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Dispatches - Germany, May 18, 1939-August 31, 1939
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Dispatches - Germany, May 18, 1939-August 31, 1939
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JNA
DIVISION )
EUROPEAN AFFAIN:
TELEGRAM RECEIVED MAY my
JR
GRAY
DEPARTMENT or
Berlin
FROM
Dated may 18, 1939
Rec'd 11:15 a.m.
Secretary of State,
/ashington.
386, lay 18, noon.
My number 371, ay 15, 7 pame
The press today announces prominently Ciano's
visit to Berlin and reports that hE is due to arrive
on May 21. It is stated that the formal signature by
762.66/595
the two Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Italo-
German Agreement will take place on the morning of May 22nd
in the new Chancellery in the presence of the German
Ambassador to Italy and the Italian Ambassador to Germany
and that other ceremonies and conferences have been
arranged. The visit will last two days and Ciano will bE
accompanied by Italian officials and journalists.
The VOLKISCHER BEOBACHTER points out that the speedy.
preparation of the agreement for signature is in the
association of the two countries and states that "the
spirit of the unreserved confidence which marks the friendly CODE
armored block of hundred and fifty million men is the
decisive factor in Europe about which all political EVENTS
G-HR
revolve
-2- #386, May 18, noon; from Berlin.
revolve and whose peace ensuring might has been
emphasized by the Milan Agreement and the spèech of
1
Mussolini at Turin."
KIRK
WWC:DDM
JNH
ET
REB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
GRAY
Berlin
FROM
Dated May 24, 1939
Rec'd 2:30 p. m.
Division of
Secretary of State,
DIVISION OF
FAB EASTERN AFFAIRS
EUROPEAN AFFAIR
Washington.
AY 2 6 1939
ky
MAY 25 1929
Department State
412, May 24, 4 p. m.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
During the last few days growing attention to Japan
26294
has been noticeable in the press. This is manifasted in
the numerous descriptive articles about Japan most of
which are written by members of the group of German
journalists now making a tour there and in the prominence
762.94/362
given both to Premier Hiranuma's recent announcement of
Japan's determination to maintain the closest cooperation
with Germany and Italy as well as to the alleged strongly
favorable reaction of the Japanese press to the German-
Italian pact. In the latter connection this morning's --
BOERSEN ZEITUNG summarizes an Editorial said to have
appeared in the Japan TIMES which declares that just as
Germany and Italy have united in a front - for peace in
Europe so Japan stands for peace in the cast and that in
this way Janan best serves its German and Italian partners.
In a britf aditorial comment the paper avers that in con-
junction with Hiranuma's statement a clear warning to the
western
G/HC
REB
2-#412, From Berlin, May 24,4p.m.
western powers may bE discerned in this semi-official
utterance of the Japan TIMES. Japan it is asserted
Emphasizes its specific duty to reorganize Eastern
Asia as well as its concurrence with the axis powers
in the anti-Comintern front and "in the face of the
current efforts to create an unfriendly triple pact
lats it bE known in this way that a cormon ENEMY of the
axis powers and Japan would bE jointly opposed though in
different parts of the world."
/
KIRK
CSB
OVISER ON MR. POLITICAL DUNN RELATIONS
TELEGRAM RECEIVEDAY 26 1939
PA.D
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
HRE
This telegram must bE
FROM BERLIN
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
Dated May 25, 1939
to anyone (c)
Rec'd 6 p.m.
Secretary of State
DIVISION
Washington
EUROPEA
MAY 26 1939
416, May 25, 7 p.m.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Thus far the continued press comment on the German-
Italian pact has followed the same general lines described
in my 408, May 23, 5 p.m. which has revealed little of
762.65/616
a definite nature as to the future policy of Germany and
Italy under the pact and no official act or utterance
of which the Embassy is aware has thrown any light on
this question. In the absence of any such concrete
indications an analysis of the pact must therefore bE
confined to impressions current in diplomatic and press
circles here and among the Germans with whom the Embassy
has had an opportunity to confer.
It is generally agreed that much in the pact may bE
regarded as constituting merely a declaration of agreements
previously arrived at between the two countries. Accord-
ingly there is a tendency notably on the part of certain
diplemats to conclude that the pact represents no important
change in the European political situation and that the
outburst of publicity accompanying its preparation and
G-HR
signature
HRE
2-#416 From Berlin May 25, 7 p.m.
signature was intended to divert public attention from the
failure thus far of German and Italian diplomacy to
achieve German aims in Danzig and the Corridor, to fulfill
aside from the acquisition of Albania Italy's aspirations
in the Mediterranian, and to prevent the signing of the
Anglo-Turkish agreement. The same persons advance the
opinion that whereas Germany was formerly free to proceed
without consulting Italy it is now prevented from doing
so in future by Article II and that Italy, deaply adverse
to risking a general war, is thus enabled to EXERT its
influence toward a moderation of German policy Especially
with regard to Poland.
The foregoing interpretation, however, is not shared
by the predominant majority of foreign journalists here
or by certain other diplomats particularly those represent-
ing countries having close relations with Germany and
the Germans
Italy and it does not conform to the reaction of / with
whom the Embassy has come in contact. It is asserted in
these circles that the pact constitutes one of the most
remarkable alliances in modern history as it is complete
and unconditional and in its intent obligates the respect-
ive parties to COME to the aid of the other in CASE of
war however started or for whatever purpose it may bE
waged. In this regard the new pact is compared with the
pre-war
HRE
3-#416 From Berlin May 25, 7 p.m.
pre-war triple alliance which left Italy a legal loophole
of Escape in 1914 and which Austria felt free to Exploit
in an attempt to conclude a separate peace with the
Allies. Furthermore the belief prevails that the military
terms of the actual treaty go beyond those agreed upon at
Milan and that an understanding has been reached either
confirming an already existing arrangement for the assign-
ment of German officers to Italian troops or inaugurating
such a system with which the trip to Rome of General
Milch announced in the press this morning is associated.
(END OF SECTION ONE)
KIRK
EMB:JRL
EU
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
EUROPEA DIVISION
HRE
MAY 26 1939
This telegram must bE
FROM BERLIN
DEPARTMENT VI
clossly paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
Dated May 25, 1939
to. anyone (c)
Rec'd 7 p.m.
Secretary of State
Washington
416, May 25, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO)
The view is likewise advanced in the foregoing
circles that Germany has succeeded in committing Italy
not only in the military field but in the Economic sphere
as well and by virtue of Article IV which binds the
parties to collaboration in the sphere of war Economy in
times of peace 0.3 well as in actual war the pact is said
to bE adjusted to the conditions of blockade which a
common Enemy would doubtless Employ against Germany and
Italy. It is thought along this line that as Italy is the
Economically poorer of the two and is less advanced in
the realm of "autarchy" or self sufficiency this would
mean making Italy more or lESS dependent upon Germany
Economically and that this trend would develop EVEN if
peace were to bE maintained. The pact is thus looked upon
as the comprehensive framework ofan alliance which would
doubtless bE amplified by special secret technical
agreements in the field of military and Economic collabor-
ation.
The
HRE
2-#416 From Berlin May 25, 7 p.m. (SEC 2)
The vague wording of the provisions of Article VI
of the pact regarding the development of the relations of
the signatories with friendly states has in particular
given rise to speculation. The VIEW is expressed that the
denunciation of certain agreements may bE EXPECTED in
CONSEQUENCE thereof and in this connection the Anglo-Italian
agreements is bring widely mentioned. It is also asserted
that the Article may connote that a creation of German and
Italian spheres of interest in the Balkans and Eastern
Europt has been determined or will bE Effected with the
purpose of Evolving at the same time a joint conlition
of these nations with Germany and Italy. Ribbentrop's
/
reference to the "mighty and invincible bloc of 300,000,000
men" contained in his statement issued following the
signature of the pact is regarded as indicating such a
purpose and the view is advanced that the pact as a whole
may envisage = larger application than merely the
immediate attachment of Italy to Germany and may bE
intended to constitute a nucleus for further combinations.
The foregoing impressions are based on considerations
limited to the Extent of the information so far revealed
and any definite cvaluation of the real significance of
the pact would depend upon a knowledge of such unpublished
understandings as may have attended it or may bE in
contemplation
HRE
3-#416 From Berlin May 25, 7 p.m. (Sec 2)
contrmplation as well as upon a subsequent disclosure of
the means which may be adopted with a view to implementing
its terms. It is clear, however, that whatever the pact
in itself may signify or whatever Effect may be given
thereto the chief consideration is the action which the
Axis powers may take in pursuit of their policies and that
factor depends solely on the intent in the minds of
Mussolini and Hitler and its development in the face of
future events in Europe.
(END OF PESSAGE)
KIRK
EMB:JRL
&
CNE
REB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
A portion of
this telegram must be
closely paraphrastd be-
BERLIN
fore, being communicated
to anyone. (c)
FROM Dated May 26, 1939
NEAR LA NEED
REC'd 3:56 p. m.
Secretary of State,
DIVISION OF
Washington.
Pay
EDROPEAN AFFAIRS
MAY 27 1939
417, May 26, 2 P. m,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
(GRAY) My 398, May 21, 11 a. me
760c.62
During the last few days the more or less chronic
anti-Polish prass campaign has undergone a definite
intensification which began at the first of the WEEK
with lengthy accounts accompanied by sharply condemnatory
7600.62/619
editorials of the shooting at Kalthof on the Polish-
Danzig frontiers of a Danzig citizen the responsibility
for which was attributed to Polish officials. The
proteste of the Danzig Government with regard to this
matter were featured as was also the despatch of a
wreath by Hitler to the funeral of this "German victim
of Polish brutality". This account has been followed by
a series of darogatory reports of new instances of
/
violence perpatrated by Polish mobs against the German
minority notably riots in Tama and Lodz which are said
to have resulted in serious injuries to Germans resident
OH/D
in
THE
REB
2-#417, From Berlin, May 26,2p.m.
in these places and in Extensive damage to their property.
Yesterday the press gave prominent publication to reports
that a German truck heading from East Prussia across the
corridor to the Reich was fired upon by Polish guards
while stopping at the Danzig customs station. In comment-
ing on this incident the LOKAL-ANZEIGER declares that
despite the protection by international law of traffic
across the corridor no one in the world can argue that
such traffic can bE maintained if drivers are met with
Polish shots and that in this way "Poland itself provides
better proof than would otherwise bE obtainable that
conditions in the corridor have become impossible
Especially since the Polish Government protects sub-
ordinate Polish authorities responsible for such incidents
and thereby practically provokes them."
This Emphasis on Polish acts of provocation against
Germany is coupled with Editorial attacks on the
chauvinistic attitude of the Polish press which accord-
ing to the VOLKISCHER BEOBACHTER as well as other papers
is now bring manifested not only toward Germany but
likewise toward Italy. (END GRAY)
This
NC ⑉3⑉ 417 from Berlin, May 26, 1939 2 p.m.
This reference to comment in the Polish press
unfavorable to Italy has aroused interest here in view of
the rumors which have been circulating. as to the
possibility that Italy may EXERCISE a restraining influence
on Poland over the Danzig controversy. Members of the
Polish Embassy here are increasingly outspoken in their
assertions as to the necessity of making a definite and
conclusive stand as inst German aggression as well as in
their profession of absolute confidence in the strength
of the armed forces of Poland coupled in certain instances
with disparaging comments on the var power of Germany.
They also state that no conversations are now being carried
on between Warsaw and Berlin and that none can proceed
until the requirements/laid down by Back as condition pre-
cedent to negotiations are fulfilled. They indicate
furthermore that the situation with which German action
has confronted the Polish Government would bE simplified
if Poland could be assured that Danzig would not eventually
bE made a base for German fortifications as a menace to
Polish territory and that the threat of German arms would
bE removed but state that the only guarantee of the
EXECUTION of any commitments by Germany to the forazoing
Effect would bE some reduction in German war preparations
In
NC -4- 7/417 from Berlin, May 26, 1939 2 p.m.
In certain neutral diplomatic circles in Berlin this
attitude as Expressed. by Polish representatives is charac-
terized as intransigeant and fraught with the gravest
dangtr. littler is said to maintain his position that the
Polish controversy must bE settled either peacefully or by
force although hE is said to have given assurances to Italy
at the time of the signature of the Italo-German pact
that hE contemplated no drastic development until August.
It is also variously reported that at the same time secret
commitments were ENTERED into by the two governments En-
visaging German action against Poland and Italian action
against Tunis. There is/no uniformity in the conjectures
as to the nature of these commitments but the impression
prevails that they are intended to favor particularly the
accomplishment of the aims of Germany and that in the
meanwhile the Polish controversy is being allowed to drift
with the increasing danger of the precipitation of a crisis
through the development of incidents on Either side.
KIRK
CSB
RBS
&
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
EG
GRAY
From
Berlin
Dated May 27, 1939
Rec'd 9:55 a.m.
DIVISION-OF
EUROPEAN AFF
no
SECRETARY of State,
S
Washington.
