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Volume I, Report to the President by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee
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TOP SECRET
THE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
BY THE
TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES PANEL
OF THE
SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
FEBRUARY 14, 1955
VOLUME I
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF DEFENSE MOBILIZATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.
TOP SECRET
RESTRICTED DATA
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT- - 1954
RD- 370
TOP SECRET
COPY No. 14
MEETING THE THREAT
OF
SURPRISE ATTACK
a 1481mg Library BUL
TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES PANEL
OF THE
SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
VOLUME I
DELETIONS
By Hb NLE 10/29/97 Date.
NLE Case 95-358
Washington - February 14, 1955
RESTRICTED DATA
This document contains restricted data as defined
This document consists of 46 pages
in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Its transmittal
No. 14 of 25 Copies, Series A
or the disclosure of its contents in any manner
DECLASSIFIED in TH H DELETIONS
to an unauthorized person is prohibited.
E.O. 11852, Sec.
11
AEC Ltr 6/18/73 CTALTS. 10/16/73
ACOA Ltr. 3/5/75; state Hr. 6/13/75 use Ltr. 7/18/75
TOP SECRET
RA.JACK
By
794 7Date 3/21/26/5/0/79
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF DEFENSE MOBILIZATION
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Mr. President:
We have the honor to transmit, through Arthur S. Flemming, Director of the Office
of Defense Mobilization, the report of the Technological Capabilities Panel on the prob-
lems arising out of the threat of surprise attack. This Panel was formed and a study
undertaken in response to a suggestion made by you on March 27, 1954 to the Science
Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization.
During the past four months, the förty-two members of the Panel have consulted
with many qualified persons. We acknowledge with deep appreciation the generous
help of all who were consulted, the information which has been made available to us,
and the opportunity which you have given us to make this study.
0 1421NO
Respectfully,
THE
The Steering Committee,
Technological Capabilities Panel
J. J. R. B. Killian, Fisk, Deputy Jr., Director Director IRKellion
J. P. Baxter, Member
James Backy Jay
J. H. Doolittle, Member
L. A. DuBridge, Member
Dul 3mmg &
L. J. Haworth, Member
M. G. Holloway, Member
E. H. Land, Member
EHlandy
R. C. Sprague, Consultant
TOP SECRET
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iii
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PREFACE
THE OBJECTIVES OF THIS STUDY
The report examines the present vulnerability of the United States to surprise
attack and ways whereby science and technology can strengthen our offense and de-
fense to reduce this hazard.
In undertaking this study, the Technological Capabilities Panel has been governed
by the following considerations:
We have interpreted technology broadly, attempting to be systematic
in examining both the possibilities of innovation and the circum-
stances that may insure or optimize the proper use of our techni-
cal strengths.
We have evaluated the "big jumps"-the technical ideas and pos-
sibilities that may greatly alter our position in the immediate and
the long future. We recognize that many programs, already au-
thorized and under way; will continue to increase our military
o-
strength.
Dwight
We have been acutely aware that technical innovation alone cannot
15.
be expected to give us complete security or to provide panaceas
for the difficulties inherent in our relations with Russia. We do
believe that technical innovations can be a powerful instrument
for creating the strength and the deterrence which can prevent war.
In giving primary attention to surprise attack on the U.S. homeland,
we recognize that there are other courses of action open to the
USSR-alternatives such as attack in Europe or "brush fire" engage-
ments, local actions which, bit by bit, permit the Communist world
to expand.
We cannot consider surprise attack without examining it in the
broad context of offensive-defensive power. We are convinced that
both "offensive" and "defensive" forces are essential to accomplish
the general mission of defending the United States. Both are de-
terrents to surprise and, should war begin, both contribute to the
destruction of enemy power. Neither one alone is adequate to
defend the United States.
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V
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THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY
With these broad objectives, limitations, and considerations in mind, the Tech-
nological Capabilities Panel has sought to investigate how the creative resources of
science, engineering, and technology may make additional contributions toward:
Increasing our capacity to get more positive intelligence about the
enemy's intentions and capabilities and thus to obtain, before it is
launched, adequate foreknowledge of a planned surprise attack.
This is our first defense against surprise attack.
Increasing still further, through innovation in technology, our re-
taliatory power as a deterrent to surprise attack and to insure
against defeat if deterrence fails.
Strengthening our defenses as an additional deterrence to surprise
attack and to blunt the attack should it occur.
Achieving security and reliability of communications, with attention
being directed to the vulnerability of our overseas communications
to interruption by the enemy.
Understanding the effect of technology upon the manpower require-
ments of the military services, particularly upon the availability of
skills necessary to maintain complex equipment.
TOP SECRET
vi
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
VOLUME I
Page
Letter of Transmittal
iii
Preface
V
PART I
SURPRISE: ITS NEW IMPORTANCE AND MEANING
1
How evolving weapons technology is imposing new requirements on
our military strength, readiness and organization; also a summary
of Volume II.
1. The Threat
3
2. The New Importance of Surprise
4
3. The Revolution in Weapons: Its Nature and Significance
5
4. A Timetable of Change in Our Military Position Relative to Russia
10
5. Nuclear Striking Power
14
6. Defense of North America
17
7. Overseas Communication: Information and Early Warning
22
8. Intelligence
24
9. Maintaining Alertness
27
10. Need for Skilled Military Manpower
30
11. Strategic Planning and Technology
31
Drive
12. Toward a Weapons Spectrum for Limited Wars
32
241
13. A Sense of Urgency Without Despair
33
PART II
LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS
35
1. General Recommendations
37
2. Specific Recommendations
38
VOLUME II
PART III
NUCLEAR STRIKING POWER: AN ELEMENT OF DEFENSE
47
How innovations in the technology of our striking power and
reduction of its vulnerability can increase its value as a deterrent
against surprise attack, and can help insure winning a general war
if deterrence fails.
1. Introduction
49
Mission of the Nuclear Striking Force
50
Symmetric Comparison
50
TOP SECRET
vii
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VOLUME II (Continued)
Page
2. Nuclear Bombs and Fall-Out
53
Nuclear Bombs
53
Radioactive Fall-Out
55
The Short-Term Hazard
55
The Long-Term Hazard
57
3. Vehicles
57
High Energy Aircraft Fuels
59
Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion
61
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
63
Medium Range Ballistic Missile
65
4. Ground Vulnerability of Striking Force
66
Warning
66
Reaction to Warning
66
Base Requirements
67
Availability of Nuclear Weapons
67
Tanker Force
67
Sea Planes
67
Emergency Measures
68
5. Short-Range Striking Forces
69
PART IV
DEFENSE OF NORTH AMERICA
71
How improvements in our defensive measures can protect us against
surprise attack and contribute to the prevention of war.
1. Introduction and Major Conclusions
73
2. Air Warning
77
3. Defense of the Continental U.S. Against Manned Bombers
84
General Conclusions
84
The Air Defense System
85
The Amount and Efficiency of Defense
88
Defense at High Altitude
93
Defense at Low Altitude
97
The Interceptor and Its Missile
102
Electronic Countermeasures
103
4. Atomic Warheads for Air Defense
105
5. A Radar Program
109
6. Sea Defenses
111
7. Defense Against Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
114
8. Non-Military Defenses
123
PART V
INTELLIGENCE: OUR FIRST DEFENSE AGAINST SURPRISE
133
Its performance, its possibilities, and its needs.
1. Probability of Strategic Warning
135
2. Intelligence and the Scale of the Attack
136
viii
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VOLUME II (Continued)
Page
3. The Question of a Major Hoax
138
4. The Problem of Surprise in Kind
139
5. The Problem of Total Decision
142
6. Early Warning in the Presence of Jamming and Sabotage
143
7. Automatic Down-Grading of Intelligence
144
8. Scientific Techniques in Intelligence
145
9. The Northern Periphery of the USSR
145
10. Satellites
146
11. Information Retrieval
148
12. Long-Term Planning for Intelligence
150
13. Recommendations
151
PART VI
OVERSEAS MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS
153
An examination of how their reliability may be improved.
1. Précis
155
2. Communications Facilities
155
3. Favorable Factors
155
4. Unfavorable Factors
156
5. Present Status
157
6. The Future
159
7. Technical Improvements
160
n.
8. Organizational Improvements
164
Dwicht
9. Conclusions
165
to
10. Recommendations
165
PART VII
SKILLED MANPOWER IN THE ARMED FORCES
167
A critical link in the readiness of our complex weapons systems.
1. Introduction
169
2. Requirements for Skilled Manpower
169
3. Supply of Skilled Manpower
174
4. The Price of Low Reenlistment Rates
178
5. Remedies for Low Reenlistment Rates
181
6. Conclusions
183
7. Recommendations
183
APPENDIX
History and Organization of the Technological Capabilities Panel
185
Organization Chart
190
TOP SECRET
ix
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PART I
SURPRISE: ITS NEW IMPORTANCE AND
MEANING
How Evolving Weapons Technology is Imposing New
Requirements on Our Military Strength, Readiness
and Organization; Also a Summary of Volume 11.
E. 1431m0 Library 3:11
Restricted Data RESTRICTED DATA
This document contains, Postricted data as defined
TOP SECRET
in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Its transmittal
or the disclosure of its contents in any manner
to on unauthorized person is prontaited.
TOP SECRET
T
TOP SECRET
SURPRISE: ITS NEW IMPORTANCE AND MEANING
1. THE THREAT
Since the fateful explosion over Hiroshima in 1945, atomic weapons have under-
gone an inexorable evolution. In comparison to a non-atomic, pre-Hiroshima bomb,
the first atomic bomb was more powerful by a factor of 8000. In comparison to that
atomic bomb, today's thermonuclear bomb is more powerful by a further factor of 250.
In the same period, there has been a steady evolution in the range, speed, and altitude
of bomber planes, with the result that today few parts of the world are beyond the
reach of aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
This evolution of nuclear bombs and the means to deliver them has given war-
fare a potential for swift, complete destruction and sudden decisiveness that is revo-
lutionizing our concepts of offense and defense.
This air-atomic system can wreak death and destruction on a scale almost beyond
knowing, and certainly beyond any sensibility to shock and horror that men have so
far experienced.
For example:
Each one of hundreds of bombers can carry and deliver atomic or
thermonuclear bombs tailored for complete destruction of its as-
signed target, and one bomber can carry several times the TNT
equivalent of all the high explosive dropped by the Allies on Germany
in World War II.
Dwight
843
For example:
It has been computed that one 10-megaton bomb exploded in Wash-
ington would produce 1,300,000 casualties. We know already of the
destruction produced at Hiroshima by a 15-kiloton bomb.
For example:
A one-megaton bomb on a major U.S. city could be the most catas-
trophic military-social setback in American history.
Discoveries underlying thermonuclear weapons enormously increase the potential
explosive power of a given atomic stockpile. An enemy stockpile which seemed modest
could suddenly become potentially large and comparably devastating. Technology
thus has magnified the power and potential of the United States and, by implication,
of her enemy. These discoveries also increase the possibility that nations other than
the United States, Russia, and England might ultimately develop a significant nuclear
capability and thus affect the bipolarity of our present balance of power. This is a
possibility to be mindful of and not a present threat.
TOP SECRET
3
-TOP-SECRET
These weapons and methods for their delivery are capabilities already achieved
by the United States. We can be certain, however, that our possession of such weapons
means that the USSR can also possess them. Today Russia has a limited capability
for intercontinental air delivery of nuclear weapons, but their TU-4 bombers on one-
way missions could reach most targets in the United States; with refueling they could
reach all targets. The Soviets have enough TU-4 aircraft and enough bombs.
The critical number of U.S. targets is not large. It may be less than 50. We
believe that 200 nuclear bombs of megaton and kiloton yield, if delivered on selected
targets with practical accuracy, could decisively defeat us, and that a first attack could
be fatal if we were surprised and unprepared. Indeed two hundred or more bombs
of kiloton yield delivered on target, while not decisive, could be devastating if not
catastrophic. The USSR clearly has an air-atomic capability that constitutes a present
threat to the United States.¹
The Soviets are probably developing missiles which are air-launched, surface-
launched, and perhaps long-range. They have a large fleet of submarines capable
of reaching our harbors. They have access to merchant ships that use our harbors.
There are numerous ways in which weapons, including the essential parts of nuclear
weapons, could be shipped or slipped into the interior of the country. There is the
loophole of the "diplomatic pouch" which, while extensively studied, requires continued
review.
While discussing the delivery of nuclear weapons primarily by aircraft we shall
not lose sight of dangers of other delivery methods for nuclear or other weapons to
which we may be particularly vulnerable. An attack using such methods is unlikely
to be decisive of itself, but it could be a truly significant supplement to a main attack
delivered by air.
2. THE NEW IMPORTANCE OF SURPRISE
With a hazard of such magnitude before us, the importance of every decision in
regard to our military planning becomes magnified. A mistake in planning, in prep-
aration, in strategy, in disposition of forces, in alertness could be fatal. The U.S. policy
of not initiating war, together with the present U.S. capability to retaliate, emphasizes
the value to an enemy of achieving surprise. The ability of air-atomic power to
cripple, if not destroy, augments the need for the United States to minimize the pos-
sibility of surprise attack. Clearly the consequences of surprise are so great that
every effort to eliminate it is justified.
From the logic of the present situation, the power of our retaliation being what
it is, it is hard to imagine the USSR attacking the United States without seeking to
achieve surprise.
