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OCR Page 1 of 3SECRET
DDE/nmr
12 January. 1945
Dear General Marshall:
ex
While it seems to mei that within the past two weeks I have sent to
you on various subjects telegraphic words that in their total would
fill a good sized volume, I have not recently written you a personal,
confidential letter.
At the moment our moat worrisome area is the south. While there is
nothing vital in that region that we should not be able to cover
easily 1f we could solve all of our problems from the purely tactical
viewpoint, the groat danger is that Devers will be oaught out of
position and some of his troops manhandled. The French were so com-
pletely upset over my plan to pull out of the Alsace Plain, that
obviously the problem begame, in its larger sense, a military one.
I could not have the weakened French forces trying to fight a battle
by themselves and, more serious than this, I could not have the Frenoh
government getting in extremely bad position with its population, a
consequence which it was apparent de Gaulle thought would follow upon
a voluntary evacuation of Alsace.
When Devers turned his complete Seventh Army northward, he was badly
mistaken in the ability of the French Anny to finish off the Colmar
pocket. At that time he had been directed to turn part of the 15th
Corpa northward, west of the Vosges, in order to support Patton's
right but it was expected that his first concern east of the mountains
would be to clean up his own rear. I must say that he oan scareely be
blamed for making a misoalculation with respect to the French, because
the forces opposing them in the pooket were at that time eshimated at
not over 12,000 to 14,000 fighting men. Nevertheless, it is a very bad
thorn in our side today+
Tomorrow morning the attacks on the northerly side of the Ardennes
salient are being extended. Ridgway's 18th Corps will come in, attacking
in the direction of St.Vith. As our lines shorten in the salient I will
be able to get a reserve out of re-fitting divisions, and these will be
so stationed as to sugport our right.
I em going up to visit Bradley tomorrow. I hope that ir he can only
make some significant penetration from his side of the salient, par-
ticularly one that might result in the destruction or capture of con-
siderable enemy foroes, you will consider him at onee for four star
promotion. I think it would have a fine general effect. For many
reasons I should like to have Spaats promoted also.
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