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The President
TOP SECRET
COPY NO.
I
NSC 5505
January 18, 1955
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
BILL
Beleaje JOHNSON
EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET AND
EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES
ATTENTION
THE ENCLOSED TOP SECRET CONTROL
FORM MUST BE COMPLETED BY EACH
INDIVIDUAL (1) WHO READS THIS
DOCUMENT WHOLLY OR IN PART OR
(2) WHO PERSONALLY HANDLES IT
AND HAS ACCESS TO ITS CONTENTS
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.6(b)
TOP SECRET
R91-280#4
BY BBM DATE 7/24/96
TOP SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
NSC 5505
January 18, 1955
TOP SECRET CONTROL FORM
LIBIT
BEL
ATTENTION
By direction of the President, this form must be signed and completed by each
individual (1) who reads this document wholly or in part or (2) who personally
handles it and has access to its contents. Such access must be limited to those
individuals having a "need to know" and appropriate Top Secret clearance.
SIGNATURE
OFFICE
DATE
Evelyne L. Roper
n.s.c.
1-18-55
homenager
1-25-55
WARNING
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMIS-
SION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
NSC 5505
January 18, 1955
NOTE BY THE EXLCUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET AND EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES
Reference: NSC 5502
The enclosed draft statement of policy on the subject,
prepared by the NSC Planning Board with the participation of a
representative of the Department of Justice, is submitted
herewith for consideration by the National Security Council
at its meeting on Thursday, January 27, 1955. Attention is
TERMS
A
invited to the divergent views with respect to paragraphs
3-f and 3-h of the enclosed draft statement of policy.
The enclosed draft statement of policy has been prepared
in the light of a "Report on the Exploitation of Soviet
Vulnerabilities", dated November 30, 1954, which was prepared
by a Special Committee, appointed by the Chairman of the NSC
Planning Board, in agreement with the Under Secretary of
State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of
Central Intelligence. This Special Committee Report is being
separately circulated for information, as an Annex to NSC 5505,
to each NSC member and other participants in the forthcoming
NSC meeting on this subject; copies having already been made
available through the NSC Planning Board to the interested
departments and agencies. A Summary of this Special Committee
Report prepared by the NSC Planning Board, together with the
views of the JCS Adviser with respect to the Report and its
Summary, are enclosed herewith for the information of the
Council.
It is recommended that the National Security Council,
after resolution of the divergent views expressed in the en-
closed draft statement of policy, take the following action:
a. Note the "Report on the Exploitation of Soviet
Vulnerabilities", dated November 30, 1954, prepared
by a Special Committee, appointed by the Chairman
of the NSC Planning Board, in agreement with the
Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary
of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence,
and the attached "Summary" thereof, prepared by the
NSC Planning Board,
NSC 5505
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b. Adopt the enclosed statement of policy on
"Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite
Vulnerabilities" as a basic guide to all appropriate
executive departments and agencies in exploiting
discontents and other problems in the USSR and
the European satellites, in conformity with
paragraph 26-c of NSC 5501, which paragraph states
one element of the general strategy contained in
NSC 5501.
c. Recommend that the President designate the Operations
Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency for
the enclosed statement of policy; utilizing a
Special Committee chaired by the Special Assistant
to the President, Mr. Nelson A. Rockefeller, and
composed of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central
Intelligence (who may be represented in day-to-day
operations by deputies appointed by them), and with
the participation as appropriate of representatives
of the Department of Justice, the Foreign Operations
Administration, the U.S. Information Agency, and
other interested departments and agencies, for
/
the purpose of:
(1) Reviewing current programs and developing
new programs to carry out this statement
of policy, and ensuring coordination of
actions taken thereunder.
(2) Making periodic progress reports directly
to the OCB for transmittal to the NSC.
d. Refer the "Report" and the attached "Summary", noted
in a above, to the Special Committee referred to in
c above, to use as background material relevant to
carrying out its assignment.
The JCS Adviser to the NSC Planning Board considers that
it is inadvisable for the National Security Council to adopt
the enclosed draft statement of policy based on the Special
Committee Report dated November 30, 1954, until the
Operations Coordinating Board has had an opportunity to weigh
the principal conclusions and recommendations of that Report
against Basic National Security Policy recently promulgated
in NSC 5501. The JCS Adviser therefore recommends that the
Council note the Summary of the Special Committee Report and
refer it, together with the full Report, to the OCB for
NSC 5505
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further study in connection with developing appropriate
implementing actions consistent with NSC 5501.
It is requested that special security precautions be
taken in the handling of this report, and that access to it
be on a striot "need to know" basis.
JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary
STATE
S
E
cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
NSC 5505
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EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET AND
EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES
Table of Contents
Page
Statement of Policy
1
Summary of Report by Special Committee
7
Views of the JCS Adviser
13
w
ANNEX to NSC 5505
(distributed separately)
Justed
Report by Special Committee on "Exploitation
of Soviet Vulnerabilities", dated November 30, 1954
NSC 5505
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DRAFT
STATEMENT OF POLICY
on
EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET
AND EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES
1. NSC 5501, "Basic National Security Policy", outlines
the following general strategy:
"26.
U.S. policies must be designed to
affect the conduct of the Communist regimes,
especially that of the USSR, in ways that further
U.S. security interests and to encourage tenden-
cies that lead them to abandon expansionist poli-
cies. In pursuing this general strategy, our
effort should be directed to:
"a. Deterring further Communist
aggression, and preventing the occurrence
of total war so far as compatible with U.S.
/
security.
"b. Maintaining and developing in the
free world the mutuality of interest and
common purpose, and the necessary will,
strength and stability, to face the Soviet-
Communist threat and to provide constructive
and attractive alternatives to Communism,
which sustain the hope and confidence of free
peoples.
"c. Supplementing a and b above by other
actions designed to foster changes in the
character and policies of the Soviet-Communist
bloc regimes:
"(1) By influencing them and their
peoples toward the choice of those alterna-
tive lines of action which, while in their
national interests, do not conflict with
the security interests of the U.S.; and
NSC 5505
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"(2) By exploiting differences be-
tween such regimes, and their other vul-
nerabilities, in ways consistent with this
general strategy."
"27. To carry out effectively this general strategy
will require a flexible combination of military,
political, economic, propaganda, and covert actions
which enables the full exercise of U.S. initiative.
These actions must be so coordinated as to rein-
force one another. Programs for the general strategy
between now and the time when the USSR has greatly
increased nuclear power should be developed as a
matter of urgency."
2. a. This paper prescribes the principles to be
applied, in conformity with paragraph 26-c quoted above,
in exploiting discontents and other problems in the
USSR and the European Satellites, such as tensions
inherent in the police state, low standards of living,
opposition to collectivization, cultural and intellectual
regimentation, interference with religion, dissatis-
THE
faction of minorities, nationality problems, the
governmental structure of the USSR, ideological weak-
nesses of the Soviet system, and disaffection in the
Satellites.
b. Such discontents and other problems can be
usefully exploited only if the U.S. (1) has or can
develop a capability for such exploitation and (2)
will thereby advance a specific objective within this
capability.
3. In exploiting such discontents and other problems,
the following principles should apply:
NSC 5505
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a. Measures for exploitation should be mutually
consistent and should be directed toward specific U.S.
objectives which are within existing or potential U.S.
capabilities.
b. Seek to create and increase popular and
bureaucratic pressures on the Soviet regime through
the exploitation of discontents and other problems
to promote evolutionary changes in Soviet policies and
conduct which will be in U.S. interest and tend to
lessen the chance of Soviet attack upon the U.S.
As appropriate, seek (1) to cause the regime to occupy
itself increasingly with internal problems and (2) to
pose difficult decisions tending to create uncertainty
THE
or divisions within the regime.
c. Continue basic opposition to the Soviet system
and continue to state its evils; but stress evolutionary
rather than revolutionary change. At the same time make
clear that while the U.S. is determined to protect its
vital security interests by force if necessary, it
does not seek to impose its ideas of government on the
USSR by force.
d. Generally depict the causes of the discontents
and other problems which are to by exploited not as
inherent conditions reparable only be revolution but
as conditions susceptible to correction by the regime
if it should choose to take the necessary action.
NSCI 5505
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e. Apply these principles to the European
Satellites, taking advantage as appropriate of the
special opportunities existing in these countries to
exert greater pressures, and to weaken the ties which
bind the Satellites to the USSR.
f. Because substantial change in basic conditions
in the USSR or the Satellites (including the imminent
threat or initiation of general war) might render these
principles inappropriate, they should be continuously
THE
reviewed. In order to be prepared to meet any such
substantial change, the U.S. should continue to develop
and maintain capabilities which would be required in the
event of such change, /in so far as this can be done
without impairing the carrying out of these principles.7*
g. Covert operations (including experimentation
with such anti-regime measures as might be applicable to
substantially changed circumstances) will not necessarily
have to conform to the above principles, but should be
conducted so as not to impair the effectiveness of such
principles.
/h. Application of the principles set forth in
subparagraphs a through e above does not preclude
experimentation with such overt anti-regime measures
as might be applicable to substantially changed
The Defense Member and The JCS Adviser propose deletion.
NSC 5505
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circumstances. The U.S. can take apparently con-
tradictory lines of action, provided it avoids
solidifying the conviction that the U.S. in determined
to overthrow the whole system by direct intervention.7*
4. Exploitation of vulnerabilities in accordance with
the above principles can be expected to modify the policies
of the USSR and the European Satellites along lines more
compatible with U.S. security interests only if further
Communist expansion is prevented. The USSR and the European
Satellites are not likely to experiment with alternatives
more consistent with U.S. interest as long as the accustomed
Communist techniques of military and political pressure on
and in the free world show signs of achieving success. There-
fore, success in carrying out the above principles will depend
upon:
THE
SEX
a. Maintenance by the U.S. and its allies, for an
indefinite period, of military forces with sufficient
strength, flexibility and mobility to enable them to deal
swiftly and severely with Communist overt aggression
in its various forms and to cope successfully with
general war should it develop; and united determination
to use military force against such agression.
b. Building the strength and cohesion of the free
world and taking adequate actions for the purpose of
* Proposed by the Defense Member and the JCS Adviser.
NSC 5505
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(1) creating cohesion within and among all the free
nations, remedying their weaknesses, and steadily
improving the relative position of the free world and
(2) destroying the effectiveness of the Communist
apparatus in the free world.
c. Thereby convincing the Communist rulers that
aggression will not serve their interests, that it will
not pay. So long as the Soviets are uncertain of their
ability to neutralize the U.S. nuclear-air retaliatory
power, there is little reason to expect them to initiate
general war or actions which they bolieve would carry
appreciable risk of general war, and thereby endanger
the regime and the security of the USSR.
TERM
Eds
NSC 5505
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SUMMARY OF REPORT BY SPECIAL COMMITTEE
on.,
EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET AND EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
1. An exploitable vulnerability exists in a foreign
society only if three elements are present: (a) a "weakness"
to be exploited, (b) a U.S. objective, and (c) a U.S. capability
we can employ or develop to exploit the weakness in a way which
will advance the objective.
2. The general objective of U.S. political warfare
operations against Soviet and Satellite regimes is to reduce
their capabilities and alter their policies so as to reduce
the threat they pose to the U.S. This objective can be broken
down into four related sub-objectives, the first of which is:
a. To reduce the actual military capabilities of
the Soviet and Satellite countries, both in the short
and the long run.
The U.S. does not possess at the present time the actual or
potential means to conduct political warfare operations that
will significantly reduce Soviet military capabilities. There-
fore, the prime task of U.S. political warfare is to affect
choices on the part of top leaders, middle bureaucrats, and the
people in the USSR and the Satellites in such a way as to
accomplish the remaining three sub-objectives, which are:
b. Reduce the chance that the leaders will choose
war.
c. Increase the chance that they would accept a
quick end of hostilities on terms compatible with U.S.
interest.
d. Increase the chance of evolutionary change over
time of a nature to reduce the Soviet threat.
It is sometimes assumed that a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for the achievement of all three of these objectives is
the removal or overthrow of the present Soviet regime. It is
not safe to assume that it is either a necessary or a sufficient
condition. While unlikely, it is not impossible that over a
number of years or decades the policies of the regime might
evolve in ways favorable to U.S. interest. And it is certainly
by no means a foregone conclusion that a revolutionary successor
regime would inevitably behave better.
NSC 5505
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3. a. Accordingly, the political warfare strategy should
attempt to promote evolutionary change within the USSR and
the Satellites in directions consistent with U.S. interest:
(1) Through measures designed to expand the field
of realistic and attractive alternatives perceived by
persons at various levels within the society.
(2) Through measures designed to induce the
Soviet and Satellite decision-makers, by persuasion
and pressure, to adopt courses of action more in U.S.
interest.
b. This political warfare strategy must rely upon,
and be consistent with, those major domestic and foreign
policies on which the U.S. depends to meet and counter the
Soviet threat. In particular the success of this strategy
will depend on:
THE
SEAL
(1) U.S. maintenance of sufficient military
strength, and the will to use it, to threaten the
USSR with military defeat should it undertake direct
military aggression anywhere in the free world.
(2) Denial, through vigorous political, economic
and military policies within the free world, of oppor-
tunities for the USSR to extend its control and in-
fluence by subversion and other non-military means.
There will be no internal experimentation by the Soviets
with alternative techniques more consistent with U.S.
interest as long as the accustomed Communist techniques
of military and political pressure on and in the free
world show signs of achieving notable success.
4. This political warfare strategy should have appro-
priate implementation where possible in military, foreign and
economic policy, as well as in information policy and special
operations. It should be continuously reviewed in the light
of existing circumstances.
NSC 5505
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TCP SECRET
POTENTIALLY EXPLOITABLE SOVIET AND SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES
5. The major Soviet vulnerabilities which lend them-
selves to some degree of effective U.S. exploitation are:
a. Popular discontents (tensions inherent in
the police state, low standards of living, opposition
to collectivization, cultural and intellectual
regimentation, suppression of religion, dissatisfaction
of minorities, ideological weaknesses of the system).
b. USSR nationality problems.
c. The structure of the USSR economy.
d. The governmental structure of the USSR.
e. Disaffection in the Satellites.
6. Popular Discontents in the USSR. The U.S. does not
possess the capability of inducing successful revolution
from below in the near future through the exploitation of
popular discontents.
SS
a. U.S. political warfare strategy should
vigorously attack the terror and tension induced by
police measures, the military rather than civilian bias
of the economy, and the restriction of communication
with the outside world. These targets would be mainly
attacked, however, not as inherent features of the
Communist state correctible only by revolution, but as
mistaken policies and practices which could be readily
modified if the leaders would only consent to do so
and which in any event are not really necessary to
their legitimate ends.
b. This strategy should emphasize specifically
ways in which present discontents could be met by the
existing regime, so as to bring effective pressure to
bear on current decisions and to dramatize for officials
at all levels of the bureaucracy the fact that realistic
alternatives to present policies are conceivable.
c. In taking this line, the U.S. should not
abandon its basic position that the whole Soviet system
is fundamentally wrong, and should continue to state
what are thought to be its errors. In doing so, how-
ever, the U.S. should make clear that it does not seek
to impose its ideas of government on the USSR by force.
