Soviet
Government that a beginning be made on student exchanges in
the field of American and Soviet youth interested in the study
of the other country's language and culture.
USIA: VOA's Russian Service has occasionally exploited this
vulnerability by making the point that, in spite of systematic
pressure and indoctrination, Soviet youth continues to be a
problem to the regime. A major peg was "An Incident in the
6th Grade" (of one of the Moscow schools), described first in
the Literary Gazette, and then elaborated upon both in letters
to the editors and Literary Gazette and in Pravada. VOA com-
mented in a number of scripts on the implication of this in-
cident, namely the natural reluctance of young people (a) to
submit to the type of ideological discipline imposed upon them
by Communist authorities, and (b) to act as informers against
their friends. Another case in point was an example of a
Komsomol youth who was chided for faithfulness to religious
STATES
customs; Bishop John, of San Francisco, commented on this in
one of his weekly Sunday talks over VOA.
Another Soviet development utilized was the intention of
the Soviet government, as disclosed by the Soviet press, to
curtail the number of admissions to institutions of higher
learning, which naturally created disillusionment among young
people.
The two-hour "Music USA" program, consisting of one hour
of popular music and one hour of jazz, was initiated with a
view to the enthusiasm of Soviet youth for this type of music
despite the regime's opposition to it as being "decadent."
2. Desire of the people for freedom of self-expression in
some form and the lack of free access to information.
State: One of the chief aims of an expanded exchange program
is to use the desire of the Soviet people for more freedom of
*American Student Association
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expression in an attempt to induce slowly an evolution of
Soviet policy and internal institutions in a direction fa-
vorable to U.S. national interests. State has abolished
the requirement of specific validation of American passports
for travel to the USSR and has allowed and in some cases in-
vited a larger number of Soviet citizens to visit the U.S.
:
steps which should increase Soviet desires for even greater
and more normal contacts.
USIA: This vulnerability has been exploited quite frequently,
whenever opportunities presented themselves. VOA broadcasts,
based on developments at the Second All-Union Writers'
Congress at the end of 1954 and a Writers' Conference early
this summer, analyzed the lack of creative freedom, or left-
handed relaxation of restrictions which constitutes "author-
ized freedom." Scripts showed how the Communist Party has
tried to enslave artists, writers, and intellectuals in gen-
eral, by requiring their servile adherence to the fluctuating
party line, and use them to serve political objectives of the
regime.
3. The dilemma that the Soviets can probably obtain real
results in agriculture, necessary for continued substantial
economic growth, only by diverting resources and altering the
collectivist structure of agriculture in ways which would re-
duce their political control over the largest segment of the
UNIT
o
population, the peasantry, which in turn would seriously
undermine the bases of Communism in the USSR.
Amount
Defense: The global base structure of the Air Force and the
6
rotation and staging operation of strategic and tactical air-
craft have influenced Soviet foreign and domestic policies,
and will continue to do so. The military strength represented
by the United States Air Force is a contributing factor in
the huge Soviet investment in armaments. This investment
competes directly with resources available for consumer goods.
USIA: This being one of the most vulnerable sectors of Soviet
economy, VOA had frequent opportunity to analyze it in its
general, as well as in its specific, aspects, including such
subject matter as that listed under vulnerabilities (9) -- the
peasants' continuing hatred of collectivization and their
natural desire for owning their own land and freely enjoying
the fruits of their labor, and (10) -- the regime's continued
reliance on collective farming in spite of all its grave
shortcomings. VOA comments on these matters were pegged to
such events as Malenkov's resignation for alleged inability
to cope with agricultural problems; the decree on increased
local authority in agricultural planning; the Khrushchev
speech in Suratov on the same matter; the decision to send
30,000 party workers to kolkhoz management posts, etc.
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Among the points made in VOA commentary was the fact that
such concessions as the lowering of agricultural taxes were
not solving the basic evils of a system that continues to de-
prive the peasant of free ownership of land and of free ini-
tiative in his work. VOA also commented upon the fact that
decentralization of agricultural planning merely shifted the
burden of ultimate responsibility from the bureaucracy to the
little people, the peasants.
The Soviet agricultural delegation's U.S. visit provided
VOA with an excellent opportunity to present a series of
scripts on American agriculture which indicated the possibil-
ities offered by the American system of private land owner-
ship, coupling individual initiative, farmers' free coopera-
tion, and governmental services, for resolving many of the
difficulties which beset Soviet agriculture, largely as a con-
sequence of its collectivist organization.
4. Counter-measures to defection are costly in terms of
money and efficiency.
