Great Britain

PSF Safe: Great Britain NAVAL DISPATCH NAVY DEPARTMENT y.Br FROM: ALUSNA LONDON 231300CR984 DATE: 23 APRIL 1940 TO: OPNAV PRECEDENCE TELETYPE INFO: TOR CODE ROOM: 1506 RELEASE: X-Y-MCM ON THE 17TH HMS SUFFOLK BOMBARDED STAVANGER AIRDROME X SHE WAS PROBABLY ALONE EXCEPT FOR AN ANTI-SUBMARINE SCREEN X SHE FIRED 217 ROUNDS USING 5 RAF PLANES FOR SPOTS X THE FIGHTER PATROL NEVER ARRIVED X THIS WAS HELD PARTIALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BOMB HITS SHE RECEIVED X THIS SINGLE HIT WHICH WAS AFT, THE RESULT OF 33 DIVE BOMBING ATTACKS IN WHICH 82 BOMBS WERE DROPPED (WITH SEVERAL NEAR MISSES) KILLED 27, WOUNDED 34, REDUCED SPEED, AND BISABLED THE STEERING GEAR X SHE WAS BEACHED IN SCAPA FLOW THE NEXT DAY TO PREVENT HER SINKING, AFTER HAVING REACHED THERE UNDER HER OWN POWER WITH THE STERN AWASH. UNDERSTAND BRITISH NAVAL ATTACHE KNOWS THIS. DISTRIBUTION Franklin D. Roosevelt Library 16 ACTION DECLASSIFIED 10 11...13...NAVAIDE...FILE.. DGO DIE 5200.9 (9/27/58) Date- 6/3/69 Signature- Millip W COME ≥ Signature- NOTE: ANY REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE SHOULD BE PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66 OF THE "INSTRUCTIONS GOVERNING THE USE OF NAVAL COMMUNICATION FACILITIES AT WASHINGTON D.C." PSF safe: Gh. Britain HE 2227 Viecount Halifax Marquess of Lothian IMMEDIATE. 1.5 s.m. September 12th [1940] 10.15 p.m. " 11th Following received from Stockholm telegram No. 1011 of September 5th begins. In view of the expressed views of H.M. Government on continuing the war, he begged me not to refuse at lesst to hear what W. had to say and pointed out that my refusal to meet him would certainly be reported to Hitler. Finally I asked for time to reflect before deciding. He asked me to at the latest by Saturday morning. Please telegraph most immediately whether I may meet W. I should of course say nothing to encourage him but it might be of interest to listen. OS 2228 Lord Halifax of September 11th Lord Lothian 2.10 Belle September 12th 1940 IMMEDIATE - 10.40 p.m. 11th " Following received from Stockholm telegram No. 1016 of September 7th. Begins. I duly informed intermediary on September 7th that I could not see W. and that in any case the interview seemed to me useless in view of publicly declared attitude of H. M. Government. A few hours later the intermediary in whose trustworthiness and dissinterestadness I have full confidence, returned in E. state of excitement and said he was convinced that the matter was of the first importance and that W. was acting at the instigation of Hitler in person. Only two men in Germany knew of his mission. Following were the main points of the proposal: 1. World to be divided into two economic spheres, one continental organized by Germany, the other maritime and colonial organized by the B,itish Empire and the United States. 2. Political independence of European countries now occupied by Germany to be restored, including "a Polish State" but excluding Czechoslovakia. Economic division of Europe must, however, be brought to an end. and 3. such mandates as are needed for its political British Empire to retain all Colonies and military interests. Germany possibly to receive some compensation elsewhere. Egypt 4. and French, Belgion and Dutch Colonies Questions concerning the Mediterranean to be open to discussion. This was "the last chance" and the alternative to perce was a continuance of war on en intensified scale; special mention was made here of the loss to Great Britoin of Egypt, the Middle East and ultimately India. I gave the intermediary no encouragement whatsoever to believe that I should have any message for him but he has since twice returned to the charge obviously at W.'s instigation and informed me that W. has decided to prolong his stay here until September 12th ns he 18 desperately anxious not to return empty-handed. He wouldstay here longer if it were any use. Any talks could/ he said :CL could continue for the present through neutral personage. I have reported all this more fully in personal letters to you and I have no reason to expect that the proposals are of interest to H. M. Government. At the same time since the date of departure of the bag is uncertain I have ventured to telegraph this summary in case you may wish me to make a further move before We leaves. His final remark to the intermediary was that the absence of any message from me would be taken in Berlin ns a definite refusal. COPY Tel. No. 2229 of September 12th. from: Viscount Halifax to : Marquess of Lothian Following addressed to Stockholm telegram No. 726 of September 6th. You should not yourself meet Weissauer in view of the obvious danger of misconstruction. Moreover it would be quite useless for you to do so as you could not enter into a discussion and could only receive 8. message from him which it is always open to him to pass to you through the President of the High Court or any other channel. The attitude of His Majesty's Government has been made quite plain in reply to the King of Sweden (see my telegram 1660) in which we alluded to the necessity of words being effectively guaranteed by deeds. COPY No. 2233 From: Viscount "alifax To: Marquess of Lothian of September 11th. Addressed to Stockholm telegram No. 737 of September 11th repeated to Washington telegram No. 2233. Your telegram No. 1016. Personal and Scorett You should return 8. reply to the intermediary 88 follows:- His Majesty's Government did not enter into this war for self defence aims, but for facts and general purposés affecting the freedom and independence of many states in Europe. Their position was defined at length towards German peace offers in maturely-considered statement made by Mr. Chamberlain, then Prime Minister, in the House of Commons on October 12th, 1939. Nothing that has happened since then has led His Majesty's Government to recede in any way from the principles and resolves which were then so clearly set forth. On the contrary, the intention of all the people of Gov't Teleg 1/12/72 1972 DO the British Empire is to prosecute the war and has been By Authority of British FEB strengthened by the many horrible crimes committed by the rulers of Nazi Germany against the smaller states on her Date border, and by indiscriminate bombing of London without the DECLASSIFIED slightest relation to military objectives. His Majesty's Government do not wish to prolong the war for 8 day longer than is necessary. It therefore lies with the German By Government to make proposals by which the wrongs that Germany has inflicted upon other nations may be redressed. Moreover, it would be necessary before any such proposals could be considered, that effective guarantees by deeds not words should be forthcoming from Germany which would ensure in a general peace the restoration of freedom to France, and to other countries which have been deprived of it, as well as the security of Great Britain and the British Empire. safe: Gr. Britain COPY Prom: Viscount Halifax to Marquess of Lothian IMMEDIATE Tel. No. 2234 of September 11th. Personal and You should inform the President in confidence of the contents of Stockholm telegrams Nos. 1011 and 1016 and of my telegrams to Stockholm Nos. 726 and 737. I feel that the President should know at this moment when Hitler is battering London with indiscriminate attacks from the air he is also following his familiar technique of trying to seduce us with superficial fair promises of an illusory peace at the expense of everyone but ourselves. I am sure that the President understands that we are not unmindful of our responsibilities and that we shall meet all attacks and all blandishments with firm resolve to rid the world of this scourge. DECLASSIFIED By Authority of British Govt. telegram, 1-12-72 By & Date FEB 8 1972 PSF safe Gg Britain AS This telegram must bE clossly paraphrased be- London fore being communicated to anyone. (br) Dated October 26, 1940 REc'd 9:26 a.m. Secretary of State, Washington. TRIPLE PRIORITY. 3536, October 26, 2 p.m. STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. Following is extract from telegram received by the Foreign Office which informs me full tele- gram was cabled to Washington for communication to you through British Embassy. (BEGIN GRAY) "The following COMES from an absolutely sure source which must on no condition bE compromised. Garman peecy terms for France: For Italy: Department of Alpee Maritimes, half Algeria and Tunis. For Spain: Morocco. For Japan: Indochina. For Germany: Alsace-Lorraine plus an internationa- lized zone from Switzerland to the sea. Naval and air bases in north France for the duration of hostilities. French REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED AS-2- No.3536, Oct. 26, 2 p.m., from London. French fleet at the SERVICE of the Axis. A tripartite FrancE-Grman-Italian mandate OVER all French colonies and at the moment of the cessation of hosti- lities the relaxation of colonial conditions imposed on France. Petain has refused but his ministers are equally divided. (END GRAY). Lord Halifax would greatly appreciate it if the fore- going alleged German peace terms for France may bE tele- graphed to the American Consul General at Algiars with the request that if possible he communicate them urgently to General Weygand. JOHNSON WWC UNCLASSING PSF safe: G-Britain THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON October 26, 1940 My dear Mr. President: In accordance with our telephone conversation, I am enclosing herewith the letter with enclosure which was left with me this morning by Mr. Butler. I am also enclosing the London Embassy's telegram of this morning which covers the same ground. Believe me Noths The President, The White House. BRITISH EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C. October 26th, 1940 Dear Mr. President, I enclose herein the text of a telegram received in the Foreign Office yesterday from the British Ambassador in Madrid. I have been instructed when informing you of this message to call particular attention to Sir Samuel Hoare's remarks about the press. I have also been asked to inform you that the Foreign Office are endeavouring to convey information regarding the German terms to General Weygand via Tangier. Believe me, Dear Mr. President, Very sincerely yours, harik Butter The Honourable Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, Washington, D. C. Telegram from the British Ambassador in Madrid to the Foreign Office dated October 25th, 1940. Following comes from an absolutely sure source which must on no account be compromised. German peace terms for France: For Italy: Departments of Alpes Maritimes, half Algeria, and Tunis. For Spain: Morocco For Japan: Indo-China. For Germany: Alsace-Lorraine plus an internationalised zone from Switzerland to the sea. Naval and air bases in North France for the duration of hostilities. French fleet at the service of the Axis. A tripartite Franco-German- Italian mandate over all the French Colonies and at the moment of cessation of hostilities the relaxation of Colonial conditions imposed on France. Petain has refused but his Ministers are equally divided. I think that Petain, reinforced by The King's letter, will win. Please have British and American press ready to intervene heavily on his side if he does not but do not let them take action until I wire. In the meantime keep them friendly to him. Could you possibly transmit terms urgently to General Weygand? If you can, please conceal Madrid source. Fite PSF safe G.Britain AS This telegram must be closely paraphrased be- London fore being communicated to anyone. (sc) Dated DECEMBER 6, 1940 Rec'd 9:10 a.m., 7th Secretary of State, Washington. 3984, December 6, midnight. STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY AND THE UNDER SECRETARY AND FOR TRUITT MARITIME COMMISSION. My 3965, December 5th. The shipping situation is less favorable than it appears on the surface. VESSELS under the British flag aggregated 17,750,000 tons before the war. On October 27 the figure was 17,639,000, an apparent net loss of only 111,000 gross tons. These figures do not indicate the true position, however. Neutral VESSELS which worked for Britain in the last war Either are not available or are included in the foregoing figures. Moreover, 4,200,000 gross tons are currently under repair. This means that the working merchant marine at present consists of 11,739,000 gross tons. SOME of this tonnage, however, must work in trades away from the United Kingdom. The total now available to REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED AS-2- No. 3984, DEC. 6, midnight, from London. to SETVE the needs of this country is believed to bE about 9,500,000 gross tons, all of which 18, of COUTSE, greatly reduced in carrying capacity as a result of wartime condi- tions. Please inform Truitt that more detailed figures WETE contained in a dispatch sent by the Naval Attache to the Navy Department on DECEMBER 5. JOHNSON TFV UNCLEASIFIED safe: Gh Britain Copy No. I BRITISH SUPPLY COUNCIL IN NORTH AMERICA Willard Hotel Washington DC January 5, 1841 Dear Mr. Secretary: I inclose for transmission to the President the new statement of British Require- ments during 1941 and 1842 of - Merchant Ships Aircraft Ordnance Steel Machine Tools - which statement was promised in the Prime Winister's letter to the President of December 8th, 1940, paragraph 16, and again in his cable of January 2, 1941. Very truly yours, arthur BRinns Chairman The Secretary of the Treasury, Washington, D. C. Copy No. , STATEMENT OF MRITISM REQUIREMENTS of Werchant Ships, Aircraft, Ordnance, Steel and Machine Tools for delivery from the United States during 1941 & 1942 Estimated deliveries Unit of from orders already placed Deficiencies to be provided for Total Deliveries Required or under necotiation in United States from United States from United litates 1941 1942 1961 1962 1941 1942 aux (other than Warships) Merchant ships & cargo liners, with engloss gross tons 50,000 250,000 3,200,000 2,550,000 3,250,000 2,900,000 Small Motor Craft single 150 - 150 200 300 200 Warine engines unite 1,000 - 200 1,500 1,200 1,500 AIRCRAFT Bonbers & General Reconsaissance units 4,500 2,000 3,000 14,000 7,500 16,000 Pureuit incl. 4,000 700 1,500 7,300 5,500 8,000 Flying Boate spares 200 100 100 600 300 700 Miscellaneous - - 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 ) Total Operational 8,700 2,900 5,600 22,900 14,300 25,700 Trainers 1,100 350 2,500 5,950 3,700 6,300 ) Grand Total) 9,900 3,150 8,200 28,950 18,000 32,000 TASKIA TANK EQUIPMENT infantry and Cruiser Tanks single 2,300 1,350 3,000 . 