NSC 5505
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SERVICE
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The line taken under this strategy should be aggressive
in pressing for change, but evolutionary rather than
revolutionary, and generally avoid a tone openly and
stridently hostile to the system. Stressing through
open propaganda our implacable opposition to the whole
Soviet system, may confirm for all who identify them-
selves in any degree with that system the image spread
by the leadership of an external world aggressively
hostile, which will greatly narrow popular and
bureaucratic conceptions of alternatives open to the
USSR.
d. Exploitation of discontents resolvable only
through revolution should be avoided.
7. USSR Nationality Problems. * It is not now in the
U.S. interest to give the impression to the Soviet leader-
ship by either official actions, or unofficial actions likely
to be attributed to the U.S., that the U.S. desires the dis-
memberment of the USSR. On the other hand, the exploitation
of minority nationalities' discontents, either openly within
this limitation or in truly covert fashion, should be
continued as feasible.
8. The Structure of the USSR Economy. Although the
/
U.S. capability to affect Soviet agricultural output and
consumer goods production is extremely limited, political
warfare operations should be so designed as to encourage
greater investment in agriculture and increased production
of consumer goods as a desirable diversion of resources
from war production. A program of positive U.S. trade offers,
primarily of consumer goods, should be considered by the
appropriate departments and agencies.
9. The Governmental Structure of the USSR. It is in the
U.S. interest to encourage the current trend toward "constitu-
tionalizing government" rather than a return to the Stalinist
system. Encouragement of more delegation of authority and
regularization within the bureaucracy may in time act to
widen the range of more acceptable alternatives evident to
at least some elements in the present or potential leadership
See NSC 5502, "U.S. Policy Toward Russian Anti-Soviet
Political Activities", January 11, 1955.
NSC 5505
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and to that extent render more difficult adoption of
policies leading towards general war. Those relatively
junior officials without present power of major decision
are an important target because from their ranks will come
the leadership of later decades. Within this context,
divisive issues within the bureaucracy should be exploited,
i.e., how far to relax police power, how much to expand
consumer goods, how to expand agriculture, how to conduct
foreign policy, and so forth.
10. Disaffection in the Satellites. All the internal
weaknesses of the Soviet system are present in the European
Satellites in a much exaggerated form. Therefore, U.S.
capabilities for the exploitation of vulnerabilities in this
area, as compared with the USSR, vary both as to substance
and degree. In the Satellites the basic strategy might well
attempt to raise expectations farther and depict alternatives
more radically different from present practice. Programs to
encourage Satellite peoples to make strong but limited
demands on their leaders for improvements should be even more
effective in influencing choices both of the Satellite and
the Soviet bureaucracies, than would similar programs in the
USSR. Moreover, there are greater potentialities in the
/
Satellites for some clearly revolutionary and underground
activities as well as for anti-regime propaganda in
general. The U.S. should take advantage of such opportunities
so far as consistent with the basic strategy. Nevertheless,
the following considerations should govern main lines of
strategy toward the Satellites:
a. Barring external military aid and intervention,
no anti-regime revolt in the Satellites could succeed
at present. The United States is not now prepared to
undertake such aid and intervention. Accordingly, al-
though it is in the interest of the U.S. to foster con-
ditions which, in the event of either general war or
changed circumstances may be favorable to revolt (or
related activities, such as sabotage, partisan movements,
etc.), it is not in U.S. interest at the present time
to encourage revolution as a major element of its
strategy toward the Satellites.
b. Belief on the part of Satellite and Soviet
leadership that the U.S. is implacably dedicated to the
overthrow of both Satellite and Soviet regimes may
negate the possibility of exerting U.S. influence
towards a more acceptable evolution of Satellite or
Soviet society.
NSC 5505
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FUTURE CONTINGENCIES
11. It would be folly to adopt any political warfare
strategy so irrevocably that the U.S. could not change it if
developments made this seem wise. There is every reason why
planning should be done on the basis of a variety of contin-
gencies. Despite the present unlikelihood of a revolutionary
situation, the U.S. should prepare plans and seek to maintain
assets to exploit crisis situations or general war, so far as
this can be done without prejudicing carrying out the above
strategy. This strategy does not preclude experimentation
with such anti-regime measures as might be more applicable in
changed circumstances (e.g., general war). However, at any
particular time, U.S. political warfare operations should be
guided by the above over-all strategy, departure from which
should be undertaken only for cause and with a clear recogni-
tion of possible conflict.
/
SEAL
(
syning
NSC 5505
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COPY
TOP SECRET
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
6 January 1955
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NSC PLANNING BOARD
Subject: Exploitation of Soviet Vulnerabilities,
Comment and Recommendation by the JCS
Adviser.
1. The JCS Adviser considers the foregoing Planning
Board paper, subject: "Summary of Report by Special Committee
on Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabil-
ities", to be an adequate summary of the Millikan Report on
the same subject.
2. While in agreement that political warfare strategy of
the type stated therein should be developed as a part of an
integrated U.S. national cold war strategy, the JCS Adviser
feels that measures growing out of such a strategy, whatever
they may be, will not be meaningful in creating, prior to
atomic plenty, conditions under which the U.S. and its Allies
can meet and alleviate the Soviet Communist threat under
proper safeguards.
3. U.S. and free world military strength and the deter-
mination to use it if necessary to prevent further Communist
aggression are assumed by the Millikan Report to be a sine
qua non for successful implementation of a policy promoting
evolutionary change within the Soviet Bloc. The collective
military strength of the U.S. and its Allies, if properly
employed, would have been sufficient in recent years to have
put a stop to Communist aggression. However, the limited
success which has been achieved is due only in part to the
utilization of this military strength.
4. With the above in mind, there is little cause to
believe that greater resolution in the use of collective
military power against Communist aggression will exist after
atomic plenty; the opposite is probably true. If free world
vitality and determination to resist Communist aggression are
undermined by unreasoning fear of atomic holocaust, the major
pre-condition for a policy of evolutionary change will not be
met. If the free world is thus inhibited, and the Communists
continue to absorb new territory by any and all means at their
NSC 5505
13
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disposal, it is difficult to perceive how the U.S. can present
to the Soviets alternatives attractive to them which do not
conflict drastically with the security interests of the United
States.
5. The views of the JCS on NSC 5440 are equally appli-
cable to this report. For emphasis, the following extract
from their views is stated in conclusion:
"The JCS are of the opinion, therefore, that our
national strategy should recognize that until the Com-
munist regimes are convinced that their aggressive and
expansionist policies will be met by countermeasures
which inherently will threaten the continued existence
of their regimes it will not be feasible to induce a
change in their basic attitude or bring about the abandon-
ment of their present objectives."
6. The JCS Adviser recommends that the NSC note the
summary of the Millikan Report and refer it to the OCB for
further study in connection with developing appropriate imple-
menting actions consistent with NSC 5501 as approved.
LICENSE
SEAL
(SIGNED)
JOHN K. GERHART
Major General, USAF
JCS Adviser to the
NSC Planning Board
NSC 5505
14
TOP SECRET
The President
TOP SECRET
COPY NO. 1
NSC Annex to 5505
January 18, 1955
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Library
The
EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET AND
EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES
ATTENTION
THE ENCLOSED TOP SECRET CONTROL
FORM MUST BE COMPLETED BY EACH
INDIVIDUAL (1) WHO READS THIS
DOCUMENT WHOLLY OR IN PART OR
(2) WHO PERSONALLY HANDLES IT
AND HAS ACCESS TO ITS CONTENTS
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.6(b)
TOP SECRET
MR 91-280#5
BY BBM DATE 7/24/96
TOP SECRET
7.39
November 30, 1954
Pres
Memorandum for General Robert Cutler
National Security Council
1. Transmitted herewith is the Report on the Exploitation
of Soviet Vulnerabilities prepared by the undersigned Committee
pursuant to a memorandum dated August 13, 1954 from you to the
Undersecretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and
the Director of Central Intelligence.
2. The members of the Committee, while nominated by
their respective agencies, have participated in the Committee's
deliberations in their personal capacities rather than as
official representatives of their departments. Accordingly
the views expressed in the report are solely those of the
members of the Committee itself and do not represent the
official position of any department or agency.
THE
3. The State Department representative originally
nominated to the Committee, Mr. Francis Stevens, participated
in the early stages of the drafting of this report but was
prevented by another urgent assignment from continuing with
the Committee and has had no opportunity to review the final
draft.
4. The Committee will submit at a later date two
appendices to the report as follows:
a. A draft policy statement on the
nationalities problem as it affects general
U. S. foreign policy and specific operations.
b. A selected bibliography of earlier
studies of the problem of Soviet vulnerability.
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7.39
-2-
5. The Committee has limited the scope of its work to
the USSR and the Eastern European Satellites. No considera-
tion is given in this report to the exploitation of the
vulnerabilities of Communist China.
nex 7. Villikan
/
Max F. Millikan, Chairman
Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Richard M. Bissell
Central Intelligence Agency
Walter ). Stamelf
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.
Bowar STATED ship LIDERTY
Department of State
Randolph V. Zander
Department of Defense
The B Koons
Tilghman B. Koons, Executive Secretary
Member, Special Staff, NSC
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7-38
Copy no, 52
of 75 copies
Total no. of pages 71
REPORT ON THE EXPLOITATION
THE SHA
OF
SOVIET VULNERABILITIES
November 30, 1954
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ANALYTIC TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
1
Introduction: Some propositions must be stated to
clarify our list of vulnerabilities
1
1. Definition: A vulnerability involves:
(a) a weakness of the target society,
(b) a U. S. objective,
(c) a U. S. capability
1
2. Assumed foreign policy context: The U. S.
will take action designed to prevent
further Soviet military or nonmilitary
expansion beyond the present borders of
the Bloc
2
3. Objectives of political warfare:
(a) To reduce Soviet military
capabilities
(b) To deter a choice of war
SIGNATURE
SEL
(c) To encourage early settlement in
case of war
(d) To promote long-run change in Soviet
society
2
4. Interdependence of political warfare measures:
Apparently unrelated measures interact
with each other
3
5. Operations designed to reduce capabilities:
We have little possibility of signifi-
cantly reducing current Soviet capabilities
by political warfare means
4
6. The task of political warfare - to influence
choice: The main purpose of our political
warfare effort must be to try to influence
choices made by common people, lower and
middle bureaucrats, and leaders
6
7. Denial of the choice of aggression: We must
deny the Soviets the alternative of a
choice of military or nonmilitary aggres-
sion if we are to induce them to consider
other choices in our interest
7
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8. Developing alternatives: Emphasizing
present evils will be effective only
insofar as we can suggest realistic
alternatives
8
9. Implications for political warfare:
(a) If we are to affect choices we
must be able to communicate;
(b) we must present a consistent
picture of choices over a period
of time;
(c) our ideas must be simple and must
be reiterated. Above all, indivi-
dual measures must fit into a
strategic concept of what we hope
to achieve
10
SECTION II. POTENTIALLY EXPLOITABLE WEAKNESSES OF THE
USSR
13
1. Popular discontents: These include (a) resent-
ment of the police state, (b) low standards of
living, (c) collectivization, (d) cultural and
IDENTY
intellectual regimentation, (e) suppression of
religion, (f) treatment of minorities,
(g) ideological objections. Our technique of
exploitation depends on which of the following
ends we are pursuing:
13
Promote revolution: We do not have the
capability to achieve this
16
Discourage a choice of war: Action to
increase popular discontents may help
or hurt our chances depending on how
it is done
17
Maintain dissatisfaction against a future
crisis: How we do this depends on what
kind of a crisis we expect
19
Exaggerate popular discontents in order to
affect over time the choices of the
leadership: There is reason to believe
this might be effective
20
Dependence of this vulnerability on our
objectives: What we do with respect
to popular discontents will depend, as
examples cited show, on the priority
given to each of the above objectives
21
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iii
Our capabilities to exaggerate popular
discontents: We believe these are
least if we are promoting revolution,
greatest if we are seeking to influence
choices of the bureaucracy
25
2. Dissatisfaction of Minorities: Some U. S.
objectives will be served by supporting minority
groups, others by avoiding such support. The
choice depends on the strategy adopted.
26
3. The Structure of the Economy
30
Three key weaknesses are:
The weakness of Soviet agriculture: We do not have
the capability to reduce agricultural out-
put but we may be able to encourage a
diversion of Soviet resources into invest-
ment in agriculture which will slow the
rate of growth. How we do this depends
on our strategy.
31
The lack of sufficient consumers goods:
Here again we may be able to affect the
attention and resources devoted to this
problem in ways which serve our interests
35
Vulnerability to East-West trade policy:
We cannot have a great impact by further
East-West trade reduction, but positive
DEPARTMENT
trade offers might be a part of some
though not all strategies
37
4. The Governmental Structure
39
The dilemma of centralized power: delega-
tion is politically dangerous but admini-
stratively more efficient
39
The constitutionalizing of government:
The trend since Stalin's death has been
toward more delegation and regularization
within the bureaucracy permitting con-
sideration by middle officials of some-
what wider ranges of alternatives. This
may be a weakness we can exploit
40
Issues potentially divisive in the
bureaucracy: Differences of opinion
must exist within the bureaucracy as to
(a) how far to relax police power, (b) how
much to increase consumer goods, (c) how
to expand agriculture, (d) how to conduct
foreign policy
42
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Our capabilities to broaden the conception
of alternatives: If we deny the option
of external aggression but avoid a
posture of implacable hostility to the
entire bureaucracy, we may be able to
affect bureaucratic choices in our inter-
est in important ways if we adopt a con-
sistent strategy and follow it
44
5. Disaffection in the Satellites
1,8
Weaknesses in the satellites: These are the
same as in the USSR but greatly heightened
by subjugation to a foreign power
48
Objectives of political warfare in the
satellites affecting military capabilities:
We have more chance than in the USSR of
directly reducing capabilities, but efforts
to do this may conflict with other
objectives
119
Affecting choices: Our acts in the satellites
may influence choices by (a) the satellite
peoples, (b) the satellite bureaucracy,
(c) the Soviet bureaucracy, and affects on
all three sets of choices must be con-
sidered. A strategy of promoting small
marginal changes may be more effective
with all three than one of pressing for
revolutionary activity.
50
DIRECT
SECTION III. A SUGGESTED POLITICAL WARFARE STRATEGY
55
The need for a strategy: A group of measures, to be
effective, must be fitted into a strategic pattern
55
The strategy in general: To illustrate this theme
a possible strategy is outlined involving denial
of the choice of external aggression combined with
measures to promote internal evolutionary change.