MAY 27 1939
nu
DEPARTMENT of SIA
423, May 27, 3 p,m.
Although the Berlin papers continue to publish
reports of apparently minor attacks upon Germans and
German property in Poland, editorial comment this
morning passes over these incidents and concentrates
upon the state and progress of the alleged British
"Encirclement policy".
740.00/1605
The semi-official DDPK attempts to demolish
British professions that the action of that Government
is directed only against "aggression" as such and not
against any particular country and that Great Britain
is prepared to negotiate guarantees with all other
nations. The DDPK points out that "indirect and
GMB
direct aggression" and the "violation of vital in-
terests" is defined by the British in such a way as
to induce the countries already guaranteed to undertake
provocative acts and steps which would set "collEctive
security" in motion in their favor. The sympathatic
treatment
⑉2⑉ 423, May 27, 3 p.m. from Berlin
treatment accorded in Great Britain and France to the
recent Polish outrages against Germans in Danzig is
takén as indicating the spirit in which future provoca-
tion by Poland may bE judged.
The DDPK comments that the irrasponsible manner in
which Great Britain is trying to will over Russia and
the willingness on the part of England to submit to
Soviet blackmail for these purposes Emphasize the
common danger involved for all in the British maneuver
and in this connection special reference is made to the
uneasiness apparent in Scandinavian countries which is
held to be prompted by the Example of Soviet help in
Spain. The DDPK says that whoever speaks of willingness
to negotiate and yet at the same time holds them to in-
transignance and arrogance can hardly awake confidence
and that the professions of good will made by such
parties concerned are only intended as a cloak under
which to continue the policy of division and tension.
LEt no one bE deceived, the commentary concludes, that
Berlin and Rome do not SEE bEhind the veil or are lack-
1ng in the perception and determination to meet the
danger at the proper time.
In
⑉3⑉ #423, May 27, 3 p.m. from Berlin
In an article in the VOLKISCHER BEOBACHTER called
"the Encirclers" Doctor Goebbels remarks upon the
strange affinity which Great Britain is trying to culti-
vate with Soviet Russia. This shows, hE says, that the
British front has nothing in common with democracy but
cutting across ideologies is a purely political weapon
designed to hold Germany down in the interest of the
balance of DOWER and of British trade. The weakness of
/ the front is illustrated in Great Britain itself where
young men can only reluctantly be forced to shed their
blood for their country's policy. According to Doctor
Goabbels Germany and Italy have already won the first
move as they have created an alliance ideologically,
politically, and militaryly perfect. "Any attack
against this front will bE met with a stunning blow".
Doctor Goobbels says. "At present people are talking
of a war of nerves which has broken out and must bE
gone through. WE know nothing of this. But should this
bE the case WE are convinced that WE will win it and
chiefly for the reason that our better right gives us
better nerves".
KIRK
CSB
HRE
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
GRAY
BERLIN
FROM
Dated June 1, 1939
Rec'd 5 p.m.
5 1939
Secretary of State
DIVISION OF
Washington
EURNER 14- AFFAIRS
JUN 2 1939
433, June 1, 6 p.m.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
My 431, June 1, noon.
The text of the German-Danish nonaggression pact is
published in this evening's press. Article'I provides that
759.6212
neither of the two parties shall resort to war or Employ
force against the other or furnish support to third countries
Engaged in war against one of the parties. Article II
provides that following the Exchange of ratification which
740.00/1626
shall take place as soon as possible in Berlin, the treaty
shall Enter into force for a period of ten years that if
not denounced before the expiration of that périod the
EVITE 40
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
7l
EPARTMENT
treaty will bE prolonged for another ten years and that
the same applies to the SUCCESSIVE periods.
OF
A protocol provides that support by the contracting
party not Engaged in the conflict will not bE regarded as
Existent within the meaning of Article I of the treaty if
GMB
the conduct of the party is in accord with the general
rules of neutrality and that therefore the continuation
of a normal Exchange and transit of goods between the
contracting
it
HRE
2-#433 From Berlin June 1, 6 p.m.-
contracting party not Engaged in the conflict and a third
power will not bE regarded as inadmissible support.
KIRK
NPL
Enclosure No. 1 to
despatch No. 123or
June 2, 1939, from
American Embassy, Berlin.
MEMORANDUM
Lieutenant Colonel Antoni Szymański, Military
and Air Attache to the Polish Embassy, was not dis-
posed to make optimistic predictions regarding any-
thing but the most immediate future of European
political and military affairs. In relation to the
German-Italian Treaty of May 22, he said that the
Italians had been giving out that the treaty would
make for stability in Europe since the Germans would
now have to consult the Italians. Since this in-
terpretation of the treaty had emanated from Italian
sources, he was not inclined to place undue reliance
on its being necessarily the only possible one. At
the same time, the treaty did seem to render it imprac-
ticable for the Germans, or rather for Hitler, to
stage any sudden and unexpected move such as he had
done in the past. In that sense the Itelian pact
might seem to institute delay in initiating military
operations and so might tend to serve the cause of
peace.
Lieutenant V. A. Sundman, Military and Air
Attaché of the Finnish Legation in Berlin, stated in
relation to the German-Italian treaty of alliance
that he felt the somewhat generalized terms of the
pact signed on May 22 must have behind them a more
detailed military agreement if the provisions of the
pact were to be executed. However, he felt that
any
- 2 -
any supplementary military agreement would be one of
detail only and would be designed merely to make ef-
fective the provisions of the general pact just
signed in Berlin. He hoped that the pact, which
obliged the Germans to consult their Italian allies,
might be interpreted as one which would prevent pre-
cipitate action by the former.
Berlin, June 2, 1939.
JP:AC
3 7P
EU
EMBASSY OF THE
PAID
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
No. 930
Berlin, June 5, 1939.
Же
AVE
Subject: Conversation with Albanian Minister
in Berlin as to recent events and
developments in Europe and the
Balkans.
DIVISION OF
EMOPEAN AFFAIRS
VIVISER ON POLITICAL Mil. DUNN RELATIONS
DEPARTMENT DESTA
AMTMENT In OF STATE
nyo. 140.00
JUN 28 1939
20 1939
DEPARTMENT of STATE
off
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
Instrno
Jose
Nil,
Milis
The Honorable
JUN 29 1939
The Secretary of State,
Washington.
az
The
Sir:
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
740.00/1790
Referring to the Embassy's despatch No. 746
of April 27, 1939, reporting expressions of view
by Mr. Raouf Fico, Minister of Albania in Berlin,
on political and military developments in Europe,
with special reference to the Balkan Peninsula, I
1/
have the honor to transmit a memorandum of a con-
versation between Mr. Fico and a member of the
Embassy in which the Minister expresses further
views on recent developments in Europe and the
Balkans.
It will be noted that the Albanian Minister,
despite the occupation of his country by Italy, is
still
-2-
still recognized by the German Government as
possessing a certain diplomatic status.
Respectfully yours,
a.Kal.
Alexander Kirk,
Charge d'Affaires ad interim.
Enclosure:
1/ Memorandum as above.
JP:PF
Enclosure to despatch
No.
flor June 5, 1939,
from American Embassy, Berlin.
MEMORANDUM
May 27, 1939.
Subject: Conversation between Mr. Raouf Fico,
Minister of Albania, and Mr. Patterson.
Mr. Raouf Fico, who had been a Turkish official
before the creation of an independent Albania, stated
that he was still recognised by the German Foreign
Office as Minister of Albania. He had, however, vir-
tually nothing to do, and seldom left his Legation.
Instructions from Tirana were rare and of a routine
nature. His family were actually at Tirana, but while
he received letters occasionally from them, these
carefully avoided references to aught but such non-
political matters as personal health, etc.
On the occasion of Count Ciano's visit to Berlin,
he had been invited to Ribbentrop's reception and had
attended. He had, in view of the King of Italy's being
also King of Albania, met Count Ciano at the Berlin
railroad station on his arrival. He had, in so doing,
acted on his own initiative and had received no instruc-
tion or invitation to do so. He had noted on the
platform the diplomatic representatives of countries
associated with the Rome-Berlin Axis and the Anti-
Comintern Pact. On my remarking that Jugoslavia, whose
Minister had been reported on the platform, did not
appear officially to be of that number, Lr. Fico admitted
that
-2-
that this was so officially but that Jugoslavia, since
the siezure of Albania, was in a most precarious pos-
1
ition vis-à-vis the Axis and that the country and
presumably its Berlin representative, did not have all
the freedom of action desired. Also Jugoslavia was one
of the countries which did not have official relations
with the Soviet Union so could be considered at least
associated with the Anti-Comintern group of countries.
Mr. Fico did not know what the result of the
German-Italian agreement of May 22 would be, but
762.65
appeared to feel that it had hitched Italy to the German
chariot. Italy would be the first loser in a general
war, due to its exposed position. Italy was, in his
view, the key to the situation during a coming was in -
Europe, since if that country could be neutralized by
detachment through force or guile, from Germany, the
Germans could not win the war. Countries which, like
Jugoslavia, had now to play ball with Germany, would
at once side with Germany's opponents and Germany would
be absolutely alone in a world of antagonists. Germany's
economic situation would not permit of its fighting a
long war successfully, but Germany, on the other hand,
would not collapse economically without a prior war. The
oil wells of Rumania would probably be the first German
objective in a war due to the need of fuel for its air
force and motorized units. Mr. Fico thought that the
Poles would fight rather than yield substantially to
German demands and that the Turks would too. Greece,
and even
-3-
and even Bulgaria, would side against Germany in case
of a continued war. Hungary was too much in the grip
of Germany to be able to do very much by way of
opposition to German demands. In short, Mr. Fico
considered that Germany was in a less favorable
situation than in 1914 as regards resources and allies.
However, the East European countries had made mistakes
through short-sightedness. Poland had been particularly
at fault there in nibbling at Czechoslovakia in the
autumn of 1938 at Teschen, despite its grievances
against the Czechs who, when the Soviet troops had
invaded Poland after the War, had refused to allow
munitions destined for Poland to pass through Czecho-
slovakia. The Czechs, under Benes (whom he described
as the spoiled child of the League of Nations) might,
in the nature of affairs, nòt have been able to conciliate
the Germans or Hungarians within their borders or outside,
but they had shown political ineptitude in short-
sightedness in not conciliating the other Slavs in the
country: Slovaks and Ruthenians.
The danger of war, while perhaps not immediate,
continued owing to the German expansionism which showed
no sign of decreasing. However, this passion might be
restrained now that Great Britain had formed an
alliance of threatened countries. He felt that the
Russian alliance would be obtained. Mr. Fico remarked
bitterly that had the alliance organized by the British
been in effect two months ago, the Italians would not
have
-4-
have ventured to descend on Albania, which might in
consequence have retained its independence. Jugo-
slavia had been short-sighted in not opposing Italian
designs on Albania since that country was now occupied
by a strong Italian force which could be used against
Jugoslavia. Jugoslavia was really in a weaker position
than Greece vis-à-vis the Axis.
It seemed probable that Germany would not resort
to brutal coups just now, since the German people did
not wish war and the leaders did not wish to precipitate
it if they could get their ends by other means.
J.P.
The Minister, in conclusion, stated that he had
received invitations to official ceremonies in connection
with the coming visit to Berlin of Prince Paul and that
he proposed to accept them. He would not, however, go
to the station to receive the Prince-Regent, the situation
not being the same as the case of Count Ciano was the
representative of the Government of the King of Italy.
He asked that his observations be considered confidential.
J.P.
JP:PF
#HT
EU
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
-PAD
Berlin, June 5, 1939
No. 938
ADDKC
Subject: Account of the Visit to Berlin of the
Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano,
May 21-23, 1939.
WISTON
EUROPEAN
762.65
AUT
762.65/634
O.Nil.
Mili&
The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
CB
6961
Washington.
Sir:
With reference to my despatch No. 92% June 5,1939,
concerning the signature on the 22nd ultimo of a politi-
cal and military pact between Germany and Italy, I have
the honor to submit herewith for the Department's infor-
mation an account of the ceremonies attending Count
Ciano's visit to Berlin, during the course of which the
Pact was signed.
The Italian Foreign Minister arrived in Berlin by
train at 11 o'clock on the morning of Sunday, May 21,
being met at the station not only by Herr von Ribbentrop,
the German Foreign Minister, but also by several Cabinet
members; representatives of the German armed forces, in-
cluding Admiral von Raeder, Generals von Brauchitsch and
Milch; and members of the Party organizations, including
GML
the
- 2 -
the S.S. and S.A., as well as of the municipality of
Berlin. Furthermore, the diplomatic representatives
of countries closely associated with the Rome-Berlin
Axis or with the anti-Comintern Pact were on the sta-
tion platform. These were the Japanese and Spanish
Ministers and the Ministers of Albania, Yugoslavia,
"Manchukuo" and Hungary. Count Ciano was accompanied
by the ranking Italian army officer, General Pariani,
by a company of Italian civil officials, and by a num-
ber of Italian journalists.