5,700 1,350 Universal Carriers Items - - 3,200 5,000 3,200 5,000 ORDNANCE Field Ouns 400 550 2,400 - 2,900 550 Medium Duns - 80 1,200 - 1,200 no Heavy Duns - - 400 - 400 - Naval Dune (16 inch - 2 pounder) single - - 5,900 800 5,800 800 Tank & Anti-Tank Duna, items 5,100 3,700 11,150 2,700 16,250 6,100 Anti-Aireraft Heavy Oune - - 4,200 - 4,200 - Anti-Aireraft Light Duna 80 600 4,020 - 4,100 600 20 an. Aircraft Cannons 4,500 16,000 - 2,000 4,500 18,000 20 an. Derlikon Guna (Nawal) 1,000 1,000 6,000 2,000 7,000 3,000 .50 Machine Guns single 23,000 49,000 23,500 31,000 46,500 90,000 .303 Machine Duns Items - 168,000 - 168,000 .30 Machine Dune 48,000 42,000 27,000 - 75,000 42,000 Sub-machine Guna 92,000 4,500 68,000 - 160,000 4,500 Rifles 350 400 1,950 50 2,200 450 Revolvers thousands 165 25 45 25 210 50 Anti-Tank Rifles - - 50 10 50 10 AMMINITION Field Oun ) 7,600 9,200 - 19,900 7,600 29,000 Medium Gun 1,500 1,850 - 3,000 1,600 4,950 Heavy Cum. 400 - 300 3,950 700 3,950 Heavy Anti-Aireraft thousands - 5,950 650 5,950 650 Light Anti-Aireraft 1,500 1,200 3,600 400 4,900 1,500 Tank & Anti-Tank 6,900 6,100 - 1,400 6,900 7,600 Aerial Bombo 550 10 no" /8' defined not yet defined 20 m. Aircraft 10 15 a 150 210 165 .50 85 165 115 75 200 240 ,303 millions 730 - 2,120 3,000 2,950 3,000 .30 650 1,100 110 360 760 1,460 Pistol Calibre (excluding sub-machise (un) 12 - - - 12 - .55 Anti-Tank life - - 25 20 25 20 201 & STAEL Ordinary Iron & Steel ) 6,500 6,600 - - 6,600 6,600 Alloy & Special Purpose Steel thousand 700 725 - . 700 725 Drop Forgings tons 18 18 222 192 240 210 Pig Iron, 900 900 - 600 900 1,500 Steel & Iron Serap 900 900 - 100 900 1,000 Machine Tools ) I million 100 - - 100 100 100 NOTES OM REQUIREMENTS: A. Merchant Shipe. Based on maintenance of United Kingdom merchant fleet at existing level, 1.4., after allowance for present rate of losses. 3, Aircraft. Based on present British Air Staff estimate of equadron requirements to give preponderance over eneay. c. Tanks. D, Ordnance. lissed on British Har Office strategic calculations. E. Ammunition. 7. Steel. lissed on United Kingdom deficiency as . result of loss of Continantal sources of supply. G. General. All of the above estimates assume the maintenance of British output. British Supply Council in North America, Washington January 5, 1941 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON CONFIDENTIA INTIA January 13, 1941. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT filed Japanfer The attached despatches from the Naval Attache at Tokyo and the American Consul at Malta are forwarded as being of possible interest to the President. Respectfully D. J. CALLAGHAN Franklin D. Roceevelt Library DECLASSINED in (9/27/58) Date- 6/3/04 Signature will THIS DOCUMENT IS THE BEST AVAILABLE. EVERY TECHNICAL EFFORT HAS BEEN MADE TO INSURE LEGIBILITY. ToiN brankling Roosevelt Library DEGLASS IFIED MiBr. DOD Dih. 0200.9 (9/1 AR) Date- 6/3/69 GONEIDENTIAL Signature- gridny. 3D1 WASHINGTON DC JAN 11 OPNAV FROM STATE : RESTRICTED FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM AMERICAN CONSUL AT MALTA ; QUOTE 4 CAN 11 4 PM YESTERDAY BRITISH CRUISER WITH CONVOY OFF PANTELLERIA SANK ITALIAN DESTROYER OF VEGA CLASS - ILLUSTRIUS ATT CKED BY MORE THAN 40 GERMAN DIVE BOMBERS FROM SICILY WITH CONSTANT BOMBING FOR 7 HOURS @ TORPEDO ATTACKS MISSED BUT THOUSAND POUND BUMB MADE A HOUE IN FLIGHT DECK MORE THAN 20 FEET SQUARE AND FOUR OTHER BOMBS STRUCK VESSEL - MORE THAN 20 AIRPLANES DESTROYED AND ABOUT 100 KILLED 9 DAMAGE TO VESSEL CONSIDERABLE. FLEET AUR ARM DESTROYED SIX GERMAN BOMBERS AND PROBABLY THREE OTHERS DESTROYER GALLANTRY STRUCK MINE OFF PENTELLERIA LOST BOW WOWED TO MALTA CONVOY ARRIVED SAFELY AMERICANS ALLEN OF ASSICIATED PRESS AND LT COM HARTMAN ON BOARD ILLUSTRIOUS ESCAPED INJURY SCB HENRY ACTION .....38 16 NAVAIL OPNAV CONF : THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON CONFIDENTIAL Franklin D. Roosevelt Libraryanuary 17, 1941. DECLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT This is an interesting account of German dive bomber attacks, forwarded by our Naval Observer with the British Mediterranean Fleet. Respectfully, D. J. CALLAGHAN Franklin M.Br. SD15 SD WASHINGTON DC JAN 16: OPNAV FROM STATE: DISPATCH ONE Date- 5200.9 (9/27/58) DECLASSIFIED Library CONFIDENTIAL: SHEET 6/5/69 FOLLOWING IS A PRAPHRASE TELEGRAM NO 13 FROM LEGATION, CAIRO Signature- Ivalings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c THEY THEN FIRED TORPEDOES AT FiFTEEN HUNDRED YARDS, ONE HUNDRED FEET OFF THE WATER, FOLLOWING WRICH HAVING TURNED NINETY DEGREES THEY DEPARTED. THE EMERGENCY TURNED AWAY THE BATTLESHIPS, NARROWLY AVOIDING THE TORPEDOES. ANTAXXX ANTIAIRCRAFT FIRE OF AN INTENSE NATURE WAS NOT ABLE TO BRING THESE AIRPLANES DOWN. THE BATTLESHIPS WERE LEFT WITH NO FIGHTER PROTECTION VHEN THREE FIGHTERS WERE SENT IN PURSUIT OF THE TORPEDO PLANES, THE TWO OTHER FIGHTERS BEING OVER THE CONVOY. WHEN THIS TOOK PLACE, APPROXIMATELY 24 GERMAN DIVE BOMBERS (JUNKERS-88) CAME INTO view. FOR THE PAST TWENTY MINUTES THESE PLANES HAI BEEN CLOSING IN ON THE FLEET. THE ILLUSTRIOUS WAS THE MAIN OBJECT OF THEIR ATTACK, ALTHOUGH THEY ALSO ATTACKEI THE VALIANT AND THE WARSPITE. SINCE THE ATTACKS WERE DETERMINED AND PRESSED HOME, THE PLANES MUST HAVE BEEN PILOTED BY GERMANS. THE PLANES ATTACKED FROM THE QUARTER OR THE STERN, AND WHEN THEY DIVED THEY EITHER SPIRALED OR DIVED AT 70 DEGREE ANGLES AND MANEUVEREI FROM 14,000 FEET TO 4,000 FEET. THEY PULLED OUT OF THE I I VE AT ABOUT 1,000 FEET, DROPPING DELAYACTION ARMOR- PIERCING BOMBS, EACH WEIGHTNG 1.000 POUNDS. ALL SHIPS RECEIVED VERY CLOSE AND NUMEROUS NEAR MISSES. SIX HITS WERE RECEIVED BY THE ILLUSTRIOUS, THE AFT AND FORE ELEVATORS WERE WRECKET AND HER ARMOREI FLIGHT DECK WAS SO 15 SHEET THREE DAMAGED, AND A NUMBER OF FIRES, DESTROYING SIXTEEN PLANES, WERE STARTED. THE STEERING GEAR WAS DAMAGED, THE OFFICERS QUARTERS WERE WRECKED, AND THE SHIP, AFTER BEING FLOODED FROM FRAME 136 AFT, SETTLED DOWN BY THE STERN EIGHT FEET. 60 WERE SERIOUSLY WOUNDED, 40 SLIGHTLY AND 83 WERE KILLED. ALTHOUGH DIVE BOMBED BY TWELVE PLANES, BOMBET BY SIX PLANES FROM A HIGH LEVEL AND TORPETO ATTACKED BY TWO PLANES, SHE WAS ABLE TO REACH MALTA BY STEERING BY HER ENGINES. THE HAWSE-PIPE OF THE WARSPITE WAS HIT AND ABOUT TEN MEN WERE WOUNDED ON BOTH BATTLESHIPS. EIGHT FULMER FIGHTERS BROKE UP AN ATTACK ON THE CONVOY BY BRINGING DOWN SEVEN OUT OF TOTAL OF ABOUT TEN DIVE BOMBERS WHICH MADE ONLY NEAR MISSES. TWELVE OF THE SAME TYPE BOMBERS LATE IN THE AFTER- NOON ATTACHED THE TWO BATTLESHIPS, ALTHOUGH HXXX THE VALIANT WAS PARTICULARLY CONCENTRATED ON. LUCKILY NO HITS AND ONLY VERY NEAR MISSES WERE MADE BUT THE ATTACK WAS DETERMINED, THE PLANES PULLING OUT AS LOW AS 100 (REPEAT 100) FEET AFTER DIVING AT 70 DEGREE ANGLES. THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF ANTIAIRCRAFT FIRE AGAINST DETERMINED MASS FORMATIONS WAS AGAIN PROVEN BY THE FACT THAT ONLY ONE PLANE WAS BROUGHT DOWN IN ALL ATTACKS BY HEAVY ANTIAIRCRAFT FIRE BY ALL AVAILABLE GUNS FROM ALL SHIPS. THE ONLY SOLUTION IS FIGHTER PROTECTION. ABOUT 200 MILES FROM ITALY AT 3 PM ON JANUARY 11, AFTER BEING SHADOWED DURING THE MORNING, THE SOUTHHAMPTON AND GLOUCESTER WERE SURPRISED COMPLETELY BY AN ATTACK OUT OF THE SUN BY SEVERAL ITALIAN HIGH LEVEL BOMBERS AND APPROXIMATELY TWELVE GERMAN DIVE BOMBERS. THE AFTER 80 15 ENGINE ROOM OF THE SOUTHHAMPTON WAS HIT AND SEVERAL SHEET FOUR FIRES WERE STARTED THERE AND IN THE SURROUNDING OIL TANKS AND TURRET NUMBER THREE. THE SHIP BECAME UNTENABLE AND HAD TO BE ABANDONED AND SUNK WITH A LOSS OF ABOUT FIFTY LIVES BECAUSE THE FIRES COULD NOT BE GOT UNDER CONTROL AND THE MAGAZNEXXXXX THE MAGAZINES COULD NOT BE FLOODED. THE FORWARD DIRECTOR TOWER OF THE GLOUCESTER WAS HIT BUT THE BOMB FORTUNATELY DID NOT EXPLODE. NO ATTACK WAS MADE ON THE GLOUCESTER DURING THE TRANSFER OF THE SURVIVORS OF THE SOUTHHAMPTON, ALTHOUGH SHE WAS SHADOWED CONTINUALLY. 22 A CRITICAL SITUATION FOR THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN FLEET IS PRESENTED BY THE APPEARANCE OF A NUMBER, WHICH is BELIEVED TO BE ABOUT TWO HUNDRED, OF GERMAN DIVE BOMBERS CAPABLE OF A RAINUS OF THREE HUNDRED MILES. WARSHIPS AND CONVOYS TO GREECE AND MALTA AND THOSE PASSING THROUGH THE STRAITS OF SICTLY ARE IN GRAVE DANGER, AS SCREENS CAN GIVE BUT LITTLE FIGHTER PROTECTION. THAT THE FIGHTERS ANI BOMBERS AT MALTA WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO LOCATE AND TO ATTEMPT TO DESTROY THESE GERMAN DIVE BOMBERS IS REVEALED BY PERSONAL CONFERENCE WITH ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM. EVEN MUSSOLINIS FLEET WILL BXXXXX WILL PUT TO SEA IF FURTHER DAMAGE IS SUFFERED BY THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN FLEET, AND BRITISH MIDDLE EASTERN GAINS COULD BE LARGELY COUNTERACTED. THAT THE FORMIDABLE, NOW AT BERMUDA, WILL BE SENT TO THE MEDITERRANEAN, IS EXPECTED BY THE ATMIRAL, BUT THERE WILL STILL BE A LACK OF FIGHTERS. THE ADDITIONAL FORCE WHICH IS CONSIDERED NECESSARY BY'HIM TO FOLD UP 2. THE ITALIANS BY JUNE IS TWO AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, SIX CRUISERS, ANT TWENTY-FOUR DESTROYERS. 8D 15 SHEET FIVE IT IS URGENTLY RECOMMENTED THAT THERE SHOULD BE IMMEDIATELY GIVEN TO THE BRITISH, TO BE PLACED IN THE FORMIDABLE AND BROUGHT TO THE MEINTERRANEAN, ABOUT FIFTY OF THE LATEST UNITED STATES NAVY FIGHTERS, WITH AMMUNITION AND FULLY EQUIPPED. REQUEST INFORMATION WHETHER THIS CAN BE JONE. 3. RECOMMENDATION HAS BEEN MADE TO THE AIM RALTY BY AIMIRAL CUNNINGHAM THAT, FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBSERVING CARRIER OPERATIONS AND TRAINING METHODS FLIGHT COMMANDER ROBERTSON OF THE ILLUSTRIOUS BE SENT TO THE UNITEDSTATES. AS THE WAR EXPERIENCE OF ROBERTSON WILL BE OF GREAT VALUE, IT If RECOMMENDED THAT AFPROVAL BE COMMUNICATED DIRECT TO THE AIMIRALTY. 4, SYINEY HAS RETURNED TO AUSTRLIA. BONAVENTURE 19 HERE ONLY TEMPORARILYZ. PERTH IS NOW HERE AS A PERMANENT ASSIGNMENT. 5. IT IS EXXX IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT A STUDY OF ALMOST-WITHIN- REACH- FIRES BE MADE IN ORDER THAT THE SAME MAY BE FOUGHT UNDER CONDITIONS OF FIRE MAINS DAMAGED, OIL TANKS RUPTURED, DENSE SMOKE, AND HEAT. 6. IT is RECOMMENDED THAT, BY MEANS OF THE FOLLOWING: TRILL, DEFENSE BE TESTEI AGAINST DIVE HOMBERS ANT TORPEDO ATTACKS: HAVE ONE DIVISION OF HEAVY SHIPS ATTACKED BY TORPEDO PLANES OR I/VE BOMBERS, AND USE OBSERVING PARTIES. MOONT GHT ATTACKS USING FLARES ARE ALSO RECOMMENTED. IT 18 BELIEVEI THAT CAMERA CHECK SIGHTS SHOULD DE DEVELOPED. EXPER- IMENTS USING FIGHTERS ON CRUISERS ARE SUGGESTED.' (SGD) FISA. UNQUOTE. TOD 624P JAN 16: ---- SD 15 DISTRIBUTION ACTION...16 22 BUSHIPS 10/11 12 13 38 BUORD NAVAID 00A 01 BUA ER FILE Infn. Safe: Gt. Britain AIDE MEMOIRE. Lord Halifax has told us that the President, after full consideration of the suggestions which His Majesty's Government have put forward for dealing with M. Stalin's demand for the recognition of his 1941 frontiers in Finland, the Baltic States and Roumania, as a condition for signing an agreement for co-operation with us in post-war problems, did not feel able to approve either the acceptance of these demands or the two alternative proposals submitted to him. We understand that the President felt that both of these alternative proposals were difficult to reconcile with the Atlantic Charter and that it was premature to attempt detailed treatment of the problem. 2. Lord Halifax has also told us that the President feels donfident of being able to reach agreement direct with M. Stalin and proposes to set about doing so, through M. Litvinov in the first instance, supporting his action later through Admiral Standley. We understand that the line the President might propose to take is that he entirely recognises the justice of M. Stalin's claim for security and that this can be met in a variety of ways in regard to which it is difficult for the moment to take a final decision. 3. As Lord Halifax stated to Mr. Summer Welles, when the latter informed him of the President's attitude, His Majesty's Government would naturally feel nothing but satisfaction if the President could in fact reach agreement with M. Stalin. At the same time His Majesty's Government feel that they should, in the light of their own experiences in the Moscow talks and elsewhere, put before the United States Government their own view of the problem and some suggestions 2. suggestions as to how it might be handled. Admittedly no easy solution is at hand. 4. It is true enough that one of the chief aims of Soviet policy has been and no doubt still is to obtain the maximum guarantees of Russia's "security" so that the Soviet Government can work out their own social and economic experiment without danger of foreign intervention or war. But this is by no means the chief motive which lies behind L. Stalin's present demand for the recognition of his 1941 frontiers. We cannot therefore help feeling that the President is unduly optimistic in supposing that some other form of security in lieu of the reoccupation of the Baltic States will prove acceptable to M. Stalin. Since M. Stalin has decided that the Soviet Union's security requires that the Baltic States should be in the Union, he will not be willing to discuss the rights and wrongs of this decision. 5. M. Stalin's view undoubtedly is that having taken this decision, he is merely asking us to assist him to recover these territories at the Peace Settlement, if the need arises - ancient Russian territories which had been regained by the Soviet Union before Hitler's attack on Russia. As for the Atlantic Charter, he would argue that the frontier which he wishes us to recognise in Finland was one that was settled in due form by a treaty between the Soviet and Finnish Governments, that the Baltic States voted for inclusion in the Soviet Union by means of plebiscites, thus fulfilling the principles of the Atlantic Charter, and that Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina were handed back to Russia by Roumania in accordance with the provisions of a treaty concluded between the Soviet and Roumanian Governments. Moreover, M. Stalin signed the Atlantic 5. Atlantic Charter on the assumption that it only became effective for the Soviet Union on the basis of the frontiers of 1941. 6. It is true that we have suggested two alternative proposals to the President based on Russia's security needs, but we doubt whether they would satisfy M. Stalin even if they could be shown to have the support of the United States of America and were accepted as a contribution towards sincere co-operation between our three countries at the peacemaking and after the war. But these alternative proposals contained concrete offers, whereas the President would appear to be of the opinion that it is premature to attempt a detailed treat- ment of the problem. 