56
In information policy: Ways are described of pro-
moting gradual change without abandoning our
fundamental disagreement with the system
57
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In special operations: Measures are suggested to
support this strategy, while it is recognized that
we must retain the capability to follow quite
different lines if circumstances so indicate
60
In military policy: We must convince persons in
the Bloc that our military posture is firm but
defensive
63
In diplomatic and economic policy: While denying
the Soviets the possibility of subversion and
diversion of the Free World, we can confront
them with many diplomatic and economic choices
they will have to take seriously. This strategy
would greatly aid our policies in the Free World
and could be made acceptable at home.
64
Conclusions
69
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SECTION I
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Introduction
Many attempts have been made both within the government and without
to list Soviet vulnerabilities. They never seem to supply what the
requester wants. We believe this is both because there are ambiguities
in what people mean by vulnerabilities and because there are specific
difficulties in applying that concept to the USSR. We therefore feel
it necessary to preface our discussion of specific vulnerabilities with
some propositions intended to clarify our point of departure. For
brevity these propositions are stated baldly, without qualification and
without supporting argument. We have made no systematic effort to
LISTR
BUL
explore the vulnerabilities of Communist China, and what is said in
this report does not necessarily apply to that country.
DEPARTMENT
1. Definition. A vulnerability of a foreign system can be defined
only if each of three elements is clearly specified: (a) a characteristic
of the society (a "weakness" to be exploited); (b) a U. S. objective
(a result we hope to achieve by exploiting the vulnerability); and
(c) a set of instruments we can employ or develop to exploit the
vulnerability.
In past efforts to list vulnerabilities the need for the second and
third elements have usually not been adequately understood. It has
been implicitly assumed that any event that would "make trouble" for
the regime, whatever its other effects, would serve U. S. interests.
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We believe a precise statement of what we want will frequently reveal
this to be untrue. It has likewise been often assumed that it will be
possible for us to find instruments short of war capable of effectively
exploiting any major "weakness," if only we are ingenious enough. We
think there are broad areas where this is impossible.
2. Assumed foreign policy context. For the purposes of this
exercise we assume that political warfare vis-a-vis the Soviet Union
takes place within the framework of two presently established policies
of the United States:
a. The U. S. will maintain sufficient military strength to
threaten the USSR with military defeat should they undertake
direct military aggression anywhere in the Free World.
b. The U. S. will vigorously promote economic, political,
and military policies within the Free World designed to deny to
the Soviet Union opportunities for extending their control and
influence by suvversion and other nonmilitary means.
3. Objectives of political warfare. Within this framework of
policies designed to make both military and nonmilitary aggression
unprofitable for the USSR, we take it to be the general objective of
our political warfare operations against Russia to reduce Russian
capabilities and alter Russian policies so as to reduce the threat
they pose to us. We believe it is useful to break this objective down
into at least four related sub-objectives, as follows:
a. To reduce the actual military capabilities of the Soviet
Bloc countries, both in the short and the long run.
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b. To render it less likely that whatever leadership controls
Russia will choose to use the military capabilities of the Bloc
against us.
c. To render it more likely, should hostilities occur, that
whoever controls enemy areas will choose to cease hostilities on
terms acceptable to us at the earliest possible moment.
d. In any event to promote changes in Russian society
which will tend, if only in the long-run, to reduce or remove the
latent threat posed by that society to our way of life. These
changes might occur by violent crisis and revoultion or by
gradual evolution. They will in any case depend on choices made
by Russians.
4. Interdependence of political warfare measures. Individual
political warfare measures cannot be evaluated separately in isolation
from each other. In a modern industrial society with advanced
SHE
communications a series of such measures interact and interrelate in
a great many ways. If they are separately designed rather than as
parts of an over-all pattern it is highly likely that the effects of
some measures will contradict those of others in such a way as to
minimize rather than maximize the effect of the program as a whole.
This is so because:
2. A measure aimed primarily at one objective may have
unfavorable consequences for another. Some things we might do, for
instance, to reduce present military capabilities may at the same
time increase the likelihood that the leaders will choose war or
reduce the chance of a quick cease fire if hostilities occur.
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b. A measure aimed at one target group or element in the
population, say the peasant, may produce reactions unfavorable to
our interest in another target group such as the upper bureaucracy.
c. A measure whose effects are expected to be favorable in
the short run may produce delayed consequences unfavorable to us.
For instance, a measure which reduces immediate military capabilities
may contribute importantly to a growing image of our purposes which
will ultimately stiffen the resolve of important groups to oppose
us to the death rather than make terms compatible with the U. S.
interest.
These points will all be illustrated in the discussion of specific
vulnerabilities which follows in Section II. If they are valid, it
follows that a simple listing of separate vulnerabilities is most
CENTRAL
841
unlikely to give a correct impression of our capabilities for
influencing events in the Soviet Bloc.
5. Operations designed to reduce capabilities. Political warfare
operations could promote the first of the objectives listed above,
namely reduction of the present or future military capabilities of the
Soviet Bloc, in two ways:
a. They could operate directly on the physical plant
(sabotage, etc.) or organizational efficiency (overload, etc.)
on which military strength depends.
b. They could influence morale and support for the regime,
inducing groups or individuals to make choices which would lower
military effectiveness.
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5
We do not believe the U. S. presently has the capability, actual
or potential, to conduct political warfare operations that will
significantly reduce present Soviet military capabilities by either
of these means. Our reasons are:
a. We know of no weaknesses we can exploit which will directly
affect Soviet offensive atomic weapon capabilities.
b. We know of no way we can reduce Soviet atomic defensive
capabilities other than through our influence on the choices some
Soviet citizens might have to make in the event of atomic attack
(or its imminent threat) as to whether to continue to support the
regime. We believe we might influence these choices gradually over
time, but we think it unlikely that anything we can do in peacetime
will sufficiently affect attitudes in the near future to change
BEL
defensive capabilities markedly.
and
c. Present offensive and defensive capabilities in conventional
weapons might be influenced if we could affect the probable behavior
of members of the Soviet or satellite armed forces in combat, and
to a much lesser degree if we couldaffect the behavior of supporting
civilian groups. We believe our potential present influence on the
behavior of these groups is small, though we probably have some
margin of influence in the satellites. If we could bring it about,
an increase in discontent and resistance to the policies of the
regime might reduce the leadership's estimates of their capabilities
for undertaking aggression without threat to their own power.
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d. The direct costs we can currently impose on the Soviet
economy by any operations we can think of are unlikely to be great
enough to reduce significantly current military capabilities,
6. The task of political warfare -- to influence choice. If the
preceding propositions are accepted, it follows that the prime task for
political warfare is to attempt to affect the choices likely to be
made in the future by leaders or people in Russia and the satellites
DEPARTMENT
Justed
in such a way as to achieve the second, third, and fourth objectives
outlined above; that is reduce the chance that the leaders will choose
war, increase the chance that they will agree to a quick cease fire in
the event of war on terms compatible with the U. S. interest, and
increase the chance of changes over ime in Russian policy, revolutionary
or evolutionary, which will stably reduce their threat to us. It may
also be possible to affect future (not present) choices in such a way
as to serve indirectly the first objective of reducing Soviet military
capabilities.
It is sometimes assumed that a necessary and sufficient condition
for the achievement of all three of these objectives is the removal or
overthrow of the present Soviet regime. We do not think it safe to
assume that it is either a necessary or a sufficient condition. While
unlikely, it is not impossible that over a number of years or decades
the policies of the regime might evolve in ways favorable to our interest.
And it is certainly by no means a foregone conclusion that a revolutionary
successor regime would inevitably behave better. We have tried to state
our objective in terms of the choices we would like any Russian regime
to make.
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7
Our principal task, then, is to affect choices. Choices by
individuals or groups, leaders or people, depend upon the way they
perceive the alternatives. Political warfare can thus affect choices
in three ways:
a. By words and acts which suggest to the target that the
range of realistic alternatives is wider than he had supposed.
(A major purpose of Soviet internal propaganda is to narrow the
range of alternatives, persuading the target that there really is
no choice between present practice and anything else.)
b. By words and acts which impress the target with the
unattractive features of courses of action (alternatives) not
891
consistent with our objectives.
C. By words and acts which impress the target with the
practicability and desirability of courses of action (alternatives)
which are in fact consistent with our objectives.
7. Denial of the choice of aggression. In one area of policy
the Soviet conception of the alternatives is particularly sensitive to
what we say and do. Our military and political posture determines in
large measure what they believe will be the consequences for them of
external aggression, local or general, military, political, or economic.
We have the capability of persuading them that military force, wherever
used outside the present boundaries of the Bloc, will be met by over-
whelming force sufficient to threaten the destruction of the regime.
We believe we also have the capability, through policies we follow in
the Free World, of denying to the Soviets the opportunity of extending
their control and influence by nonmilitary means. As we understand it,
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it is present U. S. policy to do everything in our power to render
external aggression unattractive to Russia. Discussion of the means
of implementing this policy is outside the scope of our assignment,
but the effectiveness of any of the political warfare measures considered
in what follows hinges critically on our effectively denying them this
alternative. As explained below, we believe this to be the only way of
encouraging any Soviet leadership to explore constructively other ways
of achieving legitimate Russian objectives.
8. Developing alternatives. Assuming that our military and
political posture is such as to remove from Russian leaders and people
all hope of successful external aggression, we believe we will influence
their choices more by suggesting alternatives to present policies
OHL
than by emphasizing present evils. To the extent that we can stir up
Jumea
popular discontent or increase the leadership's estimate of its extent
we can emphasize in their minds the internal dangers of external
aggression. But we can do this better by suggesting alternatives than
by attacking present conditions. Making a bad situation look worse
will not affect behavior (choices) unless the subject sees something he
can do about it. We therefore believe that to be effective the bulk
of our political warfare effort must go into portraying for leaders and
people a positive conception of the realistic and attractive
alternatives open to them, consistent with our interests. We believe
this because:
a. There is abundant evidence that the peoples of the Soviet
Bloc are fully aware of the unsatisfactory nature of their lot.
It is improbable that we can worsen that lot or heighten their
distaste for it sufficiently to induce them to act differently.
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b. While there are signs that elements in the present leader-
ship may be developing a somewhat more flexible view of the alter
alternatives open to them, there remain major limitations in the
conception of alternatives held by both people and regime.
The possibility of choice for most people, even for totalitarian
leaders, is not continuously present. At intervals events force a
re-examination of alternatives and choices present themselves. Policies
are then adopted or rules of thumb laid down and decisions for a time
follow conventional patterns. There are moments of history, periods
of internal crisis, the chaos during and following wars, the occasion
of major international negotiations, when the range of possible choices
widens suddenly and rapid change is possible. There are other more
frequent times when more limited alternatives for marginal changes are
considered. Even slow change is not continuous but consists of a
series of more or less discrete choices interspersed with periods of
following rules already decided on.
BELL
On the other hand, the conception of the alternatives which
Judied
decision makers bring to these moments of choice is shaped and
determined by everything that has happened over a long period. The
possibility of unfamiliar alternatives takes hold slowly in men's
minds. Thus whether choices will be made favoring our interest at
moments of decision depends in part on the groundwork that has been
laid by our acts and words over a considerable period of time in
shaping the concept of the alternatives. In many cases precomeptions
are so deeply embedded that they cannot be changed at the moment when
the choice presents itself. Preconditioning is essential and whatever
we do and say will inevitably precondition.
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9. Implications for political warfare. This has a number of
implications for political warfare:
a. We cannot influence the perception of alternatives, either
now or at moments of crisis, unless we can communicate with those
we wish to influence. A high priority should therefore be placed
on developing and maintaining the best possible channels of
communication with both individuals and groups, notably those now,
or potentially close to the levers of Soviet power. Even if we
have no high priority content for these channels at the moment
we should devote major energies to establishing and maintaining
them.
b. Since the formation of attitudes and perceptions takes
time, we should be trying now to influence attitudes in ways
SSL
which will affect choices under a variety of possible future
Dolght D
contingencies. This means that we must devote a great deal of
thought (1) to exploring possible future situations in which choices
in Russia may be important and (2) to considering how our present
behavior (acts and words) will in fact influence or could be made
to influence those choices when they arise.
C. As long as communication is as difficult and limited
as it now is we cannot hope to establish subtle and complex new
perceptions of alternatives. Such simple ideas as we hope to get
across must be reiterated, and everything we say and do must lend
them credibility.
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The above set of propositions colors in important ways the
committee's conception of its task. Narrowly conceived, the "exploitation
of vulnerabilities" is usually thought of as the "exaggeration of
weaknesses," - emphasizing how bad conditions are, and making bad
conditions worse, - by special means outside the scope of the conventional
instruments of foreign policy. Thus conceived we see little promise in
the exploitation of vulnerabilities, first because we do not believe we
have the capability to exaggerate present organizational and physical
weaknesses enough to produce a significant direct reduction of military
strength, and second because we do not believe that an unselective
exaggeration of weaknesses narrowly conceived can by itself have much
effect on choices confronted by leaders or citizens of the Soviet Bloc.
Further we are not clear that such effect as it does have is
necessarily in our interest. The next section of this report lists a
SIRTH
BUL
number of what we believe to be the most serious weaknesses of the
Bwisht D
Soviet system and illustrates with respect to each the propositions
developed above.
On the other hand we do see as an important and promising task
of political warfare the building in certain minds in the Soviet Union
of a conception of realistic and attractive alternatives to present
lines of policy, - alternatives which would be much more in our interest.
For this to be done effectively, we feel that individual political
warfare operations must be put in the context of a general strategy
designed to make these various operations reinforce and support rather
than conflict with and negate each other. A number of such strategies
are possible, each implying a somewhat different pattern of individual
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actions. In the third section of this report we attempt to outline
one such possible strategy and to suggest its implications for
types of exploitation of vulnerability. We are aware that this
section perhaps goes beyond our terms of reference as originally
conceived, since it suggests certain tasks for diplomacy and the
more conventional instruments of foreign policy. None the less,
we see as the key "vulnerability" of the Soviet system the fact
that realistic and attractive alternatives to present Soviet
policy consistent with both American and Russian long-run interests
do in fact exist. Put another way, we see a possibility that
forces at work within Russia, interacting with appropriate and
sustained U. S. acts and words, might in time bring about
LIBITA
SELL
significant changes in the Soviet Union which would diminish
its threat to us.
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13
SECTION II
POTENTIALLY EXPLOITABLE WEAKNESSES OF THE USSR
A number of studies have been prepared systematically cataloguing
strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet system. A selected bibliography
of such studies is appended hereto. No attempt to reproduce such an
exhasutive catalogue will be made here. Rather it is the purpose of
this section to discuss a selection of those most important for
political warfare in order to illustrate the points made in Section I
above and to prepare the way for the discussion of alternative political
warfare strategies in Section III.
1. Popular Discontents
There is a whole family of weaknesses which can be classed under
the general heading of popular discontents and which can appropriately
be discussed together since both the objectives which their exploitation
may be designed to serve and the instruments which we might use to
THEIR
BILL
exploit them are similar. We may list them as follows:
20 Resentment at the tensions imposed by all the instruments
of the police state. These include constant and secret surveillance
of even intimate human relationships, the forced labor system,
arbitrary and unpredictable denunciation and arrest, and the
necessity to participate constantly in unwanted political activity.