Defense: Implementation of the Volunteer Freedom Corps con-
STATE
cept, although it has been postponed to a more propitious
time, and therefore not specifically an implementing action,
is considered a latent capability for exploiting the vulnera-
bilities concerned with defection.
Air Force rules of engagement have indirectly permitted
and encouraged defection by Communist pilots by providing that
no offensive action will be taken against an intruder aircraft
unless the intercepted aircraft commits a hostile act. USAFE
pilots are to direct intruding aircraft to USAF bases. Cash
rewards have been offered for Soviet aircraft desired by the
Air Force.
USIA: VOA Washington has exploited the Soviet vulnerability
to defection, in general, within the limited possibilities of
the Washington/New York area, (i. C., the recent arrival of
the Tuapse sailors). Use was made of tape recordings re-
ceived from the Munich Radio Center and covering defectors'
organizations, both here and abroad, in its news items and
has carried many successful resettlement stories.
5. Contradictions between Communist theory and Soviet
practicc.
State: This theme is used repeatedly in State's speeches and
public statements, but directly for its effect on the free
world. However, the use of this theme may be counterproduc-
tive as far as the Soviet people themselves are concerned.
USIA: Centrally produced USIA special materials, such as a
1.00 - page packet containing 12 documentary articles exposing
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Communist election travesties, a pamphlet, "Facts About
Communism-Justice", a weekly scries, "Religion VS. Communism,"
containing current documentation of Communist anti-religious
practices, and periodic backgrounders on such subjects as the
objectives underlying Soviet peace propaganda and conditions
in East Germany, an anti-Communist cartoon feature, "Comrades,"
featuring discrepancies between Communist words and deeds
etc., were distributed to numerous USIS posts for appropriate
local placement.
Typical articles appearing in Problems of Communism con-
trasted Marxist and carly Leninist pronouncements regarding
"classless society" with the rigid stratification prevailing
in the USSR; compared Soviet claims of the special qualities
of "New Soviet Man" and the new Soviet society with the facts
of increasing alcoholism and delinquency which are engendered
by the nature of the Soviet way of life; distinguished Soviet
practices from Marxist theory; reviewed in scholarly manner
three books on Marxism regarding the relation between
Marxism and Stalinism, subjecting both to critical examina-
tion; noted the disparity between the image of socialist
society as projected by Marx and Lenin and the notoriously
harsh and cruel characteristics of Soviet criminal law.
Under Scrutiny carried articles, for example, which called
attention to the discard by Brazilian Communists of their
doctrinal worker-peasant appoal in order to capitalize on
anti-U.S. sentiments; analyzed the contradiction between the
Soviet trade offensive and Soviet claims to sclf-sufficiency.
Books distributed under the idcological book program,
which contrasted Communist theory with Soviet practice, in-
cluded "Stalin VS. Marx" by Klasu Mehnert and "The Dynamics
of Soviet Society" by Walter Rostow.
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TAB A TO PROGRESS REPORT ON NSC 5505/1
LIST OF AGREED VULNERABILITIES PERTAINING TO NSC 5505/1
The following list of vulnerabilities*
represents a consensus of agreement as to
these Communist orbit tulnerapilities which
are most exploitable and which deserve the
highest priority of U. S. effort.
A. Social Discontents
1. The failure of Communist idealogy to capture the
minds and determine the ideals and goals of many Soviet
youth.
2. Desire of the people for freedom of self-expression
in some form, and the lack of free access to information.
3. Desire of the intelligentsia to we part of a cul-
tural world community.
+. The conflict between Communist attitudes toward
LIDISTRY
religion and the persistence of religious feelings.
B. Nationality and Minority Problems
5. The inferior position and Russification of many
minority groups.
S. The political unreliability of many minority
groups.
7. Pride of national groups in their cultural heritage
and their desire for self-cxpression.
*Definition as contained in NSC 5505/1. "An exploitable
vulnerability exists in a foreign society only if three
elements are present: (a) a 'weakness' to be exploited,
(b) a U.S. objective, and (c) a U.S. capability we can
employ or develop to exploit the weakness in a way which
will advance the objective."
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C. Economy
8. The dilemma that the Soviets can probably obtain
real results in agriculture, necessary for continued suo-
stantial economic growth, only by diverting resources and
altering the collectivist structure of agriculture in ways
which would reduce their political control over the largest
segment of the population, the peasantry, which in turn
would seriously undermine the bases of communism in the
USSR.
9. The persistent and deep hatred of collective farming
by the peasantry.
