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Dispatches - Germany, September 10, 1938-October 21, 1938
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Dispatches - Germany, September 10, 1938-October 21, 1938
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CONTENTS
Communications from Germany
Telegram No. 428, September 10, 1938, (760F.62/727)
Telegram No. 431, September 12, 1938, (760F.62/751)
Telegram No. 436, September 13, 1938, (760F.62/785)
Telegram No. 443, September 15, 1938, (760F.62/840)
Telegram No. 444, September 15, 1938, (
"
)
Telegram No. 451, September 17, 1938, (760F.62/870)
Telegram No. 456, September 18, 1938, (760F.62/897)
Telegram No. 457, September 18, 1938, (
If
)
Telegram No. 462, September 19, 1938, (760F.62/911)
Telegram No. 471, September 22, 1938, (760F.62/986)
Telegram No. 488, September 24, 1938, (760F.62/1085)
Telegram No. 490, September 24, 1938, (760F.62/1087)
Telegram No. 493, September 25, 1938, (760F.62/1090)
Telegram No. 491, September 25, 1938, (760F.62/1088)
Telegram No. 492, September 25, 1938, (760F.62/1089)
Telegram No. 495, September 26, 1938, (760F.62/1106)
Telegram No. 498, September 26, 1938, (760F.62/1117)
Telegram No. 505, September 27, 1938, (760F.62/1176)
Telegram No. 514, September 28, 1938, (760F.62/1268)
Telegram No. 515, September 28, 1938, (760F.62/1260)
Telegram No. 517, September 29, 1938, (760F.62/1277)
Telegram No. 518, September 29, 1938, (760F.62/1283)
Telegram No. 529, October 5, 1938, (760F.62/1495)
Telegram No. 530, October 6, 1938, (760F.62/1506)
-2-
Communications from Germany
Despatch No. 370, October 14, 1938, (760F.62/1822)
Telegram No. 560, October 20, 1938, (760f.62/1737)
Telegram No. 565, October 21, 1938, (760F.62/1747)
Telegram No. 566, October 21, 1938, (760F.62/1747)
Despatch No. 402, November 4, 1938, (760F.62/1858)
Despatch No. 429, November 12, 1938, (762.00/215)
Telegram No. 758, December 28, 1938, (741.62/325)
Despatch No. 550, January 25, 1939, (762.00/239)
Telegram No. 79, January 31, 1939, (762.00/231)
Telegram No. 80, January 31, 1939, (
If
)
Telegram No. 94, February 4, 1939, (762.00/240)
Telegram No. 116, February 10, 1939, (852.01/440)
Telegram No. 138, February 23, 1939, (711.62/231)
Telegram No. 141, February 24, 1939, (711.62/232)
Telegram No. 212, March 29, 1939, (7600.62/476)
V
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
EG
A portion of this
Berlin
message imust bE closely
FROM
paraphrased before being
Dated September 10, 1938
communicated to anyone. (B)
Rec'd 12:10 p.m.
Secretary of State,
DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
Washington.
SEP 12 1938
CrIP
428, September 10, 2 p.m.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
(GRAY) OnE. The morning papers published
summaries of Praha's "fourth plan" as WEll as the text
of the communique issued by the representatives of the
Sudeten German party with respect thereto. The only
760F.62/727
editorial comment thus far noted appeared in the
VOLKISCHER BEOBACHTER and the DEUTSCHER ALGEMEINE
ZEITUNG which briefly stated that it was very difficult
to SEE how the great gap between the latest Czech plan
and the eight points constituting the Sudeten Carlsbad.
program could bE bridged.
Two. Yesterday Evening's BERLINER TAGEBLATT
published an article by its editor of which the following
SEP 31938
FILED
GUG
passages indicate the trend.
"Through the joint deliberations of the representatives
of the national groups in Czechoslovakia it has been brought
home to the world that at Praha it is not of any question
of the future of the Sudeten Germans but of the construction
of
⑉2⑉ #428, September 10, 2 p.m. from Berlin
of the Czech state as stated therein. At a time when EVEN
small nations have awakened to a consciousness of their
identity it is not possible in a nationalities state to
maintain the sovereign rule of a state people which does
not EVEN represent a numerical majority. If this has
not yet been fully realized in Praha today, the realization
has gained ground in London and Paris as is indicated by
the remarks of the TIMES and of various French papers.
In VErsailles twenty years ago the card of the right of
self determination was thrown on the table. Thus a
promissory note was issued to the nations which to this
day has not yet been redeemed. One cannot prolong this
note forever unless one wants to make permanent the con-
ditions of unrest and insecurity which was created at
VErsailles, It is today not a question of whether the
one or the other settlement would please the Versailles
powers more or less, it is simply a question of vital
national rights which can no longer bE denied and which
must bE anchored in an unshakable national legal manner.
This realization is today quite general at Nuremberg and
for this reason further developments are here regarded
with quiet and calm which is in agreeable contrast to
the Exoitement in the political centers of the western
powers,
⑉3⑉ #428, September 10, 2 p.m. from Berlin
powers. It was the fatal mistake of the European politics
of the past twenty years that the policies of the old
Entente states believed they could, with compromises save
a system which was wrong in its plan and contradicted the
leading ideas which were proclaimed at VErsailles.
From this point of order one must today also judge
the Czechoslovak question. Past methods proved unsuccess-
ful. Now it is a question of recognizing the practical
Effects of the principles. HE who proclaims the right
of self determination as a political ideal cannot prevent
its application in a question of state law. It is the
ESSENCE of law to create practical orders of life. The
firmer, clearer and more natural the order is, the securer
is peace. Europe, however, must at last bE brought to
peace, CENTERS of unrest which have arisen out of the
disregard of national facts must bE Eliminated, Europe
needs a natural order Established on the inalienable vital
laws of peoples. That is the lesson which results from the
policy of diplomatic compromises of the past decades and
from the negotiations in Praha of the past few months. It
may today bE bitter for some statesmen to bow to this
lesson. The present bitterness, however, will bE en-
countered
-4- #428, September 10, 2 p.m. from Berlin
countered a' thousand fold by permanent and secure peace.
That is the goal towards which the policy of the Fuchrer
is directed". (End Gray)
The foregoing was written at Nuremberg and it is
believed that it was inspired by or at least submitted
to Hitler.
WILSON -
CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
JR
This telegram must bE
Berlin
clostly.paraphrased be-
FROM
fore being communicated
Dated September 12, 1938
to anyone. (C)
Rec'd 4 p.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
431, September 12, 5 p.m.
SEP 13 1938
STRICTLY CONTIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Henderson returned from Nuremberg this morning. I
find his impressions of sentiment are almost identical
with what I reported to you in my 425, September 8, 6 p.m.
760F.62/751
HE had the impression from various indications in
his talks with men in real touch with Hitler that the
latter was contemplating-a relatively peaceable statement
tonight. HE feared that the declaration given out by
Chamberlain last night will not encourage
Hitler to persevere in this policy. (Incidentally
hE had not received a copy of this statement,
nor have I, nor has it been published in the German
press). HE argued that Hitler feels deep resentment over
the claims made in Democratic countries that the British
warning of May 21 deterred him from military action and
that it is unlikely that on the day following a further
warning from Chamberlain Hitler will show himself
conciliatory.
Henderson
-2- #431, September 12, 5 p.m., from Berlin.
Henderson read ME a memorandum of conversation on
SEptEmbEr ten between Halifax and Kennedy which the
Ambassador has doubtless reported to you as well as a
memorandum of a conversation between Halifax and the
Russian Ambassador in which the latter urged that the
British Government make a more categorical repudiation
of the TIMES suggestion regarding the fate of the
Sudeten Deutsch.
The Russian Ambassador apparently also suggested
a joint demarche to Germany in which the United States
might bE induced to join. Halifax replied in respect to
the first suggestion that hE thought sufficient denial
had been made, in regard to the second that the French
had already apprised him of the Soviet suggestion.
The British manager of the American Express Company
states that families of British residents are already
leaving Berlin. HE had discussed their departure with
a Secretary of the British Embassy and the Vice Consul`
had stated that they were suggesting that such departure
should bE made.
Repeated to London and Paris.
WILSON
CSB
TELEGRAM RECEI
VED
DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
W
SEP 14 1938
JR
This message must bE
FROMBErli DEPARTMENT of State
closely paraphrased bE-
fore being communicated
Dated September 13, 1936
to anyone. (c)
Rec'd 3:48 p.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
-
436, September 13, 7 p.m.
STRICTLY CONTIDENTIAL.
The Belgian Minister Davignon, one of the acutest
minds in the diplomatic corps listened to Hitler's
760F.62/785
speech in Nuremberg last night.
HE tells me that hE is deeply convinced that
Hitler meant every word hE said and that there was no
bluff about it. The faces of the Ministers and party
leaders behind Hitler were radiant with joy as the
shap
latter spoke. On the train last night Davignon discussed
this matter with the Polish and Italian Ambassadors
and found them both convinced that Hitler meant Every
word hE spoke and that the most tragic mistake would bE
to regard it as bluff.
Davignon told me he learned from a good source
- last night before the speech that the latter part had
been rewritten and made appropriately more violent after
hearing
⑉2⑉ #436, September 13, 7 p.m., from Berlin.
hearing of Chamberlain's statement to the press on
Sunday.
Davignon added that as hE listened to the speech
hE came to the conclusion that stripped of its
vituperation and violence of presentation Hitler
had made a powerful case for the grievances of the
Sudeten Germans in the light of generally accepted
democratic ideals. This hE thought should bE given
real consideration.
Davignon is urging his Government to try to
persuade the British Government that the time has come
to act rapidly; that the four great Powers, France,
should meet
England, Germany and Italy,
under
British
chairmanship and try to find a peaceable way out of
this trouble. Davignon is aware of the risk of this
procedure--a German refusal would sharpen the tension--
but considers it a lesser risk than letting matters
drag as hE is inclined to believe Germany would accept
-
while the four powers might follow some other path.
HE at the moment SEES only two solutions, one, that
BENES accept unequivocally the Carlsbad demands of
the Sudeten Germans; two, that a plebiscite bE
suggested under international auspices and France
and Great Britain urge this on Benes, HE believes
that
-3- #436, September 13, 7 p.m., from Berlin.
that BENES cannot politically accept point one
therefore one is reduced to point two,
In his discussion with the Italian Ambassador
&
Davignon gained the impression that Italy would
cooperate in an international effort to solve this
problem.
Reports from Praha today show the shooting
of three Czechs and three Sudeten Germans and declaration
of martial law over a portion of the area.- I do not
believe that Hitler has made up his mind to armed
intervention, nevertheless, I believe that Davignon
is right in his further contention that only prompt
action somewhere can prevent the occurrence of that
type and SCOPE ef disorder and bloodshed which may
provoke Hitler into intervention.
Repeated to London, Paris, Rome.
WILSON
CSB
-
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
JR
This telegram must bE
Berlin
closely paraphrased be- FROM
fore being communicated
Dated September 15, 1938
to anyone. (c)
Rec'd 6:40 p.m.
Secretary of State,
DIVISION OF
Washington.
we
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
OWEP 16 1938
443, September 15, 1 p.m.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.
In astute discussing the present situation with certain of
the more
and well informed of the foreign
representatives here
I find relative unaninety of
760F. 760F.62/840
opiniongarding certain of its aspects. I wish to say
at once that these men's approach to the question is that
they regard a war as the greatest possible calamity which
EVEry effort should bE made to avoid and that they speak
obviously out of personal knowledge and conviction quite
aside from what might bE the policies of their respective
governments. They look upon the situation which has
FILED
CIDG
1938
developed as Extremely dangerous that risk of allowing
it to drift is the sheerest folly and that something has
to bE done and done quickly. They feel furthermore
that anything that is undertaken should bE of a practical
nature that prejudice based upon varying national
concepts should bE laid aside as far as possible and
most important that all of the factors in the immediate
disturbing
⑉2⑉ #443, September 15, 1 p.m., from Berlin.
-
disturbing issue should bE fully recognized.
Respecting they emphasize the German side of the picture considered
in such terms
the following.
OnE. The LONDON TIMES of September 7 in speaking of
self-determination for the Sudeten Germans turned the
Entire course of the affair into new channels. Doubtless
this issue was boiling beneath the surface but up to that
moment it had not burst through. Whatever the validity
of the TIMES' article as representing the views of the
British Government or of the British people, tradition
- has placed the TIMES in a position where this article
has been widely accepted as such. Repercussions in
the Sudeten German area and in the REICH were immediate,
From that moment it has been impossible to go back.
The Eight points of Carlsbad have Evaporated from the
picture. The issue to all intents and purposes is
self-determination which presumably will mean a
plebiscite resulting in cession or secession. As
matters have developed this has become true, possibly
apart from Germany's original intentions.
Two. By all progressive standards the principle of
self-determination is a just one, In any EVENT the
democratic governments cannot with good conscience
retreat
-3- #443, September 15, 1 p.m., from Berlin,
retreat from their historic position on this subject.
To ignore it is of the same character, To retreat or to
ignore is to admit that the real issues involved are
solely those of power politics with their concomitant
insincerities. The issue must bE honorably faced if
democratic forms of government are to retain popular
respect throughout the world and gain a hoped for
ultimate general acceptance. This is in Effect the
concept of DE Valera in his Geneva speech insofar as
I have seen it reported 1.E. the untried concept of
Article XIX of the League Covenant.
Three. The linking together of the democracies
and Soviet Russia as possessed of a common ideal, which
has progressively manifested itself in the western press,
is a development obviously opportunist and projects
a shadow of insincerity over the protestations of the
directly interested democracies.
Four. Such factors have had a direct Effect on
German attitude. Germany had portrayed itself as a
victim of a determined and permanent opposition in the
field of power politics. Germans believe this without
any doubt whatsoever as they survey the course of events
from the Treaty of Versailles to the rise of National
Socialism in the Reich. The present attitude of the
-
press
-4- #443, September 15, 1 p.m., from Berlin.
press of the western powers toward self-determination in
Czechoslovakia and towards the form of government in
Soviet Russia confirms them in this belief. This
attitude has recently diminished the influence of
the compromises on German policy and has greatly
strengthened the position of Hitler, National Socialism,
and the more radical Elements of the party. These
moderate Elements are naturally Germans first of all.
Their feeling that it is hopeless to try to bE understood
abroad hardens their entire attitude toward the non-
This
German world.
change had been observable
during recent weeks to any one closely watching the
situation here. It is a dangerous phenomenon.
Five. On the other hand, the foreign representatives
here are fully aware of, and in varying degrets share,
-
the recognized apprehensions concerning Germany's possible
long term designsrespecting Europe. They feel
nevertheless that of immediate and overwhelming
importance is the avoidance of any European conflict
and that this tremendous issue should not bE confused
by speculations respecting the future however well
reasoned. While the moment may occur when the states
of the world will have to say no to Germany, such a
decision
⑉5⑉ #443, September 15, 1 p.m., from Berlin.
decision must only bE taken on grounds uncontestably
just.
On a practical basis they feel that the impossibility
of Sudetens and Czechs harmoniously cooperating in
one state has been demonstrated, They inquire whether
anybody imagines that the results of a victorious
war over Germany could in any way reconcile such
inherent difficulties. (END SECTION ONE).
WILSON
HTM:EMB
Garbled groups have been serviced.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
LMS
This telegram must bE
FROM
Berlin I
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
Dated September 15, 1938
to anyone. (c) and (D)
Rec'd 7:06 p. m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
DIVISION OF
FUROPEAN AFFAIRS
SEP 16 1938
444, September 15, 1 p. m.
UF STATE
CONTINUING MY 443. (SECTION TWO)
The only dissenting VOICE to these general conceptions
among the foreign representatives is that of Francois Poncet
who believes and states frankly that WE are dealing with
"criminal lunatics" and that it is waste of time to apply
those methods and relationships to which normal men would
respond. NEVERTHELESS to act on such a hypothesis is so
stultifying as to rob millions of all hope. HENCE WE must
predicate our dealing on the hypothesis that the leaders
of the party are subject to reason and responsive to nor-
mal stimuli.