1 In analyzing the threat to the United States we have found no study available in government
that provides a coordinated symmetrical comparison of the U.S. and Soviet military positions.
As a first step in such a symmetrical analysis, we suggest that an appropriate agency be given the
authority and information to make a comprehensive comparison of U.S. and Soviet Bloc target
systems (including Bravo, Romeo, and Delta type targets) in the context of a single study.
4
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For the first time in history, a striking force could have such power that the first
battle could be the final battle, the first punch a knockout. Thus surprise takes on a
wholly new significance.
Surprise may take many forms and combinations-surprise in time, in space, in
kind. The enemy's tactics and strategy, though anticipated, might be successful if our
detection were inadequate, unalert, sabotaged, or if the information obtained were im-
properly interpreted or acted upon. We might focus too much on high-altitude attack
and be faced by a devastating low-altitude attack. We might expect attack from the
north and be hit from the south. We might be well prepared for any air attack at
any time, yet find that the bulk of an attack had resulted from clandestine delivery,
coupled with delivery by missile and by sea.
3. THE REVOLUTION IN WEAPONS: ITS NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
Essential to the background of this study is continual awareness of the recent
revolutions in the realm of concentrated explosive power. Accordingly, familiar nu-
clear knowledge has been assembled in the next few pages in order to present those
logistic and economic consequences of these revolutions that must be kept in mind.
High explosives in recent wars have been used in separate weapons or bombs in
sizes that range from as little as one-tenth of a pound to as much as 10,000 pounds.
Each weapon or bomb has had its own military use and each has been well exploited.
The upper limit of about 10,000 pounds was set, of course, not by the maximum de-
structive effect desired, but by the capacity of World War II aircraft to carry and de-
liver such loads.
Dwight
In 1945 this restriction was dramatically removed by the first atomic bomb. In
one step, as we have noted, the energy released by a single 10,000-pound bomb was
increased by a factor of about 8000; the area of destruction by 400 times.
The second, equally dramatic step, the fission-fusion bomb, gave a second factor
of about 250 in comparison to the first atomic bomb; a second factor of about 40 times in
area of destruction. The energy release from a 10,000-pound megaton bomb is more
than 1,000,000 times that of its high-explosive blockbuster ancestor; from blast alone,
the area of destruction is more than 10,000 times as great (Figure I-I). To this is added
heat, radiation and the phenomenon of "fall-out," all of which are of potential military
value. A 5-megaton bomb, detonated at ground level, will carry into the upper atmos-
phere several million tons of highly radioactive earth and debris, much of which would
soon fall out over a large area. This area may be several thousand square miles and
may be lethal to exposed inhabitants if they are unaware of their danger or uninstructed
on simple precautionary measures.
Thus, in one decade, the explosive power of a bomb weighing 10,000 pounds has in-
creased from 5,000 pounds TNT to the equivalent of more than 10,000,000,000 pounds-
from 2½ tons to 5 million tons-without changing the weight of the bomb or the
difficulty of its delivery.
The total tonnage of high explosives delivered on Germany in World War II was less
than 3 megatons. This was made up of over 5,000,000 bombs, and required 1,500,000
TOP SECRET
5
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FIGURE I-1
11
RELATIVE AREAS OF DESTRUCTION AND DAMAGE
BRONX
QUEENS
Newark
KINGS
STATEN
MEGATONS
ISLAND
KILOTONS
TONS
6
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
sorties over a period of 4 years. It is, of course, clear that one 3-megaton nuclear bomb
could not have accomplished the same result. However, a megaton bomb dropped
in the center of one of our large cities could do today what many thousands of bombs
and planes did then on a similar target. A few hundred planes with kiloton and
megaton bombs tailored to each target could have accomplished the World War II
strategic bombing mission in a few days at most.
The spectrum of weapons is essentially continuous, from the smallest to the largest
H.E. bombs, from the largest H.E. bombs to the smallest atomic bombs, and on to the
megatons. The important discontinuity between conventional and nuclear weapons
lies not in the mechanism of energy release but in the energy released from a given
weight of weapon, and in the cost of obtaining energy release at the target. This cost
is primarily that of maintaining the delivery capability, and is proportional to the
weight of the weapon. Thus the factor of 8000X250-2,000,000 in energy release per
ton between high explosive and fission-fusion is reflected in a decrease by a factor
of about 1,000,000 in cost of energy release on target (Figure I-II).
What is to be expected from nuclear weapons technology in the future? We can
expect nuclear weapons ranging from a fraction of a kiloton to many megatons
tailored to meet specific military needs: strategic, tactical, air defense, antisubmarine,
and other. It appears to us that for future nuclear weapons the factors of 8000 and
250 will not be followed by further dramatic increases; that our fission-fusion bombs
are already close to their ultimate yield in energy release per ton. The most that we
can expect is a factor of 2 or 5 or perhaps 10; and, for some time to come, we should
base our planning on a figure of
(Figure I-III).
We can build, if we choose, at the expense of a large quantity of fissionable ma-
Datahi
terial, a very heavy weapon of very large yield
Such a weapon
THE
could be delivered by ship but not by air.
All this is the revolution in weapons as we see it. Its significance lies, in part, in
the tremendous advantage given to the attacker who can mount a large-scale, surprise
attack.
We now have sizable stocks of kiloton bombs, and a few megaton bombs. Our
stocks of large-yield bombs will also be appreciable within a year or two. We know
that the Russians have tested kiloton bombs. We know that they have tested one
bomb of approximately one-megaton yield and that they are producing both plutonium
and uranium-235. We do not know that they have yet achieved a multimegaton
capacity; but we are not safe to assume that they have not. We must assume that
they can and may.
Within the context of surprise attack, we recognize some of the hazards of "uncon-
ventional" weapons and delivery methods; of bacterial and chemical agents, of clan-
destine use of nuclear weapons to augment a direct attack. We believe that these
are possibilities and that it is technically feasible to construct megaton bombs which
could be disassembled into pieces small enough for clandestine use. But our primary
attention has been focused on the vulnerability of the continental United States to
a large-scale attack with nuclear weapons.
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7
8
FIGURE I-II
SPECTRUM of WEAPONS
POUNDS OF HIGH EXPLOSIVE
EQUIVALENT POUNDS OF HIGH EXPLOSIVE
I
10
100
1000
5
50
.5
5
50
.5
5
16
1b
Ib
1b
TONS
TONS
KT
KT
KT
MT
MT
Grenade
HE
WEAPON TYPES
Rifle
Bomb
Artillery
Block Buster
TOP SECRET
SECRET 101
APPROX. COST
$400
per ton
per Equivalent
Ton of HE
APPROX. AREA
OF DESTRUCTION
01 sq. mile
[
1 sq. mile
]
100 sq. miles
(1000?)
per weapon
Page 9 denied in full.
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Throughout this report great emphasis is given to the decisive potential of thermo-
nuclear, megaton bombs. This emphasis should in no way imply that atomic, kiloton
bombs are not weapons of massive, if not decisive, power when employed in adequate
numbers.
4. A TIMETABLE OF CHANGE IN OUR MILITARY POSITION RELATIVE
TO RUSSIA
In order to clarify the effects of evolving technology on our military position
relative to Russia, we have constructed a timetable showing the pattern of change that
seems inherent in the developing weapons technology over the next decade or so.
This timetable reflects a careful evaluation of the present status and future trend
of military technology, particularly the technology of air-atomic power. It also
assumes the correctness of the current national intelligence estimates of the cor-
responding Soviet air-atomic power. It is obvious that a serious error in these estimates
of Russian capabilities would destroy the foundations on which this timetable is con-
structed. At present we see no better alternative than to base our assumptions on these
estimates.
A framework of this kind, showing the changes possible in our position relative
to the USSR, is of fundamental importance in analyzing the problem of surprise, in
planning our program of military technology, and in the formulation of broad national
policy with respect to national security and to our relations with the USSR. The
periods and possibilities described below must be considered in our planning if we are
to give proper weight to the technological factors.
Period I-The Present Phase
Because of our air-atomic power we have an offensive advantage but are vulnerable to
surprise attack.
Characteristics
1. Because of the strength of SAC and our large capability in atomic bombs, the
striking power of U.S. is great relative to USSR.
2. We do not yet have large multimegaton capability.
3. No reliable U.S. early warning; our defense system is inadequate; therefore SAC
is vulnerable and U.S. is open to surprise attack.
4. Evidence is accumulating that Soviets are developing their long-range delivery
capability.
Effects
A Neither the U.S. nor the Soviets can mount an air strike against the other that
would surely be decisive.¹ The U.S., however, could mount a sustained air
offensive that would inflict massive damage and would probably be conclusive
in a general war.
1 Decisive is defined as follows: (1) ability to strike back essentially eliminated; or (2) civil,
political, or cultural life reduced to a condition of chaos; or both (1) and (2).
10
TOP SECRET
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B. Because of our vulnerability, Soviets might be tempted to try a surprise attack.
They might be so tempted in order to attack before we achieve a large multi-
megaton capability.
Period II (Starting 1956/57-Ending 1958/60)
We will have a very great offensive advantage relative to USSR and will be less vulnerable
than previously to surprise attack.
Characteristics
1. We will have achieved substantial numbers of multimegaton weapons in addi-
tion to our large stockpile of atomic bombs. Soviets will not have.
2. Some improvement in Russian delivery capability.
3. Both Russia and the U.S. are achieving increased defense capability but both
continue vulnerable to surprise attack.
Effects
A. Our deterrent power greatly increased; our military power relative to that of
Russia at its maximum. The U.S. can mount a decisive air strike; the USSR
cannot. In the event of conflict the U.S. would be severely damaged, but
would emerge a battered victor even if the USSR mounted a surprise attack on
the U.S.
B. Because the U.S. will have a substantial stockpile of multimegaton weapons
and the ability to deliver them on target, this is a period, possibly of short dura-
1431m0
tion, when the U.S. will possess great relative military strength. Our military
THE
LIGITS
superiority may never be so great again.
An intensive study should be undertaken to determine what diplomatic and
political policies will be most appropriate during Period II to turn it to our
best advantage and to the advantage of the free world. These policies should
recognize that any war which might occur would result in severe damage
to the U.S. despite our great relative strength.
Period III
This is a period of transition from Period II to Period IV involving the occurrence in some
order of the following characteristics:
Characteristics
1. The development by the Soviets of a multimegaton capability. The firing of a
multimegaton weapon would be positive evidence that the Soviets have begun
to develop a capability with this weapon. The absence of such an explosion is
not positive assurance that they have not begun to develop this capability.
Although possible, the stockpiling of multimegaton bombs would be improbable
without a test firing. The Russian test firing of August 1953 was not conclusive
evidence of their ability to make a modern multimegaton weapon.
2. The availability to the Soviets of a large number of high-performance jet air-
craft capable of reaching U.S. targets.
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11
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3. Substantial strengthening of U.S. defenses, including the achievement of an
effective continental defense system and the reduction of the vulnerability of
our strategic delivery systems.
4. Continued improvement in U.S. delivery capabilities, probably offset to some
extent by further improvement in Russian defense.
These four characteristics will occur somewhat gradually so that overlap in time is
almost inevitable.
Effects
A. If our defenses against conventional attack are strengthened before the USSR
has attained a multimegaton capability and adequate delivery forces, the deter-
rent power of the U.S. is increased.
From the standpoint of military strength, this would continue to be a phase
favorable to the U.S.
B. Deterrent effect of U.S. power dangerously lessened if Soviet production of
multimegaton weapons and an adequate conventional delivery capability is
achieved prior to the development of an adequate U.S. warning and defense
system and before we have achieved a reduction of the vulnerability of our
strategic delivery systems. Under these conditions, Soviet possession of such
weapons and delivery capabilities would place the U.S. in danger of surprise
attack and possible defeat.
This situation might develop as early as 1958. If we permit our military posi-
tion to worsen to this extent, we will be in a poor position to ward off Russian
political and diplomatic moves or to make such moves of our own.
Period IV (Indefinite in length; possibly beginning within a decade)
An attack by either side would result in mutual destruction.
This is the period when both the U.S. and Russia will be in a position from which
neither country can derive a winning advantage, because each country will possess
enough multimegaton weapons and adequate means of delivering them, either by con-
ventional or more sophisticated methods, through the defenses then existing. The
ability to achieve surprise will not affect the outcome because each country will have
the residual offensive power to break through the defenses of the other country and
destroy it regardless of whether the other country strikes first.
The intercontinental ballistic missile can profoundly affect the military posture
of either country with respect to Period III and Period IV. If the U.S. were to achieve
an intercontinental ballistic missile capability first, it could maintain that position of
advantage, described in III-A above, so long as the Soviets did not have this missile
capability. If the Russians achieve an intercontinental ballistic missile capability
first, they might gain a comparable position of advantage.
Period IV is so fraught with danger to the U.S. that we should push all promising
technological development so that we may stay in Periods II and III-A as long as
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possible, and, if we pass into Period IV, may escape from it into another period
resembling II or III-A.
It is recognized that Period IV would be a period of instability that might easily be
upset by either side and that a world catastrophe might occur.
Should we arrive at a condition where the contest is drawn and neither contestant
can derive military advantage (i.e., Period IV), we need not assume that this state is
unchangeable or that one country or the other cannot move again into a position
of relative advantage. We see no certainty, however, that the condition of stalemate
can be changed through science and technology. This does not mean that some now
unimagined weapon or development, far afield from any present weapons system,
might not provide an advantage to one side or the other.
