Memorandum, Lewis Strauss to President Dwight D. Eisenhower Regarding a Proposal of Nuclear Sharing

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DECLASSIFIED Tim decurent consists of a Authority MR 77-167 #1 / is 2 Conin A By bc NLE Date 5/30/78 UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION WASHINGTON 25, D. c. 17 September 1953 t.P shows seft MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT General Cutler has given me two memoranda embodying questions from you. Here are my replies. Respectfully, hours Fraun Lewis L. Strauss Chairman = most 33 is Question A: "Suppose the United States and the Soviets were each to turn over to the United Nations, for peaceful use, X kilograms of fissionable material. The amount X could de" P 115. Pencer be fixed at a figure which we could handle from our stockpile, but which would be difficult for the Soviets to match. (This question was addressed to C.D. Jackson also and he concurs in the following:) this Reply: The proposal is novel and might have value for propaganda purposes. It has doubtful value as a practical move for the following reasons: (a) Our intelligence is not sufficiently firm as to the difference in size between U.S. and Soviet stockpiles, and we are ignorant of their current production rates and the extent of their raw material development. Our own experience on the Colorado Plateau from which only a trickle of uranium was being received five years ago would sustain the supposition that the Russians have also located and developed important ore bodies. (b) One of our main advantages is our stockpile whereas, presumably, one of the Soviet main advantages is their apparent rapid expansion. Under this assumption, the proposal might operate in their interest rather than in ours. (c) With the advent of the thermonuclear development (i.e., when a small number of thermonuclear bombs can produce