Six. I have already reported my views as to the
urgency of the situation in the Sudeten area and the need
of some vital and prompt step which might approach the
problem from a radically new standpoint and would prevent
EVENTS in this area from provoking Hitler to military
intervention. The visit of Chamberlain is a courageous
step.
LMS 2-No. 444, September 15, 1 p. m., from Berlin,
step. HE has shown himself ready to subordinate the risk
to his reputation to the necessity for accomplishing
something to avert a catastrophe. It may prove to be the
act which saves the situation but it is too early to form
a judgment on this point.
REPEATED to Paris and London EXCEPT penultimate para-
graph,
(END MESSAGE)
WILSON
NPL:EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
NC
Berlin
This telegram must bE
clostly paraphrased before
FROM
Dated September 17, 1930
being communicated to anyone.
(C)
Rec'd 9:20 c.m.
Secretary of State
DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
Vaqhington
SEP 19 1938
451, cotember 17, noon.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
T ilitory Attache who hels just returned to Berlin,
atotes that the maneuvers in Edst Prussic were entirely
normal DEACE time maneuvers. Supporting this description
is the fact t' that they were followed by proctically the
760F .62 /870
Entire G-2 acction of army headquarters. Te has heard of
no unusubl troon movements in South Germany. As regards
Austric 1:E has heard that there has been some military
movement an the neighborhood of the border near Pressburg.
TE states that the Military Attache's corps present at
the East Pression maneuvers reg rded C.S significant that
the Frenco Government's Hilitary Attache WCC suddenly
ordered to return immediately to sursos, which started
852.00
rumors that the French Government VIC.O considering some form
of support of the Loyalist Govermment CO an offset to the
loss of Evench prectige reculting from recent development
in
GE
the Czechoslovek situation. I mention this rumor as an
Example of the speculation that in current here. I do no
SEPT63938 SEP1 62938 OF
FILED
believe that there is any real evidence here in support
it.
WILSON
CSB
SECRETARY O STATE
SE 19/1938
TELEGRAM RECEIVEL
NOT
Dah
MB
BERLIN
This message. should be
closely paraphrased be- FROM Dated September 18, 1938
fore bEing communicated
to anyone (D)
Rec'd 2:15 p.m.
Secretary of State
Washington
7603.62
456, September 18, 2 p.m.
STRICTLY COMPIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.
I just had a long talk with Henderson who is more
moved than I have ever seen him waiting in visible im-
760F.62/897
patience the decision in the Cabinet in London and the
results of the talks with Daladier. Chamberlain did not
give HENDERSON a real glimpse of what was in the former's
mind, contenting himself with presenting a resume of the
conversation with Hitler. HENDERSON is Extremely appre-
SEP 20 1938
FILED
hensive of any procrastination. Indeed hE said hE was
in despair over the fact that for four months he had
preached urgency, that nobody at home had listened to him
and he felt himself a "voice in the wilderness".
HE did not attempt any more than did WEIZSACKER to
give me a detailed account of the conversation at Ber-
chtesgaden. NEVERTHELESS the impression I got of the
- situation checks with what WEIZSACKER told ME and EVEN
the same phrase "cession of territory" was used. HENDERSON
File
explained that this was the phrase the Prime Minister had
Employed
MB ⑉2⑉ #456, September 18, 2 p.m. from Berlin
Employed and that it probably was synonymous in his mind
with self-determination.
HENDERSON brought out Hours the telegrams hE has sent his
Government in the past 48 The main points he made
are as follows: The Prime Minister's coming headed off
military action. Hitler has promised Chamberlain, and will
keep his word barring catastrophic EVENTS in Czechoslovakia,
that hE will make no military move until the next meeting
can bE held with Chamberlain. HENDERSON has reported
vigorously that if the western powers decline to adopt
right of self-determination or EVEN adopt it with a lot
of conditions there will bE no USE talking to Hitler again.
Indeed, the latter will march and a general European war
will bE the result. If, on the other hand, France and
Great Britain are willing to adopt unconditionally "self-
determination" they should bE able in their conversations
with Hitler to win certain concessions as to the method of
putting this into Effect. A further Essential point Hen-
derson has urged is that immediate pressure bE put on
BENES to accept the idea of self-determination. There is
of course the grave risk that BENES will refuse or that
if hE accepts a revolution will break out among the
Czechoslovak people. In this EVENT there will bE German
intervention and a local war. (END SECTION ONE)
WILSON
GW RGC
(#) Apparent omission
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
RR
1-1338
This telegram must bE
FROM
closely paraphrased bE-
fore bEing communicated
to anyone (D)
Berlin
Dated September 18, 1938
RECEIVED 2:50 p. m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
457, September 18, 2 p. m.
Continuing my 456, Section Two.
HENDERSON argues and has so reported that if it
must come to war the choice lies between a general war
on a bad cause involving the reputation of the democratic
principle of self determination or a small war of limited
SCOPE. There is no question in his mind as to what the
choice should bE. As hE phrases the matter France and
England must choose between unconditional adoption of the
principle of self determination and fighting Germany. If
they choose the first they will bE faced with the necessity,
repugnant as it may be, of coercing BENES into acceptance.
If the principle is accepted some form of coercion of BENES
is inevitable still either a friendly pressure by France
and Great Britain or armed pressure by Germany.
HE
457 September 18, 2 p. m. from Berlin (SECTION TWO)
-2-
HE is reporting as well a gathering of troops in
the Austrian area north of Vienna. HE believes though hE
is not sure, that certain military preparations are being
made in the vicinity of Breslau (in this connection SEE my
451, September 15, noon, reporting Military Attache's
summary), Our Military Attache has just informed ME that
the Chief of Staff and the Commander in Chief received
the Military Attaches in cast Prussia for dinner last
night. Obviously therefore no incident was contemplated.
HENDERSON informed me that on the EVE of his departure
from Nuremberg hE had received a telegram from his Govern-
ment to remain and to notify Ribbentrop that an urgent
communication was coming.
Inasmuch as hE recognized the danger of a further
warning, hE neither notified Ribbentrop nor remained in
Nuremberg and so informed his Government. This Episode
must have occurred at almost the same moment as HEndErson's
statement to the Press.
Henderson saw Goering Karinhall yesterday afternoon
and urged him to do what hE could to SEE that peace was
maintained whatever the provocation until Chamberlain could
talk again with Hitler. Goering reassured him on this,
said
457 September 18, 2 P. me from Berlin (SECTION TWO)
said that Hitler's w.rd had been given and that barring
catastrophic upheaval in Czechoslovakia no steps would bE
taken until further negotiations had been started.
Goering said Emphatically that any conditions attached to
the acceptance of "self determination" would bE useless -
and provocative and urged HENDERSON SO to report to
his Government. Goering spoke with confidence of their
state of praparation and in respect to the air said that
they were stronger than Great Britdin, France and Czecho-
slovakia put together. Henderson states that hE did not
bluster but his very quiet was ominous.
Goering said that hE was awaiting the visits'of
the Polish Ambassador and the Hungarian Minister that hE
was Expecting both of them to talk about their minorities
in Czechoslovakia and to request that these bE taken care
of in any settlement. Goering said that hE proposed to
tell them that Germany was interested in the Sudeten
Germans alone and not in the fate of any of the rest of
Czechoslovakia,
For reasons reported in my 453 I am not (repent not)
repeating this message to Paris or London.- You may desire
to apprise them.
(END OF MESSAGE)
RR RGC
WILSON
REB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
This telegram must bE
closely paraphrased be-
BERLIN
fore being'-Communicated
to anyone. (C)
FROM
Dated September 19, 1938
Rec'd 5:13 p. m.
Secretary of State,
DIVISION OF
Washington.
EUROPEAN AFFAINS
SEP 20 1938
462, September 19, 7 p. m.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.
In these anxious days of waiting the Italian attitude
assumes a growing importance,
I have discussed with Atolico the recent indications
of Italy's attitude and as WE analyzed the letter to Lord
760F.62/911
Runciman the speech on Sunday and previous communications
- it would appear that the position is as follows:
Mussolini desires above all to avoid a European
struggle if there must bE a struggle between Czechoslovakia
GDG
and Germany hE desires it to bE limited. If this appears
impossible and a general war results then in his words,
SEP 2 1 1938
FILED
"Italy's place is chosen."
The two recent announcements 36EM to show: (a)
Mussolini serves warning on the Caschoslovak Government
that the Sudeten-German problem must bE settled in the
interest of European DE&CE. (b) "E serves warning on
Germany and holds out hope to the Czechs by declaring his
Confidential File
peaceful
REB
2-,462, From Berlin, Sept.19,7p.m.
peaceful interest in and friendship for an "independent
Bohemian state".
(c) HE foresses the possibility of a repetition of
the same sort of danger arising in the future in respect
to the Fungarian and Polish minorities and therefore
desires once and for all by one more operation to
Eliminate future danger spots in the Danube valley.
France. HE waves a red flag at France in declaring
that if the war is generalized Italy's place is chosen
and this is published on the day on which the French
Cabintt is discussing Chamberlain's proposal.
Atolico says that the Italians are under the impres-
sion of recent Events:
A month ago the British discouraged their traders
-
from dealing with Italy.
I
Two WEEKS ago the French refused visas to travelers
-
to Italy.
Then came Chamberlain's statement of a week ago
Saturday to the Effect that England in any CASE sides
with France. This was made more specific by Eden's letter
to the TIMES. In Italian EYES the guarantee that Great
Britain had given, as a remnant of the Locarno undertakings,
has
REB
3- 3462, From Berlin, Sept.19, 7p.m.
has changed into an out and out allia ICE with France.
Italy is logically driven to take definite position in
the opposing camp since to remain her: if Germany were
destroyed it would be Italy's turn ne::t.
The An assador urgently hopes that if this present
crisis is surmounted it will bE follow:d 1 mediately by
a realization of the four power pact. Without it he can
SEE no hope for the maintenance of peact in Europe or for
the avoidance of automatic and billding E lliances dividing
Europe into two camps. The four nower pact he continues
would fill the purpose originally conceived for the Council
of the League of Nations by Enabling the great western
powers in a moment of danger automatically to consult.
It is curious that in another conversation today
with Lipsky, Polish Ambassador, I found him also speculat-
ing along these same lines in respect to the Italian
attitude.
THE says that hE is so convinced that warnings and
threats to Germany are worse than useless, that hE has
consistently maintained the attitude in his conversations
with Germans that the German Govérnment will be driven
by logic and reason to a peaceful settlement rather than
one
V
REB
4-#462, From Berlin,Sept.19,7p.m.
one which will risk a European conflict.
chambulain
Lipsky feels that the Germans consider the Deutschland
visit as a triumph for Hitler. They welcome the step
with its possibility of appeasement but nevertheless
they have made no public rejoicing over the triumph and
indeed have shown by their courtesy and warmth of -
reception their appreciation of Chamberlain's attitude.
Lipsky states further that in his opinion Chamberlain's
visit has gone far towards soothing the wounded pride
occasioned by the British warning on May 21 with its
disastrous result in spurring German military preparation
and stiffening their attitude.
I
WILSON
ENB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
1-1336
FROM
EG
This message must bE
Berlin
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
Dated September 22, 1938
to anyone. (B)
Rec'd 7:30 a.m.
OF
Secretary of State,
DIVISION OF
Washington.
SACE
ULPAR ("OF" STATE
DEE
760.65
471, September 22, noon.
In a conversation yesterday with the Counsellor
of the Embassy the Russian Charge d'Affaires stated
that under no circumstances would Russia lend military
760F.62/986
assistance to Czechoslovakia EXCEPT in common action
with France. Discussing the general European situation
hE said that although it might remain for a time in
nite
formal Existence the Franco-Russian Treaty to all in-
151.6111
tents and purposes must bE regarded as dead.
GDG
Cipher text Moscow.
WILSON
RGC :DDM
SEP 26 1938
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
1w
Berlin
1-1335
This telegram must bE closel FROM
paraphrased before being com- Dated September 24, 1938
municated to anyone. (A)
Rec'd 5:30 Litte p.mseptember 27 1938.
town of Ya
DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
Secretary of State
J
SEP 26 1938 VEJ
Washington
DEPARTMENT Tale OF STATE 9/26
488, September 24, 6 p.m.
Military Attache reports that air defense measures for
760F.62/1085
not
Berlin in full Effect with all air fields guarded by anti-
862.20
aircraft batteries in their battle positions. No major
troop movements in EVIDENCE though considerable minor
military activity. Troops at Potsdam and Doberitz were
pursuing on Saturday morning their normal training
schedules. The Potsdam garrison was granted normal
week End leave at noon Saturday. Notify War Department.
- WILSON
EMB
JLT 28 1938
FILED
SEP 28 1938
FILED
GG
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
lw
Berlin
This telegram must be closelVoM
paraphrased before bEing com- Dated September 24, 1938
municated to anyone. (C)
Rec'd 5:19 p.m.
DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIR:
Secretary of State
SEP 26 1938
Washington
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
490, September 24, 8 p.m.
The past week has been of course characterized by EX-
760F.62/1087
treme nervousness and apprehension. Although the general
impression in Germany after the Berchtesgaden conversations
was that the danger of general war was past, that the
western powers would under no considerations back up
Czechoslovakia if it resisted German aggression, appre-
hension grew lest Hitler, dominated by this thought,
should launch an attack in an attempt to settle the matter
immediately by force of arms. This bEllicose attitude
was Exemplified by a talk between WEizsaecker and the
Czech Charge d'Affaires reported in my 459, September 19,
4 p.m., where Weizsaecker warned the Czech that the calling
to the colors of SEVEN or Eight Classes might have vastly
different results from those of last May.
In spite of the still obscure and perhaps unsatisfactory
results of the Godesbarg conversations there are certain
SEP
indicatio
FIGED
lw ⑉2⑉ No. 490, September 24, 8 p.m. from Berlin
indications of a lessening of the tension and perhaps EVEN
of a relaxation of insistence upon unilateral action by
Hitler. The German press reports the final conversation
with Chamberlain in an optimistic spirit. Reports from
Praha show that the Czech army was mobilized yesterday.
Three or four days ago I should have EXPECTED such mobili-
most
zation to bE met either by a/violent denunciation or by
military action on Hitler's part. Today the press denounces
the mobilization but the signs of military activity in
Germany are no more visible than they have been for the
last WEEK.
I can only speculate on the cause of this apparent
change of temper. Possibly Chamberlain was to persuade
Hitler that the danger of general conflagration was not
past and that only decisions based upon international
agreement including agreement with Czechoslovakia could
preserve peace between Czechoslovakia and Germany and
insure peace between Germany and the Great Powers,
Repeated to Paris, London, Praha Warsaw.
WILSON
(a) appar Entr ont salon
HPD
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
ML This message 1-1336 must bE closeEROM Berlin
paraphrased before being
communicated to anyone. (c)
Dated September 25,1938
Rec'd 7 p.m.
Secretary f State
DIVISION OF
Washington
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
SEP 26 1938
493, September 25, 8 D. m.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CONFIDENTIAL
760F.62/1090
Henderson returned from Godesberg last night. WE
had a talk this morning.
Henderson owned the Cr nversati. n by stating that
it-is now fifty-fifty between a general war and peace.
All depended in his opinion upon how the present memo-
randum is presented by the British and French Ministers
at Praha to the Czech Government--in other words what
the attitude f Great Britain and France is in this
connection. If these twc Governments make it clear to
the Czechs that if this memorandum is rejected the
Czechs cannot count upon Fritish and French assistance
the Czechs will probably accept. If, on the other hand,
it is presented in any less definite way he fears that
the Czechs will resist. Henders n stated Emphatically
that Hitler has not been SEEN (repeat not) bluffing.
SEP 2 to
Henderson is C nvinced that Chamberlain's first visit
FILED
Berchtesgaden prevented a German attack at that time
and
ML -2- #493, Sept. 25,1938 7 p.m., from Berlin
and that Chamberlain's second visit to Godesberg pre-
vented an attack in retaliation for Czech mobilization.