10. The dedication of the regime to maintaining the col-
lective farm system, and its stated intentions to collectivize
the peasantry even further. (i. e., Khrushchev's abortive
agrogorod plan).
11. The prolonged depression of the standard of living,
accompanied by the unrelenting pace of industrialization
with its continuing demand of heavy sacrifices from the
people.
12. The unequal share of those goods actually available
received by different elements of the population.
13. Soviet desire to exploit the scientific and tech-
nical progress of the West despite the attendant security
risk to the Soviet system.
D. Political
14. The stratification of Soviet society contrary to
the "classless" Communist concept; for example, the favored
position of the intelligentsia, bureaucracy, and Army and
Party officials.
15. Personnal power relationships.
16. The conflict between the high centralization of
decision making and the efficiency of the internal operation
of the system.
17. The potential threat to Party control from the pro-
fessional interests of the growing managerial class.
18. Conflict between foreign economic policy demands and
internal development.
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19. Cleavages at the top in objectives and methods.
20. Conflict between Soviet practice and Soviet propa-
ganda.
E. Military
21. The special position and possible political impor-
tance of the military.
22. Morale problem of Soviet troops when stationed in
European countries for any period of time.
23. The effect of desertions upon the Soviet leadership's
confidence in the reliability of Soviet officers and troops.
24. Soviet exploitation of demobilized soldiers in the
new lands and other areas of economic crisis (i. e., coal
mine_).
25. Counter-measures to defection are costly in terms of
money and efficiency.
F. Satellites*
26. Nationalism in the Satellitos.
27. Germany striving for reunification
28. Passive resistance in the Satellites.
29. Desire of Satellites to be part of a European com-
munity.
30. Reaction to Russian or Pan-Slavic nationalism and
imperialism in the Satellites.
31. Unrest caused by subjugation of Sutellites to a
traditionally hated power.
32. Confusion, dissension, and opportunism in Satellite
regimes.
33. Patriotic sentiments of the Satellite peoples.
34. Questionable political reliability of the satellite
armed forces.
These vulnerabilities are included solely for the sake of com-
pleteness. No report will be required for them since they are
being reported on elsewhere in conjunction with NSC 17..
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35. Conflicts between the Soviet Communist Party and
the parties of the various Satellites.
36. Popular dissatisfaction with Communism and Soviet
domination which will continue to slow the attainment of
Soviet objectives in Eastern Europe.
37. Opposition to the regime based on unti-Communism,
nationalism, liboral opposition to socialism, and desire for
freedom from controls over person, press. religion, and edu-
cation.
38. Peasant opposition.
39. Inconsistencies in ideology and weakness in leader-
ship.
40. The persistence of many historical and cultural ties
with the West.
41. High cost of living.
+2. Resentment against Soviet economic control.
43. Conflict between the demands of the Satellite con-
sumer and the requirements of the USSR upon productive capa-
city.
Shortages of materials, labor opposition, incompetent
planning.
45. Low investment in agriculture.
46. High defections to the West from the East German
police joopardized East German control.
G. Communist China
47. The inadequacy of Chinese food resources is aggre-
vated by Soviet demands for payment in agricultural products
for military and other assistance.
48. Dependence on Bloc shipping for essential imports.
49. Sensitivity to prestige considerations in interna-
national relations, including possible sensitivity of the
Chinese Communist leaders to the predominant position of the
current Kremlin leadership.
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50. Dependence upon the Soviet Union.
51. Traditional territorial and racial conflicts between
Russia and China.
H. Communist International Apparatus
52. Contradictions between Communist theory and Soviet
practice.
53. Basic fallacies of the Communist doctrine.
5.. Dependence of local parties on Soviet support.
55. Conflict between the national aspirations of a
country and the espousal by the local communist party of the
policies which advance the interests of the Soviet Union.
56. The manipulation of "front" organizations to serve
Communist purposes.
57. The subordination of the interests of national com-
munist parties to Soviet requirements (i. C., record of be-
trayal of nation communist parties).
(
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NSC 5505/1
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January 31, 1955
NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET AND
EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES
STATE
STATE
References: A. NSC 5501
B. NSC 5502
C. NSC 5505
D. NSC Action No. 1314
The National Security Council, the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Attorney General, the Director, Bureau of
the Budget, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission,
at the 234th Council meeting on January 27, 1955, adopted
the statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5505,
subject to the amendments thereto which are set forth in
NSC Action No. 1314-c.
The President has this date approved the statement of
policy contained in NSC 5505, as amended and adopted by the
Council and enclosed herewith, as a basic guide to all
appropriate executive departments and agencies in exploiting
discontents and other problems in the USSR and its European
satellites, in conformity with paragraph 26-c of NSC 5501,
which paragraph states one element of the general strategy
contained in NSC 5501.