7. As to the procedure which should now be followed, clearly it would be to the common advantage if conversations between President Roosevelt and M. Stalin were to result in agreement being reached between all three powers. The way would then be open for us to sign a treaty with M. Stalin. We think, however, that we should put to President Roosevelt some of the difficulties which we see in this procedure. As it is with His Majesty's Government and not with the United States Government that M. Stalin wishes to conclude a treaty and as it is from His Majesty's Government that he wishes to obtain recognition of his territorial claim, it would seem inappropriate to him that we should not be a party to these exchanges. We fear that if the President were to argue this matter alone with M. Stalin, the latter might suspect that we had agreed to this procedure in order that the United States Government might bring pressure to bear upon him, and he might resent it accordingly. Moreover, as we have not ourselves expressed any opinion to M. Stalin on 4. on this subject since the Moscow meeting, if he were now to learn the result of our exchanges of views with the United States Government through the President and not through us he might misinterpret this procedure as indicating that His Majesty's Government had disinterested themselves in this European problem. 8. An alternative method has therefore occurred to us, and we should like to suggest it to President Roosevelt. M. Stalin, by putting forward his condition, has touched upon an issue which is of equal interest to the United States and ourselves, and therefore it would seem that all three Powers should get together to discuss this difficulty. The virtue in this procedure is that such consultation would not only help to overcome this particular difficulty, but might lead in the future to close co-operation, both for the conduct of the war and in the period after the war, between the three principal Powers. We believe that such & prospect would be welcomed by M. Stalin. If the President would consider the proposal favourably, we should therefore like to propose that tripartite conversations should ensue in London on Mr. Winant's return. FOREIGN OFFICE. 25th February, 1942. In Safe: Gt. Britain AIDE MEMOIRE. Lord Halifax has told us that the President, after full consideration of the suggestions which His Majesty's Government have put forward for dealing with M. Stalin's demand for the recognition of his 1941 frontiers in Finland, the Baltic States and Roumania, as a condition for signing an agreement for co-operation with us in post-war problems, did not feel able to approve either the acceptance of these demands or the two alternative proposals submitted to him. We understand that the President felt that both of these alternative proposals were difficult to reconcile with the Atlantic Charter and that it was premature to attempt detailed treatment of the problem. 2. Lord Halifax has also told us that the President feels donfident of being able to reach agreement direct with M. Stalin and proposes to set about doing so, through M. Litvinov in the first instance, supporting his action later through Admiral Standley. We understand that the line the President might propose to take is that he entirely recognises the justice of M. Stalin's claim for security and that this can be met in a variety of ways in regard to which it is difficult for the moment to take a final decision. 3. As Lord Halifax stated to Mr. Summer Welles, when the latter informed him of the President's attitude, His Majesty's Government would naturally feel nothing but satisfaction if the President could in fact reach agreement with M. Stalin. At the same time His Majesty's Government feel that they should, in the light of their own experiences in the Moscow talks and elsewhere, put before the United States Government their own view of the problem and some suggestions 2. suggestions as to how it might be handled. Admittedly no easy solution is at hand. 4. It is true enough that one of the chief aims of Soviet policy has been and no doubt still is to obtain the maximum guarantees of Russia's "security" so that the Soviet Government can work out their own social and economic experiment without danger of foreign intervention or war. But this is by no means the chief motive which lies behind M. Stalin's present demand for the recognition of his 1941 frontiers. We cannot therefore help feeling that the President is unduly optimistic in supposing that some other form of security in lieu of the reoccupation of the Baltic States will prove acceptable to M. Stalin. Since M. Stalin has decided that the Soviet Union's security requires that the Baltic States should be in the Union, he will not be willing to discuss the rights and wrongs of this decision. 5. M. Stalin's view undoubtedly is that having taken this decision, he is merely asking us to assist him to recover these territories at the Peace Settlement, if the need arises - ancient Russian territories which had been regained by the Soviet Union before Hitler's attack on Russia. As for the Atlantic Charter, he would argue that the frontier which he wishes us to recognise in Finland was one that was settled in due form by a treaty between the Soviet and Finnish Governments, that the Baltic States voted for inclusion in the Soviet Union by means of plebiscites, thus fulfilling the principles of the Atlantic Charter, and that Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina were handed back to Russia by Roumania in accordance with the provisions of 8. treaty concluded between the Soviet and Roumanian Governments. Moreover, M. Stalin signed the Atlantic 5. Atlantic Charter on the assumption that it only became effective for the Soviet Union on the basis of the frontiers of 1941. 6. It is true that we have suggested two alternative proposals to the President based on Russia's security needs, but we doubt whether they would satisfy M. Stalin even if they could be shown to have the support of the United States of America and were accepted as a contribution towards sincere co-operation between our three countries at the peacemaking and after the war. But these alternative proposals contained concrete offers, whereas the President would appear to be of the opinion that it is premature to attempt a detailed treat- ment of the problem. 7. As to the procedure which should now be followed, clearly it would be to the common advantage if conversations between President Roosevelt and M. Stalin were to result in agreement being reached between all three powers. The way would then be open for us to sign a treaty with M. Stalin. We think, however, that we should put to President Roosevelt some of the difficulties which we see in this procedure. As it is with His Majesty's Government and not with the United States Government that M. Stalin wishes to conclude a treaty and as it is from His Majesty's Government that he wishes to obtain recognition of his territorial claim, it would seem inappropriate to him that we should not be a party to these exchanges. We fear that if the President were to argue this matter alone with M. Stalin, the latter might suspect that we had agreed to this procedure in order that the United States Government might bring pressure to bear upon him, and he might resent it accordingly. Moreover, as we have not ourselves expressed any opinion to M. Stalin on 4. on this subject since the Moscow meeting, if he were now to learn the result of our exchanges of views with the United States Government through the President and not through us he might misinterpret this procedure as indicating that His Majesty's Government had disinterested themselves in this European problem. 8. An alternative method has therefore occurred to us, and we should like to suggest it to President Roosevelt. M. Stalin, by putting forward his condition, has touched upon an issue which is of equal interest to the United States and ourselves, and therefore it would seem that all three Powers should get together to discuss this difficulty. The virtue in this procedure is that such consultation would not only help to overcome this particular difficulty, but might lead in the future to close co-operation, both for the conduct of the war and in the period after the war, between the three principal Powers. We believe that such a prospect would be welcomed by M. Stalin. If the President would consider the proposal favourably, we should therefore like to propose that tripartite conversations should ensue in London on Mr. Winant's return. FOREIGN OFFICE. 25th February, 1942. THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON SECRET February 27, 1941. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library DECLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT The attached is a summation of despatches received from Naval Attache London. I thought the information important enough to bring to the President's attention. Respectfully, D.J. CALLAGHAN Franklin D. Roosevelt Library DECLASSIFIED NAVY DEPARTMENT DOD Line 5200.9 (9/27/58) In reply refer to No. OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON Date- 6/0/69 February 27, 1941 Signature SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN CALLAGHAN At a recent conference attended by the heads of all Admiralty Divisions, First Sea Lord, CINC Coastal Command, CINC Western Approaches, Adm. Subs, Vice Chief Naval Staff, Asst. Chief Naval Staff, Representatives CINC Plymouth, Operations Officer Home Fleet, and First Lord of Admiralty, the critical shipping situa- tion was discussed and emphasized. The First Sea Lord (Admiral Pound) stated that the shipping losses for February were exceeding- ly serious, and he inferred that another month of such losses might be critical. This latter was concurred in by the Director of Trade Division. When questioned by Admiral Pound, the Director of Trade Division stated that the problem of air attacks was of more immediate seriousness than that of submarines. The First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Alexander) inquired of Air Marshal Bowhill (Head of Coastal Command) as to whether or not the Coastal Command could assure him that planes would be made available to counter the attacks on shipping by Nazi long range bombers. Air Marshal Bowhill stated in reply that there were no suitable planes available, and that even though large numbers of long range bombers from the Bomber Command were utilized as fighters, they could not successfully cope with the German long range bombers. The First Lord of the Admiralty then stated that he would have to tell the prime minister that the Coastal Command could not protect ships against the Condor bombers, and he inferred that a solution must be found at once. He further stated that he could not take the responsibility for losses that were beyond the control of the Navy. When these Nazi long range bombers are attacking ships in the Atlantic, they make a very low approach paralel to the course of the ship being bombed, ani practically lay the bombs on the deck, thus insuring a high percentage of hits. The British be- lieve that a great number of short range anti-aircraft guns could defeat this attack, but the guns are not available. It was stated by the vice chief of Naval staff that the British could use ten thousand Oerlinkon guns. Every merchant ship should be provided with at least four of this type of gun in order to provide for four cornered defense. The Admiralty continues to stress the need for more and more short range anti-aircraft guns. Because of the seriousness of the threat of long range German bombers to British shipping, and the scarcity of the type of AA gun needed, it is suggested that serious consideration be given by us to the possibility of tentative plans to supplement the destroyers and patrol planes of our support force with carriers to meet the immediate dangerous situation. Dictated by Lieutenant Mott Typed by R. Bulloch CONFIDENTIAL M Br. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library DECLASSIFIED Bax DOD DIR. Paraphrase of Code Cablegram 5200.9 (9/27/58) Received at the War Department at 11:29, June 23, 1941 Date- 6/8/69 Signature- 80/10 London, filed 17:00, June 23, 1941. The strength and disposition of the Russian Air Force is currently estimated by the British as follows: 1600 aircraft in the area of Vladivostok, 4800 along the Western front. The ratio of bombers and fighters is about two to three. Most of the fighters are of the type of the British Gladiator. Of the Hurricane class they have around 1000 aircraft. Naval aircraft number about 200. Most of the Russian bombers, known as the SB, are similar to the Blenheim and have a speed of 250 miles per hour. Their long range bomber, called the DB-3, has a range of 1600 miles and carries 3000 pounds of bombs. The reserve of the Russian Air Force is estimated at thirty percent. The morale of the pilots is thought to be good, but they are not considered well trained, most of their training having been concerned with defensive operations. 1. British Air Activity over the Continent. a. Night of June 21-22. During this night British bombers dropped 49 tons of high explosive and 5900 incendiaries bombs on Dusseldorf, 1100 incendiaries and 48 tons of high explosive bombs, including one bomb of 4000 pounds, on the railway center at Cologne, 26 tons of high explosive y bombs and 3800 incendiaries on the industrial area at Cologne, 40 tons of high explosive bombs on Boulogne and 15 on Dunkirk. CONFIDENTIAL CONFID INFORMATION COPY CONFIDENTIAL b. Day of June 22. The railway center at Hazebrouch was attacked by 17 Blenheims. Fighter protection for this operation was furnished by 12 squadrons of fighters. Patrols off the Atlantic coast of Francé and attacks upon enemy shipping were performed by 24 aircraft of the Coastal Command. c. Night of June 22-23. Sent to attack the railway center at Bremen were 54 bombers, to the Bremen shipyards 26, to the industrial area of Wilhelmshaven 27, to Dusseldorf 1 and to Emden 3. 2. German Air Activity over Britain. & Day of June 21. Over the continent the Germans maintained defensive patrols with a force of 350 fighters. b. Night of June 21-22. The Germans operated with 15 fighters and 60 long range bombers. c. Night of June 22-23. During this night German aircraft operated over the Thames Estuary, the Bristol Channel, over Essex, the East Coast and that of Cornwall. 