In all levels of the bureaucracy and in some segments of the
intelligentsia this takes the more acute form of fear for the
personal safety of oneself and one's family. In the rest of the
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population it is more a brooding sense of never being left alone,
of never being able wholly to relax than of immediate personal
danger. There is abundant evidence that this sense of sustained
tension is one of the characteristics of the system most deeply
resented by all classes from the man in the street to the upper
levels of the control structure.
b. Resentment at continuing low standards of living. Many
elements in the population are aware that they have benefited little
if at all from the much discussed economic advances of the system.
Their daily experience brings home to them the contrast between
announcements of greatly expanded production and the continuation
virtually unchanged or reduced of the levels of diet, housing,
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OHL
recreation, and consumer goods which have prevailed for decades.
Delght
Co Opposition to collectivization. No feature of Soviet
economic organization is so persistently and deeply hated by any
group as collective farming is hated by many of the peasantry.
d. Resistance to cultural and intellectual regimentation.
This is important only for limited groups in the intelligentsia,
but for some of them, who could be critical in the process of
change, it is no doubt very important.
e. Resentment at the suppression of religion. This has been
most marked in the older age groups, but a recent recrudescence
of official attacks on religion suggests that since the war religious
interest has been growing even among the youth. For most Russian
idealists religion is the only set of philosophical principles to
which it is possible to turn when and if disillusion with Communist
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ideology sets in. The trend in Soviet society over the past two
decades has been toward a marked reduction of the idealistic (as
against the organizational and bureaucratic) content of Communism
in Russia, which may account for some revival of religious interest.
f. Resentment at the treatment of minority nationality groups.
This involves special problems which are separately treated below.
g. Ideological objection to the philosophical roots of the
system. There are undoubtedly some idealist types who have been
impressed by the discrepancy between the stated aims of Communism
and its day-to-day performance and for whom Greek Orthodoxy is
not a substitute. These would welcome an opportunity to support
some alternative political philosophy if there were any realistic
way it could be promoted. Included in this group are a growing
number whose loyalties attach more to the Russian national state
than to the Soviet system. The prospects of any alternative are
LIBITA
SHE
so dim, however, that most or those who would have belonged in
1981mg
this category under other circumstances have resigned themselves
to apathy.
These popular discontents constitute weaknesses of the system in
the sense that their existence imposes heavy costs of control on the
regime, and sets limits to what can be accomplished through voluntary
action. Whether they represent vulnerabilities depends first on what
choices the U. S. hopes to influence through intensifying these discontents
if we could, and second on whether the instruments at our command permit
us to affect the discontents enough to influence choices. Further,
decision as to the particular discontents we should work on will depend
on both our objectives and our capabilities.
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Four possible goals of U. S. exploitation of these discontents may
be distinguished:
(1) We may hope to encourage important groups to undertake open
revolt and overthrow the leadership.
(2) We may hope by increasing the level of popular discontent to
increase the leaders' estimate of the internal danger of external
aggression and thus reduce the chance they will choose war.
(3) We may hope to maintain and increase the level of popular
dissatisfaction against the day when a crisis, brought on in some
other way--a war or an open power struggle at the top--opens to at
least some of the population an option to switch their loyalty from
the present leadership to someone else, Russian or foreign.
sul
(4) We may hope to create popular pressures on the regime over
DEPARTMENT
time which will induce officials at various levels to modify govern-
mental policies in ways which will move the system closer to one
with which we can live with reduced apprehension.
Certain political warfare measures may serve all these purposes
equally, but others which serve one will make another harder to achieve.
We can illustrate this by examining each of these purposes in turn.
Promote revolution. The first purpose-=revolution--might serve
our interests in two ways. First, a country in revolution is almost
inevitably a country weakened militarily. The immediate threat to
us would be abated at least briefly. Second, we might get a new
regime more willing, over time, to accommodate itself to our interests.
This, however, may be something of a gamble since no one can predict
what will emerge from the socially disintegrating process of revolution.
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17
Whether any basic American interest beyond the short term one of an
abatement of the immediate military threat would in fact be served by
an early overthrow of the regime is perhaps an academic question since
virtually all observers agree that we do not have the capability of
inducing successful revolution from below in the Soviet Bloc in the near
future. Unless we offer major actual military support no group without
present power has any realistic alternative to adaptation to the
conditions imposed by the system.
Discourage a choice of war. Many proposed political warfare
measures are based on the implicit premise that things that tend to
increase resentment against the regime will operate in our interest
even though this resentment finds no outlet in overt acts. Where this
TERMS
841
premise is explicitly formulated it is frequently justified on the
INSURE
ground that an awareness on the part of the leadership of a high level
of resentment in the population will dissuade the leadership from
aggression because it will make them doubtful of the loyalty of their
subjects. There is no boubt that the leadership is almost pathologically
sensitive to situations which might threaten their internal power. They
may well be more concerned about relatively minor indications of
disaffection than would be justified by an objective appraisal of the
situation. Thus even measures which do not in fact seriously threaten
them may cause them enough concern to inhibit them from external
aggression while they concentrate on tightening up the home base.
The contrary implication can be almost equally persuasively argued,
however. There is no doubt that up to now the Soviet leadership has
used the threat of external conflict to justify many of the measures
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18
that create popular resentment. One of the classic ways of dealing
with discontent in the Soviet system is to generate enough external
friction to give plausibility to the external threat and thus persuade
people to put up with their troubles. There is very probably a school
of thought amongst the Soviet decision-makers that believes that when
discontent increases it should be met by repressive measures whose sting
is modified by focussing attention on external dangers. This intensifi-
cation of world frictions might not be explicitly designed to provoke
hostilities but might well increase the chance of international tension
getting out of hand and resulting in war. Thus a policy on our part
of generating greater discontent, if we had the capability to make it
effective, might induce choices on the part of some of the leadership
which would increase our immediate danger.
STATE
SEAL
Much depends on the way this is done. If in the course of
ISSINO
emphasizing through open propaganda the unhappy lot of the Soviet
citizen we at the same time stress our implacable opposition to the
whole Soviet system, we confirm for all who identify themselves to any
degree with that system the image spread by the leadership of an external
world aggressively hostile. Indeed, if we are right in our assumption
stated in the first section that nothing outsiders can say can greatly
heighten the discontent of the citizen since this is already shaped
by his personal experience, the net effect of repeated attempts to do
this over time may be to solidify an unfavorable image of our purposes
in the popular and more important in the bureaucratic mind which will
greatly narrow their conception of alternatives open to Russia.
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Maintain dissatisfaction against a future crisis. Another common
argument for the stimulation of popular discontent as a political
warfare goal is that it lays the groundwork for a possible period of
crisis. Keeping people aware that they are being ill-treated prepares
them, so runs the argument, for a quick switch of loyalties in the
event that an alternative leadership appears. This switch may be to
an alternative Russian leadership or, in the event of war, to allied
forces invading Russia. This is a plausible basis for propaganda and
other operations designed to emphasize popular discontents, but again
there are many ways of doing this which may have contradictory effects.
The mere re-emphasis of present discontent is unlikely to predispose
people to a future shift of loyalties unless they are also given a
positive image of how they might be treated by an alternative regime.
But this requires specification of some of the characteristics of such
a regime, which will apply to some alternative regimes but not to others.
For instance, the alternative might be a Communist leader now somewhere
in the hierarchy whose policies would be more acceptable to us but who
DEPARTMENT
The
would continue to accept much of the symbolism of Communism. If we
emphasize ideological discontents and the incompatibility of Communist
philosophy with the good life we do little to predispose the Russian
public to take risks for an alternative Communist leader. Much more
important is the probable effect of our efforts in this event on potential
deviationist leaders themselves. If we behave in ways which repeatedly
re-enforce their conviction that we are determined to try to destroy any
regime that carries the Communist label, their disagreements with the
present leadership are likely to be submerged in the common cause against us.
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On the other hand, if we are looking mainly to an occasion when
we hope to persuade large numbers to lay down their arms in war and
come over to our side against their Russian leaders, our objective must
be to leave as little hope in their minds as possible that any moderate
change in the leadership can relieve their lot. The methods we use and
the images we draw in anticipation of these two contingencies will be
quite different and in some cases conflicting. And these are only two
of the kinds of change in loyalties which might be in our interest in
the event of conflict. Another highly possible development is the
emergence at the top in a period of crisis of a strong military leader
with little conviction about political philosophy, Communist or otherwise,
but with a fierce dedication to a traditional Great Russian nationalism.
We cannot discuss this or other possibilities further here since our
purpose in this essay is merely illustrative, but these examples should
serve to emphasize the conclusion stated in Section I that if we are
THE
PHE
trying in our political warfare to predispose persons in Russia to
DIRECT
make choices in our interest in some future crisis we must be much
clearer than we have been to date as to what the various alternatives
may be that we and they may face when the crisis occurs.
Exaggerate popular discontents in order to affect over time the
choices of the leadership. Our habit of thinking of the USSR as a
monolithic and all-powerful dictatorship is so ingrained that we tend
to fall into the assumption that the only way popular attitudes can
affect the regime is through an open challenge to authority. In fact,
however, any bureaucracy, even one in which power is sharply concentrated,
is sensitive to public reaction and will endeavor to meet public demands
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21
insofar as this can be done without prejudicing a vital interest of the
regime. There is abundant evidence that the Soviet leadership has
always been aware of the major dissatisfactions of the public and of
special groups within it. Stalin and his advisors presumably followed
the course they did not in ignorance or in disregard of these dissatis-
factions but because they felt that vital interests (including the
maintenance of their own power) required the maintenance of the terror,
the low standards of living, and the like.
The precise degree to which dissatisfactions can be assuaged
without danger to vital interests is a difficult matter to determine and
it is inconceivable that there are not wide differences of opinion on
LIBITS
041
this issue within the Soviet bureaucracy. There have been frequent
BE
shifts of Soviet policy reflecting the ascendancy of different views on
this point. These have been most notable in the post-Stalin period,
though Stalin himself followed an erratic course, easing and tightening
as pressures and problems altered. A possible objective of political
warfare measures designed to exploit popular discontents is to attempt,
by influencing these discontents, to influence the choices of the
leadership as to how to deal with them.
Dependence of this vulnerability on our objectives. Some purposes
we might be pursuing and some methods we might use to do this are
suggested in Section III in the discussion of a possible political
warfare strategy. At this point in the argument what we must explore
is how our exploitation of popular discontents might differ if we are
pursuing this objective from what they would be in the two preceding
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22
cases. The principal differences lie in the selection of the discontents
we choose to emphasize and in the sorts of choices we try to present
as open to people and regime.
If our purpose is to affect choices by governmental decision-makers
we should clearly emphasize those discontents with respect to which some
governmental decision-makers now see or can be led to see some possible
choices as open. More simply, we would in this case avoid exploiting
those discontents which appear to be resolvable only through revolution,
and we would avoid talking about others as though only revolution could
affect them. If we wish to affect the choices of those in the control
structure we must not present the alternatives to the public in ways
which confirm the bureaucrats' conviction that there are no alternatives
891
acceptable to them.
Justed
One implication of this approach would be that we would drop a
theme (appropriate to other objectives) to the effect that the interests
of the Russian people are implacably opposed to those of the regime.
If the only alternative for the people is portrayed as the throwing
out of the regime root and branch the bureaucrat must identify with either
the people or the regime. The further up in the control structure he
is, the more likely he is to think of such appeals as directed against
him rather than as opening up alternatives to him. If, as many
observers hold, change, violent or gradual, can begin in the Soviet
system only near the top, political warfare measures which solidify the
leadership in the view that the only alternative to the present state
of affairs is their own destruction are unlikely to produce changes in
our interest.
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23
The "leadership" for the purposes of this argument probably extends
farther down than is sometimes recognized. Thousands of officials are
identified in the public mind with the imposition of the measures
which produce popular discontents. Thousands are themselves responsible
for decisions in detail which implement these measures. If the attack
is on the whole structure they will see it as an attack upon themselves,
even if they have major disagreements with the instructions they have
been carrying out. Events since Stalin's death have probably tended
to increase morale in the middle and upper ranks of the bureaucracy in
the sense that more persons now have a sense of participating meaning-
fully in decision-making and therefore identify more with the "regime."
If this is so, measures implicitly designed to promote revolution among
the people at large are less likely than ever to appeal to the group
643
Dalghi
from which the leadership for such a revolution must be recruited.
If our purpose in emphasizing discontents is to affect the choices
of the bureaucracy, another corollary follows. One would emphasize
those discontents with respect to which fairly small changes are possible.
For instance in talking about abuses of police power in one's radio
broadcasting or in the pronouncements of Western officials one would
emphasize not that these abuses are an inherent feature of the Soviet
system and can be got rid of only by violent overthrow of that system,
but rather that they are unnecessary and that it is in the interest of
the Soviet regime to modify them. The line might run, "Everyone knows
that these police abuses are one of the most disliked features of the
Russian scene, Is any constructive Russian purpose really served by
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24
measures as unpopular as these? We note with approval signs that certain
Soviet leaders are trying to modify the system. But is there any reason
why they should not go a good deal further in this direction than the
very limited steps they have already taken? For instance,
=
In connection with standards of living, one would not lay great
stress on how many consumers goods could be produced if the entire
Soviet military machine were dismantled, though one might make this
calculation in passing. Nor would one compare Western and Soviet
standards of living. Rather one would question whether a little more
attention might not be paid to housing standards, pointing out that the
sort of limited relaxation of international tensions that might be
LIBITA
881
possible with a limited (and therefore conceivable) international
settlement could free at least a margin of resources now devoted to
JOHN
1481wa
military purposes without really weakening Soviet defensive capabilities.
One might plant rumors that quite conceivable modifications of police
or economic policy were about to be announced by the regime.
These rumors, which should be highly specific and detailed, should
not be so bizarre as to be implausible to the average man but should
imply that changes will be made which depart substantially from present
practice and from what are probably presently considered alternatives.
These rumors would almost certainly travel widely since they concern
everyone, and might well create expectations which at least some elements
in the bureaucracy would be in favor of satisfying at least in part.
All of this would make sense only if one's objective were to try
to promote gradual change in the system in the direction of a relaxation,
or to promote conflict and controversy within the bureaucracy as to the
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25
desirability of such change. At the moment we are not concerned to pass
judgment on whether or not this is sound policy, but only to illustrate
the point that what constitutes a vulnerability is very different if
this is your objective than if your purpose is to promote revolution.
We shallsay more about the middle and upper leadership as a target
presently. Here we wish mainly to stress that measures designed to
exploit popular discontents may have effects that are different in the
short run from what they are in the long run, and are almost certain
to have effects on targets (such as the leadership) other than those
at which they are directed. These effects must be considered in the
light of an over-all strategic concept of what we are trying to achieve
by our political warfare program.
