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Dispatches - France, January 14, 1938-March 28, 1938
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Dispatches - France, January 14, 1938-March 28, 1938
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France 1/4/38-2/28/38 1/4/38-
Contents
Commmunications from France
Telegram No. 74, January 14, 1938, (793.94/12089)
Telegram No. 125, January 24, 1938, (740.00/275)
Telegram No. 194, February 4, 1938, (862.00/3722)
Telegram No. 214, February 9, 1938, (762.00/159)
Telegram No. 240, February 15, 1938, (762.63/429)
Telegram No. 241, February 15, 1938, (762.63/430)
Despatch No. 1819, February 16, 1938, (762.63/518)
Telegram No. 249, February 16, 1938, (762.63/437)
Telegram No. 255, February 16, 1938, (762.63/438)
Telegram No. 261, February 17, 1938, (762.63/443)
Telegram No. 269, February 18, 1938, (740.00/298)
Despatch No. 1821, February 26, 1938, (760F.62/133)
Telegram No. 374, March 11, 1938, (762.63/519)
Telegram No. 418, March 16, 1938, (852.00/7512)
Telegram No. 420, March 17, 1938, (760F.62/148)
Telegram No. 445, March 23, 1938, (852.00/7586)
Telegram No. 481, March 28, 1938, (760F.62/182)
Telegram No. 677, April 30, 1938, (741.51/279)
Telegram No. 728, May 7, 1938, (751.65/385)
Telegram No. 745, May 11, 1938, (760F.62/248)
Despatch No. 2242, May 11, 1938, (761.94/1045)
Telegram No. 777, May 17, 1938, (760F.62/265)
Telegram No. 807, May 21, 1938, (760F.62/277)
Telegram No. 808, May 21, 1938, (760F.62/278)
Telegram No. 809, May 22, 1938, (760F.62/279)
Telegram No. 810, May 22, 1938, (760F.62/280)
-2-
Communications from France
Telegram No. 811, May 22, 1938, (760F.62/281)
Telegram No. 850, May 30, 1938, (760F.62/369)
Telegram No. 899, June 8, 1938, (760F.62/401)
Telegram No. 934, June 14, 1938, (760F.62/417)
Telegram No. 987, June 23, 1938, (760F.62/442)
Telegram No. 1076, July 7, 1938, (760F.62/464)
Despatch No. 2573, July 8, 1938, (760F.62/486)
Telegram No. 1125, July 18, 1938, (760F.62/482)
Telegram No. 1146, July 22, 1938, (741.51/297)
Telegram No. 1156, July 25, 1938, (760F.62/508)
011
POLITICAL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
MR. DUNN
1 51838 RELATIONS
FS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UHA
This telegram must bE
closely paraphrased bE-
From
Paris
fore being communicated
Dated Januar JANKAT JAN 1938
Divings
to anyone. (D)
Rec'd 11:55 DISARIMENT a,m.
Eu
OF
Secretary of State,
SECRETARY
OF
and
Washington.
JAN 14 1938
Jay 15
NOTED
Ev/py
74, January 14, 1 p.m.
-
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.
Blum remarked to me last night that Litvinov had said
79394
to Delbos, and Souritz, Soviet Ambassador in Paris, had
711.61
repeated to Delbos, that Litvinov had stated definitely
to Norman Davis in Brussels that if the United States
should become involved in war with Japan, the Soviet Union
would declare war on Japan at once. I replied that I felt
793.94/12089
certain that Litvinov had never made such a statement to
Norman Davis.
I should bE obliged if the Department would let me
know if Litvinov EVEr made such a statement to Davis.
BULLITT
JAN 15 1938
FILED
CONFIDI CONFIDENTIAL F/FG FILE
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
PA/D
EG
This message must bE
Paris
cloarly paraphrased be- FROM
fore being communicated Dated January 24, 1938
740.00.
to anyone. (D)
Rec'd 2:40 p.m.
Secretary of State,
SECRETARY OF STATE
Washington.
JAN 25 1938
NOTED
ON MR. POLITICAL UNN 1938 RELATIONS
125, January 24, 2 p.m.
DEPARTMENT File OF STATE
STRICTLY CONTID AL FOR THE SECRETARY
740.00 /275
In the course of a conversation this morning Delbos
said to HE that Eden would arrive in Paris tomorrow after-
noon in time to have a comprehensive conversation before
departure for GENEVA tomorrow Evening.
The British and French Governments were agreed that
they should do Everything possible to prevent any attempt
by the smaller nations to Eliminate Article 16 from the
Covenant at the GENEVA metting this WEEK. HE said that
neither he nor Eden was sure, however, that they could
prevent the smaller nations from bringing up the question.
If it should bE brought up England and France were de-
FILED
G-J
termined to have consideration of it adjourned.
HE would also discuss with Eden the question of the
recognition of the King of Italy as Emperor of Ethiopia.
The French Government was opposed to such recognition at
the present time, There was a dispute with regard to this
Contidence Fije
question in the British Cabinct. HE could tell me very
privately
⑉2⑉ 125, January 24, 2 p.m. from Paris
privately and confidentially that Chamberlain favored
recognition and Eden was opposed to it. They were both
supported by strong Elements in the Cabinet and hE had
received very privately a word from Eden that the
Britich Government had decided to bE guided for the
moment in this matter by the position of the French
Government and that hE Eden would welcome greatly a
decided nagative from the French Government.
(END SECTION ONE)
BULLITT
CSB
I
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
LMS
This telegram must be
FROM Paris
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
Dated January 24, 1938
to anyone. (D)
Rec'd 3:15 p. m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
125, January 24, 2 P. m. (SECTION TWO)
F W 740.00/275 /275
DElbos said that the French Government were carrying
the
on no negotictions whatsoever with the Italian Government
looking toward C repprochement but that the British Govern-
ment was Engaged in feeling out the ground as usual.
Delbos said that he had prepared the speech referred
to in my 56 of January 12, 7 p. m., holding out a hand to
Germany. The Government crisis had prevented its delivery
and he would bE unable to deliver it until after his return
from Geneva. HE and Chautemps were however still determined
to go ahead on this line in spite of the objections of the
G-J
French Communists.
The French Communists, DElbos said, had indicated to
Chautemps that they were opposed to his retaining the port-
$1.00 85/1002
folio of Minister for Foreign Affairs because he favored
the policy of rapprochement with Germany and he, DElbos,
had offered to withdraw from the new governmental combie
nation. HE said that Chautemps, however, was absolutely
Confidential File
determined
LMS 2-No. 125, January (24, 2 P. m., Sec. 2, from Paris.
determined to go ahead on this line and drive the Communists
into bitter opposition if necessary.
Delbos said that news from Austria was bad and hE was
10
apprehensive that Germany might make some ort of a move
862.63
against Austria in the near future. With the Rumanian
Government following its present line a German annexation
of Austria would make the situation in Central and Eastern
Europe tragic; Czechoslovakia would bE completely isolated.
(END MESSAGE)
BULLITT
CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
KLP
Paris
This. telegram must be FROMDated February 4, 1938.
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
Rec'd. 3:05 p.m.
to anyone. (c)
AMB
Secretary of State,
FEB 5.