HENDERSON was deeply perturbed at the growing
opposition in Great Britain to Chamberlain. HE feels
that Churchill is ambitious to bEC me Prime Minister
and is seizing this occasion in an endeavor to throw
out the present Cabinet and bE summoned himself by the
King. If Chamberlain falls Henders n says war is certain
since a "war cabinet" will follow, probably with Eden in
the Foreign Office. The policy of such a Cabinet would
bE to serve notice at once on Hitler warning him not to
act. This would bE the signal, Henderson is convinced,
for immediate action on Hitler's part. Hitler would do
nothing to provoke England or France but would immediately
assault Czechoslovakia. Henderson further believes that
if this matter is not settled by October 1, Hitler will
then march into Czechoslovakia regardless of threats or
risk of general war. Hitler has at last put himself in-
to a position from which hE cannot now retire.
Henders: n urged me strongly to dc what I could to
Emphasize tc you that the overthrow of Chamberlain means
711,00
war and that any public Expressi n of sympathy with his
objectives in thi- hour of uncertainty would greatly
strengthen his hand in his struggle to keep peace in
Europe.
Henderson
ML -3- #493, Sept. 25, 1938 7 p.m., from Berlin
Henderson says that in its ESSENCE the two plans are
not profoundly different. The Czechs have accepted the
first and it is incredible that having done SC a war
should break cut over the method of application of a
cession of territory already agreed upon in principle.
The British rlan had proposed outright cassion of cer-
tain districts and plebiscites for more doubtful areas,
this under international supervision. The Hitler plan
prop sed outright cession of certain areas and plebis-
cite for thers and the entire area t. bE occupied by
German f: rces as the Czechs retire.
Hitler proposed that plabiscites in the doubtful
areas should be held not later than November 26 and that for
/ this purpose German troops shall bE withdrawn and the
plabiscite held under international auspices or by a,
Czech-German commission. The plebiscite can bE carried
out in the same manner as the Saar plebiscites. Hender-
son states that the areas in question do not materially
differ in the British and Hitler plans.
Hitler was motivated in rejecting the Fritish plan
and urging his wn by (a) his conviction that the Czechs
accepted the first plan with the idea that they could
profit by the delay to sabotage the C: notssions made
and (b) his fear for the safety of the Sudeten Germans
within
ML -4- #493, Sept,25,1938 7 p.m.,, from Berlin
within this area. HE claims the only way in which hE
can assure himself of their safety is by actual pre-
SENOE of German troops as the Czechs withdraw.
In the course of the conversation Hitler gave
Chamberlain his word of honor that if this matter
were liquidated Germany would bE "a satisfied power".
HE said they would keep up their claim on Great Britain
for colonies but that nobody could imagine a German
mobilization for this purpose and that they would bE
"satisfied as far as the continent of Europe was con-
cerned." After Hitler had refused Chamberlain's memoran-
dum on the grounds above outlined hE presented an alter-
native memorandum. Chamberlain pointed out that it read
like an ultimatum and Hitler thereupon stated that
Chamberlain could change the memorandum in any way hE
saw fit if hE did not (repeat not) alter the fundamentals,
namely, prompt occupation by German soldiers of the
disputed area. Any changes could bE made in tone, Et
ceterá. A number of changes were made and a number of
statements were rejected from Hitler's memorandum.
In the first conversation Hitler had been insistent
in respect t the Polish and Hungarian claims in Czech-
oslovakia. Chamberlain had taken the position that they
were there to discuss the Sudeten German question. In
the subsequent conversation Hitler did not raise the
Polish
ML -5- #493, Sept.25,1938 7 p.m., from Berlin
Polish and Hungarian questions. The matter was only
raised inferentially when guarantees for Czechoslovakia
were discussed. Hitler declared hE was ready to give
any kind of a guarantee desired "after the questions
(plural) of mincrities have been settled".
In closing our anversation n Henderson returned
again t. the danger of war in a reversal of Chamberlain's
policy and Expressed the urgent hope that some means
could bE found whereby the American G vernment in the
first instance and the chamberlain French Government also could EX-
prese et nfidence in
and hopes for his
success in averting catastrophe.
I am the m re impressed by Henderson's C nviction
as t Hitler's determination to take matters into his
own hands if this problem is not settled satisfactorily
for him by the fact that in the rast Henderson has been
dubious if Hitler's intention to precipitate matters by
launching attack. His present belief is undoubtedly
aroused by the close contact hE has had with Hitler in
this recent series of discussions.
Repeated t. Paris, London.
WILSON
GW:EMB
rent
10
Eu
MJD
GRAY
Berlin
Dated September 25, 1938.
Rec'd. 11 a.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
491, SEptember 25, 11 a. m.
The press this morning features the transmission of the
German memorandum to Praha, the prospective trip of French
ministers tc London and the two speeches delivered yesterday
by Mussolini.
Mussolini's speeches are interpreted editorially as a
clear demonstration of the solidity of the Rome-Berlin Axis
which is now described as the "spine of Europe" which BENES
and Stalin are trying to break. The foreign press, particu-
larly the British, is attacked for spreading rumors of war
at the very time when Hitler and Chamberlain were agreeing
7"
upon a plan for peace in face of Czech provocation in the
form of general mobilization.
The gist of further Editorial comment is that the re-
sponsibility for war or peace now learly rests with Fraha
which must reply with a categorical yes or no. Germany and
England are in agreement upon the basic idea of self-deter-
mination for the Sudeten Germans and the only problem is
1088
how
MJD -2- No. 491, September 25, 11 a. m. from Berlin
how to accomplish it; it is hardly conceivable that Praha
would go.tc war over a matter of method. The Godesberg con-
versations were devoted not to a consideration of more Exten-
sive German demands but to the question of a practical EXECU-
tion of the right of self determination.
Almost no mention is made of Polish and Hungarian
minorities and such comment as appears is confined to EX-
pressions of pained surprise that London and Paris have not
better understood the claims of these nationalities.
This is the least violent tone in the German press
which WE have SEEN in weeks.
WILSON
DDM
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
ML
1-1336
This message must bE closs]FROM Berlin
paraphrased before being
communicated to anyone. (A)
Dated September 25,1938
Rec'd 7:13 P. me
DIVISION OR
Secretary. f State
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
Washington
F SEP 26 1938
VES
still
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
9/26
760F 62/1089
492, September 25, 1 p. m.
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Military Attache reports reserves being gradually
and secretly called to colors. No rmal WEEK End leave
given Berlin garrison. The fully bilized Eighth
Division was observed in Upper Silesia en the twenty-
fourth m ving south between Cosel and Leohschutz.
Survey indicates an advance state of readiness of
of air force with four hundred bombers concentrated on
PATIENT
fields in Berlin. Air defense 'measures for Berlin very
complete. Please repeat to War Department.
WILSON
EMB
FILED
Confidential File
4
GG
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
SIDN OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
1-1336
FROM
EG
This message must bE
Berlin
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
Dated September 26, 1938
to anyone. (C)
Rec'd 12:30 p.m.
: Secretary of State,
Washington.
RUSH.
495, September 26, 2 p.m.
The feeling abroad in anti cipation of Hitler's
760F.62/1106
speech tonight appears to bE more apprehensive than
in Germany EVEN though Hitler is calling a conference
of his advisers on foreign affairs early this afternoon
and it is impossible to reach them until Evening.
I had a talk with Woerlup, told him of the tension
abroad and asked whether there is any reassuring message
I could send my Government. Woerlup was in general re-
assuring. HE said hE did not anticipate any unusual
DOB
announcement in the speech although of course hE had
not SEEN it. HE said "the word is with the Czechs and
until they answer I do not believe WE will do anything
startling".
I asked him whether Hitler had given assurance to
1939 SEP
FILED
Chamberlain that no violent step would bE taken while
negotiations were pending. Wosrlup replied that Hitler
had
-2- #495, September 26, 2 p.m. from Berlin
had assured Chamberlain in the Berchtesgaden conversations
that barring "catastrophic" events in Czechoslovakia hE
would make no move while nagotiations WERE under way.
Wosrlup felt that I was safe in sending you a reassuring
message. HE added that Mussolini's Emphasis on October 1
gave the whole matter more of the form of an ultimatum
than the situation justified.
REpEatEd to-Paris, London, Praha, Warsaw.
WILSON
RR:HPD
I
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
1-1336
FROM
SEP 27 1938
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MJD
Berlin
This telegram must bE
Dated September 26, 1938.
closely paraphrased
before being communicated
Rec'd. 3:25 P. m.
to anyone. (A)
Copins
DIVISION
Secretary of State,
OF
EUROPEAN you
Washington.
SEP 27 1938
DEPARTMENT Cur OF STATE
G
498, September 26, 7 p. m.
The Military Attache informs me that one of his assist-
ants has reported by telephone to him from Gorlitz in Lower
and
760F.62/1117
112.20
Silesia that on the morning of the 26th he witnessed the
movement of the Eighth Corps consisting of two divisions, up
to the Czach frontier between NEisse and the Polish border.
This corps was accompanied by two tank regiments, the 15th
and 16th, thus giving ground to the belief that the corps
this been given an offensive mission.
On the afternoon of the 26th hE witnessed while in the
GDG
vicinity of the Gorlitz the movement of modernized columns
of the Third Corps in the direction of Braslau.
Please repeat to "Yar Department.
ILSON
CSB
SER 381934 1934
FILED
WISER ON POLITICAL MR. DUNN RELATIONS
11938
SEP 28 1938
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
OF
it
DEPARTMENT
NOTED
MJD
Berlin
AM
1-1330
FROM
This telegram must bE
Dated September 27, 1938.
closely paraphrased
befort being communicated
Rec' 3:45 m.
PAID
to anyone, (A-1)
-
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
Secretary of State
SER 30 1938
STATE UNDER SECRETARY of STATE
Tashington.
SEP 28 1938
MR. MESSERSMITH
MR. WELLES
RUSH.
505, September 27, 8 P. m.
7.60F. 760F.62/1176
76y br
STRICTLY CONTIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.
Just had a talk with Henderson. HE believes that unless
there is some startling change in the situation Hitler will
quio
3
order full mobilization and attack after Chamberlain's speech
before the House of Commons. HE said that Sir Horace Wilson
had come to urge Hitler to be moderate in his speech. HE can
DC] 4 1938
FILED
not SEE that the offer of a guarantee by England and France
of Czech fulfillment of the British plan has made any imprts-
sion on the Germans. Chemberlein, he says, is tired. HE does
not know what hE will say in Cormons tomorrow but he feels
GDG
that. 2 message to Chamberlain from President Roosevelt urging
him to do his utmost to keep Great Britain from Engaging in
war and precipitating a general European conflagration over
question Blready agreed upon in principle might bE of some
Confidential Filed
avail.
Always before Hitler has left himself a way out and until
very
MJD ⑉2⑉ No, 505, September 27, 8 P. m. from Berlin
open.
very recent days I have felt the t such a way was
Very
recently, however, he has so committed himself and so burnt
his bridges that I cannot SEE any hope that hE will retire
materially from the position taken. Hence, I am driven to
the belief that only a. decided change in the attitude of Czech
slovakia as SET forth in their answer to Hitler's memorandum
will prevent a German attack within the near future. From in-
formation available here there is every indication that France
and Gre to Britain will declare war in that EVENT. TE are thus
on the EVE of a full sized European war unless some dramatic
and unexpected EVENT turns the tide.
REPEATED to Paris and London.
WILSON
PEG
GW
Apparent
top
du
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
MJD
Berlin
This telegram must bE
clostly paraphrased
FROM
Dated September 28, 1938.
before being communicated
Rec'd. 4:25 p. m.
to anyone. (A)
Secretary of State,
DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAINS
Washington.
SEP 29-1938 Cup
514, September 28, 7 p. m.
DEPARTMENT OF STAR
I made an appointment to SEE "Eizsaecker at 1 o'clock
today. Ribbentrop was unavailable. In view of the circum-
stances I felt it appropriate to inquire direct from a high
German authority concerning the situation. Inasmuch as I was
760 F.62 1268
at 1 o'clock waiting for a telephone connection with you, I
sent Gilbert to the Foreign Office in my place. Gilbert re-
ports his conversation as follows: Knowing him as I do I
could feel that "/Eizsascker was definitely seeking for a
peactful solution but was unable in any Expression to go
GOG
beyond the Chancellor's declared position. HE stated that
the divergence between the Czech and German positions was
Execedingly narrow inasmuch as on the matter of cession no
question of principle remained. He said that the Czechs
had already de facto granted such cession and that all that
Germany now asked was a rapid rather than a delayed imple-
mentation of that agreement. Germany he said would not ob-
ject to the customarily somewhat protracted procedure were
FILED
the circumstances ordinary. The circumstances were however
not
MJD ⑉2⑉ No. 514, September 28, 7 P. m. from Berlin
not ordinary. The Czechs after granting the cession had in-
stituted an unnecessary regime of repression and violence in
the Sudeten German area. The circumstances that two hundred
thousand Sudeten Germans had already fled to Germany was EVi-
dence of this. It was self-evident that their coming could
not bE instigated by Germany. They came because they fElt
they had reason to fear the Czechs. This was a situation
which was intolerable to the German people. It W&S one that
could not bE protracted. In similar circumstances any other
nation would feel the same. The Czech Government seemed to
fear that the German forces would not restrict themselves to
the Sudeten area. Although resenting such a viewpoint Ger-
many had suggested a "screen" of neutral troops (or perhaps
of the British Legion) between the German and Czech forces.
This would give Praha if it was sincere in the cession of
the territory all the security necessary. HE felt,
however, that although BENES had granted the cession
under pressure that hE was now placing EVEry obstacle
in the way of its implementation in order to bring about
a general war. HE added that hE felt that Everything
would have been settled long ngo had it not been for
Bents himself HE stated that Praha had not given a
written answer to the Hitler memorandum but that a re-
fusal had been conveyed through the medium of the
British
MJD -3- No. 514, September 28, 7 P. m. from Berlin
British Embassy.
In answer to a question whether Germany would be
willing for the Entire occupation of the Sudeten area
pending a final settlement to bE undertaken by neutral
forces WEIZSAECKER said that the difficulty lay in the
time Element which was the pressing factor.
VILSON
CSB
THE
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
DIVIS
EURO
Fills
REB
SEP 291938
GRAY
From
DEPARTMENT
Berlin
Dated September 28, 1938
Rec'd 4:55 p. m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
515, September 28, 8 p. m.
The Italian Ambassador has just informed us that
Hitler has issued (that?) invitations for a meeting with him in
Munich tomorrow of Mussolini and Daladier have accepted
that no reply has yet been received from Chamberlain
who is at present speaking in the House of Commons and
760F. 62/1 1260
that his acceptance is taken for granted.
All this is confirmed by HENDERSON and while I was
talking to him Goering called him and obviously was
urging strongly that Chamberlain accept.
HENDERSON says that in his conversation with Hitler
this morning the Chancellor was much more moderate, that
they had been working on an idea of German troops
occupying the major portion of those territories pre-
dominantly Germanic with British legionaries to occupy
those territories whose fate is to bE decided by plabiscit
REPEATED to Rome, London, Paris, Praha, Warsaw.
SEP30 SEP 1938
FILED
WILSON
EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
GPO
FROM
MY
Berlin
This telegrah must bE
closely paraphrased DE-
Dated September 29, 1938
fore being communicated
to anyone. (c)
Rec'd 7:56 c.m.
Secretary of State
DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFACE
Wash ngton
SEP 29 1938
24
517, Eptember 29, noon.
DEPARTMENT OF stard
STREETLY CONFIDENTIAL.
Geist learns from Gestapo sources that orders have
been issued by Hitler for the Entire S 3 and Arbeitsdignst
to hold themselves ready to 30 with the Sudeten Treikorps
into the deten area. It is planned that the occupation
will take blace by these forces as police units rather
760F. 760F.62/1277
than by Section troops.