The first official act of Count Ciano was to lay -
a wreath at the War Memorial in Unter den Linden, which
he did at 11:45 o'clock, reviewing afterwards the guard
of honor drawn up for the occasion. At 12:15 Count
Ciano paid a call on Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop in
the Foreign Office, which was immediately returned at
the Hotel Adlon, in which the Italian party were lodged.
Herr von Ribbentrop then offered a luncheon at the Hotel
Kaiserhof in honor of the Italian visitors. Following
the conclusion of the luncheon, Count Ciano was received
by Chancelor Hitler in the new Chancellery in the pres-
ence of the German Foreign Minister and the Italian
Ambassador to Germany. In the evening a dinner was
given by Chancelor Hitler to the Italian visitors and
among the guests were included Field Marshal Göring,
Herr von Mackensen, the German Ambassador in Rome, and
Herr von Papen, recently returned from his mission at
Ankara.
The
- 3 -
The formal signature of the German-Italian Pact
of Political and Military Alliance took place in the
new Chancellery 24 hours after the arrival of Count
Ciano in Berlin. Following signature by the two
Foreign Ministers at 11 o'clock on the morning of the
22nd, Herr von Ribbentrop turned to Hitler, who wit-
nessed the ceremony, with the following words: "My
Leader, I announce to you the completed signature of
the German-Italian Pact of Military Alliance." There-
upon, according to the press, Chancelor Hitler conferred
on Count Ciano the highest decoration in the gift of the
Reich, namely, the Grand Cross of the Order of the
German Eagle, in gold. Thereafter the Führer withdrew,
leaving the two Foreign Ministers to make public announce-
ment of their act over the German and Italian radio nets.
Herr von Ribbentrop and Count Ciano also later
made statements to the press regarding the Treaty of
Alliance. In view of the interest attaching to these
two sets of addresses, 762.65/608 which were mentioned in the
Embassy's telegram No. 408 of May 23, 5 p.m., the ori-
1.2. ginal German text, together with English translations,
are being enclosed herewith. Incidentally the refer-
ence to the "mighty and invincible block of 300,000,000
people" made in the Reich Foreign Minister's statement
to the press, which is contained in the second enclosure
to this despatch, has caused considerable speculation.
According to sources close to local Party circles, this
total was arrived at by the following calculation of
the peoples whom the Reich Foreign Minister evidently
hopes
- 4 -
hopes will eventually form the Berlin-Rome diplomatic
block. First, there would be the 150,000,000 com-
prising Germany and Italy, including Albania and the
"protected" peoples of Bohemia and Moravia, as well as
Slovakia. To this would be added 65,000,000 Japanese,
24,000,000 in Manchuria, 24,000,000 in Spain, 10,000,000
Hungarians, 6,000,000 Bulgars, as well as 14,000,000
Yugoslavs, whom Germany and Italy hope to gain either
as willing allies or possibly as subject peoples through
a division of this country among themselves. On this
basis of speculation the total would thus come to about
293,000,000.
The remainder of the day of May 22 was occupied by
conversations between Ribbentrop and Ciano, interrupted
by the award by telegraph on the part of the "King of
Italy and Albania, Emperor of Ethiopia" of the Order
of the Annunciation to Ribbentrop. The decoration
was conferred at a luncheon offered by the Italian Am-
bassador. Following the luncheon, Count Ciano called
on Field Marshal Göring and is reported to have had a
talk of some length with him.
The events of the day concluded with a large en-
tertainment offered by the Foreign Minister and Frau
von Ribbentrop to the Italian guests. The foreigners
present included ambassadors and ministers who had
received Ciano at the station on his arrival in Berlin.
The Italian visitors took leave of Berlin and of Ger-
many on the following morning.
On
- 5
On crossing the frontier into Italy Count Ciano
addressed a telegram in the following terms to his
German colleague:
"Upon my return to Italy I wish to
express to you, Excellency, my thanks for
the reception, prompted by such hearty
friendship, accorded me by you, by your
Government and by the citizens of Berlin.
"I will always cherish the memory of
the two days I spent in Germany, for they
are closely connected with the historic
act which has united the history of Nation-
al Socialist Germany and of Fascist Italy.
Please give my kindest regards to the
Führer and convey to him my warmest wishes.
Will you also kindly express to Frau von
Ribbentrop my deeply felt esteem and my
hearty thanks for her charming hospitality.
To you, my dear friend, my sincerest greet-
ings and wishes.
Galeazzo Ciano."
The German press during the visit was devoted
almost entirely to laudatory articles emphasizing
the friendship existing between Germany and Italy
and the influence and military might they would wield
11/603
through the Treaty of Alliance (see in particular
Embassy's telegrams No. 399 of May 21, 1 p.m., and No.
408 of May 23, 5 p.m.).
Japanese interest in the signature of the Italo-
German pact was manifested by a telegram despatched
by the Japanese Government to that of Germany reading
in translation as follows: "The Japanese Government is
firmly convinced that the conclusion of the Pact of
Friendship and Alliance between Germany and Italy,
powers on a footing of intimate friendship with Japan,
has deepened the existing ties between the two coun-
tries
- 6 -
tries, and by giving a firm support to unstable
European conditions constitutes a most valuable
contribution to the maintenance and strengthening
of world peace. On this account the Japanese Gov-
ernment offers its heartiest good wishes on the
occasion of this historical event."
Respectfully yours,
Alexander Kirk
Charge d'Affaires ad interim
710
JP:AC
Copy to American Embassy, Rome.
t
Enclosure No. 1 to
despatch No. 938or
June 5, 1939, from
American Embassy Berlin
VÖLKISCHER BEOBACHTER
May 23, 1939
gelöff
gleiden
3tale bes unb
gange @rbteile gegeneinanber aufsumiegeln,
werden!
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blent bee neue Batt gerabe bez Siae
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bes
Hallent|men
Muğen-
pemelnimaft unb einet immer tteferen Bets
fähelichen Bebrohungen,
bie
Sunbenbeit gulammenführen. Der beutige
oor
bet
Bertrag,
bet in einer umfallenben Form
Bährenb bie Stele ber Cinfreijungspoliti,
Brojje
abgab,
Billen bet beiben Bölter funbtut, ibre
fet rein negative Rnb unb ber Wuf-
3ufunjt
gemetnfam ju meikern, beswedt
redjethaltung alten Unredits bienen, um
Stibben{zep
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nights anberes, als bas not ber
Belt
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botumentarijo feltsulegen, mos Idjon lange
ben Blas in ber Belt, ben then aufommen-
bie
Iebenbige politime wat.
ben Untell an ben Gütern biefer Crbe Dot.
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guenthalten, Rnb bie Toeale ber Drbnungs-
Gelt Deutiblanb unb Staffen bie Beffein
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immer wieber milbe Spefulationen
bote [tebenben Wittein an verteibigen. Xx
litter
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ber unlösliden unb jáidjalhaften Betbun-
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tann -
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BEST AVAILABLE COPY.
Enclosure No. la to
despatch No. 938 of
June 5 1939, from
American Embassy,
Berlin.
Translation
from
VÖLKISCHER BEOBACHTER
May 23, 1939.
The Statements of the Foreign Ministers
to the press.
The text of the declaration made by the Italian
Foreign Minister Count Ciano to the German and foreign
press is as follows:
"The pact which Herr von Ribbentrop and I signed in
the name of our governments unequivocally establishes the
complete political and military solidarity of Germany
and Italy. Its provisions are categorical. The spirit
with which they are imbued is the same that resides in the
ethical laws of Fascism as outlined by the Duce in his
historic speech on the May Field on September 28, 1937:
"To be friends, and being a friend, to march together to
the end.' Italian-German relations have conformed with
these laws in the past and, they will do so in future.
From now on the two countries and the two peoples consti-
tute one indestructible bloc closely welded together by
the analogy of their views, the existence of a common
frontier established for all time, the community of their
interests and the complete harmony of their policies.
"The pact of today's date lends to the historical fact
of this firm unity the form of definitely defined obliga-
tions between the two states. The alliance concluded by
Italy and Germany is without ulterior motives and reserva-
tions.
- 2 -
tions. Its basis, its provisions and its aims are clear-
ly expressed. At the same time it is a pact of constant
political cooperation and unconditional military collabora-
tion.
"During the negotiations and conclusion of the agree-
ment the National Socialist and the Fascist Governments
had in mind the maintenance of European peace. I need not
repeat what the Duce had occasion to say frequently a short
time ago, namely that first and foremost Italy intends to
continue her work and her cultural projects. Neither are
there any problems in Europe that cannot be solved with
good will and justice nor are there any grounds that would
justify a war which would necessarily spread from a European
war to a world war. This is what Italy thinks and it is
also what Germany thinks.
"Just as our two countries agree in this common desire
for peace so they agree in the resolve to demand that the
knots shall be untied which are still binding the life of
Europe and in the determination to unite their forces,
their will and their destinies in order to make a front -
in peace as in war - against any attempt to threaten their
living space or to violate the development of the life and
the interests of their peoples. For, in our opinion, these
interests cannot be separated from each other and must be
upheld and protected by us in an indissoluble community."
The declaration of Reich Foreign Minister von Ribben-
trop was as follows:
"The
- 3 -
"The Berlin-Rome aris, which was the outcome of
Germany's and Italy's joint defensive begun years ago
against the beneficiaries of the Versailles status quo,
and of the determination of both states to give Europe
a fairer peace, has repeatedly passed through the trial
by fire successfully. Therefore, if the pact for a
German-Italian alliance determined upon only two weeks
ago in Milan was signed today by the plenipotentiaries
of the Duce and the Führer in the capital of the Reich,
this does not signify a new era in Germany's and Italy's
policy, it merely means that the two governments are
thereby bringing a natural development to a logical con-
clusion. It is only natural that the identical aims
of National Socialism and Fascism should bring the
peoples together in an ever closer community of inter-
ests and an ever deeper unity. Today's treaty, which
comprehensively demonstrates the will of both nations
to master their future together, has no other purpose
therefore than to confront the world with a documentary
statement of what has long since been a living political
reality.
"Since Germany and Italy have shaken off the fetters
of Versailles and the Geneva system and have been build-
ing up their policies exclusively on the strength of
their newly arisen empires, instead of on ideologies
remote from reality, the so-called democracies have
doubled their exertions to force the two powers into
dependence again and, more recently, even to encircle
them
- 4 -
them. At the same time, those countries tried again
and again to play off the axis powers against each
other and even to disrupt the afis. In spite of all
the disappointments which the clear policy and the un-
shakable coalition of the Powers of Order have caused
these democratic schemers, they never stopped speculat-
ing wildly about a possible breach of the axis. This
play was meant to make others forget the lack of any
positive political success of their own.
"In the face of all these illusions and intrigues
the new pact proves beyond all doubt and misrepresenta-
tions the indestructible unity of the 150 million people
united under the leadership of Adolf Hitler and Benito
Mussolini. While the encirclement policy of the demo-
cratic governments is directed against Germany and Italy -
disguised or openly - the new Berlin-Rome pact threatens
no one. While the pact policy of our opponents is play-
ing an irresponsible game with war and war panic, while
they endeavor to rouse whole continents against each
other, the object of the new pact is precisely to guar-
antee peace against such dangerous menaces. While the
aims of the encirclement politicians are purely negative
and work to maintain old injustices in order to prevent
Germany and Italy from occupying the place they are en-
titled to in the world and to keep them from enjoying
the goods of this earth, the ideals of the Powers of
Order are positive and constructive: They want peace,
but a just peace, in order to guarantee to their peoples
and the whole of Europe - and in the last analysis, the
world
- 5 -
world - the blessings of permanent and firmly estab-
lished order.
"Both governments are firmly convinced that there
is not a single problem in Europe that cannot be solved
peaceably if there is good will on all sides. But at
the same time, they are definitely resolved not to re-
treat one step before threats of force and to protect
the vital rights of their peoples with all their might
and with every means at their disposal. No one in the
world can henceforth doubt, misinterpret or shake the
indissoluble and fateful unity of the Great German
Reich and the Italian Empire.
"Any inroads on Italian or German rights will in
future have to face the combined might of the two coun-
tries. Every inch of German and Italian soil will from
now on be defended jointly by Italian and German soldiers.
Germany and Italy together with their powerful and loyal
friends throughout the world form a mighty and invincible
bloc of 300 million people who are prepared to offer their
hand to everyone in friendship but who are also determined
to shatter every enemy with their massed forces."
AC
&
Enclosure No. 2.to
despatch No. 938of
June 5, 1939, from
American Embassy,Berlin.
DEUTSCHE ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG
May 22, 1939
dob. Bertin, 22. 5.