8:-
HHT
Washington.
194, February 4, 6 p.m. (SECTION ONE)
STRICTIN CONFIDENTIAL
had
The only explanation that DElbos
had of the
resignatich of Blomberg is on all fours with current
862.00/3722
newspaper reports. HE stated, however, that in CASE
Reichenau should replace Blomberg he would bE most
apprehensive with regard to an early move against Austria.
In this connection I venture to report from certain
information which WE have just received from a member of
CITY
the Austrian Legation in Paris who is reputed to be
closest to Schusnigg: he states that that here are
serious reasons to fear a German move against Austria
this spring, perhaps EVEN next month. This official has
FP
herstofore in conversation with us been confident of
Austria's ability to defend her independence but new his
attitude has completely changed and hE is pessimistic in
the extrime.
ME
-
- 2 -
#194 from Paris - section one
HE states that in addition to such motives as
racial unity, Et cetera, which have influenced Germany
in the past to work for the incorporation of Austria into
the Reich there are now important Economic reasons. A
few WEEKS ago the Austrian Government, dissatisifed at
the way commercial Exchanges with Germany were building
up a mass of frozen marks in Germany, reduced by 60%
Austrian exports of iron ore and wood to Germany. Goering
has recently let it bE known that continued deliveries of
these commodities are Essential to the four year plan
and that if by spring Austria has not resumed them in full
Germany will take steps to assure that she gets them.
BULLITT
I
KLP:CSB
I
CA
This telegram must bE
closely paraphrased be-
PARIS
for bring TELEGRAM RECEIVED
to anyone (C)
Dated Feb. 4, 1938
-
Recd 6:25 p.m.
FROM
Secretary of State,
Washington.
194, February 4, 6.p.m. (SECTION TWO)
Austria could, of course, agree to resume these deliver-
is but our informant thinks that Schusnigg, having taken a
firm position in this matter, may feel that rather than
yield to German pressure he would do better to step art.
This would mean & new government including probably Nazi
aympathizers. If Austria stands firm against this German
pressure then what is feared is not so much an attempt from
the inside by Austrian Nazis but a move of S 3 troops across
862.00/3722
the frontier with support by the German Government if there
should not be immediate reaction from France and Great Brit
ain.
FILED
That is thoroughly discouraging to the Austrian Govern-
ment is the lack of interest shown by the British and French
Governments in doing anything to aid Austria to resist Germ-
any. All that would bE necessary would bE an Expression of
interest at Berlin in continued Austrian independence, but
Great Britain does not wish to do anything that might
offend the Germans thereby prejudicing the chances of reach-
FP
ing an understanding with them and the French will do
nothing without the British. /
BULLITT
SMS NPL
CA
This telegram must bE
closely paraphrased be-
PARIS
fore being cTELEGRAM RECEIVED
to anyone (C)
Dated Feb. 4, 1938
Recd 6:17 p.m. DIVISION DE
FROM
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
Secretary of State,
FEB5 - 1938
Washington.
DEPARTMENT STATE
194, February 4, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE)
Mussolini wants to support the independence of Austria
but cannot afford to part company with Germany. Mussolini had
made repeated afforts to begin conversations with Great
Britain for & settlement of their differences but had receiv-
Ed no Encouragement. HE was now thoroughly alarmed about
British intentions vis-a-vis Italy and felt that hE must
cling to Germany.
Among the principal COUSES of the present tension in
862.00/3722
Germany between the Reichswehr and the party has been, acc-
ording to our informant, the difference of opinion regarding
policy towards Austria. The REichswehr with Von Blomberg
FEB 1071938
CHTIA
favored a conciliatory policy with the maintenance of at
least a facade of Austrian independence. The party, however,
was impatient and wanted immediate-nction. If Von Blomberg's
retirement should be followed by that of Von Fritsch, the
appointment of the new chief-of-staff to succeed the latter
may have great significance as revealing future German pol-
icy towards Austria. If Von Reichenau, an extremist, is
FP
appointed it will mean, according to our Austrian friend,
that a move against Austria is not far in the offing.
BULLITT
SM3 NPL
CA
This telegram must bE
Eu
closely paraphrased be-
PARIS
fore being COMPLEGRAM RECEIVED
to anyone (C)
Deted Feb. 4, 1938
RECD 6 p.m.
DIVISION
EUROPEAN AF
Secretary of State,
FROM
Washington.
DEPARTMENT OFS,
194, February 4, 6 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)
In discussing today the question of German purchases of
iron ore with Bonnet and Alphand, Director of Commercial
Accords, I was informed that the German Government had noti-
fied the French Government two days ago that it would make
no iron ore purchases in France during the month of February.
Both Bonnet and Alphand stated that this would mean the imm-
862.00/3722
Ediate uncmployment of 20,000 French workmen. Bonnet therefort
had ordered Alphand to go to Berlin tomorrow to attempt to
persuade the Germans to continue the regular orders of iron
ore during the month of February.
Both Bonnet and Alphand stated that they belicyed. that
the Garmans had announced their intention of making no pur-
chases of French iron ore during February because they had
no money with which to pay for this ore. Bonnet said that
his information indicated that the Germans EXPECTED to rec-
9da
Eive all the iron ore they needed during the month of Feb,
ruary from Sweden on credit and he expected the Germons to
resume their purchase of iron ore from France in the month
of March.
(E) D OF MESSAGE)
BULLITT
FILED
SMS RGC
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
1-1326
MC
FROM
This telegram must bE
closely paraphrased bE-
Paris
fore being communicated
to anyone. D
Dated February 9, 1938.
Rec'd 11:45 a.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
214, February 9, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE).
CONSTRUCTION The German Ambassador, who has just
returned from Berlin, made a number of statements to ME
762.00/159
last night which may possibly bE of interest to the DE-
partment.
HE said that in spite of his own antipathy to the
162.02
Nazis, which was well known, hE was delighted by the
appointment of Ribbentrop as Minister for Foreign Affairs.
For the past two years hE had been attempting to persuad
Neurath to introduce Nazis into the Fortign Office.
Neurath had refused. As a result the Nazis had acquired
a complete distrust of German career diplomats and had
FEB
built up their own Foreign Office under RibbEntrop. HE
believed that Ribbentrop would soon discover that the
career men in the portfolios and the field were much abler
and more devoted to the interests of Germany than his
GL
former associates and that hE would soon fall under their
influence.
The
MG
Page 2, #214 from Paris
-
The German Ambassador added that he EXPECTED no
spectacular development in German foreign policy. HE
pointed out that whereas in the past Hitler had made his
large decisions in foreign policy on the advice of what-
EVEr old Nazi comrad happened to bE visiting him at Berch-
tesgaden, hE would in future make such decisions after
consultation with the new Privy Council under Neurath
which contained in addition to Neurath four other men
who were Entirely reasonable and devoted to the idea of
working out the problems of Europe peacefully: KEitEl,
Brauchitsch, Admiral Raeder and Lamoffers.