Implications of the Timetable
The periods of relative military strength which we have delineated reflect our own
appraisal of the technological, intelligence, and military factors affecting our military
position in relation to that of Russia. While we originally had other objectives in
constructing the table it is apparent that it has implications for our diplomatic policy
and international negotiations. It seems clear, for. example, that Period II (also
Period III-A) may be from the standpoint of relative military strength a very favorable
period for political moves and diplomatic negotiations.
We emphasize that even though our relative military strength may change in the
manner suggested in the table, we still remain in a position where the United States
can be grievously hurt.
The timetable points up other urgencies in our program. We must press forward
Dwight
in the United States to fill the gaps and correct the weaknesses in our offense and
The
defense. Our capacity to maintain a position of advantage will depend upon our
carrying through, thoroughly and without delays, the remedies already available,
authorized, or planned to overcome present weaknesses.
We must also press forward to develop more sophisticated offenses and defenses.
We must constantly seek new technological breakthroughs that will bring about sig-
nificant advances in our military power. The Russians will certainly do everything
possible to achieve an advantage by searching for big advances in their weapons
technology.
In the succeeding parts of this report, we have sought to point out the places
where we need to carry through, to expedite, and to complete currently accepted
improvements in our weapons systems which will provide new strength in both offense
and defense. We have sought to suggest the new decisions, undertakings, and develop-
ments which we believe to be important to the continued buildup of our military
strength. We have tried to pick up those promising developments that might be
important new advances in technology and in intelligence. All these things that we
analyze, report upon, and recommend are designed to keep us in a position of advantage
in terms of the timetable we have constructed.
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5. NUCLEAR STRIKING POWER
Attention in this section is devoted to those parts of the military force which
now and in the future have some capability of inflicting damage directly upon
targets in the Soviet homeland by means of air delivered bombs. This section, therefore,
deals primarily with the Air Force and appropriate parts of the Navy. The Army, while
an essential element of U.S. military strength, does not normally engage in long range
aerial bombing.
Bombers of more modern design will soon enter the U.S. inventory and their
successors must be developed. The availability of lightweight thermonuclear weapons
in quantity will give significance to the striking power of small aircraft. Seaplanes
may hold special promise. In the future are the possibilities of nuclear propelled
aircraft and of ballistic missiles.
In maintaining a nuclear striking force superior to that of the USSR, the United
States must strive for quality rather than quantity. The increases in the yield per
ton of nuclear bombs have brought about corresponding increases in the power of the
nuclear striking force. Since present U.S. technology is already near the upper limit
of yield per ton of bomb allowed by nature, we cannot expect for long to maintain
ascendancy over the Soviets through better bomb technology.
Superior delivery systems are, therefore, necessary for the maintenance of superior
nuclear striking forces. The significant problem of delivery systems is the active
opposition of the enemy. First, the U.S. nuclear striking force must be reasonably
invulnerable to a surprise attack; and second, the delivery systems must be able to
penetrate the Soviet defenses without unacceptable losses. The central problem of
delivery systems can, therefore, be divided into two parts-ground vulnerability and
air vulnerability.
Ground Vulnerability
Today the Strategic Air Command represents essentially the entire U.S. nuclear
striking force. With large numbers of bombers concentrated on a small number of
poorly defended bases, it is unacceptably vulnerable to even a small-scale surprise air
attack. The Department of Defense, recognizing this, has various programs under
way to reduce the ground vulnerability of the striking force. None of these will be
available during the next two or three years when warning is a minimum and the
Soviets have some capability for neutralizing the U.S. nuclear striking force and destroy-
ing U.S. cities. There are emergency measures which could be taken during this
period to decrease the ground vulnerability of the Strategic Air Command and which
should be considered in relation to the immediacy of the threat.
Warning is most important for preventing the destruction of the Strategic Air
Command by a surprise nuclear attack. This has been recognized and great effort
properly is being put on improving the warning system. Within two or three years
ample warning of an air attack of substantial size should be available.
Of almost equal importance to warning is the reaction to it. The basic necessary
reaction is bomber dispersal to the air within the warning time. Additional bases are
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necessary, are being planned and should be provided to limit to a reasonable number
the bombers at risk at each base, and to permit the bombers of the Strategic Air Com-
mand to be airborne towards target within the warning interval. With the bombers
airborne there is additional time for interpreting the warning and making the decision
to attack the USSR. One serious delay in the reaction time of the Strategic Air
Command will be eliminated when nuclear bombs are more immediately available to
the nuclear striking force.
The new significance of the striking power of small aircraft, which would come
with the availability of lightweight megaton bombs in quantity, should be taken into
account in future planning. Our presently programmed light bomber, fighter-bomber
and attack aircraft, if given a megaton striking capability, would be a force with which
the Soviets must reckon when planning an attack. By increasing the number of
aircraft which the Soviets would need to destroy, the Soviet force required would be
larger and more likely to be detected, thus increasing the difficulty of their mounting
a successful surprise attack.
It is recognized that our short range forces, to be most effective, must be deployed
near Soviet borders, where they would be subject to attack, even by Soviet short range
bombers, which exist in large numbers. The mobility of our forces can be increased
and, therefore, their vulnerability decreased, through use of short range take-off and
landing techniques. Under way are research and development programs aimed towards
practical methods of achieving mobility for land based aircraft. The carrier at sea
gives an example of a short range force, all elements of which are mobile.
In the future a considerable degree of dispersal and mobility might be achieved
Elsanhon
through the use of seaplanes, and they might become an important part of the
Dolght
U.S. nuclear striking force. The Department of Defense should conduct further
FUL
studies and experimentation to determine the feasibility of a seaplane nuclear bomber
force.
Long-range nuclear striking forces would be more secure if based in the United
States. A true intercontinental force, without dependence on tankers or forward
bases, would therefore be a real "jump" in the capability of the U.S. striking forces.
Improved aerodynamic design (e.g., boundary layer control) may lead to a substantial
increase in range in a given airplane. Perhaps of greater immediate promise are
the development and use of high energy fuels. The programs for aerodynamic im-
provements, and for high energy fuels and propulsion systems capable of using these
fuels should be vigorously supported. Supplies of these high energy fuels adequate
for development and testing of engines and equipment should be manufactured and
made available at an early date. Somewhat further in the future is nuclear propulsion
for aircraft which promises to provide radii of action unlimited when measured in
terms of the dimensions of the earth and would permit the U.S. bomber forces to strike
anywhere in the world. It could have this long range even at low altitude. The
program directed toward development of aircraft nuclear propulsion systems should
continue to receive support. However, the date of achieving a significant nuclear-
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powered bomber capability is sufficiently uncertain that it would be wise to continue
developing improved chemically-powered bombers for the intercontinental mission.
Air Vulnerability; Ballistic Missiles
High speed and high altitude have been primarily exploited in order to avoid
enemy defenses. These are worth further exploitation. In addition, more emphasis
should be given to the development of a significant very low altitude capability for the
U.S. nuclear striking force. This is important because of the difficulty of defending
against very low altitude attacks. As we have noted, the nuclear propelled aircraft
could have intercontinental range even at low altitude. In the future it may become
necessary for our striking force to have the capability of destroying the enemy's
defense system in order to penetrate these defenses with acceptable losses.
The ballistic missile, when available, will exploit speed and altitude to so great
an extent, that defensive measures will be complex and costly, if they can be developed.
The achievement of a ballistic missile capability would furnish an important increase
in nuclear striking capability for either the United States or the USSR. It is important
that the United States achieve such a capability first. The development of an inter-
continental ballistic missile is being directed and carried out, by competent organiza-
tions and it has a high priority. It should continue to receive the very substantial
support necessary to complete it at the earliest possible date.
We believe that the development of a medium range ballistic missile would be for
either the United States or USSR an easier development, more certain of success in a
shorter time than the intercontinental version. The Department of Defense should,
therefore, establish a program to develop a medium-range ballistic missile for strategic
bombardment. A land-based system would probably be easier to develop than a ship-
based system; however, ship basing probably would allow better coverage of Soviet Bloc
targets, would be mobile and would be free of political restraints.
It is important to note that there will be a continuing need for manned bombers
even after the achievement of a capability with ballistic missiles.
We have discussed a number of ways of increasing the U.S. nuclear striking power,
most of which are active Department of Defense programs. To maintain superior
U.S. nuclear striking power these programs should continue and the others we have
discussed should be approved and supported. There are many other programs also
directed towards maintaining superior U.S. nuclear striking power. The fact that we
have not mentioned a program carries no implications of any kind.
Radioactive Fall-Out
We discuss this complicated problem on page 55 of Part III of this report, and the
reader wishing more detail should consult this section.
In summary we recommend that: (1) Current studies directed toward better
understanding of the hazards which may result from the detonation of a large number
of nuclear weapons should be continued. (2) Plans for the military use of nuclear
bombs should not at this time be restrained because of the long-term radiological hazard.
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6. DEFENSE OF NORTH AMERICA
1
The Objectives of Defense
In our studies of defense measures we have tried to recognize all major threats to
the continental United States and to consider defense against them in the broadest
possible terms.
Defense against these threats has two aims: to protect in the event of war and,
by virtue of this protection, to discourage attack.
Pursuit of these aims is jointly shared with our offensive forces. Our striking
forces must blunt the attack at its source; defense must protect our retaliatory power
as well as our people and our cities. Together they provide overall strength and a
substantial deterrent to war.
In its role as a deterrent, the defense need not necessarily be capable of stopping
all forms of attack completely, but must, in the enemy's view, make attack extremely
hazardous. Faced by our retaliation and by limits on his sustaining power he dare
attack only with reasonable certainty of large initial success.
The Problems of Defense
The requirements of defense are vast and complex. We must defend a huge area
against a large, varied and changing threat of partly unknown nature. We must be
prepared to do so at an instant's notice and with a degree of success beyond all previous
demand. The tools are intricate and many of the problems are at the very limits of
Eisen
technology.
Dwight
Unfortunately, assignment of the task does not fit naturally into the present or-
The
ganization of our military forces. Its various elements-distant warning and con-
tinental surveillance, interceptor forces and ground-based weapons, defense against
submarines and destruction of their missiles-are shared among diverse groups from
all three Services. Inevitably there are problems of responsibility, of command, and
of the proper meshing of equipment.
The system now sketched out for continental defense is the largest integrated
system ever conceived to perform a specific task. It is, unfortunately, not yet being
planned as an integrated entity. There exists no agency with both the competence and
the authority to do this planning. There is inadequate coordination between operating
and development agencies. The development of specific weapons and equipments is
often spread through a number of laboratories and contractors with insufficient atten-
tion to overall system needs. The procurement and operational introduction of already-
developed equipment is slow and cumbersome. Promptness and decisiveness are lost
through wide dispersion of the decision-making process.
In spite of all these problems, an important beginning toward an effective defense
has been made by the military services and other agencies of government. Organiza-
tional improvements have been made. The creation of CONAD was a major advance,
and its growing effectiveness will continue to strengthen our defense. New and better
1 In studying the defense of North America, the Panel has informed itself about the progress
of Project Lamp Light, sponsored by the Departments of the Navy and of the Air Force.
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weapons have been developed and procured. We have the beginnings of a continental
radar net. Unfortunately, however, the nation was slow to recognize the need, the
program was late in starting, and the system is as yet embryonic.
As a consequence of all these factors-the magnitude and complexity of the prob-
lem, the organizational readjustments required, and lateness of our start-the United
States is at present unacceptably vulnerable to surprise attack. Our military defenses
are as yet numerically deficient and have serious qualitative weaknesses. The defenses
could be avoided or overwhelmed and might even be unaware of an attack until the
first bomb exploded. Under these circumstances our cities could suffer millions of
casualties and crippling damage, and enough SAC bombers and bases could be de-
stroyed to reduce drastically our ability to retaliate.
Many steps are being taken to improve this situation. A Distant Early Warning
line is to be installed. Additions and improvements are being made or planned in the
continental radar net to give better high and low altitude cover and to extend the
system outward from our continental boundaries. New and improved weapons are
being developed and procured. All of them we enthusiastically endorse. Even with
these and other planned and programmed measures there will remain, however, great
and continuing need for improvements to match and keep up with the increasing threat.
General Conclusions
The threats which exist now may continue for. many years. They are primarily
nuclear weapons carried by intercontinental aircraft, by mine-laying vessels and sub-
marines, and by missiles launched from seaborne platforms. Refinements of the air-
borne carriers, and ultimately intercontinental ballistic missiles, must be expected
in the future. We must also be alert to other still more obscure dangers-to clandes-
tine introduction of nuclear bombs, to covert or windborne attack with biological agents.
We have considered the technical problems of defense against these threats. We
have studied our present defenses and the programs to improve them. We have found
great sources of strength and grave weaknesses and have examined measures for im-
provement. If our conclusions were to be put into a single sentence, it might be this:
Although technology is important, in the end our success at defending our-
selves will depend upon the effort we put in and how well we organize that
effort.
This generalization stands upon two others:
First, there is no unique perfect weapon or technical trick that is going to
make defense an easy job. Against even the present threats we will need strategic
intelligence, warning of-and surveillance of-a potential or approaching attack,
the best of destructive weapons well deployed and efficiently brought to bear, pro-
tection of people by shelter and evacuation, and protection of recuperative strength
by stockpiling and dispersion. There is no magic formula to simplify this list.
We need every element and we need it in time.
Second, most of the basic technical problems raised by the threats of attack
by manned bombers and from the sea have been solved; the rest seem solvable.