The President has designated, as the coordinating
agency for the statement of policy contained herein, a
Special Committee chaired by the Special Assistant to the
President, Mr. Nelson A. Rockefeller, and composed of the
Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
and the Director of Central Intelligence, and with the
participation as appropriate of representatives of the
Department of Justice, the Foreign Operations Administration,
the U.S. Information Agency, and other interested departments
and agencies, for the purpose of:
(1) Reviewing current programs and developing
new programs to carry out the statement of policy
contained herein, and ensuring coordination of actions
taken thereunder.
NSC 5505/1
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(REVISED)
NSC 5505/1
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(2) Making periodic progress reports to the
National Security Council; including evaluations of
the adequacy of the policy in relation to existing
or anticipated conditions, and the need for any modifica-
tions in the policy, together with illustrative examples
of current and projected programs.
The "Report" contained in the Annex to NSC 5505, and
the "Summary" thereof contained in NSC 5505, are hereby
referred to the above-mentioned Special Committee, to use
as background material relevant to carrying out its assign-
ment.
It is requested that special security precautions be
taken in the handling of this report, and that access to
it be on a strict "need to know" basis.
JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary
cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
LIMITA
The Attorney General
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
Mr. Nelson A. Rockefeller
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EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET AND
EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES
Table of Contents
Page
Statement of Policy
1
Summary of Report by Special Committee
7
Views of the JCS Adviser
13
LIBITA
SUAL
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STATEMENT OF POLICY
on
EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET
AND EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES
1. NSC 5501, "Basic National Security Policy", outlines
the following general strategy:
"26. U.S. policies must be designed to
affect the conduct of the Communist regimes,
especially that of the USSR, in ways that further
U.S. security interests and to encourage tenden-
cies that lead them to abandon expansionist poli-
STATE
cies. In pursuing this general strategy, our
effort should be directed to:
"a. Deterring further Communist
aggression, and preventing the occurrence
of total war so far as compatible with U.S.
security.
"b. Maintaining and developing in the
free world the mutuality of interest and
common purpose, and the necessary will,
strength and stability, to face the Soviet-
Communist threat and to provide constructive
and attractive alternatives to Communism,
which sustain the hope and confidence of free
peoples.
"c. Supplementing a and b above by other
actions designed to foster changes in the
character and policies of the Soviet-Communist
bloc regimes:
"(1) By influencing them and their
peoples toward the choice of those alterna-
tive lines of action which, while in their
national interests, do not conflict with
the security interests of the U.S.; and
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"(2) By exploiting differences be-
tween such regimes, and their other vul-
nerabilities, in ways consistent with this
general strategy."
"27. To carry out effectively this general strategy
will require a flexible combination of military,
political, economic, propaganda, and covert actions
which enables the full exercise of U.S. initiative.
These actions must be so coordinated as to rein-
force one another. Programs for the general strategy
between now and the time when the USSR has greatly
increased nuclear power should be developed as a
matter of urgency.' fl
2. a. This paper prescribes the principles to be
applied, in conformity with paragraph 26-c. quoted above,
in exploiting discontents and other problems in the
USSR and the European Satellites, such as tensions
inherent in the police state, low standards of living,
opposition to collectivization, cultural and intellectual
regimentation, interference with religion, dissatis-
faction of minorities, nationality problems, the
governmental structure of the USSR, ideological weak-
nesses of the Soviet system, and disaffection in the
Satellites.
/
b. Such discontents and other problems can be
usefully exploited only if the U.S. (1) has or can
develop a capability for such exploitation and (2)
will thereby advance a specific objective within this
capability.
3. In exploiting such discontents and other problems,
the following principles should apply:
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a. Measures for exploitation should be mutually
consistent and should be directed toward specific U.S.
objectives which are within existing or potential U.S.
capabilities.
b. Seek to create and increase popular and
STATE
653
bureaucratic pressures on the Soviet regime through
the exploitation of discontents and other problems
to promote evolutionary changes in Soviet policies and
conduct which will be in U.S. interest and tend to
lessen the chance of Soviet attack upon the U.S.
As appropriate, seek (1) to cause the regime to occupy
itself increasingly with internal problems and (2) to
pose difficult decisions tending to create uncertainty
or divisions within the regime.
c. Continue basic opposition to the Soviet system
and continue to state its evils; but stress evolutionary
rather than revolutionary change. At the same time make
clear that while the U.S. is determined to protect its
vital security interests by force if necessary, it
does not seek to impose its ideas of government on the
USSR by force.
d. Generally depict the causes of the discontents
and other problems which are to by exploited not as
inherent conditions reparable only be revolution but
as conditions susceptible to correction by the regime
if it should choose to take the necessary action.