BULLITT
RR
CSB
DIVISION ICE
EUROPEAN AFFA
EU
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
9- 1938
JR
DEPARTMENT
This telegram must bE
Paris
clostly paraphrased bE-
FROM
fore being communicated
Dated February 9, 1938
to anyone. (D)
Rec'd 12:45 p.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
214, February 2, 2 p.m. (SECTION TWO)
Elczek added that he knew intimately Keitel and
Brauchitsch, and that they represented together with
Back the finest intelligence and the greatest moderation
to bE found in the Reichswehr.
Elczek said hE was convinced that the year 1938 would
be a year of PEACE. HE did not consider it possible to
762.00/159
nchieve any real rapprochement between France and Germany,
however, until the Spanish conflict should have been
settled.
WELCZEK stated that the proposals of Van Zeeland were
being taken most seriously in Berlin. I had no opportunity
to pursue this question further.
Delbos two days ago stated to mE that WELCZEK in
EB 1 1938
sec. 2 filed
conversation with him had Expressed himself in terms on
all fours with those be used in talking with me last night.
Both Choutemps and Delbos who in the past have considered
GMB
Elczek timid, and ill-informed said that they now
considered
-2- #214, February 9, 2 p.m. (SECTION TVO) from Paris.
considered him well informed and an EXCELLENT Ambassador
who spoke with authority. Inasmuch as WELCZEK represents
the old Imperial diplomatic group it appears that unless
hE is entirely deceived the recent changes in Germany
may produce no very spectacular changes in foreign policy.
(END MESSAGE)
- BULLITT
KLP:CSB
EDA
TELEGRAM RECEIVED PM
This telegram must bE
PARIS
closely paranhrased
before being communi-
FROMDated February 15, 1938
cated to anyone (d)
RECEIVED 3:17 p.m.
Secretary of State
DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
Washington
OCT due
240, February 15, 3 p.m. (SECTION ONE REPARTMENT OF STATE
I have just discussed with LEgEr the situation created
by Schuschnigg's visit to Berchtesgaden.
LEGER said that Schuschnigg had informed the French
Minister in Vienna very privately and confidentially that
762.63/429
hE had been received with the utmost brutality. Hitler
had had three generals including Reichenau standing behind
him throughout the conversation and had made the following
four demands: (one) that the Austrian Government should
declare an amnesty for all Nazis and permit those now in
Germany to return to Austria; (two) that those Nazis who
had been deprived of their pensions and positions because
of their political affiliations should bE restored to their
pensions and positions; (three) that Seyss - Inquart should-
2
be appointed Minister of the Interior and given control of The
entire Austrian police force; (four) that Austria should 1942
"n
agree to take no action with regard to foreign affairs with- TO
out previous consultation with the German Government.
Leger
EDA - 2 - 1240, February 15, 3 p.m. from Paris Section 1.
Leger went on to say that Schuschnigg had returned to
Vienna intensely depressed and that Guido Schmidt was doing
his best to persuade Schuschnigg to accept these demands of
Germany.
LEGET made the obvious comment that the acceptance
1
of these demands would mean the end of Austrian indepen-
dence.
bullitt
CSB
CA
EU
This telegram must bE
closely PTELEGRAM RECEIVED
fore being communicated
to anyone (c)
Dated Feb. 15, 1938
1-1336
Recd 5:57 p.m.
FROM
Secretary of State,
Washington.
240, February 15, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO)
I asked if the French Government had taken any action
in Vienna or given Schuschnigg definite advice. LEGER re-
plied that there had been no formal contact whatsoever be-
tween Schuschnigz and the French Minister since the former's
visit to Derchtragaden. The information which Schuschnigg
762.63/429
had given the French Minister had been given most privately
and Schuschnigg had not asked for advice nor had any been
given him.
LEGER went on to say that he did not know whether or not
the Franch Government would decide to urge Schuschnigg to
reject these demands. The question would have to bE decided
by Chautcaps and Delbos after consultation with Chamberlain
and Eden. The decision would in his opinion rest on the
interpratation of recent events in Germany.
A message had been received from Francois Poncet giving
what he, Itzer, believed to bE an accurate account of the
genesis of the Derchlesguden visit. Hitler's old Nazi friends
had been urging him to give up the idea that he could cc-
XII
quire Austria by penceful evolutions and to turn to the
TO
method of force. Hitler was most loath to USE force because
the generals of the Reichswthr had convinced him that the
army
I
CA
--2-- 240 from Paris
(Sec 2)
/
army would not bE in condition to fight a major war against
France and England for approximately another year. Hitler
therefore had wished to make C. last attempt to gain his
objective by overwhalming Schuschnigg's will to resist.
BULLITT
EMB NPL
CA
This te TELEGRAM RECEIVED
clossly paraphrased be-
PARIS
fore being communicated
to anyone (D)
Dated Feb. 15, 1938 -
1-1336
FROM
Recd 4:55 p.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
240, February 15,13 p.m. (SECTION THREE)
TE had had the three generals present in order to make it
clear to Schuschnigg that if necessary there would bE force
behind his words.
An additional reason for Hitler's reluctance to use
force or threat of force was the fact that during the present
period of preparation of the German army he wished to avoid
any act which might product a strong government of national
762.63/429
defense in France and an intensification of British war pre-
parations and incidentally an increase in American hostility
to Germany.
Leger went on to say that both he and Francois Poncet
were entirely convinced that if Schuschnigg should accept the
first two demands of Hitler but reject the final two demands
Fitler would not dare to use force. HE would Employ EVEry
means short of mobilization to make life uncomfortable and
impossible for the Austrian Government but would not mobilize.
LEGER said that he was not sure that Chautemps and Delbos
would agree with him in this diagnosis. It was possible to
dd
believe that Hitler would mobilize three or four divisions
on the Austrian frontier and that Schuschnigg would bE forced
to give way at a moment of great European crisis.
BULLITT
EMB NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
EG
1-1336
FROM
This message must bE
Paris
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
Dated February 15, 1938
to anyone. (D)
Rec'd 3:01 p.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
240, February 15, 3 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)
If one adopted the latter interpretation, it would obviously
bE less dangerous to have Schuschnigg submit now rather than
762.63/429 429
later. Leger said that there were indications that the
latter interpretation might bE the interpretation of the
British Government. In that case France would do nothing.
Schuschnigg would have to bE assured of at least moral
support from France and England and perhaps also Italy in
order to bE in a position to resist.
Leger said that the French and British Governments
would discuss the problem this morning. HE added that
Hitler had not delivered an ultimatum with a time limit to
Schuschnigg and he believed that Schuschnigg would attempt
to gain time by standing on his dignity for a brief space.
(END MESSAGE)
BULLITT
FP
WWC:HPD
CA
This Elegrar most bE
- to
closely percharased be-
PARIS
to anyone
fort being ( TELEGRAM RECEIVED
Dated Feb. 15, 1938
Recd 5:03 p.m.
1-1336
Secretary of State,
FROM
Waskington.
EUROPER
met
PM
148133
241, February 15, 4 parle
n
DEPARTMENT OF
76263
Reference my 194, February 4, 6 p.m.
COMPRE
"TIAL
The GREE informant in the Austrian Legation advised us
today that for the past few weeks Italy has assured Austric
that 1: the event of German aggression against Austria Italy
762.63/430
will mobilize. Italy has, however, at the same time urged
Austria to temporize as much as possible with Germany in order
to gain time and not put Italy in the position of having to
take such action.