3. Aircraft Losses Reported. a. British losses. During daylight operations of June 22 the Royal Air Force lost two fighters. One bomber crashed in England and two were lost by enemy action during the night of June 22-23. b. Axis losses. Reported shot down during the day of June 22 were 29 ME-109's, probably destroyed were 5 and damaged were 7. Fifteen of those destroyed were ME-109F's. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library 4. British Air Activity, Other Theaters. DECLASSIFIED д. Middle Eastern Theater. Nothing new r DOD.DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58) -2- Date- 6/3/69 GONF ENTI TTAL A Signature- oval CONFID ENTIAL Prestin D. 5. Axis Air Activity, Other Theaters. DECLASSIFIED a. North African Theater. Slight damage was caused by an attack the Most of enemy aircraft on the harbor of Alexandria during the night of June 20-21. 17:00, June 23, 1941, The LEE Distribution: THE PRESIDENT Secretary of War State Department Under Secretary of War Chief of Staff War Plans Division Office of Naval Intelligence (2) GHQ Franklin D. Roosevelt Library G-3 DECLASSIFIED Air Corps DOD Dirt 5200.9 (9/27/58) of Date- 6/3/69 the Imented of the Signature- Nil trained. most Bombers sone Dusselderf, 4000 of high Cologne, 40 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL Mr.Br. Mr. Br. Franklin D. Library Fele Paraphrase of Code Cablegram DECLASSIFIED Received at the War Department DOD at 09:50, July 10, 1941. 5200.9 (9/27/58) Date- 6/3/69 London, filed 15:25, July 10, 1941. Signature- give 1. With reference to your cabled instruction to send forward the digest of General Wavell's operations in Greece and Crete by mail, please be advised that it left here by air on July 2. 2. Russia. a. Under the command of General Golikov, a Soviet military mission, containing officers of all branches, arrived in London the night of July 8-9 and was welcomed with enthusiasm by press and public. b. Responsible informants here report that Stalin, in a conversation with the British Ambassador on July 9, claimed that although the Soviet position was strained it was none the less true that they had not yet set in motion their best defensive plans. 3. The following 1s a summary of British Military Intelligence information to the morning of July 10: a. Syria. On July 4, British troops attained Kamichlive on the Turkish border in the neighborhood of Tel Kfuchek. In the valley of the Euphrates, Empire forces reached Raqqa on July 5. A flanking move- ment to the east around Damour has placed the British in a position to control the Beirut Damour road. On July 9, General Dentz, High Commissioner of the Vichy Syrian Government, asked for terms of capitulation. No reports are available here concerning the provisions of the proposed agreement or if they have been accepted by General Dentz. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION COPY CONFIDENTIAL b. Russia. The main German objectives seem at present to be towards Kiev from the direction of Novograd, Volynek and and Shepetovka and in the neighborhood of Ostrov and Polotsk. 6/3/69 C. Libya. On July 8, minor detachments of Axie armored cars were repulsed by British advanced troops south of Bir Sheferzen is miles southwest of Sollum). The Axis blasting operation in the Halfaya-Sojum district, commented on in two of our cables, is now thought to reveal formation of defence positions containing deep shelters in the rocks of the escarpment. This would seem evidence that the Axis in that part of the border sector are taking up a defensive attitude. London the LEE in a Distribution: THE PRESIDENT Secretary ;of War State Department Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Franklin D. Roosevelt Library had War Plans Division DECLASSIFIED Office of Naval Intelligence G. H. Q. DOO UIN. 5200.9 (9/27/Incelligence Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 Date- 6/3/69 Signature- In the valley of the Repire flanking more sent to the eant to control the Betrut Commissionery of the Vichy System No reports are of the proposed agreement Dents. -2- CONFIDENTIA 1, INFORMATION COPY 921 BAP THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON CONFIDENTIAL July 22, 1941. Franklin D. Receevelt 1/1brary DECL , PRIFIED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT L , This summary, showing the marked increase of British air activity over the continent, is forwarded as being of possible interest to the President. Respectfully, J. R. BEARDALL ENTIAL ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS NAVY DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE REPORT Serial F-20:5-41 Monograph Index Guide No. 1005-600 (Start new series each year, La. I-#), 2-40 (Ty correspond with SUBJECT gives below. Bee o, N. 1. Index Guide Make reparate report for each main title.) From Div. of Naval Intelligence at Mashington Date July 16 19.41 (Ship, Beet, unit, district, offie, station, or person) Reference NA and MA reports received in DNI, (Directive, correspondation, previous related report, etc. If applicable) Source Compilation from references Evaluation RELIABLE (As official, personal observation, publications, press, conversation with-identify (As reliable, doubtful, unverided, etc.) when practicable, etc.) Subject GREAT BRITAIN - AIR OPERATIONS IN WEST EUROPEAN THEATRE prepare sketchen suitable for blueprinting (Nation reported on) (Main title as per todex guide) (Subtitime), (Make separate report for each title) Barar.-(Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinetly stated; Include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.) BRIEF A pronounced increase has taken place in the tempo and intensity of British night bombing operations against German-occupied Western Europe. Comparing the first ten days of July with the first ten of June, five to ten times as many bombers were sent out, and three to five times as many tons of high explosive and nearly ten times as many incendiaries Use this form for original and repies of page and standard 8 by 13 Inches plain white paper for additional pages. Forward original and aix: copies. Officers preparing and thom forwarding were dropped, Summary data are: Date Number of Tons of Number of (Number of Bombers High Ex- Incendiary Bombers re- sent out plosive Bombs ported lost dropped dropped in combat) reports sign the last page of original and retained the copy of reports only. Hubmit copies of ellppings, sketches, etc., when practical. If practicable, June 1-10 237 354 14,490 4 11-20 1,571 881 22,900 25 21-30 1,126 1,029 81,080 45 July 1-10 1,664 1,643 138,400 55 NOTE: The present compilation is the first of its sort issued by D.N.I. It is issued at this time, mideJuly, because there are now sufficient (and corroborative) data to make & reasonable and interesting ovalus- tion. The marked increase of British air activity over the continent is clearly shown in this study. This gives further credibility to the claim of British air superiority - at least temporarily - over Germany in the liestern Theatre. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library DECLASSIFIED DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/68) Date- 6/9/69 Distribution By Originator Signature Whlip Resting apare below for - in o, N. L Draw circle around unit or units (M shown (If) the distribution block below) to which this particular copy of this report photostating. has been reuted for information, for further routing, or for retention. Indicate by check 07 on this copy the complete distribution of other copies of this report. To show routing not provided for on this form, use blank boxes. APCDEFIZ / / F Sec. Nam. Archines Ww or Op-16 Op-18-1 può Budget Board Of. College M.L.D. H.O. levels. t / / / Nam. Ord. T.&D. CAR Eng. S&L M.&S. U.S.M.C. C6C Carp. Cas. C.b.C. Com. Can U.S. Bat. Fee. See. For. A.P. I F.A.T.U. Airm, Attachd at / and and State Can- Markins Op-10/11 Op-12 Op-11 Op-14 Op-28 Op.-21 Op-13 Op.-30 Op.-38 - Cam. Cirl Com Ceine Aide Aido Aide Aids Div Auro Air C to to to to of Com One-S: sxiber (15) Return le Room No. Auth BatFor Lant Pres. Sec UnderAstNev A.R. Nav. 16-38499 CONFIDENTIAL BRITISH BOMBING RAIDS AT NIGHT AGAINST WEST EUROPE Number of Tons of Number of Number of Date Bombers High Ex- Incendiaries Bombers (Night) sent out plosive dropped reported dropped lost in JUNE combat 1/2 None - - o 2/3 186 167 14,490 4 3/4 None - - o 4/5 None - 1 0 5/6 None - - 0 6/7 None - - 0 7/8 14 73 - 0 8/9 37 ? ? 0 9/10 ? ? ? 0 10/11 ? 114 ? o 11/12 149 169 12,900 8 12/13 339 165 - 6 (a) 13/14 173 155 - 0 14/15 164 ? ? o 15/16 ? ? ? 2 16/17 222 ? ? 4 17/18 193 64 1,600 1 18/19 163 173 2,400 0 19/20 40 42 6,000 2 20/21 128 113 - 2 21/22 125 178 10,800 1 22/23 111 86 6,700 2 (b) 23/24 144 161 10,400 2 24/25 136 106 15,500 3 25/26 131 72 4,000 4 26/27 102 130 5,700 4 27/28 156 126 16,000 12 28/29 17 minelaying - 0 29/30 136 106 4,980 13 30/01 68 64 7,000 4 JULY 1/2 57 69 - 3 2/3 161 162 16,000 4 3/4 162 123 15,500 7 4/5 149 202 - 4 5/6 208 246 17,300 4 6/7 215 200 7,700 6 7/8 301 297 27,200 9 8/9 139 116 33,800 10 9/10 140 121 11,900 6 10/11 132 107 9,000 2 Notes: (a) Two additional bombers crashed in England this night. (b) One additional bomber crashed in England this night. Evaluation: The above figures are incomplete, especially for early June, and they are certainly inexact. Reports on the same night's operations from different observers rarely if ever agree in numerical detail. Bomber losses in combat are probably reported in full as shown above, but losses due to accidental bad landings and take-offs are almost never reported. The figures 88 presented herein are regarded by DNI as the best available. There can be no doubt that the trend in air operations is accurately shown. The figures are summarized for ten-day periods on the preceding page, Franklin D. Receiveit Library RECLASSIFIED 900 Dia. 5200.9 (9/27/59) - 2 - Date- 6/3/69 YVR But Up to October 1st of this year, the total orders placed in the United States for the account of the British Government amounted to $1,600,000,000 and additional orders ready to be placed approximate another $3,239,000,000. Of the $1,600,000,000 of orders already placed, $237,000,000 represents capital com- mitments for the purposes of plant expansion, personnel train- ing, and the like. A capital commitment of $100,000,000 has been allocated to the aircraft industry alone, while the remainder of $137,000,000 has been committed for expanding the facilities of powder, munitions, and other industrial enter- prises engaged upon the production of war material. The British Government as of October 1st has placed orders for more than 11,000 airplanes and 27,000 engines. Ad- ditional orders to be placed by the British Government for air- craft and engines equal those already outstanding. With respect to other war materiel the British have already placed orders for 68,489 tons of explosives and pro- pellants; 1,105,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition; and 254,117 small arms of various types, as well as for other items including tanks, tank engines, small boats, marine engines, and raw materials, especially iron and steel. In addition to the foregoing, the British Government is in the process of placing - 2 - orders for 1,175,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition; 1,850 field guns; 22,600 medium guns; 54,275 small arms; 2,000 tanks; and other miscellaneous items. Between June and October of this year certain surplus materiel was sold or exchanged by the United States Army and Navy for more modern equipment. All of this surplus materiel was eventually purchased for the account of the British and Canadian Governments from domestic corporations. In summary, this surplus materiel included 890,000 rifles, 20,500 revolvers, and 86,583 machine guns, with 144,790,000 rounds of ammunition for the same; 895 field guns with ammuni- tion; 316 three-inch mortars with ammunition; 8,500 tons of T.N.T.; 4,860 tons of powder; and 6,600 aircraft bombs. In addition to these items there were included large quantities of accessory equipment, such as ammunition chests, magazines, spare barrels, caissons, etc. All of this materiel so pur- chased for the account of the British and Canadian Governments was delivered just after the evacuation at Dunkirk. In addition to the expansion in our own production capacity resulting from British orders, we have also obtained plans and specifications of British war materiel, such as the Rolls Royce Merlin engine, the power-driven aircraft turret, and - 3 - detailed technical information concerning anti-aircraft mea- sures, anti-submarine measures, etc. Further, the use by the British of American-made planes and guns has given us valuable information as to the effectiveness of these weapons under actual combat conditions. PSF Safe File Gh. Britani Draft note from His Majesty's Ambassador to Mr. Cordell Hull. 1. Sir, I have the honour under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to refer to the speech made by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on August 20th. In that speech Mr. Churchill stated that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom had decided some months ago that the interests of both the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations required that the United States should have facilities for the naval and air defence of the western hemisphere against the attack of a hostile power which might have acquired temporary but lengthy control of a large part of western Europe and its resources. I have now been instructed to inform you that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, in agreement with His Majesty's Government in Canada, are happy to give the assurance that in the hope of furthering and making still more cordial and enduring the existing good relations between Great Britain and the United States, and as a free contribution on their part towards the defence of the Americas, and the inhabitants thereof, they are ready to make available immediately to the United States Government naval and air facilities in certain areas in Newfoundland/ -2- Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and British Guiana, needed for the purpose of hemispheric defence, such areas to be leased to the United States Govern- ment for a period of 99 years. His Majesty's Government do not desire rent or any other payment in return for the grant of these facilities or in consideration of the leases. His Majesty's Government suggest that if their offer is acceptable to the United States Government, the two Governments should immediately determine by agreement the exact location of the areas within the territories abovementioned to be leased to the United States Government for its naval and air purposes, and the powers to be exer- cised within these areas by the United States authorities. Draft note from Mr. Cordell Hull to His Majesty's Ambassador. 