LIDITA
SEL
Our çapabilities to exaggerate popular discontents. These are
limited for any of the four purposes outlined above. We doubt very
much whether we have sufficient capacity to communicate with broad
elements in the Soviet populace to the degree necessary to convince
them that systems radically different from the one under which they
live are a practical possibility. In certain of the more advanced of
the European satellites such as East Germany and Czechoslovakia where
broad elements of the population have had personal experience of
radically different systems the situation is different. Here radio
broadcasting, the skillful placing of information in the grapevine,
visits of Westerners, and even clandestine contacts can be very important
in keeping a popular image of the West alive in the face of Soviet
propaganda. But the history of early attempts of the Voice of America
to communicate a "full and fair picture" of American life to the Soviet
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26
people seems to bear out the contention that in Russia this is too far
from reality to carry conviction.
There are, however, numerous ways, some of which will be suggested
later, f or emphasizing that limited changes in present practices, which
would be enormously popular and which could be meaningful even in the
USSR are possible. Some increase in the volume of overt communication
would probably be desirable but no large additional costs need to be
incurred. Probably the most effective way of spreading knowledge of
alternatives to present practice is to encourage maximum contact of
Soviet citizens with Westerners in every way possible. Certain of
our present policies discourage both visits of Russians to this country
and visits of Americans to the Soviet Union. These at least should be
revised.
DEPARTMENT
141
2. Dissatisfaction of Minorities
One weakness in the Soviet system which has been listed under the
preceding heading deserves separate treatment because its possible
exploitation poses special problems for the United States. The weakness
is found in the fact that the USSR contains within its borders cultural,
ethnic, and racial groups whose loyalty to their local society and
tradition may be greater than to Great Russia. Most observers would
agree that control over these groups has been so effectively established
by the regime that there is no possibility of generating from the outside
open and effective resistance to Soviet authority by these groups under
present conditions. None the less indications of current support in
principle and possible future support of a more concrete kind could
serve a number of U. S. purposes.
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27
It could perhaps be argued, for instance, that such support, by
keeping alive belief in an eventual independent alternative, might so
weaken the loyalty of these people to the regime that its capability of
waging war would be reduced. As long as the USSR was doing well in
such a conflict there is no reason to suppose that the control measures
which have been effective in peace could not continue to be exercised
as effectively as now. Should the USSR suffer reverses, however, and
in particular should the territory of the Soviet Union be invaded by
Western ground forces, the military and other costs of such an invasion
might be greatly affected by the views of minority groups concerning our
attitude toward them. Hitler received potentially valuable support
from residents of the Ukraine and of the Caucasus during his invasion
STREET
SHE
of Russia. He threw this support away by making it clear that these
minorities could expect no better treatment from him than from their
Soviet masters. This is a lesson the Soviets are not likely to let the
minorities forget, but we could probably insure a less than totally
hostile reception for our armies should they invade certain minority
areas by giving over a period of time enough evidence in pronouncements
and acts that we were prepared actively to support local dreams of
independence.
Similarly in the event of intercontinental atomic warfare,
should we effectively destroy from the air the centers of Soviet
control and wish to negotiate a settlement with separate widely
scattered groups in Russia our chances of doing this quickly would
be materially improved by a history of support for the minorities.
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28
Finally should a crisis occur at the top of the Soviet power
structure which at least temporarily weakened the system's instruments
of control it might be quite possible to organize active resistance
on the part of some of the minority groups if careful plans had been
laid.
On the other hand there are other contingencies in which a
history of U. S. support for the minority groups would effectively
block developments in our interest. Suppose, for instance, that the
crisis in the leadership should take the form of consideration
by the Soviet military of whether they should displace the Party
and the secret police and assert full control, They would be
influenced in this decision by their estimate of the probability of
foreign intervention during the resulting crisis. The army is, by
SHE
and large, devoted to the unity of the Russian state and would
probably not wish to precipitate a crisis which they thought might
lead to its dismemberment.
Or consider the situation after an atomic bombardment which
knocked out the nerve centers of Party control in the cities but
left intact large armies in the field. In this event it would be the
military with whom we would be negotiating a cease fire. Their willing-
ness to come to terms would be influenced by whether they thought
they could salvage intact the Russian federation. A prior commitment
on our part to independence for the minority groups might hold things
up seriously.
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29
The impact of our exploitation of minority sentiments on the prospects
for long-term evolution of Soviet society in directions favorable to
us would depend on many things, including how we supported minority
interests. If we did this in such a way as to confirm our aggressively
hostile intent in the minds of the people and the leadership, our
ability to encourage slow change would be reduced. This should not,
of course, deter us if our choice of strategy excludes emphasis on
promoting evolution. We should also give serious thought to whether
in the long run the various nationality groups are sufficiently
capable of stable independent existence so that our interests would
be served by the establishment of separate states if this were at some
future time feasible. This contingency is probably so far in the future
that it is impossible now to form a judgment.
CERTAIN
ST>
Our capabilities for exploiting nationality sentiments are
considerable if we decide that this is worth doing vigorously in
spite of its ambiguous effects. We cannot promote effective present
resistance, but we could lay the groundwork for such resistance in a
period of crisis. Should we decide to do this, it should be with
full realization of the risks we run of prejudice to other parts of our
political warfare program.
Of course this is an area in which, if we are careful, we can
continue to support covertly a variety of groups and activities among
the minorities at the same time that we maintain a publicly neutral
view. This may be desirable as a kind of insurance against the day
when we may wish to use these groups more actively.
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30
The existence of émigré groups in this country, promoting the
interests of separatism, exposes us to the danger of exaggerating
the desire for independence of the minorities still living in the
Soviet Union. It has been suggested that in some cases these groups
are discontented more because they are not fully accepted as Russian
citizens on a par with all others than because their separatist
ambitions are being thwarted. It is important to have better evidence
than we now have as to the true nature of their discontent before
planning major measures to exploit it. Some of the special problems
posed by the emigre groups are discussed in an appendix to this report.
3. The Structure of the Economy -
STREET
841
The most outstanding weakness of the Soviet economy is to be
INSUED
found in its failure, to date, to solve its agricultural problem.
A
second weakness important from some points of view is its failure, in
part related to agriculture but in part springing from other factors,
to provide a growing supply of consumers goods to the Russian people.
Finally a third weakness toward the exploitation of which major American
efforts have been directed is the partial dependence of the Soviet
economy for certain products on sources outside the Bloc.
The vulnerability of the USSR to the exploitation of these
weaknesses must again be considered in the light of the various
objectives we may have in our political warfare efforts. We may
operate on the economy to reduce capabilities, to deter a choice of war
by Russian leaders, to promote a quick choice of peace in the event of
war, or to promote revolutionary or evolutionary long-run change in
Soviet society.
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31
The weakness of Soviet agriculture. The impact of agricultural
stagnation on present military capabilities has probably not been great.
The food supply is adequate to feed the troops and prevent the starvation
of civilians. The military machine does not depend in a crucial way on
nonfood agricultural raw materials. We do not have the capability
in being to affect Soviet agricultural output directly. It is somewhat
uncertain whether with a substantial additional effort we could
develop this capability through developments in biological and chemical
warfare, weather warfare, and the like. Supposing we could, what U. S.
interests would this serve?
It would take a very substantial reduction in Soviet agricultural
output to reduce markedly current Russian capabilities to mount a
ground offensive. In a long war lasting several years sharp reduction
Listery
JUL
of agricultural output would no doubt ultimately become crucial. The
INBINO
instruments to effect this are more appropriate to hot war than to
cold, but fear of agricultural failure might be an important deterrent
to risky adventures by the leadership. A decision to risk general
war would almost certainly not be taken by the leadership during an
agricultural crisis believed to be temporary, but chronic agricultural
failure might encourage local aggression in an area like Southeast
Asia to secure added food for the Bloc.
Taking a longer-run view it is probable that continued agricultural
failure and the measures taken by the USSR to overcome it would in time
reduce the rapid rate of Soviet economic growth and would thus slow
down the growth of economic capabilities for war of the Bloc. It seems
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32
quite likely that in spite of added investment in agriculture there
will be continued shortfalls against Soviet plans. If we had the
capability of rendering these shortfalls more extreme we might encourage
the larger allocation of resources to agriculture which will probably
take place to some extent in any event.
Insofar as we can influence the choices of the regime as to
how large a volume of resources to allocate to investment in agriculture,
we will probably reduce both growth and military strength by encouraging
as large an allocation as possible. The productivity of investment in
Soviet agriculture is probably relatively low. In other words the
capital resources which must be invested in agriculture (in irrigation,
fertilizers, and the like) to increase the value of output by a given
amount are probably a good deal greater than in other sectors of the
SEAL
economy. Hence the more resources are shifted from other purposes
to agricultural improvement the slower the over-all rate of growth
will be.
What are our capabilities for influencing choices as to investment
in agriculture? This is part of the general problem of the degree
to which we can by our behavior affect the total pattern of Soviet
bureaucratic choice. As explained later these choices will depend
in part on how safe the leadership feels it is to divert resources
from more directly military uses and in part on the pressures on
them from the population to increase the availability of foodstuffs.
The totality of our acts, diplomatic, military, overt and covert propa-
ganda will probably have some effect on their estimate of risk,
particularly if these acts are consistent . Insofar as we can devise
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33
measures to increase popular pressures for agricultural improvement
and for more food, as discussed in the preceding section, these will
have an influence on such choices about resource allocation as the
bureaucrats conceive to be open to them.
Clearly there is little prospect that anything we can do can have
a sudden and dramatic effect on these choices. The best we might hope
is that over ten or fifteen years of consistently following an
integrated political warfare strategy we might have some marginal
influence on the rate of shift in the allocation of resources. Such
a shift, if it came about, would not only affect future military capa-
bilities but might also promote long-run changes in Soviet society
which would make it less menacing.
Note that our techniques of exploitation will depend on the kind
of influence on choice we hope to have. If we conclude that our
LIMITA
FUL
best hope is to promote eventual revolution, we will emphasize in
all our acts and words the impossibility of dealing with the Soviet
agricultural problem without completely altering the whole system of
organization of agriculture. Our tactic will be to try to make that
system, in any and all of its variants, perform as badly as possible
in order to generate the conviction in at least a few minds that only
complete and violent change can produce significant results. This
tactic implies abandoning any effort to exert influence on present
bureaucrats in the ultimate hope of getting them all thrown out in
favor of others.
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34
The alternative tactic would be to promote primarily technical and a-
political consideration of the Soviet agricultural problem, to focus
attention on changes which would not appear to involve a complete
change in the system, and thus to stimulate among the existing
bureaucracy belief in a wider range of alternatives than they now see.
There are many ways we could do this, particularly against a background
of continued difficulty in Soviet agriculture. We could disseminate
technical information on the kinds of investment in agriculture that
are possible. This would not be news to the upper bureaucrats, but it
need not threaten them in any way. It might affect popular discontent
by emphasizing that there are things that can be done to relieve the
food situation that are not being done. It might impress today's
middle and lower bureaucrats, who are tomorrow's upper bureaucrats
with the notion that there are possibilities that could be exploited if
the priorities of the top leadership were shifted a little. This
TIRTH
SHE
would be particularly appealing to those locally responsible for
I
agricultural output.
We could organize international conferences on agricultural
techniques with field trips to projects in all parts of the world
(including the USSR). We could perhaps even pry open some Soviet minds
to the possibility of alternative forms of organization of agriculture
by proposing in international bodies, with a strictly technical tone,
studies of the relative influence on productivity of different systems
of peasant incentive and control with examples from China, India, Russia,
Hungary, France, etc.
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35
It may be objected that this tactic could promote actual improve-
ment in the agricultural situation in Russia and thus remove a
weakness rather than exploit it. There are several comments to be
made on this objection. In the first place, the Soviets can probably
obtain real results in agriculture only by diverting resources and
changing organization in ways which would almost certainly reduce
the threat that system poses to us. This would result partly from
the reduction in heavy and military investment which a major large-
scale program of agricultural investment would require, and partly
from the relaxation and re-emergence of private peasant incentives
which is the organizational change most likely to increase productivity.
In the second place, there is a question as to whether small improve-
ments in the lot of the citizen - in this case some increase in the
availability of food stuffs -- reduces or increases his effective
discontent. Such increases please him for a time, but they also
create expectations which can be satisfied only by a continuation of
the same process. There was wisdom in Stalin's apparent conviction
STATE
that relaxation and improvement in standards of living may well be
an irreversible process which leads to ever-increasing demands.
Whether this is correct or not, our concern here is to point out
that the steps one takes to exploit possible vulnerabilities in
Soviet agriculture depend on the total pattern of effects one is trying
to achieve.
The lack of sufficient consumers goods. Turning to the weakness
in consumer goods production, a virtually identical set of considerations
applies. There are probably no ways short of war in which we can
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36
directly reduce the volume of goods other than food available to the
Soviet consumer. Neither present nor possible trade controls have the
capability of pinching the consumer significantly. A relaxation of
such controls combined with a drive for nonstrategic East-West trade
might increase the possible volume of consumer goods available if we
thought this would be in our interest. This is further discussed
below in connection with trade policy.
Our potential influence, then, if we have any, must be exercised
largely through an effort to affect the choices of the present or
an alternative regime as to the allocation of resources between
consumer goods and other things. To the extent that we can induce
or promote an increase in the proportion of Soviet resources devoted
to consumers goods we will, as in the case of agriculture, probably
TERM
SELL
reduce the rate of growth and possibly induce structural changes which
will make the system less menacing. This is particularly true of
housing, whose annual yield of services per dollar of capital invested
is lower than that of any other form of investment.
The exploitation of this vulnerability, it should be noted, is
to be effected by instruments which operate directly on either popular
discontent or bureaucratic choice, and must therefore be closely
related to programs for exploiting many of the other vulnerabilities
we outline in this section. Again, a strategy of maximizing strains
between people and regime in order to promote revolution may dictate
measures inconsistent with those designed to induce change by smaller
increments.
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37
Vulnerability to East-West trade policy. The avowed purpose of
East-West trade control as practiced to date has been to reduce direct
military capabilities. It is our judgment that the vulnerability of
the Soviet economy to such controls is not great enough to justify a
greatly expanded effort at restriction on our part. Judged by the
sole criterion of direct effect on military capabilities present
techniques of exploitation are probably in the right direction although
the magnitude of their effects is probably not great. East-West
trade policy should at least be examined, however, in relation to
other objectives of political warfare. Little thought has been given
to the use of East-West trade policy as an instrument for affecting
the choices, now or in the future, of the populace or the bureaucracy.
One consideration is that a highly publicized policy of trade
restriction or economic warfare can be and has been used by Soviet
propaganda to verify the image of the United States as a hostile and
LIBITA
SEL
aggressive force. Over the years this may well act to reconcile the
Soviet public to the present Soviet system and limit the perception
of alternatives. By itself trade policy would probably not be of
great importance, but taken together with a pattern of other apparently
hostile acts it adds its contribution.