Presumbly this plan is preducated on C. penceful
Evacuation by Czech forces as it is inconceivable that
such forces could be used for attack.
GLG
WILSON
RGC
KLP
SEP 30 1938
FILED
Confidential File
of
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
Top of Ex
MY
Berlin
This telegram must bE
FROM
closely paraphrased be-
Dated September 29, 1938
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B-1)
Rec'd 9:40 c.m.
Secretary of State
DIVISION OF
COROPEAN AFFAIRS
Washington
SER 29 1938
518, TEPTEMBER 29, 1 p.m.
DEPARTMENT OK STATE
Supplamenting my 512, September 28, 5 p.m.
The following background on the Hunich meeting today
was learned at the French Embassy last night: When Francois
Poncet talked to Hitler yesterday morning as C. result of his
urgent instructions hE found the latter continued to bE
760F.62/1283
most violent in his tirades against the Czechs which Hitler
described 00 "Mongols and not 3lave". Eitler told Poncet
that if he had been dealing with the French on such a
question no such situation would have developed as now
GDG
Existed in the Sudeten area and cited the Scar plabiscite
0.0 an example of how such questions could bE arranged.
Poncet replied that if matters had been arranged today 0.3
in the Scar question they would not bE faced with the pre-
-
_sent coute risis. In the Saar, combined international
forces had been sent in first to keep order and oscure
a fair vote while in this CASE Kitler wanted German military
occupation first and a plobiscitc later. It was this
SEP 30 1939
threat of military action tlirt VOD setting all the world
against Epriany which would find that military action
against
MY ⑉2⑉ No. 513, September 29, 1 p.m. from Berlin
Czechoslovakia would bring in England and France against
her within C. few days and that in Poncet's opinion would
eventually bring American countries into a war against
Germany. HERE Ribbontrop interposed to say that Germany
was strong Enough to face any combination of powers.
Poncet went on to suggest that if itler was so concerned
over the disorders in the Sudaten area why would it not
bE possible to send French troops in to keep order until
a plan could bE worked out, The conversation was broken
off at this point as Titler was summoned to the telephone
to talk with lussolini, When he came back he promised not
to take an: action until hE made a written reply to the
French note which Poncet had presented (of which WE are not
informed respecting the precise contents). HE said that
hE would have an important message for Poncet shortly.
Poncet returned to the Embassy and early yesterday
afternoon vas called urgently to the Foreign Office to SEE
Ribbontrop who said that Titler and Bussolini were meeting
in Hunich today and that Mitler would like at the same time
to confer with Deladier and Chamberlain. Poncet got in
touch at once with Paris and had an acceptance of the
invitation by Daladier within an hour. Poncet left last
night for Hunich,
The rench are of the opinion that the original
suggestion
MY -3- No. 318, September 29, 1 p.m. from Berlin
Suggestion for the meeting came from Chamberlain but that
it was colually proposed by Mussolini in his telephone
conversation with Hitler yesterday morning.
I
WILSON
PEG
EUROPEAN AFFAUL For
DIVISION OF
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
OCT 6 1938
RAW
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
This telegram must bE
closery paraphrased be-
FROM Berlin (part air)
fore being communicated
to anyone. (c)
Dated October 5, 1938.
Rec'd 8:30 a.m., 6th.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
529, October 5, 2 p.m. (SECTION ONE)
OnE. In a conversation which I had with Weizsaecker
760F 62/1495
and in the conversations of the Counselor of this Embassy
with the French and British Counselors as reported in the
Embassy's 528, October 5, 1 p.m., certain problems associated
460762
with the Munich settlement were discussed.
Both the British and French Counselors spoke in strongly
condemnatory terms concerning the precipitate nature and the
character of Poland's action in the Case of TESCHEN. Paris
and London had protested at Warsaw and Berlin had joined in
this protest. It was not known whether Rome had taken any
action in this manner. Speculations were voiced concerning
the reality of Berlin's protest and although there was a
general inclination to credit it with good faith, there
Existed the possibility of its having to do with more general
and undisclosed German-Polish understandings.
OCT8 1938
FILED
-2- 529, October 5, 2 p.m., from Berlin.
Regarding Hungary, the French and the British feel
certain that she will obtain the return of her minorities.
Press reports are to the Effect that Hungary has demanded,
and Czechoslovakia has accepted, direct negotiations for a
settlement of this question. The situation in Budapest
seems, however, to bE obscure concerning the Extent of the
territory which Hungary might desire to gain. If Hungary
had wanted to take strong unilateral action she was now in
any EVENT presumably restrained by Rumania and Yugoslavia.
Thus whatever might bE the circumstances, while Poland had
gained her Ends in an outwardly discreditable manner, Hungary
would probably gain hers in an outwardly "creditable" manner.
The French and British Counselors and Weizsaecker con-
firmed the public belief that the Slovak and Ruthenian ques-
tions had not been specifically raised at Munich. Respecting
Ruthenia they were both under the impression that consistent
with repeated Enunciations by the Chancellor during the past
year of his objection to the creation of "new minorities"
and also for political and military strategic reasons, Germany
did not wish the establishment of a common frontier between
Poland and Hungary. As a check to Germany, Italy might de-
sire a stronger Hungary associated with Poland by a common
frontier. But it was not known whether Rome would attempt
to
-3- 529, October 5, 2 p.m., from Berlin.-
to play any role in this matter. The present situation in
Slovakia is not at all clear. There had long been differ-
ENCES in popular opinion in Slovakia but there was as yet
nothing definite as to how the majorities lay, particularly
as affected by the new circumstances. It was felt, however,
that if Praha acted quickly and wisely respecting the grant-
ing to the Slovaks what they sought, it would bE Entirely
possible for Praha to retain Slovakia, It was also believed
without going into certain differences in the respective
situation that the same was generally true regarding Ruthenia.
On this score WEizsaecker spoke of the great difficulty of
knowing what the Slovaks really desired. HE said that the
German Government had received four communications from
different Slovak groups (one from Geneva) all advocating
different things.
In the course of these conversations it was manifest
that the French and British Embassies fully recognized that
the jubilation of the public in Great Britain and France and
also largely in Germany and Italy was at present almost solely
based on Escape from a dreaded war and that every effort must
now bE made by Paris and London and in fact to a degree by
Every capital to follow the present situation through to the
establishment
/
RAW
-4- 529, October 5, 2 p.m., from Berlin.
establishment of conditions in all directions which would
-
make for a durable peace.
(END SECTION ONE)
WILSON
RR
KLP
I
RAS
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
PPC
REB
FROMGRAY
Berlin
Dated October 6, 1938
Rec'd 4 p. me
DIVISION OF
Secretary of State,
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
OCT 7 1938
Washington.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Cor this
530, October 6, 5 p. me
The general tone of the Berlin press since the
announcement of the Four Power Agreement presents a
marked contrast to that manifested after the incorpora-
tion of Austria. Except in the most Extreme papers such
760F.62/1506 1506 GDG
as the SCHWARZEKORPS organ of the S.S. there has been
virtually no expression of an attitude of defiant triumph
and no crowing over the German victory. Instead the
predominant note has been relief at the avoidance of war.
The "broad statesmanship" and "courageous vision", of
Hitler are, of course, enthusiastically heralded and he
is lauded as having made possible a new Era of European
peace based on realistic negotiation between the Govern-
ments rather' than on the detested GENEVA system of
collective security. Mussolini, too, is warmly praised on
these grounds but at the same time homage is paid to
Chamberlain and Daladier in their roles as saviours of
OCT 1938
FILED
peace. There seems to have been a dElibEratE desire to
create
K
REB
2-#530, From Berlin,Oct.6,5p.m.
create an impression of appreciation in Germany of their
policy which would serve to strengthen the political
position of these two statesmen in their own countries and
to justify their action in Munich. Chamberlain's opponents
in England are bitterly attacked as pseudo-liberals who
Either deliberately or otherwise are acting under the
influence of Moscow.
Although in the light of the policy in Germany of
rigid control of the press this attitude is obviously
officially inspired it nevertheless seems to reflect to a
large degree the viewpoint of the great mass of the
German people who were appalled at the thought of a world
war, whose primary reaction to the Munich agreement was
one of profound relief that it had been avoided, and who
are apparently genuinely ready to give full credit to
Chamberlain for being to a considerable extent responsible
for preventing war. Even despite the successful outcome
of Hitler's policy there is still noticeable a feeling of
resentment that hE could bring the nation to the very brink
of war.
Editorial comment with regard to Benes' resignation
consists in general of a review and condemnation of his
policy
s
REB
3-#530, From Berlin,Oct,6,5p.m.
policy particularly foreign policy, of the last twenty
years. The hope is Expressed that future Czech Governments
will fundamentally alter BENES' course thus permitting
friendly cooperation between Germany and Czechoslovakia,
a relationship to which Germany is ready to contribute
its full share.
No mention has been made aditorially of the Polish
and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia. Prominence
is daily given, however, to news despatches from Warsaw
and Budapest relative to these matters.
WILSON
CSB
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
4
POLO
No. 370
Berlin, October 14, 1938. RECEIVED.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Subject: Transmitting Review of German-
ASK
and
WWW
Czechoslovak Crisis. 1938 NOV 7 PM I 22
TDC
DIVISION OF
WERCIB DIVISION
COMMUNICA IONS
AND neededs
$
DEC 30 1938
strubution
instructions
DEPARTMENT OF STATE M.I.D.
O.N.I.
The Honorable
GRNOV 29 1938
The Secretary of State,
ple
Washington.
Sir:
I have the honor to transmit a review of
events in the German-Czechoslovak crisis cover-
ing the period between Herr Hitler's Reichstag
speech of February 20 and the settlement arrived
at in Munich on September 29. While this review
760F.62/1822
makes no attempt to deal with all the various in-
ternational angles involved, it is fairly compre-
hensive as regards the part played by Germany and
it is hoped that it will be found useful as fur-
nishing a record of the dispute as observed from
Berlin.
Respectfully yours,
G/HC
Hugh R. Wilson
Enclosure:
Review of German-Czechoslovak
Crisis.
800
JDB:EM
Enclosure to despatch
No.370 of October 14,
1938, from American Em-
bassy, Berlin, Germany.
REVIEW OF GERMAN-CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS OF 1938
List of Headings
Page
Hitler's Reichstag Speech of February 20
1
The Austrian Anschluss
2
The German Plebiscite Campaign
2
The British Prime Minister's Speech of March 24
2 - 3
Henlein's Carlsbad Eight Demands
3 - 4
The Period May 1 - - May 22
4 - 5
The May 21-22 "Crisis
If
5 - 7
Hitler's Decision of May 28
7 - 8
Hess' Speech of June 12
8
The Period June 12-July 26
9
Appointment of Lord Runciman, July 26
9
The "Nationality Statute" of August 10
10
Breakdown of Negotiations between the
Sudetens and the Czechs
10
German Military Measures
10 - - 12
Resumption of Negotiations between the
Sudetens and the Czechs
12 - 14
Developments in Germany Before and During
14 - 17
the Party Congress
The "Dynamic of Events" in the Sudeten Area
17 - 19
Chamberlain's Visit to Berchtesgaden
19 - 21
The Franco-British Plan
21 - 22
The Beginnings of the Polish and Hungarian Phases
22 - 23
The Godesberg Conversations of September 21-23
23 - 25
The Godesberg Memorandum of September 23
25 - 26
Chamberlain's Final Interview with Hitler at
26 - 27
Godesberg
Czech Rejection of the Godesberg Memorandum
28
The Second Visit to London of the French Ministers.
28 - 29
- 2 -
List of Headings
Page
The Sir Horace Wilson Phase
29 - 30
President Roosevelt's Appeals
30
Hitler's Speech of September 26
31 - 32
Developments after Hitler's Speech
32 - 34
The State of Feeling in Germany on the
Afternoon of September 27
34 - 36
The Break-Up Leading to the Detente
37 - 38
The Arrangement of the Munich Meeting
39 - 40
The Munich Meeting of September 29 and the
Resulting Agreement
41 - 43
Conclusions Regarding the Crisis
44 - 51
- 1 -
Hitler's Reichstag Speech of February 20.
The practical identity of the Austrian and Sudet-
- en German questions, both of which have been forced
to a solution in the year 1938, was established in
the following phrases in Herr Hitler's speech of
February 20 before the German Reichstag:
"Two of the countries adjoining our
frontiers alone contain a mass of 10 mil-
lion Germans. Up until 1866 they were
still united with the whole German people
in a constitutional federation. Until
1918 they fought shoulder to shoulder
with the German soldiers in the World War-
Against their will they were prevented by
the Peace Treaties from uniting with the
Reich. This in itself is sad enough-But
there is one thing regarding which there
must, in our eyes, be no doubt. Constitu-
tional severance from the Reich cannot
bring about a deprivation of all national-
political rights, that is to say, the gen-
eral rights of national self-determination,
which, by the way, were solemnly promised
us in Wilson's 14 Points as a condition
precedent for the armistice; (this) can-
not be simply ignored merely because the
people in question are Germans. It is in-
tolerable in the long run for a world power
with a just appreciation of itself (Selbst-
bewusstsein) to know that there are fellow-
countrymen at its side who, because of
their sympathies or their close ties with
the nation as a whole, its destinies and
its philosophy of life, are constantly sub-
jected to the most severe suffering. Just
as England watches over her interests
throughout the whole world, so will the
Germany of to-day also watch over her in-
terests and protect them, even though they
be so much more limited. And one of these
interests of the German Reich is the protec-
tion of those German fellow-countrymen on
our frontiers who are not able by their own
power to secure for themselves the right to
ordinary human, political and ideological
freedom."
The
- 2 -
The Austrian Anschluss. On March 13 Austria
formally became a part of the German Reich. Sever-
al German planes having inadvertently flown over
Czechoslovak territory, the Czechoslovak Minister
in Berlin made representations to General Göring
from whom he received assurances that "nothing re-
specting Czechoslovakia was contemplated" (Embassy's
telegram No. 120, March 13, 3 p.m.).
The German Plebiscite Campaign. In his speech-
es delivered during the propaganda campaign prior
to the "plebiscite" on April 10, the Führer again
and again reiterated his determination not to tol-
erate the oppression of 10 million Germans on the
Reich's frontiers (Embassy's despatch No. 73 of
April 5, 1938). Inasmuch as it could be assumed
that the problem had been definitely closed as re-
gards the same 6 1/2 million Austrian-Germans, Herr
Hitler could be regarded as giving a warning with
respect to the 3 1/2 million Sudeten Germans, even
though at that time he chose to speak only in math-
ematical parables.
The British Prime Minister's Speech of March 24.
Prime Minister Chamberlain delivered a declaration
before the British House of Commons, in which he
pointed out that England's cóncern in the Czechoslo-
vak question was not on the same footing as its in-
terest in safeguarding the integrity of France and
Belgium. He declared England's unwillingness to
guarantee
- 3 -
guarantee Czechoslovakia against attack or to as-
sociate itself directly with France's security
pact with Czechoslovakia (both of which steps, Cham-
berlain said, exceeded England's obligations under
the League Convention). At the same however,
he asserted:
"Where peace and war are concerned,
legal obligations are not alone involved,
and, if war broke out, it would be unlike-
ly to be confined to those who had assumed
such obligations. It would be quite im-
possible to say where it would end and what
governments might become involved. The in-
exorable pressure of facts might well prove
more powerful than formal pronouncements,
and in that event it would be well within
the bounds of probability that other coun-
tries, besides those which were parties to
the original dispute, would almost immediate-
ly become involved. This is especially true
in the case of two countries like Great Brit-
ain and France, with long associations, with
interests closely interwoven, devoted to the
same ideals of democratic liberty, and deter-
mined to uphold them."
Henlein's Carlsbad Eight Demands. Speaking
on April 24 before a gathering of the Sudeten Ger-
man Party in Carlsbad, Konrad Henlein - no doubt
in agreement with the highest Reich German author-
ities - put forth the following "eight demands"
which for the first time made the world acutely
conscious of the Sudeten German question:
(1) Full equality of status for Czechs
and Germans.
