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State Department 1943
Jan. -June 15)
B.F.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
January 4, 1943
X.
Personal
s/3
Dear Steve:
With reference to our telephone conversation of
this afternoon, I think it would be helpful if the
President could tomorrow, in reply to some question
as to what basis there 1s in the charges made that
the committee headed by the Archduke Otto of Hapsburg
xpp78151
has control of the Free Austrian Battalion now in
process of organization by the War Department, let
it be known: (1) that any Austrian national resident
in the United States of military age who desires to
fight against Hitler for the reconstitution of Austria
is entitled to apply for enlistment in the Free Austrian
Battalion; (2) that the connection of Archduke Otto
with this activity is merely that of having organized
a committee to assist in informing reliable Austrian
nationals in the United States as to how and where
such individuals might apply to the War Department
for enlistment; (3) that, as the War Department has
announced, any reputable committee of Austrians would
be given the same opportunities as those accorded the
committee of which the Archduke Otto 1s a member; and
(4) that two brothers of the Archduke Otto have al-
ready enlisted as privates in the Free Austrian Battalion.
Secretary Hull feels it very desirable that the
President make such a statement because of the contin-
uing propaganda that this Government had some political
motive for permitting the Archduke Otto and his associ-
ates to take part in the organization of the Free
Austrian Battalion. I enclose a copy of a confidential
The Honorable
Stephen Early,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.
x25
x4675
166
-2-
memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover which shows the kind
of propaganda which is going on, most of it emanating
from Czechoslovak and Yugoslav sources.
Believe me
Yours very sincerely,
Alls
X 20
Enc.
COPY
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D. C.
PERSONAL AND
Date:
January 2, 1943
To:
Honorable Adolf A. Berle, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.
From:
J. Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau x10-B
of Investigation
Subject: MILITARY COMMITTEE FOR THE LIBERATION OF AUSTRIA
I am in receipt of information from a highly confi-
dential source, the content of which alleges that
Otto von Hapsburg's "Military Committee for the Liber-
X ation of Austria has sent out requests to 6,000
Czechoslovakians in the United States to join the
"Austrian Battalion".
The content of the requests reportedly being
sent out by Otto von Hapsburg is unknown to this Bur-
eau but I thought you might be interested in the above
information in the event it has not already been called
to your attention.
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER
THE UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE
BY MESSEN GER
WASHINGTON
800
The Honorable
Stephen Early,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.
PERSONAL
Union of So afria -1943
C.F.
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM SENT
FROM:
Secretary of State, Washington
state
TO:
AMERICAN CONSULATE, Capetown
DATED:
February 3, 1943
NUMBER: 19
x558
x861
The following message is for the Minister.
x289
Topic 1. You are advised that discussions on the
problem of war production in South Africa, especially
as it is effected by the present volume of gold mining,
have been continued by the Department and other Govern-
mental agencies since you left Washington. The Depart-
ment and the other Governmental agencies are not inter-
ested in the quantity of fine ounces produced in the
Union or in the monetary uses of gold, as you know;
they are only concerned with the fact that industries
more directly connected with the war effort need the
materials and labor used by the gold mines. The War
Production Board has ordered American gold mines to be
closed for similar reasons.
Topic 2. It is believed by the mission which the
Board of Economic Warfare sent to study the supply
requirements of the Union that a substantial reduction
in the present rate at which ore is milled, perhaps 25%,
could be achieved within the year. This would effect an
DECLASSIFIED approximately
x4675
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-79
x4193 xx7 Lend Lease
By J. Schauble Date FEB 2 1972
CF state World WartI
-2-
approximately corresponding saving in the materials which
the gold mines need and a somewhat smaller saving in
labor. It is also believed by the mission that if the
United States would make available the supplies needed
to support the war industries of the Union such a reduc-
tion could be absorbed by the Union economy. We would
consider further reductions, possibly to a total of 50%,
according to the needs of the war effort and the economic
position of the Union.
Topic 3. You are already familiar with the attitude
which has been taken by Prime Minister Smute on this
question. He has definitely refused to consider any
agreement by the South African Government to impose a
quantitative restriction on gold mining operations, but,
according to the mission sent by the Board of Economic
Warfare, it is believed by Smute that a shortage of
necessary supplies may eventually reduce these operations
and that Union economy could absorb the gradual reduc-
tion brought about in this way without creating political
difficulties.
Topic 4. It is agreed by the Department and other
interested Governmental agencies that the Union Govern-
ment should not be pressed to give a formal commitment
to ourtail gold mining operations, but they are not
willing to provide sufficient materials for maintaining
such
such operations at the present levels. Accordingly, it
has been decided by them to suggest to the British Govern-
ment that both Governments make available to South Africa
the material assistance needed to maintain and expand
the Union's war industries, but at the same time to
indicate that there will inevitably be a substantial
reduction in supplies for other purposes.
Topic 5. There was a formal meeting of the Board
of Economic Warfare on October 16 which was attended by
the Vice President, the Lend-Lease Administrator, the
Assistant Secretary of State Acheson, the Secretary of
the Navy, the Under Secretary of War and other repre-
sentatives of the Departments and agencies that are
members of the Board. The following is the substance
of a resolution which was adopted:
"WHEREAS, The most effective utilization of all
the resources of the United States and United Nations
is required for successful and early conclusion of
the war;
*AND WHEREAS It is believed that the Union
of South Africa is Anta position to give further
aid to the United Nations' war effort by the maxi-
mum conversion of its industries to war production;
"NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, That it is
recommended
recommended by the Board of Economic Warfare that
the maximum and rapid conversion of the economy
of South Africa to full war economy be achieved,
and assistance in such conversion be given by
appropriate United States agencies by making
available such supplies, within the limits of
shipping and production facilities, as are neces-
sary for the further development of the wair in-
dustries of South Africa, and that appropriate
administrative measures be taken for carrying
out this program aggressively."
The text of this resolution is given for your confi-
dential information only.
Topic 6. Pursuant to this resolution it 10 the
intention of the American Government to offer to the
Government of the Union of South Africa assurances of
its best efforts, consistent with other war needs, to
furnish the supplies required to support South Africa's
war effort. Materials for the ISCOR extensions are
among these supplies. It is hoped that these materials
may be ready for shipment early in 1943 instead of late
in that year. Supplies for the Union would consist
largely of machinery, industrial chemicals, steel, and
petroleum and related products. The greater part of
these materials would be allooated to the Director General
of
-5-
of War Supplies, with smaller amounts being allocated
to other essential industries, agriculture, railways,
et cetera.
Topic 7. There would be a considerable reduction
in supplies for direct use by the gold mines. If the
gold industry could acquire from the United States about
41,000 tons of supplies for direct use in gold mining,
and if it would draw on its stocks to a point that would
leave a six month stockpile at the end of the year, the
gold industry could maintain its present level of opera-
tions through 1943 according to the Transvaal Chamber of
Mines. According to the Board of Economic Warfare present
operations could be maintained by the gold industry through
1943 by using only 13,000 tons of American supplies and by
reducing its stockpile position to a three month basis.
With slightly less than 10,000 tons from the United States,
the industry could make a 25% reduction in the rate at
which ore 10 milled and have a three month stockpile at
the end of 1943. Accordingly we would expect to furnish
not more than 10,000 tons during 1943 to the gold industry
and most of this amount would be delivered toward the end
of the year. A much smaller quantity of supplies would
be delivered if there were not a satisfactory reduction
in the rate at which ore is milled during the year. This
paragraph and the preceeding one are for your confidential
information.
Topic 8.
-6-
Topic 8. Among other factors the ability of the
United States to furnish these supplies will depend
upon the shipping situation. No definite statement
concerning the availability of shipping space can be
made by the War Shipping Administration until it has
first consulted the British Ministry of War Transport
about coordination of shipping to South Africa from the
United Kingdom and the United States. This will be done
as soon as the supply program has been submitted to
Prime Minister Smuts.
Topic 9. A schedule of materials which the United
Kingdom would endeavor to furnish to the Union of South
Africa during 1943 must accompany the list of materials
which the United States is to supply. For example,
consumption goods should come mainly from the United
Kingdom for only a small quantity has been included in
the American list.
Topic 10. It is proposed that a Supply Council be
established in South Africa to regulate the flow of
supplies to the Union. The Union of South Africa, the
United States and the United Kingdom would have equal
representation on this Council. All requirements of the
Union for materials that must be obtained from overseas
would be considered by the Council. Every effort consistent
with
-7-
with the war needs of the United Nations would be made
to provide these materials in accordance with schedules
accepted by the three Governments concerned. If there
should be a deviation from these schedules which the
Council would not approve unanimously, the objecting
Government would be released from its obligations to
conform to the schedules. The Council should give first
consideration to the needs of the war industries of the
Union, and for industries not directly connected with
the war effort only minimum quantities of supplies
should be approved.
Topic 11. We would expect the Council's activities
to cause a substantial reduction in gold mining opera-
tions. There are several benefits which might be
derived from such a reduction. One of these benefits
is the release of equipment and manpower for use in the
war industries of the Union. The possible objections
that the manufacture of war supplies can be conducted
more economically in the United Kingdom and the United
States should be outweighted by the advantages of pro-
duoing additional quantities of war supplies in South
Africa which is relatively near the areas where the
supplies will be used. The saving in materials which
the gold mines need, not only the relatively small
amounts
-8-
amounts required from the United States, but the sub-
stantial quantities that are obtained in South Africa
would be another benefit from a reduction in gold mining
operations. The reduced consumption of coal. by gold
mines and related industries would be perhaps the most
important advantage. A large amount of shipping which
is used now for transporting coal could be released for
other purposes if enough coal were available in South
Africa. Fifty thousand long tons of coal a month are
moved from the United States to the eastern coast of
South America at the present time and 70,000 long tons
a month are moved from the United Kingdom. It is esti-
mated that the total saving in shipping would amount to
500,000 tons if, in addition to its present exports, the
Union could make 120,000 tons of coal available each
month for shipment to South America in vessels returning
in ballast from the Indian Ocean. This saving is equal
to the full time use of 50 new vessels with a carrying
capacity of 10,000 tons each, and it is stated by the
War Shipping Administration that no greater economy in
shipping can be envisaged at the present time, other than
the saving resulting from the use of the Mediterranean
route to the east instead of the Cape of Good hope
route. We cannot overemphasize the importance of
such
-9-
such an economy, and the War Shipping Administration is
extremely anxious that it should be accomplished as soon
as possible. The question of giving priority to coal
over other exports from the Union will be taken up by
us with the supply authorities here if the increased
shipments of coal should Gause congestion in the use of
port and railway facilities.
Topic 12. There was probably too much emphasis on
closing the gold mines and too little on the development
of Union war production in the previous discussion with
John Martin and Prime Minister Smuts. Therefore, we
hope that the present offer, which is of a more con-
structive material, Nature will be less likely to have politi-
cal consequences and will be more acceptable to the
South African Government. The President has approved
the offer and it is to be transmitted to Prime Minister
Smute in the form of a personal message from the Presi-
dent. You are requested to deliver this message, orally
and in person, directly to the Prime Minister. The fol-
lowing 1s the substance of the measage:
Topic 13. The increasing difficulties in pro-
dueing and delivering supplies for the United
Nations have been taken up with me by my advisers.
I all sure you will agree that all materials produced
should
-10-
should be utilized to the greatest extent possible
for the direct prosecution of the war and that the
minimum amount possible under the circumstances
should be retained for other essential purposes.
Topic 14. It is apparent what difficulties
are attendant upon the sending of supplies to the
Union of South Africa from this country and it is
essential that a vital need be filled by all sup-
plies sent. Thes Government knows and appreciates
the considerable and valuable contributions to the
war effort made by the production of war supplies
and by base metal mining and ship repairing in the
Union of South Africa.
Topic 15. This Government is anxious to give
assistance to the Union of South Africa to imrease
the production of those supplies and m terials which
are required for the United Nations' war effort. An
early increase in the quantity of coal available in
the Union for shipment to South America is regarded
by us as particularly important so that we may achieve
a substantial saving in the use of shipping by the
United Nations. The interested agencies of this
Government will make every effort consistent with
the war needs of the United Nations to send to the
Union
-11-
Union the supplies which are needed to maintain and
expand its war industries. It is contemplated that
the Union Government would likewise make every effort
to expand the industries which are directly devoted
to war purposes, and to increase the amount of its
resources available to these industries.
Topic 16. Such a plan would depend entirely
upon the South African Government's approval and
full ocoperation for its success. The readjustment
of available resources, including equipment, man-
power and other facilities, within the Union would
be required by an expansion of the war industries
of the Union. It is realized by me that this can
only be accomplished at the expense of those indus-
tries which do not contribute directly to the prose-
cution of the war. An attempt will be made by the
United States Government to furnish supplies not
only for the Union's direct war needs, but also for
other urgent requirements. However, it will be 1m-
possible to avoid a substantial reduction of supplies
to industries which have only an indirect share in
the war effort because of the lack of shipping space
and materials.
Topic 17. A detailed proposal to establish a
supply
-12-
supply program for South Africa together with a
Supply Council to carry out that program will be
presented to the Government of the United Kingdom
and to your Government if these ideas meet your
approval. I believe that such a program would
have the most beneficial results in maintaining
your country's war economy.