Die Gellärung bes von 9tibbentrop
Die
bie ber Italienifige Mußen-
ther ben Runbfunt fautet:
Ocal
bet Unterşeldinung bes Batter
"Unfang Stat fogten bet Filler unb bee Time ben Ent-
botte fölgenben Bortfaut:
(4)(x), ber engen Berbunbenheit grotfdjen them belben Böl-
less bucch ben eines umjaffenben politifden unb
Sexte abgefditoffenë
milltäriften Husbrud gm geben. 3n Dal-
palt
befliment unb befräftigt in flat unriffexen politifden
Ianb haben ber italienifde Mußenminiften unb id) unter
uno
militärijden Berpfliðinnigen jene tiefe Bezbunden-
bem Subel Oberitalieno, bas bem Wbgefandten bee
Selt
bes Gelfies unb bee Decle, welde gwifden bem
ginen triumphalen Cmpfong bereitete, unb unter bez 84+
unb bem
Rimmung bee gefamten italiemijden Bollee biefen Defching
Staften beiteht.
bee Regiezungsdefs burd Destry
Die
belben burd) bes Genie uno ben Differ bell
just Woden fpätee beneits, begrOft bas game beut(d
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großen
Boll mit bes gleiden Begrifterung ben bee
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poft untergeldjnet bat.
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Seefeing
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liftifden unb Revolutionen entftamben,
pon Reaft, Willien unb Sntereffen gufammen.
einer immer engeten Sntereffengemeinfdoft unb tieferen
Berbunbenbeit bet beiben Bölfer gefübet bat. Deutfoland
Die Whened bes fino in There Rünge
unb Statien first jest eine unlösbare
Riarbeit®
einbertig, beft fir frinte Rommentate be-
36th
Defensart entipridit bec Offenbeit,
Die Belt bet fid) mit biefer Tatfache absufinben. Reine
wolde
bis
Beglebungen
PRodit bet Crbe, Zeine Unfeinbung unb trine Delu fonn
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Dee
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den Re ausbrilden, in ber Wille gweier Böller,
Miss
Bufammengebörigteit lbres Schidlale autiefft
bie fompligierteften unb awelbeutigften Battigfteme an a
Finben perfuden, um Deutfdlanb unb Stafien einaufretten,
Rab.
to in biefes Bünbnis bie Unitort barow!.
guridt
oile are befonbeten Fraube, metnen Ramen
Selne бртофе If: flot unb gielfider, wie es unferer
add
jemen
bes Settn Reidominifiezo D. Ribbentrop in
Dentingswelfe entfpridit. In Submit weeben ble Belben
Dofument acceinigt P feben, in biefem Dolument,
Rationen gulammenfteben, fomme, was be tommen mog,
Wie " bie biother bon Deutichlanb unb Stalien
immee bereif, efnem Freunbe bie Griebensband entgram-
gefefftete beflegelt, aud) ben Tangen Weg
suftreden, aber elfern entfdioffen, gemein(am the Debena-
in
before Berfolgung unlere belben Rationen
redie an maßren unb fidjerguftelTen,
foren
allionen non Webeltern, Dürgern unb
Sunbertfünfaig Rillionen Deutide unb Staffener bilben
befeelt, ben famer the bödftes
mit
New
reunden
Belt
dan
Blod.
and
Blelbenben
Scleben an bewahren, aber gleidiaseitig
de If ein Rolges Bewuft(ein für jeben
entföloffen, mit bee unbesigfamen entfdiebenbeit thre
smb Staffener, MI biefer unfölliden Rampl-
Rebens- unb Waffiegeredite " Decteibigen,
gemein[daft unter bee Alibrung Bitlere unb Benito
in bis Sufanft 84. maticiecen wetben."
(dinis an geböcen."
BEST AVAILABLE COPY
Enclosure No. 2a to
despatch No. 938of
June 5,1939, from
American Embassy, Berlir
Translation
from
DEUTSCHE ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG
May 22, 1939
Radio Addresses by Ciano and Ribbentrop.
The radio address which the Italian Foreign Minister
Ciano gave after the signing of the pact was as follows:
"The pact of alliance and friendship concluded today
stipulates and confirms in clearly outlined political and
military obligations the deep relationship of the spirit
and the work existing between National Socialist Germany
and Fascist Italy.
"The two great nations renewed and strengthened by
the genius and the will of the Führer and the Duce have
taken their place at the head of European history in order
to maintain the foundations of a thousand-year old culture,
and today they have welded themselves together into an in-
destructible bloc of strength, will and interests to pro-
tect the principles of order and justice in a world which
is in the process of disintegration.
"The agreements in the pact are so unequivocal in
their brevity and clarity that they require no commentary.
They correspond in nature to the honest frankness which
characterizes the Italian-German relations. The will
which they express is the will of two nations deeply con-
scious of the community of their destinies.
"It
- 2 -
"It affords me particular pleasure to see my name
connected with that of Herr von Ribbentrop on this docu-
ment - on this document which while putting a seal on the
work Germany and Italy have accomplished together in the
past also points the long way which our two nations with
their 150 million workers, civilians and soldiers will
march along together into the future, imbued with the
desire to keep the peace - always their highest ideal -
but at the same time firmly resolved to protect their
inalienable rights to life and progress with unyielding
determination."
The statement of the Reich Foreign Minister von Rib-
bentrop made over the radio was as follows:
"Early in May the Führer and the Duce resolved to
give expression to the close coalition between their two
nations by concluding a comprehensive political and mili-
tary pact of alliance. In Milan, where the people of
northern Italy gave the envoy of the Führer a triumphal
reception, the Italian Foreign Minister and I by a hand-
shake confirmed this resolution of the chiefs of govern-
ment with the approval of the entire Italian people. Today,
only two weeks later, with the same enthusiasm, the whole
German nation is welcoming the envoy of the Duce, Count
Ciano, who has just signed the pact with me.
"This historic act is the conclusion of a development
which grew out of the inner similarity between the National
Socialist and the Fascist revolutions and has led to an
ever closer community of interests and deeper union of
the two nations. Germany and Italy are now an indissol-
uble community.
"The
- 3 -
"The world will have to make the best of this fact.
No power on earth, no enmity and no agitation can alter
it. To democratic war agitators who are trying to in-
vent the most complicated and double-faced pact system
in order to encircle Germany and Italy, this alliance is
a.positive answer. Its language is clear and sure of
its aims, in conformity with our way of thinking. The
two nations will stand together in future, come what may,
always ready to hold out a hand of peace to a friend but
grimly determined to protect and guarantee their vital
rights together.
"One hundred and fifty million Germans and Italians
with their friends in the world constitute a bloc that is
invincible. It is a proud feeling for every German and
Italian to be a member of this indissoluble militant com-
munity (Kampfgemeinschaft) under the leadership of Hitler
and Benito Mussolini."
AC
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Berlin, June 5, 1939.
No. 929
Angle
Subject:
Remarks concerning German-Italian
Military and Political Agreement
of May 22, 1939.
23 4 20
fill
CONFIDENTIAL
$
as
762.65
O.NKI,
762.65/633
M.I.D.
The Honorable
JUN 30 '335
The Secretary of State,
Washington.
as
STRICTLY IDENTIAL
STATE UN POLITICAL
Sir:
DEPARTMENT of STATE
Referring to my despatch No. 927 of even
date, enclosing the text of the Pact of Friend-
ship and Alliance between Germany and Italy,
signed in Berlin on May 22, I have the honor
1/
to transmit herewith a memorandum containing
certain observations on this agreement made to
a member of the Embassy staff by the Military
and Air Attaches to the Embassy of Poland and
to the Legation of Finland in Berlin.
Respectfully yours,
For the Charge d'Affaires a. 1.:
710
JP AC
Donald R. Heath,
First Secretary of Embassy.
GML
EU:
CJ
GRAY
BERLIN
Dated June 7, 1939
RECEIVED 12:32 p.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington,
454, June 7, noon.
pote
1 DO and
My 427, May 31, 4 p.m.
As a climax to the parade and other ceremonies in
celebration of the return from Srain of the Condor
/
card
Legion, Hitler at noon yesterday in the Lustgarten ad-
/
dressed the volunteers in a speech which is character-
ized chiefly by the omission of any direct mention of
0845 r58
Soviet Russia or Bolshevikism which has usually been
associated with the Spanish question and on the other
hand by sharp condemnation of the democracies, notable
Great Britain and France arming in the latter instance,
perhaps reflects GErman resentment emphatically voiced
in the press of Daladier's speech last Sunday, A sum-
mary of Hitler's remarks follows ,
Stating that in the summer of 1936 "international
forces" stirred up in Spain the fire of a revolution
which was-intended to lay not only Spain but Europe in
ashes and ruin, Hitler declared that in response to
Franco's
⑉2⑉ #427, June 7, noon, from Berlin
Franco's plea or assistance in rescuing his country
hE had decided in July of that yEar to render active aid
to the same extent and for such a time as the rest of
the world should support the internal Enemies of Spain,
HE had taken this step not only to protect Europe but
also Germany from a similar catastrophe at some later
date and in so doing had likewise demonstrated GErmany's
sympathy for a courageous nation which, despite British
pressure to Enlist its aid against Germany, had remained
powerful throughout the world war. Italy hE said had
arrived at the same decision for similar reasons and
German-Italian cooperation in this respect thus con-
stituted the first practical dEmonstration of the
ideologioal bonds uniting these two countries, Hitler
then sharply condemned the "international plutocracies"
for their inability to understand and their unwillingness
to admit these idenlistic motives back of German and
Italian action and said that the return of the volunteers
now gave the lie to the vicious allegations by politi-
cians and journalists in France and England that Italy
and Germany had intended to conquer Spain, divide it
among themselves and steal its colonies. With such lies,
these people in the democracies stirred up their nations
and tried again and again to make Spain the starting
point
-3-0#427, June 7, noon, from Berlin.
point of the catastrophs which these encirclement poli-
ticians, war agitators and war profiteers desired most
ardently, namely, the next great European war. Recalling
how painful it has been for so long to have to make silence
about the deeds of the Condor Legion in Spain, Hitler
heaped praise on the voluntaers and assured them of the
full recognition by the entire German nation of their
heroism. Their successful struggle in Spain would only
SERVE to increase the German nation's confidence in
itself to strengthen the bond of comradeship with its
friends and to leave no doubt in the world that if inter-
national war agitators should EVET try so carry out their
intentions of attacking the German Reich, such an
attempt would meet with a defense by the German people and
the German army regarding which the Encirclement propa-
gandists do not yet seem to have a correct idea. Hitler
concluded with a tribute to the Italian volunteers in
Spain and to Franco who, through his courageous and un-
failing belief in victory, become the savior of his people.
KIRK
KLP
NOVISER ON POLITICAL
1 1939
DUNN RELATIONS
EU
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
OF
STATE
CA
JR
This telegram,must bE
Berlin -
closely paraphrased be-
FROM
fore-being communicated
Dated June 14, 1939
toranyone. (C)
Rec'd 8:30 a.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
u DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
491, June 14, 11 a.m.
17608.62
JUN 14 1939
CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
My 488, June 13, 7 p.m.
Reports have continued to circulate in Berlin to
the Effect that conversations were proceeding between the
760C.62/639
German and Polish Governments in regard to the controversy
between the two countries and it has been variously
rumored that proposals on the part of Germony have been
presented not only'in arsaw but also in London and Paris
and that the Italian Government was manifosting an active
interest in the alleged conversations through the Polish
Ambassador to Rome whose visit to Warsaw was said to have
coincided with that of the Polish Ambassador to BErlin.
In discussing these rumors a member of the Polish
Embassy here stated that insofar as hE was aware they
were Entirely without foundation, that neither Government
had made any approaches in the matter since last March,
that according to his information the Polish Government
GHR
was not contemplating the possibility of any progress until
there
⑉2⑉ #491, June 14, 11 a.m., from Berlin.
there should bE some indication of an intent on the part
of the GErman Government to meet the conditions=precedent
to negotiations as laid down in Beck's speech on May 5
and that Garmany need not bE EXPECTED to make any
constructive proposal in regard to Danzig and the corridor
until it had become convinced that the intimidation
tactics which it was Employing against Poland could not
(repent not) succeed.
The Polish Embassy here, the secretary said, was
awaiting with interest developments in connection with
Cosbbels projected trip to Danzig where ht might make
some statements which would throw somé li ht an German
plans. HE added, however, that in spite of the recurrent
waves of tension it was his personal opinion that Polish
German relations need not bE EXPECTED to undergo any
drastic change until the latter part of the summer and
in this connection he referred to the current rumor to
the Effect that on or about August 1 Germany would
inaugurate some action possibly in the form of an intensive
agitation against Polish "control" of Danzig.
KIRK
CSB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
fill
PAP
1-1330
BERLIN
Ellen
FROM
This telegram must bE
IUN 2A 1000 H
closely puraphrased bE-
Dated June 17, 1939
fore being communicated
to anyone. (D)
Rec'd 10:30 DEPARTMENT name JundA18.
Secretary of State
Washington
514, June 17, noon
-
741.61/709
741.61/709
by 510, June 17, 3 p.m.
STRICTLY compidential
The British Ambassador in discussing the Anglo-
French-Soviet negotiations Expressed the opinion that
SEC.1
SEC.2
although there was no reason to believe that the German
military croup was particularly impressed by the Evaluation
of the possible extent and efficncy of Soviet àid as a
positive factor in the EVENT of war in Europe the attitude
740.00
which the Soviet Government might adopt was certainly
Filed
of most consideration in the minds of that group in re-
lation to meeting the glaring risks involved in a war
on two fronts and that this consideration constituted
LINOJ
ample justification for the current allegations that the
German Government was not only restraining anti-Sovist
maniftatations but was EVEN looking to the possibility
CONFIDENTI AL FILE
of insuring a benevolent neutrality on the part of
Sovist Russia towards Germany in the EVENT of war. In
the immediate circumstances, however, the Ambassador
stated
GML
INC
PAP ⑉2⑉ 514, June 17, noon from Berlin
stated the main importance of the outcome of the Anglo-
French negotiations lay in the moral support which
would accrue to the extremists in Germany in CASE those
negotiations might fail. (END OF SECTION ONE)
741.61/709
KIRK
HTM:EDA
SEC.2
CONFI CONFIDENTI
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
HRE
1-1336
FROM
This telegram must bE
BERLIN
clostly paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
Dated June 18, 1939
to anyone (D)
Rec'd 1:05 p.m.
Secretary of State
Washington
741.61/709
515, June 18, 1 p.m.
Continuing my 514, June 18, noon (SECTION TWO).
The Italian Ambassador here in discussing the SAME
subject said that the delay in concluding the above
mentioned negotiations lends strength to the argument
SEC.2
heard in Germany that the complications Encountered arise
at least in part from the fact that the aims of the accord
EXCEED the requirements of a policy of defence on the part
of the so-called encirclement powers and that in fact the
proposed accord looks to a policy of offense against
Germany. As a possible counteraction to this impression
the Ambassador added intimations had been in circulation
to the Effect that, when an agreement had been reached with
the Soviet, England would propose some broad constructive
measures which would be destined to relieve the tension
throughout the world. In a subsequent conversation with
CONFIDENTI AL FILE
the French Ambassador hE informed me that hE had heard of
the foregoing intimation and was inclined to ascribe
it/s origin to British sources.
(END OF MESSAGE)
KIRK
TWO
NPL
EU
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
CA
RS8
1-1326
FROM
This telegrom must bE
clossly paraphrased be-
BERLIN
IN A4 fill 44
fore being communicated
DEPART STATE
to anyone (D)
Dated June 23, 1939
Rec'd 4:10 p.m.
Secretary of State
Washington
545, June 23, 3 p.m.
My 505, June 15, 9 p.m.
360k.01
A member of the Polish Embassy here has nade the
following observations in regard to recent developments
7600.62/658 SEC.I
in Polish-Grrnon relations:
BEGIN STATEMENT. Goobbels' Intest speeched marked
no conspicuous contribution and constituted merely a
forceful reiteration of the claim to Donzig which had been
as srted and consistently rinint ined by Germeny. The
FILED
fact, however, that & Minister of the Reich could make
6861
with inpunity 30 anti-Polish a opench in Danzig itself
night induce C. more favorable resction abroad to the
Polish cause in that it proved the actual free status
of the city and hence gave support to the contention that
Germany was not primarily interested in the technical
return of Danzig to the Reich or a "corridor through the
CONFIDI CONFIDENTIALS PILE
Corridor" but in reality was entertaining for more Extens-
ive berritorial pretentions. Although Goobbels did not
reverl
CA
--2--545 from Berlin
reveal those territorial anbitions the Polish Embassy
had information to the Effect that discussions in Nazi
party sectional mestings had covered the return to Germany
of the Corridor and Posen.
There were no definite indications as to what would
bE the next steps which Germany night take in the Danzig
controversy. The Polish Embassy assumed, however, that
later on in the surrier an intense press campaign would
be started against Poland sinilar to that lounched against
Czechoslovakin last surrier in the hope that it would be
successful in undermining Polish nornie to the point that
the Polish Government would yield Danzig. Obviously no
one could know what Hitler was planning or would eventually
do but it was conceivable that in the present international
situation he would SECK to avoid any military action and
was prepared if necessary to allow the matter to go over
for another year hoping with the lapse of time he could
weaken the British and French determination to support
Poland.
(END OF SECTION ONE)
KIRK
EMB NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
CJ
1-1336
This telegram must bE FROM BERLIN
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
Dated June 23, 1939
to anyone. (D)
REc'd 3:48 p.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
19. 7600.6 AGITS
546, June 23, 4 р.п.
Continuing my 545.
(SECTION TWO).
The Polish Embassy had noticed one rather alarming
development and that was the visit to the Baltic
SEC.2
countries of German officers and members of Ribbentrop's
personal staff with the purpose it was assumed of EX-
ploring the possibilities of "Encircling" Poland poli-
tically or militarily from the north. There was
strong opposition in Lithuania to the present Government
and there had been speculation in Poland as to whether
Germany would Endeavor to Exploit this situation. It
was thought, however, that after Germany's action of
taking over the Czechs such attempts would not (repeat
not) bE successful. Furthermore as a result of the march
into Prague the German influence in inciting autonomous
agitation among the Ukranians in southern Poland was no
longer Effective. In any CASE at the present time
Germany
GML
-2- #546, June 23, 4 p.m., from Berlin
Germany would not make any discoverable effort to
stir up agitation among the Ukranian Elements in Poland
because such action would arouse Russian suspicion at
a time when Germany was endeavoring to gain Russian
goodwill.
End Statement.
END OF MESSAGE.
KIRK
NPL:EMB
WAY
to
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
REB
A portion 1-1334 of
this telegram must bE
FROM
closely paraphrased bE-
BERLIN
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)
Dated July 21, 1939
Rec'd 5:05 P. m.
Secretary of State,
DIVISION OF
Washington.
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
JUL 22 193872
360c62 760c.
682, July 21, 10 p. m.
(663?)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
(GRAY) My telegvam No. 682, July 17, 4 p. m.
7600.62/724
German press comment on Rydz-Snigly's recent spacch
while sparse has been to the effect that it denotes a re-
pudiation of "Pilsudski's testament" which Enjoined a
permanent understanding between Germany and Poland that
it demonstrated the suirit inspiring Poland's actions and
that it showed that the danger of conflict did not arise
from the side of Danzig or Germany but from a possible
adventure by Poland on England's orders or even on its
own initiative.
The local press featured with hEad lines "A warning
to Poland" General Brauchitsch's speech yesterday at
Tannenberg in which he interpreted the symbolic ignifi-
cance to Germans of the term "Prussian land".
The Berlin papers have devoted meager attention to the
GE
incident at Postelau involving the shooting of a Polish
JUL
2
customs
FILED
/
1939
REB
2-#682, From Berlin, July 21,10p.m.
customs guard by a Danzig border official and it is
stated that at a press conference for the foreign press
held this afternoon at the Propaganda Ministry it was
announced that in the German view the incident is
liquidated. (END GRAY)
According to foreign correspondents present at this
conference the official spokesman also EXPRESSED the
opinion that while Germany demanded the unconditional
return of Danzig it rajected completely a warlike solution
and did not EXPECT a so-called August crisis although it
was indicated that the present situation could not endure
many months longer.
KIRK
EMB
NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
RFP
GRAY
Berlin
FROM
eg X
Dated August 5, 1939
Rec'd 10:40
Secretary of State
DIVISION OF
Washington
736, August 5, 1 mana p.m.
it
FUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG ni 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Under headlines proclaiming the weakness of the
741.24/274
British flest in the Far East and charging Grent Britain
with "perfidious double dealing" this morning's press
publishes lengthy summaries of, Chamberlain!s statement
in the House yesterday relative to British policy via 2
vis Japan. The Foreign Office DDPK declares that although
the statement revenled a stiffening of the British atti-
tude in consequence of the denunciation by the United
States of the American-Jepanese treaty Chamberlain neverthe-
AUGA 1939
THE
less had to admit that England is unable to procesd as far
as it would like to and that it would only use force in
the Far East as a last resort since its military strength
is required nearer home because of the obligations
assumed by Great Britain in Europe. The article goes on
to assert that only Great Britain itbelf is responsible
for its present dilemma since in the pursuit of its
Encirclement policy England has Extended its obligations
30 far that there is no longer any possibility of
retrenchment
GML
RFP -2- #736, August 5, 1 p.m. from Berlin
retrenchment and that by the terms of the guarantee
Extended to Poland Great Britain has signed over to Poland
the power to decide whether and when the Entire British
military force is to bE used. In conclusion it is
asserted that as long as England participates in
artificially created disputes and EVEN goes so far as to
side with those who are not amenable to a reasonable
settlement "should after all bE the one to bear the costs
of the growing unrest and the impossibility of a penceful
development.
Other papers also stress the weakness of the British
position as revenled by Chamberlain's remarks and likewise
Emphatically assert that his replies have Exposed the
profound deceitfulness of British foreign policy. In
this connection the BOERSEN ZEITUNG for Example declares
aditorially that Chamberlain made it clear that Greqt
Britain intends to observe the agreement arrived at by
Arita and Craigie only until such timc as it can free
its hands in Europe.
9
KIRK
RR
EO
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
CJ
This telegram must bE
BERLIN
clossly paraphrased be-
fore being communicated FROM Dated August 8, 1939
to anyone. (D)
Rec'd 4:50 p.m.
yele
DIVISION OF
Secretary of State,
EUROPEAN AFFAIR
Washington.
AUG 9 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
751, August 8, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE)
From conversations with colleagues here during the
past few days the impression is obtained that the accu-
mulated tension of recent months is regarded as being
concentrated ncw into a period covering the next few
WEEKS. Many point to the next fortnight as the crucial
time, some look to the latter half of September, but all
/
740.00/2026
are inclined to agree that owing to the technical problem
of transporting the masses who are EXPECTED to attend
the celebration of the anniversary of Tannberg on
/
AUG
August 27th and the Party Congress at Nursmburg which is
filed
schtduled to close on September 11th it is unlikely that
1939.
any action requiring Extensive use of railroad and other
transportation will bE launched by Germany from the
latter part of August to the middle of September.
In spite of the impression of the imminence of a
crisis the same uncertainty which has hitherto prevailed
is noted as to the actual intentions which Hitler may
Confidential GMB File
have. Persons professing to bE in a position to judge
assert
-2- #751, August 8, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Berlin
assert that Hitler does not want war, that hE is fully
aware of the possibilities of social and Economic chaos
inherent in & general conflict, that hE does not believe
that the solution of the Danzig problem alone is worth
a general war, and finally, that although hE is preparing
for eventualities hE has not yet reached a definite de-
cision as to his course in the immediate future. This
general view is also reflected among the diplomatic re-
presentatives of those countries openly or tacitly
aligned with Germany. The situation which has been
created, however, is recognized as one which in its pre-
/sent course points to climax but although conjecture is
without limit no agreement, seems to Exist as to the test
by which Hitler's intent may at present bE gauged or
EVEN as to the Elements both within Germany and abroad
which might combine in the formulation of that intent
and direct its implementation.
(END SECTION ONE).
KIRK
NPL:EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
CJ
/
This telogram must bE
BERLIN
closely paraphrased be-
FROM
fore being communicated
Dated August 8, 1939
to anyone. (D)
Rec'd 4:02 p.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
752, August 8, 9 p.m.
Continuing my 751, August 8, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO).
In the meanwhile rumors circulate as to attempts
which are being made towards palliative measures in the
Danzig controversy in which Mussolini's name is most fre-
what
quently mentioned. In my conversations with my colleagues
here, however, nothing definite along this line has been
forthcoming and no indication has been given that efforts
are being made to EASE the general state of tension
which i,s so acute that there is little inclination to
regard the specific points of conflict immediately at
issue as subjects for peaceful solution or to cooperate
with a view to dealing with those individual issues at
a time when the overwhelming possibilities now envisaged
may bE rendered more remote.
(END OF MESSAGE).
KIRK
EMB:NPL
this
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
CJ
GRAY
BERLIN
1-1336
FROM
Dated August 10, 1939
Rec'd 4:12 p.m.
Secretary of State,
DIVISION OF
PERSON
per
Washington.
AUG W
772, August 10, midnight.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Today's Berlin press gives prominent attention to
762,855
762.65/674
Goabbels speech delivered yesterday in Venice and to
General Brauchitsch's noonday address to the armament
workers at Dusseldorf today which was relayed by wireless
to ralliss held in all the armaments fac cories throughout
Germany.
After Emphasizing the solidarity of the Axis
Goebbels in his speech declared, "Europe today finds
itself in a very serious crisis which cannot be brought
to an end before the vital interests of the poorer probles
are settled. It is folly to sprak of peace as long as
this crisis lasts. To solve it is not to disturb the
peace but to create it. This crisis can only be overcome
G-J
C.
by incisive measures". Gostbels also said that the result
of the National Socialist and Pascist revolutions will not
only bE to create a new Germany and Italy but also a new
Europe.