Further consideration should be given to the possibility of using
trade offers, trade conferences, and the like as an instrument to
dramatize for people and bureaucrats some alternatives to present
courses of action. An obvious example would be an American offer
to help raise standards of living of Russian consumers by supplying
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38
consumers goods in exchange for Russian nonstrategic materials. This
could be used to stir up popular pressures by explaining to the
Russian people what attractive articles they could obtain at what low
prices if such a program were to be undertaken. An examination of
possible terms, lists of goods, samples, prices, and the like taking
place quite widely through the Soviet bureaucracy, might have a
substantial influence in widening the interest of some. Soviet
bureaucrats not only in the deal at issue but in the consumer goods
sector of their own economy. This is merely an example of a political
warfare use of East-West trade policy quite different from, and perhaps
inconsistent with, the use we have made of it so far which deserves
closer examination, particularly if an altered conception of over-all
political warfare strategy were to be adopted. One attractive
feature of such a new type of exploitation of Soviet weakness is
that our capabilities for playing the game of trade offers are much
greater than theirs. We need not fear having our bluff called, as
SHE
they must, since our capacity to supply consumer goods is almost
limitless.
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39
4. The Governmental Structure
The dilemma of centralized power. Perhaps the most serious
long-run weaknesses in the Soviet system are those arising out
of the difficulties of maintaining centralized power in a police
state and at the same time achieving efficiency and imagination
in administration. Efficiency requires delegation of authority,
clear lines of jurisdiction, and the development of subloyalties
to units of administration which must work smoothly as teams.
But each of these things carries a potential threat to the
centralization of power. Delegation of authority means delega-
tion of power, clear lines of jurisdiction permit administrators
to solidify their control within their own field, bureaucratic
subloyalties can become so strong that they supersede loyalty
to the top in the event of disagreement.
DEPARTMENT
SELL
Stalin dealt with this dilemma by boldly seizing one horn.
He provided minimum delegation of authority, he did his best to
keep lines of jurisdiction muddy and changing, and he instituted
an elaborate system of cross-spying and interagency infiltration
designed to prevent the development of lasting subloyalties.
At times when the penalties of this system in inefficiency were
too great it was modified. During the War, for instance, the
autonomy, and internal cohesion of the armed forces on whose
efficiency the survival of the state depended was permitted to
increase. After the War, Party and police controls were widely
reinstituted throughout the armed forces.
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There is good evidence that the Stalin system generated
deep resentments and discontents through the bureaucracy, but
the only elements that could even speculate about alternatives
were those in command of instruments of power -- the military,
the Party, and the secret police. Of the three the military
were apparantly least happy about the state of affairs, but the
system of police and Party controls through the military was
too pervasive to permit action, and we have no firm evidence
that any steps were ever contemplated by army leaders to take
such action. Our capabilities to exploit this weakness other
than by direct military intervention were extremely limited.
Even offers of direct intervention would have had ambiguous
effects, since the military are restrained from thinking about
resistance to the regire by the fear that any sign of internal
LIBIRTY
SHALL
weakness will be seized upon by us as a pretext not merely to
THEIRO
destroy the regime but to dismember Russia.
The constitutionalizing of government. There are many signs
that the new regime is experimenting with a somewhat different
policy of attempting to secure greater efficiency by regularizing
the bureaucracy, clarifying lines of jurisdiction, and permitting
a greater sense of cohesion to develop within departments and
bureaus. This "constitutionalizing" of government, if it is
taking place, poses other but equally serious problems for the
maintenance of centralized power, which constitute a weakness
which it may be possible to exploit. Under this kind of a system
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41
the limitations on the capacity of any bureaucrat to contemplate
a wider range of alternatives are much less severe. Differences
of view as to how to deal with particular individual problems
are much more likely to arise and once having arisen to become
institutionalized in departmental positions. Furthermore inde-
pendent contemplation of a wider range of alternatives is likely
to be found a good deal further down in the hierarchy as fear
of sudden and arbitrary removal for deviationism abates somewhat.
This greater freedom to consider new choices is likely to
be felt first and most in the areas furthest removed from
traditionally political or ideological issues. As the test of
a policy becomes increasingly its success in achieving its goals
and decreasingly whether it corresponds in detail to a current
Party line, officials have more and more opnortunity to experi-
ment, particularly when such experiment runs little risk of
carrying them into ideological issues. As the bureaucratization
of decisions proceeds, officials will be slow at first to take
-
advantage of the option it gives them to experiment. At this
point marginal nudges suggesting possible choices they believe
to be realistic alternatives under the circumstances may be
most important. Any student of American bureaucracy knows that
once departmental positions are established, interagency and
interpersonal conflict can grow around what began as purely
technical disagreements until the full array of instruments of
power is called into play by each protagonist to establish his
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42
position. Under these conditions an attempt to revert to com-
pletely centralized decision-making will meet stiff resistance
and may even provoke open conflict in the leadership.
Our intelligence is too poor to permit a firm estimate of
how far this process of constitutionalism and regularization of
procedures has already gone. While it has almost certainly not
yet gone very far, there have definitely been some changes from
the Stalin technique of rule. There are three reasons why,
however far it may have gone, it is probably in the United States'
interest to promote it. The first is that the process itself
constitutes some dispersion of power through the bureaucracy
and thus increases the likelihood that officials can be found
in the hierarchy more willing to consider policies attractive
to us. The second is that the farther it goes the greater
become the possibilities of open resistance to a top leader who
attempts to reverse it and to re-establish the mantle of Stalin.
LIDITA
BUL
The third is that such dispersion of power if it progresses a
Type
good deal farther, may make it harder for the system quickly
to make "strong" decisions of the kind most dangerous to us.
Issues potentially divisive in the bureaucracy. It is not
difficult to list the major issues about which there is almost
certain to be some disagreement in the upper bureaucracy. They
probably are:
a. How far should the relaxation of internal tensions,
the reduction in police power, the limitations on arbitrary
arrest go? It would be strange if there were not some who
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43
felt that the regime had already departed too far from
Stalin's rules and that no good could come from this
stirring up of expectations of a more peaceful life. The
fact that some measures in this direction have in fact
been taken suggests that there are probably others who
would like to see it pushed a good deal farther, who feel
that the secret police method is a costly and dangerous
method of maintaining control and that if more voluntary
adherence to the regime were to be encouraged the state's
affairs could be run much more efficiently.
b. To what degree should resources be shifted from
heavy industry and military output into consumers goods
production? Those responsible for national security
undoubtedly view with alarm the minor shifts that have
already taken place. On the other hand there must be a
group of technicians who are itching to demonstrate what
THE
/
the economy can do in civilian output and who rationalize
-
this as necessary to build morale, even from the narrow
point of view of military effectiveness. No doubt there
are also in this latter group those who feel privately
that the external danger has always been somewhat exaggerated
and perhaps some who argue that the atomic bomb now makes
"cheap defense" possible and reduces the need for quite
such large efforts in conventional weapons.
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44
c. What methods should be used to boost agricultural
output? How far should the reinstatement of peasant
incentives be pushed as against a really all-out effort
to make full collectivization work?
d. How far should the recent new line in foreign
policy be pushed? Was it merely inviting trouble to relax
the iron curtain even a little? Does the London Pact
demonstrate the failure of the "soft" line to split the
allies? Or has there not yet been time to gain the full
fruits of the new line, and is the trouble rather that it
has not been carried far enough or maintained long enough?
A much longer list could and should be drawn up. We are
not implying that the policy disagreements on these matters have
been or will be permitted to threaten the unity of action of the
regime. We are merely saying that an area of controversy, how-
191
ever narrow, must exist and that it is to our interest to widen
it.
Our capabilities to broaden the conception of alternatives.
The degree to which alternatives in both internal and external
policy are considered will depend in part on the success of
Soviet external policy. If Soviet efforts to extend Communist
influence abroad and to weaken the Western Alliance are progressing
favorably the bureaucracy is much more likely to remain united
and satisfied with present courses of action. Thus if we are to
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encourage any bureaucrats to think a bout alternatives, we must
exploit to the full our capabilities of confronting the Soviet
Bloc with sufficient military force to deny them the benefits
of external military aggression and with sufficient Free World
cohesion, and economic and political vitality, to deny them sub-
versive victories wherever possible.
Second, and this is much more difficult, if we are to exploit
our capacity to affect marginal decisions, and probably even if
we hope at any stage to encourage an open revolutionary break
we must so far as possible avoid creating the impression that we
are unalterably hostile to the continuation of any regime in
which any present bureaucrats participate. As already pointed
out, insofar as our purpose is to affect choices we will fail
if we convince the target that our real purpose is to eliminate
him. It will be objected that all Communist bureaucrats
believe this anyway since capitalist encirclement is a cardinal
principle of Communist doctrine. This may be t rue of the
STATE
SAL
fanatical Communist, but the repeated shifts in the official
Soviet attitude toward coexistence suggest that practical men
find plenty of room for operational maneuver within the limits
of dogma. There may well be a tendency in the new race of tough-
minded practical bureaucrats to operate on the basis of much
less rigid and abstract assumptions than their revolutionary
prodecessors. This does not mean that these men are not good
Communists, or in some sense do not believe in their ideology.
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A majority of Americans genuinely believe themselves to be Christians,
and would resist to the teeth any direct attack from abroad on
Christianity, but few base their political decisions on a rigid
application of Christian principles.
Within this framework of firm denial of the option of success-
ful external military or subversive aggression combined with con-
tinual reiteration in word and deed of the idea that we are not
opposed to the legitimate interests of any reasonable Russian regime
we have many opportunities for affecting choice at various levels
of the bureaucracy. We can do this as suggested above partly by
operating in a variety of ways on popular discontents. We can
affect in limited ways the effectiveness of the Soviet economic
system. We can influence the behavior of people and possibly even
of bureaucrats in the satellites. Above all we can do this by
direct contacts with members of the bureaucracy itself in our
LIBITY
BALL
normal diplomatic dealings, in the U. N., in specialized confer-
ences and meetings such as the technical committees of the ECE,
by broadcasts and other information media activities which
reach bureaucrats much more easily than the people, and by
inserting ideas into the stream of publicly available news in the
West (newspapers, domestic radio, speeches, etc.) most of which
gets to certain levels in the bureaucracy. We can give much more
attention than we have to opening a variety of diplomatic alterna-
tives by a constant stream of proposals of all kinds. Indeed
the notion that the bureaucracy, in the broad sense of the whole
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47
of civil and-military officialdom, should be a principal conscious
target and will almost always be an actual audience to anything we
do is one of the main conclusions we would draw. It is a target
we must regard as crucial because it is the only target we can
reach that may have the power to produce change over time in
Soviet behavior.
In considering this target our instruments must be chosen,
however, with several points in mind. First, we probably cannot
hope to have major short-term influence on any Soviet choices
except foreign policy choices. The images we create of our pur-
poses and of the alternatives open to the regime will take effect
only slowly and cumulatively through time. This means that to
create consistent images we must engage in words and deeds that
THEIR
FUL
are consistent through time and with each other.
Second, if we are playing for the long pull we should not
be too distressed if our political warfare program appears to have
little influence on the top three or four figures in the hierarchy.
We are playing for keeps, and in the long run it is the present
middle and lower bureaucrats with whom in almost any event we are
going to have to deal.
Third and most important, we should decide what kind of an
influence we are going to try to exert in a pattern of activities
related to each other and then engage in other activities directed
at other ends only after consideration of how far they contradict
our central purpose. In other words, we should establish a strategic
concept for our political warfare and then adhere to it.
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5. Disaffection in the Satellites
The fact that the satellite countries of the Bloc are under
the detailed control of an alien and in many cases a traditionally
hated power constitutes one of the most crippling weaknesses of
the Soviet Bloc system. Since the nature of Soviet influence in
Eastern Europe is quite different from that in China WE will limit
ourselves to the case of Eastern Europe in what follows.
Weaknesses in the satellites. All the internal weaknesses of
the Soviet system are present in the European satellites in mch
exaggerated form. The popular discontents are probably more
deeply felt, first because they exist in a context of daily
oppression by representatives of a foreign power and second becaus,
in many of these areas there linger memories of a recent different
and freer system. This is especially important in East Germany
and Czechoslovakia. What in Russia are minority discontents of
uncertain strength are in the satellites deep sentiments of
national pride with roots in historic traditions of independence.
TERM
The economic weaknesses of the Soviet Union are similarly magnified
in the satellites. The agricultural failures of collectivization
are more recent and dramatic, standards of living have in some
cases not only not been raised but actually depressed far below
former levels by collectivization and industrialization, and East-
West trade controls imposed mainly by the Russians have wrenched
traditional trading patterns into new and frequently less desired
patterns. Within the governmental structure there is added to
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49
the dilemma of maintaining efficiency under highly centralized
authority the dilemma of providing inc ntives positive or negative
which will induce bureaucrats of one nationality to serve the
interests of another.
Precisely because these weaknesses are so much more pro-
nounced it is especially tempting to design measures to exploit
them vigorously in all directions at once. However, the problem
of determining the full impact on all our objectives, direct and
indirect, of political warfare in the satellites is even more
complex than in the Soviet Union, and it is even more essential
that various objectives be sorted out and a consistent strategy
to pursue them developed.
Objectives of political warfare in the satellites affecting
military capabilities. In the first place, we cannot rule out
LIDISTRY
941
quite so easily in the satellites the possibility that we can
DIRECT
directly affect military capabilities by operations of one sort
or another. At the least there are real possibilities of covert
support for organized resistance groups which might perform
valuable sabotage functions in the event of hostilities. Pre-
paratory measures to maintain contact with any such groups that
may exist and perhaps even to encourage the formation of new ones
should not be beyond our capabilities. In considering what we
would gain from such operations we should, however, carefully weigh
the consequences for our other political warfare objectives if
operations of this sort should become known to persons in the
satellites who are targets of other programs and appeals.
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50
Affecting choices. Insofar as our political warfare operations
in the satellites are designed to affect choices rather than to
reduce military potential by direct physical means, we must bear
in mind that there are at least three and perhaps four quite
different groups whose choices may be important to us. These are
(1) the bulk of the satellite populations, (2) possibly some
potential anti-Communist leadership, (3) the bureaucracy of the
Communist governments of the satellite countries, and (4) the
Soviet bureaucracy.
If we conclude that it is desirable and practical to attempt
to promote actual revolution in a satellite, certain sorts of
rather large-scale propaganda efforts to encourage open resistance
by substantial numbers of people may be in order even if, by
engaging in such operations, we limit the possibility of affecting
LICENSE
The
decisions of the satellite Communists and the Soviet bureaucracy
system
in our favor. At the moment, from the evidence available to us,
we are inclined to doubt whether there is any possibility that
such a mass uprising could be successful in any satellite country
against the strength of the Red Army. Conditions may very possibly
change, however, and it would be short-sighted not to have plans
laid and possibly even a skeleton organization in being to exploit
a situation of crisis if one should arise. These plans should,
however, be laid in the utmost secrecy so as not to prejudice
efforts we may wish to make to achieve our objectives by more
evolutionary means.