Topic 18. The President's message is being brought
to the attention of the British Embassy here and the sub-
stance of this message has been forwarded to the American
Embassy in London. We expect the next steps to be detailed
technical discussions conserning the supply requirements
of the Union if Prime Minister Smute agrees in principle
with this proposal. The British Government will be asked
to prepare a schedule of materials which the United King-
dom will make available to South America Africa during 1943.
For your information a list of supplies which the United
States is to furnish has already been prepared by the
Board of Economic Warfare, The two schedules must be
coordinated with each other and then discussed and
approved by the three Governments concerned.
Topic 19. During your conversations with Prime
Minister Smute and other Union Government representatives
you should emphasize that the purpose of the program is
to
-13-
to maintain and expand the war industries of the Union.
The only commitments that we expect to ask from the
Union Government are (1) an early agreement to increase
the quantities of coal available; (2) the establishment
of a Supply Council; (3) agreement with the principle
that there should be the maximum application of the
resources of the Union to direct use in the war effort.
Even though other points may not have been settled, it
is our hope that arrangements with respect to coal can
be completed first because of the urgent need of ship-
ping space. Since the program is not directed primarily
at the gold mines, there should be no specific agreement
concerning them.
Topic 20. It is hoped by us that it will not be
necessary to discuss the question of ourtailing gold
mining operations at length and it is our suggestion
that you do not mention the subject first. You should
make it clear, if the subject is raised, that our interest
in the matter is as set forth in paragraph one of thi 8
telegram, but the contents of paragraphs two, rive, six
or seven should not be referred to by you. It is true
that the effect of the program will probably be to our-
tail the operations of the gold mines, but it is felt
by us that such a reduction is bound to t ake place
whether
-14-
whether or not the program is accepted in its present
form. As regards materials for the maintenance of
any industry that does not contribute directly to the
wars prosecution, it is extremely unlikely that this
country will be in a position to supply any such
materials.
HULL x20
FD/d.
2-1-43
C.H.
old
6.7.
This appearal to
FDR 2-10-73
state
World Nar II
February 4, 1943
SUMMARY OF
me
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
British Landing Rights at Roberts Field
1. The British wanted landing rights at Roberts
Field, beginning the summer of 1942. Various reasons
were given, none of them very convincing.
2. The Army objected, and there was a row which
grew in intensity.
3. The British sought State Department inter-
vention November 2, 1942; Army still recalcitrant;
British case still unconvincing.
4. British (substantially) threatened reprisals,
January 23, 1943. State decided this was no time for a
row; prevailed on Army to grant landing and refueling
rights but not commercial stop rights. Army acquiesced,
but unconvinced.
5. January 29, 1943, Monrovia reported Arnold
ordered grant of landing and servicing privileges to
BOAC, after discussion at Casablanca. This was sub-
stantially the arrangement Army had been induced to
accept.
6. Recommended that, the row having been gener-
ally settled on January 25 in Washington, the agreement
be formalized. Arrangement here appears to be, on the
whole, the arrangement ordered by General Arnold.
x20
x476
Adolf A. Berle, Jr.
x4675 X249 x48 afficial Orig retd to Sec. State 2/10/43
xb. Istate
February 4, 1943
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
Re General Marshall's memorandum of February 1:
British landing rights at Roberts Field, Liberia
1. Included in the agreement permitting American
troops to enter Liberia was the right of military use
of Roberts Field. We also have civilian rights granted
to Pan-American Airways. We agreed that we would not
permit foreign aircraft to use the field for civil pur-
poses.
x2875
2. Shortly thereafter, the British flying officers
asked that Roberts Field be made available to the Brit-
1sh Overseas Airways. The American Commandant denied
permission, as inconsistent with the Liberian agreement.
One British plane came in and landed without permission
(according to our officers: the British dispute this).
A violent controversy ensued. The British renewed their
application; the War Department has consistently opposed
it, believing that there was no technical need of grant-
ing these landing rights; that it was in violation of
the Liberian agreement; and that the alleged necessity
was really a cover to permit British Overseas Airways
to establish itself in Liberia. The dispute continued
to grow.
3. On November 2, the British Embassy asked the
State Department to intervene. The War Department con-
tinued its opposition. The dispute was not helped by
the attempt of the British group to use the field,
apparently on some misunderstanding of orders. Our
technicians reported no reason why the field should
be used, the British having a good air field at Free-
town, about a hundred miles away. General Handy
maintained
x249
-2-
maintained the Army position.
A meeting of the British and American officers
did not change the Army viewpoint.
4. Continued discussions were had, but on
January 20, 1943, Sir Ronald Campbell again pressed
his request with me and showed a telegram intimating
that the British would undertake what were in effect
reprisals, namely, decline to permit Army planes to
carry mail in Africa.
5. We decided that the quarrel had gone far
enough. Though the British case technically was bad,
landing rights at Roberts Field were certainly not
worth a row, and we expounded this view to the Army.
Reluctantly, they assented to an arrangement by which
we agreed to persuade the Liberians to permit British
planes to land at Roberts Field, solely for refueling;+ servicing
no British installations to be made. Thus the British
Overseas Airways could obtain refueling and transit
rights, which was all they had asked; but could not
establish Roberts Field as & commercial stop.
6. Before this arrangement had been consummated,
Monrovia reported an order from General Arnold direct-
ing that the BOAC be allowed to stop and refuel, and
on your return we were advised that this matter had
been directly negotiated at Casablanca.
7. Conclusion. We believe here that the arrange-
ment we had finally induced the Army to accept is sub-
stantially in accord with the order worked out at Casa-
blanca. I recommend that we formalize the arrangement
with the British Embassy here, in that sense. The aide-
memoire we had drafted prior to receiving word from
Casablanca I believe will do this. In that case, the
subject will be off your mind.
Attached, a copy of the proposed aide-memoire.
Adolf A. Berle, Jr.
(549)
Attachment:
note:
1
Aide-Memoire.
aide memoire referred
returned to Mr. mundy, offer?
a.a. Berle, Jr. state nn
Onigineth to Sec. State
2/10/43
accordame with Jois instruction,
2/11/43 hm
2 Treed 3 -11-43
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
7
February 4, 1943
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. A. A. BERLE, Jr.
For immediate report.
F. D. R.
Enclosure
Serret
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
February 1, 1943.
In the course of our conferences in Casablanca, the Prime
Minister stated to General Arnold that we have denied servicing and
landing rights at Roberts Field, Liberia to the Royal Air Force
and to British Overseas Airways Corporation, in connection with
their operations in support of the United Nations war effort.
Accordingly I sponsored a message to the Commanding Officer, Roberts
Field directing him to extend those privileges to British aircraft
without discrimination.
Since returning to Washington and examining into the matter, I
find that we have for several months accorded to the Royal Air Force
the use of our facilities at Roberts Field to the extent of our
capabilities. I understand that the State Department interprets the
agreement between the Governments of the United States and Liberia
as limiting our air operations in Liberia to those which are con-
ducted by military agencies and, that all operations of commercial
planes in Liberia, conducted by United States corporations, are in
accordance with specific concessions granted those corporations by
the Government of Liberia. Consequently, British requests for com-
mercial use of U. S. Army facilities in Liberia have been referred
to the State Department. I am informed that the British Embassy has
raised the question with Assistant Secretary of State Berle and has
been acquainted with the underlying facts and furthermore that a
proposed arrangement with the Government of Liberia is about to be
suggested.
Inasmuch as this matter may have been discussed by you with the
Prime Minister, and possibly with the President of Liberia, I feel
it necessary to ask your instructions in the matter before proceeding
further.
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD
DIR.
5200.9 (9/27/58)
x25
10-19-66
X25-T
x25 Signature- Carl spicer
SECRET
P.res
AS
Santiago
This tolegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
Dated February 10, 1943
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)
Rec'd 10:55 p.m,
Secretary of State,
Washington.
272, February 10, 7 p.m.
CONFIDENTIAL
FOR THE PRESIDENT.
On request of Foreign Minister. Am informed
Wallaco has said ho would be delightod to accopt
invitation to Chilo provided you give permission.
Government here eager for visit end am informed
Wellos has spoken to you about it and scoms favorable.
In the event you have no objection and inform me, for
transmission to Fornandez, en official invitation will
be sont. Time not mentioned but invitation would go
forth at onco. Have requested D to urge this upon
you. I urged that Wallaco be sent for President's
inaugur tion but since Chile had not broken with Axis
this impossible. Now I feel it would be an immeasurable
service were ho to come. It would greatly aid toward
the hearty collaboration we want, would arouse great
popular onthusiasm and would strengthon our position
generally. I need not add perhaps that Wallace is
very popular in Chile.
BOWERS
WSB
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By RT.
Data OCT 17 1972
PSF
C.F
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
State
State
February 12, 1943
I
MEMORANDUM FOR
UNDER SECRETARY WELLES
x20
Please prepare reply.
F. D. R.
Enclosure
x303
State Dept. dispatch 2/10/43 "272 from
Santiago Chile from Bowers re possible
visit to Chile of V.P. Wallace
X12
DECLASSIFIED
x429
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By RT.
OCT 17 1972
Date
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
February 13, 1943
15
My dear Mr. President:
With regard to the request contained in your memo-
randum of February 12 to prepare a reply to Ambassador
Bowers' telegram of February 10 urging that the Vice
President accept an invitation from the Government of
Chile to visit that country, will you let me know what
your wishes in the matter may be?
I have no doubt that a visit from Henry Wallace
would produce an excellent effect on Chilean public
opinion, but I do not believe that he should undertake
this trip if the visit would be limited solely to Chile.
I think he should certainly visit the republics through
which he would have to pass on his way to Chile, namely,
Panama, Ecuador and Peru, since, obviously, feelings
would be hurt if he passed through those countries with-
out making the same kind of visit which he would make in
Chile. If these additional visits were made, I suppose
some two weeks would be required for the trip.
Believe me
x87
The President,
The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 16, 1943
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE FILES
The President directed me to
telephone the Under Secretary of
State and say that he approved
of his suggestions about the
Vice President's visit to South
America and asked the Under Secretary
to make the necessary arrangements
with the Vice President.
G.O.T.
DECLASSIFIED
/
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
FEB 22 1972
By J. Schauble Date
BADAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED
FROM:
American Consulate General, Capetown
he
10
seeing
General
Smite
TO:
Secretary of State, Washington
b.7.
DATE:
February 15, 1943
State
NUMBER:
169
The following message is from the Minister,
x558
In connection with the following message reference is
made to my cable from Capetown of February 10, 1943, No. 151.
I have had several conversations with John Martin to
whom the message from the President was referred. He has
discussed the Lend-Lease a gread deal and it has been urged
by him that Gage should be our representative on the supply
X
council if it is established here and that the council should
be composed only of United States and Union of South African
members with perhaps a British representative present but on x861
the outside. He seens to nurse the hope that if a council must
be accepted it may somehow be rendered innocuous while a new
extension is given to Lend-Lease with the manipulation of which
he feels himself familiar.
Beyond what was reported by me in my telegram to which
reference is made above I have said nothing concerning gold
mine supplies. From the Department's cable of February 13,
No. 28 it would seem that the Union Government prefers to ask
its direct questions on this critical subject in Washington.
This morning, however, I asked Martin ifhe thought that a reply
would be forthooming soon from General Smute and it was stated
x4193
xpp75949
x289
by him that it is certain that there will be. This afternoon
x229
-2-
he is seeing General Smute concerning this.
James Orr DENBY X
Jek24
ADDF,LSS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
noon
WASHINGTON, D.C.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
fell
b.F.
February 19, 1943
State
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:
With reference to the President's memorandum of
February 5th addressed to the Under Secretary, Colonel
Juan Beigbeder arrived in Washington this morning and
is at the Statler Hotel.
x
Will you be good enough to check with the President
and let me know when he desires to see Colonel Beigbeder?
In this connection will you also let me know whether the
President wants to see Colonel Beigbeder alone or to
have him accompanied by the Spanish Ambassador.
George T. Summerlin
6.
Summerlin advises that Colonel Juan Beigbeder
has arrived in Washington. He is the Spaniard
about whom Ambassador Hayes wrote you (His
26
confidential letter attached). You wrote
rom
will
Sumner Welles that you wanted to see Beigbeder
when he arrived.
FORDEFENSE
BUY
UNITED
STATES
SAVINGS
BONDS
AND 8TAMPS
Beigleder Col. Juan
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
COPY
February 5, 1943
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
col.
I want to see Juan Beigbeder
who is coming over from Spain and
will be here during February and
March.
F. D. R.
(Request made as a result of letter
from Ambassador Hayes - Jan. 21, 1943
Before Mr. Beigbeder comes in, the
President wants Amb. Hayes' letter
to refresh his memory - filed with
Miss Turner Diplomatic file.)
copy of this memo t Hayes'
letter gatten from mins
Lurner's file 2-25. 2B.
Personal and
Madrid, January 21, 1943.
Dear Mr. President:
The "Peninsular Campaign" proceeds fairly well.
Our only set-backs during the past month have been:
(1) Franco's message to Hitler wishing him success
against Communism, (2) a slight increase of Axis pro-
paganda in the Spanish press, and (3) the present cer-
emonial visit of the Secretary of the Falangist Party,
Señor Arrese, to Berlin.
