Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "12008652",
    "label": "Memorandum of Conference with the President Authored by John S. D. Eisenhower",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/12008652"
}

{
    "id": "12008652",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/12008652",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Memorandum of Conference with the President Authored by John S. D. Eisenhower",
    "description": "This memorandum authored by John S. D. Eisenhower describes the lack of intelligence on the progress of the Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missile program.  The military and political risks and benefits of overflights of the Soviet Union are also described.",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/12008652",
    "creators": [
        "Eisenhower, John S. D. (John Sheldon Doud), 1922-"
    ],
    "collections": [
        "White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary: Records of Paul T. Carroll, Andrew J. Goodpaster, L. Arthur Minnich, and Christopher H. Russell",
        "Alphabetical Subject Files"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/eisenhower/186628/186628_0008_Page_1.jpg",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/eisenhower/186628/186628_0008_Page_1.jpg",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/eisenhower/186628/186628_0008_Page_1.jpg",
    "imageCount": 4,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/12008652",
    "naId": 12008652,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 3,
            "logicalDate": "1959-04-03",
            "month": 4,
            "year": 1959
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 2,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/eisenhower/186628/186628_0008_Page_2.jpg",
    "mediaId": "d7ef31d3cec10419",
    "ocrText": "TOP SECRET\n- 2 -\ncan make ample use of our uncertainty if we have no hard intelligence\non their actual capabilities. )\n(c) With regard to Tyura Tam, the President felt that information\nobtained from that area would indicate nothing as recent progress of actual\nconstruction. In this connection, he cited the great difficulty of concealing\nconstruction while it is under way. He does not feel that our intelligence\non this matter must be obtained \"this year or never.\n3\n(d) The psychological impact on Khrushchev of our flying such a mission\nat this time would be very serious. We are currently in a state of negotia- -\ntions over the Berlin crisis which threatens to be one of the most serious\nof our crises to date. As an example of the mood, he cited the statement\nmade recently by Khrushchev to Mr. Carlo Schmid of the German Socialist\nParty that no unilateral action would be taken by the Soviets until after the\ntermination of a summit meeting. He further cited the State Department's\napparently optimistic outlook for negotiations, as evidenced by their re-\nquesting his approval asking Khrushchev for information on our eleven\nmissing airmen (from the C-130 incident last fall). Since our U-2 flights\nhave been detected consistently for the past two years, we will inevitably\nbe needling Khrushchev by conducting such an action. This could have\nserious repercussions on the negotiating atmosphere we are trying to foster.\nMr. Murphy confirmed the President's view that Khrushchev would exact\na price for such action on our part.\nIn the course of the discussion, various other issues were brought out:\n(a) The unfavorable reflection of Soviet testing on their claims of\nhaving ICBMs in serial production.\n(b) The timing of our own production of a successor to the U-2, which\nDr. Killian estimated as two years.\n(c) The vulnerability of the U-2 to the Soviet YAK interceptor. Here\nMr. Quarles feels the U-2 is relatively safe so long as the Soviets have not\ndeveloped a reliable air-to-air missile. This was confirmed by Mr. Bissell\nand Dr. Killian by mentioning the mission last fall in which the Soviets\nscrambled fifty aircraft.\n(d) A comparison between Soviet and U.S. SAM capabilities. It was\nagreed that the Soviets apparently do not have a capability comparable to\nthat of NIKE (60, 000 feet altitude and\nrange for AJAX; 75,000 feet\naltitude and\nfor HERCULES). If they did, the U-2 would not"
}