(2) A guarantee for this equality by the
recognition of the Sudeten Germans as
a legal body incorporate.
(3)
- 4 -
(3) Determination and legal recognition of
the German areas within the State.
(4) Full self-government for the German
areas.
(5) Legal protection for every citizen liv-
ing outside the area of his own nation-
ality.
(6) Removal of injustice inflicted since
1918 and reparation for the damages
thereby caused-
(7) Recognition of the principle: Within
the German areas German officials.
(8) Full liberty to profess German nation-
ality and German political philosophy-
In addition Henlein demanded in effect that the
Czechoslovak Government revise its foreign policy
which had led the country into the ranks of the ene-
mies of the German people.
The German press accorded immediate support to
Henlein's demands and portrayed the Sudeten German
question as having become a "European problem" (Em-
bassy's telegram No. 198, April 25, 2 p-m-)-
The Period May 1 - May 22. In a series of speech-
es delivered on the German National Holiday of May 1,
Henlein affirmed his resolve not to withdraw one iota
from his demands, describing them as the minimum rath-
er than the maximum of the Sudeten Germans' require-
ments.
As
- 5 -
As a result of the visit of the French Pre-
mier and Foreign Minister to London, the British
and French governments decided to take joint steps
in Prague to advise the Czech Government to offer
concessions to the Sudeten Germans. The British
Ambassador in Berlin was also instructed to inform
Goring of the joint demarche and to urge Germany
against taking any action which might endanger
peace (Embassy's telegram No. 223, May 5, 4 p.m.).
The British Ambassador also saw Reich Foreign Min-
ister von Ribbentrop who described the issue as one
primarily between the Czechoslovak Government and
the Sudeten Germans and assured the British Ambassa-
dor that Germany would not attack Czechoslovakia pro-
vided that no attack was made upon the Sudeten Ger-
mans (Embassy's telegram No. 246, May 14, 8 p.m.).
In the meantime the German press started a
running fire of protest against alleged Czech mis-
treatment of the Sudeten Germans.
On May 13 a special guard called the "Volun-
tary Protective Service" was established by the
Sudeten Germans ostensibly to defend themselves
against further attack.
The May 21-22 "Crisis." The increasing ten-
sion in the Sudeten area, which arose with the ap-
proach of the communal elections set for May 22,
was reflected in fresh outbursts in the German press
against a new series of incidents culminating in the
shooting of two Sudeten Germans by Czech frontier
guards.
- 6 -
guards. Herr Hitler sent a wreath to the funeral
of the victims and the German press indignation at
the shooting reached a pitch as vehement as that
irmediately preceding the occupation of Austria.
These developments seemed to mark the end of all
pretense to dissimulate the Reich's direct and im-
mediate interest in the fate of the Sudeten Germans.
Ostensibly on the report that Germany had massed
troops at the border, the Czechoslovak Government de-
creed a partial mobilization, calling up several class-
es of reserves. Although no unusual troop movements
were observed on the German side (Embassy's telegram
No. 263, May 23, 6 p.m.), the situation gave the ap-
pearance of becoming increasingly tense. The Brit-
ish Ambassador called twice upon Herr von Ribbentrop
I
on May 21, first, to state that the British Govern-
ment was pressing Prague to come to an agreement with
Henlein, and on the other hand to urge moderation of
the German Government; and on the second occasion
to warn the German Government, in terms of the Brit-
ish Premier's declaration of March 24, of the possi-
ble consequences of hasty measures. The British
Ambassador was somewhat cooly received and indeed
met with a response which can only be described as
a rebuff (Embassy's telegram No. 261, May 22, 2 p.m.).
The (allegedly) unauthorized step taken by certain
subordinates in the British Embassy to order special
cars for the evacuation of their families from Berlin
served substantially further to discredit the British
Government in German eyes.
Following
- 7 -
Following an approximately 90% victory for
the Henlein Party in the local Sudeten German
elections, tension relaxed and the German press
attacks receded to a pitch of suppressed vehemence
with which was mixed high indignation against Brit-
ish "meddling" over the week-end of May 22.
Hitler's Decision of May 28. Unknown at the
time to the general public and only subsequently
disclosed in his Nuremberg speech of September 12,
the Führer on this date gave orders for the taking
of those military measures which, he said, were de-
signed to prevent a repitition of the calumny -
"intolerable for a great Power" - which Germany had
suffered through reports circulated abroad that the
Reich had mobilized troops on the week-end of May
22 and had been "bluffed out" of marching into
Czechoslovakia by pressure from Great Britain and
France. In their practical effect these measures
marked the beginning of the wide concentration of
German military forces which was to play such an
important role in bringing pressure to bear upon
Prague and the western Powers.
The specific orders which the Führer gave on
May 28 were to strengthen still further the army
and air force and to rush to completion before the
beginning of winter Germany's western fortifications.
There followed thereafter Göring's order of June 22
opening the way for a forced conscription of civilian
labor
- 8 -
labor for the construction of the western forts.
Starting in August, a greater number of reservists
than ever before were called up for training and,
moreover, for the first time since the war, re-
serve divisions were joined with the regular army
for maneuvers (although it was officially stated
this step was decided upon a year ago). The law
of July 13, considerably enlarging the power of
the military authorities to requisition and com-
mandeer private property and services, completed
the legal structure whereby virtual mobilization
could be carried out without a general mobiliza-
tion order.
Hess' Speech of June 12. Since his speech-
es delivered during the plebiscite campaign, Herr
Hitler had remained silent on the Sudeten German
issue and was to say nothing further publicly un-
til his concluding speech at Nuremberg on Septem-
ber 12. Aside from the press and several minor
Party orators who kept the issue ardently alive,
the most important proclamation in the interval
was made by the Führer's Deputy, Herr Hess, who,
speaking in Stettin on July 12 said, with respect
to Czechoslovakia: "It is clear and unmistakable
to all eyes: This State is no longer in a posi-
tion to maintain calm and order within its fron-
tiers, is no longer able to protect the life of
its own citizens. This State has become a center
of danger for the peace of Europe."
The
- 9 -
The Period June 12 - July 26. This period
was one of comparative calm. On June 7 the Su-
deten German Party transmitted to the Czechoslo-
vak Government a 14-point memorandum embodying
and elaborating Henlein's original eight demands.
Various counter-proposals of the Czech Government
as published in the foreign press were sporadical-
ly attacked in the German newspapers as insuffi-
cient.
Appointment of Lord Ruiciman, July 26. On
this date the British Government entrusted Lord
Runciman with the mission of mediating between
the Sudeten Party and the Czech Government. The
I
German press greeted his appointment with reserve
and skepticism (Embassy's telegram No. 360, July
27,, 3 p.m.).
According to the British Prime Minister's
House of Commons speech of September 28, the Ger-
man Foreign Minister, also reserved Germany's atti-
tide in a conversation with the British Minister,
stating that it must regard the matter as of pure-
ly British concern. In a personal letter addressed
to Herr von Ribbentrop on July 28, the British For-
eign Secretary expressed his regret at this attitude
and set forth the hope that Germany would collabor-
ate in the finding of a peaceful solution.
The
- 10 -
The "Nationality Statute" of August 10. The
Czech Government formally placed before the Sudet-
en German Party its draft of the so-called "Nation-
ality Statute." This draft was rejected by the
German press as indicating that the Czech Govern-
ment was not disposed to grant fundamental concess-
ions- The proposal for the establishment of local
assemblies and -councils was described as a "gerry-
mandering" device designed to cheat the Sudetens
of their autonomy.
Breakdown of Negotiations between the Sudet-
ens and the Czechs- On August 17 the Henlein
group met with the political committee of the
Czech Government. The Sudetens' continued in-
sistence upon the Carlsbad points led to a stand-
still although in breaking off the discussions the
Henlein group let it be known that the door still
remained open for further negotiations. As the
British Prime Minister stated in his speech of
September 28, Lord Runciman thereupon sought to
bring about a resumption of discussions on a new
basis.
German Military Measures. Attention may now
be shifted to the German military measúres which,
as they began to assume an intensified form early
in August, caused serious concern to Great Britain
and France as indicating that the Reich was deter-
mined to seek a solution of the Sudeten problem by
autonomy.
In
- 11 -
In his House of Commons speech on September
28, the British Prime Minister reported that the
British Ambassador in Berlin was instructed to
make representations concerning these military
preparations on the ground that they jeopardized
Lord Runciman's work, as well as the peace of
Europe. Replying to these representations in a
letter, Herr von Ribbentrop refused to discuss
the military measures and stated that the British
efforts in Prague had only served to increase Czech
intransigeance.
In a speech delivered August 27 at Lanark, Sir
John Simon, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer,
reiterated the Prime Minister's declaration of March
24. This speech was sharply attacked by the Ger-
man press as being entirely "negative" (Embassy's
telegram No. 407, August 29, 5 p.m.).
Following information that several German di-
visions had been moved to the French frontier, the
French Government called up certain reservists at
the end of August, and on September 7 manned the
Maginot Line.
As disclosed in Mr. Chamberlain's speech of
September 28, the British Ambassador, after re-
turning to Berlin from London whither he had been
called for special consultation with the British
Cabinet, delivered urgent personal messages to
both the German Foreign Minister and to the State
Secretary
- 12 -
Secretary in the German Foreign Office, outlining
Great Britain's probable attitude in the event of
a German attack upon Czechoslovakia. Mr. Cham-
berlain emphasized that these "personal warnings"
were delivered in the place of formal representa-
tions "which might have been interpreted by the
German Government as a public rebuff as had been
the case in regard to the British steps taken on
May 21."
Resumption of negotiations between the Sudet-
ens and the Czechs. On August 18 Lord Runciman
had a meeting with Henlein and on August 19 the
Czech Government announced the appointment of
numerous Sudetens to official posts formerly held
by Czechs in the Sudeten area. On August 21 the
Czech Government put forward new proposals which
appeared to have been regarded by the Henleinists
as a suitable basis for negotiation. Discussions
were broken off, however, by a new series of in-
cidents.
On September 3, the British Minister in Prague
called on Dr. Benes and while stating that his gov-
ernment was not prepared to say whether anything
less than the Carlsbad program would suffice, he
- urged Dr. Benes to go immediately and unreservedly
to the limit of concession, the more particularly
in view of possible developments at the forthcoming
Nuremberg
- 13 -
Nuremberg Party Congress. The British Minister's
representations were supported by Lord Runciman, and
on September 6, the opening of the Nuremberg Cong-
ress, the Czech Government communicated to the Su-
detens what was known as the "Fourth Plan."
In his letter of September 21 (forming item
No. 1 in the White Paper laid before the British
I
House of Commons on September 28 - hereinafter re-
ferred to as the "first White Paper") addressed to
the British Prime Minister, Lord Runciman gave his
opinion that this plan embodied almost all the re-
quirements of the Carlsbad eight points. The Ger-
man press received the plan with exemplary restraint
and for a few days there was an encouraging calm -
as it proved, a lull before the storm. On September
7 there occurred the incident involving the arrest
and alleged mishandling of a number of Sudeten dep-
uties at Mihrisch-Ostrau which provoked an explo-
sive flareup in the German press. The Henlein
.
Party put forth certain demands for investigation
and reparation and after the Czech Government had
yielded to these, negotiations on the plan were
resumed on September 10. There followed thereafter
other incidents which increased in frequency after
Herr Hitler's closing speech at the Nuremberg Cong-
ress on September 12, and on September 13 the Sudet-
en delegation refused to meet the Czech negotiating
committee
Copies of the two pertinent British
White Papers are attached hereto.
- 14 -
committee, as had been arranged.
In his letter to the British Prime Minister,
Lord Runciman places responsibility for the break-
down squarely upon Herr Henlein and Herr Frank and
other extremists who, he says, had made up their
minds by this time that they did not wish a set-
tlement on the former basis. Whatever may have
been their motives, there seems to be little doubt
but what the Sudetens took this action after con-
sultation with the Reich Government and in this
connection it is significant that Herr Henlein
paid Herr Hittler a first visit on September 3
and remained with him at Nuremberg for the greater
part of the National Socialist Congress.
Developments in Germany before and during the
Party Congress. The scene now shifts back to the
diplomatic front.
One reason why Henlein and his Reich German
patrons may no longer have wished to consider a
settlement on the basis of Sudeten autonomy with-
in the Czech State may have been the following
suggestion with which the London TIMES of Septem-
ber 7 concluded its leading editorial:
"No Central Government would still
deserve its title if it did not reserve
in its own hands Defence, Foreign Policy,
and Finance. There does not appear to be
any dispute about this principle in the
minds of the Government or of Herr Henlein;
and, if the Sudetens now ask for more than
the Czech Government are apparently ready
to give in their latest set of proposals,
it can only be inferred that the Germans
are going beyond the mere removal of disa-
bilities and do not find themselves at ease
within
S
- 15 -
within the Czechoslovak Republic. In
that case it might be worth while for
the Czechoslovak Government to consider
whether they should exclude altogether
the project, which has found favour in
some quarters, of making Czechoslovakia
a more homogeneous State by the secess-
ion of that fringe of alien populations
who are contiguous to the nation with
which they are united by race. In any
case the wishes of the population con-
cerned would seem to be a decisively
important element in any solution that
can hope to be regarded as permanent,
and the advantages to Czechoslovakia
of becoming a homogeneous State might
conceivably outweigh the obvious dis-
advantages of losing the Sudeten Ger-
man districts of the borderland."
Although the British Government denied that
this suggestion represented its considered official
opinion, the lead seems to have been quickly caught
up in Germany- On the German side an editorial
perhaps fully as important as that published in the
TIMES appeared in the BERLINER TAGEBLATT of Septem-
ber 9, which stated that with respect to Prague,
"it has been brought home to the world that the
point at issue is no longer merely the fate of the
Sudeten Germans but the construction of the Czech
State as such." It was intimated that important
decisions on this basis had been taken in Nurem-
berg (see Embassy's telegram No. 428, September 10,
2 p.m.).
In the meantime the British Ambassador had
been impressing upon the leading German personali-
ties in Nuremberg his government's attitude as
expressed
- 16 -
expressed in the Prime Minister's speech on
March 24 and in Sir John Simon's speech on Aug-
ust 27. As the Prime Minister explained on
September 28, no direct approach was made to
Herr Hitler nimself inasmuch as it was feared
that personal representations might have a con-
trary effect to that intended.
The inflammatory speeches of Goebbels and
Göring on September 10 at Nuremberg, both only
of incidental importance, prepared the atmos-
phere for the Führer's cheech on the following
Monday - On September 11 the British Prime Min-
ister gave a statement to the press emphasizing
the close ties between Great Britain and France
and pointing to the probability in certain even-
tualities of Great Britain going to the aid of
France- Although this press statement was not
mentioned in Hitler's speech, it is assumed to
have caused him to sharpen the tone of his ad-
dress (see Embassy's telegram No. 436, Septem-
ber 13, 7 p.m.).
On the eve of Herr Hitler's closing speech
on September 12, the German press stressed the
necessity of "self-determination" being applied
in Czechoslovakia (see Embassy's telegram No.
432, September 12, 6 p.m.), and this question in-
deed formed the central theme of Herr Hitler's
speech
- 17 -
speech, although no specific modalities were sug-
gested as to how self-determination should be car-
ried out. After describing at great length the
defensive measures on Germany's western frontier,
Herr Hitler proclaimed that the Sudeten Germans
(in contrast to the Arabs in Palestine) were
"neither defenseless nor abandoned." As the Brit-
ish Prime Minister subsequently pointed out to the
House of Commons, this speech for the first time
promised the support of the Reich to the Sudeten
Germans if they could not obtain satisfaction for
themselves.
The "Dynamic of Events" in the Sudeten Area.
As mentioned above, the Sudeten leaders had re-
fused to meet with the Czech authorities on Sept-
ember 13 for further discussion of the "Fourth
Plan."
On the same day serious rioting broke out in
the Sudeten areas, causing the Czech Government to
decree Standrecht, or measures equivalent to mar-
tial law, in the affected districts. On the same
evening the Henlein group met and addressed a set
of demands (described in certain sections of the
American press as an "ultimatum") to the Czechs,
stating that they could not be responsible for
the consequences if the emergency measures were
not inmediately withdrawn.
On
- 18 -
On the following day, September 14, Henlein
dissolved the Sudeten negotiating committee and
issued'a proclamation to the effect that the
Carlsbad program was no longer sufficient and
that the situation called for "self-determination."
Thereafter Henlein fled to Germany but appears to
have returned for a brief interval to Eger where
he issued a statement on September 15 proclaiming
the will of the Sudetens to "return home to the
Reich." Following this, he occupied himself
with the formation on German territory of a Free
Corps consisting of 4 units, each containing
10,000 men, made up primarily from the Sudetens
who had fled to evade service in the Czech army.
-
A word may be said at this point concerning
the state of feeling in Germany, which presented
a paradoxical picture from many aspects. During
these critical days the violence of the press.
propaganda against Czechoslovakia was unparall-
eled. While considerable uneasiness existed,
there was little public manifestation of it in
Berlin at least and it was curious to read of
demonstrations being held in London and Paris.
The German wireless stations would occasionally
interrupt their programs with news of a freeh
Czech "atrocity" and would then resume their
playing of soft music- Although the artificial
indignation of the German press against the Czechs
did
- 19 -
did not meet with a response which made popular
outbursts likely at this juncture, at the same
time the events of these days furnished an ex-
ample of the ability of a totalitarian regime to
keep public uneasiness within bounds and from
reaching a panic state.
Chamberlain's Visit to Berchtesgaden. On
September 14 the British Prime Minister despatched
a telegram to Herr Hitler suggesting a meeting on
the following day (Embassy's telegram No. 439, Sept-
ember 14, 9 p.m.). Before the House of Commons
on September 28, the British Prime Minister ex-
plained that he had this plan in mind as a last
resort, adding that "one of the principal diffi-
culties in dealing with the totalitarian govern-
ments is the lack of any means of establishing
contact with the personalities in whose hands lie
the final decisions for the country."
According to the Prime Minister's speech re-
ferred to above, Herr Hitler in his conversations
made it plain from the very first that "he had
made up his mind that the Sudeten Germans must
have the right of self-determination and of re-
turning if they wished to the Reich"; that if
they could not achieve this by their own efforts,
he would assist them to do so, and that rather
than wait he would be prepared to risk a world
war. He also said that if the Prime Minister
could
- 20 -
could give him an immediate assurance that the
British Government accepted the principle of
self-determination, he would be ready to discuss
ways and means of carrying it out. Mr. Chamber-
lain replied that he would have to consult his
Cabinet colleagues and in the meantime obtained
a guarantee that Germany would refrain from ac-
tive hostilities until an answer had been given.
In recounting these developments to the House of
Commons on September 28, the Prime Minister sta-
ted that he had no doubt that his "visit alone
prevented an invasion, for which everything was
ready."
Upon returning to London, the British Prime
Minister recalled Lord Run ciman who gave substan-
tially the same advice that he later set forth in
his letter of September 21 (item No. 1 in the first
White Paper), namely, to the effect that while the
Sudetens had been responsible for a breakdown of
negotiations, a cession of territory was inevitable;
that for the Sudetens who remained in the Czech State
an arrangement similar to the so-called "Fourth Plan"
should be created; and that Czechoslovakia should
adjust its internal and external policy in such a
way that it could live at peace with all its neigh-
bors, like Switzerland. In the meantime publica-
tion had been made on September 15 of Signor Mus-
solini's open letter to Lord Runcimen, in which
Mussolini
- 21 -
Mussolini, after describing Czechoslovakia as a
"crocodile State" and a fiction of Versailles,
suggested a series of plebiscites to enable va-
rious nationalities to exercise their rights of
self-determination.
The Franco-British Plan. The consultations
in London on September 18 between the French Pre-
mier and Foreign Minister and the members of the
British Cabinet resulted in a plan which was com-
municated to the Czech Government on the follow-
ing day.
This plan, which constitutes item No. 2 in
the first White Paper, sets forth the joint opin-
ion of the British and French Governments that
the interests of Czechoslovakia and of world
peace would best be served by the immediate trans-
fer to Germany of districts in which over 50% of
the inhabitants are German- It was suggested
that the Czech Government might wish to agree to
this method of direct transfer, "as a case by it-
self," in preference to a plebiscite procedure
which might involve far-reaching consequences as
regards the other nationalities in Czechoslovakia.
It was envisaged that an international body might
be set up to deal with the adjustment of frontiers
and a possible exchange of German and Czech popu-
lations in certain districts. In return for ac-
ceptance, the British and French Governments were
willing
- 22 -
willing to offer a guarantee against unprovoked
aggression which would replace Czech treaties
with France and Russia involving reciprocal en-
gagements of a military character.
On September 20 the Czech Government replied
by suggesting that the Sudeten German question be
submitted to arbitration under the terms of the
German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Treaty of 1926-
The British and French ministers in Prague were
instructed, however, to urge immediate acceptance
of the plan in the interests of European peace,
and on September 21 the Czech Government declared
its unconditional acceptance.
On September 22 the Hodza Government resigned
and was succeeded by a national concentration Cab-
inet under General Sirovy, which, according to Mr.
Chamberlain's House of Commons' statement, stood
by its predecessor's acceptance of the Franco-
British plan.
The Beginnings of the Polish and Hungarian
Phases. The Czechoslovak problem entered a new
phase with the raising of demands in the Polish
and Hungarian official press that the minorities
of these two countries must be accorded in equal
degree the rights to be obtained for the Sudetens.
These demands found hearty support in the German
press
- 23 -
press as well as in several speeches by Signor
Mussolini, the issue being stated in the slogan
that the "Czech Nationalities State" as estab-
lished in 1918 must be destroyed.
Considerable diplomatic activity was begun
by the Hungarian and Polish Governments.' On
September 20 the Hungarian Regent visited General
Goring and on the following day the Hungarian
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, as well as
the Polish Ambassador, called on the Fuhrer at
Berchtesgaden. At the same time steps were ta-
ken by the representatives of these two countries
in London; they were informed, however, by the
British Government that while the latter appreci-
ated the interest of these two governments in
their respective minorities, it hoped that they
would undertake nothing to extend the scope of
the crisis at this particular juncture.
The Godesberg Conversations on September 21-
23. The British Prime Minister took with him to
Godesberg certain proposals which the British and
French Governments had agreed upon for effecting
the transfer of the Sudeten territories and for
delimiting the final frontier.
Although at the first meeting in Godesberg
Herr Hitler did not name any time limit for occu-
pation, he said that he could not accept these
proposals on the ground that they were too dila-
tory
- 24 -
tory and offered the Czech Government opportuni-
ties for evasion. With respect to the proposed
guarantee for Czechoslovakia envisaged in the or-
iginal Franco-British plan of September 20, Herr
Hitler said that he would be willing to enter in-
to the guarantee only on the condition that other
Powers, including Italy, were also guarantors, and
on the further condition that the other minorities
in Czechoslovakia were first satisfied.
As Mr. Chamberlain said in his House of Com-
mons speech on September 28, he had come to Godes-
-
berg with the expectation that he and the Führer
would quietly discuss arrangements for the trans-
fer of the Sudeten territory and that he was there-
fore surprised when he was confronted with other
proposals which he had not contemplated. According-
ly, as he said, he "withdrew" and dispatched on
September 23 a letter to Herr Hitler (item No.3 in
the first White Paper) in which he wrote: "I am
sure that an attempt (as Herr Hitler had evidently
I
proposed) to occupy forthwith by German troops
areas which will become part of the Reich at once
in principle, and very shortly afterwards by for-
mal delimitation, would be condemned as an unnec-
essary display of force."
Surmising that the Czechoslovaks would use
I
their forces to resist, Mr. Chamberlain suggested
in his letter that the Sudetens themselves might
be
- 25 -
be entrusted with maintaining order, acting pos-
sibly under the supervision of neutral observers.
In his written answer (forming item No. 4
in the first White Paper), Herr Hitler, abiding
by his original intentions, stated that "it is,
however, for a nation an unworthy demand to have
this recognition (of the right of self-determina-
tion) made dependent on conditions which are not
provided for in treaties nor are practical in
view of the shortness of time." He also added,
"there is no international power or agreement
which would have the right to take precedence
over German right."
In a second letter to Herr Hitler (item No.5
in the first White Paper), the British Prime Min-
ister requested a memorandum which he could hand
,to the Czechs, at the same time asking for an as-
surance that no military action be taken by the
Reich which, would prejudice further chances of
mediation.
The Godesberg Memorandum of September 23.
In very brief summary Herr Hitler's memorandum
(item No. 6 in the first White Paper) stipulated
that German troops were to occupy on October 1
certain large areas (indicated on a map annexed
to the first White Paper) regardless of the pos-
sibility that in certain portions of this area
the Czechs should prove to be in the majority.
Provision
- 26 -
Provision was made on the other hand for the OC-
cupation by Czech troops of certain doubtful areas
which might include large "German-language islands."
Herr Hitler demanded that the territory to be evac-
uated by the Czechs be handed over intact as re-
gards military and commercial establishments as
well as regards foodstuffs, goods, cattle, and
raw materials.
The memorandum set forth the German Govern-
ment's willingness that a plebiscite be held be-
fore November 25 in "areas to be more definitely
defined," and that alterations of the frontier be
decided by a German-Czech, or an international,
commission.
The demand was made that the Czech Govern-
ment immediately discharge all Sudeten Germans
serving in the Czech army, and release all those
held as political prisoners.
It was suggested finally that a German-Czech
commission be set up to settle all questions of.
detail arising out of the points set forth in the
memorandum.
Chamberlein's Final Interview with Hitler at
Godesberg. In the House of Commons speech of
September 28, Mr. Chamberlain tells of the sur-
prise which he felt at finding for the first time
that Germany had set a time limit for occupation.
He related that in his final interview with Herr
Hitler
- 27 -
Hitler late in the evening of September 23, he
characterized the document more as an "ultimatum
than a memorandum" and that he bitterly reproached
the Führer for his failure to respond to the Brit-
ish efforts to secure peace.
In friendly terms Herr Hitler replied that
he had made a response by holding back certain
operations which he had planned, and that he had
offered in his proposal to Czechoslovakia a fron-
tier very different from the one which he would
have taken as the result of military conquest.
The Prime Minister also related that Herr
Hitler had repeated a statement which he had
first made at Berchtesgaden, namely, that"this
was the last of his territorial ambitions in Eur-
ope, and that he had no wish to include in the
Reich people of other races than German."
With respect to his desire to make friends
with Great Britain, Herr Hitler was quoted as
saying: "It is true, there is one awkward ques-
tion - the colonies." As regards Czech mobili-
zation, which was announced in the middle of
these conversations, Herr Hitler said, alluding
again to colonies, "there will be no mobiliza-
tion about that."
Czech
- 28 -
Czech Rejection of the Godesberg Memorandum.
As mentioned inmediately above, the Czechoslovak
Government ordered a general mobilization on the
evening of September 23, this action being based,
according to the German press, on fallacious re-
ports concerning a "breakdown" of the Godesberg
conversations.
Herr Hitler's memorandum and the accompany-
ing map were taken to Prague by the British Mil-
itary Attache in Berlin who encountered consider-
able difficulty in crossing the German-Czech fron-
tier where a nightly battle was in progress be-
tween the Czechs and armed members of the Sudet-
en Free Corps.
In a letter dated September 25 addressed to
the British Prime Minister (item No. 7 in the
first White Paper), the Czech Minister in London
communicated his government's rejection of the
memorandum, stating: "Against these new and
cruel demands my Government feels bound to make
the utmost resistance, and we shall do so, God
Helping."
The Second Visit to London of the French
Ministers. The French Prime Minister and Minister
for Foreign Affairs paid a second visit to London
on September 25 and 26 during which they informed
their British colleagues that if Czechoslovakia
were
- 29 -
were attacked France would fulfill its treaty
obligations. According to the British Prime
Minister, they were told in reply that if as a
result of these obligations French forces be-
came actively engaged in hostilities against
Germany, Great Britain would feel bound to sup-
port them-
The Sir Horace Wilson Phase. In anticipa-
tion of a speech which Herr Hitler was scheduled
to make in Berlin on the evening of September 26,
Mr. Chamberlain considered it useful to dispatch
Sir Horace Wilson with a"personal message" embod-
ied in a letter (item No. 9 in the first White
Paper) which was delivered on the evening before
the speech.
The letter set forth the reasons which in-
duced the British Government to agree with the
Czech Government's rejection of the Godesberg
memorandum. "With a clear appreciation of the
consequences which must rollow the abandonment
of negotiations and the substitution of force,"
the British Prime Minister asked Herr Hitler to
agree that there should be immediate discussions
between German and Czech representatives, in the
presence of British representatives, concerning
the methods by which the territory should be hand-
ed over. Recalling that "the only differences
between
- 30 -
between us lay in the method of carrying out an
agreed principle," the letter concluded, "Surely
the tragic consequences of a conflict ought not
to be incurred over a difference in method."
As the Prime Minister told the House of Com-
-
mons, Herr Hitler listened to Sir Horace Wilson
but stated that he could not depart from the mem-
orandum for the reason that further conferences
would lead to intolerable procrastination.
President Roosevelt's Appeals. On Sept-
ember 26 President Roosevelt addressed his appeal
to Herr Hitler and to Dr. Benes. On September 27
Herr Hitler dispatched an answer directly to the
President, the correspondence being published in
the German papers next morning. Amplifying Herr
Hitler's reply, German press comment pointed out
that the Reich was merely seeking in its demands
a fulfillment of President's Wilson's scheme for
self-determination, and politely criticized Pres-
ident Roosevelt for failing to mention the dis-
tressing fate of the Sudeten Germans (Embassy's
telegram No. 510, September 28, 2 p.m.).
The President's second appeal, which was sent
to Herr Hitler on September 27, has not been pub-
lished in the German press nor as far as is known
has it yet been answered.
Hitler's
- 31 -
Hitler's Speech of September 26- Next in
order comes Herr Hitler's speech delivered on
the evening of September 26 in the Berlin Sport-
palast, the historical scene of many earlier
Party gatherings. The atmosphere of the meet-
ing was boisterous, if indeed not unruly, the
audience being made up from one-third to one-half
of 3udeten German refugees who had been brought to
Berlin.
The speech began with a historical summary of
the moves which Herr Hitler claimed he had made for
peace, including his various proposals for disarm-
ament, his pact with Poland, the London Naval Agree-
ment of 1935, and his personal friendship with Mus-
solini. From France, he said, Germany wished ab-
solutely nothing. This led him to speak of the
Sudeten Germans as "the last problem which must be
solved and will be solved." "It is the last ter-
ritorial demand which I have to make in Europe,"
he declared, "but it is the demand from which I
will not deviate and which, God willing, I will
fulfill."
The Czechoslovak State was based on a lie,
Herr Hitler continued, and the father of this lie
was Dr. Benes, who "while I was doing my duty as
a simple German soldier, wandered about the world
from one clique to another." After saying that
he sympathized with the Slovaks, Poles, Hungarians,
and
- 32 -
and Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia, Herr Hitler
emphasized, however, that he claimed to speak
only for the fate of "my Germans," 214,000 of
whom had been compelled up to that time to seek
refuge in the Reich. He said that the Godesberg
memorandum asked for nothing more than the realiza-
tion of what Dr. Benes had previously promised; that
Germany had been willing to invite the British Le-
gion to maintain order in the Sudeten districts;
and that Germany was prepared to draw the frontier
in accordance with the vote of the inhabitants.