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e. Apply these principles to the European
Satellites, taking advantage as appropriate of the
special opportunities existing in these countries to
exert greater pressures, and to weaken the ties which
bind the Satellites to the USSR.
f. Because substantial change in basic conditions
in the USSR or the Satellites (including the imminent
threat or initiation of general war) might render these
principles inappropriate, they should be continuously
reviewed. In order to be prepared to meet any such
substantial change, the U.S. should continue to develop
and maintain capabilities which would be required in the
event of such change, in so far as this can be done prior
to such change without impairing the carrying out of
these principles.
g. Covert operations (including experimentation
with such anti-regime measures as might be applicable to
substantially changed circumstances) will not necessarily
have to conform to the above principles, but should be
conducted so as not to impair the effectiveness of such
principles.
4.
Exploitation of vulnerabilities in accordance with
the above principles can be expected to modify the policies
TERMS
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of the USSR and the European Satellites along lines more
compatible with U.S. security interests only if further
Communist expansion is prevented. The USSR and the European
Satellites are not likely to experiment with alternatives
more consistent with U.S. interest as long as the accustomed
Communist techniques of military and political pressure on
and in the free world show signs of achieving success. It is
to be emphasized that no political warfare strategy can in
any sense substitute for adequate military, political, and
economic programs designed to strengthen the Free World.
Therefore, success in carrying out the above principles will
depend upon:
a. Maintenance by the U.S. and its allies, for an
indefinite period, of military forces with sufficient
strength, flexibility and mobility to enable them to deal
swiftly and severely with Communist overt aggression in
its various forms and to cope successfully with general
war should it develop; and united determination to use
military force against such aggression.
b. Building the strength and cohesion of the free
world and taking adequate actions for the purpose of
sty
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(1) creating cohesion within and among all the free
nations, remedying their weaknesses, and steadily
improving the relative position of the free world and
(2) destroying the effectiveness of the Communist
apparatus in the free world.
STREETY
SHA
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SUMMARY OF REPORT BY SPECIAL COMMITTEE
on.
EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET AND EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
1. An exploitable vulnerability exists in a foreign
society only if three elements are present: (a) a "weakness"
to be exploited, (b) a U.S. objective, and (c) a U.S. capability
we can employ or develop to exploit the weakness in a way which
will advance the objective.
2. The general objective of U.S. political warfare
operations against Soviet and Satellite regimes is to reduce
their capabilities and alter their policies so as to reduce
the threat they pose to the U.S. This objective can be broken
down into four related sub-objectives, the first of which is:
a. To reduce the actual military capabilities of
the Soviet and Satellite countries, both in the short
and the long run.
The U.S. does not possess at the present time the actual or
potential means to conduct political warfare operations that
will significantly reduce Soviet military capabilities. There-
fore, the prime task of U.S. political warfare is to affect
choices on the part of top leaders, middle bureaucrats, and the
people in the USSR and the Satellites in such a way as to
accomplish the remaining three sub-objectives, which are:
b. Reduce the chance that the leaders will choose
STATE
w
war.
DIRECT
c. Increase the chance that they would accept a
quick end of hostilities on terms compatible with U.S.
interest.
d. Increase the chance of evolutionary change over
time of a nature to reduce the Soviet threat.
It is sometimes assumed that a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for the achievement of all three of these objectives is
the removal or overthrow of the present Soviet regime. It is
not safe to assume that it is either a necessary or a sufficient
condition. While unlikely, it is not impossible that over a
number of years or decades the policies of the regime might
evolve in ways favorable to U.S. interest. And it is certainly
by no means a foregone conclusion that a revolutionary successor
regime would inevitably behave better.
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3. a. Accordingly, the political warfare strategy should
attempt to promote evolutionary change within the USSR and
the Satellites in directions consistent with U.S. interest:
(1) Through measures designed to expand the field
of realistic and attractive alternatives perceived by
persons at various levels within the society.
(2) Through measures designed to induce the
Soviet and Satellite decision-makers, by persuasion
and pressure, to adopt courses of action more in U.S.
interest.
b. This political warfare strategy must rely upon,
and be consistent with, those major domestic and foreign
policies on which the U.S. depends to meet and counter the
Soviet threat. In particular the success of this strategy
will depend on:
(1) U.S. maintenance of sufficient military
strength, and the will to use it, to threaten the
USSR with military defeat should it undertake direct
military aggression anywhere in the free world.