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Apart from these preparatory measures there is reason to
believe that a strategy of encouraging the satellite populations
to make strong but limited demands upon their leaders for improve-
ments in their conditions of life may be even more effective in
affecting choices both of the satellite and the Soviet bureaucracies
than similar programs in Russia. Since both the people of the satel-
lites and their own present leaders know from pre-Communist
experience what is possible in the way of an alternative way of
life, their pressures for change will be much greater, and minimal
concessions will do much less to relieve those pressures. The
satellite bureaucracy must contain many men who resent the squeezing
of their own peoples for the benefit of the military or political
strength of the Soviet Union and who will be sympathetic to
attempts to improve the lot of their citizens so long as they
believe this to be consistent with retaining their own power
THE
domestically. Finally, there must be many in the Soviet bureaucracy
who are aware of the huge cost of keeping satellite populations in
line entirely by repressive police measures and who must find tempting
the idea that maybe an occasional carrot can save the expense of
several divisions of troops.
In short, throughout the decision-making apparatus of the
satellites the question of how far to yield to popular pressures
for economic improvement, relaxation of police pressures,
religious liberty, and the like must be a question on which there
is wide difference of opinion. It could be the purpose of our
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52
political warfare to widenthose differences by attempting to
increase pressures for kinds of concessions that might quite
conceivably be granted without menacing the whole structure of
Communist control. The granting of such concessions, or their
denial, might equally increase the difficulty for the Soviets of
imposing the restrictive measures which a warwould require, and
thus, by raising a question as to the loyalty of the satellite
peoples, deter a Soviet choice of war.
Certain other types of appeals can be made direct to the
satellite bureaucracy which can similarly encourage them increas-
ingly to assert independence of their Soviet masters without
obviously risking their positions and their necks. We can make
economic offers to the satellites of trade of a sort which they
would find very tempting, but which would be inconsistent with the
plans the Soviets have for their development. We can encourage
STREET
BEL
their self-respect by treating them as independent on issues on
which they probably disagree with the Soviets, even where we know
they are in fact puppets. We can solicit increasing contacts with
satellite diplomats, technicians, scientists, artists, and the
like to emphasize to them that we would like to accept them,
Communist or non-Communist, into the society of free nations,
and that it is the Soviets who are preventing such contact.
These measures will all have an audience in the Soviet
bureaucracy. They can be so designed as to conflict to a minimal
degree with our attempt to construct an image of our purposes not
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53
implacably hostile to true Russian interests. We can suggest what
some Soviet bureaucrats probably already suspect, namely that the
Soviet family of nations can only continue to be operated success-
fully if increasing freedom of action is given to the satellites.
We can warmly welcome whatever steps have been taken in this
direction, point out how limited they are, and urge continued
further steps. We cannot expect, of course, to endear ourselves
to the Soviet hierarchy by this posture. The effects we hope for
from it would be mainly in the satellites themselves. But it
would at least be consistent with the view that our interest is
not necessarily in the destruction of the Soviet Union but rather
in the promotion of freedom everywhere, an ideal the Soviets can-
not publicly reject. Beyond this, this line provides no ammunition,
as does a "liberation" policy, for the Soviet propaganda effort to
prove to the satellite leadership that our real purpose is to
establish either our own hegemony or that of the Germans over all
STATE
of Eastern Europe.
In summary, since we cannot now predict by which of a number
of alternative processes Soviet control in the satellites might
ultimately be weakened, it may be desirable to adopt so far as
possible a political warfare strategy which supports as many of
these processes as possible. We may find our lever in choices by
the public in the satellites, we may find it in decisions taken by
anti-Communists (thought this does not look promising), we may find
it in alternatives considered by the satellite Communist leadership,
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54
or we may even conceivably in time find it in choices made by the
Soviet bureaucracy itself. If we follow a strategy with the satellite
peoples implying our relentless enmity for their present leadership,
and a strategy with the satellite leaders implying that we will bend
all our energies to the overthrow of the Soviet regime in Russia,
we may deny ourselves the possibility of exerting any influence over
the evolution of either satellite or Soviet society. This may be
a loss worth taking if we are fairly sure that we can thereby
achieve our goals in more revolutionary ways, but we must at least
recognize that possible contradictions exist, both between alterna-
tive policies directed at the satellites and between satellite
policy and policy toward the USSR. We should make up our minds what
we want to do about such contradictions.
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SECTION III
A SUGGESTED POLITICAL WARFARE STRATEGY
The Need for a Strategy
The purpose of the preceding section has been to emphasize
by example the degree to which the vulnerabilities one can
effectively exploit depend on the general strategy one has
decided to adopt. We have pointed out a number of kinds of U. S.
action usually assumed to be desirable which turn out when
examined to have ambiguous effects on a U. S. interest or contra-
dictory effects on two different interests. Thus it is not clear
without further argument that we should try to divide the Russian
people to the maximum extent from the regime or that a worsening
of the position of the common man in the USSR would be in our
interest. It is not clear whether we want to encourage ever
more repressive measures by the regime or whether some relaxation
SHL
would serve our long-run purposes more. What is clear is that
DEPARTMENT
1981kg
it is wasteful and ineffective to follow separate political
warfare measures whose effects offset each other.
This does not mean, of course, that it is necessary to
place all our bets on one series of developments. There are
some measures that will work equally well whatever contingency
develops. In other cases we can take one set of measures to
prepare for one possibility and another set to prepare for a
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56
different one, providing the effects of the two do not cancel
each other out. We can even follow one line publicly and quite
a different one covertly provided we make certain the contra-
diction is not revealed and provided the actual effects of the
two courses of action do not negate each other.
The Strategy in General
In order to illustrate the central theme that we must have
a strategy to guide political warfare we attempt in the
following paragraphs to indicate the broad outlines of a possible
strategy which we believe to be consistent with our present
foreign policy as enunciated in the relevant basic NSC papers.
We try to indicate what kinds of exploitation of vulnerabilities
this strategy would exclude as well as those it suggests. This
THE
BHL
strategy has not been designed to apply to China.
INSING
In essence the strategy here outlined is a scissors with
two blades. The first which is not the immediate concern of
this committee is the effective denial to the Soviets of the
possibility of external expansion by military or nonmilitary
means. The second is the attempt to promote evoultionary changes
internally in the Soviet Bloc in directions consistent with our
interest. This we would pursue first by measures designed to
expand the field of realistic and attractive alternatives perceived
by the people and by various levels of the bureaucracy and second
by measures designed to persuade them to adopt alternatives in
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57
our interest. The aim of this strategy would be hopefully the
gradual evolution of the system over time to something less
menacing, and in any event the setting up of resistances to
reversion to the Stalinist system strong enough to assure that
if the attempt were made it would seriously weaken the control
structure and perhaps produce a split at the top.
The elements of the strategy in information policy, in
special operations, in military policy, and in diplomatic and
economic policy might be somewhat as follows:
In information policy: The strategy would imply a con-
tinued vigorous attack on the terror and tension induced by
police measures, on the military rather than civilian bias of
the economy, and on the restrictions of communication with the
outside world. These would be mainly attacked, however, not as
LIDIRTY
THE
inherent features of the Communist state correctible only by
THE
revolution but as mistaken practical policies which could be
readily modified if the leadership would only consent to do so
and which in any event are not really necessary to their legitimate
ends. In speeches and via information media we would welcome
as encouraging signs the recent measures indicating some disposition
on the part of the government to relax police pressures, to shift
resources to consumers goods production, and to permit more
contact with the rest of the world. Our line would point out
how limited these measures have been so far and would suggest ways
in which they could be extended, perhaps gradually and bit by
bit.
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These suggestions would not be general exhortations to
better behavior but quite specific ideas as to particular sorts
of change for which the people might press and which the bureauc-
racy might well consider. We would suggest that we were
sufficiently interested in seeing them move in these directions
to be willing to assist in every way we could, by supplying
technical information about consumers goods production, samples
and prototypes, even possibly agreeing to trade consumers goods,
etc. The line would emphasize the possibilities of coexistence
and urge the regime to try a variety of measures moving in this
direction, such as sending Soviet technicians to many more
international conferences, cooperating with us on technical and
other studies, and the like. We would emphasize (and political
OHL
policy would have to be changed to permit this) that we welcomed
DIRECT
visits by Soviet citizens for cultural, scientific, and even
recreational purposes and were even prepared to subsidize such
interchange.
In taking this line we should not abandon our basic position
that the whole Soviet system is fundamentally wrong. We
would continue to state what we think its errors are, and
reiterate our conviction that Russians will come in time to
recognize them. We would draw a sharp line, however, between
those security interests which we are determined to protect by
overwhelming military power if need be, and our philosoply of
government which we know we could not impose by force even if
we wanted to, but which we believe they will come around to in
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59
due course because it would serve their interests better. Mean-
while we would warmly welcome any steps, however limited, toward
a system designed more fully to satisfy such human aspirations
as security from surveillance and pressure, a free exchange of
ideas, higher standards of individual material well being, and
the like. We would point out practical ways in which, within
the context of their present system, they could move ever
further in these directions without fear. The key to this element
of our strategy is to make suggestions which seem plausible
enough to ordinary citizens and even to some bureaucrats to
raise their expectations markedly but which are sufficiently
beyond present practice to prove embarrassing to the regime.
This line, which would have the effect for the ordinary
citizen of dramatizing his discontents by suggesting the possi-
LIDISTRY
OHL
bility of realistic and attractive alternatives, could differ
in the satellites from that addressed to the Soviet Union. In
these areas it might well attempt to raise expectations farther
and depict alternatives more radically different from present
practice. Both in the satellites and in the USSR it should be
aggressive in pressing for change, but evolutionary rather than
revolutionary, and generally avoid a tone openly and stridently
hostile to the system. Should this strategy be adopted the
tone might be set by a major Presidential speech.
Excluded by this strategy would be any direct attempt to
encourage revolution by mass uprising, violent ideological attacks
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60
which would reinforce the conviction of the bureaucracy that
the U. S. would continue to be a major threat to any Communist
government whatever its external policy; also efforts to drive a
wedge between the people and the leadership which would have the
effect of solidifying the entire bureaucracy in opposition to any
change, and the suggestion that we were determined to isolate the
Soviet Union and its citizens from contact with the Free World.
In special operations: Many operational projects could
be designed to give effect to this strategy. Expectations could
be aroused by the planting of rumors that further relaxation of
police controls, increased availability of consumer goods, more
scope for private production by peasants and the like were about
to be announced by the leaders. It is known that rumors of this
kind concerning events closely touching the lives of Soviet
841
citizens spread with extraordinary rapidity and accuracy in Russia
Daight
and the satellites, especially if they are sufficiently specific
and detailed to carry conviction. It is believed to be within
our capabilities to start such rumors, which might exert
considerable pressure on at least some segments of the bureaucracy.
We could perhaps arrange for the publication in Communist
journals outside the Bloc or elsewhere of discussions, quite
nonpolitical in tone, of techniques of political and economic
administration conceivable to Communists but varying from those
now employed in Russia and designed more fully to meet known
discontents.
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61
We might supply to groups of peasants, workers, intellectuals,
and the like in the satellites information and advice on how to
make effective marginal demands on the satellite regimes for
limited changes in their own interest, without endangering their
safety or freedom. It should be possible for us to help groups
behind the curtain increase the effectiveness of pressures they
are already applying to force concessions which will make life
more tolerable. Operations designed to do this are already in
progress.
We cannot expect people in the Bloc to risk their lives
and make martyrs of themselves in what they know will be a vain
attempt to destroy the whole system. But even without our aid
many are daily taking risks to force adjustments in the system
which will make it less oppressive. They already see practical
alternatives. It could be an object of our clandestine activities
to widen their conception of what is practical.
OHL
Simultaneously we could be attempting through various chains
DEPARTMENT
DIRECT
of personal contact such as neutral technicians and diplomats to
reach middle Soviet bureaucrats with ideas about somewhat altered
policies. It should be much easier to communicate through such
channels ideas less threatening to the whole status and value
system of the target official than open treason. The development
of indirect channels of communication of this kind to Soviet
officials at all levels would be of great value in itself even if
it had no immediate effect on decisions.
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In individual cases where this looked particularly promising
and could be done under deep cover we should continue to attempt
to persuade individual Soviet officials to defect. Our principal
approaches to the middle bureaucracy, however, would be not so
much to tempt them to defect as to urge a variety of feasible
changes in all kinds of policies. Whenever defectors are used,
under U. S. Government sponsorship, to make statements addressed
to Russians as to evils of the system, these statements should
emphasize practical errors of Soviet administration rather than
fundamental ideological disagreements.
Excluded measures in this area would be the open promise of
military support to resistance groups, sabotage and wrecking
operations in which U. S. Government support would become known
to elements of the bureaucracy, official support of measures to
train and equip revolutionary units to take active part in the
event of trouble, measures explicitly designed to provoke tighter
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and more repressive controls on the part of the regime, and the
like. Measures which, if known to the Soviets, would be incon-
sistent with our public posture could, of course, be undertaken
with due precautions to keep them truly covert. The guiding
principal in undertaking spoiling operations would be to avoid
solidifying the conviction throughout the bureaucracy that we
were determined to overthrow the whole system by direct inter-
vention.
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In military policy: Military and political policy are perhaps
outside the proper scope of this paper, but we cannot emphasize
too strongly our conviction that a concept of political warfare
strategy such as that here suggested depends as much on concomitant
moves in the military and political field as on the skill with
which information and covert operations are conducted. In the
field of military policy it must be stressed again that this
strategy requires an uncompromising determination to resist both
major and minor aggressive moves by the Bloc with every military
resource at our command. There will be no internal experimentation
by the Soviets with alternative techniques more consistent with
our interest as long as the accustomed Communist techniques of
military and political pressure on and in the Free World show
signs of achieving notable success. If, therefore, this strategy
is to have a chance of success the Soviets must be convinced
that we intend to respond with massive retaliation to any attack
Listery
all
on us or our allies, that we will develop means of countering
INSURE
with force attempts to use military pressures more locally, and
that we will defend ourselves against aggression of any kind with
sufficient force to threaten Russia with certain defeat.
Within this framework of a firm military posture, we must
find as many ways as we can to bring home with conviction the
genuinely defensive character and purposes of our military plans.
The impact of our acts on the Soviet image of our purposes should
be a consideration in deciding, for instance, on the scale of our
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continental defense effort and the publicity to be given to it.
The most careful thought should be given to ways in which we
could convincingly reassure the Soviets as well as our allies
that we do not intend to use our military force to destroy Russia
except in self defense. The strategy here outlined calls for
redoubling our efforts to find acceptable disarmament plans which
we can plausibly present, accompanying them each time with state-
ments as to the costs to the Russians as well as to ourselves of
the current state of tension.