Our informant likevise stated that ht had talked OVETH
the telephone t. Vienna this morning and that it was his
FILED
impression that Chancellor Schuschnigz would probably appoint
for 863 your
Seiss-Inquart as Minister of the Interior and head of public
security but would have the control of the government police
taken anay from the latter department and put under the
Profect of Police in Vienna; thus outwardly acceding to
FP
Hitler's demends but actually not doing 30 in that the
latter's real desire was to have C., Nazi sympathizer control
the D lice,
BUILI T
-
MPL END
EMBASSY OF THE
EO
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Paris, France, February 16, 1938.
PAID
1819
No.
NEW
and CELATIONS
AMS
MAR 17.1038
STRICTLY CONSTDIST
STATE
Subject: Statements of Austrian Press Attaché.
DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
1/4 MAR 1 20438
DEPARTMENT STATE
762.63/518
STRICTLY CONSIDENTIAL
ONI
MID
The Honorable
MAR 21 1938
The Secretary of State,
in
Washington, D. C.
Sir:
762 63/430
With reference to the Embassy's telegram No.
241/\of February 15, 4 p.m., I have the honor to
transmit herewith a copy of a strictly confidential
memorandum of conversation between a member of the
Embassy staff and Dr. Martin Fuchs, Press Attaché
of the Austrian Legation, concerning the recent
FILED
visit of Chancellor Schuschnigg of Austrie to
Chancellor Hitler at Berchtesgaden.
Respectfully yours,
4
. n
For the Ambassador:
CONFIDENTIAL FILE
Carbon BOG copies of
Edwin C. Wilson
2 destroyed Enclosure:
Counselor of Embassy
1. Memorandum dated
February 15, 1938.
File 700.
In quintuplicate.
SH/hhp cc- Embassy, Berlin and Legation, Vienna.
GML
1819
Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No.
of February 16, 1938,
from the Embassy at Paris.
COPY-FULL TEXT
Paris, February 15, 1938.
MEMORANDUM
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
For: The Ambassador.
From: Mr. Hawks.
Subject: Conversation with Press Attaché of Austrian
Legation.
***
The following is the substance of information given
me this morning by Dr. Martin Fuchs, Press Attaché of
the Austrian Legation, concerning the recent visit which
Chancellor Schuschnigg of Austria paid to Fuehrer Hitler
at Berchtesgaden:
This visit was made at the invitation of
Hitler and was arranged by Von Papen. After the
recent arrest in Vienna of Tavs and the seizure
of incriminating documents in connection there-
with, and also after the recent shake-up in Germany,
Chancellor Schuschnigg desired to have clarified
the Austro-German situation. Von Papen also felt
that this would be a good thing and took up the
matter with Hitler, who was willing and who gave
indications to the effect that a meeting between
himself and Schuschnigg might possibly have &
favorable result. Chancellor Schuschnigg informed
the French, English, Hungarian, and Czechoslovakian
Governments of his acceptance of this invitation
prior to his departure for Berchtesgaden.
Most of the conversation took place between
Hitler and Schuschnigg alone, and Assistant Foreign
Minister Schmidt, Ambassador Von Papen, and Von
Neurath were only called in to explain technical
details. Hitler immediately started complaining
that Austria had not fulfilled its obligations under
the Accord of July 11, 1936. These complaints
covered two fields: first, that of Austrian foreign
policy, and second, that of Austrian internal policy.
In the first field, which is covered by Article 3
of the agreement of July 11, 1936, which states that
"the Austrian Federal Government will always base
its policy in general ... on those fundamental
principles which are in accordance with the fact
that Austria considers itself a German state",
Hitler claimed that Austria should have followed
Germany's lead in (1) resigning from the League
of Nations, (2) joining the anti-Comintern pect,
and (3) pulling away from Czechoslovakia.
With regard to these complaints, Schuschnigg
replied that Austria 1s a German state, but that
it is
- 2
it is up to the Austrian Government to decide
what it is best for Austria as a German state to
do with regard to foreign policy; that the Austrian
Government felt that it was not to the best inter-
ests. of the country to do any of these three above-
mentioned things and that it would not do so.
With regard to internal affairs, Hitler claimed
that Austria had promised to take account of the
National-Socialist Party in Austria and to bring
some of its members into the Government. This had
not been done and, quite to the contrary, the
Austrian Government had persecuted the National-
Socialist Party in Austria and taken severe
measures against it. To this Schuschnigg replied
that, under the 1934 Constitution, all political
parties were abolished and the Patriotic Front was
formed taking in many elements but as as a political
party. With regard to pro-German representation,
he pointed out that the Ministry of the Interior
had been given to Gleise-Horstenau, who is pro-
German, and also that the Assistant Foreign Minister,
Guido Schmidt, was favorably inclined toward Germany.
He likewise stated that for some time past the
question had been before the Austrian Government of
appointing Herr Seiss-Inquart, who has definite pro-
German leanings, as Minister of the Interior to
replace Gleise-Horstenau. Under the Constitution,
the Government could not legally recognize the
National-Socialist Party, even as an entity of the
Patriotic Front.
Schuschnigg then called Hitler's attention to
Germany's frequent violations of the 1936 agreement
in that she interfered in the internal affairs of
Austria by aiding and abetting the efforts of the
Austrian National-Socialist Party against the
Government, even to the extent of sending into
Austria anti-government propaganda in the diplo-
matic pouches. He also brought up the recent
arrest of Tavs and the documents discovered at
that time, which proved the complicity of the German
National-Socialist Party in interference in
Austrian internal affairs. Hitler stated that
the persecutions being carried on against the
National-Socialist Party in Austria must cease.
He demanded that Seiss-Inquart be named Minister
of the Interior and also head of the Department
of Public Security. He said that if this were
not done he (Hitler) could not be held accountable
for what the National-Socialists might do.
Hitler was positively brutal in his talk and
Schuschnigg returned to Vienna very worried and in
a bad temper.
Public opinion in Austria is very excited over
this matter as, since no official statement in
regard thereto has yet been issued, all sorts of
rumors are circulating.
France.
- 3 -
France and England have not stated what their
position would be in the event of a German aggression
against Austria, but it is felt that in such an event
they would not take direct action. Austria has not
asked either France or England for support if Germany
takes any aggressive action, and Dr. Fuchs feols
that it is much wiser not to make such & request,
since Austria would run the risk of being refused,
in which case Hitler would be bound to know it and
would then have an absolutely free hand. In his
opinion, it is much better to keep the French and
English position uncertain, since this may act as
a brake against possible German aggression.
Italy, during the past few weeks, has on sev-
eral occasions stated that in the event of aggression
by Germany against Austria, Italy will mobilize (he
used the word "mobilize" and repeated 1t). Italy,
however, has impressed upon Austria her desire that
the latter temporize as much as possible with Germany
in order to gain time and also in order that Italy
will not be put in the position of having to take
such action.