(2) Denial, through vigorous political, economic
and military policies within the free world, of oppor-
tunities for the USSR to extend its control and in-
fluence by subversion and other non-military means.
There will be no internal experimentation by the Soviets
with alternative techniques more consistent with U.S.
interest as long as the accustomed Communist techniques
of military and political pressure on and in the free
world show signs of achieving notable success.
4. This political warfare strategy should have appro-
priate implementation where possible in military, foreign and
economic policy, as well as in information policy and special
operations. It should be continuously reviewed in the light
of existing circumstances.
/
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POTENTIALLY EXPLOITABLE SOVIET AND SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES
5. The major Soviet vulnerabilities which lend them-
selves to some degree of effective U.S. exploitation are:
a. Popular discontents (tensions inherent in
the police state, low standards of living, opposition
to collectivization, cultural and intellectual
regimentation, suppression of religion, dissatisfaction
of minorities, ideological weaknesses of the system).
b. USSR nationality problems.
c. The structure of the USSR economy.
d. The governmental structure of the USSR.
e. Disaffection in the Satellites.
6. Popular Discontents in the USSR. The U.S. does not
possess the capability of inducing successful revolution
from below in the near future through the exploitation of
popular discontents.
a. U.S. political warfare strategy should
vigorously attack the terror and tension induced by
police measures, the military rather than civilian bias
of the economy, and the restriction of communication
with the outside world. These targets would be mainly
attacked, however, not as inherent features of the
Communist state correctible only by revolution, but as
mistaken policies and practices which could be readily
modified if the leaders would only consent to do so
and which in any event are not really necessary to
their legitimate ends.
ADDRESS
b. This strategy should emphasize specifically
ways in which present discontents could be met by the
existing regime, so as to bring effective pressure to
bear on current decisions and to dramatize for officials
at all levels of the bureaucracy the fact that realistic
alternatives to present policies are conceivable.
c. In taking this line, the U.S. should not
abandon its basic position that the whole Soviet system
is fundamentally wrong, and should continue to state
what are thought to be its errors, In doing so, how-
ever, the U.S. should make clear that it does not seek
to impose its ideas of government on the USSR by force.
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The line taken under this strategy should be aggressive
in pressing for change, but evolutionary rather than
revolutionary, and generally avoid a tone openly and
stridently hostile to the system. Stressing through
open propaganda our implacable opposition to the whole
Soviet system, may confirm for all who identify them-
selves in any degree with that system the image spread
by the leadership of an external world aggressively
hostile, which will greatly narrow popular and
bureaucratic conceptions of alternatives open to the
USSR.
d. Exploitation of discontents resolvable only
through revolution should be avoided.
7. USSR Nationality Problems. * It is not now in the
U.S. interest to give the impression to the Soviet leader-
ship by either official actions, or unofficial actions likely
to be attributed to the U.S., that the U.S. desires the dis-
memberment of the USSR. On the other hand, the exploitation
of minority nationalities' discontents, either openly within
this limitation or in truly covert fashion, should be
continued as feasible.
8. The Structure of the USSR Economy. Although the
U.S. capability to affect Soviet agricultural output and
consumer goods production is extremely limited, political
warfare operations should be so designed as to encourage
greater investment in agriculture and increased production
of consumer goods as a desirable diversion of resources
from war production. A program of positive U.S. trade offers,
primarily of consumer goods, should be considered by the
appropriate departments and agencies.
9. The Governmental Structure of the USSR. It is in the
U.S. interest to encourage the current trend toward "constitu-
tionalizing government" rather than a return to the Stalinist
system. Encouragement of more delegation of authority and
regularization within the bureaucracy may in time act to
widen the range of more acceptable alternatives evident to
at least some elements in the present or potential leadership
See NSC 5502, "U.S. Policy Toward Russian Anti-Soviet
Political Activities", January 11, 1955.
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and to that extent render more difficult adoption of
policies leading towards general war. Those relatively
junior officials without present power of major decision
are an important target because from their ranks will come
the leadership of later decades. Within this context,
divisive issues within the bureaucracy should be exploited,
i.e., how far to relax police power, how much to expand
consumer goods, how to expand agriculture, how to conduct
foreign policy, and so forth.