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It is the scale of our technical effort, and its planning and integration in detail,
which need attention. Above all and throughout, we must strike a realistic balance
between technical perfection and timeliness.
Granted solutions to the technical problems the question rises-Can we build
enough defense and can we build it fast enough? The answer hinges on innumerable
factors, many of an intangible nature. We have analyzed those within our competence,
calculating some, and estimating others. We have concluded:
The nation can afford enough protection against the air and seaborne
threats to create a serious obstacle to effective attack, an obstacle whose appre-
ciation by the USSR would be a direct and forceful deterrent. To defend at
this level demands an increased and balanced effort which must be matched to
the increasing threat.
Defense Against Air Attack
The ultimate objective of an air defense system would be to recognize an attack
at its instant of launching, to keep it under constant surveillance, and to destroy it
by immediate and continuing counterattack. Since all of this is not now feasible
and, in particular, since defensive fighting forces are now limited in range, actual
fighting must, perforce, be confined primarily to a much smaller area within and
surrounding our continental limits; activities beyond that zone are largely confined to
the acquisition of information regarding the attack. It is therefore convenient to
speak of "warning" (which also includes surveillance) in the remoter areas, and
D.
Elsenho
"active defense" carried out within a smaller "combat zone."
A. Air Warning and Surveillance. To ensure that defensive forces will be in
any
readiness, that striking forces can be dispatched or evacuated, and that non-
military measures can be activated, requires at least two hours of advance warn-
ing; more would be preferable. At present we do not have this capability.
The warning system must provide information in depth. Warning itself
can be achieved by radar lines in remote locations. The more remote a line, the
earlier it provides information, but the less certain is the nature of that informa-
tion. Hence, any single line must be a compromise between timing of the first
warning and the positive nature of that warning. A more effective system would
include several (at least two) lines, the outermost to give an early alert of pos-
sible attack, the innermost to give unmistakable signal of actual attack while
enemy forces are still several hundred miles from our perimeter. The radars in
this line would also provide the defense with surveillance information necessary
for analysis of the attack and effective deployment of defensive forces.
These considerations must be modified in practice by geographical, topograph-
ical and climatic factors, and by political considerations. Fortunately, we are sur-
rounded by large areas of friendly territory and oceans giving us considerable
latitude.
We endorse the planned Distant Early Warning Line (DEW), including the
seaward portions and urge its installation without delaying for technical or geo-
graphic refinements.
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In addition to the fixed lines, it is desirable to have available at suitable loca-
tions on the DEW line, radar-equipped planes ready to shadow an incipient attack
and forward information as to its strength, location and course, thus providing
a reasonable substitute for continuous radar cover in the intervals between the
lines.
Additional benefits would also be derived from fixed radars and listening devices
and from patrols in advance of the DEW line, particularly in the regions near
enemy launching bases. In addition to possible intelligence and warning in-
formation they would serve as harassment to the enemy, for example in conduct-
ing refueling operations. Definite benefits would result to our allies and to our-
selves by integrating the DEW line with future radar nets in Europe.
Complete warning must be comprehensive. Fortunately, however, the early
warning requirement is bounded, since once the system is achieved it will not be
appreciably affected by the size of the Russian threat.
It is clear that the problem of providing air warning is global. It involves
operations on land, on the sea, and in the air. It extends from temperate zone
to polar icecap. It is shared by all of our armed forces and by our allies. No part
of the defensive system is more important.
B. Active Air Defense. The devastating and widespread effects of single
weapons, together with the probable strength of enemy air attacks, demand a
very high attrition on attacking forces. Such attrition can be assured only by.
substantial defenses in depth. The air defense system visualized and being con-
structed by the Continental Air Defense Command has this concept. It is based
on interceptors guarding our perimeter and interior, and on ground-based missiles
and guns surrounding our most critical centers. Information for the control and
direction of the interceptor force and for alerting the local defenses is provided
by a "ground environment" consisting of fixed radars and a communication
network.
At present this system has serious technical weaknesses, especially at both
extremes of altitude. Jet bombers can overfly both our radar net and our inter-
ceptors; our radar is poor and our weapons virtually helpless at very low altitudes.
These weaknesses are recognized and steps are being taken to correct many of
them. Others will require further technical development.
We are convinced that nuclear warheads offer the best means of ensuring a
very high "kill" by our defense weapons, air-to-air and ground-to-air. They
should be adopted as the major, though not the exclusive armament for our air
defense forces.
We are also convinced that to conduct effective combat at very high altitudes
demands a drastic revision of the function and traditional form of the interceptor
aircraft. The burden of speed and maneuverability in combat must be shifted
to the air-to-air missile and the interceptor must become an airborne launching
platform having adequate radar and the range and mobility needed to marshal
forces against a concentrated attack.
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As the Russian threat increases with the inclusion of megaton weapons,
stronger defense will be essential and a premium will be placed on destroying
attackers long before they reach heavily populated regions where damage can
result from a downed or jettisoned bomb. Defense must be extended seaward
and northward beyond these populated regions. Radar surveillance and inter-
ceptor bases should be advanced northward, and surveillance extended seaward
to a distance approximately twice effective interceptor range. Realistic rules for
engagement must develop with extension of the battle outward.
In addition to the need for the improvements mentioned above, it will be
necessary to increase the quantity of defensive weapons, and to continue to do so
as the threat increases. Fortunately, the elements of the ground environment
need not be increased accordingly.
Many of these improvements and extensions have already been recommended
by CONAD and others. Substantial increases in our total defenses are contem-
plated and are essential. Although not all of the technical means are yet in hand,
the problems seem solvable.
Defense Against Sea Attack
We are at the present time vulnerable to attack from submarines and surface
vessels. Although plans are underway for partially overcoming these threats, we have
at present little in the way of defenses against them.
For the present, a possible attack is limited to a relatively narrow coastal belt
which, however, contains all of our ports, many of our major cities and some of our
&
military installations. The slowness of the primary vehicles benefits the defense if
Dwight
attack is discovered in advance. However, the difficulties of discovering submarines
THE
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and weapons carried in commercial shipping enhance the possibilities of surprise.
Protection against seaborne attacks can best be accomplished by taking measures
against the seaborne carriers before launching of a missile or penetration of a harbor.
Such a defense requires continuous and accurate information on all surface craft and
submarines within potential striking range; means for identification of unknowns for
close surveillance of submarines and suspicious surface vessels; and policies permitting
diversion or, when necessary, direct military action in areas well beyond our territorial
waters as presently defined.
An important element in the picture should be a continuous and accurate plot of
all surface and sub-surface vessels. Not only will this serve to aid in the close surveil-
lance of individual vessels but advanced information of an incipient attack might be
inferred from concerted movements of remote submarines or suspicious surface craft.
The programmed Atlantic and Pacific Lofar ("Caesar") systems for deep water
submarine detection should be expedited
Harbor defenses should be activated in all our principal ports for protection against
mining, particularly nuclear mines.
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Non-Military
Since our active defenses would not impose complete attrition on an enemy attack,
protective measures are essential to reduce our overall vulnerability, to protect our
people and to provide resiliency for post-attack recovery.
Civilian defense to protect our people is essential to avoid catastrophic casualties
in the event of a successful attack. The threat already imposed by fission weapons
will in the near future be greatly amplified by the increased destructiveness of thermo-
nuclear weapons and by the danger of radioactive fall-out over large areas contiguous
to possible targets. New and comprehensive policies are needed to delineate responsi-
bilities and to guide programs for constructing shelters and for evacuating appropriate
segments of our target cities. Such policies should be based on an immediate study
of the new implications of multimegaton weapons by a competent and informed group.
After implementation of the policies, the public should be fully informed of the nature
of the threat, of the policies in effect, and of the measures required to afford protection.
In the event of atomic war, one of the most important elements in providing the
requisite national resiliency will be the ability of the people to resume organized activity
after the initial attack. We are concerned over the concentration of our essential
civilian supporting industries in critical target areas and the lack of a positive national
program designed to reduce this vulnerability.
Defense Against the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)
In the foreseeable future we may be faced with the threat of intercontinental
ballistic missiles. Although the technical problems that must be solved in attaining
a defense against this threat are extremely complex, there are sufficiently promising
leads to justify an expanded and accelerated research effort on a broad front. There
should be established a strong, balanced program of theoretical and experimental
investigations of the basic problems of detection, interception and destruction.
We believe that one important element of defense against the ICBM-warning-is
presently attainable. It is practicable to build a radar system providing approximately
15 minutes warning of the arrival of an ICBM and giving a reasonably good localization
of the expected target area. Such a system would be of great value to our retaliatory
forces and in saving lives, whether or not a successful defensive weapons system can
be devised. In speaking of defense against the ICBM, we wish to make clear that
defenses against manned bombers will continue to be vitally important after the advent
of the ICBM.
7. OVERSEAS COMMUNICATION: INFORMATION AND EARLY WARNING
The network of Soviet jamming transmitters is very extensive and remarkably
well coordinated. It represents a suspiciously heavy investment of material and human
resources. We are compelled to infer that it has an important military function, and
that this function probably is the disruption of our long-distance communications in
the event of war or at any other juncture when such action appears profitable to the
Soviets. To cut completely our trans-Atlantic communications, jamming of the high-
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frequency (short-wave) radio circuits would have to be combined with sabotage or
clandestine attack on our cable circuits.
At present, jamming the high-frequency circuits would leave us with extremely
limited trans-Atlantic communications. Although the advent of new trans-Atlantic
telephone cables will improve the situation during the next two or three years, the results
of effective jamming will remain very serious. All communications across the Pacific
are by radio and can be jammed.
For several years the Soviet jamming potential has worried people in government.
Certain positive steps have been taken to provide less vulnerable trans-Atlantic channels
of limited capacity, but the situation is still serious and will remain so until much
more is done.
Jamming threatens not only military communications at and after the onset of
war, but also the lines of communications involved in getting and acting on early
warning. It is sometimes argued that jamming will not seriously impair early warning
because the outbreak of full-scale jamming would be in itself indication of imminent
surprise attack. We believe that we should not take comfort from such an argument.
The channels over which early warning will come can hardly be predicted in
advance. In all likelihood, it will not be a single message that conveys the warning,
but rather many pieces of information whose full significance is revealed only when
they are assembled in "the light of other current information. Hence any severe
contraction of our communication channels, even if all are not cut off, may reduce the
chance of getting useful early warning. The only way to remove this danger is to
reduce the vulnerability of our communications systems to the point where a substantial
0.
communication capacity over both oceans can survive a determined jamming attack.
Onlent
We believe that considerable reduction in vulnerability, particularly of our radio
circuits, can be achieved by technical improvements and by organizational arrange-
ments.
At present there is no one organization with responsibility for investigating the
reliability of the overseas communications networks, planning improvements, and
promoting needed technical developments. In some areas effective work is being done.
However, promising new ideas, as well as known possibilities for reducing vulnerability
of our present facilities, need exploiting. There are common meeting grounds to
exchange information and insure against overlap and duplication, but there is no
comprehensive agency to direct the effort.
In view of the great importance of global communications and the weakness of
the present situation, it is believed that there is need for an agency having the powers
suggested in order to take full advantage of the research and development resources
of the country.
In addition to the gains that can be achieved by technical improvements, the value
of pooling resources of the various armed services and commercial companies seems
evident. "Pooling" is being done at present to advantage; however, there is no con-
tinuous over-all status reporting which includes all of the services and commercial
companies. As a result, the present situation is weak in at least two respects: (a) there
is no focal point at which the presence of widespread jamming or cable cutting can be
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determined and evaluated as possible evidence of enemy intent, and (b) maximum
advantage cannot be taken of the diversification of types of facilities or of routes and
frequencies.
It is strongly urged, therefore, that consideration be given to the establishment
of a military communications office for the continuous collection of current status
information and with responsibility for the coordination of emergency traffic.
There are numerous technical possibilities deserving of exploitation. They are dis-
cussed at length in Part VI of this report. Briefly they are: protection against sabotage,
increased transmitter power, improved antennas-all quite obvious; a new teletype
system called "NOMAC," self-checking codes, high speed (SQUIRT) transmission, multi-
frequency switching, facsimile, low speed CW transmission, the use of a Communication
Zone Indicator (COZI), forward scatter transmission, Voice of America facilities as
point-to-point circuits, new cables with attention paid to cable vulnerability-all fairly
straightforward, if not obvious; and finally-neither obvious nor straightforward, but
worth serious study and evaluation-transmission via meteor trails and transmission
via artificial satellites.
This is not a complete list. It is given here only to point out that there are many
important possibilities. Overseas communications is a national problem of immediate
concern. It is a problem for which we see technical solutions.
8. INTELLIGENCE
A classic mission of intelligence is the provision of useful strategic warning of
impending attack. By "strategic warning," we mean warning of an attack while it
is in the preparative stage. For an air strike, this means warning before the bombers
take off from their staging bases. This warning may be months, weeks, days, or
hours before the first blow is felt. By the phrase "useful strategic warning," we mean
strategic warning that is clear enough, and well enough used, to deny to the enemy
the enormous advantages of surprise attack in modern war. Can we have, and can
we depend upon having, useful strategic warning in the event of a sudden attack?
Our intelligence facilities are largely devoted to the problem of strategic warning.
A great mass of data is continuously gathered, and from this those items most likely
to be indicators of an attack in preparation are selected for review by capable groups
of specialists. Experience has taught helpful lessons about the subtle nature of these
strategic indicators. Today's methods include features designed to avoid past errors,
at least in the detection and interpretation of suspicious indications.