Should it be concluded that no disarmament plan acceptable
to us can be devised at the present time, we would be somewhat
embarrassed in the pursuit of the strategy here proposed but
probably no more so than in pursuit of alternative strategies
which do not envisage an early showdown. Excluded would be
military ultimatums, implied or explicit, concerning Soviet internal
policy, military acts giving rise to an expectation of U. S.
891
resing
military intervention in the event of internal crisis, and the
like. Since German military power is such a potent symbol of
aggressive threat, especially to the satellites, special
attention should probably be given to ways of insuring that German
rearmament would not be used aggressively against the Bloc, and
of countering Soviet propaganda fostering the contrary view.
In diplomatic and economic policy: This strategy requires
redoubled efforts to deny the Soviets the fruits of efforts to
subvert and divide the Free World. We can pursue this contest
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65
for men's minds most aggressively without posing any direct
threat to the Russian state or to fundamental internal Russian
or even Soviet interests. We must pursue it sufficiently
vigorously and effectively by both diplomatic and economic means
to force some Soviet minds ultimately to re-examine their tactics
and their strategy. If the Soviets meet with continued success in
subversion and division of the West there is little hope for the
development in Russia of policies more consistent with our
interest. If this alternative is blocked to them, and particularly
if they were to lose ground outside the Bloc, there is a chance
that other alternatives will increasingly be considered. Indeed,
we believe that one of the most persuasive arguments for the entire
strategy here proposed is that it will generate much more whole-
hearted support among our allies than alternative postures we
DEPARTMENT
091
might assume. Thus we believe this strategy would itself
1931mg
powerfully unite the Western alliance and deny to the Soviets the
option of dividing the West.
Again, assuming this vigorous and aggressive though non-
military political and economic posture with respect to Free
World developments, this strategy would give diplomatic activity
a major role to play in expanding in Soviet minds, and particularly
those dealing with foreign affairs, the conception of possible
alternatives. The strategy calls for confronting the Soviet
bureaucracy in a friendly way with all sorts of choices they or
their constituents might possibly feel they had to take seriously.
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This would include increasing the number of problems to be taken
up cooperatively in the U. N. It would include proposals emphasizing
our interest in free communication, such as proposals for free use
of the air around the world under suitable U. N. safeguards. It
would involve further exploration of possibilities for the
unification of Germany and the ending of the occupation of Austria.
It might involve new proposals, repeated in a number of alternative
forms, for world economic programs in which the Soviets would be
invited to participate. It would certainly involve maximizing
contacts between Americans and Russians at all levels and on all
kinds of problems. This last implies a major change in our
present policy with respect to the admission to this country for
nonpolitical purposes of citizens of the Soviet Bloc countries.
This strategy would exclude attempts to isolate Soviet
citizens or officials from the West and to shut them out of
international councils and discussions. It would require that
while keeping our guard up, we act on the premise that when Soviet
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proposals are put forward there are some Soviet officials who
INSURANCE
take them seriously. It would exclude treating Soviet and
satellite officials as mere puppets even, and perhaps especially,
when we know them to be such. Rather we would encourage their
desire for independent decisions by acting as though we thought
they were free to take them.
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67
One of the major questions posed by this strategy is whether
it is possible to maintain its various essential parts simul-
taneously. Can we persuade first our allies and second our own
people to maintain a vigilant military posture and to engage in
an aggressive political and economic contest with Communism in
the Free World and at the same time to accept an atomsphere of
straightforward personal relations, a more sympathetic under-
standing, and a relaxation in various types of institutional
relations between our country and the countries of the Soviet
orbit? We believe that with appropriate leadership this can be
done. Indeed we think this combination of firmness and
flexibility would be much better understood by our allies and
much more acceptable to them than the somewhat blustery and trigger-
TERM
841
happy hysteria that some of them believe characterizes our present
JURING
attitude. This strategy does not constitute a "soft" policy.
Indeed it has no chance of success unless we keep our guard
fully up until the very day and hour when the Soviets actually
enter concretely and irreversibly into effective collective
security arrangements, and unless we see to it that the Free
World successfully resists Communist encroachment. It cannot be
overemphasized that what is here proposed does not involve giving
up anything or surrendering our relative position in the arms
race in reliance simply on Soviet assurances or on a more friendly
general climate. It is a flexible policy in that it attempts to
exploit whatever chance there may be that the Soviet system can
gradually evolve into something somewhat different.
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On the home front we cannot accept the view that for America
to be firm and vigilant it is necessary for us to be stridently
hostile and angry. If we reject the pursuit of peace by preventive
war, we believe Americans can adopt a confident posture of
readiness and still encourage gradual evolution.
Of course our intelligence is so limited and the future so
uncertain that it would be folly to adopt this or any other
strategy so irrevocably that we could not change it if develop-
ments made this seem wise. There is every reason why planning
should be done on the basis of a variety of contingencies. Should
open resistance and an effective split between the present leader-
ship and the people suddenly appear more plausible we should be
ready to exploit it. In order to be ready, and continually to
STREET
041
test the situation, we must keep our hand in by well-considered
spoiling operations appropriate to a different approach and
DEPARTMENT
philosophy. Also we must not be inhibited by the difficulties
of predicting the full consequences of an action from taking any
action at all. The essence of political warfare is experiment
and ingenuity. The burden of our argument here is that at any
particular time our political warfare operations should be
guided by an over-all strategy and that departure from that
strategy should be undertaken only for cause and with a clear
recognition of possible conflict.
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69
Conclusions
This committee was asked to list Soviet vulnerabilities and
to indicate what would be required effectively to exploit them.
We have listed what we believe to be some of the important
vulnerabilities, but the principal conclusion to which we have
been forced is that for reasons given in this report a mere list
of separate items would not supply the guidance the National
Security Council requires. We believe an appraisal of specific
vulnerabilities can be made only with reference to a general
political warfare strategy. In more detail:
1. We to not believe the U. S. presently has the capability,
actual or potential, to conduct political warfare operations that
will significantly reduce present Soviet military capabilities.
2. We believe the principal task of political warfare
Dalgar
directed to the Soviet Bloc countries is to affect choices made
both by the Russian and satellite people and by officials at all
levels of the Bloc bureaucracy in such a way as to reduce the
probability of war and to increase the chance of evolutionary
change.
3. We have outlined briefly a political warfare strategy
emphasizing the promotion of evolutionary change within the Soviet
Union. This strategy does not preclude experimentation with such
anti-regime measures as might be more applicable in changed
circumstances (e.g., general war). We have listed some of the
measures such a strategy might call for as well as some of those
that might be soft-pedalled.
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70
4. We believe this strategy is most likely to advance U. S.
interests within the framework of our present basic foreign policy
as enunciated in official documents. Should there be a major
change in basic national policy, such as the undertaking of courses
of action designed to bring about a decisive reduction of Soviet
power within a short period, important elements of this strategy
would not be appropriate.
5. We wish to emphasize that no political warfare strategy
can in any sense substitute for adequate military, political, and
economic programs designed to strengthen the Free World. In
particular it is an essential requirement of the strategy here
proposed that the Soviet Bloc be denied opportunities for further
military or nonmilitary expansion.
SELL
6. We conceive of the strategy here proposed as an active
1481mg
rather than a passive one. It definitely does not call for any
reduction of the level of either administrative or financial effort
devoted to political warfare, military preparation, or economic
measures. Although we have not reviewed present programs in
detail, we believe that at least the present magnitude of effort
is necessary, and some expansion may be required if this strategy
is to have a chance of being effective.
7. While this strategy is designed primarily to serve the
objective of bringing about long-run changes in the character of
the Soviet system which will make it less menacing to us, we
think it will also serve to create conditions which will make it
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71
less likely that the Soviet leadership will choose to undertake
military aggression and more likely that, if hostilities occur,
they can speedily be brought to a satisfactory end.
8. While we have felt it outside our terms of reference to
give explicit consideration to the effects of the strategy here
proposed on the attitudes of other nations of the Free World or
on domestic attitudes in the United States, we believe these effects
are likely to be favorable. We believe the adoption of this
strategy might help replace the image, widely held abroad, of the
United States as a country aggressively and implacably hostile
to Russia with an image, much closer to the truth, of a nation
dedicated to the preservation and encouragement of democracy,
peace, and the principles of an open society. It might even
help us to reaffirm these basic principles in our own minds.
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Copy No.
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Total No. of pages 71.
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C1A-36354-A
cy-12
171-0675
Bibliographical Note on Soviet Vulnerability Studies
1. The most intensive and complete examination of strengths
and weaknesses of the Soviet system is to be found in the series of
reports of the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System, prepared
by the Russian Research Center at Harvard University under contract
with the Department of the Air Force (Contract AF 33(038) - 12909).
Under this contract, which extended over several years, teams of
analysts interviewed several thousand ex-Soviet citizens in the United
States and Western Europe on all aspects of Soviet life. The findings
were checked against all available unclassified materials bearing on
LIDITATY
the subject. Numerous detailed monographs were prepared on various
/
special subjects.
The final report of the project, entitled Strategic, Psychological,
and Sociological Strengths and Vulnerabilities of the Soviet Social
System, (unclassified) was submitted to the Air Force in December 1954.
2. An early report, focussed on communications to the Iron
Curtain area, but dealing with a broad range of social and political
as well as technical matters, was Project Troy Report to the Secretary
of State; February 1, 1951 (Volumes I through III, Top Secret; Volume IV,
Secret). This report was prepared by a group of ten natural scientists
and twelve social scientists assembled for a four-month period by
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Volume I, the Main Report,
(81 pages), gives both the technical and social and political conclusions
of the study. Volume II (30 pages) and Volume III (60 pages) contain
various special reports on social and political topics and on non-electronic
TOP SECRET
TOP-SECRET
ii
means of communication. Annex 8 on "Political Warfare, U. S. versus
Russia" contains a summary of strengths and weaknesses. Volume IV
(76 pages) is devoted to technical reports on electronic communication.
A more recent review of technical developments is given in Project
WS Gossard (see below).
3. The Center for International Studies at M. I. Γ. produced, in
August 1952 under contract with C. I. A., a five-volume report entitled
The Vulnerability of the Soviet Union and its Satellites to Political
Warfare (Secret). This report was the result of some eighteen months'
work by a variety of scholars under the direction of W. W. Rostow.
Volume I (222 pages) contains the Recommendations, a summary of Volume II
on the Origins, Present Status, and Prospects for Soviet Society, a
summary statement of Vulnerabilities, and four staff papers (1) on the
LISTRITY
FUL
problem of Stalin's death, (2) on radio broadcasting, (3) on the
(
nationalities problem, and(4) on U. S. interests and objectives in
Russia and Eastern Europe. Volume II, The Dynamics of Soviet Society,
by W. W. Rostow, has subsequently appeared separately as an unclassified
book. It contains the principal judgments of the project on the
strengths and weaknesses of Russian society. Volumes III, IV, and V
contain special studies of the leadership, the nationalities, the
satellites, and other problems.
4. The status of our political warfare effort was extensively
reviewed and recommendations for the future made in the Report of the
President's Committee on International Information Activities under the
chairmanship of Mr. William Jackson. This report does not examine
Soviet strengths and weaknesses in detail, but does give conclusions
TOP
SECRET
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iii
as to what are and what are not promising lines of activity, based
upon testimony of experts in the field.
5. The report of Project WS Gossard (Top Secret) April, 1954
(53 pages plus annexes) gives a comprehensive review of a wide range
of proposals for exploiting Soviet vulnerabilities, including a number,
such as "The Malenkov Reforms" (Annex 3) which fit the strategy
proposed in this report. The focus of Project WS Gossard, prepared
over several months by a group in C. I. A., is operational rather than
academic.
6. A committee of OCB, operating under terms of reference dated
February 17, 1954, produced a report on June 8, 1954 entitled Report
on U. S. Policy for the Exploitation of Soviet Vulnerabilities. The
BELL
body of the report (23 pages) reviews the views set forth on this
subject in replies prepared by the Department of State and C. I. A.
to a questionnaire drawn up by the committee. Annex B (37 pages) of
the report gives a "Review of NSC Policy Toward the Soviet Union
Emphasizing U. S. Policy on Exploitation of Soviet Vulnerabilities."
7. There was prepared by C. I. A. for this committee a
Preliminary Catalogue of Soviet Bloc Vulnerabilities (Top Secret),
September, 1954, (Outline and Summary 14 pages, text 174 pages). As
its title implies this is a listing intended to be exhaustive rather
than selective, and no attempt is made at critical evaluation of the
vulnerabilities listed.
8. From the long list of published works that bear on the subject
of this report, we would select the following as particularly helpful:
CECRET TOP
SECRE
iv
Fainsod, Merle, How Russia is Ruled, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1954.
Fischer, George, Soviet Opposition to Stalin, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
1952.
Leites, Nathan, A Study of Bolshevism, Glencoe, Illinois, 1953.
Moore, Barrington, Terror and Progress, U. S. S. R., Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1954.
STRIBT
DEPARTMENT
Daight
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 17, 1954
MR. PRESIDENT:
We think that the attached report on the EXPLOITATION OF
SOVIET VULNERABILITIES, prepared by an expert Interdepartmental
Committee, chaired by Dr. Max Millikan, of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, is the best original paper which has come
to the Planning Board during your Administration.
This report is especially notable for its thoroughly
realistic approach to the problem of vulnerabilities. It recog-
nizes that an exploitable vulnerability exists in a foreign society
only if three elements are present: (a) a weakness to be ex-
ploited; (b) a U.S. objective, and (c) adequate U.S. capability
to exploit the weakness in a way which will advance the objective.
Because of this realistic approach, the conclusions of
the report necessarily throw out all kinds of measures which have
been discussed and advanced in past years, but which fail to meet
one or more of these three criteria.
This report has had a profound influence on the Planning
Board in preparing the draft of Basic National Security Policy, to
be discussed next week.
The report is so closely knit, and so well written, that
it is difficult to pick out certain parts for you to read. I have
underlined in red those parts, the reading of which would inform
you adequately of the consistent line which runs through the report.
There is a highly informative analytical table of contents on
pages i - - V.
It is interesting that while the development of this
report began last summer, much of its thinking and conclusions run
parallel to views which you have been expressing in more recent
months.
DECLASSIFIED
MR 86-479, 121
ROBERT CUTLER
Special Baur Assistant
( INDING Library 841
Authority MR 91-280.1
to the President
By TB NLE Date 2/6/98
Attachment
Hope you can glance at
this before Then ay
TOD SEGRE SEPRET
UNCLASSIFIED
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON
December 1, 1954
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NSC PLANNING BOARD
SUBJECT: Exploitation of Soviet Vulnerabilities
The enclosed report on the subject, prepared by a
Special Committee, is transmitted herewith for preliminary
discussion by the Planning Board at its meeting on Monday,
December 6, 1954.
It is requested that special security precautions
be observed in the handling of the enclosed report, which
is being given a limited distribution.
LISTED
THE
JAMES S. LAY, Jr.
Executive Secretary
DECLASSIFIED
Authority MR 86-479
By Lib NLE Date 8/11/87
UNCLASSIFIED