10. Disaffection in the Satellites. All the internal
weaknesses of the Soviet system are present in the European
Satellites in a much exaggerated form. Therefore, U.S.
capabilities for the exploitation of vulnerabilities in this
area, as compared with the USSR, vary both as to substance
and degree. In the Satellites the basic strategy might well
attempt to raise expectations farther and depict alternatives
more radically different from present practice. Programs to
encourage Satellite peoples to make strong but limited
demands on their leaders for improvements should be even more
effective in influencing choices both of the Satellite and
the Soviet bureaucracies, than would similar programs in the
USSR. Moreover, there are greater potentialities in the
Satellites for some clearly revolutionary and underground
activities as well as for anti-regime propaganda in
general. The U.S. should take advantage of such opportunities
so far as consistent with the basic strategy. Nevertheless,
the following considerations should govern main lines of
strategy toward the Satellites:
a. Barring external military aid and intervention,
no anti-regime revolt in the Satellites could succeed
at present. The United States is not now prepared to
undertake such aid and intervention. Accordingly, al-
though it is in the interest of the U.S. to foster con-
ditions which, in the event of either general war or
changed circumstances may be favorable to revolt (or
related activities, such as sabotage, partisan movements,
etc.), it is not in U.S. interest at the present time
to encourage revolution as a major element of its
strategy toward the Satellites.
b. Belief on the part of Satellite and Soviet
leadership that the U.S. is implacably dedicated to the
overthrow of both Satellite and Soviet regimes may
negate the possibility of exerting U.S. influence
towards a more acceptable evolution of Satellite or
Soviet society.
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FUTURE CONTINGENCIES
11. It would be folly to adopt any political warfare
strategy so irrevocably that the U.S. could not change it if
developments made this seem wise. There is every reason why
planning should be done on the basis of a variety of contin-
gencies. Despite the present unlikelihood of a revolutionary
situation, the U.S. should prepare plans and seek to maintain
assets to exploit crisis situations or general war, so far as
this can be done without prejudicing carrying out the above
strategy. This strategy does not preclude experimentation
with such anti-regime measures as might be more applicable in
changed circumstances (e.g., general war). However, at any
particular time, U.S. political warfare operations should be
guided by the above over-all strategy, departure from which
should be undertaken only for cause and with a clear recogni-
tion of possible conflict.
/
BILL
r
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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
6 January 1955
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NSC PLANNING BOARD
Subject: Exploitation of Soviet Vulnerabilities,
Comment and Recommendation by the JCS
Adviser.
1. The JCS Adviser considers the foregoing Planning
Board paper, subject: "Summary of Report by Special Committee
on Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabil-
ities", to be an adequate summary of the Millikan Report on
the same subject.
2. While in agreement that political warfare strategy of
the type stated therein should be developed as a part of an
integrated U.S. national cold war strategy, the JCS Adviser
feels that measures growing out of such a strategy, whatever
they may be, will not be meaningful in creating, prior to
atomic plenty, conditions under which the U.S. and its Allies
can meet and alleviate the Soviet Communist threat under
proper safeguards.
3. U.S. and free world military strength and the deter-
mination to use it if necessary to prevent further Communist
aggression are assumed by the Millikan Report to be a sine
qua non for successful implementation of a policy promoting
evolutionary change within the Soviet Bloc. The collective
military strength of the U.S. and its Allies, if properly
employed, would have been sufficient in recent years to have
put a stop to Communist aggression. However, the limited
success which has been achieved is due only in part to the
utilization of this military strength.
4. With the above in mind, there is little cause to
believe that greater resolution in the use of collective
military power against Communist aggression will exist after
atomic plenty; the opposite is probably true. If free world
vitality and determination to resist Communist aggression are
undermined by unreasoning fear of atomic holocaust, the major
pre-condition for a policy of evolutionary change will not be
met. If the free world is thus inhibited, and the Communists
continue to absorb new territory by any and all means at their
NSC 55031
13
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disposal, it is difficult to perceive how the U.S. can present
to the Soviets alternatives attractive to them which do not
conflict drastically with the security interests of the United
States.
5. The views of the JCS on NSC 5440 are equally appli-
cable to this report. For emphasis, the following extract
from their views is stated in conclusion:
"The JCS are of the opinion, therefore, that our
national strategy should recognize that until the Com-
munist regimes are convinced that their aggressive and
expansionist policies will be met by countermeasures
which inherently will threaten the continued existence
of their regimes it will not be feasible to induce a
change in their basic attitude or bring about the abandon-
ment of their present objectives."
6. The JCS Adviser recommends that the NSC note the
summary of the Millikan Report and refer it to the OCB for
further study in connection with developing appropriate imple-
menting actions consistent with NSC 5501 as approved.