2. Sir, I have received your note of of which the text is as follows:- (Here insert the text of the Ambassador's reply.) The United States Government have noted with most grateful appreciation the readiness of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, in agreement with His Majesty's Government in Canada, to make immediately available to the United States Government naval and air facilities in certain areas in Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and British Guiana. This assurance on the part of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will certainly in- crease the national security of the United States and greatly strengthen its ability to cooperate effectively with the other nations of the Americas in the defence of the western hemisphere, and the offer of His Majesty's Government is gladly accepted. The Government of the United States will immediately designate Commissioners to meet with Commissioners designated by His Majesty's Government to decide upon the exact location of the areas within which the suggested naval and air facilities are to be extended, the nature of those facilities, and the powers/ -2- powers to be exercised within these areas by the United States authorities. The United States Government note with appreciation that His Majesty's Government do not desire rent or any other payment in return for the grant of these facilities or in consideration of the leases to be granted to them. At the same time, in view of the very material addition which this action by His Majesty's Government will make to the security of the United States, the United States Government wish for their part to make some contribution towards the security of the United Kingdom and the defensive strength of the British Navy in the Atlantic. They have therefore decided immediately to transfer to His Majesty's Government the following naval and military material:- 50 destroyers 20 motor torpedo boats A certain number of aircraft and rifles. The United States Government wish to make it clear that they do not desire any payment in return for this naval and military material. sase Gr Br.Britani PSF DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON December 30. 1941 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT You will recall that you approved recently a draft Lend-Lease Agreement between the United States and Great Britain. This draft Agreement was handed to the British Ambassador and has been the subject of extensive conversa- tions between the Department of State and Lord Halifax. I am informed that Lord Halifax feels strongly that the British Government should agree to sign this draft at once in its present form and that he has strongly represented this point of view to the British Government. A responsible officer of the British Government informed an officer of the State Department yesterday that in his opinion it would be exceedingly helpful if you expressed an interest in this Agreement to Mr. Churchill upon his return to Washington. He added that in his opinion if you suggested to Mr. Churchill that he discuss this matter with Lord Halifax the Agreement could be signed in its present form without further delay. CH TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR BMP COPY Copy No. 28 To: Washington for Combined Chiefs of Staff. London for Chiefs of Staff. Prime Minister Australia. Army Australia. From: ABDACOM No. 01226 of 15th February, 1942. MOST IMMEDIATE. Following just received from SINGAPORE. "Owing to losses from enemy action, water, petrol, food and ammunition practically finished. Unable therefore to continue the fight any longer. All ranks have done their best and are grateful for your help". RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION. U.S.Chiefs of Staff. DECLASSIFIED JCS MEMO, 1-17-73 BY RT, DATE FEB 19 1974 AMIDI 3 CABLEGRAM AC-4 FILED 19/114P Received at the War Department Message Center Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D.C. FEBRUARY 19 1942 URGENT Box. '822A M. From LONDON To MILID U Copies furnished as noted: NO. 1996 FEBRUARY 19TH PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN CLN PRESENT GOVERNMENT RESIGNING TONIGHT WITH NEW GOVERNMENT TO BE RECONSTRUCTED AND ANNOUNCED IN PRESS TOMORROW MORNING UNDER CHURCHILL AS PRIME MINISTER WITH WAR CABINET AS FOLLOWS CHURCHILL PRIME MINISTER ATLEE DASH DOMINIONS OFFICE CMA RETAINING DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER PD CRIPPS DASH LEADER OF THE HOUSE PD OLIVER LYTTELTON DASH WITHOUT PORTFOLIO PD EDEN DASH FOREIGN OFFICE PD BEVIN DASH LABOR PD ANDERSON DASH LORD PRESIDENT PD BEAVERBROOK OUT OF THE GOVERNMENT ENTIRELY PD MORE FOLLOWS PD MCCLURE DECLASSIFIED State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72 CLUCE with 18 (IEL voses creat 13 Ok INSURER U.S. BECEGED 1845 20% By J. Schauble Date FEB 4 1972 Action Copy BALES BOOK CO.,INC. NIAGARA 14 AM DI 4 .CABLEGRAM AC-4 FILED 19/135P Received at the War Department Message Center Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D.C. FEBRUARY 19 1942 URGENT CEOPE 844A M. LONDON From MILID To Copies furnished as noted: NO. 1996 SECTION TWO FEBRUARY 19TH PART TWO PD OTHER MINISTERIAL CHANGES NOT FULLY SETTLED BUT UNDERSTAND LORD MOYNE IS OUT CMA WITH CRANBORNE MOVING FROM DOMINIONS TO COLONIAL OFFICE PD MARGESSON MAY GO OUT IF STRONG SUCCESSOR CAN BE DECIDED ON IN TIME PD MOST OF THE OTHER MINISTERS CMA HOWEVER CMA WILL REMAIN CMA INCLUDING DUNCAN CMA MOORE DASH BRABAZON CMA LEATHERS CMA ALEXANDER CMA SINCLAIR CMA MORRISON CMA LLEWELLYN CMA AND WOOLTON MORE WILL FOLLOW MCCLURE OLUINS DECLASSIFIED State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72 FEB 4 1972 By J. Schauble Date Action Copy REDIFORM-PATO.-AMERICAN SALES BOOK CO.,INC., NIAGARA FALLO,M.Y. 13 AM DI 5 CABLEGRAM AC-4 Received at the War Department Message Center Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D.C. FEBRUARY 19 1942 9:27 A.M. From AMEMBASSA O LONDON STORE To MILID URGENT Copies furnished as noted: NO. 1996 SECTION THREE FEBRUARY 19TH URGENT THIRD PART PD LYTTELTONS ACTIVITIES NOT YET CLEARLY DEFINED PD WILL PROBABLY PRESIDE AT CHIEF OF STAFFS MEETINGS AND CERTAIN OTHER COMMITTEE AND COUNCIL MEETINGS WHICH HAVE PREVIOUSLY TAKEN so MUCH OF PRIME MINISTERS TIME PD WILL GENERALLY ASSIST PRIME MINISTER IN THE DIRECTION OF THE WAR CMA PERHAPS INCLUDING SUPPLY CMA BUT THE PRIME MINISTER RETAINS COMPLETE CONTROL PD PARA POSITION OF MINISTER OF PRODUCTION MAY BE ABAN-> DONED WITH SOME OTHER SYSTEM OF COORDINATION SET UP PD PARA IT IS DIFFICULT TO APPRAISE FULLY REASONS FOR BEAVERBROOKS RESIGNATION PD PRIME MINISTER OFFERED HIM ALMOST ANY POSITION IF HE WOULD STAY CMA LORD PRIVY SEAL AND AIR MINISTRY PD PARA UNDOUBTEDLY HIS HEALTH IS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR PD THIS IS TO BE GIVEN AS THE PUBLIC REASON PD OTHER REASONS UNDOUBTEDLY INCLUDE THAT HE IS TIRED OUT AND REALIZES THAT HIS BAD TEMPER INTERFERES WITH THE SMOOTH WORKING OF THE CABINET AS A TEAM DECLASSIFIED MCCLURE I State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72 FEB 4 1972 Action Copy By J. Schamble Date SALES AMDI'6 CABLEGRAM AC-4 FILED 19/222P Received at the War Department Message Center Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D.C. FEBRUARY 19 1942 URGENT 935A M. From LONDON To MILID URGENT Copies furnished as noted: NO. 1996 SECTION THREE PART TWO FEBRUARY 19TH PD HE MAY DOUBT WHETHER THE NEW GOVERNMENT IS REALLY STRONG ENOUGH AND MAY WANT TO RETIRE FOR A TIME CMA EXPECTING TO COME BACK AT A LATER DATE WITH INCREASED HEALTH OMA VIGOR AND PRESTIGE PD THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT IT IS HIS PRESENT SINCERE INTENTION TO SUPPORT CHURCHILL IN HIS PRESS AND OTHERWISE PD PARA HE PLANS TO LEAVE FOR AMERICA IN ABOUT A WEEK OR TEN DAYS ON A TRIP FOR HIS HEALTH PD PARA HIS WITHDRAWAL WILL BE WELCOMED BY SOME BUT A SURPRISE AND DISAPPOINTMENT TO THE PUBLIC GENERALLY MCCLURE THATE is 839 DECLASSIFIED EL State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72 SEORET By J. Schauble Date FEB 4 1972 Action Copy SALES BOOK FALLS.M.T. 16 AC--4 CABLEGRAM 10112 :23 P I But but Britain Received at the War Department Message Center Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D.C. FEBRUARY 20, 1942 4:28 P M. From LONDON To THE PRESIDENT LSOINIS Copies furnished as noted: NUMBER 2014 FEBRUARY 20, 1942 PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN CLN SUPPLEMENTING MY CABLE FEBRUARY NINETEEN REGARDING CABINET CHANGES IT NOW DEVELOPS THAT ON ACCOUNT OF BEAVERBROOKS RETIREMENT LYTTLETONS ACTIVITIES WILL BE LARGELY ON PRODUCTION AND SUPPLY PARA THE PRIME MINISTER TOLD ME TODAY THAT BEAVERBROOKS SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES IN WASHINGTON HAD NOT YET BEEN DEFINED PD TAKING CARE OF HIS HEALTH WILL BE THE FIRST CONSIDER- ATION PD THE PR1ME MINISTER SAID HE HOPED TO HAVE HIM BACK IN THE CABINET AT A FUTURE DATE MCCLURE CEORET DECLASSIFIED State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72 By J. Schauble Date FEB 4 1972 Action Copy SALES BOOK FALLO.R.T. safe GS Britain But Bot BRITISH EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C. Go 19"teb: 1942. my dear Harry The President may like to See this private telepam Smid get from anchinker. have sent Marshall a no copy but otherwise have fain it distribution because ? its extreme Secrecy your facts in Dill MOST INTEDIATE FROM: Mideast TO: War Office rptd British Army Staff, Washington, No: C.8/744 18th Feb. Cairo, 18th February, situation review. Private for Field Marshal Sir John DILL, from General AUCHINLECK. 1. 15 Feb enemy moved forward German Afrika Corps of 15 and 21 Armoured and part 90 Light Divisians on North in area MARTUBA TMIMI TEMRAD and Italian Mobile Corps of Ariete and Trieste (believed to have absorbed Trento) Divisions to South round MECHILI. 2, Enemy advanced on broad front in relatively small columns each comprising some tanks lorried infantry and artillery. Generally enemy columns withdrew when engaged by our fighting patrols and mobile columns which have been most active and successful in keeping close touch with enemy movements throughout but on 14 Feb they pushed forward and shelled at long range our forward troops in Northern sector GAZALA position without effect. 3. Enemy air forceswere also active divebombing and machinegunning our forward troops and also attacking rear installations particularly TOBRUK port and EL ADEM aerodrome. Our Air Force scored signal success against them and on 14 Feb out of formation 30, 20 enemy aircraft destroyed, 2 probably destroyed and 10 damaged mostly Italian. Enemy is using DERNA and MARTUBA as forward landing grounds. 4. On 15 Feb enemy forward troops withdrew from TEMRAD area apparently North West into GESEL AKDAR while Italians retired to MECHILI whence considerable south west movement observed by air reconnaissance. This movement continued 17 Feb and by evening country south of line GAZALA MECHILI was reported by ground reconnaissance clear of enemy through MECHILI seened held in some strength. Afternoon 17 Feb South African armoured cars reported NO enemy seen track TMIMI MECHILI. Enemy air force inactive yesterday possibly due bad weather. DECLASSIFIED J.C.S. Memo 1-12-43 By RHP Date MAR 28 1973 7(5)... 5. Enemy intentions still obscure. If his movements were reconnaissance in force results almost certainly negligible. If he intended to launch blits attack with object breaking through to TOBRUK and throwing us in confusion he has apparently changed plan for time being at any rate. Possible that enemy plan was to entice our armoured forces forward and then attack them on ground favourable to him out of support range of GAZALA positions. Enemy apparently so far unable use DERNA as supply port probably owing destruction carried out before we withdrew on BENGHASI which is being mined constantly by R.A.F. and his maintenance difficulties probably considerable. 6. Meanwhile our positions on line GAZALA BIR HACHEIM much strengthened and many minefields laid especially in most Northern sector and round BIR HACHEIM which is now strongly defended locality. Precaution against breakthrough by armoured forces ACROMA and EL ADEM converted into defended localities and entrances of TOBRUK perimeter also held. 7. Dispositions 13 Corps. Round GAZALA and South of escarpment 1 South African Division with 1 and 2 South African Inf Bde Gps and Polish Bde Gp under command. Next 150 Inf Bde Gp. 50 Division which has relieved French Bde Gp on left of Poles. 4 Ind Div with 5 and 11 Ind Inf Bdes Gps holds left sector main pesition to about 18 miles South of GAZALA. 1 Armd Div comprising 2 Armd Bde Op and 200 Gds Motor Bde Gp to Southeast 4 Ind Div. 2 Armd Bde cruiser and General Stuarts with one regt of 50 Valentines of 1 Army Tank Bde temporarily attached. Free French Bde Op BIR HACHEIM. 29 Ind Inf Bde Gp with 38 Ind Inf Bde under command holding TOBRUX and environs. 5 NZ Inf Bde Gp at EL ADEM pending relief by 50 DIV from SYRIA and IRAQ. 50 Matildas 1 Aray It Bde attached to Infantry Dive in GAZALA sector. Tank strength in forward area rising slowly but steadily as tanks are reconditioned and sent forward. 2 8A Div (3 Bdes) working on SALUM CAPUZZO defensive area and 7 Ind Inf Bde on MADDALENA defensive area. 8. Railway reached CAPUZZO 16 Feb. 9. General RITCHIE intends follow up enemy closely with fighting patrols and mixed columns while continuing strengthen intensively GAZALA - BIR HACHEIM - TOBRUK position, to form firm base for future operations and secure TOBRUK. Meanwhile offensive striking force will be built up as rapidly as possible in forward area. 1/10) 10. During these operations estimated from ground and air reports that enemy tank strength in forward area 100/120 German/Italian all types. Total enemy medium tank strength as estimated by Intelligence Staff 50/60 German 50 Italian. This does NOT rpt NOT include Italian Littorio Armd Div whose HQ now identified TRIPOLI and whose 140 Medium tanks may have reached LIBYA or be coming.shortly. 11. Casualties to date CYRENAICAN campaign round figures Officers Men British 780 and 7500. Indian 60 and 1200. New Zealand 310 and 4200. Union Defence Force 220 and 4300. Polish 20 and 300. Australia 9 and 100. By categories killed 3300 wounded 7700 missing 8100 total 19100. Above NOT rpt NOT for publication in any form. Enemy prisoners to date passed through ALEXANDRIA or in Base Hospital German 260 and 9100 Italian 1080 and 22000. Total 32500. 