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SEORE 3 June, 1944 Memorandum: 1. Subjects: 001 a. Proper coordination with the French. b. Weather. C. Beach and undersea obstacles. d. Future success of the air in breaking up effectiveness of hostile ground units. e. Future organization. 2. The matter of coordination with the French has been highly com- plicated because of lack of crystallization in ideas involving both the political and military fields. Specifically, the President de- sires that coordination be effected with the French on the basis of dealing with any group or groups that can effectively fight the Germans. His Directive apparently recognizes the influence of the National Committee of Liberation in France but he is unwilling to promise any exclusive dealing with the group since that, he appar- ently believes, would be tantamount to recognizing the Committee as a provisional government of France, set up from the outside. We have our direct means of communication with the Resistance Groups of France but all our information leads us to believe that the only authority these Resistance Groups desire to recognize is that of DeGaulle and his Committee. However, since DeGaulle is apparently willing to cooperate only on the basis of our dealing with him ex- clusively, the whole thing falls into a rather sorry mess. DeGaulle is, of course, now controlling the only French military forces than can take part in this operation. Consequently, from the purely military viewpoint we must, at least until the time that other French forces might conceivably be organized completely independent of his movement, deal with him alone. He, however, takes the attitude that military and political matters go hand in hand and will not cooperate militarily unless political recognition of some kind is accorded him. We do not seem to be able, in advance of D-day, to straighten the matter at all. I have just learned that DeGaulle has failed to accept the Prime Minister's invitation to come to England, saying that he would make his decision this afternoon. The rapid sorting out of all the conflicting ideas is quite necessary if we are to secure the maximum help from the French both inside and outside the country. 3. The weather in this country is practically unpredictable. For some days our experts have been meeting almost hourly and I have been holding Commander-in-Chief meetings once or twice a day to consider the reports and tentative predictions. While at this moment, the morning of June 3rd, it appears that the weather will not be so bad as to - - - - SECRET