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{
    "localId": "12008631",
    "label": "Project Involving Aerial Surveillance of the Soviet Union",
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    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/12008631"
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{
    "id": "12008631",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/12008631",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Project Involving Aerial Surveillance of the Soviet Union",
    "description": "This item focuses on the vulnerability of the U-2 spy plane to Soviet interception, the production and deployment of Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), the risks of intelligence operations, and information gained from intelligence operations.",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/12008631",
    "collections": [
        "White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary: Records of Paul T. Carroll, Andrew J. Goodpaster, L. Arthur Minnich, and Christopher H. Russell",
        "Alphabetical Subject Files"
    ],
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    "naId": 12008631,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 31,
            "logicalDate": "1959-03-31",
            "month": 3,
            "year": 1959
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
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{
    "seq": 2,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/eisenhower/186628/186628_0009_Page_02.jpg",
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    "ocrText": "MORI DocID: 895437\n-\nTOP SECRET,\nU-2 Vulnerability Tests\nVulnerability of the U-2 was tested against the '-102 and -104 fighters at\nEglin AFB in December 1958. The tests were conducted under optimum\ncontrolled ground and air environment for the attacking pilot (i. e., out-\nstanding pilots, isolated air space, ideal weather, pre-selected intercept\npoint, etc. ). The F-104 cannot cruise at altitudes over 60, 000 feet, but\nit possesses a capability to convert speed to altitude and attain co-altitude\nof the U-2 for a period of less than 30 seconds. The F-104 was equipped\nwith air-to-air missiles of the infra-red seeking variety and airborne radar\nthat locates the aircraft and allows the pilot to visually acquire the target\nto complete the attack. The F-104 radar malfunctioned at high altitudes.\nThe pilot of this fighter could not visually acquire the target in sufficient\ntime to solve the fire control pr oblem. The F-102 all weather fighter con-\nsistently acquired the target and was able to solve the fire control problem\nfor launching air-to-air missiles. To be successful, the missiles require\noutstanding high altitude performance and a slant range in excess of five\nmiles,\nThe performance of both aircraft exceeded the present capability of opera-\ntional Soviet fighters. The standard operational Soviet fighters cannot\nattain co-altitude of the U-2. A new fighter, the Fitter, of which an estim-\nated 120 have been produced, is considered capable of co-altitude for a period\nof several seconds. It is not, however, presently considered operational.\nThe standard Soviet all weather fighter, YAK-25/Flashlight, is considered\ncapable of acquiring the U-2 on airborne radar. However, to complete a\nsuccessful intercept would require an air-to-air missile with a slant range\nin excess of seven miles. The USSR is considered to have air-to-air missiles,\nhowever, there is no intelligence source that indicates that the missiles are\noperational.\nConclusions\n1. The F-104 can attain co-altitude, but the difficulty in visually acquiring\nthe target makes any single attack a low probability of successful intercept.\n2. The F-102 with its radar can acquire the U-2 and possesses the perfor-\nmance to solve the fire control problem, however, air-to-air missiles of\noutstanding performance and long range are required to accomplish airborne\nintercept. There is no known operational deployment of air-to-air missiles\nby the Soviets.\n3. Successful intercept of the U-2 by the Soviet defensive fighters for the\nnext few months is unlikely.\nTAD CEODET\nTOP CLUNLT"
}