Dealing at first with the comradeship between arma-
/
ment
-2- #772, August 10, managht meen, Berlin
ment workers and soldiers which hE announced would bE
in' nsified by exchanges of visits of workers deputies
to army maneuvers and soldiers! visits to armaments fac-
tories Brauchitsch said Germany had no intention of in-
timidating the world with threats or of letting itself
bE intimidated "least of all by the senseless threats of
certain fortign generals who speak already of a victor-
ious battle before Berlin and a new peace of VERSAILLES".
The speaker stressed Germany's national and social unity
and said, "WE look to the future with the most profuse
confidenct". Saying that the Fushrer would never play
lightly with German lives Brauchitsch declared that should
"the Fughrer however make of us the last and greatest de-
mand then WE can bE sure that there is no other way but
that this will bE inalterably necessary for the survival
of our people".
Editorial comment on this speech Emphasizes that be-
fore and during the last war the German worker was never
reconciled to the then political system that this has
been changed by the fact that the Fushrer is a former
worker and that the German people realize they are all
in the same boat and that if Germany collapses everything
collapses. The German papers quarrel with foreign press
interpretations of the country-wide tours of German
leaders
-3- #772, August 10, noon, Berlin
leaders such as those of Goering (SEE my 760, August 9,
7 p.m.) and Brauchitsch and state that far from being
undertaken with a view to creating favorable public
opinion for future difficult times they were designed
to promote and reflect the comradaship of all classes
in Germany's cause.
KIRK
JRL:EMB
E
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
1-1334
JR
FROM
GRAY
Berlin
Dated August 12, 1939
Rec'd 1:12 p.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
785, August 12, 3 p.m.
762.65
AUG 14 1939
ily 775, August 11, 1 p.m.
DEPARTMENT OF SEATE
This Evening's BOERSEN ZEITUNG announces that a
meeting took place this afternoon bet EEN Cidno and
762.65/678
Ribbentrop and Hitler at Berchtesgaden. The papers
contain n° corrient with regard thereto or in connection
with the conversations which have taken place batween
Ciano and Ribbentrop and merely publish sumeriés of
aditorials in the Italian press expressing approval of
AUG 15 1939
Ciano's visit and stating that it vill SERVE to underline
onew the competence of the Axis to Engage in.constructive
work=hined towards the Establishment of the long ownited
PERCE of justice in Europe.
FP
KIRK
C:DDM
EU
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
HRE
This telegram must bE
BERLIN
closely panaphrased be-
fore being communicated FROM Dated August 12, 1939
to anyone (D)
Rec'd 5:40 pame
was. summan 1 decla
Secretary of State
DIVISION OF F the (2)6)
Washington
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS 8-43-39
AUG 14 1939
789, August 12, 8 p.m.
PU DEPARTMENT OF STATE
-A prominent German journalist who is known to bE
very close to Goering as well as to Ribbentrop and who
7600.62/806
62
in the past has proved to bE reliably informed has stated
loc.
categorically and with Emphasis that there could be no
(compromies COMPROMISE
compris E
with regard to Danzig and that Hitler was
determined to SEE it returned to the Reich. HE expressed
the conviction without qualifications that this would
achieved without the outbreak of a general European war,
since hE was convinced that neither Great Britain nor
AUGJ be 5 1939
FILED
France would go to war over Danzig. Moreover, he indicated
that this view was shared by the persons in authority in
Germany. HE admitted the possibility that the Poles might
fight but declared that Germany could handle them in
short time and that such action on their part would not
suffice to bring Great Britain and France to their side.
The foregoing statement W.S made in a conversation
with an American not connected with the Embassy and similar
opinions have been EXPRESSED within the last few days by
persons in close connection with Government officials.
KIRK
NK:EMB
CONTENTS
Commmunications from Germany
Telegram No. 794, Received August 14, 1939, (762.65/681)
Telegram No. 804, August 15, 1939, (762.65/684)
Telegram No. 805, August 15, 1939, (
If
)
Telegram No. 809, August 16, 1939, (7600.62/834)
Telegram No. 810, August 16, 1939, (
If
)
Telegram No. 827, August 18, 1939, (760C.62/862)
Despatch No. 1324, August 18, 1939, (7600.62/1151)
Telegram No. 833, August 19, 1939, (7600.62/875)
Telegram No. 835, August 19, 1939, (762.65/689)
Telegram No. 842, August 21, 1939, (7600.62/889)
Telegram No. 849, August 21, 1939, (7600.62/896)
Telegram No. 911, August 25, 1939, (760C.62/1025)
Telegram No. 952, August 29, 1939, (7600.62/1167)
Telegram No. 958, August 30, 1939, (7600.62/1199)
Telegram No. 964, August 31, 1939, (7600.62/1210)
Telegram No. 965, August 31, 1939, (
If
)
Telegram No. 1565, October 3, 1939, (762.65/748)
Telegram No. 2287, December 9, 1939, (762.65/784)
Telegram No. 2385, December 17, 1939, (762.65/786)
Telegram No. 144, January 19, 1940, (740.0011 E.W.1939/1531)
Telegram No. 603, March 9, 1940, (762.65/809)
Telegram No. 685, March 18, 1940, (762.65/820)
Telegram No. 977, April 14, 1940, (740.0011 E.W.1939/2193)
Telegram No. 1304, May 11, 1940, (
"/2853)
Telegram No. 1840, June 13, 1940, (
"/2855 21/28)
Telegram No. 1841, June 13, 1940, (
"/2855 22/28)
-2-
Communications from Germany
Telegram No. 1842, June 13, 1940, (740.0011E.W.1939/2855 23/28)
Telegram No. 1974, June 20, 1940, (
"/2855 24/28 )
Telegram No. 4670, November 12, 1940, (761.62/789)
Telegram No. 4671, November 12, 1940, (
If
)
Telegram No. 4672, November 12, 1940, (
"
)
Telegram No. 4673, November 12, 1940, (
If
)
Despatch No. 4607, March 8, 1941, (762.94/500)
Telegram No. 1144, March 27, 1941, (762.94/488)
Telegram No. 1239, April 2, 1941, (740.0011 E.W.1939/9565)
Telegram No. 1360, April 9, 1941, (
"/9832
)
Telegram No. 1423, April 13, 1941, (
"/9941
)
Frankfort Report No. 12, April 16, 1941, (761.62/999)
Telegram No. 1617, April 28, 1941, (740.0011 E.W.1939/10710)
Telegram No. 1674, May 1, 1941, (761.62/918)
Telegram No. 2094, May 27, 1941, (740.0011 E.W.1939/11356)
Telegram No. 2095, May 27, 1941, (
"/
)
Telegram No. 2261, June 8, 1941, (
"/11763
)
Telegram No. 2319, June 12, 1941, (762.94/538)
Telegram No. 2483, June 21, 1941, (740.0011 E.W.1939/12296)
Telegram No. 3318, August 28, 1941, (711.94/2218)
REB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
GRAY
Berlin
FROM
Undated
Rec'd August 14, 1939
3:30 p. me
Secretary of State,
DIVISION or
Washington.
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
76265
AUG 15 1939
794.
762
STREPARTMENT OF STATELE tia
762.65/681
My 791, August 14, noon,
The evening papers none of which publish on Monday
mornings feature Ciano's meeting with Hitler and Ribbentrop
characterizing it as a demonstration of the clear unanimity
of German and Italian policy on all matters "from the
Far East to Spain" and in particular on Danzig. The
foreign press is ridiculed for its dangerous tendency to
read into the meeting an indication of a difference of
views between the axis partners when in fact the two Govern- AUGELY
ments are in complete accord and the rumor circulated abread
filed
that an aggressive move in the Balkans was the main subj Ect $395
of the conversations is bitterly denounced as an unscrupu-
lous attempt to cause tension in eastern Europe which would
draw these states toward the encirclement front. Although
Editorial comment thus follows the line adopted by the
VOLKISCHER BEOBACHTER article quoted in my telegram under
reference both BOERSEN ZEITUNG and the DAZ (*) with
Emphasis
GML
REB
2-#794, From Berlin, Undated
emphasis that the axis powers believe that the points at
issue in Europe today can bE settled without war. At the
same time, however, it is pointed out that they must bE
solved and both papers declare that whereas Great Britain
and France are constantly proclaiming their love of peace,
their actions belie these words, notably the guarantee
which as part of the encirclement policy confers upon
Poland the power to provoke a war. In the concluding
paragraph of its editorial the BOERSEN ZEITUNG summarizes
the German standpoint under the following three headings:
"(one) now as ever Germany has no points of dispute with
England and France which affect their vital interests or
cannot bE peacefully settled. (Two) The question of
Danzig has nothing to do with the independence and
freedom of Poland. (Three) Germany's determination to
solve this question at the given time is as strong as is
its armed power in case it should bE forced to utilize it
for its defense against certain blows."
KIRK
CSB
EU
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
EDA
This telegram must bE
BERLIN
closely paraphrased
FROM
before being communi-
Dated August 15, 1939
cated to anyone (D)
RECEIVED 8:20 p.m.
Secretary of State
Paraphrase - daily il
DIVISION OF 6 ITC Pres
Washington
EUROPEAN AFFORD bet
JUG 16 1939 8-14-31
804, August 15, 8 p.m.
4
a
742.65.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
then
STRICTLY CONTIDENTIAL
nimio.
The Italian Ambassador did not (repeat not) proceed
to Rome with Ciano as stated in the press but returned
to Berlin. Although I have asked to SEE him hE has not
yet given ME an appointment and it is now said that he
has left Berlin this evening.
A friend of the Ambassador who saw him however
informs ME that the optimism which Attolico has hitherto
762.65/684 SEC. 1-2
displayed has disappeared and that hE is manifesting
great anxisty. HE is under the impression that Attolico
AUC 17 1939
FILED
believed that Hitler might bE inclined to adopt a more
moderate attitude and although the Ambassador refrained
from giving definite information as to the course of the
conversations at Salzburg and Berchtesgaden hE indicated
that moderation had not been manifested and that Hitler
WCS enraged by the tone and contents of the uncompromising
reply of the Polish Government in the exchange of notes
a few days ago in regard to the German protest over certain
Confidential File
GMB
developments
EDA - 2 - #804, August 15, 8 p.m. from Berlin
developments relating to matters in the city of Danzig.
My colleagues here are apparently in ignorance of
what actually transpired in the course of the Ciano
conversations and the results of the Burckhardt conference
at Berchtesgaden have not yet been discussed but the
impression prevails that whatever efforts Ciano may have
made to modify Hitler's attitude have failed.
(END SECTION ONE).
KIRK
CFW:RR
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
JR
This telegram must bE
clostly paraphrased before
Berlin
being communicated to
FROM
anyont. (D)
Dated August 15, 1939
Rec'd 8:29 p.m.
Secretary of State,
DIVISION OF
Washington.
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 6 1939
805, August 15, 9 p.m.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Continuing my 804, August 15, p.m. (SECTION TWO).
The report has EVEN been repeated to the effect that
although Ciano and Ribbentrop had agreed in writing upon
certain bases of cooperation between Germany and Italy
in CASE of eventualities with the oral stipulation by
Cinno that the Danzig issue would not (repent not) bE
precipitated, Hitler himself had rejected that stipulation
and had declared that Danzig was Germany's affair.
There is no indication here to minimize the gravity
-
of the present situation. The extent of the military
preparedness is generally acknowledged and certain
indications have lately been detected that a process of
mobilization which would Enable immediate military action
867
is being Effected without the actual publication of orders
usually attending mobilization. The intent of Hitler is
still unknown and some authentices account of the
result of the Ciano visit as well as that of Csaky who is
reported
-2- #805, August 15, 9 p.m., from Berlin.
reported to bE again in Munich 13 awaited to throw
some further ight on this controlling factor. Certain
of my colleagues however express the conviction that
1f the present momentum continues the Danzig issue may
bE precipitated within a brief delay unless Hitler
can bE prevailed upon by some direct approach unattended
by publicity to postpone action or is presented with
some compromise as to Danzig before an act occurs which
ht will seize upon as & final provocation.
(END OF PESSAGE).
/
/
KIRK
RR:WVC
-EU
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
CJ
This telegram must bE
BERLIN
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
FROM Dated August 16, 1939
to anyone. (D)
Rec'd 4 p.m.
Secretary of State,
Paraphicses til EPMIT
DIVISION OF ctara
Washington.
L
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS8 17-35
AUG 17 1939
809, August 16, 5 p.m. (SECTION ONE)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.
I have just SEEN the British Ambassador. HE said
that it was his belief that unless influence could bE
brought to bear upon Hitler within the next week or ten
7600.62/834
days he would take his decision on Danzig and that he
could not then bE deflected from his purpose. Hitler,
Henderson said, had now reached a point where hE could
not hElp hinself EVEN if hE wished to; that the possibility
that some untoward incident would precipitate a decision
AUG 1.7 1939
FILED
at any time was always present, and that at any rate
unless something intervened Hitler would have to declare
himself at the coming celebration of Tannenberg or Nurem-
berg which in spite of rumors of postponement were still
scheduled to take place at the dates announced.
FP
In discussing the possibilities of some approach to
Hitler, Henderson said that he believed that Daladier was
in a better position to intercede this time than Chamber-
lain unless it might be possible to induce Mussolini to
cooperate
-2- #809, August 16, 5 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Berlin
cooperate with the latter in an approach to Hitler and in
this connection the Italian Ambassador here left for ROME
last night. Henderson also mentioned rumors of action by
the Vatican but appeared to know nothing specific on this
point.
(END SECTION ONE).
KIRK
NPL:EMB
EO:
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
CJ
This telegram must be
BERLIN
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
FROM
Dated Lugust 16, 1939
to anyone. (D)
Rec'd 3:38
pen.
DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
Secretary of State,
AUG 17 1939
Washington.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
810, August 16, 6 p.m.
Continuing my 809, August 16, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO).
The most expeditious and probably most Efficacious
step that might bE taken, however, Henderson continued
would bE for the Polish Ambassador here to SEE Hitler.
Lipski had consistently held himself aloof from contacts
7600.62/834
with German officials. The Ambassador said hE knew that
Hitler in June of this year had told Lipski in a public
gathering that hE should ask to SEE him whenever hE wished.
Lipski, Henderson said, should tell Hitler that the recent
Exchange of notes between the German and Polish Governments
had been unfort nate that neither country wished to assume
the responsibility for the overwhelming consequence of a
war, that as long as the present state of tension continued
and grew to a climax no reasonable consideration could bE
given to the problems which now had grown to incorporate
the threat of war, and that time should bE given to an
Compential File
effort to find some solution for those problems. In the
d'
meantime
-2- #810, August 16, 6 p.m., from Berlin
meantime it was Essential Henderson said, that both Ger-
many and Poland and especially Poland should agree to put
an End to all adverse treatment of the nationals of one
country established in the territory of the other and
should refrain from all utterances both official and pub-
lic which might further Endanger mutual relations.
I understand that Henderson is communicating with his
government in the sense of the foregoing and that he is
conferring today with the French Ambassador and possibly
with Lipski- HE spoke without reserve but I know that he
did not intend that his views should bE ascribed to him in
conversation with others and Especially with officials of
his own Government.
(END OF MESSAGE).
KIRK
NPL:E B
JR
This telegrTELEGRAM RECEIVED
closely paraphrased be-
Btrlin
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)
Dated August 18, 1939
FROM
Rec'd 12:20 p.m.
Secretary of State,
DIVISION or
EUROPEAN AFFAIR
Washington.
AUG] 1939
827, August 18, 3 p.m.
DEPARTMENT OF
The following message received from the American
Consul General at Funich repented herewith for the
Department's information.
"August 17, 1 p.m.
7600.65
An Italian friend who was at Salzburg in an
official capacity for the duration of the Ciano
conversationsis not at all optimistic regarding the
760C.62/862
chance of preserving peace unless Poland yields to
Germany on Danzig. I cannot say with certainty that
hE is fully informed about the discussions and the
decisions reached, but from his attitude and his guarded
words it was clear that hE is not pleased with what
within the limit of his knowledge transpired at Salzburg.
HE would say only that Italy would like to have the
matter of Danzig settled by a compromise, but that hE
FP
does not believe this to bE probable. HE believes that
Hitler is prepared to risk a war at this time if hE
cannot obtain what hE wants by other methods, he added
tha
AUG 2 21 1 1939
FILED
-2- #827, August 18, 3 p.m., from Berlin.
that while there is not the slightest doubt that Italy
does not want war, it is SO committed to Germany
that it must march with the latter even though the
ostensible cause of hostilities should be Danzig."
KIRK
DDM
to
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
No. 1324
Berlin, August 18, 1939:
Subject: German Public Opinion regarding the
Current International Situation.
DIVISION or
EUROPEAN know
AUG 91979
M
1760c.62
1151
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Distribution
Gloss
ONI
FASTMENT OF STATE
for
RECEIVED
MIX
The Honorable
SEP 7 1939
The Secretary of State,
Washington.
1930
Sir:
I have the honor to present the following
estimate of German public reaction to the interne-
tionel situation at this juncture based upon local
observation and reports from our consulates:
7600.62/1151
DIVIS 40
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
SEPT
Pm
By virtue of the Poress campaign and knowledge
of the extensive military preparations the public
76
has been prepared to believe that the Denzige
Polish issue will be forced to a speedy conclu-
Ungion sion, end by virtue furthermore of the threats ut-
tered in.the German press, it is now envisaging
the possibility of military action against Polend.
Briefly, it would appear that the greet mars of
the German population is ready to follow Hitler in
SEP:27 1939 1939
RFC
any
- 2 -
any action along these lines out es yet is not re-
garding with any degree of conviction the possibil-
ity of a general conflict.
The anti-Polish agitation carried on after the
World War up to the conclusion of the German-Polish
Agreement of 1934 has, together with E. natural an-
tipathy for the Poles, unquestionably laid a foun-
dation for the present drive, particularly in Prussia'
where the division of the Reich by the Corridor has
loomed larger as an intolerable servitude than per-
haps the fate of Danzig itself, and where' the seizure
of Upper Silesia was for a long time regarded as a -
greater injury than the prohibition of the Austrian
Anschluss following the War and than the incorpora-
tion of the Sudetenland within Czechoslovekia.
The question of whether Germany in asserting its
demands against Poland will be forced to 60 to war
with the Western Powers is that which admits such
doubts and apprehensions as exist, although here
again the variant effect of several factors seem to
produce a balance of support for the Reich's present
policy. While it is true that an international busi-
ness community such as Hamburg, as well as consider-
able sections of the older population, are opposed
to any course which might so much as involve a risk
of general war, a curious state of confidence pre-
vails that this will not take place, and as a result
of National Socialist propaganda many people believe
that
- 3 -
that if war does eventuate, Germany has, even despite
its economic difficulties, a more than equal chance
of obtaining, if not complete victory, at least a
profitable peace. The following considerations
play a role in the popular mind in determining this
state of feeling: (1) that Great Britain and France
will probably not fight for Danzig or Poland; (2) that
if they do Germany would have just cause for waging a
war forced upon it by the encirclement policy of the
western nations; and (3) that its diplomatic and mil-
itery position is vastly improved as compared with that
of 1914.
In the eyes of many Germans Great Britain, sup-
ported by the present Administration in the United
States, is regarded e.s the Reich's arch enemy rather
than France or Russia. In the populer view France
has no desire to wage war unless attacked end the
French are portrayed in the role of being incited
against Germany by Great Britain which is endeavor-
ing likewise to ensnare Russia for the same purpose
although, according to German belief, with little hope
of success inasmuch as it is thought that Russia, OC-
cupied as it is with its internal affairs and incapable
of surviving a war, will stick to 8. strictly isolation-
1st course. Large sections of the public seem to
have accepted the picture of Great Britain painted by
the
V
- 4 -
the German press, which is to the effect that that
cquntry is pursuing & meddlesome policy in encour-
aging Poland to resist a reasonable settlement with
Germany such as that proposed by Hitler last Merch,
and furthermore that Great Britain's course would
appear to be all the more irresponsible from the de-
scriptions given by the German press or British gen-
eral incompetence and weaknesses resulting from the
world-wide emberrassments and commitments of its
Empire.
Although from memories of the last War, Great
Britain may still to a certain extent be feared, it
is morally discredited and it is felt that even if
it succeeds in crushing Germany, the Empire and the
British nation will collapse in the rocess. Lang
people, including thinking Germins and particularly
German Government officials, are inclined to leave
out of account the operation of 0 possible "last
stand psychology" on the part of the democracies and
are sincerely convinced that the British and the
French out of regard for their own interest vill not
fight Germany over Poland. In these cuarters the
present encirclement line-up is regarded as & some-
what tenuous affair and the belief in expressed
that to be really effectivel 11 anti-German front would
not only require an out-and-out allience between Great
Britein, France; Poland und Russia, but one widen had
been
- 5 -
been developed over a period of time through the
exchangesof army officers and a pooline of re-
sources. From official analyses published in the
press of Germany's present diplomatic and military
positions, particularly as compared with that of
1914, it is widely felt here that it would follow
that Germany would have an undeniably just cause in
proceeding against Poland either on the basis of
present conditions or new Polish provocations, that
in this case the onus of attacking Germany would be
placed upon Britain and France, that, with the speedy
defeat of Poland and the subordination of Russia to
German influence which might even result in Russia,
for its own immediate safety, concluding an agree-
ment with Germany, the encirclement ring would be
opened up to the East and to the Southeast where in
the Balkans Germany might secure needed raw mater-
ials, and that Great Britain and France, held in a
stalemate on Germany's western frontier, and possi-
bly harried in distant quarters of the world by the
other Axis partners, might have no other course than
to sue for peace on the basis of & recognition of
Germany's eastern conquest. With respect to the
United States, the recent action on the neutrality
legislation is viewed, particularly in National So-
cialist Party quarters, as an indication that 180-
lation sentiment may delay America's entry into
the
- 6 -
the European war for a considerable period and it is
believed that even if Americe does associate itself
with Great Britain and Frence it will not be able to
make its influence decisively felt in time.
By the immensity of its purport and by its ap-
peal to German patriotism the present international
situation has for the time being overshadowed internal
problems and in conjunction with a certain amount of
official restraint in dealing with discontented groups
such as the churches and the reactionary opposition,
has produced a high degree of domestic solidarity.
While it is true that there is much latent dis-
content owing to economic difficulties, the very pres-
sure of these difficulties seems at the present time
to have increased the force of the patriotic impulse
which in calling for further sacrifice for national
gain overrides contemplation of personal inconvenience.
Crowning the thoughts and hopes of large masses of the
population is en almost blind confidence that the Fuh-
rer will solve the people's problems without war and
that Germany's diplomatic campaign against Poland will
either succeed in breaking up that country or in the
event of hostilities in persuading other nations of
the soundness of Germany's case. While the Cerman
people are still averse to a general war and would
doubtless betray B. more intense state of nervousness
if
- 7 -
if they really believed 1t imminent, they would
perhaps accept it with 8. greater conviction in
the justice of Germany's cause then they posessed
last September, the more perticularly perhabs be-
cause, under the stress of economic pressure end
following en adjustment to the idea of absorbing
foreign peoples according to the Caech example,
they have come to believe that Germiny 88 B mat-
ter of vital necessity has B. natural claim to an
empire which the Western Powers have no right to
dispute. On the basis of that conviction Und or
their faith in the Führer there is every reason to
believe that even if confronted with the imminence
of 8. general conflict the German people would con-
serve their soliderity and march in blind obenience.
/
Respectfully yours,
Alezander a. Mirk
Charge d'Affaires nd interin.
/
800
AK/JDB:EM
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
CJ
This telegram must bE
BERLIN
closely paraphrased bE-
fore being communicated
Dated August 19, 1939
to anyone. (D)
FROM
Rec'd 10 a.m.
Secretary of State,
DIVISION OF
Washington.
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
8-20-39
JAUS AUG 211939
833, August 19, noon.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
760C 7600.62/875
CONFEDENTIAL.
760c62
In C. conversation with the Polish Ambassador yesterday
evening he W.S emphatic in denouncing the anti-Polish
campaign in the German papers which he said was Exceeding
all proportion and was presenting information and accounts
of occurrences and incidents that were not only gravely
exaggerated or destorted but of which some were entirely
without foundation in fact. HE cited published accounts
of certain instances which EVEN the German Embassy in
Warsaw had passed over as unworthy of consideration and
said that he believed that any denials- submitted to the
Filed
Foreign Of iCE here could serve no purpose as the press
campaign in question was directed colely by the Propaganda
Ministry.
In discussing the present situation the Ambassador
said that he did not believe that Hitler had 0.3 yet
CONFIDENTIAL FILE
taken a definite decision although there were influences
surrounding him which were pushing him to Extremes. In
the
GMC
⑉2⑉ #833, August 19, noon, from Berlin
the meanwhile the war of nerves was being intensified
and was no doubt Expected by the Germans to bring Poland
to terms but, the Ambassador said in the present cir-
cumstances he saw no outcome which could bE regarded as
excluding the possibility of war. The Ambassador added
that hE believed or at least hoped that the disastrous
consequences of a war was giving Hitler pause but that
at the moment he himself saw no light ahead.
KIRK
/
/
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
HM
This telegram must bE
Berlin
closely paraphrased bE-
fore being communicated
FROM Dated August 19, 1939
to anyone (D)
Rec'd 1:27 p.m.
Paraphrose t Pr chsee
Secretary of State,
DIVISION OF (8.20/59
FUROPEAN AFFAIRS
Washington.
AUG 81 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
835, August 19, 5 pemo
782.65
My 805, August 15, 9 peme
mb
The following statement has reached the Embassy as
na
coming from informed German official circles outside the
760c.