Thanking Mr. Chamberlain for his efforts, Herr Hit-
ler said that he had assured him that he had no
further interest in Czechoslovakia after that State
had solved its minority problems. Concluding his
speech on an ecstatic note, Herr Hitler said that
Benes had the decision of war or peace in his hands
and that he must choose inasmuch as Germany was re-
solved to come and seize "German rights" on October
1. Herr Hitler called upon the world to believe
that Germans were a far different people now than
in 1918 when "a wandering scholar had succeeded in
infecting them with the poison of democratic phras-
es."
Developments after Hitler's Speech. Events
moved rapidly after Herr Hitler's Sportpalast speech.
As Mr. Chamberlain told the House of Commons,
after reading the speech he issued a statement that
the British Government would guarantee the fulfill-
ment
- 33 -
ment of the promises made by the Czechoslovak
Government. Sir Horace Wilson called on Herr
Hitler for the second time on the morning of
Tuesday, September 27, and finding his attitude
unchanged, reiterated the British Government's
probable position in the case of a conflict. At
that time Herr Hitler apparently informed Sir
-
Horace Wilson of certain action (presumed to be
general mobilization) which he planned to take at
2 p.m. on the day following if the Czechs had not
by that time accepted the Godesberg memorandum-
In the meantime the British Prime Minister
evidently had a conversation with the Czechoslo-
vak Minister in London in which the latter assert-
ed his Government's readiness, under certain con-
ditions, to take part in a conference with German
and British representatives, as the Prime Minister
had suggested. (The Prime Minister had in the
meantime informed Herr Hitler of this proposal in
/
a letter which forms item No. 9 in the first White
Paper.) The substance of the Czechoslovak Minis-
ter's statement to Mr. Chamberlain is embodied in
a letter which he wrote to the British Prime Min-
ister, forming item No. 8 in the first White Paper.
On the evening of September 27, Mr. Chamber-
lain delivered his broadcast address to the Brit-
ish nation. Describing as "unreasonable" the at-
titude displayed by Herr Hitler in the Godesberg
memorandum
- 34 -
memorandum, Mr. Chamberlain said that he could
well understand the reasons for the Czech Govern-
ment's refusal to accept these terms. He declared
his readiness to take another trip to Germany, al-
though at that moment he thought it would serve no
useful purpose. It seemed incredible, he said,
that England should be undertaking military prepa-
rations because of a quarrel in a far-away country,
and a quarrel, moerover, which had been settled in
principle, but the issue as he put it was whether
resistance should not be offered if "a nation made
up its mind to dominate the world by fear of its
force." Calling upon the British people to go
quietly about preparations for an emergency, he
stated that in the meantime he would leave no ef-
fort untaken to keep the peace.
The State of Feeling in Germany on the After-
noon of September 27. Tuesday afternoon and eve-
ning seemed to mark the height of the crisis and
the seriousness of the hour was felt in Germany in
no less measure than in other countries.
Since the preceding Saturday and Sunday, anti-
aircraft units had been posted on the roofs of many
buildings in Berlin, upon the Olympic Stadium, upon
sport fields, and along roads passing by local air
ports. Reports were current of the nightly move-
ment of troops to the south and southeast. On
Tuesday
- 35 -
Tuesday evening from six to nine, street traffic
was periodically held up for the passage of sev-
eral trains of armored cars directly through the
middle of town and down the Wilhelmstrasse, where
they were reviewed briefly by the Führer from his
balcony at the Reich Chancery. (Official sources
have later confessed that this was largely a "prop-
aganda march" for the benefit of the British En-
bassy on the Wilhelmstrasse and that the armored
cars later turned around and went back to their
barracks on the outskirts of Berlin.)
The Berlin populace greeted these military
manifestations with glum silence and genuine warry.
For once it appeared that a National Socialist
propaganda campaign had over-reached its mark, in-
asmuch as the general public failed almost entire-
ly to respond to the campaign of hatred against
the Czechs, and while they may have felt some sym-
pathy for the Sudeten Germans, they were probably
at no time of the opinion that their salvation
was worth the risk of war- The mass of the peo-
ple, moreover, seemed to be fully aware of the
dangers they were facing. Although this aspect
was played down in German press editorials, it
percolated through from broadcasts from foreign
states and furthermore was reflected in reports
from
- 36 -
from German correspondents in London and Paris,
which on the whole presented a fairly accurate
picture of the state of feeling abroad. Mr.Cham-
berlain's radio address to the British nation was
apparently considered too strong for German con-
sumption, however, and was considerably diluted in
the next morning's papers. Curiously enough, there
was little outward resentment shown toward Great
Britain or France. Evidence was unmistakable
that a campaign against Czechoslovakia with its
possibly wider dangers would be the first adven-
ture for which Herr Hitler could not count upon
enthusiastic support, although most of the people
seemed to accept the eventuality with resignation.
It became abundantly clear that those people who
still had memories of Germany's defeat of 1918
are bitterly opposed to war, although the exuber-
ance of the Hitler Youth and the newer members of
the S.S. at the prospect of hostilities served per-
haps as a foreboding that this attitude might change
in years to come-
In foreign diplomatic circles the information
was circulated that the British Embassy had burned
its archives and was ordering its nationals to leave
the country, including the correspondents of all
British newspapers.
The
-
- 37 -
The Break-Up Leading to the Détente. Al-
though it was not generally known at the time,
the turn for the better probably occurred late
Tuesday night, September 27, with the receipt
by the British Prime Minister of another mes-
sage from Herr Hitler (item No. 10 in the first
White Paper)- In his House of Commons' speech
on the following day, Mr. Chamberlain described
this letter as indicating that Herr Hitler was
disposed to place certain limitations on his in-
tentions; specifically, Herr Hitler had stated
that the "final settlement of the Sudeten prob-
lem would be made dependent not upon a German
unilateral decision, nor on German measures of
force, but rather on a free vote under no out-
side influence;" "that the proposed German mil-
7
itary occupation was no more than a 'security
measure' and would stop within the limits set;"
and that Germany had not the slightest wish to
check the independence of the remaining Czech
State, but was ready to participate in a formal
guarantee.
As Mr. Chamberlain told the House of Commons
on September 28, he now felt that the "differences
and the obscurities had been narrowed down still
further to a point where really it was inconceiv-
able that they could not be settled by negotiations."
Accordingly
- 38 -
Accordingly he dispatched the following mes-
sage to Herr Hitler (constituting item No. 1 in-
the second White Paper):
"After reading your letter, I feel
certain that you can get all essentials
without war and without delay. I am
ready to come to Berlin myself at once
to discuss arrangements for transfers
with you and representatives of the
Czech Government, together with the rep-
resentatives of France and Italy if you
desire. I feel convinced that we can
reach agreement in a week. However
much you distrust the Prague Government's
intentions, you cannot doubt the power
of the British and French Governments
to see that the promises are carriedout
fairly and fully and forthwith. As you
know, I have stated publicly that we are
prepared to undertake that they shall be
so carried out. I cannot believe that
you will take the responsibility of start-
ing a world war which may end civiliza-
tion for the sake of a few days' delay
in settling the long-standing problem."
Mr. Chamberlain also dispatched the follow-
ing message to Signor Mussolini (item No. 2 in
the second White Paper):
"I have to-day addressed a last ap-
peal to Herr Hitler to abstain from force
to settle the Sudeten Problem, which I feel
sure can be settled by a short discussion
and will give him the essential territory,
population, and protection for both Sudet-
en and Czechs during transfer- I have of-
fered my elf to go at once to Berlin to dis-
cuss arrangements with German and Czech rep-
resentatives also of Italy and France. I
trust your Excellency will inform German
Chancelor that you are willing to be repre-
sented and urge him to agree to my proposal,
which will keep all our peoples out of war-
I have already guaranteed that Czech prom-
ises shall be carried out and feel confi-
dent that agreement could be reached in a
week."
The
- 39'-
The Arrangements of the Lunich Meeting.
Early on the morning of September 28, the French
Ambassador called up the State Secretary in the
German Foreign Office to say that Mr. Daladier had
a proposal to communicate to Herr Hitler. The
French Ambassador was instructed to say that if
the German and British Governments agreed to these
proposals (which Mr. Daladier had apparently evolv-
ed independently and the contents of which have
never been divulged), and the Czechoslovaks re-
fused to accept it, France would reconsider its
treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia. In the course
of the meeting which later took place with Herr Hit-
ler, the latter began by denouncing the Czechs as
"Mongols not Slavs" and recalled the far different
and happier solution of the Saar question. The French
Ambassador is reported to have pointed out that Germany
wished in the Sudeten question to reverse the Saar pro-
cedure by occupying the territory prior to the vote; he
then alluded to the danger of a general war which might
bring in the "American countries." Foreign Minister
von Ribbentrop interposed that Gormany was stronger
than any aggregation of powers. At this point the
conversation was interrupted by Hitler being informed
that the Italian Ambassador had brought an urgent per-
sonal message from Mussolini who had apparently just
received Chamberlain's message through the British
Ambassador at Rome.
Lussolini's
- 40 -
Mussolini's message was to the effect that
the British Ambassador had just made a suggestion
to him, on the strength of which he begged Herr
Hitler to postpone for 24 hours the action which
he had planned to take that afternoon at two
o'clock. Signor Missolini added that if Herr
Hitler wished to see him he was willing to ar-
range a meeting. Hitler thereupon summoned his
advisers and on the basis of Mr. Chamberlain's
offer to return to Germany, decided to invite
Mussolini, Chamberlain and Daladier to come to
Munich the next day.
(
The invitation was presented to the British
Prime Minister under dramatic circumstances while
he was addressing the special meeting of the House
of Commons on the afternoon of September 28. The
essential points in Mr. Chamberlain's speech, which
consisted of a review of British action in the Czech
affair, have been dealt with in detail in the fore-
going sections.
Since the foregoing was drafted, further
information concerning Mussolini's com-
munications to Hitler has been received
and embodied in the Embassy's telegrams
No. 565 and 566 of October 21, 4 p.m.
The
- 41 -
The Munich Meeting of September 29 and the
Resulting Agreement. It is understood that
Mussolini on his way from Rome worked out the
draft of what was later to become the Munich
agreement. Herr Hitler went to Kufstein to
meet Mussolini and on the train back to Munich
declared himself to be satisfied with the plan,
which was later presented to the British and
French statesmen. At the meeting in the Fuh-
rer's house in Munich, the participants sat
around an open fire in easy chairs, and for 14
hours Hitler's interpreter, Schmidt, translated
from German into French, French into English, etc.,
in all possible geometrical combinations. In
the discussion of the plan paragraph by paragraph,
a number of changes were made but in its final es-
- sentials the subsequent agreement corresponded very
much to Mussolini's draft.
Two Czech diplomats were called to Munich to
/
keep in touch with the conference. A striking
feature of the final agreement, however, is that
Czechoslovakia was not given the status of one of
the negotiating parties, nor is reference made to
Czech acceptance of the plan as 8. condition ne-
cessary for its operation. This was apparently
taken for granted, and on September 30 Prague an-
nounced its unconditional acceptance of the agree-
ment, thus ending the crisis.
The
- 42 -
-
The text of the agreement is published as
item No. 4 in the second British White Paper and
furnishes an interesting comparison with Herr
Hitler's Godesberg memorandum.
In the Munich agreement Herr Hitler won his
point that occupation should commence by October
1, this agreement, however, providing for a more
gradual procedure whereby this should be carried
out by the consecutive occupation of defined zones.
and should reach its completion on October 10. Herr
Hitler also obtained satisfaction in his original
Godesberg demands concerning the release of Sudet-
en German political prisoners in the Czech army,
as well as concerning the point that the evacu-
ated territory should be handed over essentially
intact. Herr Hitler may have sacrificed a mini-
mal advantage in conceding far-reaching powers'
to an international commission, although such a
commission was envisaged in the Godesberg memoran-
dum as an alternative to a purely German-Czech
commission. The proposal for a possible plebi-
scite is largely the same as that contained in
the Godesberg memorandum. With respect to guar-
antees, the annex of the Munich agreement con-
forms substantially to Herr Hitler's earlier
statements that he would consider taking part in
such a guarantee, in association with Italy, once
the
- 43 -
the Polish and Hungarian minority problems had
been settled.
Two maps are annexed to the second British
White Paper. The first indicates the territory
which Germany proposed to occupy under the terms
of the Godesberg memorandum; the second indicates
the four zones which the statesmen at Munich agreed
that Germany should occupy without further formal-
ity. There is enclosed herewith a third map, tak-
en from the London TIMES of October 10, showing
the total extent of territory which Germany occu-
pied as of October 10 as the result of Zone 5,
within which the Commission of Ambassadors lumped
together certain supplementary areas to be occu-
pied by German troops. The third map will be
found to differ very little from the map of the
Godesberg memorandum. By agreeing to a certain
delay and to a larger measure of international
supervision, Herr Hitler would thus seem to have
lost practically nothing territorially (if in-
deed he did not gain); while the avoidance of
war and the subsequent improvement of Germany's
position among the powers following the Munich
agreement can hardly be denied him as a great dip-
lomatic victory.
Conclusions
- 44 -
Conclusions Regarding the Crisis. After
the Austrian Anschluss it was inevitable that
steps should be taken to bring the Sudeten Ger-
mans nearer to the Reich. This appears to have
been done first in Henlein's demand at Carlsbad
for autonomy. At what point Hitler may have de-
cided that actual incorporation of the Sudetens
within the Reich was feasible must remain a matter
for speculation. It is clear, however, that on
May 28, following the British demarche and the in-
sinuations concerning Germany's "weakness" made in
the foreign press, Hitler decided that the Sudeten
question must be brought to some kind of a solution
before this fall. The time when he made up his
mind that acquisition of the Sudetenland was possi-
ble to bring about during the current year probably
occurred between May 28 and his closing speech at
Nuremberg on September 12.
With the passage of the crisis, two questions
immediately spring to mind: (a) Was Hitler will-
ing if need be to risk a general war to bring the
Sudetens into the Reich? or (b) did he employ this
threat merely to coerce Czechoslovakia and the West-
ern Powers, intending at all times to leave himself
a possible way out from a general conflict?
The British Prime Minister, whose testimony
is deserving of attention as that of the most in-
timate witness to the negotiations, appears to
Since the above was written further informa-
tion concerning Hitler's decision to acquire
the Sudetenland has come to the Embassy's at- believe
tention. See my confidential personal letter
to Mr.Moffat, Chief of the European Division,
dated October 22, 1938.
- 45 -
believe in the first possibility, having told
the House of Commons on September 28, "I have
no doubt now, looking back, that my visit alone
prevented an invasion, for which everything was
ready
Following his visit to Berchtes-
gaden, Mr. Chamberlain definitely had the impress-
ion that Herr Hitler was determined to go ahead
with his plans even though they might lead to gen-
eral hostilities. While Herr Hitler may have
hoped that Great Britain and France would inter-
vene to force Prague to yield to a peaceful ces-
sion of the Sudetenland, it is doubtful if he
could have envisaged the specific step which Mr.
Chamberlain took in offering to come to Berchtes-
gaden. In surmounting this earlier crisis, name-
ly, that, prior to the Berchtesgaden meeting, it
would appear that Mr. Hitler enjoyed spectacular
good fortune.
Hitler's actions at Godesberg and immediate-
ly thereafter are understandable on the premise
that he fully believed that the most drastic
threats were necessary to secure without delay
the territory promised Germany in the Franco-
British plan, which the Czechs had accepted in
principle. Here again the question arises as to
whether Herr Hitler had in mind an avenue of es-
cape from the possibly disastrous consequences
which
- 46 -
which might have ensued from his being forced
to stand by his program of radical action. In
his Monday evening speech at the Sportpalast,
Hitler gave the outward appearance of having
closed the door and, moreover, maintained this
position subsequently in his conversations with
Sir Horace Wilson.
Accepting the thesis, however, that he was
always willing to compromise temporarily on 10%
of his demands, the strengthening of the British
and French attitude to the point where these gov-
ernments on September 27 gave the appearance of
being prepared to go to war, may have seemed to
him to be the moment to concede the vital 10%,
which he did in his final letter to the British
Prime Minister dispatched on the evening of Sept-
ember 27. It may be assumed, moreover, that af-
ter Berchtesgaden Hitler had a fairly good idea
of the man he was dealing with in Chamberlain and
he may perhaps have thought therefore that he
could always count upon Chamberlain for one more
effort to maintain peace. The fact that Musso-
lini gave first utterance to the details of the
Godesberg memorandum had led certain people to
suppose that Hitler may have concerted with the
Duce in advance some last-minute move for a way
out; whether this was so or not, this proved
unnecessary inasmuch as Chamberlain took in time
the
- 47 -
the decisive step of addressing his last ap-
peal to Hitler. Although the crisis following
1
Godesberg was far more intense, a case may be
made out for maintaining that Hitler knew the
factors and the elements in the game that he was
playing better than he did, say, before the Ber-
chtesgaden meeting when, although the situation
had not reached such a critical point, the ele-
ments of chance were possibly greater.
In the last analysis Hitler cannot have
failed to have weighed the consequênces which
might have arisen from a forced march into Czeche-
slovakia. It is generally assumed that that coun-
try would have fought back, and although it is
problematic how long it would have taken Germany
to subdue Czechoslovakia, certain opinions have
been ventured that at the outside a little more
than a month would have been necessary. While a
war lasting that length of time in the middle of
Europe would certainly have offered chances for
all sorts of complications, the opinion held in
Berlin, at least, was that France and Great Brit-
ain would only have broken off relations at the
beginning of hostilities without necessarily de-
claring war upon Germany from the first. What
would have occurred, therefore, must be left to
speculation.
In
- 48 -
In the face of the many imponderables,
including that most unfathomable factor of all,
namely, the character of the man at the head of
the Reich, it would be idle to attempt to pre-
sent at this point a definitely formed conclusion
as to whether Hitler acted in an irresponsible
manner and was saved from disaster merely by good
fortune, or whether he was following a plan which
he foresaw would lead to the result eventually
produced. It is perhaps only possible at this
juncture to furnish material which may assist
those to form an opinion on this point who care
to make the attempt. In this connection, cer-
tain incidental developments may be adduced which
lend support for the maintenance of either one
thesis or the other.
On the one hand it is known that Hitler's
course of action gaused the gravest concern to
many of his most intimate advisers, excluding
Herr von Ribbentrop whose statements, as record-
ed above, would seem to indicate that he was urg-
ing the Führer to proceed with the Godesberg plan
whatever the dangers involved. A story has been
circulating in informed quarters that at the height
of the crisis General Göring and former Foreign
Minister von Neurath called upon the Führer, it
being presumed from the character of these two
personages
- 49 -
personages that they intervened to urge moder-
ation. Herr Hitler's mood at the Sportpalast
meeting gave the appearance of desperate reck-
lessness, although in this connection it must
be recalled that he was speaking primarily for
his German public before whom he is always at
his histrionic best.
On the other side of the picture there ex-
ists evidence to show that Hitler refrained from
acting precipitately in certain important matters.
During the few days before the meeting in Berch-
tesgaden when open rioting had broken out in the
Sudetenland, Germany failed to take any extraor-
dinary military steps. At the Berchtesgaden meet-
ing Hitler gave an assurance that he would not
attack Czechoslovakia during the pending negotia-
tions, an assurance which Chamberlain in his House
of Commons speech gives him full credit for living
up to. As military experts point out, the prepa-
rations in no way corresponded to a general mobil-
ization, nor was there that complete conscription
of private vehicles and supplies which would have
occurred as part of a general mobilization. It
is true, of course, that the bases of a mobiliza-
tion were laid in the skeleton organization of the
reserve units as well as in the provision of legal
steps suited to bring about quickly such a mobili-
zation. In their extent, the measures were direct-
ed solely to a possible reduction of Czechoslovakia
and
- 50 -
and at no time did they approach the stage of
a general mobilization for a European war.
It is an oft-repeated assertion that Hit-
ler is desirous of avoiding a general conflict
at all costs. Nevertheless, in the last cri-
sis he could hardly have escaped taking this
into account as an eventuality, however remote.
It is learned on good authority that he com-
missioned one of his advisers to draw up a re-
port on the state of feeling among the German
people. The fact that this report was over-
whelmingly negative might have played a certain
role in his calculations.
In the course of time possibly other infor-
mation may be revealed which will throw light up-
on the question as to how near Germany came to
war. As sometimes happens, this may be employed
to stress the inevitability of the final conclu-
sion recorded by events, that is, it may be sub-
sequently maintained that war was merely a re-
mote possibility. Without attempting to preju-
dice in advance the value of such material as
may in the future be adduced, it would at the
same time seem a pity to leave out of account
what for want of a better term must be called the
"subjective atmosphere" of the recent crisis, which
made itself felt in the fact that large sections
of
- 51 -
of the German people sincerely believed that
they were on the brink of war, an opinion which
was shared as well by many foreign observers in
Berlin.
Enclosures:
1. Map taken from the London
TIMES of October 10, 1938.
2. Copies of British First and Second
White Papers entitled respectively:
"Miscellaneous No.7 (1938), Cmd.5847" and
"Miscellaneous No.8 (1938), Cmd.5848."
JDB:EM
At the time of mailing copies of the
White Papers ordered have not arrived.
They will be sent subsequently. See despatch No. 397 of
October 31, 1938 from the
Embassy, Berlin,(760f.62/1847
saved
ord, who
phed
hom
and
entorce
H.
complaint.
while neip us.
BOUNDARIES OF FIFTH ZONE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
DRESDEN
EURO
BRESLAU
Chemnitz
A
Kreuzburg
Freiberg
R
Zittau
Glauchau
N
Schweidnitz
DAKE
Zwickau
Waldenburg
Reichenbach
Tepht,
Annaberg,
Oppeln
Plauen
Aleitmentz
Mohene
Neisse
Klingenthal
Komotau
Jung
Glatz
Tarnowitz
From London TIMES of October 10,1938.
Raudeill
Mainuk
Bunzleu
Manigi
Reinerz
Saaz
Daramen
Neustade
Sadawao
Do Glogau
Kladno
Zap Elbe
Nimburg
Königgrätz
OF
Gleiwitz
Rakonitio
o
Rokitnit
Leobschutz
Zone 3
Karolinenthal
Luditz
PRAGUE
Print
Zone
Jagerndorf
Beroum
PRAHA
Pardubitz
Ratibor
Kolin
Brandeis
N
Zditz
Rican
Ruttenberg o
Chrudimo
o
9
Mohenmaut
a
Troppau
Oderberg
Dobris
Leitory
Pribrem
Beneschauf
Ostr
Pils
Tescheh
Hokitzan
Zone 5
Dobran
BRDA
Selcan
Deutsch
Ronse
Brod
Breznitz
tschein
40
chefleritz
Olmütz
o
Numpoleta
Leiprik
Jablunkau
Mühlhausen
Klattau
Blatna
Tabor
Iglau
Prossnitz o
Waldmünche
Prenau
Moseritach
Horadzowitz
Pilgram
M
Cracia
a
a
Cham
Pisek
BRUNN
Wischay
ang Reichenstein
Trabitach
Weseli,
Kromeriz
OF
Teltsch
BRNO
Austerlite
Zilma
Regensburg
Mähr
a
chatics
THE
Budwitz
Budweis
Kow
Wittingeu
Grafenau
Muspitz
CARPATHIANS
Straubing
S'lovakia
Deggendorf
Goding
Gmünd
M
Zone
Kaplitz
Retz
Notice
Sigmundsherberg
Passau
durg
Mays
Aigen
POLAND
Mistelbach
ofreistade
your
Kip,
N
U.S.S.
Y
Krems
Stockersu
Cferding
Urfahr u
S
T
Marneuhung
OF
Austria,
HUNDARY
Miles
Linz
Grein
Danuh
Klasterneuburg
RUMANIA
o
10 20 30 40 50
Melk
Boken
Enns
VIENNA
(Bretislava
SLAVIA
Buchgress
(1850)
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
RAW
1-1336
FROM
This telegram must bE
Berlin (part air)
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
Dated October 20, 1938
to anyone. (c)
Rec'd 11:48 n.m., 21st,
DIVISION OF
Secretary of State,
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
OCT211938
ON MR. POLITICAL DUNN RELATIONS
Washington.
2 51938
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
560, October 20, 4 p. my
The Counselor of the French Embassy Montbas just called.
HE stated that Francois Poncet had returned from his talk
with Patler at Berohtesgaden rather encouraged by Hitler's
attitude.
760F. 760F.62/1737
Hitler had said that a false impression had gotten
abroad that he regarded the Munich meeting as an isolated
Episode. This was not the fact. Hitler insisted that hE
felt that the accord at Munich should bE followed by a de-
finite betterment of relationships among the great powers
of the west and that real benefits for the future should
flow from this understanding. Hitler had instructed Ribben-
trop to put into precise form certain arrangements that
might bE concluded in the spirit of the Munich agreement
GDG
but was not yet ready to speak in detail.
Hitler added that hE did not anticipate any difficulty
with the French, that the French would tell him "yes"
English CT29
r
75162
"no" and that this would decide the matter. With the
CETTLE
EDA - 2 - #560, October 20, 4 p.m. from Berlin
English, however, it is different. You give them a paper.
There is a storm of discussion, billions for armament and
no precise satisfaction comes. In fact Hitler declared
that hE might have to denounce the naval agreement. HE
241.62
was not yet ready to do so because hE had not built up to
in
the 35% in heavy units but when hE was so built up hE would
judge by the state of mind in England whether to denounce
the agreement or not.
Hitler said that hE desired to have real understanding
with England but that what hE could not tolerate was a
partial understanding while Great Britain armed at a fur-
ious rate. In other words hE would not accept a piece of
sugar to keep him quiet until the British armament program
was completed.
Cipher text accompaniment to London. -
WILSON
RGC:EDA
PPARENT
OMISSTON
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
RAW
This telegram must bE
Berlin
closely paraphrased bE-
fore bEing communicated
FROM - Dated October 21, 1938
to anyone. (D)
Rec'd 4:20 p.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
OCT 22 1938
565, October 21, 4 p.m.
MR. WELLES will
760F.62/1747
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE UNDERSECRETARY.
/1924
Supplementing my 558, October /1697a 20, 2 p.m., and in fur-
ther reply to your 181, October 18, noon.
Report on your point No. one. WEizsaecker telephones
hE cannot verify the hour at which Hitler received the Presi-
dent's second message. Papers are not given a time stamp in
the Chancery and hE is unable to find anyone who saw the paper
delivered.
Wiedemann states that hE saw the telegram between ten
and Eleven o'clock the morning of Wednesday the 28th, that
OCT 24 2 1938
FILED
it was already translated at that time and that he "supposes
that it had already been brought to the Chancellor".
REference to your Point Three. I had a long talk this
morning with Attolico who bEggEd ME to keep strictly con-
fidential anything he told ME about September 28. His story
follows:
HE did not participate in events on the 27th instant
other than to follow as well as he could what was going on.
On the morning of the 28th at Eleven o'clock hE-told
the Belgian Minister, who was calling on him, that hE
GDG
fully
RAW -2- 565, October 21, 4 p.m. from Berlin
fully EXPECTED war to break out that day.
A few minutes later Mussolini called on the telephone
in person to inform Attolico that a message from Chamberlain
had just been received through Lord Perth. Mussolini in-
structed Attolico at once to apprise Hitler that whatever
happened Mussolini was with him to the finish. HE knew that
Hitler was planning to issue orders for final mobilization
and the march of troops at 2. p.m., that hE had just received
a message from Chamberlain that looked interesting but hE
wanted time to consider it. HENCE hE begged Hitler to delay
everything 24 hours. HE closed with a further assurance of
his solidarity whatever happened.
Attolico went at once to the Chancery and was informed
by the adjutant that Francois-Ponest was with Hitler. HE
persuaded the adjutant to carry in a note saying that Attolico
was there with a message from Mussolini. Hitler read the note
and told Francois-Poncet that he was called to the telephone,
went out of the room leaving Francois-Poncet with Ribbentrop.
HE then heard the message from Mussolini hesitated some
twenty seconds and said that since Mussolini requested It hE
would delay affairs 24 hours. Attolico then said that
Mussolini was calling him at noon sharp to have Hitler's
answer and that hE must hurry back to the Embassy to take
the
RAW -3- 565, October 21, 4 p.m., from Berlin.
the call. Attolico says that Hitler returned to Francois-
Poncet and told the latter that hE had just had a message
from Mussolini thus giving Francois-Poncet the impression
that Mussolini himself had called on the telephone.
Mussolini called Attolico promptly at twelve, instructed
him to return to Hitler to thank him for his consideration,
to state that Chamberlain proposed that the whole situation
bE liquidated in one week, and that hE undertook his guaranty
in respect to carrying out the solution not only vis-a-vis
Germany but vis-a-vis Italy as well. Attolico was further
to state that acceptance of the plan in Mussoline's opinion
meant for Hitler such a "grandiose victory", that there was
no point in precipitating hostilities. Attolico was to
return to Hitler at once and in the meantime Chamberlain's
proposal was to bE read over the telephone to the Italian
Embassy.
Attolico proceeded again to the Chancery where he En-
countered Goering and Neurath in the anteroom. HE immediately
acquainted these two with the state of affairs and received
Goering's assurances that hE would push for the acceptance
of Chamberlain's proposal. Hitler then entered the room
and Attolico delivered his message briefly. Hitler appeared
puzzled and said that nobody had yet spoken to him about
the
RAW ⑉4⑉ 565, October 21, 4 p.m., from Berlin.
the problem being solved in one week and hE thought there
was some confusion. Attolico immediately volunteered to re-
- turn to his Embassy, get the copy of Chamberlain's communi-
cation (not yet delivered by the British Embassy) and return
at once with it. HE desired thus to give Goering a chance to
urge Hitler to accept the proposal. Attolico returned to
the Embassy, plcked up Chamberlain's communication, found a
further message from Mussolini instructing him to say that
if Hitler so desired Italy would bE present at any conference
if Chamberlain chose to come over again and Hitler received
him.
END SECTION ONE.
WILSON
EMB
ROW
REB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
This telegram must bE
clostly paraphrased be-
BERLIN
fore being communicated
to anyone. (D)
FROM
Dated October 21, 1938
Rec'd 3:50 p. m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
566, October 21, 4 p. me
Continuing my 565, October 21, 4 p. m. (SECTION TWO)
Attolico returned to the Chancellory. This time
Hitler was summoned from a conference with Henderson
carrying in his hand Chamberlain's communication which
Attolico also presented. Hitler said that hE could not
SEE much purpose in an announcement in Rome that dealings
at Godesberg had given him the impression that hE was in
/
agreement with Hitler's suggested line. Chamberlain had
then returned to England, Encountered a wave of hostile
opinion and had slipped back. HE would only talk to
Chamberlain again provided not only that Italy was repre-
sented but that Italy was represented by Mussolini in
person.
Attolico rushed again to his Embassy, telephoned
Mussolini, rushed back to the Chancellory arriving there
about 2:40 for the fourth time since 11 o'clock. Hitler
came
REB
2-#566, From Berlin,Oct.21,4p.m.
came from the lunch table still eating. Attolico who
speaks no German spoke this time four words in that
language "morgenelfuhr Mussolini ladies a panic".
Hitler laughed for the first time during the day and
Attolico went back to lunch.
Attolico added one further detail emphasizing again
its strictly confidential nature. In the course of the
third visit Hitler dictated a brief outline of his minimum
and irreducible demands and told Attolico to communicate
them to Mussolini. Attolico did so but warned that other
influences here might cause Hitler to stiffen those demands
before the meeting. Mussolini replied that hE thought hE
could take care of that. At the first meeting of the
four heads of government Mussolini at once spoke and
proposed as his own suggestion the irreducible demands
which Attolico had telephoned. Attolico states that hE
has since learned that in fact the demands had been
stiffened subsequently but that Hitler was unable to dis-
claim Mussolini's suggestion in view of the fact that it
had originated with himself.
(END OF MESSAGE)
WILSON
EMB-KLP