But these are not taken too seriously by the gen-
eral run of Spaniards, and on the other hand there are
some substantial gains for us: (1) the formation of
the "Iberian Block", followed by the recent publication
of a Spanish "red book" about it, which is currently
called "Spain's Declaration of Independence from the
Axis"; (2) the instructions of the Foreign Office to
its agents throughout the Americas to have nothing to
do with Falangist organizations or activities; (3) Count
Jordana's latest assurance that he has told Germany that
if its forces attempt to enter Spain Spain will resist;
(4) the recall of the German and Italian ambassadors,
the former "in disgrace" for his "failure"; (5) the ob-
vious satisfaction of both the Foreign Office and the
non-Falangist press with the cordial call of our General
Patton on General Orgaz in Spanish Morocco; (6) the prom-
inent and extensive publicity given throughout Spain to
your great message to the Congress; and (7) the recent
steps taken by the Government here, the result, at least
in large part, of our promptings, to improve conditions
in Miranda and the other prisons and concentration camps
and
The President,
The White House.
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter. 1-11-72
x4675
FEB 22 1972
By J. Schauble Date
16.7 x422 state Norld Nav II
-2-
and to release numerous categories of refugees and in-
ternees. We have just been enabled, for example, to ob-
tain the release of some "interned" American aviators and
to transport them to Gibraltar. In connection with the
general refugee problem, I am eagerly awaiting the arrival
of the promised representatives of the American Red Cross.
The recall of the German Ambassador, von Stohrer, who
had been here since 1940, was the result, I am told, of
Hitler's violent denunciation of his "weakness". The new
Ambassador, von Moltke, is a nominal Catholic with eight
children! I have only two!
One of the most interesting Spaniards I have met is
Colonel Juan Beigbeder, who will leave shortly by clipper
for the United States. He is very "Latin" -- impulsive
and voluble, -- a good soldier, and a very good friend of
ours and of the British. In 1939-40, before the meteoric
rise (and descent) of Serrano Suñer, he was Foreign Minis-
ter and helped to deter Franco from imitating Mussolini's
example and plunging into the war on the side of Germany.
Indeed he somewhat scandalized Franco by openly describing
Hitler as "Antichrist". He is a devoted Catholic and Mon-
archist and he hates the Falange.
Moreover, Beigbeder knows a vast deal about North
Africa and has a large following among the Moroccan tribes-
men. He was High Commissioner of Spanish Morocco for sev-
eral years, and in addition to learning Arabic (which he
speaks fluently) he has personally explored all the lands
from Tangier to Cairo.
He now goes to America as a special military observer
for the War Minister, General Asensio. The latter can't
fully believe what our radios and our Madrid Embassy tell
him about our gigantic war production and determination,
and he wants Beigbeder to find out if we aren't "bluffing"
a bit. Beigbeder expects to be in the States during Feb-
ruary and March and to be able, through his reports, to
overcome Asensio's doubts.
Beigbeder warns us that he is loyal to the present
Spanish régime -- so long as it stays out of the war --
and that he should not be given any secret or confidential
information about our war-plans. He adds, however, that,
in the highly improbable event of Franco's letting the
Germans come into Spain or failing to resist them vigor-
ously, he will lead a revolt here and in Spanish Morocco
and will join forces with us. A very entertaining man!
With
-3-
With cordial greetings,
Faithfully yours,
Harle
X 4848
,
6.7.
state
February 27, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
You will probably recall that about a year ago a Mr. Walter
x773
G. Ross gave me a map that had been torn from a bill post board
In Madrid, and which interested you very much as it was an appeal
to the Spaniards to side with the Germans. The same Mr. Ross
came in Saturday to see me, as he was disturbed by reading in
a Spanish newspaper that the President had received Colonel
Juan Beigbeder.
x
Mr. Ross was Acting Military Attache in Lisbon during
the last war. He has also lived in Spain for a long time. He
is further vouched for by my old classmate, Colonel Robert
Fletcher, former Military Attache at Madrid.
X
Mr. Ross left with me a calling card bearing the full name
of Colonel Beigbeder, which is "Juan Beigbeder Atienza".
x
When Ross was in Spain Colonel Beigbeder was Foreign Min-
ister, having received this appointment from Franco when he tood
over in Madrid. It is Mr. Ross's opinion that at that time
Beigbeder was working with the Germans. Before his appointment
as Foreign Minister Beigbeder was in charge of troops in North
Africa, Spanish Morocco, and according to Ross, the Colonel
probably knows more about North Africa than any other man.
When asked what he could tell me concerning Colonel
Beigbeder's background, Mr. Ross asserted his greatest weakness
was women, and it was because of this that he was returned to
North Africa by Franco. Ross stated that while Foreign Minister,
Beigbeder lived with a beautiful English girl named Rosamond
Fox, whom the Germans claimed was a British spy. The Germans
finally compelled Franco to force her to leave the country and
she went to Portugal. Two weeks later, Serrano Suner, with whom
Beigbeder had many fights, persuaded Franco to send Colonel
Beigbeder back to North Africa.
Mr. Ross explained that he understood that Colonel
Beigbeder did not come to the United States through the Spanish
Ambassador, but was sent here by Franco. Ross felt that as
he was here as a private citizen we should know his background,
as he, Ross, felt Beigbeder would give to the Germans any
DECLASSIFIED
X 422
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
X 20
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 22 1972
X 4675
-2-
information he received in this country. Ross says that when
he knew him in Spain as Foreign Minister, Beigbeder very
definitely favored the German Embassy.
When I told this information to the Chief of the Spanish
Desk in the State Department, he said that he didn't agree
with Mr. Ross, as he thought probably Ross was exaggerating
the Colonel's German proclivities. However, my classmate
Colonel Fletcher, insists that he would believe anything that
Ross said as he, Ross, was intensely patriotic. But, of course,
he might make an error in judgment.
E.M.W.
feie
March 10, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE:
e.7,
At the direction of the President I am
State
forwarding to you herewith, confidential
memorandum concerning Colonel Juan Beigbeder.
EDWIN M. WATSON
Secretary to the President.
DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date
FEB 22 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 5, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:
Tell this to Sumner Welles.
F.D.R.
1-2L
ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
In reply refer to
March 18. 1943
Eu
My dear General Watson:
I have received your memorandum of March 10, 1943
in regard to Colonel Juan Beigbeder Atienza.
At the time when Colonel Beigbeder was Foreign
Minister of Spain, he had inevitably to transact business
with the Germans. I think you will agree that this need
not necessarily reflect a pro-German bias. In fact it
18 our information that while in office as Foreign Min-
ister the subject was reputedly pro-British, and it was
popularly believed in Spain that his dismissal from
office was brought about principally by a too active
contact with the British Embassy.
The Department has no information concerning a
connection with Miss Rosamond Fox. If this story 1s
true the behavior attributed to the Germans and Serrano
Suñer would scarcely tend to endear them to him.
It appears to be correct that Colonel Beigbeder did
not come to the United States through the Spanish Am-
bassador, but that the Spanish War Minister, rather than
General Franco, arranged his present mission.
Colonel Beigbeder has stated voluntarily that he
will feel it his duty toward the War Minister to report
what he sees in this country, and has asked that care
be
Major General Edwin M. Watson,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.
FOR VICTORY
BUY
UNITED
STATES
SAVINOS
BONDS
AND
STAMPS
-2-
be taken not to show him anything we should not like
to be communicated to our enemies. He has explained
that this does not signify any doubts respecting the
War Minister himself, but an uncertainty in his own
mind respecting the loyalty of certain subordinates
in the War Ministry.
In view of the above, I do not feel that the report
of Mr. Ross 18 entirely justified.
N incerely yours, Alls
(670)
ligned oreginal ofthe letter sent to
than
Hon. Summer Weller hm yordelivery
1943
e.F
February 26, 1943
State
Dear Tony:
Thank you for your letter of February 12 and
for its enclosure giving me a forewarning of the
subjects which the Norwegian Foreign Minister may
discuss with me when he comes to Washington. Need-
less to say, I shall give careful consideration to
any message which King Haakon may send me through
Mr. Lie.
The King's wish that Crown Prince Olav be
xpp75653
placed in nominal command of any United Nations
forces sent to Norway is a matter on which I cannot
x4725
commit myself at this time but which must be dis-
cussed with the British in the light of both
military and political considerations.
Please give my personal regards to King
*1978124
Haakon.
With all good wishes, I am
Very sincerely yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
The Honorable
Anthony J. Drexel Biddle,
American Minister near the
Government of Norway,
Care of American Embassy,
London.
7. State
x4675
ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
EB
February 23. 1943
My dear Mr. President:
In response to your memorandum of February 19,
1943, I return herewith a letter addressed to you by
Ambassador Biddle, together with its enclosure, and
a draft reply prepared for your signature.
I Faithfully yours, Mills
Enclosure:
1. From Ambassador Biddle,
with enclosure, returned.
2. To Ambassador Biddle.
The President,
The White House.
(640)
hm
THE WHITE HOUSE
washington
February 19, 1943
B
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATEX20 X x20
For preparation of reply
for my signature.
F.D.R.
Enclosures
Letter from Tony Biddle, Embassy of the
U.S.A., 40, Berkeley Square, London, W. 1,
2/12/43, to the President, in re plans
of The Norwegian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Trygve Lie, to visit Washington.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 19 1943
priur Le 1dc string 1251
40, Berkeley Square,
London, W. 1.
February 12, 1943.
My dear Mr. President:
The Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Trygve Lie, (who became Minister for Justice when
the Labor Government came into power at the time
that we took up our duties in Norway) has just
informed me that at the request of King Haakon and
X
his Government he plans to visit Washington within
the next several weeks.
The King, he said, wished him to convey to
you in strictest confidence an expression of his
earnest desire that, in event of an Allied landing
in Norway, H.R.H. Prince Olav be placed in nominal
command of the liberating forces. This, Lie
assured me, was in complete accord with the wishes
both of the Government and of the "Home Front",
which represented the opinion of well over 90% of
the people of Norway. Lie, moreover, stated that
in sounding out the British King, Mr. Churchill and
Mr. Eden, he had found them in accord with this
idea, but reluctant to commit themselves, pending
your approval.
The King had furthermore, requested Minister
Lie to hand you a secret document which the King
had approved, February 2, 1943. It was drawn up
by the Norwegian authorities here only after full
consultation with the "Home Front". For your
information
The President,
The White House,
Washington.
-2-
1/
information, I am attaching hereto a copy of this
secret document.
The main points therein are:
(a) a statement on the Government's position
in carrying out its task outside Norway;
(b) the Government's position in connection with
the liberation of Norway, whether by gradual military
reconquest, or as a result of German collapse on
other fronts. As regards an Allied occupation, the
document states that the Government must try to
arrange that this be carried out in close cooperation
with the Norwegian authorities, and preferably under
Norwegian supreme military direction; that if the
country were liberated through an invasion, the
invasion troops would be accompanied by representatives
of the Government; that the liberated districts would
have to be placed under Norwegian civil administration
as soon as possible. In this connection, the document
emphasises that "we must at all costs try to avoid
being drawn into conditions of the French type";
(c) as regards the question of supplies during
the "transition period", the Government was trying
to ensure that supplies were shipped to the country
at the earliest possible moment; that Norwegian
authorities retained the right to dispose of these
supplies;
(d) in event of the possibility that the present
regime in Norway were altered before the end of
hostilities, for instance if the German Army Command
superseded the Reichskommissariat and the Quisling
regime were liquidated, there would perhaps be a
demand for the establishment of a new "Administrative
Council". Such a Council should be appointed by the
Supreme Court, and it would formally occupy the same
position as the Administrative Council of 1940. It
would not have the position of a government, but,
as King Haakon had stated in his letter of April 19,
1940, to the President of the Supreme Court, Paal
Berg, it would "be an auxiliary to the civil
administration
-3-
administration for such time as the military occupation
lasts". Its term of office would cease as soon as the
Government were again able to exercise its authority
in Norway. In event of the reconquest of a part of
Norway, the Government would gradually assume power
in the regions liberated. (During its session at
Elverum, April 9,1940, the Storting invested the
Government with authority to make decisions necessary
to safeguard the interests of the Kingdom "until the
moment comes when the Government and the Presidential
Board of the Storting agrees to summon the members of
the Storting to their next ordinary sitting");
(e) as regards the term of office of the last
Storting, it had lapsed, and its convocation, even if
only for a brief period, might possibly antagonize
the people. On the other hand, while circumstances
might arise which necessitated the old Storting's
convocation as the "last constitutional organ, apart
from the present Government", this possibility was
remote. The question might also be solved, the
document continues, by the Governments ordering
elections to the Storting immediately following the
country's liberation, and thereupon handing its
resignation to the King, reserving only its duty to
report to the new Storting. Since it appeared,
however, that some time, perhaps six months to a
year, should elapse between liberation and new
elections, the Government, as previously declared
by the Prime Minister on December 25,1942, had
concluded to hand its resignation to the King as soon
as the country had been freed, for instance at the
time when the King and his Council were able to
assemble in Oslo;
(f) the new Government should be formed after
deliberations between the King, the present Government,
and the leading personalities at home. It must be a
coalition government with the broadest possible base.
This government would govern the country until the
new Storting convened. Among other tasks, it must
take
-4-
take the necessary decisions concerning the new election
to the Storting, which should take place, at the latest,
within a year of the appointment of the new Government.
It would then be a matter for the new Storting to
decide the fate of this government;
(g) actions of the Government had to be investigated,
according to the constitution, by the Protocol Committee
of the Storting. Since it was out of the question to
accord this privilege to the Protocol Committee of the
old Storting, and since it would seem inadvisable to
postpone such an investigation until the new Storting's
nomination of its Protocol Committee, it might be
advisable to invite the Supreme Court to appoint a
Commission to investigate the Government's actions to
œver the period since immediately preceding April
9,1940.
Another question, Minister Lie said, that the
King would like him to discuss with you discreetly
was that concerning post-war regional agreements.
(I am aware that in this connection Lie would discuss
the question in light of his frequently declared
policy of "Atlantic Partners".
Another question he has been requested to discuss
with the authorities concerned, is that regarding
replacements of shipping tonnage.
The foregoing is by way of apprising you in
advance of the main points of Lie's proposed talks.
Lie is not only a grand fellow - a regular fellow
and a human being with good common horse sense - but
also a statesman of proven ability. Once he breaks
through his preliminary shyness, I believe you will
find in him one of the soundest men in Europe.
With my warmest regards and every good wish, I am
Yours faithfully,
Tomy Biddee
COPY
THE PRIME MINISTER
Translation
[2-2-43]
Secret
The first and foremost task of the Government has
been to uphold the position of Norway as a sovereign state
and to organize our war effort outside Norway in order
thereby to prepare the way for the reconquest of the
country. This requires certain administrative and
economic measures, which must be planned beforehand.
These measures will be of a provisional character and the
Government does not, of course, wish to tie the Norwegian
people to any fixed policy for the future. This also
applies to foreign policy. Our foreign policy must at
present be regarded as a part of our war effort. The
same applies to our information service, which aims at
arousing interest in Norwegian points of view and Norwegian
interests and at counteracting attempts to influence the
opinion in allied and neutral countries in a way
disadvantageous to Norway.
By DECLASSIFIED Authority of JCS Memo
3/2/85
It can be taken for granted that only such binding
agreements as are necessary for our war effort, will be
concluded. The Norwegian people must themselves decide
10 Feb 1975
the future lines of our foreign policy through their
constitutional organs.
By Date
As is well known the Government has never tried
to issue directions for the struggle of the home front.
Whenever the Government has taken action or has issued
official statements with a direct bearing upon the work in
Norway, this has always taken place as a result of an
appeal from home, or because the Government considered it
necessary, for the sake of the libe ration and the future
of Norway, to issue a warning against some threatening
danger, as for instance during the negotiations be tween the
Presidential Board of the Storting and the Administrative
Council on the one side and the Germans on the other during
the summer and autumn of 1940. Later, the Government has
tried to follow, as far as possible, the advice received
from responsible quarters in the home front, - advice
which has in general been consistent with the Government's
own point of view. It has not always been easy for the
Government to ascertain who were representing the home
front. The Government has, however, tried and will
continually try to strengthen its contact with such
responsible circles as may be presumed to enjoy general
confidence at home.
Nobody
-2-
Nobody knows whether the liberation of Norway
will come through a gradual military re-conquest of the
country, or whether it will result from a German collapse
on other fronts. Even in the latter case, we will have
to reckon with an allied occupation, inter alia because
the Allies will wish to supervise the evacuation of the
country and the disarming of the German military units.
In any case, we must try to make such an occupation as
brief as possible, We shall have to try to arrange for it
to be carried out in close co-operation with the wegian
authorities and preferably under Norwegian supreme military
direction. If the country is liberated through an invasion,
the invasion troops will be accompanied by representatives
of the Government and the liberated districts must as soon
as possible be placed under Norwegian civil administration.
If the Government is to be in a position to solve
all the complicatedproblems which arise in this connection,
it is indispensable that it should be able to count upon
receiving the support and confidence of all sections of
the Norwegian people and that the moral and constitutional
authority of the Government should not be questioned. We
must at all costs try to avoid being drawn into conditions
of the French type.
The second important question which presents itself
in connection with the transition period is the questi on of
supplies. The Government is trying to ensure that supplies
are shipped to the country at the earliest possible moment,
and that Norwegian authorities obtain the right to dispose
of these supplies. The Government will do all within
its power to solve these problems.
It is possible that the present regime in Norway
may be altered before the end of hostilities, for instance
if the German Army Command supersedes the Reichskommissariat
and the Quisling-regime is liquidated. In such an event
there will perhaps be a demand for the establishment of a
new "Administrative Council". Such a council ought, in any
event, to be appointed by the legal Supreme Court. Formally,
the Council would occupy the same position as the
Administrative Council of 1940. It would not have the
position of a Government, but it would, as H.M. the King
stated in His letter of April 19th, 1940, to the President
of the Supreme Court, Hr. Paal Berg, "be an auxiliary to the
civil administration for such time as the military occupation
lasts." Its terms of office will cease as soon as the
Government is able again to exercise its authority in Norway.
In
-3-
In the event of the re-conquest of a part of Norway, the
Government will gradually assume power in the regions
liberated by military invasion.
The Government will not be able to recommend or to
agree that an Administrative Council, or any other Norwegian
institution should enter into negotiations with the German
Wehrmacht or other German authorities, except in matters
of absolute necessity to the civil a dministration during
the German military occupation. We must avoid difficulties
similar to those exp erienced during the summer and autumn
of 1940. During the sitting at Elverum on April 9th, 1940,
the Storting invested the Government with authority to
make the decisions necessary to safeguard the interests of
the Kingdom, "until the moment comes, when the Government
and the Presidential Board of the Storting agree to summon
the members of the Storting for their next ordinary sitting."
The term of office of the last Sbrting has,
however, lapsed long ago, and it is also possible that the
feelings of the people, or sections of the people, will be
against a convocation of this Storting, even it it were
only a question of quite a brief session. On the other hand,
situations may arise which make it necessary to convoke
the old Storting as the last constitutional organ, apart
from the present Government. The possibility of such a
situation arising is, however, very remote.
The question might also be solved by the
Government's ordering elections to the Storting
immediately after the liberation of the country and
thereupon handing in its resignation to the King, reserving
only its duty to report to the new Storting. It appears
evident, however, that some time ought to elapse after
the liberation of the country before new elections are
ordered, perhaps from six months to one year. Consequently
the Government has reached the conclusion, already stated
by the Prime Minister in his speech on Christmas Day 1942,
that it ought to hand in its resignation to the King as
soon as the country is free, for instance at the time
when the King and his Council are able to assemble in Oslo.
It is yet too early to say anything regarding the composition
of the new Government. It should be formed after
deliberations between the King, the present Government and
leading personalities at home. It must be a coalition
Government with the broadest possible foundation in the
Norwegian people. This Government will govern the country
until the new Storting convenes. The tasks of the
Government
-4-
Government should be limited to the solving of the problems
which are immediately connected with the re-conquest and
the reconstruction of the country. Further, it must take
the necessary decisions required in connection with the
new elections to the Storting which ought to take place
at the latest within a year of the appointment of the new
Government. It will then be a matter for the new Storting
to decide whether this Government enjoys its confidence
or whether a new parliamentary Government will have to be
formed.
According to our Constitution, the actions of the
Government have to be investigated by the Protocol committee
of the Storting. It is out of the question, however, to
accord such a privilege to the Protocol committee of the
old Storting, and it will hardly be a dvisable to postpone
such an investigation until the new Storting has nominated
its Protocol committee. The Government therefore thinks
that it might be advisable to invite the Supreme Court,
as soon as the country is libe rated, to appoint a Commission
charged with the task of investigating the actions of the
Government. The task of this Commission should also
probably cover the period immediately preceding the 9th
April, military affairs and disposition during the campaign,
as well as the activities of the Administrative Council
and the negotiati ons which took place between the
Presidential Board of the Storting and other Norwegian
circles and the Germans during the summer of 1940. The
result of the Commission's investigations would then have
to be placed before the Protocol committee of the new
Storting. By entrusting these investigations to such a
Commission, which could be presumed to enjoy general
confidence, it will be possible to avoid the transition
from occupation to freedom and peace being disturbed by
ill-natured and disruptive controversies.
CHC
l.7.
old
\
15-10-43
state PSF
May 7, 1943
deceipt
My dear Mr. President:
You will recall last October your insistence that
an American mission should 60 to the Near East to assist
x912
the cause of the United Nations by taking advantage of
the goodwill that exists for the United States in that
area. The final agreement with the British was for
Lieutenant Colonel Harold B. Hoskins, A.U.S., and one
officer to make a survey trip.
Colonel Hoskins has now returned after three and
one-half months in which he visited all of the Near
East and North Africa.
During the course of his visit he saw and talked
to British, French, and American military and political
officials, and to a large number of the leading Arab
and Jewish officials and prominent persons in that area.
A copy
The President,
The White House.
C.F.
x4675-L
- 2 -
A copy of his report is attached.
I believe that at least the summary warrants your
careful reading. I also trust I may have your approval
for further efforts along the lines indicated and for
the wording of the proposed United Nations' declaration
attached hereto, which, if you concur, we could first
discuss with the British and subsequently with other
United Nations.
Faithfully yours,
Cordell Bull
Enclosures:
x20
1. Summary of Colonel Hoskins'
report on the Near East.
2. Proposed United Nations'
declaration.
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X 4725
X 700
X 76-6
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X 4675
PSF
state
CF
TO
Letter drafted
CF: state
ADDRESSED TO
THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE
NEAR EAST
The President
REPORT BY: LT. COLONEL HAROLD B. HOSKIN
AUS
1-100
CF: state
SUMMARY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HOSKINS' REPORT ON THE NEAR EAST
Part I gives the outstanding facts developed in the course
PSF
of his three and one-half months' trip through the Near East and
North Africa and may be summarized as follows:
(1) The most important and most serious fact 18 the
danger that, unless definite steps are taken to prevent
it, there may be a renewed outbreak of fighting between
Arabs and Jews in Palestine before the end of the war and
perhaps even during the next few months. Such fighting in
Palestine 1s almost certain to lead to the massacre of Jews
living in the neighboring states of Iraq and Syria as well
as in other places in the Near East.
The tension 1s growing steadily and as a result
the Arabs are likely to be goaded, as their only effective
means of protest, into breaking the informal truce which has
existed in Palestine since the outbreak of the war in 1939.
The Arabs feel that the Zionists, by continuing a world-
wide propaganda for a Jewish State in Palestine, have not
kept their part of the bargain. There is therefore in the
minds of the Arabs a growing fear that, unless they do some-
thing, they will be faced, when the war is over, with a deci-
sion already taken by the Great Powers to turn Palestine
over to the Jews. This fear is, of course, one on which
Axis propaganda to this area has constantly and effectively
harped.
(2) The Jews feel that with their increased numbers
and with their increased stocks of arms they can more than
hold their own in actual fighting with Palestinian Arabs.
However, from previous experience the Jews realize that,
whenever serious fighting with the Arabs starts in Pales-
tine, assistance from neighboring Arab states will again
pour in. It is this increased opposition that the Zionists
admit they probably do not have the power to overcome with-
out outside assistance from British or British and American
military forces.
(3) There is an ever-present Arab fear of American
support for political Zionism with its proposed Jewish State
and Jewish Army in Palestine. This is now extending to the
further fear of American support for the penetration of
Jewish people into Syria and other neighboring Arab areas,
once Palestine has been fully populated.
(4) There 1s also a growing Syrian fear of American
support for, or at least acquiescence in, a continuation
of French control in Syria after this war 1s over. The
Syrians remember that, after the last war and despite an
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overwhelming preference for the United States and specific
objection to France, the mandates for Syria and Lebanon
were nevertheless given to France.
In fact, the fear that already haunts all of the
Near East 1s that at the end of the present World War the
United States may again return to isolationism. Even today
this 1s the cause of such worry that reference 1s made to
it in almost every conversation held with private or offi-
cial individuals.
(5) Tension and difficulties with the Arabs in North
Africa have already been reported to the War Department by
General Eisenhower. The unenthusiastic, and in some places
uncooperative, attitude of the North African Arab popula-
tions reflects hostile propaganda that has claimed that
American successes in North Africa would aid the Jewish
cause in Palestine.
Obviously the security of American or United
Nations troops in the Arab or Moslem world has not yet
reached a critical stage. But the situation is definitely
unhealthy. The experiences of British troops during their
retreat in Burma are a grave and recent warning of the
serious effects that a hostile, rather than friendly,
native population can have on our military operations.
(6) Since Zionist propaganda in the United States 18
much greater than corresponding Arab pressure, it 1s impor-
tant for the American people to realize that, in the Moslem
world, Arab feelings remain uncompromisingly against the
acceptance of a political Zionist State in Palestine.
It should be very clear to the American people,
therefore, that only by military force can a Zionist State
in Palestine be imposed upon the Arabs.
Part II notes some of the effects of the Arab-Jew conflict in
Palestine on the United States.
Our domestic disunity is aggravated by dissension
among American citizens of various foreign born groups and
increasing conflicts among various Jewish groups, as well
as increasing anti-Semitism.
An unfortunate effect for the Jews themselves has
resulted from mixing together two problems that should be
kept quite separate. Support for all-out aid to persecuted
Jews in Europe, on which there can be no difference of
opinion
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opinion, should not be diminished by tying it up with the
extremely controversial proposal to establish a Jewish
political state in Palestine.
Part III suggests a specific step toward winning wartime support
for our United Nations' cause of the 60 million Arabs in North Africa
and the Near East.
(1) By the issuance now of a brief statement by the
United Nations (or at least by the four major powers) giv-
ing assurances regarding the procedure that will be followed
in arriving at a post-war settlement of Palestine. Such a
statement need only restate as official policy of the United
Nations, in regard to Palestine what the United States,
Great Britain, and their Allies have already announced as
their general policy in regard to territorial problems
everywhere. This assurance can be very brief and need
only consist of two points: (1) that no final decisions
regarding Palestine will be taken until after the war;
(2) that any post-war decisions will be taken only after
full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.
A statement along these lines issued as soon as
possible would go far to relieve existing tension in the
Near East and would, in the opinion of officials in that
area, be the military equivalent of at least several extra
divisions of troops.
Part IV outlines a post-war solution.
The existing population of one million Arabs and one-
half million Jews in Palestine is not to be moved and is to
form a bi-national state within a proposed Levant Federa-
tion. This independent Levant Federation would be formed
by the re-uniting of Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and Trans-
Jordan that, prior to their dismemberment after the last
war, had for years been one natural economic and political
unit. The Holy Places, including Jerusalem, Jaffa and
Bethlehem, are to be an enclave under United Nations' con-
trol. The cession of some specific territory other than
Palestine for a Jewish State 1s proposed -- possibly northern
Cirenaica, which 1s now virtually uninhabited.
The Jewish refugee problem 1s met to the extent that,
under the proposed plan, the Jews could put another half
million in Palestine so a.s to reach parity with the Arabs
and up to a half million Jews in northern Cirenaica.
PROPOSED DECLARATION
The United Nations, having in mind the terms of their
Declaration of January 1, 1942, are agreed that while
public discussions on controversial international ques-
tions are in general desirable, in order to promote an
informed public opinion and clarification of the issues
involved, it is undesirable that special viewpoints should
be pressed while the war is in progress to such a degree
as to create undue anxieties among United Nations and
other friendly governments and peoples.
In this connection, the United Nations have taken
note of public discussions and activities of a political
nature relating to Palestine and consider that it would
be helpful to the war effort if these were to cease.
Accordingly, the United Nations declare it to be their
view that no decision altering the basic situation of
Palestine should be considered until after the conclu-
sion of the war. When the matter is considered, both
Arabs and Jews should be fully consulted and their agree-
ment sought.
April 20, 1943
THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST
PART I - THE FACTS
I. Purpose of Memorandum
The object of this memorandum is to summarize the
facts and information collected during three and one-half
months (November 1942 to March 1943) when, in compliance
with instructions from the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff,
I visited the Near East.
II. My Mission
1. Itinerary.
Although physically familiar with most of the
areas visited on this trip, I had not been in the Near
East since the spring of 1939. Fortunately, it was pos-
sible on this visit not simply to hit the high spots in
whirlwind fashion but actually to spend approximately two
weeks in each country-Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine,
Trans-Jordan, and Iraq. I also visited Turkey and Iran
in order to get first-hand information on the attitude of
these neighboring states toward the Arab world. In addi-
tion I motored over 800 miles through Egypt and Cirenaica
along the coast from El Alemein to Bengazi. My return
flight to the United States took me along the rest of North
Africa via Tripoli, Algiers, and Casablanca to Marrakech
and Dakar.
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2. People Seen.
The facts and information given in this memorandum
reflect conversations with:
(a) British and Fighting French military and
diplomatic representatives in the various
countries.
(b) American consular, diplomatic, and military
representatives.
(c) American missionary and educational leaders.
(d) Arab leaders both in and out of political
office.
In my contacts with Arab leaders I was
assisted by a list especially prepared for
me by President Bayard Dodge of outstanding
graduates of the American University of Beirut
living in the areas visited. I also renewed
contact with many friends of my father and
mother who had served as missionaries in Syria
for 50 years.
3. Procedure.
In all my contacts D explained that I was there to
collect information not to give it, to listen and not to
talk. I hoped that they cared to give me their views as
the information which I was collecting was not for publi-
cation in any way but for the benefit of the United States
Government. In gathering first-hand information I was
naturally aided to a great extent by my ability to con-
verse in Arabic or, where necessary, in French or German.
III. Background - American Interests and Standing in the
Near East
Although American interests in the Near East
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have centered primarily on the importation of tobacco and
dates, and our exports have centered on films and automobiles,
our main interests in the Near East, due to 100 years of
missionary and educational efforts, have remained in the
cultural field. The facts that these missionary and educa-
tional efforts were supported entirely by private philan-
thropic contributions rather than by Government funds has
added to the prestige that the United States gained from
these efforts. The standing and influence, for example,
of the American University of Beirut and of Robert College
in Istanbul and of their graduates is hard to realize ex-
cept after a first-hand visit to the area.
As a result, American prestige has for many years been
extremely high throughout the whole Near East. This situa-
tion was strikingly confirmed in 1919 when, from the Crane-
King Commissions' investigation, over 60 per cent of the
petitions submitted by the people of this area gave the
United States as their first choice for a mandatory power.
This was over four times the request for Great Britain,
which was the second power suggested.
At the same time, the fact must also be clearly recog-
nized that American prestige has declined considerably in
recent years and is still declining. Some of the reasons for
this decline are suggested in the later sections of this
memorandum.
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IV. Outstanding Facts:
The outstanding facts developed in the course of my
trip may be summarized as follows:
1. The most important and most serious fact is the
danger that, unless definite steps are taken to prevent it,
there may be a renewed outbreak of fighting between Arabs
and Jews in Palestine before the end of the war and perhaps
even during the next few months. Such fighting in Palestine
is almost certain to lead to the massacre of Jews living in
the neighboring states of Iraq and Syria as well as in other
places in the Near East.
The tension is growing steadily and as a result
the Arabs are likely to be goaded as their only effective
means of protest into breaking the informal truce which
has existed in Palestine since the outbreak of the war in
1939. The Arabs feel that the Zionists by continuing a
world-wide propaganda for a Jewish State in Palestine have
not kept their part of the bargain. There is therefore in
the minds of the Arabs a growing fear that unless they do
something, when the war is over, they will be faced with a
decision already taken by the Great Powers to turn Palestine
over to the Jews. This fear is, of course, one on which Axis
propaganda to this area has constantly harped.
2. There is clearly a hardening of feeling on both
sides which is reflected in an increasingly unyielding
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attitude by the extremist leaders of both Arabs and
Jews in regard to any compromise solution. Both sides
are armed and indicate a willingness to fight.
It is common knowledge that the Zionist undercover
military organization, the Hagana, has made plans and
has stocks of tommy guns and machine guns as well as
small arms. Much of this equipment was bought from
French Vichy troops in Syria and has, during the past
two years, been smuggled into Palestine.
with
The Jews particularly feel that their increased
numbers and with their increased stock of arms they can
more than hold their own in actual fighting with Pales-
tinian Arabs. However, from previous experience the
Jews realize that, whenever serious fighting with the
Arabs starts in Palestine, assistance from neighboring
Arab states will again pour in. It is this increased
opposition that the Zionists admit they probably do not
have the power to overcome without outside assistance
from British or British and American Military forces.
3. It is also increasingly clear that the growing
interest of Jews and Moslems in all parts of the world in
the Palestine settlement is now so large that it makes
quite impossible any purely domestic or local solution
that might otherwise have been arrived at by the Arabs and
Jews living in Palestine itself.
⑉6⑉
4. The outbreak of internal conflict in Palestine
is obviously one of the major objectives of Nazi propa-
ganda in this area. It is aimed at precipitating Arab-
Jewishfighting at a moment when combat troops of the
United Nations can least readily be spared for putting
down domestic insurrection. Furthermore, Axis propaganda
in this area has of late become increasingly effective
because the Nazis have played down reference to Axis
interests and have laid their main emphasis on the one
fact that, if the United Nations win the war, the Arabs
can be certain that they will lose Palestine to the Jews.
Nothing could be simpler or more readily understandable
to the average Arab than the Axis three-point program
which in their daily broadcasting promises:
(a) the elimination of all alien control,
whether British or French;
(b) the liquidation of the Jews in Palestine;
and
(c) "complete independence".
5. Traveling through Palestine one clearly realizes
that it is not an unpopulated area into which an indefinite
additional number can immediately be poured. For quick
comparison, Palestine in area is a little smaller than
the State of New Hampshire and already has a population
four times as large. The figures, which, like all Near
Eastern statistics, are only approximations, indicate
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the large growth that has taken place:
1920
1942
Arabs
600,000
1,000,000
Jews
70,000
500,000
670,000
1,500,000
6. There is an ever-present Arab fear of American
support for political Zionism with its proposed Jewish
State and Jewish Army in Palestine. This is now extending
to the further fear of American support for the penetra-
tion of Jewish people into Syria and other neighboring
Arab areas, once Palestine has been fully populated.
The Zionist press in Palestine claims the support of
public opinion in Britain and the United States for its
aspirations and the Arab press makes no effective denial.
Although the State Department has taken no official
position in the dispute as to the correct interpretation
of the Balfour Declaration calling for a "national home
for the Jews", the recurring petitions of members of
both houses of Congress have been interpreted both by
Zionists and by Arabs as indicating clearly where American
sympathies lie. Furthermore, it should be clearly realized
that every American statement in favor of Zionism is within
a few hours widely broadcast by the Axis radio to the
whole Arab world in support of its main propaganda theme
that a United Nations victory means for the Arabs the
certain loss of Palestine to the Jews. For example, the
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December 1942 petition supporting the Zionist position
signed by 67 Senators and 180 Congressmen was very widely
broadcast by the Axis radio throughout all the Near East.
It was, of course, referred to not as a petition but an
expression of government policy. It resulted in unprece-
dented demonstrations against the United States that
culminated in Damascus in the closing of the bazaars for
several days as a protest against the United States.
7. There is also a growing Syrian fear of American
support for, or at least acquiescence in, a continuation
of French control in Syria after this war is over. The
Syrians remember that, after the last war and despite
an overwhelming preference for the United States and
specific objection to France, the mandates for Syria and
Lebanon were nevertheless given to France. As a result
many pro-American supporters in Syria have for years
felt the displeasure of the French and claim that since
that time they have been discriminated against or passed
over in Government appointments.
In fact, the fear that already haunts all of the
Near East is that at the end of the present World War
the United States may again return to isolationism.
Even today this is the cause of such worry that reference
is made to it in almost every conversation held with pri-
vate or official individuals.
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8. Tension and difficulties with the Arabs in
North Africa have already been reported to the War
Department by General Eisenhower. On my return to the
United States via North Africa I found in both the
Eighth Army and the First Army American officers res-
ponsible for the security of American troops who were
increasingly disturbed by the unenthusiastic, and in
some places hostile, attitude on the part of the North
African Arab populations toward the United States.
They expressed fear of still further difficulties if
the issues of a Jewish political state and of a Jewish
Army continue to be pressed at this time. The un-
cooperative attitude of the North African Arabs reflected,
in their opinion, the irritation of the Arabs at the
behavior of some of the local Jewish populations in
North Africa as well as the effectiveness of hostile
propaganda which continued to claim that United States'
successes in North Africa would only give greater support
to the Jewish claims in Palestine.
9. From my trip through North Africa I also got
the impression that American political efforts had,
quite naturally and perhaps of necessity, concentrated
on the problems of our relations with the Marious French
groups or factions. The effect of our military occupa-
tion on the Arabs who form approximately 95% of the popu-
lation and their attitude toward the United States had
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as a result not been given the attention it deserved.
Furthermore such information on the attitude of the
Arabs as was available to American officers had almost
invariably been received at second hand from the local
French authorities.
Obviously the situation of American or United Nations
troops in the Arab or Moslem world has not yet reached a
very critical stage. But it is definitely unhealthy
and now is the time when steps should be taken to prevent
a further deterioration. The unfortunate British ex-
perience during their retreat in Burma is only too recent
an example of the serious effects that a hostile rather
than friendly native population can have on military
operations.
10. Since Zionist propaganda and political pressure
in the United States is much greater than corresponding
Arab pressure, it is important for the American people to
real ize that, in the Moslem world, Arab feelings remain
uncompromisingly against the acceptance of a political
Zionist State in Palestine. The Arabs in Palestine have
on many occasions fought both the Zionists and the British
military forces sent against them, and there is absolutely
no basis for assuming that they will not again fight when
they feel it necessary. It should therefore be very clear
that a Zionist State in Palestine can only be imposed
upon the Arabs by military force.
April 20, 1943
THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST
PART II - THE UNITED STATES AND THE PALESTINE PROBLEM
In view of the difficulties involved, the United States
might well prefer, if it were possible, to keep out of any
responsibility for a part in the settlement of the complicated
problem of Palestine. However, the facts outlined above are
already having repercussions on the United States and must
therefore be considered for their effects on:
(1) Our military situation -- aid for our United Nations
war efforts and particularly the security of American
troops in North Africa.
After a visit to these areas there can be no question
about the lack of enthusiasm, suspicion, and, in some in-
stances, passive resistance toward the United States in
different parts of the Near East and North Africa. Unless
steps are taken to correct it, this situation can deteriorate
further and develop into native hostility such, for instance,
as that from which the British suffered so heavily during
their retreat in Burma.
(2) Our domestic unity in wartime.
Jewish leaders in the United States should in fairness
be advised of the effects both at home and abroad of con-
tinued agitation for a Jewish State in Palestine. Without
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any denial of their constitutional freedom of speech,
these leaders might decide, in the interests of their
cause as well as in the interest of domestic unity in
wartime in the United States, to curtail at least for the
duration their efforts to achieve political Zionism.
(3) Dissension among different racial groups in the
United States.
The United States in its domestic life is affected by
the Zionist demand for a Jewish State in Palestine from
two clearly defined angles. On the one hand there are
five million Jews in this country who, along with the rest
of the population, are being subjected to a steady stream
of propaganda in favor of a Jewish Army and a Jewish State.
On the other hand there is the relatively inarticu-
late opposition of several hundred thousand American citi-
zens of Syrian and Arab racial descent, as well as the
considered opinion of the overwhelming majority of these
Americans who have made a deep study of the Palestine prob-
lem and who feel that the Zionist solution is not a sound
or correct one for this area. As far back as the report of
the Crane-King Commission in 1919, there 1s the statement
in their report that the Commissioners had reluctantly come
to the conclusion that a Jewish State in Palestine was
inadvisable, although they had "begun their study of Zionism
with minds predisposed in its favor".
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(4) Development of divisions and conflicts among Jews
in the United States.
At a time when the primary effort of everyone must
be centered on winning the war there would seem to be some
question whether now is the time for an active Jewish
minority to put pressure for the support of political
Zionism on the majority of American Jews who, while re-
maining Jews by religion, do not think it advisable to
support political Zionism. Like other American citizens
they should be free to make their decision and when they
have made it they should not be subject to a continuing
pressure that in not supporting political Zionism they
are virtually forswearing their faith.
(5) Anti-Semitism in the United States.
There seems to be little question that if this
active minority of American Jews continues to agitate
for a Jewish Army and a Jewish State in Palestine it will
add fuel to the anti-Semitic charges already rife that the
primary loyalty of American Jews is to political Zionism
and not the United States. This will be particularly un-
fortunate if, in addition, it is felt that such agitation
has an unfavorable effect on our military efferts and the
security of American troops abroad.
(6) Effect on all-out aid to persecuted Jews in Europe.
Not only in the United States but in the Near East
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and, in fact, in every part of the world there is the
important job of keeping the desire of everyone to aid
in alleviating the suffering of the Jews in Europe from
being diminished by tying up this problem, on which there
can be no difference of opinion, with the extremely con-
troversial one in regard to the establishment of a Jewish
political state in Palestine. These are two very differ-
ent issues and, for a proper solution of each, should be
kept apart.
(7) American influence in the Near East.
The people of the United States must be made to
understand more clearly the seriousness of the Arab-Jew
conflict in the Near East and the influence which, per-
haps unconsciously, they wield in this area. For example,
when American citizens or members of Congress sign peti-
tions advocating the establishment of a Jewish State in
Palestine, they should realize that, for all practical
purposes, they are asking the American Government to commit
itself to the use of American armed force in the Near East
after the war. Based on British experience this means that
American soldiers will be killed in Palestine in the en-1
forcement of such policy. Whether the American people,
if they realized more fully this implication, would still
favor its adoption may be a matter for debate. At least,
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however, they should be clearly informed that only by
force can a political Zionist policy in Palestine be made
effective and, as a result, they should have a chance to
express themselves on such an issue before they are com-
mitted to such a serious step.
(8) A sound solution in Palestine and post-war peace.
A sound solution for the problem of Palestine must
be found since otherwise there will be a continuation
after this war of the conflicts that for centuries have
plagued the Near East. For the United States, as for
the rest of the world, such conflicts must be prevented
since, if they continue, they contain the seeds of a
possible third World War with its inevitable consumption
of American money, materials, and most valuable of all,
American lives.
(9) Basis of any peaceful solution.
Without at the moment attempting to outline detailed
suggestions for a peaceful solution, one basic fact must
be taken into account. Palestine now contains one million
Arabs and a half million Jews. The great majority of
neither group wishes to be moved and can only by force
be transferred elsewhere. Any proposed solution, there-
fore, if it is not to cause still greater injustices to
either one side or the other, does not start with a
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"tabula rasa", but must assume the continuation in Palestine
of both the Arabs and the Jews that are there.
(10) The need for a definition of American policy toward
Palestine and the Near East and the announcement of
a decision on the part of the United States Govern-
ment to help find a proper solution of this problem.
Since it seems clear that we in the United States
cannot on the one hand wash our hands of all responsi-
bilities in the Near East nor on the other hand even
escape domestic repercussions of the Arab-Jew problem,
is it not advisable for us to apply our best energies
and intelligence in helping to find a sound and peaceful
solution?
The problem is indeed difficult but not insoluble.
April 20, 1943
THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST
PART III - WINNING WARTIME SUPPORT OF ARAB WORLD FOR
THE UNITED NATIONS' CAUSE
(1) Uncertainty the main cause of Arab-Jew tension.
As noted in Part I of this memorandum, uncertainty
as to the future of Palestine is at the present time
perhaps the major cause of rising tension between the
Arabs and Jews in Palestine. In the rest of the Arab
or Moslem world -- North Africa, the Middle East, and
India -- this problem is primarily reflected in the
indifference or lack of active support of the Arabs
for the cause of the United Nations.
(2) A United Nations' assurance regarding the post-war
settlement of Palestine.
Fortunately this rising tension can be relieved and
considerable progress can be made toward winning greater
support for our United Nations' war effort from the 60
million Arabs that inhabit North Africa and the Near
East. Furthermore, such a result can be accomplished
without the necessity of announcing now any final solu-
tion to the Palestine problem. It would consist in the
issuance by the United Nations (or at least by its four
major members) of a statement giving assurances regarding
-2-
the procedure that will be followed in arriving at a
post-war settlement of Palestine. Such a statement need
only re-state as official policy of the United Nations
with regard to Palestine what the United States, Great
Britain, and their Allies have already announced as their
general policy in regard to territorial problems every-
where. This assurance can be very brief and need only
say that no final decisions regarding Palestine will be
taken until after the war and then only after full con-
sultation with both Arabs and Jews. A statement along
these lines, issued as soon as possible, would go far to
relieve existing tension and would, in the opinion of
officials in the Near East, be the military equivalent
of at least several extra divisions of troops.
Here is a practical, concrete step on which the
Foreign Office in London might be promptly consulted.
Then with their agreement, the matter might be referred
to Russia and China for their approval and joint action.
(3) Suggestion that group of Arab leaders and moderate
Jewish leaders meet in U.S. to discuss and attempt
to arrive at a settlement of Palestine problem.
As a further step and in an endeavor to have the Arab
as well as the Zionist position presented to the American
people, it is suggested that Emir Abdullah of Trans-jordan
or some other Arab prince, following the procedents set
-3-
by the visits of George of Greece and Peter of Yugoslavia,
be allowed to visit the United States. He should be
accompanied by five or six moderate-minded Arab repre-
t
senatives from Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Trans-Jordan.
Such a group could contain Christian as well as Moslem
members.
At the same time certain moderate Jewish leaders
from Palestine who recognize the necessity of arriving
at a peaceful solution with the Arabs might also be allowed
to visit the United States. This group should include among
others Dr. Judah L. Magnes, President of the Hebrew Univer-
sity in Jerusalem, who, in the January 1943 issue of For-
eign Affairs, outlined a middle of the road program for a
possible Arab-Jew settlement.
While in the less heated atmosphere of this country,
these two groups, together with representatives of both
Zionist and non-Zionist Jewish organizations as well as of
various Christian church groups, might be urged to meet and
attempt to work out a peaceful post-war settlement for the
age-long conflict over Palestine.
April 20, 1943
THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST
PART IV - A PLAN FOR PEACE IN THE NEAR EAST
The principle has been suggested previously that,
since we cannot escape repercussions from an unsound
solution of the Arab-Jew problem, we had better use our
best efforts toward finding a sound solution. A con-
crete plan for post-war peace in the Near East is offered
below at least as a starting point for discussion and con-
sideration. It does not represent the opinion of any one
group but is a composite of ideas and suggestions ob-
tained by the writer from many varied sources during his
three and one-half months' tour of the Near East between
November 1942 and March 1943.
Also, as mentioned in a previous section, this pro-
posed plan starts with the assumption that the one million
Arabs and the half million Jews who are already in Pales-
tine and wish to remain there shall be allowed to do so.
An injustice in one area cannot be righted by causing a
corresponding injustice in another area.
In the interests of brevity a knowledge of the basic
facts is assumed and only conclusions, without the detailed
-2-
reasoning back of each point, are therefore given:
(1) Reunion in a Levant Federation of the four
existing states of Lebanon, Syria, Palestine,
and Trans-Jordan
Prior to the decisions of the Peace Conference
in 1919 the territories of these four states formed one
political and economic area. The efforts to split this
area four ways have not been successful and have always
been contrary to the basic interests of the people them-
selves. Since no single unit is large enough or eco-
nomically capable of standing alone, these four areas
must again be united in a full economic union; funda-
mentally this means at least no customs barriers and as
many other joint government activities (such, for in-
stance, as defense, currency, and postal services) as
can be agreed upon.
Politically, after almost 25 years of frag-
mentation there can and probably must be, at least to
begin with, considerable local political autonomy for
the various sections of the proposed federation, although
Trans-jordan might be joined to existing Syria and thus
reduce the number of political sections to three --
Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine. Suggestions on the prac-
tical details of such a federation have been worked out
by several British officials long resident in this area,
and a copy of one of these plans is attached as annex
to this report.
(2) Abolition of both French and British Mandates
In Syria and the Lebanon, France has failed so
completely and has lost so much prestige that only by
force can she remain. On the other hand, Britain has
not been much more successful in Palestine where Arab-
Jew conflicts have continued to break out at intervals
and a large and expensive bureaucracy has been saddled
on the country. It would not help the cause of the
United Nations, not be fair to the people of these
areas, nor in line with the promises of the Atlantic
Charter to transfer control of Syria and the Lebanon
from France to Great Britain, or even to an Anglo-
American control, were such a thing feasible.
(3) Complete Independence for this Area
The people of this area are as capable and
-3-
perhaps more capable of self-government than some of the
neighboring states that are already independent. Ad-
mittedly, independence will result in mistakes and
mismanagement but from this experience in self-govern-
ment, these peoples will learn better and more soundly
than if they continue to be controlled in most of their
activities by foreign powers. Furthermore, independence
has been promised to them by France and Britain and
these promises should be lived up to.
(4) Foreign Technical Assistance Only as Requested
And Paid for by the Arab States Themselves
To the extent that any foreign technical
assistance is given, this should come through what-
ever form of postwar organization is set up by the
United Nations. Such technical assistants should not
serve as watchdogs for the interests of the foreign
power that urges their appointment, but they should
be employed and paid by the local state and be res-
ponsible only to it, along the lines already adopted
for the employment of Americans in Iran.
(5) Freedom for an Eventual Federation of Arab
States If Desired
After the Levant Federation has been formed
and the choice left to the people of that area both
as to the extent of political federation and the form
of government -- whether a monarchy or a republic --
then, and perhaps not even then, such a federated
state might decide on economic and political collabora-
tion with neighboring Arab states such as Iraq, Saudi-
Arabia and Egypt. It should be clear from the start
that if any of these states eventually found it to
their advantage to join or form such a federation of
Arab states, they should be free to do so, even though
the immediate prospects for the formation of such a
federation may not appear very bright.
(6) External Boundaries to Remain as They Are
Fortunately no serious boundary disputes exist
in this Near East area and no external boundary changes
need be contemplated unless, perhaps, Turkey were willing
to code back to Syria the small but purely Arab area in
the Hatay south of the Amanus Range, which includes the
ancient city of Antioch. Such a cession would still
leave Turkey the Amanus Range as a sound strategic fron-
tier and give back to Syria an area racially and
economically Arab.
-4-
Internal boundaries between Lebanon and Syria
might also, at least to begin with, be left as they
are. Greater Lebanon contains almost 50 per cent Moslems,
but this may prove an advantage rather than otherwise,
since as a result there will be little likelihood of
persecution of minorities. Furthermore, with the
economic union that must be developed, the question of
internal boundaries, where no customs barriers exist,
becomes much less important.
(7) Palestine, a Bi-National State within the
Levant Federation
The question of Palestine 1s, of course, the
most difficult and the most controversial feature of this
whole problem but is one the solution of which must be
frankly and firmly undertaken. As a first step, a state-
ment by the United Nations should be issued stating
that Palestine is not to become either a purely Arab
or a purely Jewish state but a bi-national state to
might
which Jews, migrate up to but not to exceed parity
in numbers with the Arabs. Were such a policy to be
established it would allow for the further settlement
in Palestine after the war of approximately half a
million Jews. Any migrations of Jews into Lebanon,
Syria, or Trans-jordan should be subject to the consent
of the people of those areas. Such a solution for
Palestine will, of course, not have the support of
either the extremist Arabs or the extremist Jews but
can be justified as a necessary compromise to prevent
Palestine remaining a festering sore capable of con-
tinuing to infect not only the Near East, but virtually
all of the Moslem world from Casablanca to Calcutta.
(8) The Holy Places, including Jerusalem, Bethle-
hem, and Jaffa, to be an Enclave under United
Nations' Control
In the conflict between the Arab Moslems and
the Jews, the even stronger numerical claim of the
Christian peoples of the world to a share in the ad-
ministration of Jerusalem and the Holy Places has tended
to be overlooked. Furthermore, there is good reason
to believe that the Vatican with its world-wide in-
fluence will not favor any settlement that allots
Jerusalem exclusively to #ither the Moslems or the
Jews. An international administration of an enclave
-5-
containing Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Jaffa under the
United Nations will more nearly solve this long-
standing problem since it will assure free access to
the Holy Places and particularly to Jerusalem to the
believers of all three religions.
(9) The Proposed Settlement to Include an Offer
of a Cession of Territory -- Possibly Northern
Cyrenaica -- For a Jewish State
As part of a further effert to assist the Jews
driven from their homes in Europe and to satisfy the
demands of that Jewish minority that favors the forma-
tion of a Jewish Army and a Jewish State, the United
Nations should offer a definite piece of territory to
the Jews in which a Jewish State may be formed. This
offer might consist of the renewal of the previous
British offer of land in Uganda or perhaps in some
part of South America. The important point is that,
to offset the decision that Palestine is not to become
a Jewish State, a specific area somewhere else should
be made available for the establishment of a Jewish
State to which politically-minded Jews from any part
of the world who wish to do so can emigrate.
There might at the same time be considered
the possibility of ceding to such a proposed Jewish
State the Jebl Achdar area of northern Cyrenaica. Any
area chosen will have difficulties, drawbacks, and dis-
advantages, but the Jebl Achdar perhaps more nearly
fits all requirements, with less drawbacks, than any
other area one can suggest. Its location in relation
to Europe, its soil and climate so similar in many
respects to Palestine and, most important of all, its
present virtually uninhabited conditions make it worth
careful consideration. The Italian colonists previously
installed are gone but have left behind them farm lands
and cleared areas that can almost immediately begin to
support many thousands of Jews. Eventually this region
might again support a half million inhabitants that
history indicates at one time lived there.
The question of the rights and claims of the
Senussi (numbering less than 200,000) to reacquire this
northern portion of Cyrenaica would need to be studied
and fairly met. However, even under the plan suggested,
three-fourths of Cyrenaica would in any case remain to
the Senussi. As nomadic people whom the Italians drove
from the Jebl Achdar area, the claims of the Senussi to
-6-
consideration would undoubtedly have the support of
their co-religionists throughout the Moslem world.
If, therefore, the Arabs were to agree to a Jewish
State in northern Cyrenaica, they could in all proba-
bility only be induced to do so if at the same time
they were given a definite assurance that, as a result,
a Jewish State would never be imposed on them in
Palestine.
Conclusion
Even if no final solution can be put into operation
until the war has been won, the problem of Palestine is
so complicated and has defied solution so long that it is
not too soon to be studying intensively what should be
done when the war is over. This time it should be our aim
to arrive at the peace table with a suggested solution
that, because it is in line with American principles, com-
mands the support of both the Government and of the American
people. At the same time those responsible for the develop-
ment of such a plan should also have had the practical sug-
gestions of all important organizations and individuals,
both here and abroad, who might have something constructive
to contribute to its content.
Harold Harold B. B. Hoskins Hoshins
Lt. Colonel AUS
e.7.
State
May 8, 1943.
Dear Joe:
Miss Tully has shown me your letter
of April seventh with regard to the possible
publication in your forthcoming book "Ten
Years in Japan" of my letter to you of January
21, 1941.
It seems all right for you to publish
this letter, provided, of course, that your own
letter of December fourteenth, to which my
letter 1s a reply, 18 also published. My view
1s naturally subject to there being used in
your book other material of a similar character:
material based on or taken from official reports
and despatches. I understand that the proper
people in the Department of State are now giving
attention to this general question.
As ever,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
Honorable Joseph C. Grew,
Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.
x197
7
b.F.
State
JUN 15 1943
Great and Good Friend:
I have received Your Najesty's communication of
April 30, 1943, relating to matters affecting Palestine,
X700
and I appreciate the spirit of friendship you have mani-
fested in expressing these views 29.Ah? to me.
I have noted carefully the statements made in this
Presidents safely
leopy of the
communication, as well as these contained in Your Maj-
esty's letter of November 19, 1938, and the oral mes-
sage conveyed to Mr. Kirk, the American Minister, at
dated1/9/39, 3500, filed
the conclusion of bis recent visit to Riyadh.
x4180
Your Majesty, no doubt, has received my message
Migo Turner doesnot.
delivered by Mr. Moone to His Highness the Amir Faisal. have message
As I stated therein, 1f appears to me highly desirable X
that the Araba and Jews interested in the question
should come to a friendly understanding with respect
to matters affecting Palastine through their own
efforts prior to the termination of the war. I am
x76-6
x3500
glad of this opportunity, however, to reiterate my
assurance that it is the view of the Government of
the United States that, in any case, no decision
altering the basic situation of Palestine should be
reached without full consultation with both Arabs and
Jews.
I renew ay expressions of best viehes for Your
Majesty's good health and for the well-being of your
people.
Your Good Friend,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
His Majesty
Abdul Aziz 1bn Saud, xpp77960
King of Saudi Arabia.
State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
June 14. 1943
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
With reference to your memorandum of June 4, 1943,
there is enclosed for your signature, if you approve,
a letter addressed to King Ibn Saud in reply to his
communication addressed to you on April 30, 1943.
The enclosed letter to the King reiterates the
assurances given in your recent telegram to him and
incorporates substantially the same phraseology or
tained therein.
1 1 Alls
Enclosure:
To King Ibn Saud.
(1168)
hm.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 4, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE STATE DEPARTMENT x20
FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.
F. D.R.
Letter from King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, 4/30/43,
together with translation of same, which refers
to situation regarding the Jews and the Arabs.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
As per request for return of
translation of King Ibn Saud's
letter of April 30, 1943
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
May 29. 1943
My dear Mr. President:
I enclose a communication addressed to you by
King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, which has been trans-
mitted to the Department for delivery to you by the
American Minister at Cairo. There is attached an
English translation of the King's letter, which is
written in Arabic
A Faithfully yours, Maths
Enclosures:
1. Letter from King Ibn Saud.
2. Translation of the letter.
The President,
The White House.
C
O
P
Y
TRANSLATION
In the Name of God
the Merciful and Compassionate
From Abdel Aziz, Ibn Abdel Rahman El Faisal,
King of Saudi Arabia.
To His Excellency Franklin Roosevelt, President
of the United States of America.
Excellency,
In this great world war in which nations are shedding
their blood and expending their wealth in the defence of
freedom and liberty, in this war in which the high prin-
ciples for which the Allies are fighting have been pro-
claimed in the Atlantic Charter, in this struggle in which
the leaders of every country are appealing to their country-
men, allies and friends to stand with them in their struggle
for life, I have been alarmed, as have other Moslems and
Arabs, because a group of Zionists are seizing the oppor-
tunity of this terrible crisis to make extensive propa-
ganda by which they seek on the one hand to mislead
American public opinion and, on the other hand, to bring
pressure upon the Allied Governments in these critical
times
-2-
times in order to force them to go against the principles
of right, justice and equity which they have proclaimed
and for which they are fighting, the principles of the
freedom and liberty of peoples. By 80 doing the Jews
seek to compel the Allies to help them exterminate the
peaceful Arabs settled in Palestine for thousands of
years. They hope to evict this noble nation from its
home and to install Jews from every horizon in this sa-
cred Moslem Arab country. What a calamitous and infamous
miscarriage of justice would, God forbid, result from this
world struggle if the Allies should, at the end of their
struggle, crown their victory by evicting the Arabs from
their home in Palestine, substituting in their place vagrant
Jews who have no ties with this country except an imaginary
claim which, from the point of view of right and justice,
has no grounds except what they invent through fraud and
deceit. They avail themselves of the Allies' critical
situation and of the fact that the American nation is
unaware of the truth about the Arabs in general and the
Palestine question in particular.
On November 19, 1938 (Shawal 7, 1357 H.) I wrote to
Your Excellency a letter in which I set forth the true
situation of the Arabs and Jews in Palestine. If Your
Excellency would refer to that letter, you will find that
the
-3-
the Jews have no right to Palestine and that their claim
1s an act of injustice unprecedented in the history of
the human race. Palestine has from the earliest history
belonged to the Arabs and 1s situated in the midst of
Arab countries. The Jews only occupied it for a short
period and the greater part of that period was full of
massacres and tragedies. Subsequently they were driven
out of the country and today it 1s proposed to re-install
them in it. By 80 doing the Jews will do wrong to the
quiet and peaceful Arabs. The Heavens will split, the
earth will be rent asunder, and the mountains will tremble
at what the Jews claim in Palestine, both materially and
spiritually.
Having sent to Your Excellency my above-mentioned
letter, I believed, and I still believe, that the Arab
claim to Palestine had become clear to you, for in your
kind letter to me dated January 9, 1939 you made no remark
about any of the facts which I had mentioned in my pre-
vious letter. I would not have wasted Your Excellency's
time over this case nor the time of the men at the head
of your government at this critical moment but the per-
sistent news that these Zionists do not refrain from bring-
ing forth their wrong and unjust claim induces me to remind
Your Excellency of the rights of Moslems and Arabs in the
Holy
-4-
Holy Land 80 that you may prevent this act of injustice
and that my explanation to Your Excellency may convince
the Americansof the Arabs' rights in Palestine, and that
Americans whom Jewish Zionism intends to mislead by
propaganda may know the real facts, help the oppressed
Arabs, and crown their present efforts by setting up
right and justice in all parts of the world.
If we leave aside the religious animosity between
Moslems and Jews which dates back to the time when Islam
appeared and which is due to the treacherous behavior of
the Jews towards Moslems and. their Prophet, if we leave
aside all this and consider the case of the Jews from a
purely humanitarian point of view, we would find, as I
mentioned in my previous letter, that Palestine, as every
human creature who knows that country admits, cannot solve
the Jewish problem. Supposing that the country were sub-
jected to injustice in all its forms, that all the Arabs
of Palestine, men, women and children, were killed and
their lands wrested from them and given to the Jews, the
Jewish problem would not be solved and no sufficient lands
would be available for the Jews. Why, therefore, should
such an act of injustice, which is unique in the history
of the human race, be tolerated, seeing that it would not
satisfy the would-be murderers, 1.e., the Jews?
In
-5-
In my previous letter to Your Excellency I stated
that if we consider this matter from a humanitarian point
of view, we would find that the small country we call
Palestine was crammed at the beginning of the present
war with nearly 400,000 Jews. At the end of the last
Great War they only constituted 7% of the whole popula-
tion but this proportion rose before the beginning of
the present war to 29% and is still rising. We do not
know where it will stop, but we know that a little before
the present war the Jews possessed 1,000,332 donams out
of 7,000,000 donams which is the sum total of all the
cultivable land in Palestine.
We do not intend, nor demand, the destruction of
the Jews but we demand that the Arabs should not be
exterminated for the sake of the Jews. The world should
not be too small to receive them. In fact, if each of
the Allied countries would bear one tenth of what Palestine
has borne, it would be possible to solve the Jewish prob-
lem and the problem of giving them a home to live in. All
that we request at present is that you should help to stop
the flow of migration by finding a place for the Jews to
live in other than Palestine, and by preventing completely
the sale of lands to them. Later on the Allies and Arabs
can look into the matter of assuring the accomodation of
those
-6-
those of the Jews residing in Palestine whom that country
can support provided that they reside quietly and do not
foment trouble between Arabs and the Allies.
In writing this to Your Excellency I am sure that
you will respond to the appeal of a friend who feels that
you appreciate friendship as you appreciate right, justice,
and equity, and who 1s aware that the greatest hope of the
American people is to come out of this world struggle,
rejoicing in the triumph of the principles for which it
1s fighting, 1.e., to ensure to every people its freedom
and to grant it its rights. For if-God forbid!--the Jews
were to be granted their desire, Palestine would forever
remain a hotbed of troubles and disturbances as in the
past. This will create difficulties for the Allies in
general and for our friend Great Britain in particular.
In view of their financial power and learning the Jews
can stir up enmity between the Arabs and the Allies at
any moment. They have been the cause of many troubles
in the past.
All that we are now anxious for is that right and
justice should prevail in the solution of the various
problems which will come to light after the war and that
the relations between the Arabs and the Allies should
always be of the best and strongest.
In
-7-
In closing, I beg you to accept my most cordial
greetings.
Written at Our Camp at Roda Khareem on this the
25th day of Rabi'Tani, of the year 1362 Hegira corres-
ponding to April 30, 1943.
6.7.
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
X
xxxxxxx
******
state
XXX
XXXX
ligned 5/26/43
April 27, 1943
AMERICAN LEGATION,
CAIRO.
Your 723, April 7, 10 a.m.
x700
x76-6
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE MINISTER.
Please arrange for the transmission of the following
message from the President to King Ibn Saud through the
confidential media he indicated:
*3500
XPP77960
QUOTE The American Minister, Mr. Kirk, has communi-
cated to me Your Majesty's expression of friendship for
the United States and sympathy for the United Nations'
cause, which I am most grateful to receive. He has in-
formed me also how Your Majesty has manifested this
friendship and sympathy by remaining silent in regard to
issues affecting the Arab peoples among whom Your Majesty
is revered n8 a distinguished leader.
In conveying my appreciation of Your Majesty's sym-
pathetic understanding and helpful cooperation, I wish
to express my thorough agreement with Your Majesty's con-
sidered opinion that continued silence with respect to
such matters would prove most helpful to the United Nations
Returned to Secretary of State, may 26, 1943.
- 2 -
in their bitter struggle to preserve the freedom of man-
kind. Nevertheless, if the interested Arabs and Jews
should reach a friendly understanding in regard to
matters affecting Palestine through their own efforts
before the end of the war, such a development would be
highly desirable. In any case, however, I assure Your
Majesty that it 1s the view of the Government of the
United States that no decision altering the basic situa-
tion of Palestine should be reached without full con-
sultation with both Arabs and Jews.
I take this opportunity to express my best wishes
for Your Majesty's good health and for the well-being of
your people. Franklin D. Roosevelt. UNQUOTE
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
890F.00/81 Conf.
NE:WLP:EML PA/M
signed 5-26-43
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
May 25, 1943
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
There is enclosed a copy of a telegram from the
American Minister at Cairo conveying to you an important
confidential message from King Ibn Saud. Expressing his
personal interest, as an Arab and Moslem leader, in the
Arab question, with particular reference to Palestine
and Syria, the King states that, although urged to make
x2418
representations to this Government respecting Palestine,
he has refrained from doing so only because of his desire
not to embarrass the United States at this time or to
prejudice the United Nations cause by taking a step
likely to increase Arab-Jewish antagonisms. He desires
to ascertain, therefore, whether you approve of his atti-
tude of silence and, if so, whether he will be advised
in advance of any steps of an affirmative character
contemplated by the Government with respect to this
question.
The necessity of replying to the King's message
and of providing him with the assurances which he
requests
- 2 -
requests 1s emphasized by the receipt of a further
telegram from Mr. Kirk, a copy of which also 1s en-
closed, stating that the King has delivered to him
for transmission to you a personal letter regarding
the Palestine question constituting substantially a
reiteration of the King's views expressed in his pre-
vious oral message delivered by Mr. Kirk and in his
letter addressed to you in 1938.
Accordingly, there 1s enclosed for your signature,
if you approve, a message addressed to King Ibn Saud
conveying to him substantially the viewpoint expressed
in the proposed statement on Palestine which you ap-
proved on May 10, 1943. Filed b. 7State.
CH
20
Enclosures:
1. Telegram no. 723, April 17, 10 a.m.,
from Cairo.
2. Telegram no. 857, May 10, 5 p.m.,
from Cairo.
3. Draft telegram to Cairo.
COPY
This telegram must be
Cairo
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
Dated May 10, 1943
to anyone (sc)
Rec'd 4:55 p.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
857, May 10, 5 P. m. (SECTION ONE)
ACTLI CONF
NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION
My 723, April 17, 10 a.m. and Jidda's 40, May 3,
7 P. m.
Shaikh Youssef Yassine who is now in Cairo
X
en route to Syria has delivered to me for forwarding
a sealed personal letter from King Inb Saud to the
President regarding Palestine question, together with
copy thereof for Legation files of which translation has
been made to accompany Arabic original.
In general, letter constitutes reiteration of King's
views as set forth in my telegram under reference and
his previous letter to President in 1938. Following are
principal points covered:
One. Confidence of Arabs in high principles of
Allies is being shaken by Zionist attempts to profit by
stress of war to spread false propaganda in United States
and other Allied countries having as purpose elimination
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
of
- 2 -
of peaceful Arabs in Palestine and replacement by Jews who
have no valid claims on country.
Two. In his letter of November 19, 1938 to President,
King explained rights of Arabs as contrasted with Jews in
Palestine and disastrous consequences which would follow
fulfillment of Jewish designs. King's remarks were pre-
sumably clear to President since latter made no comment
thereon in his reply of January 19, 1939.
Three. King would not importune President by bring-
ing up matter again now were it not for reports of renewed
Zionist activity and necessity that President and American
people should know facts in order to avoid a great in-
justice to Arabs.
KIRK
X 4180
This telegram must be
Cairo
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
Dated May 10, 1943
to anyone. (sc)
Rec'd 7:55 a.m., 12th
Secretary of State
Washington
857, May 10, 5 P. m. (SECTION TWO)
Four. Leaving aside matter of traditional animosity
between Jews and Arabs and viewing matter from purely
humanitarian standpoint it is obvious that Jewish problem
cannot be settled by colonization in Palestine since
country could not absorb sufficient number of Jews even
if all Arabs in country were exterminated. As it is
Jewish population and land holdings increased tremendously.
Five. Elimination of Jews from Palestine is not
demanded but merely that immigration should be stopped by
finding other refugees for the land, that further land
purchases be prohibited. If each of Allied countries
were prepared to bear one tenth of burden of Palestine
problem could be settled. Subsequent Allies and Arabs
could discuss accommodation in Palestine of Jews now
resident there in light of absorptive capacity of country.
Six. Trusts that President will respond to this
appeal of a friend who respects principles for which
American people are fighting because if Jewish desires
should be fulfilled in Palestine a permanently disturbed
situation would result which would create difficulties
for the Allies in general and Creat Britain in particular.
All
- 2 -
All that is desired now is the assurance that right and
justice will prevail in the solution of post war problems and
that Arab Allied relations may remain of the best.
Original letter is being transmitted by next pouch.
I would appreciate advice as when President's reply to matter
presented in my telegram under reference may be expected.
KIRK
(COPIED:NE:EML)
890F.00/81 Conf.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
VCH
Cairo
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
Dated April 17, 1943
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)
Rec'd 9:40 p.m.
Secretary of State
Washington
723, April 17, 10 a.m. (SECTION ONE)
S.
CONFIDENTIAL
FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER
SECRETARY
The greater part of my conversation with Ibn Saud
and his advisors during my visit at his desert camp
midway between Ryadh and Dahran was confined to supply
and Lend-Lease matters and to an exchange of cordialities
which this time were especially marked on the part of
the Saudi Arabians. On the day of my departure, however,
the King sent for me and in a private audience said there
was a matter which he desired to discuss with me personally
and in strictest confidence and which he would request
that I bring to attention of President. He referred, he
said, to the Arab question and particularly to certain
aspects thereof in respect of Palestine and Syria.
Turning first to Palestine he said situation there
was of more concern to him than to any other Arab leader
because Jews had been hostile to Arabs from time of
Prophet Mohamed to present and he, Ibn Saud, as the lead-
ing Arab and Moslem, therefore, had a special interest
in developments in Palestine where, because of vast wealth
at
-2- #723, April 17, 10 a.m. (SECTION ONE) from Cairo
at their disposal and their influence in Britain and
the United States Jews were steadily encroaching on Arabs.
If this trend was allowed to continue it could only be
expected that Jewish-Arab conflict would become more
acute, which would be deplorable from Arab standpoint
and would also cut across Allied war effort.
Recently he had heard of representations in respect
of Palestine made to American Government by Egyptians
and certain Arabs had urged him to do likewise, but he
had hitherto refused for following two reasons:
One. He had made his views on subject known to
President on a previous occasion and had received
President's reply.
Two. He did not want to do anything at present
time which would cause difficulty to United States at a
time when it needed to devote its undivided attention to
prosecution of war. Thus should he write the President
and receive a reply favorable to Arabs, Jewish antagonisms
would develop and, should reply be favorable to Jews or
no reply at all made, Arabs dissatisfaction would be
aroused. Were it not for these considerations arising
out of war he would feel obligated to act, but under
existing circumstances his sympathy for the United Nations'
cause and his friendship for the United States had led
him to conclude that it would be preferable to remain silent.
Although
-3- #723, April 17, 10 a.m. (SECTION ONE) from Cairo
Although Palestine received the chief emphasis the
King also referred to question of Syria and said Syrians
were his friends and independence of country was of
great personal concern to him. He had noted in this con-
nection the announced intention of the Allies to give
Syria complete independence and he felt he must believe
in their sense of justice and fidelity to their given
word. In this case, like that of Palestine, he had
desired, therefore, to maintain silence in order to
avoid causing embarrassment to Allies.
In adopting this policy of silence, however, he
said that it was obvious that he, AS the leading Arab
and Moslem, would be placed in a difficult position if
the American Government should respond favorably to the
overtures of others since it might be made to appear that
his silence had been motivated by lack of interest on his
part, whereas the contrary was the case. He, therefore,
wished to be advised whether President concurred in his
views regarding the maintenance of silence for the time
being. Should such not be the case, he had certain plans
for action clearly in mind. On the other hand, should
President agree, he would appreciate being 80 advised and
at same time receiving an assurance that he would be in-
formed in advance of any affirmative steps which American
Government might contemplate taking in response to
overtures
-4- #723, April 17, 10 a.m. (SECTION ONE) from Cairo
overtures by other Arab persons or agencies in order that
he might consider possible adjustments in his policy.
Since his own decision in matter had been taken in defer-
ence to our vital interests he hoped he could count on
our being equally understanding of his position.
KIRK
NPL
(Section Two appears on following page)
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
FMH
Cairo
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
Dated April 17, 1943
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)
Rec'd 4 p.m.
Secretary of State
Washington
723, April 17, 10 a.m. (SECTION TWO)
Turning from specific question of Syria and Palestine,
King said he had heard indirectly of recent proposal to
call Arab conference but that he had not been approached
by sponsors of idea who had apparently been guided by
knowledge of his policy of not desiring to do anything
to make trouble for Allies. Whether he was or was not
invited in this particular instance was 8. matter of rela-
tive indifference to him because he knew full well that
no bona fide Arab conference could achieve any important
results without his participation. He was, however, con-
cerned by the fact that much of this present Pan Arab
agitation emanated from Iraq and had as its ultimate
purpose the extension of Hashemite power. Ibn Saud
emphasized that he had no personal territorial ambitions
outside his own country but merely wished to see Syria
and Palestine attain individual independence and take
their place along side Saudi Arabia and Iraq in a balanced
comity of Arab states; in other words Syria for the Syrians,
Palestine for the Palestinians, et cetera. There was,
however,
-2- #723, April 17, 10 a.m. (SECTION TWO) from Cairo
however, strong indication (mentioning Nuri Abdul Illah
and Abdullah by name) that an effort was being made to
use Pan Arabism 88 & means for formation of Iraq, Pales-
tine and Syria into a Hashemite bloc. Such a development
he could only view with gravest apprehension in view of
traditional hostility of Hashemites to House of Saud and
King trusted Allies would not countenance materialization
of such a serious threat to Saudi Arabia.
In conclusion King stressed confidential nature of
his observations and asked that they be revealed to no
one not even the British although latter were cognizant
of his general views. He also requested that any reply
of President to question regarding his present policy of
silence in respect of Palestine and Syria should be trans-
mitted only to Prince Faisal or Shaikh Youseef Yassine.
King referred on several occasions in course of his remarks
to friendly private and official relations which had 80
happily developed between Saudi Arabia end United States
and suggested that American intereste in Saudi Arabia
were such as to justify its occupying e. special place in
the formulation of Ameri can policy in Near East.
In transmitting this message from Ibn Saud for the
President, it 18 difficult if not impossible without incur-
ring the criticisms of hyperbole or even emotionalisms,
adequately
-3- #723, 10 a.m., April 17 (SECTION TWO) from Cairo
adequately to reflect the sincerity of the King and his
profound conviction in the virtue of his own judgment.
He is simple, honest and decisive and these qualities
transcend the limited formula of his special experience.
He believes that we are his friends and to him friendship
bespeaks complete confidence. Compromise 18 inadmissible.
He truly feels that his problems Are ours and ours are
his and in giving this message for the President, he con-
firmed throughout an absolute faith in the justice of the
democracies and a conviction that the order which 18 to
follow their victory will justify that faith.
(END OF MESSAGE)
KIRK
LMS
P.F. State
file
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
August 6. 1943
$ 3
My dear Mr. President:
I refer to your telegram of May 26, 1943, addressed
to King Ibn Saud regarding the status of Palestine.
The Legation at Jidda has informed the Department
that this message was forwarded to the Amir Faisal, Saudi
Arabian Foreign Minister, who transmitted it promptly to
King Ibn Saud. The Amir Faisal has requested the Lega-
tion to express to you the King's gratitude for your
friendly communication.
Faithfully A yours, Dally
x20
X
X 3500
X 700
The President,
The White House.