Foreign Office. Hitler had desired Mussolini to attend
the Salzburg conference in person, that Mussolini had re-
fused to come but had sent Ciano with a message. to Hitler,
that 1f Germany precipitated action over the Danzig issue
Italy would not take part. Furthermore, the support now
being given Germany in the Italian press was intended to
present to the world the outward appearance of the soli-
darity of the axis.
GEGI DNT
FILED
In connection with the general question of Italian-
German cooperation, military observers make the point
that if Germany could limit operations to a war against
Poland only it would bE strategically to her advantage to
have Italy remain neutral and that Germany's interests
could b.E best served if initially Italy should remain neutral
with an assurance of military assistance in case a world
ConMential File
war should develop.
KIRK
GW:CSB
elephane Subtance MID
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
DIVISION CO2
BUROPEAN AFFAIRS
11-
AUG 21 1939
JR
This telegram must bE
FROM
DEPARTMENT UF STATE
closely peraphraded be-
Berlin
fort bring communicated
to nyons. ()
Dated August 21, 1939
Rec'd 6:40 n.m.
Secretary of State,
Unchington.
360c67,
842, August 21, 9 n.m.
760C.62/889
My 817, August 17, 3 D.M.
According to foreign military observers here troop
concentrations started yesterday and should attain
sufficient magnitude within three to five days from today
to Enable offensive action against Foland.
Inform or Department.
KIRK
PEG:KLP
-
CONFIDENTIAL FILE
GML
DIVISION OF
TELEGRAM RECEIVE
EUROPEAN AFFM
EDA
AUG21 1939
This telegram must bE
closely paraphrased
BERLOUNARTMENT OF SPM
before being communi-
FROM Dated August 21, 1939
cated to anyone (D)
RECEIVED 12:09 p.m.
Secretary of State
Washington
849, August 21, 4 p.m.
760362 7602 62
Reputable German journalists are reliably reported
760C.62/896
as saying that Poland is ready to come to an agreement
with Germany over Danzig but that Germany's cims now
definitely include cession of large portions of Polish
territory in order to obtain foodstuffs and timber which
are immediately Essential to Germany. According to
this report Hitler has now definitely decided that
Poland is to bE shattered and that as soon C.S he has
reached his territorial objectives in that direction
hE will declare a general peace with guarantees.
KIRK
KLP
GEST 22 SEX
THIN
CONFIDENTIAL FILE
GML
Ex/PM 8-26-29
HRE
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
This telegram must bE
BERLIN
closely paraphrased bE-
fore being communicated
Dated August 25, 1939
to anyone (D)
FROM
Rec'd 9:05 p.m.
Secretary of State
UNDER SECRETARY 04 STATE
SECRETARY
OF
SIA,
Washington
AUG 2 6 1939
NA weller
file
NOTEU
911, August 25, 9 p.m.
SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY.
My 906, August 25, 6 p.m.
I have just had a brief talk with Henderson. HE was
760C.62/1025 760C.62 /1025
not explicit as to the details of his talk with Hitler
and consequently there is little to add to the statements
contained in my telegram under reference which, however,
I have reason to believe are in general accurate. The
Ambassador was emphatic in his conviction of the necessity
for Beck or the Polish Ambessador to approach the German
Government and said that the Polich Government should bE
urged to submit at ONGE a proposal for an Exchange of
population in order to lieve the tension caused by the
minority questionain German-Polish frontier districts
which he said was stressed by Hitler. A prop. sal on that
FILED Confidented
matter might bE followed.by a discussion of the Danzig
and Corridor problems. HE chined from mention of the
plan of Anglo-German coopetition and I was unable to press
for further Elucidation of that point natsuch a course
might have entailed betrayal of the source of my previous
information
HC
HRE
2-#911 From Berlin August 25, 9 p.m.
information. HE stated, however, that Hitler had prepared
a plan of limitation of armaments and had emphasized the
German-Soviet accords as a definite phase in German polic:
HENDERSON said that JE was flying to London tomorrew
morning and that a German plane was being placed at his
disposal as other accomodations were not available. HE
felt therefore that Hitler would defer any move until his
return. HE said that Hitler was much more calm during the
interview today than at Berchtesgaden and that hE ascribe
Hitler's request to SEE him today to the Chamberlain
letter delivered at Berchtesgaden to the vote in Parliam-
Ent yesterday and to the President's message which he
regarded as of great importance although it was not
mentioned by Hitler. HEndErson said also that hE was
impressed by Hitler's appearance of sincerity on this
occasion and that hE felt that it was too late to
consider the possibility of bluff as Hitler would now
have to risk a war if some formulae were not found to
solve the points of conflict which had been developed
in Polish-German relations. Italy, the Ambassador added,
was using its influence on Poland to that End.
The French Ambassador was received by Hitler early
this evening and is now preparing his report to his
government but as he may not bE able to SEE me until
tom rrow morning I am telephoning Bullitt in Paris to
acquaint
HRE
3-#911 From Berlin August 25, 9 p.m.
acquaint him with that fact.
I am told that the Italian and Japanese Ambassadors
were also received by Hitler.
Am just informed 8:00 p.m.
KIRK
ROW:NPL
/
ON
POLITICAL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
MR. DONN
AUG 30 1939
PA
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FROM
AC
This telegram must bE
Berlin
closely paraphrased bE-
fore being communicated
Dated August 29, 1939
to anyone. (SC)
Rec'd 3 p.m.
)
Secretary of State
Washington
We FUROPEAN AFT,
DIVISION OF
952, August 29, 3 p.m.
AUG 30 1939
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
62
DEPARTMENT or STATE
760C.62/1167
1760c.
My 947, August 28, midnight.
The British Ambassador EXPECTS to SEE Hitler again some-
time today. Although until the nature of Hitler's reply 1s
known, any impression as to immediate developments must bE
based on conjecture, there are indications that the first
view as to an implied rejection by Hitler of the British
standpoint has moderated and the Emphasis has shifted to
the possibility that some way may still bE found to avert
war.
KIRK
PEG:WVC
AUG 1939
FILED
Confidential File G/HC
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
PA.D
NC
This telegram must bE
BERLIN
closely paraphrased
before being communicated FROM
Dated August 30, 1939
to anyone. (D)
Rec'd 11:22 a.m.
Secretary of State
Washington
NOVISER ON C ON MK. POLITICAL DUWN RELATIONS
1939
TRIPLE PRIORITY.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
you
DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 31 1939
958, August 30, 2 p.m.
7602.62
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.
not
My 955. August 29, 9 p.m.
I understand that the interview with Hitler yesterday
evening created a distinctly unfavorable impression on
7600.62/1199
Henderson. Not only did Hitler Express himself with the
vehemence which was lacking in the interview prior to
Henderson's departure for London but the essential terms of
Hitler's statement were regarded as offering small Vasis for
a profitable continuation of discussions Especially in regard
to the German stipulation as to Dănzis, the Corridor and the
Polish minorities and the -
/ requirement as to the appointment of & Polish negotiator.
AUG 3 1939
FILED
As regards this latter point however I am informed that the
German memorandum stated that the Government "counted on"
I
the arrival of a negotiator during the day of August 30th but
did not convey this requirement in the form of an ultimatum
and that Hitler confirmed to Henderson that no (revent no)
ultimatum on this point was intended.
Both the French and British Ambassadors today manifest
Confidential G/HC
distinct pessimism as to the immediate situation and From
inform tion
NC ⑉2⑉ #958 from Berlin, August 30, 1939
information obtained from members of the Polish Embassy
conditions are regarded as sufficiently grave to warrant the
701.60c62
immediate departure of several of the personnel of the
Embassy although the Ambassador himself and certain secretaries
are remaining. Speculation in general is turning on the
point as to whether Hitler has Entered upon an actual phase
of negotiation in the hope of satisfying his aims sufficiently
without having to resort to war or whether hE is working
for time pending the adjustment of new factors which may
have hrisen as regards the military situation or the completion
of diplomatic moves Especially in the direction of Moscow
and Tokyo. HOWEVER unclear may bE the opinion as to the
tactics now in process there seems to bE agreement that while
on the one hand Hitler will bE astute to detect any sign of
weakening on the part of governments opposing his aims and if
impressed by any such sign will endeavor to profit thereby
in his present dealings; on the other hand if circumstances
finally confront him with what appears to him to bE definite
obstructions in the way which hE feels hE must go hE cannot
choose but proceed in the attempt to override those obstruc-
tions regardless of methods and consequences.
I am informed that the official information from London
which reached the British Embassy during the night was to the
Effect that attempts were being made to produce a Polish
negotiator
NC -3- #958 from Berlin, August 30, 1939
negotiator but that the time mentioned seemed short. From
foreign sources I learn that the pessimism prevailing in
London is in contrast to the moderate relaxation in tension
some
which/have lately discerned as being manifested in lower
German Government circles in Berlin.
(Impossible to repeat foregoing to Paris or London).
KIRK
HPD
AUG 3 11938 RELATIONS
POLITICAL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
MK. DUNN
PA-D
HRE
1-1336
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
This telegram must bE
FROM
BERLIN
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
Dated August 31, 1939
to anyone (D)
REC'd 12:22 a.m.
Secretary of State
Washington
He
DIVISION OF
FHROP AN AFFAIRS
TRIPLE PRIORITY
96
August 31, 3 a.m.
BAS DEPARTMENT OF STATE
31 1939
7602.12
My 958, August 30, 2 p.m.
760C.62/1210
HENDERSON SCW Ribbentrop at midnight and delivered to
him the British reply to Hitler's statement. I understand
that this reply repected the gratification of the British
Government that the German Government agreed to negotiate
but suggested that in view of the fact that the time
stipulated did not suffice for a Polish negotiator to reach
FILED
Berlin the bases for the proposed negotiation bE presented
1939
to the Polish Ambassador in Berlin for submission to his
Government. I understand further that Henderson asked
Ribbentrop to ive him C. statement of the proposed bases
for negotiation and that the latter after at first refusing
to do so on the EXCUSE that it WCS after midnight of the
day during which the Polish negotiator should have presented
didential File
himself, finally read a statement but in so hurried & manner
that the British Ambassador W.S.S. unable to grasp the contents
and Ribbentrop refused to furnish the Ambessador with a copy
thereof
G/HC
HRE
2-#963 From Berlin August 31, 3 a.m.
thereof. Henderson urged upon Ribbentrop to give the
proposals to the Polish Ambassador but Ribbentrop stated
that he would not send for the Ambassador although he
intimated that hE would receive Lipski if hE asked for an
interview, Henderson left the interview with the impression
that a deadlock had been reached and that the gravest
consequences might bE EXPECTED.
KIRK
CFW:NPL
BK DUNA
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT state
PaiD
NC
1-1339
This telegram must bE
FROM BERLIN
closely paraphrased
before being communicated
Dated August 31, 1939
to anyone. (D)
Rec'd 2 a.m.
Secretary of State
Washington
6
TRIPLE PRIORITY.
965, August 31, 4 a.m.
SECRET AND STRICTLY CONTIDENTIAL,
Continuing my 964, August 31, (SECTION TWO).
Shortly after HENDERSON'S return from this interview hE
received from a secret Emissary in whom the British had con-
7600.62/1210 SEC.2
fidence an oral statement of what was said to bE the proposals
which Ribbentrop had read to the British Ambassador but which
hE had not understood. These proposals I understand are briefly
and approximately as follows:
One. The Free City of Danzig to bE returned immediately
to Germany.
2 1939
Two. A southern boundary of the Corridor to bE drawn from
Marienburg through Graudenz, Bromberg to a town to the north-
east of Marensidemuhl.
Three. In that area of the Corridor a plebiscite is to
bE held on the basis of the population on January 1, 1918 with
an absolute majority deciding.
FILED Confidential File G/ HC
/
Four. Pending the plebiscite that area is to bE administer-
Ed by an international commission consisting of representatives
of
NC -2-#965, from Berlin, August 31, 1939
of England, France, Italy and Russia and in the meanwhile the
Polish police and military are to bE withdrawn in favor of
an international force.
Five. During the regime of the international commission
free communication is to bE established between Germany and
Danzig and Poland and Gdynia,
Six. After the plebiscite an Exchange of population is to
take place if found necessary.
SEVEN. Gdynia is to bE confirmed as Polish.
Eight. Danzig is to bE purely a commercial city and not
(repeat not) militarized.
Henderson I understand is greatly Encouraged by the
knowledge of these proposals; hE has telegraphed to London
a statement thereof and is urging that immediate steps bE
taken to persuade the Polish Government to appoint B. represen-
tative for the purpose of negotiating on those bases. HE has
insisted
also
with the Polish Ambassador here to SEEK an interview
with Ribbentrop. As soon as possible in the morning HENDERSON
will ask Ribbentrop for a copy of these proposed bases without
revealing the fact that hE has been given knowledge thereof.
REPEATED nowhere, (END MESSAGE)
KIRK
HPD