Schuschnigg is in a very difficult position and
it is not certain what will be done. This is
particularly true since he had practically offered
to name Seiss-Inquart as Minister of the Interior
before Hitler demanded that he do so, and that he
be named also head of the Department of Public
Security, and accompanied that demand with what
literally amounted to an ultimatum. What will
probably take place is that Seiss-Inquart will be
named Minister of the Interior and Chief of the
Department of Public Security, but that the
Government police will be put under the Prefect
of Police in Vienna. Thus Hitler's demand will
in appearance have been acceded to, but actually
he will not have gotten what he wished, namely,
the police under the control of a National-Socialist
sympathizer. The decision in this matter will
probably be taken at a meeting of the Council of
Ministers scheduled to take place this evening.
S. H.
SH/hhp
sitarity]. Hjawks]
REB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
PA/D
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
PARIS
fore being communicated
FROM
to anyone. (D)
Dated February 16, 1938
Rec'd 3:47 p. m.
Secretary of State,
-
FEB1 1938
762.62
Washington.
Die
249, February 16, 5 p. m.
762.63/437
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.
The Austrian Minister has just read to me a
telegram which hE received this morning from Schuschnigg.
It indicated that Schuschnigg has by no means given up
hope of maintaining Austrian independence,
Schushnigg had confidence that Seyss-Inquart,
although a pan-German, would not work in an underhand
manner for the introduction of Nazis into the regime.
G-J
Amnesty would bE Extended at once not only to
Nazia but also to Social Democrats. This amnesty
would, however, not include those who had Emigrated
FEB FEB 19
from Austria thus Excluding from the country all those
FILED
Austrian Nazis who are now in Germany.
-
The right to conduct political propaganda would bE
extended not only to the Nazis but also to the Monarchists
and Social Democrats. Those Nazis who had been Excluded
from office and pensions because of their political
opinions would have their pensions restored but would
Confidential File
not
REB
2-#249, From Paris, Feb.16,5p.m.
not be given their former offices.
The position of Schuschnigg was, I gathered, the
following: that he would continue to struggle for
Austrian independEnce; that he believed this independence
could bE maintained in the long run only if there
-
should bE reconciliation between England, France,
`and Italy; that he considered recognition of Ethiopia
sisdior
essential for any such reconciliation since the
Italians were genuinely convinced that the British at
some future date would attempt to drive the Italians
out of Ethiopia which would mean the collapse of the
Fascist regime in Italy.
(END SECTION ONE)
BULLITT
WWC-NPL
REB TELEGRAM RECEIVED
This telegram must bE
closely .paraphrased bE-
PARIS
fore being communicated FROM
to anyone. (D)
Dated February 16,1938
- Rec'd 4:47 P. m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
i
249, February 16, 5p. m. (SECTION TWO)
Schuschnigg felt that the actions which he was
about to take would produce EL temporary breathing
FW 762.63/437
period but in the End would prove to bE just as un-
satisfactory to Hitler as his actions which followed
the accord of July 1936. HE EXPECTED therefore that
at SOME future date Germany would attempt again to
PEDEST the Berchtesgaden coup and would mobilize 1f
necessary on the Austrian frontier. He would make
no further concessions. HE could not attempt to fight
Germany alone and if faced by German mobilization would
have to resign.
The question of Austrian Existence as an
G-J
independent state therefore depended on the possibility
that before Hitler again should become sufficiently
irritated to mobilize on the Austrian frontier there
might be reconciliation between England, France and
Italy and an agreement between those states to support
Austrian
Confidential File
REB
2-#249, From Paris, Feb,16,5p.m.
(Sec. Two)
Austrian independence.
The Austrian Minister added that he believed
the Extension of amnesty to the Social Democrats
would add greatly to the strength of Schuschnigg's
regime as the Social Democrats would bE the strongest
opponents of 8, gradual Nazification of Austria,
In contradiction of the opinions Expressed
above with regard to Styss-Inquart I was told this
morning by a gentleman who says he knows Seyss-Inquart
intimately that the latter is a hundred percent
Nazi by conviction although a devout Catholic and
that hE will insert Nazis gradually into all vital
posts and strike for a decision in a few months.
END MESSAGE.
BULLITT
NPL
EMB
REB TELEGRAM RECEIVED
- This telegram must DE
closely paraphrased be-
PARIS
fore being communicated FROM
to anyone. (C)
Dated February 16, 1938
Rec'd 4:34
Secretary of State,
RH
Washington.
sb
1
255, February 16, 9 p. m.
762.63/438
In conversation today the Belgian Ambassador
who served in Berlin before coming to Paris said
that in his opinion the Austrian situation might
easily have found a'worse solution than the temporary
one actually reached. Every one knew that in the
absence of a determined stand by Great Britain and
France Hitler could SEIZE Austria whenever hE wanted
to. As a -matter of fact hE had not seized Austria
but had come to an agreement with Schuschnigg by
FILED
brutal mothods, it is true, under which Austria would
1938
bE allowed to consinue as an independent state for
the time being at least. Kerchove attached great
importance to the fact that Skubl as Understorstary
of the Department of SEcurity is apparently to con-
tinue in control of the Austrian police and felt
that this as -cll PS other points which Schuschnigg
is reported to have obtained indicate that there has
not by any means been complete abdication in the face
of Hitler's demands.
BULLITT
NPT-EXB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
REB
This telegram 1-1335 must bE'
closely paraphrased be- FROM PARIS
fore being communicated
to anyone. (C)
Dated February 17, 1938
Rec'd 3:35 p. m.
/
Secretary of State,
Aur
Washington.
261
w
,
February 17, 8 p. m.
The Foreign Office states that Francois Poncet
is seeing Ribbentrop at five o'clock this afternoon.
The appointment was asked for the day before vesterday
762.63/443
but Ribbentrop was unable to SET an hour before this
afternoon. Francois will request information concerning
the Exact significance of the meeting at Berchtesgaden
on February 12 and will state that the French Government
has a deep interest in whatever takes place in Central
Europe.
The British Ambassador in Berlin saw Ribbentrop on
the 15th and made a demarche along the lines of the
fortgoing. HE was told that the discussion at Berchtes-
gaden with Schuschnigg had been concerned only with
removing the causes of difficulties which had arisen
FEB 1 9 1938
FILED
from the working of the Austro-German agreement of July
1936 and that a communique would bE issued shortly giving
FP
all pertinent information (this was before the final
decision of the Austrian Government had become known).
The
REB
2-#269, From Paris, Feb.17, 8p.m.
The French do not EXPECT to receive any more
satisfactory or enlightening response from Ribbentrop
than was given to the British. They state however
that the fact that this step has been taken in Berlin
by both the French and British Governments has some
importance as manifesting the interest of both
Governments in what transpires in Central Europe.
It seems clear, however, that the French and
British action in Berlin has been taken mainly for the
sake of the record out of a feeling that they could
hardly afford to pass by recent EVENTS in complete
silence,
Copies to Berlin, Vienna.
BULLITT
CSB
ROVISER ON MR. POLITICAL DUNN RELATIONS
FEB 2 1938
CA
DEPARTMENT File OF STATE
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
PARIS
PATD
fore being communicated
to anyone (D)
Dated February 18, 1938
Recd 5:16 p.m.