12, Situation 9th and 10th Army fronts unchanged. Defensive areas finally settled and work proceeding well. 13. Political situation EGYPT imxproving though some soreness over recent events persists among officers of Army. 14. Relations with Free French good and improving. 15. NO immediate prospect arrival Polish contingent from Russian TURKISTAN. 16. Internal condition Greek and Yugoslav contingents thoroughly unsatisfactory owing internal dissension but hope may improve soon. 17. Political situation SYRIA PALESTINE IRAQ reasonably staisfactory but food shortage may complicate matters. 18. Position in IRAN NOT so good but Minister of State has this in hand. Box THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON I Go, February 20, 1942 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: THIS IS VERY INTERESTING READING. HARRY L. HOPKINS COPY BRITISH EMBASSY, ANNEXE, WASHINGTON, D. C. 11th February, 1942 Dear Harry, I have just got the attached telegram which was sent to me for transmission to the President at the request of the American Ambassador in London. Would you be so very kind as to pass it to the President. Yours ever, /s/ JACK DILL Harry Hopkins, 480., The White House, Washington, D. C. DECLASSIFIED JCS BY RT. DATE 191974 DECLASSIFIED BY RT, DATE 191974 COPY COPY NO. 1 From: Troopers To: Britman No. 69606 M.1.3 (c) of 9th February Personal for Field Marshal Dill from C.I.C.S. Following is summary of military conversations held in Russia in December 1941 and report of MASON MACFARLANE on visit to Russian Front in January 1942. Full text follows by bag. 1. M. STALIN was informed that on conclusion of operations in LIBYA it had been hoped to send 10 squadrons of Hurricanes to the Russian Front but owing to changed situation in the Far East that was now impossible. Supply of tanks and aircraft however would continue. He fully understood we could not help in the way we had proposed. 2. STALIN enquired as to likelihood of opening second front in Europe. We replied that we should not be able to in immediate future but that one of the objects of the Libyan campaign was to secure a base from which we could attack ITALY 3. Policy of Russians had been to fight continuous rearguard action thereby tiring the German troops. They were now able to make a counter- offensive which they proposed to continue throughout the winter. How- ever they expected the Germans to attack again in the spring as the Germans still had a great superiority in tanks, whereas the Russians had only a slight superiority in the air. 4. When asked how he would view the situation if Russia became en- gaged on the Eastern Front STALIN replied that he would regard it without enthusiasm but by the spring troops that had been withdrawn from that theatre would be replaced by new formations so that it would then be as strong as it was previously. He believed the Jap- anese would attack the Soviet Union before the spring but if this did not repeat not happen he was prepared to resume conversations as to the advisability of Russia declaring war on Japan. 5. Russians suggested an operation to seize PETSANO, the Russians providing the land forces while we provided naval and some air forces. (This plan has subsequently been dropped at Pussian instigation). 6. Transportation facilities on the PERSIAN GULF supply route were discussed. The Russians asked for capacity of 60,000 tons per month rising to 90,000 or 120,000 tons by April. Maximum we could offer was 90,000 by April. with regard to taking material by road to TABRIZ it was pointed out that we were trying to obtain vehicles for this but they would have to come from the U.S.A. DECLASSIFIED BY RT, DATE FEB 19 1974 - 2 - 7. GENERAL NYE states "There was a general feeling of confidence in MOSCOW and morale of the army was high. MARSHAL SHAPODHNIKOV (CGS) appeared to be clear headed, capable staff officer with all the qualities of a commander whereas GENERALS TIMOSHENKO and VOROSHILOV although they had great drive and energy did not repeat not impress him as having much intellect or general ability. STALIN'S confidence struck a more sober note and in private conver- sation he stated that Russia's strength would be so improved next year and the Merman army so shaken by its experiences that he thought it possible that war might be over by autumn 1942. GENERAL NYE felt that the Russians were inclined to over estimate not so much their resources as their military skill vis-a-vis the Germans and that they are only likely to obtain striking successes offensively if the morale of the German army cracks. Following is a summary of GENERAL MASON MACFARLANE'S report on his visit to 16th Division of 5th Army on the MOZHAISK sector 26th to 28th January. General Situation. 5th Army attacking on 37 mile front astride MOSCOW SMOLESK Road 6 miles east of GZHATSK. Considerable resistance especially in centre where Germans hold positions in considerable depth which they clearly intended holding. 5th Army apparently intend to maintain pressure on centre while right wing conforms to southerly movement by next army on right. Climatic Conditions. Temperature minus 40 degrees Fahrenheit and snow 2 feet 6 inches in open country and from 3 to 5 feet in forests. Medium and heavy tanks can get across country slowly and with difficulty. Cavalry, Artillery and Infantry largely confined to proximity of roads. German Defensive Tactics. Germans hold towns and villages linked up by small defended localities. In retirement Germans employ tanks and anti-tank guns on all roads leading to their positions. Before withdrawing everything is scorched. On front of 5th Army are five infantry and one Panzer divisions, latter's tanks being distri- buted among all divisions. Russian Offensive Tactics. Consist chiefly of infiltration of Infantry and Ski Troops. Latter work round defended localities and pin down garrison while infantry attack. Russians do lot of night fighting at which they excel. Russian Artillery was deployed in depth along main road. Air. German activity on this front almost negligible while Russians showed considerable activity. Russian Commissariat. Troops had no blankets but their clothing provided adequate protection. All troops wear felt not leather boots. Andeavors made always to provide two hot meals a day also have haversack ration. Miscellaneous. All German light tanks have been withdrawn. Prisoners interrogated by GENERAL MACFARLANE were ill-clad and depressed. Russians say captured letters show low morale of home front. GENERAL MACFARLANE much impressed by senior Commanders and Commissars, also by group of partisans he met. JCS DECLASSIFIED MEMO, 1-17-73 BY RT. DATE FEB 1974 - 3 - General Impressions. Seven months of war had made veterans of Russians. Russians started war with relatively untrained staffs but their officers are neither uneducated nor unintelligent. No signs of bragging or of under-estimating Germans but healthy con- fidence that tide has turned. Under present climatic conditions Red Army is definitely superior to Germans. Their equipment appar- ently still adequate and no shortage of man power. Possibility of German comeback realized but High Command intends giving them no respite. Definite deterioration of German fighting ability since beginning of campaign. Danger exists that Red Army may outrun its transportation but leaders intend to keep contact with enemy and not let him disengage to refit and regroup. Russian staff work and administration typically Russian and gets progressively worse higher up but end is usually achieved. Red Army in bad way in autumn but its tail is now up. Full summary of telegrams follow by air mail. DISTRIBUTION: Field Marshal Sir John Dill (2) Admiral Little General Wemyss Air Marshal Evill Secretariat Admiral Stark General Marshall Admiral King General Arnold DECLASSIFIED JCS BY RT, DATE FEB 191974 SECRET 15ml hBu CABLEGRAM MARCH 11, 1942 8:10 A.M. From LONDON To MILID LONDON NO. 2150 MARCH 11 PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT COLON BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER AND CRIPPS ARE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT RESULTS OF CRIPPS GOING TO INDIA REPRESENTING WAR CABINET TO NEGOTIATE PROPOSALS PD PARA I GATHER THAT THERE WERE SOME DIFFICULTIES IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND CRIPPS DURING THE EARLY DAYS OF HIS MEMBERSHIP ON WAR CABINET PD NOW CMA HOWEVER CMA THE PRIME MINISTER IS WELL SATISFIED WITH THE RELATIONSHIP THAT HAS DEVELOPED BETWEEN THEM AND FEELS CRIPPS IS OF REAL HELP TO HIM PD HE REGRETS THAT CRIPPS HAS TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY AT THIS TIME BUT THE MISSION IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE PD FROM HARRIMAN MCCLURE forbidden. Only such extracts as are absolutely necessary The making of an exact copy of this message is will be made and marked SECRET. This copy will be safe- 4. C. of S., G-2, without delay guarded with the greatest care and will be returned to the DECLASSIFIED State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72 By J. Schemble Date FEB 4 1972 AM War.Room 14.3.42. DETAILED DAMAGE REPORT NO. K. 1274. Photographs taken by No. 1 P.R.U. on 4.3.42 and 8.3.42. SORTIE N380. SORTIE N392. F.24", F.14", F.5". F.40", F.8". Low Obliques. Contact scale: 1/7,000. Flying height: 500 ft. Flying height: 23,600 ft, Moan time of photography: 1250 hrs. Mean time of photography: 1530hrs. LOCALITY: S.W. SUBURBS OF PARIS. MOTOR ARMAMENT PLANT (RENAULT): BILLANCOURT. Damage resulting from recent night attack upon the target is assessed from excellent low obliques taken on the following day and poor quality verticals of a reasonable scale taken 4 days later. There is ample evidence supplied by those two sortios of the high degree succéss obtained in the operation. Damage is distributed very evenly over the entire aroa of the Works and considering the scale and intensity of the attack the proportion of civilian damage is surprisingly small and concentrated mainly at the boundaries as the target. PROBABLE EFFECT OF DAMAGE. It is now considered that the destruction caused will probably moan that it will be impossible to uso the Plant again on anywhere noar the samo scale as before until large scole repairs and re-construction are completed. If this is attempted, which is unlikely, it will undoubtedly take a period of years to accomplish sinco many vital parts of the plant, such as special tools, casting machinery etc., will have to be replaced. The only soctions of the Plant which appear to be either intact or sufforing from only slight damage are the Diesel Engine Assembly Shop, the Artillory, part of the Tyre Manufacturing Plant and a few other less importent dopartments. It is intoresting to note that the least damaged shops lio on the extrame castorn boundary of the Ilo Seguin and the main Works on the % Wing. It is also interesting to noto the amount of damago which hes been caused by fire, and since the number of incendiories carried was not considerable, it appèars likely that E.E. falling on Sections of the Piant, such as furnaces, heat prodossing, cellulose paint spraying etc., resulted in burning material being distributed over a wide area, causing many heavy fires. Owing to this fact it is extremely difficult to differentiate between damage caused by fire and by KA NIGHT PHOTOGRA HS. AA attempt has been made to analyse the fire tracks on the films of the night photographsand to tie them up with the actual damage seen. In all, approximately 70 fire tracks were analysed and 30 approximate plottings of fires attempted. The information obtained is in most cases very approximate and is mainly used for confirmation. 7 most cases fires are seen to spread in antoNEdirection and in some cases the spread is very rapid indeed, which indicates that the strength of the wind was very suitable for fire attack. It is quite obvious from the number of fire tracks which are seen to be diminishing towards the end of the atthok that the ARP. Services were making efforts to obtain control, but the damage on the day photographs proves that the soale and accuracy of the attack proved too much for them. / DETAILS OF DAMAGE DECLASSIFIED J.C.S. Memo 1-17-43 By RT Dat APR 5 1973 Rage 2, DETAILS OF DAMAGE. A/380 Indox to Damage Mosaics. Print No. Before. After. ILZ SEGUIN. A. 1. THOUGH POWER STATION (65,000 K.W). Roof damage is scen to the Power Station apparently caused by blast, The building gives the appearance that internal damago has boon caused, in which 0050 the plant on the island will have been put out of action (quite apart from other damage caused). An obliquo view of the same damago. 1/18 Item 1, B. OODWORKING SHO 2. The roofs at the wostern and show signs of damage and it is possible to 300 down into the building. At the eastorn end lighter roof damage is apparent 3. Crator on waste land West of shops. Blast" from this near miss may be responsible for same of the roof damage soon. This damage can be soon more clearly on 1/18 the oblique view. Item 2, C. BODY PRESS SHOP. The roof of this shop appears intaot except one point towards the western end, 5. This shows what appears to be the seat of a fire. The roof is scorched across the entire width of the shed. Shows another view of these shops of the 2/3 damage referred to above. It can also be Item le seen on this print that the roofs of the shod covering the western half of the island bear distinct charring marks, indicating that thore E is probably severe internal damage. D. TANK ASSEMBLY SHOPS, 6. Heavy destruction has been caused at the western ond of these shops. 12/37 Close up illustrating the same damage. Itam 2. 3overo drumige should have boon done to the overhead travolling assembly system. Night Photogra h Evidenco, This fire was doon in progrdss on night photographs at 2205 hrs. Prai then onwards it appears to diminish and Is seen 'as' a very li tht track lator. It doos not appoar to registor on prints taken after 2230 hrs. This /would appoar to REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED Rage 2. RS Page 3. Boforo, After. N/380 Print No. would oppear to indicate that same measure of control was obtnined. Although the area is largo and the damage is sovore it must be remómbored that the shops contain collulose spraying cabins and storos of paint, and that tho resulting firo would have boon difficult to overoome. 7. Sovore damage at the eastorn and of the same shops. à close-up of the damage. 