(SIGNED)
JOHN K. GERHART
Major General, USAF
JCS Adviser to the
NSC Planning Board
NSC 5505/1
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON
COPY NO. 1
January 26, 1955
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SUBJECT:
Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite
Vulnerabilities
REFERENCE:
NSC 5505
At the request of the Department of Defense
the enclosed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect
to the draft statement of policy contained in the reference
report on the subject are transmitted herewith for the infor-
mation of the National Security Council in connection with its
consideration of NSC 5505 at its meeting on January 27, 1955.
James Executive JAMES S. LAY, Secretary D.Lay.Jr. Jr.
153
DEPARTMENT
YES
cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
DECLASSIFIED
Authority MR 86-477
By His NLE Date 8/9/89
UNCLASSIFIED
COPY
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THE JOINT CHILFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
25 January 1955
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Subject: Exploitation of Soviet and European
was
Satellite Vulnerabilities NSC 5505
-
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their
views regarding a draft statement of policy, subject as
above, prepared by the National Security Council Planning
Board for consideration by the Council at its meeting on
27 January 1955.
2. The draft statement of policy does not provide for
an over-all political warfare program vis-a-vis the Soviet-
Communist Bloc, as envisaged in subparagraph 26 c of NSC 5505.
It prescribes principles to be applied in exploiting dis-
content and other problems in the USSR and European satellites
alone and makes no reference to the vulnerabilities of Com-
munist China. Among the most pressing current problems of
U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Bloc are those
concerning Communist China. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are
of the opinion that a political warfare program which fails
to explore the vulnerabilities of that country and to prescribe
principles for their exploitation would be seriously deficient,
and the development of an over-all program is urgently needed.
It would, therefore, appear necessary that a study be made
to determine the practicability of expanding the proposed
policy into an over-all political warfare policy or, as an
alternative, to formulate as a separate program one dealing
with Communist China alone.
3. The principles set forth in paragraph 3 of the draft
statement of policy are derived substantially from the study
titled "Report on the Exploitation of Soviet Vulnerabilities"
(Annex to NSC 5505, distributed separately). That study
clearly indicates that this concept of political warfare
strategy is supplementary to political and military policies
designed to strengthen the Free World and that its effective-
ness "depends as much on concomitant moves in the military and
political field as on the skill with which information and
DECLASSIFIED
5200.30
Authority DOD DIRective
By DJH NLE Date 6/25/07
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covert operations are conducted." It is considered that the
draft statement of policy should be amended to indicate
clearly, as in the conclusions of the subject study, that
the proposed policy set forth therein is supplementary to
rather than a substitute for adequate military, economic, and
political programs. Accordingly, the following changes are
suggested (changes indicated in the usual manner)
"4. Exploitation of vulnerabilities in accordance with
the above principles can be expected to modify the policies
of the USSR and the European Satellites along lines more
compatible with U.S. security interests only if further
Communist expansion is prevented. The USSR and the European
Satellites are not likely to experiment with alternatives
more consistent with U.S. interest as long as the accustomed
Communist techniques of military and political pressure
on and in the free world show signs of achieving success.
It is to be emphasized that no political warfare strategy
can in any sense substitute for adequate military, political,
,
and economic programs designed to strengthen the Free World.
Therefore, success in carrying out the above principles will
depend upon:
"a. Maintenance by the United States and its allies,
for an indefinite period, of military forces with
sufficient strength, flexibility and mobility to enable
them to deal swiftly and severely with Communist overt
aggression in its various forms and to cope successfully
with general war should it develop, and united deter-
mination to use military force against such agression.
"b. Building the strength and cohesion of the free
world and taking adequate actions for the purpose of
(1) creating cohesion within and among all the free
E
nations, remedying their weaknesses, and steadily
improving the relative position of the free world and
(2) destroying the effectiveness of the Communist
apparatus in the free world.
Thereby
Communis
that
agression
that
not
pay.
long
Soviets
of
their
power-
there
is
little
them
initiate
general
war
believe
would
appreciable
risk
of
general
and
endanger
the
regime
and
the
security
of
the
USSR.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the deletion of
the bracketed phrase in subparagraph 3 f in the belief that
such an indefinite restraint on the continued development of
adequate over-all security posture is not in accord with
approved U.S. security policy.
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5. With respect to the proposed new subparagraph 3 h,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that its retention or
omission would not be of real consequence if the amendments
proposed in paragraph 3 above were adopted.
6. It is requested that the foregoing views be presented
to the National Security Council for consideration by the
Council in connection with NSC 5505 at its meeting on
27 January 1955.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
/s/ ARTHUR RADFORD,
Chairman,
LIBIRTY
w
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
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