Secretary of State,
SECRETARY O OF STATE
FEB 19 1938
740.50 740. nib
Washington.
NOTED
269, February 18, 7 p.m. (SECTION ONE)
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY
I asked Dolbos for his views with regard to the
present situation in Europe. "There is nothing to say" he
replied with a gesture of weary disçouragement. I asked if
740.00/298 740.00 /298
71267
he could imagine any action that could be taken to prevent
Austria from falling definitely and irrovocably into the
hands of Gormany and he replied "there is nothing to do."
I statod to him that three reliable persons had asserted to
mo last night that Vansittart had stated yestorday in
London that the British Government would be glad to follow
FEB 23 1938
filed
France in any action that the French Government might decide
to take and was only waiting for the Fronch Government to
G-J
suggest something. Dolbos agreed that this was simply a
manouver on the part of the British to throw the onus of
doing nothing on Franco.
T asked Delbos if he had heard the report that Hitler
in his snooch on the trentieth would announce the quid pro
quo for Italy's abandonment of Austria to wit a military
alliance butwoon Gurmany and Italy. Delbos replied that he
had not hoard the report but that if it should prove to bo
and
true
CA
--2---269 from Paris, Soc. 1..
truo the only fitting reply would be a military alliance
betwoon Grust Britain and Franco. I asked 1f ho bolioved
scriously that such an alliance was within the roalm of
741.51
political possibility. Ho ropliod that so far as dofonse
was concorned an allianco had oxisted since the 17th of
April 1936. He know of courso that a formal military
allianco was out of the question.
BULLITT
I
NPL EMB
-
CA
This tologramegram
RECEIVED
closoly peraphrased bo-
PARIS
foro boing communicated
to anyono (Dhess
Dated Feb. 18, 1938
FROM
Recd 7:04 p.m.
Secretary of state,
"ashington.
269, Fobruary 18, 7 p.m. ( SECTION T.O)
1 asked Deloos 1f Francois-Poncot the Fronch Ambassa-
dor in Berlin had not reported this morning that when the
Czoch Minister had talked recontly with Neurath and Ribben-
trop they had said to him with a certain air that they trusted
Germany's relations with Czechoslovakia in the near future
FW 740.00/298
roziez
would become as satisfactory ns Germany's relations with
Austria had now bocomo. Dolbos said that he had not seen
any such report. I believe this was an accurate statement
but morely because ho had not yet read the tolegram which,
I have boon informed on absolute authority was received
this morning by tho Quai d'Orsay.
T reminded Dolhos that in all our conversations for
the past two months I had suggested to him that 1f he should
dolay making his proposal for "humanization of warfare" the
G-J
751.62
opportunity to engage Germany in an amicuble conversation
would be killod by an action of Gormany against Austria.
Ho ropliod that ho rocalled this much too clearly. I asked
him if ho folt now that it would be possible for him to
make the statement with regard to roconciliation with
Germany and humanization of warfare which he had
Confidential File
expected - ---
CA
1-2-269, from Puris, Section
expected to make. Ho said that under present circumstances
ho did not S00 how ho could mako any such statement.
You will percoive from the foregoing that the
attitude of absoluto nogation which has charactorized
the policy of the pormanent officials of the Qua1 d'Orsay
has now borno another fruit and that Dolbos is for the
momont as completely nogative as his subordinates.
Thore is another important factor to noto. Flandin
in his spooch at Bordcaux Fobruary 13 and in his statement
to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Chambor of
Deputics chllod attention to the fact that the great posi-
tion of France in Central and Eastorn Europe. in the 17th
and 18th conturies had been based on the 1 rgost population
of any European state and the greatost national unity whore-
as today the population of Franco was comparatively small
and national unity was conspicuously loss than in certain
other states, Flandin produced the impression that he
thought France would have to adopt a purely defensive atti-
tude for the moment and abandon support of friends and
allies in Central and Eastern Europe. This opinion has been
spreading with great rapidity during the last few days.
BULLITT
EYB NPL
S
CA
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
This telegram must he
closely paraphrased be-
PARIS
fore being communicated
to anyone
Dated Feb. 18, 1938
FROM
Recd 6:53 p.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
269, February 18, 7 p.m. (SECTION THREE)
There may be 2 rapid reversal but at the present mom-
ent, for the first time since I have served at this post, it
is questionable that France would support Czechoslovakia,
except in case of direct and flagrant German invasion.
Those who desire to see France attempt to maintain
FW 740.00 /298
her traditional position in Europe are entirely in disagree-
-
mont 08 to the monns to produce 2 national unity and revival
of will. The Socialists, Co runists and Left "ing of the
way.
Rudical-Socialists believe that 1 ministry containing Commun-
1st representatives might rally the country and persuade the
workmen to abandon the forty hour wook and devote all their
onergies to strongthoning the military position of France.
Tho Right "Ying of the Radical Socialists and all the part-
10s to the Right boliovo that only a Contro Government,
oxcluding the Communists and ruling with an iron hand can
bring a revival of the national will.
Tho course of Fronch politics will be determined by
tho prossuro of ovents; but at the moment there is small
sign of 7 dosiro to S erifico present woll being and ease
G-J Confidential biie
for the maintonanco of French influence beyond the Rhino.
In this
CA
--2--269 from Paris Soction 3..
In this connection, I may ndd, ultra confidentially,
that Chautomps in our last convorsation before the mooting
betwoon Titler and Schuschnigg it Borchtosgadon expressed
the opinion that It was invit thle that Austria should
fall into the hands of Germany and inovitable that Frando
I
would do nothing to prevent this calamity. Ho also forc-
saw clearly that Germany's control of Austrin would moan
oventual Gorman control of Hungary, Rumania and Czecho-
slovakia.
It appears, ther fore, that poaco may be maintained
tomporarily in Europo by reported acquicsconces in Gorman
triumphs. If the Gormans should follow a policy of
fortitorinro, sunvitorin modo, thore may be no war because
thore may be no rosistanco.
ED MESSAGE
BULLITT
Paris, France, February 26, 1938.
No. 1821
Subject: Statements of Prince Max Hohenlohe on the
Sudeten problem.
The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
Sir:
I have the honor to transmit herewith, for the
information of the Department, & copy of & strictly
confidential memorandum of conversation between a
member of the Debassy staff and Prince Max Hohenlone
with regard to the Sudeten problem in Czechoslovskia.
Respectfully yours,
Edwin C. Wilson
Charge d'Affaires ad interim.
Enclosure:
1. Memorandum dated
February 24, 1938.
File 800.
In quintuplicate.
SH/hhp
4. trankings of
de
CC - American Embassy, Berlin.
American Legation, Fraha.
1821
Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No.
of February 26, 1938,
from the Embassy at Paris.
COPY--FULL TEXT
Paris, February 24, 1938.
MEMORANDUM
STRICTLY
AL
For: The Ambassador.
From: Mr. Hawks.
Subject: Statements of Prince Max Hohenlohe on the
Sudeten problem.
***
The following is the substance of statements made
to me by Prince Max Hohenlohe.
Prince Hohenlohe is an old friend of mine whom I
have known for the past ten years. He owns a very large
property in the Sudeten part of Czechoslovakia and has
just returned from Prague where he had a talk with
President Benes concerning the minority question in
Csechoslovakia. He also saw Herr von Ribbentrop in
Berlin. He has no official position, but, due to his
large property holdings in Czechoslovakia, has a certain
amount of influence.
President Benes is now ready to discuss with
Germany the problems which exist between the two
countries. He does not feel that Germany, at
least for the present, will take any action against
Czechoslovakia. What Germany really desires from
Czechoslovakia is more economic than political,
since it needs to import certain raw materials
from Czechoslovakia. There are now before the
Czech parliament proposals for alleviating the
position of the German minorities in Czechoslovakia
through making them certain concessions with regard
to education, etc. If these are passed, and it is
the intention of the Government that they or similar
bills be passed, Germany will be satisfied and
there will be no question, at least for the present,
of setting up any autonomous state. Germany does not
desire to take any aggressive action against Csecho-
slovakia at this time as it is not as strong as it
would like to have people believe.
The attitude of the Czech Government towards
the Sudetens had changed radically in the last two
weeks. Henlein, the head of the Sudeten group, is
now no longer persecuted by the Government, his
paper is allowed to be published--it formerly was
suppressed by the Government--and he 1s evidently
in Government favor. He is a strong man, independent,
has absolute control of his party, but is a patriot
and is not Hitler's tool. If the Government gives
his
- 2 -
his party certain privileges he will be satisfied
with that and will not work towards setting up an
autonomous state. Two members of the Sudeten
party who have been in prison for the past six
weeks have been suddenly released, no reason
being given for the action.
The situation between Csechoslovakia and
Germany is much less critical than it was and
their problems will be ironed out, at least for
the moment, without any drastic steps being taken.
The general feeling in Prague and Berlin is
that Schuschnigg cannot remain in office more than
two or three months longer.
(Sgd) STANLEY HAWKS
SH/hhp
JR
This
RECEIVED
closely paraphrased be-
fore bring communicated
Dated March 11, 1938
to anyone
D)
FROM Rec'd 2:30 p.m.
Secretary of State,
DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
Washington.
Pr
MAR 11 1938
RUSH.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
374, March 11, 4 p.m. (SECTION ONE)
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.
Massigli told me at noon that the report was true
762.63/519
that Nazi storm troops have been mobilized on the Austrian
frontier and that railway communications between Austria
and Germany haVEbEEN interrupted.
HE said that Schuschnigg Ladanade a great mistake in
underestimating Hitler's reactions to the announcement
of the elebiscite. Also that it had been a mistake to
hold the plebiscite on only three days notice. The
MAR 1938
filed FII ED
shortness of the period had caused surprise EVErywhere
and was bound to provoke a strong reaction in Germany.
HE said that it was impossible to tEll as yet whether
Hitler intended by intimidation merely to influence the
result of the plabiscite or whether hE intended to prevent
CONFIDENTIAL Fill
the plabiscite and force out Schuschnigg. If there is any
bloodshed it seems likely that Hitler will intervene
directly in Austria,
WILSON
KLP:HPD
GML
(a) Apparent omission,
JR
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
This telegram must bE
Paris
closely paraphrased bE-
fore being communicated
Dated March 11,
1938VISION OF
to anyone. (D)
FROM
EUROPEAN AFFAINS
REc'd 2:50 p.m. MAR II 1938
Sucretary of State,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington.
RUSH:
374, March 11, 4 p.m. (SECTION TWO)
I inquired if there had been any consultation between
762.63/519
the British and French and if the two Governments intended
to take any steps. HE said that Halifax and Chamberlain
had spoken with Ribbentrop yesterday about Austria and
Delbos had seen Welzeek this morning. HOWEVER "these
were merely words and it is only actions which count
- today".
I have never seen Massigli SO dejected. HE said
that the course of EVENTS in Austria is entirely in
Hitler's hands. Neither England nor France nor any other
country is willing or able to lift a finger to restrain
Hitler. France has no Government and when one is formed
it will not bE able to act with authority. The Essential
problem is to find somthow, sometime, D. way of conciliating
CONFIDENTI
a regime of liberty with a spirit of discipline and order.
Until that can bE dont France will bE unable to take
any Effective action.
VILSON
HPD
GML
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
JR
DIVISION OF
This telegram must bE
Paris
EUROPEAN -AFEAIRS
closely paraphrased bE-
fore being communicated
FROM
MAR 11 1938
to anyone. (D)
Dated March 11, 1938
DEPARTMENT
REC'd 9.30 p.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
RUSH.
374, March 11, 4 p.m. (SECTION THREE)
762.63/519
I have also spoken today with the new German Counselor.
HE tells me that he is of "the new school of diplomacy"
and believes in speaking sincerely. I asked him about
Austria. HE said: "WE will never allow any fortign
country to intervene as between Austria and Germany.
That is of German question and WE will settle it ourselves."
I asked him about Czechoslovakia. HE said that Germany
auttted that other countries had a right to bE heard
regarding Czechoslovakia but that so far ns the three and
3
met,
62.
one-helf million Germens in Czechoslovakia are concerned
760-3
Germany will SEE that treatment which she regards as
-
satisfactory is accorded them by the Czechoslovak Govern-
ment taking whatever steps may be necessary to accomplish
this "vithout regard to frontiers". HE added that the
CONFIDENTI " FIL
Czechs were showing "comprehension",
(END MESSAGE)
/ILSON
KLP:HPD
GML
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
JR
DIVISION OF
This telegram must bE
Paris COROPEAN AFFAIRS
clostly paraphrased bE-
fore being communicat FROM March 1631938
to anyone. (D)
Secretary of State,
GRIEJS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington.
MAR 17 1938
418, March 16, 8 D.M. (SECTION ONE).
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFAIRS
STRICTLY
I have just SEEN Massigli. HE said that the
succession of victories gained by the Nationalists over
the government forces in Spain after the first battle of
Teruel has been due EntirEly to their superiority in
aviation and artillery all of which has been furnished
by Italy and Germany. HE said that beginning with the
End of December and continuing through January there
have been a marked increase in the number of Italian
and German airplanes observed in Spain. HE said that
00 /7512 SEC. 1,2
while the French Government had no absolute proof that
the Germans and Italians had shipped plants to Spain in
FILED
the past few days there were indications that this
had in fact taken place.
assigli read me R telegram just received from the
French Charge d'Affaires at ROME. This telegram reported
rtlioble information to the Effect that at the last
meeting
Confidontial File ams
-2- #418, March 16, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Paris.
meeting of the Fascisti Grand Council Mussolini had
declared that hE had been given definite assurances by
Hitler of complete support for the achievement of
Italian objectives. The telegram went on to say that
there were unmistakable indications that Mussolini
had been deeply impressed by Hitler's SUCCESS in
Austria and that hE would attempt to follow Hitler's
tactics in achieving Italian aims.
ILSON
NPL:EMB
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TELEGRAM RECEIVEDIAR 1 7 1938
MBO
DIVISION OF
This telegram must be
Paris
WEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (D)
FROMATED March 16,01938
Rec'd 8:40 p.m.
Arrain
Secretary of State,
DEPARTMENT OF SIA, file PM
1939
Washington.
418, March 16, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO).
The Charge reported that before long it could be expected
that Hustolini would proclaim himself the protector of
and
Italians living outside of Italian frontiers this being
aimed particularly at Tunis. The Charge reported his
conviction that Mussolini would USE the British negotia-
White
tions as a means of gaining time.
the victory of
the Nationalists in Spain was completed and the Establish-
ment of Italian forces in Spain and the Balearics made.
74165
Ecure with the dELIBERATE intention of provoking war in
the Mediterrantan when circumstances were most favorable.
Massicli said that the Charge d'Affaires on the basis
of observation made on the ground in Italy had thus ar-
rived at the same conclusion which the French Ministry
of Foreign Affairs had reached sometime ago as being the
correct interpretation of the significance of the Rome-
Berlin axis as applied to Italian objectives. SEE my
403, March 14, 7 p.m. reporting conversations with Leger.
There
2- No. 418, March 16, from Paris.
There were prople in the government who believed that if
war WOO now inevitable with Italy it world bE better to
CEASE immediately the farce of non-intervention and to
Eject the Italians from Spain and the Balearics rather
751.65
than to have the war take place a short time hence when
Italy had firmly Established her forces in these places.
HE said, however, that as yet there had been no decision
to abandon the non-intervention policy. The British were
urging caution and hE spoke bitterly of the facility with
which the British allow themselves to bE duped when it is
a matter concerning the Essential interests of France.
HE stated that the situation was very serious.
END CIF HESSAGE.
WILSON
NPL:EID
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
MBo
This telegram must bE
FROMᵃᵃʳis
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
Dated March 17, 1938
to anyone. (c)
Rec'd 9:50 a.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
DIVISION OF
-
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MAR 1938
420, March 17, noon.
DEPARTMENT Of STATE
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIALS,
751.62
The Military Attache has had talks with high officers
of the General Staff and tells me his impressi ons as fol-
760F.62/148
lows: The General Staff is opposed to intervention by
France in Soain. General Staff believes that Germany will
force the issue in Czechoslovakia before long. General
Staff is of the opinion that in CASE of German aggrtssion
against Czschoslovakia, France will bE unable to take Cf-
fective action against Germany unless Great Britain sup-
ports France. This does not mean that France would refuse
to 30 to Czechoslovakia's aid immedi tely; the army will
carry out the orders of the Government; but it does meán
BSGL I-HAN
filed
that the General Staff believes that action by France
against Germany without Great Britdin's support would bE
hoptless.
WILSON
WWC:RR
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
JR
1-1386
This telegram must bE
FROM Paris
closely puraphrased be-
fore being communicated
Dated March 23, 1938 -
to anyone. (D)
Rec'd 9:57 n.m.
Secretary of State,
File
DIVISION OF
my
Washington.
PM BUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MAR 23 1938
445, March 23, 10 a.m.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
STRICTIV CONFIDENTIAL.
A Communist Party leader has told us that hE
considers the outlook for Republican Spain very dark.
852.00/7586 00 /7586
The Government, he believes, could defend itself if it
could receive 300 planes with well trained pilots and
some heavy artillery immediately but while it is
possible to get munitions in quantity across the
frontier big guns are too conspicuous to smuggle EVEN
through the lax French control there. HE has little
hope of being able to get the Government to abandon
nonintervation
(a). Aid from Russia has been curtailed much more than
is realized he said by pirate sinkings but the crucial
852.51 not.
difficulty is that the funds of the Spanish Government
Confidential File
are now Exhausted. The Government's emissaries are
begging for food, clothing, fats, medical supplies,
anything from the Communists here but they state very
definitely they cannot pay for them.
the
GE
-2- #445, March 23, 10 a.m., from Poris.
The outlook at present 18 no less discouraging.
His party contrary to their previous pretentions and
belief, has lately oser forced to the conclusion that
the French péorle cannot bE induced to go to war at
present without the certainty of full and immediate
British participation.
In greatest confidence he stated unequivocally that
the Soviet Union also will not (repeat not) now fight
for Czechoslovakia. Heretofore the Communists have
invariably declared that Russia would not only send air
forces immediately but would drive a relief army through
Rumania. HE Expects therefore that Germany will bE able
to gain mastery of Czechoslovakin without provoking
a general war.
I
- HE does not believe that a National Union Government
will bE formed in France until the External menace
851.80
becomes both very ncute and apparent but says that
100.158
in the present grave state of affairs the Communists
are disposed to support most any government without
fussing about cabinet posts for themselves or other
conditions.
WILSON
KLP:CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
EDA
This telegram must bE
PARIS
closel Yord paraphrased
FROM
before being communi-
Dated March 28, 1938
cated to anyone (c)
RECEIVED 5:46 p.m.
Secretary of State
I
Washington
481, March 28, 7 p.m. (SECTION ONE).
in file ph Ge
n
CONTIDERIIAL.
The Counselor of the German Embassy said to me today
that hE believed Ambassador Kennedy was Entirely safe in
760F.62/182
offering ten to one against war. He said that there would
bE no direct action by Gergany against Czechoslovakia
unless the Czechoslovak Government should "oppress"
the Garman minority. If the Czechoslovak Government
would make reasonable concessions there would bE no
difficulty. HE said that during the past two WEEKS the
GDG
Cztchoslovek Government had shown itself very concilia-
tory in dealing with the German minority problem. HE
said that the only future hE could SEE for an artificial
patchwork sort of state like Czechoslovakin was to be-
come a Federal state such as Switzerland or Else If the
process of disintegration goes further, Bohemia might
remain as a small independent state, the Sudetan country
be incorporated in Germany, and Slovakia returned to
Hungary.
HE said
EDA - 2 - #481, March 2, 7 p.m. from Paris Section one
HE said that the End of the Spanish conflict would
probably come within a few days. The German Government
qul ness
would make no difficulty about withdrawing their DEOPLE
from Spnin, While Germany had definite commercial
interests in Spain their only direct interest in the
Spanish civil war had been to ensure that there would
be no Bolshevism in that country.
WILSON
NPL:EMB
REB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
This telegram must bE
clostly paraphrased be-
PARIS
fore being, communicated
to anyone. (C)
FROM Dated March 28, 1938
REC'd 6:20 D. m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
481; March 28, 7 P. m. (SECTION TWO)
There mi tht bE a little difficulty regarding the com-
plate withdrawal of the Italians from Spain and
particularly from the Balaarics but he assumed that
the British would take care of this point before con-
cluding negotiations with the Italians. HE said that
in any Case Franco's Essential need would bE money to
finance the reconstruction of Spain and neither Germany
nor Italy had any money to lend. Furthermore, he said
that there had already been indications that Franco's
people had a short memory concerning assistance they
had received in the past and it might bE EXPECTED that
once they have gained a complete military victory they
will bE anxious themselves to get the Italians out of
Spain and Spanish possessions as quickly as possible.
HE said that a few days ago his Government had
been disturbed over the possibility that the Extreme
Left and the labor unions in France might force Blum
to intervene directly in Spain. HE now felt that this
danger was past, Copies to London, Berlin,
(END OF MESSAGE)
WILSON
EMB-NPL