3/1 Itom 1. Several turrotless frames, probably A F. Vs, most of which appear wrocked. Item 2. Charring marks and severe dostruction of Itam 3. the roof is soon far away from the soat of the fire, proving that probably the entiro work- shops have boen dostroyed. Night Photo. Evidonce. From a close study of the night photographs it is considered that this firo began at 2205 hrs. with a vory large explosion (undoubtodly the result of H. E). A wide double fire-track is soon at 2210 hrs. and persists throughout many of the night ni yhe photographs taken in the adid until about 2230 hrs. E. THE DIESEL ENGINE ASSEMBLY SHOP. 8. With the exception of same minor roof damage at the western end of this shop the building appears intact. However, the proximity of the heavily dumaged assembly shops leaves little doubt that interior damage has been done. THE SOUTH BANK. F. TYRE MANUFACTURING PLANT. 9. Same severe damage has been caused to & small section of this plant at the western end. The ontire' shed appears to have boon burnt out, An oblique view of the same damage. 2/37 Item 3. 10. Damage to the west end of one of the main shods, probably by fire. An obliquo print illustrating the same 2/37 damage. Item 4 11. Furthor roof damage to the plant which suggests internal destruction. There is no coartain confirmation of 3 fire in this area on night photographs. / G. EXPORT PACKING DEPT. REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED Page 4. Boforo. After. 1/380 G, Print No. EXPORT PACKING DEPT. 11 As With the exception of the extramo wostern end, the three shods reported to be in the Ex- port Packing Dopt. have been destroyed, apparent- ly by both fire and H. & 10 craters are soon in the road and on open ground 8,7, of the building. Night Photo, Evidence. The firo track at approximately this point is soen at 2145 hrs. and persisting throughout the raid. It is of a fairly constant intensity but docreases considerably towards the end. It 1s. last soen on a photograph taken at 2224 hrs, THE NORTH BANK H. THE ARTILLERY. 12. From both vertical and obliquo photographs no damage is apparent to this part of the Works with the exception of some minor roof damage. No fire tracks are soon on night photographs in the area, I. REPAIR SHOPS. 13. This building is soon to be completely destroyed. The damage has probably been done by fire, Oblique view showing tho damaged repair shops at the N. ond, 1/33 Item 1. Night Photo. Evidence. From night photogra hs it can be seen that those fires started at the S. end of the shops and gradually sproad N. until the whole building was ablaze, No fire tracks are seon on photos. takon during the early part of the attack but they were visible at approximately 2202 hrs. when they appear as a double fire. At 2230 hrs. they still appoar as a double fire but the point of origin appears to be moving N. through the building. At 2220 hrs. the fire track is still apparent, but diminishing in size and at 2232 hrs. it appears to have been extinguished (or alternatively it may have been obscured by dense smoke). J. ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS. 140 The Southern end of a bloak of offices belong- ing to the Administrative Buildings has boon badly damaged. This appears to bo a hit by H.E. although it may have boon furthor complionted by fire, The roof appears intaot for at loast 3/4 of its length Obliquo view of the damaged ond of blook of offices. 1/33 Item 2. REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED n30 5. Bofore. Aftor. A/380 Print No Night hoto, Evidonco, It is fairly cortain that this firo is soon as a track on night photos. It may have started from 142 or may have boon a continuation of the fire in the Ropair Shops. 15. Note: Unidontified Building. The large 6-bay building in the 2 also appoars to have been severely damaged by firo which may have originatod from the samo source. 16. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES MAIN BLOCK. This building is considered to have boon completely destroyed by fire. Prints showing the damaged offices with 1/33 the firo still burning in the N.W. corner. Item 3. Another oblique view of the damaged officos, 1/15 Item 1. Night Photo. Evidenco. This firo is first soen in progress at 2200 hrs. and is seon burning at 2232 hrs. It appears to be linked very much in its history with a firo burning at the 3. and of the COMPONENT SHOPS. Sometimes those are soon 0.8 ono fire; sanetimos as two developing in intonsity togother. K. COMPONENT SHOPS. 17. Shows damage to the 3. part of the shops although it is almost cortain that destruction has boon caused to the ontire building. An oblique view showing the damage. The 1/15 seat of the firo appears to have boon at tho Item 2. S.E. and & sections. Night Photo, Evidonco. 300 notos on the firo in the Administrative buildings. L. AIRCRAFT COLOPONIENT SHOPS. 18. The S. part of the shops do not appear to have sustained matorial damage although the roof is soverely charred at the W. end indicating that the fire in the adjacent Component Shops has sproad Eastward beneath the roof boforo control was obtained. Oblique view of the damage, 1/33 Itam 4. / Shows sevoro damage REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED Page 6. Boforo. Aftor. 4/380 Print No. 19. Shows severe damage to the Northern shops in this department. 20. A very large fire has occurred at this point and finally 6 bays of the building have collapsed. in oblique view of the collapsed building. 3/13 Item 1. Night Photo. Evidence. The damage at 19 and 20 can be linked up with fire tracks seen on photos. At 2201 hrs. they were seen as a group of small fires, probably incendiaries taking holdon the roofs. At 2205 hrs. they were seen as one large wide fire track. This evidence indicatos a very rapid speed of spread. The fire appears to have continued on the same soale throughout the period during which ght photos. were taken and is soon as one of the largost firos burning during the attack. M. MOTOR VEHICLE REPAIR SHOP. 21. Severely charred roof indicates fire damage. This framed building appears to have received a diroct hit. The roof is probably composed of reinforced concrete. Thore is en indication of a hole in which the bomb may have fallen and 1/33 penetrated several floors before exploding. Item 5. Dobris is seon in the yard at the foot of the wall, Night photo, Evidence. A small fire track is seen at approximately this point on e print taken before 2200 hrs. but is not soen on subsequent prints. N. DELIVERY DEPARTMENT. 22, Shows one of the largest buildings in the plant with severe damage by H.E. and probable fire at the S. & corner. An oblique view showing major part of the 3/13 damaged sheds. No fires were traced in this Item 2. area on night photographs. O. SPARE PARTS SHOP. 23. Considerable damage has occurred at the West end of the shops. It is not considered that the shops are completely destroyed although there are indications of damage by blast and falling debris throughout its whole length. P. HOT STAMPING SHOP. 240 Only the girder skeleton of the roofs of this shop appears to remain. The damage was probably caused by fire spreading Northwards from the Press Shop. REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED / Night Photo, Avidence. Page 7. 4/380 Before. After. Print No, Night Photo, Bwidence. à firo track at this point was soon burning at 21.42 and ajain at 22.32 with about the shmo intonsity: Occasionally on the night photographs it disappoars. This may be due to the affoot of drifting smoke. PATTERN SHOP. 25 Two sheds appear to have boon gutted by fire, The same damage soon on an oblique photograph. 3/13 Itam 3. 26 The sito of & H. & incident at the Eastorn sootion of the Pattern Shop. à small building has collapsed and much damage has boon done by blast and falling dobris. The drunago of the Pattern Shop is seon more 1/15. clearly on two oblique views. Item 4 R. ENGINE SHOPS. 3/13 Item 4 27 All the shops appear to have been demaged severoly, practically none of the roofing remaining intoot. 28 An aroa of extonsive destryction caused by HE; probably during the progréss of a fire. 29 Two other severely damaged incidonts in the area. A low oblique showing the intensity of 1/15 the demage to the Engino Shops. Item 5. The two severely damaged pointa referred to 1/15 above which are typical of H& incidents. Item 6. Night Photo. Evidence. Lar e volumes of smoke were soen drifting from approximately this point on night photos, after 22.15 hours. S. THE METAL STORES. 30. While the roof appears to have beon severoly damaged, the girder structure is intact and rigid. It is considered that the damage hero is not as severe as elsewhere, and it has boon caused by blast, The contonts of the sheds should not be of an easily dostructiblo nature. T. POV R STATION 31. Severe dema o is apparent to the Power Station, There are one or two large holes in the roof. The frame of the buildings appears intnot and thore are no dofinite signs of charring. The damage is probably due to noighbouring blast. The two chimney stacks are still standing /Hight. Photo, Evidonce, REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED Pago 8. Boforo. After, Print Nos. Nicht nota Evidenco. The fire was soon to start during the attack at 2200 hrs. and continuos to 2205 hrd. It has apread and is last seen on a print at 2220 hrs. NOTE: This evidonce is contradictory to the damage soon on day photographs and it is possible that the firo cannot be pinpointed correctly. U. THE FREE 32. The roof and interior have been severely damaged at the S.W. corner. Although the remainder of the roof of the Southern portion appears moro or less intoot, it is probable that the interior damage is intensive. 33. This is apparently the site of a severe fire which has caused considorable internal damage. The damaged point at the 3.% corner soen 2/35 from oblique viow. Itam 1. The damage at the North und of the building 2/35 can be seen moro clearly. The Northermost Item 2. shed oppoars severely damaged. On the road North of the shops thore is 2/35 debris and men can be soon handling fire-hose Itam 3. or ropo. V. IRON YND STEEL FOUNDRY. 34. Very extensive damage has been done to this part of tho works. Damage to the roof of the E. section soon at 5 main points probably the result of H. & The section contains the sont of what must have been on enormous fire. The roofs of most of the sheds have collapsed, Local debris damage suggests additional H. E A close-up showing domaze to & end of 2/35 foundry. Itam 4 This shows a cloaror view of the seotion of Item 5. what was probably one of the most severe fires during the attnok. Night Photo, Evidence. Firo tracks on ni ht photos. suggest that the fire began in the S.W. corner as a group of scattered incidents which appear to spread Northwards. They were first seen on a print at 2200 hrs. and at 2220 hrs. they were soon as a double track, X. PRESS SHOPS. 35. It can be soen that the Press Shops are al- most completely destroyed. Considerable damage / has boon done REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED Page 9. Before. After. A/380 Print No. has been done by H. 3. which has undoubtedly caused fires. The obliquo view of the damagod Pross Shops. 2/35 Item 6. Night hoto Evidonce. The night photo. ovidence appended to the damage notos on the hot stamping shop relates closoly to the fires soon in this area. Y. CHEMCAL PRODUCTS SECTION. 36. Destruction to this section of the plant is on the same severe scale and the buildings appear to be completely burnt out. This shows on oblique view of the damage 2/35 with fire still burning. Itam 7. 2. KELLNER TANK ASSEMBLY SHOPS. This part of the plant is said to. be entiroly under Gorman control, manned by German engineers and workmen. Demage appears to have been caused to the main shops and to a number of small sheds thin the area of the assembly shops. 37. It socms probable that the main sheds were severely damaged by the end of a stick of He E. The stick appears to have been laid diagonally. 38. The ges-holder which appears $0 have received a diroct hit onused a fire. Although the oradlo doos not appear to have been damaged, the container itself is buckled. 39. This shows what may be the other end of the H. R$ stick. Damage by H. Rf to the GEAR and GEAR SHOPS. This shows the damaged shops with tanks parked in the yards. One damaged heavy tank has boon thrown by blast into the centre of the yard. Close up of tho damaged Kellner Shops. 1/18 Item 3. Into THE GEAR AND GEAR BOX SHOPS. 40. The broad area of damage is visible across the centro of these shops. With the exception of one or two points the roof girders appear unbroken. This suggests that damage was caused by a combination of H.Z. and fire. Night Photo, Evidence. The ni tht photos, generally show a fire in roughly this position sproading laterally which conforms approximately to the shape of the REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED /damage. The position Bofore Page 10. /380. Before. After. Print No. doma/o, The position of the fire track indicated that the firo tonded to sproad 16 rather than to the E. and that it probably bogan in the E. 33. REPAIR SHOPS. Extensive damage is seen and there is oon- sidorable charring and fire damage at the No end. Night Photo. Evidence. One or two smallish firos are seen at different times in the "charred" area and theso remain small to the end. Unfortunately tiis is inconsistent with the damago seen since one would have expected a heavy fire track. CC. WESTERN TAN: ASSEMBLY SHOPS, This is reported to be a now oxtension of the Renault works undertaken by the Germans. There is somo evidence of recent constructional activity but this has been very slow. Undoubtodly the shops aro boing used for tank assembly. Tanks are soon in the yards and damaged shops, some fully equipped, others turretless. 120 42. Stick of H.E. E. through the yard which has caused severe damage to adjacent sheds and among the parked tanks. 43. Diroot hits on N. sheds. 44. Near missos to the Works. Close up of the damaged sheds. 2/24 Item 1. The crotor in the road E. of the sheda, The N. shods with broken girdera are clearly 2/24 visible. Tanks, sane parked, can be soon ranked Item 2. on the floors. Ni tht Photo. Evidence. it 2145 hrs. afair sizul 3-point fire is soon which is still visible or 3 track fire at 2232 hrs., diminishing later. DD, BRONZE AND ALUMINIUM FOUNDRY. This foundry is operated on 3 complicated chain system which if damaged would be extremely difficult to repair. 44. Severe roof damage is visible with hardly any charring which suggests that blast was the primary cause. It is impossible to say to what extent the plant has sustained interior drunage though somo has obviously been caused. / SE. SPRING SHOPS. REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED Pago 11. Before. After. 