We are brought to the conclusion that there is a good possibility that an enemy's
preparations for a massive surprise attack on the United States would be detected.
However, this possibility is not a certainty. Because the need for strategic warning is
so very great, in the event of an attack, we have a correspondingly great urge to believe
that the warning will be forthcoming. This human factor impairs sober, balanced
judgment. Who can be really sure that the USSR could not slowly, quietly, over the
months, assemble planes and crews for a sudden and possibly desperate attack on our
SAC bases? Or what assurance do we have that the enemy may not develop an air
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force so active that it might, at any time, conduct a maneuver that ends with the
actual drop of bombs on our cities?
To find out what the Russians are up to we depend almost entirely on physical
manifestations of activity. We detect things happening-physical activity and physi-
cal change-rather than secret decisions, intentions, and plans. For strategic warn-
ing, intelligence must detect and evaluate the evolution of the attack, which began
long before with the buildup of the striking force, its vehicles, weapons, crews, and
bases. A massive attack involving much logistic preparation and numerous attacking
forces is far less likely to succeed in surprising us than attack by a very small force.
(Presumably an enemy would not risk a small attack unless he judged our retaliatory
forces to be vulnerable and our defenses to be weak.)
A complication in the strategic-warning problem arises because a surprise attack
might involve real surprise in kind as well as in timing. Our intelligence may be
thwarted if it is concentrated upon air forces and the first strike should be delivered
from the sea. There are many possible kinds of attack, and of these, several might
appear as reasonable courses to a potential enemy.
There is also a question as to the certainty of our putting strategic warning to
effective use. This question assumes larger proportions when we allow for confused
warnings, "spoofed" indicator boards, jammed communications, and even of sabotage
to vital links in our response mechanisms. Moreover, just as we believe that our tech-
niques in the discovery of strategic-warning indicators have improved, so also must
Eisenho
we assume that the techniques of denying, confusing, and inverting these indications
Dwight
have advanced. The Soviets are not amateurs in these techniques.
RUI
Because we are unable to conclude that the United States surely will, or surely will
not, have useful strategic warning in the event of a surprise attack, we recommend that
our planning take serious account of both possibilities.
Apart from the provision of warning, intelligence has a larger role, in both hot
war and cold. If intelligence can uncover a new military threat, we may take steps
to meet it. If intelligence can reveal an opponent's specific weakness, we may prepare
to exploit it. With good intelligence we can avoid wasting our resources by arming
for the wrong danger or at the wrong time. Beyond this, in the broadest sense,
intelligence underlies our estimate of the enemy and thus helps to guide our political
strategy.
Our intelligence community has gained enough information about the Soviet
Union to give what is probably a reliable picture of its levels of military preparedness,
industrial development, and technological strength. This picture reveals a huge coun-
try, with great potential, still backward in many ways by our standards, but going
forward rapidly, producing highly competent scientists and technicians in many fields,
and devoting concentrated effort to the transformation of its brute strength into com-
petence for modern technological war. Yet estimates of the specific capabilities and
immediate intentions of the Soviets have, at their center, only a very small core of hard
facts.
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In the course of our studies we have had the extraordinary privilege of a guided
tour through the U.S. intelligence community, with the opportunity to look and to
question as we wished. We inquired into the ultimate foundations of our National
Intelligence Estimates, with particular attention to those estimates on which much of
our national policy in defense is based. Such typical estimates relate to the Soviet
nuclear stockpile, to their jet-bomber force, and to their preparedness for long-range
nuclear war. In our judgment, these are excellent estimates, meticulously prepared.
Even so, no amount of analytic and synthetic thought can be a satisfying substitute
for hard facts.
It has become exceedingly difficult to obtain significant information from covert
operations inside Russia. The security zones at the border, the general restrictions
in the interior, the thousands of security police, and the innumerable informers among
the populace are brutally effective in limiting the infiltration, exfiltration, and useful-
ness of agents. Therefore, we must more and more depend upon science and technology
to assist and to complement the best efforts in classical intelligence.
Intelligence operations already make much use of technological advances-in the
form of radio, airplanes, parachutes, balloons, electronic devices for ELINT, audio
devices, infrared equipment, and polygraphs. As science and technology progress,
possibilities for new applications continuously appear. We envision as attainable in
the near future a great increase in the usefulness of science in intelligence. Revolu-
tionary new techniques will be devised to give us facts and answers instead of assump-
tions and estimates. Only a few illustrative examples can be mentioned here.
Do the Soviets have operative short- and intermediate-range missiles? Are they
making progress toward an intercontinental ballistic missile? We do not know. A
special high-power radar is being developed to look from outside at Soviet high-altitude
missiles.
Air bases along the northern periphery of the USSR would be of special importance
in a strategic air strike against the United States. Our reconnaissance of these bases
is inadequate. The technology now seems to be available for mastery of the geographic
factors in the polar region. Men, supplies, equipment, and shelter can be delivered
to any part of the polar pack ice by air lift. Experience has shown that determined
men, carefully selected and trained, with strong technological support, can survive and
work under these arctic conditions. The information to be gained from the passive
use of stations on the polar pack ice, especially if they can be near to and concealed
from the Russian air bases, would be obtained by acoustic and electronic listening, by
visual spotting, and possibly through use of the passive ends of fluttar links. We should
proceed with development of the special equipment and training of the specialized
personnel needed for intelligence operations in the region of the polar pack ice.
It is now possible to launch a small artificial satellite into an orbit about the earth.
Existing rocket components could be used, and the cost would be modest. (This project
is under consideration in the Department of Defense.) Such a satellite would be
entirely harmless and could have some worthwhile although limited intelligence appli-
cations. When our intercontinental ballistic missile program is further advanced,
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the propulsion units needed for larger, reconnaissance satellites will become available.
We can obtain by this means, if certain technological problems can be solved,
almost continuous surveillance-extensive selective, and detailed enough to reveal
objects (airplanes, trains, buildings) on the ground.
This Panel has examined other specific applications of science and technology to
intelligence techniques. We chose to pursue several of these, partly to make some
tangible scientific contribution and partly to study the technique of applying science
in the intelligence domain. These case histories have strengthened our optimism that
the physical and biological sciences can be made into new tools with which to dismantle
the Iron Curtain.
Note: In order to keep this report out of a more restricted classification, the Panel has pre-
pared for highly restricted circulation, two other reports on intelligence embodying recommenda-
tions and conclusions for transmittal directly to appropriate offices of the government.
9. MAINTAINING ALERTNESS
For many years it has been accepted as a truism that democracies have done badly
at the outset of a war but win in the last round because of their greater industrial
capacity, greater resilience, and staying power. The enormous increase in the power
of nuclear weapons, however, has destroyed the basis for any such assumptions from
now on. We had resilience enough to come back after the surprise air attacks on Pearl
Harbor and Luzon; we did not have the alertness to prevent or blunt the surprise.
But resilience after a wide-scale attack with multimegaton bombs is something
else again; the increase in the power of a single weapon by a factor of a million, as
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described above, is eloquent evidence that no nation can count on blundering its way
through to victory in World War III. The possible penalty of inadequate dispersal or
The
for a failure of strategic intelligence or early warning looms as portentous as an atomic
cloud. Democracies can no longer feel entitled to a quota of mistakes in the first
phase of a long war. Now the consequences of a single oversight, a single failure of
alertness or of communications or of the power of decision, or an undue slowness in
reaction time, might cripple the striking power on which the whole free world depends.
If the first mistake is bad enough, there may be no road back.
We have said that the United States is now vulnerable to surprise attack. In the
face of this fact and of the changing pattern of threat as described in our timetable, we
have no choice but to maintain a taut readiness, an ability to minimize the possibilities
of surprise, a capacity to keep ourselves resilient if it should occur.
We examine in some detail how we may achieve better intelligence, how we may
assure an increase in early warning, and how we may defend ourselves. Assuming
that we achieve effectiveness in all of these components of our defense against surprise,
we still are left with the problem of how we make sure that we have quick and sure
reaction to any moves the enemy might make. The alertness of our response to warn-
ing of an impending surprise attack may well decide the success or failure of the attack.
We are thus led to place great importance on the readiness, alertness, and certainty of
our entire system of reaction, decision, defense, and retaliation. We need to strengthen
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this system wherever we can and to train and test it through périodic experiments and
drills.
We can gain strength and certainty by adding parallel paths of communication
and by duplicating the authority to order defensive and retaliatory responses. We do
the latter at the price of losing centralized civilian control of responses, a price we
cannot consider for all responses. But we can and should afford this price for the less
complete responses which are not likely to endanger peace. We need clearly to sep-
arate, in our thinking, these gray precautionary, less complete responses from the black-
or-whiteness of the ultimate, total, decision.
Experiments and drills are essential. The only way we can be reasonably sure of
the adequacy of our procedures for rapidly making decisions and communicating
these decisions is to conduct realistic tests of the entire decision-making, decision-
implementing system. We have in mind something more specific than war-gaming or
command-post exercises, desirable though these may be. To test our alertness will
require a series of tests which assume different forms and degrees of warning and
which carry through all the operations involved in our response to such warning-even
to the point of getting both defensive interceptors and retaliatory bombers into the air.
Such tests should involve the whole system under all the simulated operational
conditions which might accompany surprise attack. They should cover the entire
flow of information and decision, and the response to this information and decision.
One such test might involve the reception of early-warning information; the decision
to respond to this warning, and the authorization by the President for planes to take
off with nuclear weapons for a practice mission within the continental United States.
We are convinced that such tests would throw light on possible weaknesses in our com-
munications system and would give us a better understanding of how our decision-
making process would work under conditions of surprise, and of how well the whole
system responds to sudden information, interprets it, uses it correctly, and brings
about positive action.
Test maneuvers with nuclear weapons must take place either in a period of inter-
national calm as a drill, or in a period of genuine alert as a near-final precaution,
dangerous but essential. At other times, the dangers of accidental war may be too
great. Many of the other tests and drills, however, can and should take place when a
slight or moderate warning is at hand. Drills without notice are more realistic and
effective. Drills based on intelligence give practice and test to the means by which
intelligence is converted into decision. Above all, drills based on moderate warning,
warning not thought to be serious, offer an additional chance of avoiding a recurrence of
Pearl Harbor. Rather than fearing that the enemy may "spoof" our intelligence sources
and distant warning lines, we must hope that he will do so realistically, and with mod-
erate frequency. Realistic drills, based on intentional or unintentional "spoofs," are
our surest course to reliable alertness, strength and resiliency, when and if the day of
surprise attack comes.
The Strategic Air Command and the Air Defense Command have demonstrated
the effectiveness of tactical exercises, as have other branches of the three services.
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The emergency relocation drills sponsored by the Office of Defense Mobilization are
important to the attainment of readiness within the Executive Branch of the govern-
ment. Practice sessions to determine response to simulated warning of hostile intention
and action would add much to exercise and test the thinking habits at the top of gov-
ernment, necessary for a speedy response to surprise attack.
The present studies by the staff of the National Security Council on the decision-
making machinery associated with different types of alert constitute an important and
necessary step in the development of realistic tests of national readiness and alertness.
We are encouraged by the effort to complete these studies with dispatch.
Back of all this emphasis on alertness and reliability of information is the new
problem which a near-total weapon has posed for the military and political executive:
the problem of the total decision.
It is only wisdom on our part to believe that a clever enemy will discern the dilemma
of the total decision. He can be expected to design any surprise attack to engender
ambiguity in our early warning signals. He may discover and proceed to tantalize our
indicator boards. He may disrupt our communications, even probe our radar nets,
without making war. He may appear bellicose and then turn reasonable, again and
again. If he has his way, the total decision.will be for our executives an hour of extreme
agony.
The total decision must be made almost spontaneously, else it will be too late. Its
consequences being total, it cannot be delegated. Because it cannot be delegated,
there must be absolute reliability in the pathway whereby the question reaches the
executive. And there must be a prearranged program for alternate executives if there
0.
arises an insuperable block in the pathway.
Dwight
In two senses there must be practice travel over this path. Obviously there
13.
should be rehearsals of the communication technique, accomplishing the testing of
the whole variety of wire, machinery, and persons, and their security from covert dis-
ruption or substitution. But beyond this, on a higher plane, there should be the
psychological rehearsal-the moral and spiritual preparation for the total decision, in
urgency, in conflict, and in confusion. Rehearsals should be based upon actual and
potential strategic-intelligence and tactical-warning situations. The findings should
be used especially to sharpen the requirements for adequate early-warning signals.
Our military and political executives need not always reach a simple black or
white decision in response to warning. There are the gray responses, those between
purely defensive actions and unmistakably hostile actions. A particular set of warning
indications might justify the full arming of SAC, or might justify no more than alerting
of radars and ground observers. It is important that responses, as justified, be freely
taken. This not only prepares for the immediate development but also gives invaluable
exercise to the whole response and defense network. The low-level responses, of course,
need not wait upon high-level decisions. Yet enough of the non-trivial alerts should
pass through the early-warning chain to the highest levels, to provide a context for the
psychological practice which we recommend.
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With these needs and considerations before use, we reiterate the urgent importance
of an examination of all the technical, procedural, and personal links by which early
warnings are translated into responsive action.
There is a need to assign staff responsibility in the Executive Office of the President
for promoting and monitoring the planning and execution of readiness tests and for
insuring that the examination described above is carried through. This responsibility
should include periodic reporting on the status of our national alertness in responding
to surprise attack.
10. NEED FOR SKILLED MILITARY MANPOWER
The enormous gains in weapons performance during the past ten years have been
achieved at the expense of complexity in our weapons systems. Atomic weapons and
the radical extensions of speed, altitude and range of our delivery vehicles have engen-
dered a wealth of innovations in electronic and mechanical equipments. The develop-
ment of all-weather interceptors and guided missiles to cope with the correspondingly
increased offensive capabilities of the USSR has resulted in weapons complexity of a
high order in our defensive systems.
This increased complexity has multiplied military needs for technical maintenance
personnel, particularly in the higher skill-experience levels. There are adequate num-
bers of men available to the Armed Forces to satisfy presently foreseeable require-
ments for maintenance personnel. The problem is one of quality-not numbers. It is
the problem of retaining in the Service the best men in whose training this country
has made a large investment.
It is essential that the Services have a professional "hard core" maintenance force;
but it is impractical to attempt to build a professional maintenance force on the basis
of draft, and enlistments encouraged by draft, without a career concept and long-term
opportunity for promotions and rewards comparable to opportunities in private
industry.
The proposals contained in the President's recent message to the Congress on mili-
tary manpower fully recognize the importance of retaining in the military services
highly trained technical personnel. If adopted, it is hoped they will do much to create
the incentives and national climate needed to accomplish this objective. The reenlist-
ment situation for skilled personnel will require close watching to determine whether
still stronger incentives are required.
Even if everything possible is done, there probably will still be a deficit of skilled
military maintenance personnel for many years. This shortage can be partially cor-
rected through more extensive use of industrial contractors. The services have used
industrial contractor maintenance with considerable success in a limited number of
situations. Industrial maintenance seems especially well suited to jobs in the ZI.
Use of industrial type maintenance by the military is not without difficulties. But the
problems of adapting civilian maintenance to a variety of military operations appear
solvable. Further, industrial contractors must not be used in a manner to aggravate
the competition for personnel with the services. Special consideration should be given
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to using industrial contractors in field maintenance and in the maintenance of test
facilities.
Although it is probably not possible to predict with precision the exact types of
military equipment and the nature of their deployment for the next five to ten years,
it is important for the services to develop long-range requirements for skilled main-
tenance personnel based on various assumptions as to types, numbers and locations
of equipment. This must be done for the entire Department of Defense if future
requirements for skilled personnel are to be anticipated as early as possible, so that
timely corrective actions can be taken.
11. STRATEGIC PLANNING AND TECHNOLOGY
New weapons create not only their own special problems, but also domains of
concern which in some ways transcend the weapons themselves. One such is the
military mission to be performed, often involving all three services, each using some
similar weapons in all three media-land, sea, and air.
Military missions in earlier wars have been relatively clear cut. Through World
War I the traditional fighting roles of armies and navies, while supplementing each
other, did not interact importantly. Armies fought land battles, fleets fought sea
battles and delivered supplies to the armies. With World War II, considerable change
had already come. High speed communication was world-wide. World-wide trans-
0
portation by air had begun. Battles were in three dimensions. Ships at sea were
vulnerable to attacks launched from land, and land armies to attacks from the sea.
Dwight
Air, sea, and land forces shared in many common battle objectives.
The
LIVE
The objective, the functional military job, is the dominant thing. The forces and
weapons we may have must be put together in the best manner to accomplish the
objective. Recognition of need for coordination led to the establishment of the Armed
Forces Staff College in 1946. Addressing the students of that institution in 1948,
General Eisenhower stressed the technique necessary "to put men together who have
been trained in different services and who operate in different media."
The need increases. Today's problems are more urgent and more complex. They
are well illustrated by the example of Continental Defense. Global offensives demand
global defenses; there are no longer any natural barriers recognized by a compre-
hensive offense. Continental Defense is not a one-service job; it is a national military
objective, of very broad scope. It requires the best techniques and many different
techniques, the best integration of them into an effective system, and renewed under-
standing that this defense problem does not separate naturally into three parts: there
is one comprehensive, functional military job to be done.
The threat is manifold: bombs deliverable by air and by sea; by planes crossing
land or ocean, by missile, by ship or by submarine. The defense must have eyes and
ears, a central nervous system, quick-acting brains and a fighting response when
necessary. Three services take part in the defense: The Navy in controlling ships,
detecting and killing submarines; in giving early warning of air attack over the
oceans; of intercepting enemy aircraft. The Army provides "point" defense with anti-
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aircraft guns and Nike missiles. The Air Force has the large radar detection net and
the mechanization for surveillance and for control of interception, and an interceptor
force to destroy enemy bombers.
Within the context of surprise, there are other examples of national problems
with technological implications which bridge several departments, for which we do
not now see a natural home. We will cite three, all of which are discussed elsewhere
in this report. They are: communications, particularly overseas communications, on
which we may have to rely for warning; electromagnetic warfare, both offensive and
defensive; and large-scale experiments to test realistically all aspects of our national
alertness and response. These examples go beyond a particular service and beyond
the Department of Defense; yet they are important, perhaps vital, parts of our defense.
Science and technology have changed and will continue to change and complicate
the character of war. The new weapons have brought into focus new military objec-
tives. The new objectives create further needs which science and technology are
called upon to satisfy; needs to devise and produce, integrate and test weapons,
counter-weapons and systems of weapons that will best serve the functional military
objectives.
Our professional military men have a primary, military responsibility, for which
they are primarily trained. Our professional technical people have an increasing
responsibility to assist their military counterparts. Just as techniques are necessary
to put men together who have been trained in different services, SO is it necessary that
techniques be found for men trained in research and development to work more
intimately with the military planners to meet common objectives.
Recommendations on organizational matters per se do not fall within the purview
and assignment of this Panel, nor does organization, alone, ever solve all problems.
We feel compelled, nevertheless, to express our conviction that within the Department
of Defense lie significant opportunities to bring technology and military planning
closer and more effectively together.
As an initial step to this end, we endorse earlier recommendations and plans that
there be a man trained and experienced in science or technology, with proper admin-
istrative experience and ability, appointed as Assistant Secretary for Research and
Development to serve these ends in each of the three services.
12. TOWARD A WEAPONS SPECTRUM FOR LIMITED WARS
This report has dealt mainly with surprise attack in the context of total general
war. We have not considered the possible applications of science and technology to
the development of special weapons for peripheral wars, although in the course of this
study we inevitably have speculated on the possibilities.
We are impressed by recent developments in controlled fragmentation such as
the Army's "JACKSTRAW" and associated weapons. This is but one example of the
innovations that might be made in "conventional" weapons. We believe that tech-
nology might help in the further development of weapons to be used in local wars
where indigenous troops, without either technical or extensive military training, may
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do the fighting. Progress may be possible in achieving new weapons which are easy
to use, and readily transportable. There is a wide field for science and technology
to augment the talented and responsible personnel in the military services already
working on such weapons.
There are also possibilities for the special application of nuclear weapons and
tactics to limited areas. Nuclear explosives might be useful for controlled fragmenta-
tion or for other kinds of weapons designed to deny to the enemy some specified area,
without destroying the area.
We have emphasized that there is no important discontinuity in explosive force
from the largest H.E. bomb to the smallest fission bomb. It is important that this
fact be clearly made known. Small fission weapons may be of decisive importance in
peripheral wars.
We fully appreciate the complexities involved in dealing with peripheral wars
and the careful and continuing attention being given to it by our military, diplomatic
and political authorities. We are convinced, however, that, through a greater appli-
cation of scientific and technological innovation, major contributions can be made in
our approach to this problem. This potential for help has not been adequately ex-
ploited. We strongly recommend, therefore, that a study group be appointed to under-
take an exhaustive examination of the weapons technology for peripheral wars. Such a
technical study might be but a part of a more comprehensive examination of the
peripheral war problem.
E.san
13. A SENSE OF URGENCY WITHOUT DESPAIR
Dwight
The
These considerations and possibilities lead us finally to the conclusion that if we
are to preserve a status of superior military strength or even if we are to endure and
survive the less favorable state of stalemate we must maintain a strong program in
basic science and other policies which help our science to flourish and our technology
to be strong. In the long future, the security of our nation may depend upon weapons
and methods not now imagined but which could evolve out of a vigorous and creative
program in pure science, or in other fields of thought.
While this report deals mainly with technology and its use to prevent or defeat
surprise attack, it has been influenced throughout by these additional convictions:
That survival is not enough; that a state of indefinite insecurity is not enough;
that a condition of stalemate is not enough. Instead, the United States has the
will and the resources moral, political, economic, and technological to maintain a
degree of strength, alertness, and resilience that deters aggressors and that provides
the basis for a sense of steady confidence without complacency, a sense of urgency
without despair.
We may survive the hazards of the years ahead provided we show the courage,
the firmness, and the greatness to stand steady at home and in the contest of ideologies
to enlarge and strengthen the free world as a cohesive community of nations.
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PART II
LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Dwlght
and C.
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LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS
1. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
We recommend that:
1. After review by the President and the National Security Council of the "Time-
table of Change in Our Military Position Relative to Russia," consideration be given to
the recommendation in this timetable that an intensive study be undertaken to deter-
mine what diplomatic and political policies will be most appropriate during Period II
to turn it to our best advantage and to the advantage of the free world. (See pages 10
through 13, Part I.)
2. The National Security Council formally recognize the present Air Force pro-
gram for the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile as a nationally sup-
ported effort of highest priority.
3. Actions be taken to permit the present unacceptable ground vulnerability of
the Strategic Air Command to be reduced more rapidly. We recommend, further,
that the emergency measures, discussed on page 68 of Part III, be carefully examined
by the National Security Council in relation to the immediacy of the threat.
4. The National Security Council examine the specific recommendations we have
made for strengthening our continental defenses with a view to incorporating them in
an early revision of NSC 5408.
5. The National Security Council examine the technical, procedural and personal
links by which early warnings are translated into responsive national action. We
Dwikht
recommend, further, that a mechanism be established within the Executive Office of
The
L
the President for promoting and monitoring the planning and execution of readiness
tests.
6. The National Security Council establish policies and take actions which will
permit the full exploitation of the intelligence and other advantages which can be made
available to us through the establishment of stations on the polar pack ice, particularly
on the Eurasian rim.
7. The National Security Council initiate preparatory studies of the problems of
international negotiation in the following areas growing out of recommendations of
this report:
a. Atomic Weapons in Air Defense. Negotiations with Canada to provide our
air defense forces with authority to use atomic warheads over Canada.
b. Extension of the Planned Early Warning Line. International negotiations
for the seaward extension of the Distant Early Warning Line from Greenland via
Iceland and the Faroes, to join future NATO warning systems.
C. Remote Sea Monitor Line. International negotiations for the installation
of a submerged, sea traffic monitor line extending from Greenland to Iceland and
to the United Kingdom.
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8. A re-examination be made of U.S.-Canadian continental defense relationships
with a view toward bringing about still more effective cooperation between the two
countries.
9. A re-examination be made of the following principles or practices of international
law from the standpoint of recent advances in weapons technology:
a. Freedom of the Seas. Radical extension of the "three-mile limit" to permit
control of surface and subsurface traffic from the coastline to beyond the likely
striking range of sea-launched nuclear missiles.
b. Freedom of Space. The present possibility of launching a small artificial
satellite into an orbit about the earth presents an early opportunity to establish
a precedent for distinguishing between "national air" and "international space,"
a distinction which could be to our advantage at some future date when we might
employ larger satellites for intelligence purposes.
10. An agency be established, or designated, having responsibility for investigating
the reliability of the overseas communications networks, and for planning and promot-
ing technical and other improvements needed to achieve a considerable reduction in
the vulnerability of our overseas communications.
We recommend, further, that a communications office be established, or designated,
having responsibility for the continuous collection and evaluation of information on
the current performance of all vital links of the overseas communications networks; and
that this, or a related office, have responsibility for coordinating the rapid interchange
and rerouting of traffic in the event of widespread interference with our communications.
11. A study group be appointed to undertake an exhaustive examination of the
techniques and the weapons technology for peripheral wars. Such a technical study
might be but a part of a more comprehensive examination of the peripheral war problem.
12. A study, as a follow-up to this present report, be sponsored by the Executive
Office of the President within two years. The technology of national defense is dynamic
in nature and requires continual review and evaluation to take into account interna-
tional and political, as well as technological change.
2. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS
A. For Still Further Strengthening Our Striking Power, we recommend that:
1. The development of an intercontinental ballistic missile (with about 5500
nautical mile range and megaton warhead) continue to receive the very substantial
support necessary to complete it at the earliest possible date.
2. There be developed a ballistic missile (with about 1500 nautical mile range
and megaton warhead) for strategic bombardment; both land-basing and ship-basing
should be considered.
3. The program for the development of high energy aircraft fuels, and propulsion
systems capable of using them, be approved and receive strong support.
4. Supplies of high energy aircraft fuels adequate for development and testing of
engines and equipment be manufactured and made available at an early date.
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5. The program directed toward development of aircraft nuclear propulsion
systems continue to receive strong support and that the program include a propulsion
system for bombers.
6. The Strategic Air Command be provided additional bases in numbers sufficient
to permit its bombers to be airborne towards target within the warning interval, as
well as to limit to a reasonable number the bombers at risk at each base.
7. The new significance of the striking power of small aircraft, which would come
with the availability of lightweight megaton bombs in quantity, be taken into account
in future planning.
8. The Department of Defense conduct further studies and experimentation to
determine the feasibility of a seaplane nuclear bomber force.
9. As a first step in comparing the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the United
States and the USSR in a possible nuclear air war, a comprehensive comparison of
U.S. and USSR Bravo, Romeo, and Delta target systems be undertaken in the context
of a single symmetric study, using common terms of reference and a common framework
of analysis.
10. For planning purposes, the maximum yield per weight of nuclear weapons be
taken as
11. For U.S. defense planning purposes, it be considered technically feasible for
the USSR to deliver, by ship or by submarine, very large and heavy, though expensive,
bombs having yields up to about
12. For U.S. defense planning purposes, it should be considered technically feasible
for the USSR to construct, for clandestine introduction into the United States, nuclear
bombs having yields as high as megatons.
13. Current studies directed toward better understanding of the radiological
Dwight
hazards that may result from the detonation of large numbers of nuclear weapons
841
be continued.
14. Plans for the military use of nuclear bombs should not at this time be
restrained because of the long-term radiological hazard.
B. For Strengthening Our Continental Defense
Recommendations Essentially Covered in NSC 5408 1
1. We endorse the planned Distant Early Warning line, including the seaward
portions, and urge its installation without delaying for technical or geographic refine-
ments. We recommend early installation of the proposed extension of the North
Canada Line to Greenland and shifting of the northern terminus of the Atlantic
extension from Newfoundland to Greenland, in accordance with the suggestion of
CONAD.
2. We endorse the planned additions of long-range radars and gap-filler radars to
the continental United States and Canadian radar nets, including extensions of con-
tiguous radar coverage to seaward (Atlantic and Pacific).
1 In grouping our recommendations we have considered as incorporated in NSC 5408 those
approved programs described in the November 1954 Progress Reports on NSC 5408.
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Recommendations for Extending or Changing Emphasis in NSC 5408 1
3. We recommend that nuclear warheads be adopted as the major armament for
our air defense forces and that this step be implemented by:
a. Expeditious development, procurement, and deployment of sufficient
weapons to provide a high kill capability at an early date.
b. Commencement of negotiations with Canada to provide defense forces with
authority for instant use of atomic warheads wherever needed over Canada.
c. Use of the high-altitude shot at the next atomic test series as a springboard
for a public information program with the dual objective of allaying possible civil-
ian fears and informing our enemies and allies that we are using our atomic capa-
bilities for defensive purposes.
4. We recommend an intensified effort to create effective defenses at low and very
high altitudes, and a broadened attack on the basic technical problems involved.
Important elements of this program are:
a. Interim rules, pending completion of the warning and continental radar
nets, to keep Nike batteries in alert status and free to fire on aircraft above
a predetermined altitude.
b. Firm planning for the evolution of a radar net to match the needs and
capabilities of the SAGE system.
c. Further development of air-to-air and ground-to-air nuclear weapons.
d. Development of interception systems and tactics specifically for high-
altitude combat.
e. A bold attack on the critical problems of fire control and guidance for
combat at low altitudes.
f. Accelerated development of specific low-altitude weapon systems.
g. A broad program of research and development in the field of radar.
h. An extensive and realistic study of the technical and tactical innovations
needed to fight an air battle in the presence of determined enemy jamming and
electronic cover.
i. A greatly enlarged program of field and operational trials and experiments
to support the developments and investigations recommended.
5. We recommend that defenses against attack from or over the sea be-in plan,
organization, and operation-an integral and coordinate part of the over-all continental
defenses; this can be achieved only if the responsibilities, missions, and means now
under the authorities of CONAD, CinCLant, and CinCPac are coordinated for joint
action.
6. We recommend that programs for submarine detection and surveillance systems
be advanced and modified as follows:
1 In grouping our recommendations we have considered as incorporated in NSC 5408 those
approved programs described in the November 1954 Progress Reports on NSC 5408.
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7. We recommend that a positive program to invigorate our non-military defenses
be instituted by:
a. Immediate initiation by the Federal Civil Defense Administration of a
study of the casualties expected from typical thermonuclear attacks under various
conditions of evacuation and shelter. This study, which should be made by a
group with access to all necessary classified data, should point out at an early
date the factors influencing the proper balance between shelters and evacuation
and provide data for individual community planning.
b. Prompt formulation of a new national civil defense policy designed to cope
with the new threat from thermonuclear weapons and radioactive fall-out from
surface bursts.
C. Clear statements of this policy by the President and other high government
officials, informing the public of the nature of the threat, the anticipated effects
of thermonuclear weapons and the defense measures designed to give all individuals
maximum opportunity for survival. These statements should provide the leader-
ship required to give public assurance that, when this policy is implemented,
megaton bomb attacks will not produce national collapse.
d. Re-examination and re-statement of the proper relationships that must
exist between civil and military authorities in order to cope with the disaster
conditions that may follow a large-scale attack.
e. Providing the Federal Civil Defense Administration with authority and
Dwisht
STATE
the necessary funds to carry out an orderly and continuous research and develop-
ment program designed to solve its own particular problems.
f. Further attention to measures to reduce the vulnerability of our essential
civilian-supporting industries, in addition to those measures now directed toward
the dispersion of direct war-supporting industries.
Recommendations Requiring New Action
8. We recommend further development of the warning and surveillance system by:
a. Early installation of a radar line 500 to 700 miles from our continental
boundaries to provide the required unmistakable signal of an actual attack and
to provide tracking information on which to base deployment of defensive forces.
The planned mid-Canada line would furnish the northern element of this line.
b. Extension of the Distant Early Warning line from Greenland via Iceland
and the Faroes to join the NATO warning system (virtually non-existent at present)
at some point recommended by SHAPE. Long-range, land-based radars should
be used wherever possible. They should be installed as soon as feasible, regardless
of when other components can become operational. By themselves they could
give satisfactory cover, except at low altitudes midway between stations.
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c. Consideration of ultimate replacement of the Alaska-Hawaii line by a system
of fixed radars along the Aleutians plus an overwater line to Midway. Such a
system would increase initial warning and reduce the overwater link.
d. Determination of the effectiveness of Airborne Early Warning planes in
trailing unknown aircraft crossing the Distant Early Warning line, as a step
toward developing a distant surveillance capability.
e. Experimentation with fixed radars and listening devices and with irregular
Airborne Early Warning patrol planes in important areas near the enemy's perim-
eter, particularly in the neighborhood of his forward launching bases. Should
they prove effective, consideration should be given to their permanent adop-
tion in appropriate areas (e.g., in refueling areas)-for intelligence purposes,
to give possible early alert of potential attack, and to harass the enemy.
9. To exploit the full potentialities of defense in depth, to protect our peripheral
cities, and to minimize the danger from large bombs anywhere within our borders,
we recommend continuing outward extension of the combat zone, by:
a. Providing a zone of radar surveillance for about 300 miles beyond the pro-
grammed extensions of contiguous radar coverage over the Atlantic and Pacific;
this need would be met by the zonal coverage provided by the radar line of
recommendation 8a.
b. Extending prime radar coverage northward to approximately the mid-
Canada line and low-altitude coverage (gap fillers) to a distance well beyond the
heavily populated regions of Canada; taking steps to enable our interceptors to
supplement the Canadian defense forces in this region (i.e., by obtaining the
necessary agreements and bases).
c. Exploiting future improvements in interceptor ranges by corresponding
extensions to seaward of the full weapons control capability, and of the surveillance-
only zone beyond. [Note: Extension of the Atlantic zone may ultimately justify
elimination of the Greenland-Azores warning line (recommendation 1), provided
the Greenland-Iceland-Europe line (recommendation 8b) has been installed.]
d. Immediate development and installation of effective data processing and
transmitting equipment and procedures to integrate overwater surveillance infor-
mation into a system linked with the land based "ground environment."
10. Drastic revision of the function and traditional form of the interceptor aircraft
to conduct effective combat at very high altitudes. We believe that the burden of speed
and maneuverability in combat must be shifted to the air-to-air missile, and that the
interceptor must become a launching platform having adequate radar and the range
and mobility needed to marshal forces against a concentrated attack. We recommend
a broad program of study and development to understand and exploit the potential
of guided missiles in air-to-air combat.
11. In order further to improve our sea defenses, we recommend that:
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12. We recommend that comprehensive programs be instituted to provide effective
control of surface and, insofar as possible, subsurface traffic in both oceans from the
coast lines to beyond the likely striking range of sea-launched attacks. For proper
implementation:
a. International arrangements should be made for the establishment of infor-
mation reporting procedures and of control measures.
b. Studies should be made of appropriate changes in the concept of the
"three-mile limit" to permit actions in keeping with the threat; for realistic imple-
mentation of any policy changes, the missions of the Coast Guard and Navy must
be amended and forces increased to equal the tasks of inspection and control.
C. Sea traffic plots should be established utilizing modern techniques for corre-
lating, analyzing, storing and displaying traffic information gathered from both
military and civilian sources. Traffic patterns as well as individual ship movements
should be carefully watched.
d. Maximum utilization should be made of the surface surveillance capability
-
of the seaward components of the air defense radar system.
Dwight
e. The feasibility of shore-based low-frequency radar for long-range detection
The
and tracking of surface traffic should be vigorously explored and, if warranted,
systems should be installed.
13. Although the technical problems that must be solved in attaining a defense
against intercontinental ballistic missiles are extremely complex, there are sufficiently
promising leads to justify an expanded and accelerated research effort on a broad front.
Accordingly, we recommend that there be established a strong, balanced program of
theoretical and experimental investigations of the basic problems of detection, intercep-
tion and destruction. We suggest that the newly established Special Panel of the Air
Force Scientific Advisory Board give early consideration to the formation of a full-
time technical group to carry out a rapid but thorough examination of the entire prob-
lem, with the objective of laying the framework for the expanded program.
14. One important element of defense against ICBM attack-warning in minutes—
is attainable. We recommend the immediate initiation of component development,
engineering design and planning for the installation of a radar detection system to pro-
vide the maximum practicable amount of warning on the approach of ballistic missiles
to the United States from likely launching areas.
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C. For Improvement and Better Use of Our Intelligence
1. Because we are unable to conclude that the United States surely will, or surely
will not, have useful strategic warning in the event of a surprise attack, we recommend
that our planning take serious account of both possibilities.
2. The fact that the probability of strategic warning increases with the size of the
attack gives added support to the recommendations that our striking forces be further
dispersed and that our defenses be strengthened.
3. We must find ways to increase the number of hard facts upon which our intelli-
gence estimates are based, to provide better strategic warning, to minimize surprise in
the kind of attack, and to reduce the danger of gross overestimation or gross under-
estimation of the threat. To this end, we recommend adoption of a vigorous program
for the extensive use, in many intelligence procedures, of the most advanced knowledge
in science and technology.
4. We need to examine intelligence data more broadly, or to invent some new
technique, for the discovery of hoaxes. As a first step, we recommend a National
Intelligence Estimate, with adequate safeguards, of our success in keeping secret our
most useful techniques of intelligence. This estimate would suggest the extent to which
an enemy might be manipulating the information obtained through these sources.
5. We require an automatic procedure to lower the security classification of certain
information about enemy tactical capabilities and orders-of-battle as war starts.
6. There are generally recognized technical and administrative problems in the field
of ELINT (electronic noise listening). This situation urgently needs attention. A
combination of technical knowledge and adequate authority at a high level is required.
7. We should at once take steps to develop the special equipment and specialized
personnel needed for intelligence operations in the region of the polar pack ice, the
largest area contiguous to Russia still accessible to us.
8. Intelligence applications warrant an immediate program leading to very small
artificial satellites in orbits around the earth. Construction of large surveillance
satellites must wait upon adequate solutions to some extraordinary technical problems
in the information gathering and reporting system and its power supply, and should
wait upon development of the intercontinental ballistic missile rocket propulsion sys-
tem. The ultimate objective of research and development on the large satellite should
be continuous surveillance that is both extensive and selective and that can give fine-
scale detail sufficient for the identification of objects (airplanes, trains, buildings) on
the ground.
9. The growing principles and technology of information retrieval will advance
and may revolutionize the handling of large masses of intelligence data. Their appli-
cations should be sought out more actively.
10. A heavy long-term investment should be made in the preparation of covert
agents as eventual sources of high-level intelligence.
D. Through Better and Safer Communications
Overseas communications systems less vulnerable to jamming and sabotage are
urgently needed. Without them, messages containing strategic-warning information
44
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may not reach our intelligence centers at a critical time. We recommend the following
technical improvements in communications equipment:
1. Immediate steps be taken to insure equipment integrity in the face of
possible sabotage.
2. The program for increased transmitter power be given all possible
encouragement.
3. Further study in improved antennas be carried on very actively.
4. Consideration be given to the value of adaptation of RCA self-checking code
system equipment to military circuits.
5. Tests and other work on the NOMAC system be carried on with highest
priority.
6. Further studies of feasibility and usefulness be made of high-speed (Squirt)
transmission.
7. Further study be made of multifrequency switching to determine whether
such military equipment should be developed.
8. In the design of future equipment, consideration be given to possible use of
facsimile in the case of jamming.
9. The services be prepared to use CW (hand code) operations in cases where
experienced operators can be provided.
10. Operational tests be made of the communications zone indicator (COZI)
system under jamming conditions and, if results prove favorable, that the equip-
ment be added to the communications system.
11. Jamming tests be made at reasonable intervals under conditions that will
tax to the limit the ability of those charged with operating the facilities to use
Dwight
evasive techniques, alternate routings, and their operational understanding.
841
12. Extensive studies and tests be made immediately to determine the jamming
characteristics of forward-scatter transmissions and that where it appears effective
the services be encouraged to install such systems where geographic conditions
permit.
13. Further work on the development of the Janet equipment for meteor-trail
transmissions be encouraged.
14. Further study and evaluation of the artificial satellite transmission system
be made.
15. The merits of Voice of America point-to-point circuits be studied in detail
and, if the results look promising, immediate steps be taken for the implementation
of a conversion program.
16. The problem of cable vulnerability be given thorough study in the light
of the present political situation and modern technology for mining and cable
cutting.
17. Efforts be made to bring to a conclusion present studies to determine:
a. If an old cable between San Francisco and Guam is worth acquiring
and rehabilitating.
b. Whether a completely new broad-band cable in the Pacific area should
be planned.
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E. For Better Maintenance of Equipment, we recommend that:
1. A professional "hard core" military maintenance force for each service be
developed of sufficient stability to satisfy future military needs for maintenance
personnel.
2. Careful and continuing study be given to the effects of the recently enacted
re-enlistment bonus, and, if enacted, of the proposals contained in the President's
recent message to Congress to determine whether stronger incentives are required to
correct the precarious lack of highly trained maintenance personnel.
3. Greater efforts be made to develop a career motivation for skilled maintenance
personnel by providing an organizational environment that recognizes the skill attain-
ments of such personnel and that permits a greater range of promotional opportunities.
4. More attention and emphasis be given to long-range personnel planning in the
highly skilled technical manpower areas, and to the impact that planned new weapons
systems will have on future requirements for technical maintenance personnel.
5. The specific use of industrial contractors for the maintenance of weapons
systems in the ZI and overseas be. given more extensive study by the Department of
Defense. This requires investigation of the kinds of military operations that can be
served through industrial maintenance contracts and of ways in which civilian mainte-
nance can be adapted to the military system, particularly under conditions of
emergency.
6. Consideration be given by each service to the organization of a select corps of
maintenance personnel willing to serve extensive periods of time in the Arctic area, in
anticipation of expanded military operations in that area.
GPO-State Service-3173
46
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H-1104
H-1104
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF DEFENSE MOBILIZATION
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
May 14, 1956
Dr. Arthur S. Flemming
Director
Office of Defense Mobilization
Washington 25, D. C.
. Library BELL
Dear Dr. Flemming:
In accordance with your request, the available members of the
Steering Committee of the Technological Capabilities Panel have re-
examined the timetable which it presented in its report to the President
dated February 14, 1955. In the Introduction to this timetable on page 10
of that report, the Technological Capabilities Panel made the following
statement: "This timetable.
assumes the correctness of the current
national intelligence estimates of the corresponding Soviet air atomic
power. It is obvious that a serious error in these estimates of Russian
capabilities would destroy the foundations on which this timetable is
constructed."
The Steering Committee has now examined the timetable in the
light of revisions in national intelligence estimates and has concluded
that some of the dates given in this timetable as presented in February
1955 are no longer valid today.
Our conclusion is that we are now rapidly approaching the con-
dition, which the Panel hoped we might avoid, described in the timetable
as Period 3B.
This period was described in our timetable as follows:
"Deterrent effect of U. S. power dangerously lessened if
Soviet production of multimegaton weapons and an adequate
conventional delivery capability is achieved prior to the
development of an adequate U.S. warning and defense
system and before we have achieved a reduction of the
vulnerability of our strategic delivery systems. Under
these conditions Soviet possession of such weapons and
DECLASSIFIED
5210.30
Authority DOD DIRECTIVE
By
TOP
DJH
for SECRET
Date
2/10/98
TOP SECRET
- 2 -
delivery capabilities would place the United States in
danger of surprise attack and possible defeat."
In our 1955 report we stated that if this period developed it might
come as early as 1958. It is now our conclusion, based upon the new
intelligence available to us as of the date of this letter, that this period
is approaching earlier than 1958 and indeed may be imminent. To
express our conclusion in other terms, the period is rapidly approach-
ing when the Soviets would have the means to carry out a decisive*
surprise attack against the United States.
The intelligence estimates which lead us to this conclusion include
the following:
1. The latest estimate of the increased amounts of nuclear
materials in the Soviet stockpile.
Justing
will
LISTRITY
2. The latest estimates of the kinds and numbers of Soviet
long-range bombers.
3. Information on the Soviet test on November 22, 1955, of
a thermonuclear weapon in the megaton range.
In addition to examining the above estimates, we have noted infor-
mation which suggests increased Soviet air defense capabilities and
evidence of substantial Soviet progress in the development of ballistic
missiles. In the field of air defense, the Soviets have made greater
progress than we anticipated and the United States slower progress.
In the light of this new intelligence and the consequent revision of
our timetable, we urge acceleration of the efforts to reduce the dangers
of a surprise attack. We attach especial importance to the protection of
our strategic striking forces in view of the heavy dependence which
U.S. security must place on an effective retaliation capability. To
insure that we move as rapidly as possible through the difficult Period
3B of our timetable, we specifically suggest:
1. Expediting improvements in our radar warning and
other components of our air defense system with
* Decisive defined as follows: (1) ability to strike back essentially
eliminated; or (2) civil, political, or cultural life reduced to a con-
dition of chaos; or both (1) and (2).
TOP SECRET
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- 3 -
special emphasis on improving the performance
against high altitude attacks.
2. Expediting the reduction in the vulnerability of the
SAC force by improving its local defenses and by
reducing the number of aircraft at risk at each base.
3. Continuing and emphatic attention to alertness, not only
of our military striking forces and military defensive
forces but at all responsible levels of Government (as
delineated in our 1955 report), including, especially,
accelerated efforts to reduce the reaction time to a
surprise attack of the Strategic Air Command and other
retaliatory forces.
The major objective of these measures is to protect the SAC
structure and to enable the maximum number of its planes to get in the
air within the tactical warning time available. In addition, we urge an
aggressive continuation of all efforts to increase the probability of
obtaining strategic warning of a Soviet surprise attack.
- JUSING Library and
In our judgment, the above recommendations must be imple-
mented if we are to make real progress in adequately reducing the
possibility of surprise attack and in developing the ability to withstand
one should it come. Without achieving these objectives we face the
early possibility of losing our capability for massive retaliation.
Respectfully,
JRKillian,J Chairman
For the following members:
L. A. DuBridge
M. G. Holloway
J. B. Fisk
J. P. Baxter
L. J. Haworth
E.H.Land
R. C. Sprague, Consultant
TOB
LUT SECRET
SEGNET
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON
June 14, 1956
è Library oul
Dear Mr. President:
Following our conversation of the letter
which Dr. J. R. Killian wrote to Dr. Flemming regard-
ing the views of the Technological Capabilities Panel, we
have reviewed the recommendations made by Dr. Killian
and his associates.
I am attaching for your information a
copy of a memorandum which I have written to the
Secretary of the Navy directing certain actions on the
part of the Navy, and also a copy of a memorandum from
the Secretary of the Air Force to me indicating actions
which the Ai r Force is taking in this area.
I thought these two memorandums would
be of interest to you.
With great respect, I am
Faithfully yours,
cewilson
The President
D.E.
The White House
Attachments
To lee Kill
DECLASSIFIED
5200.39
Authority DAD DIRECTION
Done h
20dars6, SecDef Cont. No. 5-0658
By OCH NLE Date 2/10/98
SECRET
SECRET
June 2, 1956
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of the Navy
SUBJECT: Conversions to Radar Pickets
I have carefully considered the memerandum
to you from Captain W. F. Bringle dated May 22, 1956.
In view of the importance of an early achievement of a
satisfactory condition of readiness in our early werning
system, this appears to be & sound program to proceed
upon without delay.
You are authorized to go ahead with the
four radar picket conversions now scheduled for the 1958
373.24
program in order to complete them by 1 September 1957
if practicable.
SIGNED
C. E WILSON
è Library BHL
CAR/ab
DECLASSIFIED
5200.30
Authority One DIRECTIVE
By DJH NLE Date 2/11/98
CONTIDENTIAL
SecDef Cont. No. C. 0609
6/55/19
Electrostatic reproduction made
for preservation purposes by the
Eisenhower Library for replacement
of E deteriorating menuscript item.
22 May 1956
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY THOMAS
Subject:
Conversions to Radar Pickets
1. Admiral Mumma has furnished the following information
on the above subject:
There are 16 conversions---4 in the fiscal 1957 program
are being converted now and will be completed in March 1957
There are 8 already completed.
The Dwight D.
There are 4 in the 1958 program.
The conversion of the 4 in the '57 program and the 4 in the
'58 program could be speeded up, but not all to the same degree.
Believe all 16 could be completed by 1 September 1957 with a
maximum speed up.
The critical part is that some electrical equipment, which
373.24
would have to be ordered early before the '58 program, would
have to have advance authority to start early from the President
and the Committees of Congress---pre-committment of '58 program.
Very respectfully,
DECLASSIFIED
W. Bringle F. BRINGLE
5200.30
Captain, USN
Authority D10 DIRECTIVE
Naval Aide
By WOH
NLE Date 2/10/98
Electrostatic reproduction made
for preservation purposes by the
Eisenhower Library for replacement
of a deteriorating manuscript item.
2x may 56
R&D
SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
JUN 6 1956
D.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
and
Light
SUBJECT: Supplemental Killian Report
We have considered the Supplemental Report which Dr.
Killian filed recently, on behalf of his Committee, with
Dr. Flemming and have studied our programs with a view to im-
proving them along the lines proposed by Dr. Killian. The
points made in the Supplemental Report that are pertinent to
the Air Force and our comments are as follows:
1. "Expedite improvements in our radar warning and
other components of air defense with special emphasis on per-
formance against high-altitude attack.'
The principal points involved are:
a. The improvement of the high altitude
capability of our early warning radar.
334 SAC
b. The modernization of our interceptor
force with Century series planes of the F-102, F-101B,
and F-104 types and new weapons for these interceptors.
2/10/98
C. The completion of cur Distant Early
Warning system.
As to a, we have re-examined the program for increas-
DECLASSIFIED
Authority ODD 5101.30 AIRECTIVE
Date
ing the altitude coverage of the early warning radar in
our continental defense system from 45,000 to at least
NLE
60,000 feet. This is a complicated program limited in
HDB
part by technical problems. It would be practicable to
authorize a step-up in production, with some increase in
costs, to advance the date for the completion of this
conversion from October '58 to April '58. We believe that
By
this situation is not as unfavorable as the numbers might
imply and that acceleration seyond that indicated would
entail costs that are disproportionate to the improvements
that could be expected.
Electrostatic reproduction made
RD Jope 14 Febs55
for preservation purposes by the
Elsenhower Library for replacement
of 8 deteriorating menuscript
FeeDef Cont. No. 0759
SEC
DS 56-2401-A1
SE
any
As to b, the acceleration of Century series inter-
ceptors, we have recently made moves in this direction
which we believe are as far as we should go, particularly
in the light of certain technical difficulties that we are
now encountering, as for example with the F-101 plane.
Except for the possibility of a one-way Bison mission,
which we feel is very improbable, our present (pre-Century
series) interceptors have the altitude capatility to cope
with the threat. Our new planes and the missile equipment
for them have high-priority and we believe all practicable
and justifiable measures for improving the situation are
already in the program.
As to c, we are proceeding with all practicable speed
with the initial increment of DEW Line and still expect it
to be in operation by July 1957. It will be equipped with
modern early warning radar with proper altitude coverage.
No further acceleration is practicable. The Mid-Canada
Line will be completed and in operation Ly the Canadians
probably no later than our DEW Line. It will have adequate
although not the cest radar coverage.
2. Decrease vulnerability of SAC bases by local defenses
and by dispersion. 11
As for local defenses, we are considering the alternatives
of installing NIKE or TALOS. TALOS is presently programmed for
such installation beginning in 1958. This date could De improved
time-wise by switching to NIKE but only at the expense of other
installations of NIKE. Further consideration should be given to
this point.
As for SAC base dispersal, our FY '57 program now provides
authorization and funding for the preparation of 11 acditional
dispersal bases for SAC heavy bombers. This includes 5 provided
for in the supplemental budget. We are also asking Congress to
authorize 4 more than the 11 so that design work and perhaps some
construction may be undertaken during Fiscal Year 1957. We are
also proceeding at once with this SAC dispersal base program,
seeking in this way to save several months as compared with wait-
ing for the Fiscal Year '57 appropriations. We believe that the
above measures provide maximum practicable acceleration of this
program.
3. Alertness.
Alertness is already a cardinal principle in both our
Strategic Air Command and our Continental Air Defense Command.
Electrostatic reproduction made
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Elsenhower Library for replacement
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This could, however, be improved by provision of certain
additional facilities and other special arrangements. We are
now studying these possibilities but have no immediate proposals.
In line with our discussions, we are proceeding with the
specific actions to improve the high altitude coverage of our
early warning radars and to accelerate the preparation of SAC
dispersal 'bases indicated above. We will also be alert to other
possibilities for speed-up along the lines of the Supplemental
Report to the extent that further studies may indicate feasi-
bility.
Donald a Duarles
Y Dwisht a
RECEIVED OL DELEMBE
CHERE CE THE
LET 1.00 e bH J 20
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Eisenhower Library for replacement
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of a deteriorating manuscript item.