1/380 Print No. EE. SPRING SHOPS. 45A. Damago docs not appear to be very oxtensive although the near miss on the road 1% of the shops must have affocted the building laterally. FF. COLD STAPING SHOP. 46. The hole is seon in the roof at the N. end where it is possible that H.3. onused sovere internal damage. 47. Another large hole at the N.W. corner where the girdors do not appoar to be broken. The remainder of the roofs of these shops appear to have suffered only slight damage by blast end dobris. Night Photo. Evidence. At 2145 hrs. at approximately this point a fairly largo double track is soon on night photo. films which later brooks into two smaller fires which continuo throughout the period night photos. wore taken: SECRET. DISTRIBUTION:- Reports. Photos. P.A.F. STATION, Air Ministry MEDMENHAM. P.A. to C.A.S. 1 1 D.B. Ops. 2 2 K/EMG/C. D.P.R. (1.R3) 1 1 1.14 War Room. 2 2 A.I.3 (o) 1 1 D.D.A.L. 1 1 D.L. Photos. 2 1 H.O.B.C. C. in C. 1 1 G.C. Ops. for S.A.S.O. 1 Nil. Int. 1 Nil. P.I. Sub-Section 1 Nil. Narrative Officer. 2 Nil. Groups & Stations 98 98 Ops. 1 B. 1 Nil. Wing Commander TA1. 1 3 O.R.S. 1 Nil. MEV. 1 1 M.H.S. (W/Cdr. Lowe) 1 1 P.R.U. Bonson (Int) 1 1 C.I.U. 12 Nil. REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED DETAILED INTERPRETATION REPORT NO.K.1312 Photographs taken by 1 P.R.U. on 26.4.42 and 27.4.42. SORTIE 4/655 & A/666 Scale, 1/7,800 and 1/8,000 LOCALITY, ROSTOCK. DAMAGE ASSESSMENT. Both sorties are of good scale and excellent quality and the town and environs are well covered, though most of the centro and western parts of the town are obscured by smoke on 26,4.42 and somo fires are still soon burning on 27.4.42. Whore not otherwise statod, print numbors quoted rofor to Sortio A/066, PERIOD UNDER REVIEW. This roport oovors darr.go which occurred on the nights of 25/26.4.42 and 26/27.4.42; the rosult of tho raids of 23/24 and 24/25.4.42 was sbon on Sortie 4/644 (Interprotation Roport No.K,1310). GENERAL STATEMENT ON DAMAGE. The wholo of tho town with the oxcoption of parts of the wostorn and southorn suburbs has now suffored soveroly. Damago in tho contro of the town is soon to bo extromoly heavy and over 705 of the old Town has boon dovastatio,de The three HEINKEL factorios have all boon damagod, and the aorodromo at MARIENESE is tomporarily unsorviceable. Further damago has boon caused to w.rohouses on the wator-front and c. number of largo shods most of which probably contain stocks of timbor have boon totally dostroyod. Both the CENTRAL RAILWAY STATION and tho FRIEDRICH FRANZ STATION have boon oxtonsively damaged and oro are a number of points of damage to railway tracks and ronds. DISTRIBUTION OF DAMAGE. Daingo from the first two ruids was mainly localised to the wost and south-onst of the old tom; and somo damage to buildings in the HEINMEL Factory at MARIENTE was soon. There W.S little damage to the contro of the town, The raids of 25/26 and 26/27.4.42 have rosulted in very heavy and concentrated damage to the Old Town, to residontial drons immodiately to the wost and south, and to commorcial proporty to the oast. Thoro is furthor damage to the HEINKEL Works at MARIENEHE, and c. number of sticks of bombs have fellon in and nonr the housing ostate at SCHULTOW to the South-Wost of the factory. A numbor of crators and scattored incidents are seen to the S.W., 3. and N. of the town and the villago of DIERNOW, 1* miles N.N.E. of ROSTOCK has boon badly damaged by firc. NOTE: is damago plot showing the total damage to the town from all four raids is distributed with this report. DETAILS OF DAMAGE. RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL. (a) OLD TOWN. This part of the town has boon the most soverely damagod, 5/121 approximately 130 acros of nonrly the of the old town having 5/123 boon dovestated. No statistics are available nourning the typo and donsity of buildings in ROSTOCK, but it is ostimated that at lonst 1000 houses have boon dostroyed or damaged boyond ropair in the Old Town aroa alone. The dovastated aroc strotchos the whole longth of the Old Town /and continuos DECLASSIFIED J.C.B. Memo 1-17-73 By RT APR 5 1973 Date SECRET pago 2. 111 and continues buyond it to tho Wost, this aron is about a milo long at its groatost longth and mil: wido at its groatost width, It can bo roughly dividod into two approxim.toly cqual arons at oithor ond of tho town, connocted by a narrow strip which is somowhnt obscured by smoko. This damgo W.S almost ontiroly opused by the raids of 25/26 and 20/27.4.42, and is largoly the rosult of firo, though somo H.2. incidonts aro also soons Tho old town area is much obscured by smoke on 26,4.42 and somo firos are still burning in 27,4.42 though they are proba ly under control. Throo churches, the Hoad Port nd Tolograph Offico, tho Law Courts, the Suprome Court and the Hospital, are among the buildings dostroyod. (b) TOWN ARD. OUTSIDE THE OLD TOWN. 5/121 & 123. Thoro is an area of dovastation by firo about 700 yds. long and 50- 200 yds. wido on both sidos of FRIEDRICH FRANZ STRASSE immodiately south of tho old Town. South of this is n socond area botwoon AUGUSTEN and PAUL STRASSE about 500 yds. long and of varying width. Many smaller aroas and singlo points of dr.mngo aro soon in this part of tho town, betwoon the old Town and the m.in Rnilway Station. Cohsiderable further darrgo including ono aroa of approximatoly 220 by 150 yds. is soon to the already bedly damigod district wost and north wost of KARLSTR. at tho Wostorn and of the old Town. Many houses have boon dostroyod,and a browory has boon damgod. (o) SUBURBS. Soveral bombs have fr.llon on both sidos of the LUBECKER STRASSE 4/655 in the suburb of BARNSTORF (North), and a numbor of tonomont houses or 5/48 blocks of flats have boon damagod. by blast. Over 50 bombs have fallon in or nuar the suburb of SCHUTOW/REUTERS- 5/23, HAGEN S.W. of the main HEINKEL factory. Soveral houses have boon dos- 48. troyod or damagod, but the mijority of bombs have fallon in opon ground. (a) other DAMAGE. Fivo largo barns, possibly, for grain storngo, and soveral farm build- ings and dwolling housos in the villago of DIERKOT 12 vilos N.N.B 02" ROSTOCK Hnvo boon burntiout and bagbas de the housing ostnto dejoining the village domolishing one house and damaging othors. Throo or four, seattorod farm houses have boon dostroyed. 1 East of the rivor VERNOW soveral small factorios have boon dostroyed or damagod mostly by firo, including pnsto factory south of the KASSSBOHMER WIESEN. 2, HEINKEL AIRCRAFT FACTCRIES. (a) MAIN FACTORY AT MARIENZIE. 5/130. Considerable damago to the factory is visiblo, A stick of honvy bombs has fallon diagonally across the Mhin Assombly Hangar dostroying the roof over an .ron of at lopst 305 X 135'. The dam.go oxtends possibly over a largor aroc E.S the strip cambuflago which covored the roo: has rominod in position over the udgos of the holo, The Assombly Shop for the final assembly of prototypos has boon dam- agod by blast and sovoral crators are soon on. the tarmo immodiatoly outsido. Part of the ibchino Shop has boon dostroyod by firo. The Paint Shop: has be n hit by c. modium bomb and partly dostroyod. Part of the Storo REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED 1006 N° Pago 3. Part of the Storo for Chomical Products has boon dostroyed by e. direct hit, and blast has affocted the rost of the buildings. Two lergo workshops hr.vo boun demr.god by blast, Other buildings dostroyed or darr.god includo the Cantoon and Modionl Offico, the Tochnical School thin Building, end n number of shods, smallor buildings and 11 ving Quartors. (Soo Appondix der for annotation of print distributod). 5/130 (b) SUB-FACTORY SOUTH OF NEPTUNE YARDS. 5/141 The min building has busn hit at the S.D. cornor by tho socond bomb of c. stick of throo; thoro is a holo in the roof approximatoly 70 x'40 foot and the roof has boon affooted by blast over an area of Approx- imately 150 foot squaro. The first bomb of the stick has fr.llon in opon ground about 25 yds, Wout of the building, and the third has domolishod dwollings to the Nost of tho factory. (o) SUB-FACTORY ADJOINING THE GLS WORKS. 5/121 uno of the factory buildings was burnt out during the raid of 25/26.4.42. After th raid of 26/27.4.42 the roof of the Mo.in Building is soon to be discoloured and slightly damagod, oithor by blast or scorching. Many of the Hoinkol Dwolling Housos adjoining the South ond of the factory hr.vo boon burnt out, 3. PORT AND STORAGE FACILITIES. (a) NEPTUNE SHIPBUILDING YARD. Two buildings have suffored slight roof damago from blast. 5/141. A lergo shod, possibly included in the NEPTUNE Yard, has beon badly domaged by 1% direct hit. (b) QUAYSIDE NORTH CF OLD T( IN. 5/121, 123. Soveral small buildings in and adjacant to OTTER LUDSWIG & J.MOLLERS Shipbuilding Yard have boon burnt out. Two furthor warehouses on the Town Quay have boon dostroyod. The largo stortgo Hopot at the Wost and of tho Town Quay has boon burnt out oxcont for n. few buildings at the Westorn ond, A vossol thought to be on icobroaker is soon with hor storn submorgod to the Dast of the Coaling Quay, 4/655, 5/65. (c) EAST CF THE TOWN. 4/666, 5/121 Practically the wholo of the oxtensivo storago facilities to the Zast of the town have boon dostroyed by firo. Twolvo storago shods, BOINO of thom rgo, have boon completely byrnt out 11. the Timbor Storo North of the PETRIDAMI, and th smallor storo South of the PETRIDAMS ht.o boon furthor demagod. The largo storr.go dopot to tho South of this, which included four vory largo stortico shods, has boon almost completely destroyed by firo: CUICUMICATIONS. (=) CENTRAL RAILWAY STATION. N655, 5/39,4/666,5/123. The Main Rnilway Station wes soverly damaged in the raid of 25/26.4.42. t. The ontranou hall, booking office. oto. have boon burnt out, and a lárgo part of the roofing over the phatforms has also boon dostroyed by firo. It is likoly that dobris blocked the lino tomporarily. /tn both REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED SECRE Phgo 4. both intos ovnountion V # in progross, and largo numbers of poople 0001 on the platforms and outsido the station. (b) PRISÉRICH MARZ RAILIAY AD CODS STA ICN, 4/655, 5/67,A/666,5/121 All atrition buildings have Boon dostroyed by firs. The Booking Hall and Offices word 00001 burning on 26,4.42 and by the following day all the Goods Station buildings word also burnt out, (c) RALAY TRACKS, R 11way tracks have boon demiged in c. number of places. Considerable to the linos N.W. of the Main Hailway Station was visible on 85.4142. Lines londing from the PRIEDRICH FRANZ Station were also soon damaged on 62, 26.4.12 and further damage W.S caused hogo during the night of 26/27. 20.4.98, direct hit on the lovol crossing of the main ROSTOCK- STRALLSUND 11:0 at NEISSES KREUZ, 3.3. of ROSTOCK WC.S visible, and ropair Tor' WIS Alroady in progross. The railw.y line which runs clongsido the Hoinkel Works at MARIENEHE IX.3 soun to be damigod in two placos on 27.4.42.; ropair work was alroady in progress to the moro southorly of thoso points. Soveral other STALL time of daringo to tracks are notod; those would all However be casily repaired. RTD, Full Jotnils of to milway moilitios are included in Interprotation Roport F.252). (1) ROADS. have boom c. member of scattored hits on minor roads. mmbor of crators are soon in opon country all round the town partio- ularly to the yorth, Wost and South west of tho town. - number of those apoonr to have boon.nimod at cun positions. The country to the oast and south cast of the town is not woll covored. Damage Plot and Sortio 4/666 prints 5/121, 5/123 and 5/130 distributod; prints 5/122 and 5/131 included for storoo examination. Soc Appondix "A" for dotrils of amotation. SECRET DISTRIBUTION Roports Frints. R.A.F. STATION MEDMELHAM H.Q.B.C: LAW/LNB/A C. in C. 1 1 G/C Ups. for S.A.S.C. 1 - DISTRIBUTION REPORTS PHOTOS. Intelligênco 1 - Miscollanoous P.I. Sub-Soction 4 3 M.E.M. (Air Linison) 1 1 Narrative 0 ficor 2 - H.W.S.(W/Cdr.Lowo) 1,1 Groups had Stations 98 98 T.I.D. 2.2 Ups 1 (b) 1 - P.R.U. Reason 1 1 W/Cdr. Navijation. a - C.I.U. 10 - W/Cdr. T.A.I. 1 3 O.R.S. 1 1 E.C.C.C. I.D.T. (Ph) 1 1 Intolligonco 1 1 Air Ministry P.A. to C.M.S. 1 1 War Room 2 2 D.B. Ups. 2 2 4.1.3 1 1 D.D.A.T. 1 1 D.D. Photos. 2 1 D.P.R. 2 2 A.D.I. (Ph) G 6 REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED puople " 0371 SECRET APPENDIX "A, TO ANTOTATION OF PRINTS DISTRIBUT.ND Print Nos, OLD TOWN AND VICINITY. 5/121 and 5/123. A. Main area of devastation. B. Area of devastation on both sides of PRIEDRICH PRANZ C. Area STRASSE. of devastation between AUGUSTIN and PAUL STR, 5/121. 1. Small factory gutted. 2. Destruction of storage facilities at East of tom. 3. otter LUDENIG and MOLLER, Buildings in thipbuilding yard and adjoining destroyed. 4 Warehouses on Town Quay burnt out, 5. Lawcourts destroyed by fire, 6. Hoad Post and Telegraph Office gutted. 7. PRIZIRICH FRANZ Station, Offices etc. gutted. 3. MATERICH FRANZ Station. Goods station buildings burnt out. 9, HETHIKEL sub-factory. Factory building gutted. 10, HEINKEL sub-factory. Main factory building roof damaged. 11. HEINKEL dwellings gutted. 23. Further damage to Gasworks (already severely damaged in previous 12. Craters nearby. raids). 14. Hit on odge of railway. Demage to tracks and buildings. 15. Hit on small quay adjoining MUHLEN DAMM. 1. Main Railway Station etc. gutted, 5/123. 2. Contral part of Main Railway station destroyed. 3. Denage to tracks and buildings alongside caused in previous ráids. 4. Hospital burnt out. 5. Supreme Court bumt out. Note: All other fresh areas or points of damage to residental 5/121 5/123. 6. Warehouses and storage sheds destroyed by firo, property are outlined or indicated by arrows. HEINKEL FACTORY AT MARIENEHE. 1. Damage to Main Assembly shop and crater nearby. 5/130 2. Assembly shop for final assombly of Prototypes: damage by blast. 3. Craters nearby. 4. Slight blast damage to two largo workshops. 5. Badly damaged sheds, 6. Damage by fire to Machine shop. 7. Long building destroyed by fire. 8, Shods and buildings destroyed by fire. 9. Crators and buildings damaged by blast, 10, Dimage to reilway, Workmon repairing tracks. 11. Tochnical School main building damaged. 12. Offices partly destroyed by fire. 13, Direct hit on Paint shop, 14 Damage to milway from néar miss. 15. Damage by fire and H.E. to Cantoon and Medical Office. 16. Storo for chemical products damaged by blast. 17. Drmaged aircraft. 18. Crators on landing ground. 19. Buildings destroyed in the two provious raids. REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED