Dispatches - Great Britain, July 1, 1939-April 24, 1942

EO ML TELEGRAM RECEIVED London 1-1386 FROM Dated July 1, 1939 Rec'd 10:43 n.m. Secretary of State MINISION OF Washington HIROPEAN AFRAIRS 5 1939 IW 931, July 1, 2 p.m. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 760c.62 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. A short article in the TIMES this morning by the dip- 760C.62/670 :09% lomatic correspondent was directly inspired last night by the Foreign Office at the urgent request of the French Premier who felt that the fullest publicity should be given in both countries to the menacing rumors of the last few days of German intentions to bring off on early coup in Danzig, presumably by encouragement of an apparently FILED spontantous movement for union with the Reich. There is no doubt, according to this article, that there have been large infiltrations of German Nazis in the grist of "tourists" in civilian clothes into the Free City as well as Extensive military preparations, building of barracks, throwing of bridges and arrival of German field guns. If the suspicions of German intentions are well founded, there would probably be no forestalling in securing the development of the move- ment within Danzig for union with the Reich. If Poland felt THE forced to take action it could then bE represented in Germany GML ML ⑉2⑉ London July 1, 1939 10:43 a.m. #931 Germany as an act of aggression against a German city. As the inspired article points out the maneuver is fairly obvious and circumstantial details of its projected execution have been impressed for some time reaching their head within the last few hours. According to these circumstantial stories, action will begin with a visit by Hitler to Danzig, and reports from Berlin suggest that there may bE something in this which is more substantial then rumor. Whatever the procedure adopted, it is plain that any attempt to incorporate Danzig in the Reich in violation of existing treaties would at once create a most dangerous situation. The French and British Govermments are keeping the closet contact and both have had occasion during the past few days to make their attitude clear. They are ready for common action if and when the moment calls for it. The British Ambassador at Warsaw returned to London yesterday ostensibly on leave, and the Foreign Office states this morning that the time of his return is uncertain. In the face of the situation which appears to bE developing rapidly at Danzig, the British Charge d'Affaires at Warsaw was instructed yesterday to aks Colonel Back precisely what his Government intended to do in the EVENT of a German move and to point out that the British EXPECT him to consult with them fully on any contemplated action. IN ML ⑉3⑉ London July 1, 1939 10:43 a.m. #931 In the British Fortign Office view, Beck's attitude is some- what ambiguous; he 1s stated to have Expressed his dis- belief that Germany would use Danzig as the starting point of a general war. No reply has been reported by the Charge d'Affaires at Warsaw to the query of yesterday and the Foreign Office is considering the possibility of going Bick's over his head for a more precise and concrete indication of Polish policy and plans, Whether there is any justification for the excitement any regarding/immediate prospective difficulty in Danzig, as far as London is concerned is still very uncertain, However, a section of the Cabinet and important public opinion be lieve that Hitler is not yet convinced that the British will fight if he attempts to pull off a Danzig coup, Considering ways and means of getting this opinion over to Hitler, the latest thought is that possibly Churchill and Eden may bE added to the Cabinet in the attempt to convey to Hitler the conviction that Great Britain has made up its mind that no other policy EXCEPT one of firmness towards Germany will bE considered by the British people, Whether anything will actually result from this idea is still a matter of conjecture, KENNEDY WWC:PEG TO GRAY TELEGRAM RECEIVED LONDON Dated July 10, 1939 FROM Rec'd 2:40 p.m. Secretary of State Washington t DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS 966, July 10, 7 p.m. /1.99 JUL 14 1939 atr My 955, July 8, 5 p.m. and despatch Number 2011, June DEPARTMENT OF STATE 24, 1939, In answer to a series of questions in the House of 7600.62/698 Commons this afternoon on Danzig the Prime Minister stated "I have previously stated His Majesty's Government are maintaining close contact with the Polish and French Governments on the question of Danzig. 8. I have nothing at present to add to the information which has already been given to the House about the local situation but I may perhaes usefully review the Elements of this question as they inntar to His Majesty's Government". FILED After reviewing in considerable detail the Economic inter-dependence between Danzig and Poland, Danzig's strategic position, its present Germanic character of administration and the critical position which Polish- German relations had reached in March, the Prime Minister continued; "WE have guaranteed to give our assistance to Poland in the CASE of a clear threat to her independence which she considers is vital to resist with her national forces, and WE are firmly resolved to carry out this If undertaking GML NC -2- #965 from London, July 10, 1939 7 p.m. undertaking. I have said that while the present settlement is neither basically unlust nor illegical, it may be capable of improvement. It may be that in a clearer atmosphere possible Improvements could be discussed. Indeed, Colonel Beck has himself said In his speech on May 5th that if the Govern- ment of the Reich is guided by two conditions, namely peace intentions and penceful method of procedurs, 11 conversations OTE possible. In nis spesch before the Reichstag on April 28th the Germin Chancellor said that if the Polish Government wished to come to fresh con- tractual arrangements governing its relations with Germany hE could but welcome such an idea. HE added that any future arrangements would have to be based on an- absolutely clear obligation equally binding on both partish Meanwhile, I trust that all concerned will declare and show determination not to allow any incidents in con- nection with Danzig to assume such a character as might constitute a menace to the PEACE of Europe.' " KENNEDY. ALC KLP UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE is JR TELEGRAM RECEIVED 1.3 7369 This telegram must bE closely paraphr std bt- London MR. WELLES Core being communicated to anyone. (0) FROM Dated July 11, 1939 Rec'd 12:55 D.M. Secretary of State, Vechington: 980, July 11, 4 D.M. STHIOTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE. My 05, July 8, 5.p.m. L the Polish Ambassador Cenat Reczynski last hights THE her returned from a conference with NECK. Hurton rit Chat Beck was very calm bout the 7600.62/700 entire Drnain holish situation; that up to dati he had nd direct cwidence (repent direct Evidence) that Germany an banlute break with Poland and therefore the has DE Wirsor evidence that would make him believe that war (11/13) in the of Inc. He realized that there have been THE must men this could have stirred the Polts to action, 1925 ME hon MALE up:hts th 4 shurt is not going to any nove on the part of Poland until there is Actinite action on she bart of Perminy. He told ME that Meol: intended the Pólish newspapers calm dom in their on Germany, Me believed that I Was the de ich Influence In the Polich devenspers LYNE) ANTIAL MILE assocr the bitterness against Depmony and he <<<08 511 have that stopped detre GHR ⑉2⑉ #969, July 11, 4 p.m., from London. I asked him what Beck thought about the Russian situation and he shid hE has not changed his mind and ME does not believe that Russia will be of the slightest help to Britain or Poland but that he is not attempting to influence Britain in the olightest degree if Brit in wants to make the deal. The Ambnssandor felt that unless Germany prilly wanted to provoke trouble, Boland yould 1849 ver. biolovards to avoid it. KENNEDY KLP:CSB TELEGRAM RECEIVED This message must be closely London paraphrased before being com- municated to anyone. (C) FROM Dated July 19, 1939 Rec'd 1:10 p.m. UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE Secretary of State ast 1939 Tashington MR. WELLES NOTED 1022, July 19, 5 p.m. STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE. I just saw Halifax. HE said that their final word to the Russians new is that they will accept the military pact but will not accept the Russians' definition of indirect aggression and, if the Russians insist on It, the English are going to call the whole deal off. Craigie again started discussions in Japan this morning but Halifax is not at all hopeful. 740.00/1931 filed They are getting undercurrent confidence that Hitler's next move, instead of against Danzig, is to bE against Hungar However, Halifax said that Back told him last WEEK that hE did not anticipate any real trouble, but a state of jitters for the next twelve months, I asked Halifax whether hE thought the situation might 0 GMB become acute in the near future. HE said hE had no definite information but in the next breath asked me how long it woul take me to BET back. I told him about five hours and hE said he would keep my office informed and would call on ME E to ML -2- London July 10, 1939 Rec'd 1:10 p.m. ₫1022 to come back if hE B&W the situation ti Chtening, I am seeing the Prime Minister at 12 o'clock tomorrow KENNEDY RR / TELEGRAM RECEI JR NOWISER ON MR. POLITICAL DUNN RELATIONS DEPARTMENT DE STATE This telegroul ust bE clostly DI phrased be- FROM London 11 fore being communicated to (C) Dated July 21, 1939 Rec'd 7:55 a.m. Search river Stite, SECUETARY S STATE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE 1939. JUL 21 1939 NOTED MR. WELLES 7041, 10 PERSONAL D STRICTIN CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY. TMV Privio 2 Paid of Yugoslavi. last nights HE is very beartsh the Entire outlock; WE 301d on his visit 740.00/1937 to Pibler 1.2 1993 impressed ifh three things: first of 11. 10 nvinced that the British Empirt WAS therefore would not be ble to fight very stringsusly EVEN tiher their dispositions were courageous; 3.50 way, he found the TOME condition their he his in and Gotring P hearsked Hitler/in they know FILED Nuesta his "nothing". there, he found decent ferlow, thy, TE, and ith real ENIME to be construblivi; however at that defintptly no Ionstr top. 11° Identhst he received Vira from nets that told his friends that visit try HILLER, Fitler 1d Min the Germin oň Donzix burine the in Confidential File GE the -2- #1041, July 21, 10 a.n., from London. the Reich but that he was in no hurry and thought the Poles and Germans should play down all discussions of agitation in their newspapers and SEE whether shything might automatically work itself out. H lifex V.S.S pleased but Prince Paul was very distrustful, Halifax also said that he has not given un hope 1 getting out of the Chinese situation Ith come TICE saving. I said "de you mean by making 111 connessi the AND withdrawing: fr D. Tientsin?" BE acid by althar wing from Tientoin end not giving too much in C nesidiens." I think he was little bit corrict away -1th the Beed report from Danzig because hE wanted treadoure TE that he was not definitely hopeful of Chinh, bus -just Che hit. KENHEDY CSB EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA LONDON, August 2, 1939. Alle No. 3156 SUBJECT: Debate on Foreign Affairs in the House of Commons OF 741.00 740.00 not 4 (FFAIRS FAR NEWS 1939 1934 Why WENT DE STATE Rating Grade for Dist.,State j DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1939 AUG " PM 1 50 MMUNI TONS ONI instructions 741.00/250 DIVISION OF AND RECORDS m 1D The Honorable CB AUG The Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. Sir: AUG 28 939 I have the honor to report that a debate ASSISTANT SECRETARY 90V on foreign affairs took place in the House of OF STATE IN Commons on July 31 and that in the course of AS it Mr. Chamberlain presented an account of the position of the British Government with regard to the more pressing problems confronting it. AUG 29 1939 SILMS MS While the debate revealed a marked measure of agreement on the main trend of the Government's policy, there were definite differences of opinion as to methods for obtaining desired objectives and a continuing tendency to question the Government's firmness of will. GHR In -2- In his speech, Mr. Chamberlain sketched the efforts of the Government since last March to build up the "Peace Front" and then described at some length the negotiations with Russia. There was, of course, no secret, he said, about the fact that the Soviet, the French and the British Governments had not hitherto found it possible to agree upon a satisfactory defi- nition of "indirect aggression", although they realized that indirect aggression might be just as dangerous as direct aggression, and although all three of them desired to find a satisfactory method of providing against it. At the same time, he said, the British Government was extremely anxious not even to appear to be desirous of encroaching upon the independence of other States, and if it had not agreed so far with the Soviet Government upon a definition of indirect aggression, it was because the formula which the latter favored appeared to the British Government to carry that precise implication. With regard to the Opposition's charge that the Government was guilty of "dawdling diplomacy without precedent," Mr. Chamberlain. said that the prece- dents did not support that accusation. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, he pointed out, had taken six months to negotiate; the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 had taken nine months; the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 had taken fifteen months; and the -3- the negotiations which led up to the Treaty of Locarno had taken eight months. He admitted that it would perhaps have been possible to make a provisional agreement at an early date with the Soviet Government, referring to a late date the conclusion of a detailed treaty. Such a course, he said, had been pursued with Poland and with Turkey, and the British and the French Governments were quite ready to follow that course in the present case, but the Soviet Government thought otherwise. They preferred to sign nothing, to initial nothing until a complete agreement had been obtained, and as a result they had not been able to present the world, as he (Mr. Chamberlain) would have liked, with even a provisional agreement at an earlier stage. Mr. Chamberlain then referred to the announce- ment that he had made earlier in the day regarding the decision of the British and French Governments to send military missions to Moscow to engage in Staff conversations, although a political agreement had not been concluded, and stated that he thought this step represented something which was almost without precedent in negotiations of this kind. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Chamberlain explained, had expressed the view that if they began military conversations, to which he attached very great importance, the political difficulties should not not prove insuperable. It was this expression of views, he continued, which had weighed with the British Government in taking this very un- usual decision and it was the sincere hope of both the French and the British Governments that this anticipation of M. Molotov would be realized and that they should find it possible to agree, not only in substance but also in form, upon the re- maining outstanding political difficulties. Turning to Danzig, Mr. Chamberlain said that he felt that it was unnecessary to add to the statement which he had made on July 10 (reported in my telegram No. 966 of July 10 7:00 p.m.) which expressed in clear and unmistakeable terms -the determination of the British Government. "I feel," he said, "that to add to that statement today would do nothing to strengthen it, and I do not wish to do anything to weaken it." Às regarded the Tientsin negotiations, Mr. Chamberlain said that the formula which had recently been agreed on with Japan dealt with the general background against which the later negotiations would proceed; that it was a statement of fact; that it did not denote any change of policy; that it did not denote the recognition of any belligerent rights on the part of Japan; that it did not betray any British interests in China; and that it did not purport or intend to surrender any -5- any rights belonging to third parties. The British Government, he insisted; would not, re- verse its policy in the Far East at the request of another Power, nor, he might add, had it been - asked by Japan to do so. Referring to the persistence of anti-British agitation in North China, Mr. Chamberlain said that this was carried on by people who were influenced, instigated and controlled by Japanese and he was bound to say that if this agitation continued, if these attacks upon British interests and British rights in China were to go on unchecked, the British Government would be obliged to take a very serious view of the situation. It was quite clear, he said, that it would make a successful outcome of the negotiations extremely difficult if not impossible. He had been asked a number of questions about particular items, such as the handing over of silver in the Concession and support for the Chinese currency. "These are questions", he said, "which are not confined to Tientsin, they are larger questions, and they are questions which do not affect only this country. It is perfectly certain, therefore, that we could not discuss questions of that character without the fullest communication with other countries whose interests are equally involved with our own." Mr. Chamberlain then referred to the recent action of the United States in abrogating the 1911 Commercial Treaty with Japan and discussed suggestions that had been advanced regarding Anglo-American collaboration in the Far East. "Allusion has been made, not unnaturally," Mr. Chamberlain said, "to recent action on the part of the American Government. Às I have said -6- said earlier, I believe that the general objectives and aims of the Government of the United States and the British Government are closely similar but it does not follow that each of us must necessarily do exactly the same thing as the other. We may find that different methods are appropriate in different cases. The House may rest assured that this Government places the utmost importance upon collaboration where collaboration is possible and desirable with the United States Government, and that we never fail to keep that Government informed of all that we are doing or are about to do." In conclusion, Mr. Chamberlain stated that one had to admit that the situation in which the accumu- lation of the weapons of war was going on on so many sides and at such a pace was one which could not but be regarded with anxiety; indeed, it was difficult to see what the resolution of this pro- blem could be unless it was to be resolved by war itself. Unhappily that feeling between nations was fomented daily by poisonous propaganda in the press and by other means, and he could not help feeling that if only one could halt this war of words and if, in addition, some action could be taken which would tend to restore the confidence of the peoples of the peaceful intentions of all States in Europe, there was no question that could not and should be solved by peaceful discussion. On the other hand, if war came, nothing was more certain than that victor and vanquished alike would glean a gruesome harvest of human suffering and misery. He believed that this great and fundamental truth was beginning to get down into the minds of rulers ⑉7⑉ rulers and peoples alike, and it was on that belief that he based his hope that they might yet find a way of escape from the present nightmare. A notable feature of the general debate was the recurrent advocacy of the idea of sending a leading political personality to Russia to advance the current negotiations. Sir Archibald Sinclair said that while he had heard with pleasure that the British military mission to Russia was to be headed by so distinguished an officer as Admiral Sir Reginald Plunkett-Ernle-Erle Drax, he wished to urge the Government to send, if only for a few days, in order to give an impulse to the negotiations at this new stage, a man of the highest political standing in Great Britain, a man who, on account of his personal status and perhaps because of the dignity of his office, would have access to the most powerful authorities in the Kremlin. Mr. Dalton (Socialist) took a similar view. He admitted that Mr. Strang was a very able Foreign Office official but he was "not exactly the opposite number of M. Molotov." Russians, he said, were not less proud than the people of other countries and it was a little infra dig to be left to talk for weeks with Mr. Strang without any attempt having been made for a British Cabinet Minister to make personal contact, since the rather awkward incident at Geneva when M. Potemkin was to have met Lord Halifax, but failed to do 30. Mr. -8- Mr. Eden likewise held that while a decision to send a military mission to Moscow was calculated to help remove distrust, he would have wished that two months ago the Government had made up its mind to send the most authoritative man possible to Moscow and that it had put at the head of that mission some political personality who could negotiate directly with the Head of the Russian Government. There were times, he thought, when an hour's talk might be worth a month of writing. There was even more general support in the debate for the idea of maintaining a firm policy and resorting to concrete measures with respect to Japan. Sir Archibald Sinclair referred to the action of the United States in abrogating its Commercial Treaty with Japan and to the Prime Minister's statement at Question Time earlier in the day that before Great Britain could take similar action consultation with the Dominions would be necessary and urged that the Government undertake that consultation with despatch so that appropriate action could be taken as early as possible. "Do not," he said, "let us lose another chance of cooperation with the United States Govern- ment." Mr. Eden also discussed this possibility. The Prime Minister, he said, had made it plain that any friendship between Japan and England depended upon the cessation of the anti-British a ctivities which were at present being stimulated by Japan in China, -9- China, and upon a reversal of the present attitude of Japan. "If that does not take place," he said, "we in this country do not lack action that we can take. The United States have shown us what form that action might take. There are 8 ome of us who wish that the action which the United States had taken had been taken on our part when the Tientsin blockade began. That is a matter for argument, but what is certain is that the Government will receive the support of every section of opinion in this country if they find it necessary to speak in those plain terms to the Japanese Government." As regarded the question of the Chinese currency. Mr. Eden stated that there was one question he should like to put. The Prime Minister had made it plain that the Government stood firm in its intention not to assist in any attempt to weaken the Chinese currency. He hoped the Government would go a little further than that and make it plain, perhaps when the debate was wound up, that not only would the Government not connive to weaken the Chinese currency but it would continue the policy on which it had been engaged of doing all it could to support the Chinese currency itself. Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne, Conservative, echoed this point of view. He was delighted, he said, with the very clear statement which the Prime Minister had made on that point. It was extremely satisfactory. He wished, however, to ask the Prime Minister to reconsider whether he could not go even a little further and indicate that the Government would not only do nothing to support -10- support the Japanese in this attempt but that it would do something to prevent them from bringing it about. Mr. R. A. Butler, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in winding up the debate added little that was new or signifi- cant. He expressed the opinion that there appeared to be general agreement about the direction of the Government's foreign policy although there was criticism because some wished to go faster and some wished to go more slowly. As regarded the Tientsin formula, many different interpretations had been placed on it. On the one hand there was the extreme view that the Government seemed to expect to help Japan in establishing a new order in the Far East. At the other extreme were those who would pretend that there was no war going on and that there was no dislocation and no occupation of certain areas by Japanese troops, nor any alteration of life, trade or normal conditions. It was somewhere between these two extrèmes, he said, that the British Government's policy stood. The Government had agreed to maintain an attitude of impartiality in certain day-to-day contacts in a definite area and in certain circumstances. That was an attitude of recognizing a situation of fact in the areas occupied by Japanese troops. "In the matter of the Chinese currency," he said, "we -11- "we are continuing our interest. I would remind the Committee that His Majesty's Government have done more, I think I can safely say, for the Chinese currency, which is a matter of international interest and of interest to the Japanese Government as well, than any other Government that I can think of." As regards Russia, the Government had pro- ceeded with the utmost vigor to discuss the out- standing difficulties. Now, with what the Government had achieved over the last few months, with the growing strength of the country, with the determination the Government had shown, and with the success of its diplomatic efforts, he trusted that they could face the summer prepared for any eventuality. The full text of the debate and an excerpt from Hansard embodying various Parliamentary questions 1-2/ and answers regarding the Far East are enclosed. Respectfully yours, Herschel Chargé d'Affaires ad interim Enclosures: 1. Parliamentary Debates, July 31, Cols. 1922-1928, in quintuplicate. 2. Parliamentary Debates, July 31, Cols. 1992-2102, in quintuplicate. RES:WMC EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OLITICAL an. DUNN PELATIONS PALD AUG 30 1939 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Amle No. 3170. LONDON, August 5, 1939 II SUBJECT: Debate on Foreign Affairs in the House of Lords August 3. Divindor of NW EAH EASTERN AFFAIRS give OF AFFAIRS 741.00 THE 1939 PPO 6 1939 740.00 the DEPARTMENT OF STATE 95 I No SI 6961 7 SOX Rating Grade for Distribution ONI Instructions 741.00/251 MID CB AUG 23 1939 The Honorable The Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. / Sir: Referring to my despatch No. 3156 of August 2, 1939, reporting on the debate on foreign affairs which took place in the House of Commons on July 31, I have the honor to report that foreign affairs Kl was also the subject of a debate in the House of Lords on August 3 and that Lord Halifax in stating the Govern ent's position adhered closely to the manner in which the Prime Minister had presented an account of that position three days previously. Being 6339 00 IVV filled GML ⑉2⑉ Being the eve of the Parliamentary recess, however, Lord Halifex in his concluding remarks prescribed a formula of conduct to be followed by the people of this country for the period immediately ahead. He called upon them to keep calm and as far as possible "to keep united, to avoid exag- gerated attention to rumor and to be neither over- confident nor over-pessimistic". He added: "For I suggest that a united nation which both knows exactly where it stands and knows itself to be strong can meet the future, what- ever it may hold, with confidence." While the Opposition Leaders made critical comments or inquiries with respect to the Russian negotiations - to the desirability of having a political figure of Cabinet rank proceed to Moscow - and to the issues involved at Danzig, the main emphasis of the remarks of the Opposition speakers and of Lord Halifax's replies was directed towards the situation in the Far East and its attendant problems, including the Tokyo conversations, col- laboration with the United States and support of the Chinese currency. In reply to Lord Cecil's expressed fear that Great Britain had no means at its disposal to conciliate Japan except through abject surrender, and and that the declaration arreed upon Tokyo might be inconsistent with the obligations to witch this country was bound in respect to China and Jep n and to other countries which had interests in the Far East, Lord Holifax said that he was not unmindful of any of these oblications and stated: "There is no intention in the mind of His Rajesty's Government either of disregard- inc British interests in China or of disre- garding our obligations to third Powers. all that we have done by this formula is to state the facts, as they seem to us to exist, and to attempt in practical fashion to deal with the background against which the situa- tion in Tientsin has actually arisen. It will be difficult enough to reach agreement on the Tientsin issues without placing misconstruction on the formula, and we must, I suggest, be on our guard that we do not unnecessarily com- plicate the task of our Ambassador at Tokyo, who is handling a very delicate situation with both firmness and understanding, in the efforts that he is making to reach B solution." In respect to the matter of collaboration with the United States which had been raised in the debate by Viscount Samuel, Lord Halifax stated that the British Government was acutely alive to its importance, as indeed that with France, wherever collaboration was possible. He assured the jouse of Lords that the Government had never failed DO keep the American and French Governments closely informed both as to its intent and as to its actions, actions, but that it must be recognized that this did not necessarily signify that all three Gov- ernments would do the same thing in the same way at the same time. He indicated that the denunica- tion by the United States of the 1911 Commercial Treaty was a case in point. He then added: "I can very well conceive circumstances in which His Majesty's Government might also wish to give notice of their intention to denounce their Commercial Treaty, but, as my right honourable friend the Prime Minister said on Monday in another place, that is a matter which would require most careful con- sideration, and in regard to which close ex- change of view with His Majesty's Dominions would anyhow be necessary. I would not wish at this stage to say more in regard to that subject than I have already said." In commenting upon the questions which Lord Elibank had put to him regarding the Chinese currency and the disposal of the silver stocks of Tientsin and Peking, Lord Haltfax assured the House that in considering these matters the British Government would certainly not lose sight of its obligations towards the Chinese Government or towards the other signatories of the Mine-Power reaty. Lord Halifax then dealt briefly with the questions of the Russian negotiations and the Janzic ⑉5⑉ Danzig situation. In reference to the Russian negotiations he stated that the object of these negotiations, namely, the strengthening of the forces against possible aggression, had, in the already complicated task of attempting to meet every contingency, been further complicated by the necessity of trying to provide for the new technique of indirect aggression. While these complications, he stated, cove justification for the length of time expended to date, the dispatch of military missions to Russia, both by Great Britain and by France, should be taken as concrete evidence of the interest of the British Govern- ment in bringing these ne otiations to an early and successful conclusion. In reference to Danzig, Lord Malifax directed his remarks solely to the surgestion cade by Lord Devies that its authority be placed in the hands of an international force. He expressed the view that he diù not believe that the In- stallation of such a force, all circumstances considered, would at this moment be & prectical and useful step. He took pains to emphasize, however, -6- however, that the belief which he held did not mean that the British Government W.S not watching the situation most closely or that it was not fully alive to the possible repercussions or de- velopments in that quarter upon the future of European peace. Copies of the full text of the debate as 1/ reproduced in Hansard are enclosed herewith. Respectfully yours, - Charge "Affaires ad interim Enclosure: 1. Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, August 3, 1939. VC/alc TELEGRAM RECEIVED 1-1330 CJ FROM This telegram must bE LONDON closely paraphrased be- fore being communicated Dated August 8, 1939 to anyone. (C) Rec'd 2:30 p.m. Secretary of State, Washington, Jale DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS AUG 9 1939 1139, August 8, 8 p.m. STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Apprehension that the British Government may be preparing to make terms with Germany over the Danzig issur slong the lines of the Munich agreement continues to be voiced by the Prime Minister's opponents and by certain sections of the press. Public opinion was of course acutely focussed on this issue by the widely Mr. pub icized conversations of/R. H. Hudson and Herr AUG 10 1939 FILED Wohlthat, and by the drive made in the press to have Mr. Vinston Churchill included in the Cabinet. Official quarters are sensitive to this situation and it GEEMS to me of interest that an informing and responsible official told me in the course of a conversation that no nm au - negotiationa are now under way between Great Britain and Germany nor are any overtures to this End being made by the British Government. :- JOHNSON CSB TWO 6 TELEGRAM RECEIVED CJ This telegram must bE LONDON closely paraphrased be- fore being communicated FROM Dated August 9, 1939 to anyone. (c). REC'd 6:09 p.m. Secretary of State, file B Washington. A DIVISION OF m PM EUROPEAN AFFAIRS 1146, August 9, 9 p.m. AUG 10 1939 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. DEPARTMENT OF STATE The following is a resume of a conversation I had this afternoon with Sir Alexander Cadogan. HE said that in his personal opinion, which miglit better bE described as 'tis "feeling" the situation in Europe was very slowly taking a better shape. HE did not in any way try to mini- mize the Existing tension nor its potentialities but he said that he had not yet seen any evidence that Hitler 740.00/2035 wants war as such and he is sure Hitler now realizes that the forces which would bE arrayed against Germany in a war are of formidable proportions. HE spoke with confi- dence of the high level which British and French re- armament and organization for war purposes both offen- sive and defensive have reached in the last six months. AUG 14 1939 filed I may add that this confidence is not only manifes- ted in responsible official circles generally, but is GMB becoming increasingly reflected in the press and in talk of ⑉2⑉ #1146, August 9, 9 p.m., from London of ordinary people. There is no Evidence of panic here and the general impression is that the public is psy- chologically ready for war if one comes. There is little to show that the present "war of nerves" has Effected any other End than to stiffen the country's morale. With respect to the Danzig situation, the Under- secretary said hE believed that if Germany would only allow the artificially created tension now existing, to relax there was, in his opinion, no reason why the issue could not bE amicably settled directly between Poland and Germany. HE referred to the Excellent re- lations between Poland and Germany after the conclusion of the Polish-German non-aggression agreement of 1934 when during a long period there were no material diffi- culties with respect to Danzig. This, in his opinion, EVIDENCES the unreality of present German grievances. HE had endenvored, he said, to stress these views to the German Ambassador, who left yesterday for a visit to Germany although there is no question of Great Britain injecting herself into what is at present stage a German- Polish issue. Ambassador Dirksen spoke of the necessity for, the return of Danzig to the Reich, which would then give suitable guarantees to Poland, Sir Alexander however told him he did not SEE how this could bE acceptable to Poland CA --3--1146 from London.. Poland; that a final settlement, he felt, would have to bE more or less along the line of the present territorial SET up and he reminded the Ambassador that there were no difficulties in the years immediately following the agree- ment of 1934 between Germany and Poland. I referred to a statement made by Lord Halifax in a recent forsign affairs debate in the House of Lords in which he had said Great Britain was ready to hegotiate a settlement of all differences with Germany on a peace- ful basis and asked Sir Alexander if they had any indicat- ion from Germany that she might bE willing to sit down at the table and work out a peaceful international settle- ment. HE said that as far as he knew no indication had come from Germany and he confirmed the statement made in my 1139, August 8, 8 p.m., that there are no overtures with a view to negotiations being made to Germany by the Brit- ish Government, although the way had been made clear on repeated occasions in recent months by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary in Parliament. I mentioned the interest which has been aroused by the publicity given to recent private conversations between Herr Wohlthat and Mr. R. S. Hudson, and. the Understorstory remarked that there was an opportunity which the German Government might have used CA 1-4--1146 from London used for making a gangiliatory gesture, HE spoke with some feeling of the unfairness of the critics of the Government who accuse it of a policy of "appensement" toward Germany; if these people do not want to wage C. "preventive war" what do they expect the Government to do but to build up the country's defenses to the strongest point possible and to leave the door wide open to Germany for a peaceful settlement. Just before WE parted he mentioned the Far East and gave me a feeling of his uncertainty as to the outcome of the Tokyo negotiations. I expressed my interest in the Prime nister's statement on the closing day of Parlic- ment to the Effect that under certain conditions C. flest might bE sent to the Far East and that this should be taken not as a threat but as a warning. Sir Alexander said that nctually on a paper lineup of the navy it would be possible to send & fleet to the Far East. This naturally would bE highly undesirable from the British point of view as it would mean that both the Asiatic and the European fleets would bE pared down to the bone, but in CASE of necessity the risk could be taken. (SEE Embassy's 1074, July 27, 5 p.m., paragraph two, and 905, June 27, 7 p.m.) JOHNSON NK NPL TELEGRAM RECEIVED CJ This telegram must be LONDON clossly paraphrased be- FROM fore being communicated Dated August 16, 1939 to anyone. (C) REc'd 2:45 p.m. Secretary of State, Paraphiase in w DIVISION OF Washington. EUROPEAN AFFAIRS AUG 17 1939 1172, August 16, 6 p.m. DEPARTMENT OF STATE STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. My 1116, August 9, 9 p.m. Through the courtesy of the Foreign Office I was shown this afternoon a resume of the conversation between Herr Hitler and Burckhardt as well as an instruction to the British Ambassador at Warsaw, both of which were tele- graphed to the Ambassador last night. I understood that both texts have likewise been telegraphed to the British Ambassador at Washington for communication to you. From the instruction to the British Ambassador at Warsaw will bE SEEN the official British view of the present situation and the nature of the pressure which they are endeavoring to bring to bear on the Polish authorities. I also understand that the British Ambassador has been instructed to make clear to Colonel BECK the great importance which this Government attaches to a full and frank Exchange of views and intentions before Poland takes the initiative in re- plying ⑉2⑉ #1172, August 16, 6 pem., from London plying to various forms of German pressure by any act which could be represented in Germany as Polish aggression. The Foreign Office has been at pains through background press conferences to discuss current speculations that Dr. Burckhardt had acted as an agent in communicating messages to Hitler from the British Government or that he had conveyed any message to the British Government from Hitler. Dr. Burckhardt, in whom Foreign Office officials Express confidence, has given a clear cut account of his Interview with Mitler. Officials here however do not feel that it. his thrown any additional light on what Hitler's real intentions are as to the issue of PEACE or war. JOHNSON WWC the TELEGRAM RECEIVED noc CJ GRAY SK LONDON FROM Dated August 17, 1939 REC'd 6:55 p.m. Secretary of State, DIVE ON OF FIROPTAN FFAIRS Washington. AUG 10 1939 1183, August 17, 10 p.m. m/g DEPARTMENT OF STATE STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. I. understand that the Foreign Office Gave out this afternoon to press correspondents a statement which is to be attributed to "Whitchall" to the Effect that Great 740.00/2008 Britain will not participate in any international confer- ENCE for settlement of Existing European difficulties unless Russia and Poland are included. This statement probably OWES its inspiration to rumors that a four power conference is being worked up by the Axis powers and is an indication that the military conversations at Moscow 6961 are getting along. I had a talk this afternoon with Sir Alexander Cadogan on the general European situation. HE says that the government here simply has no information on which to base a calculation as to where the present crisis is heading. They have good reason to believe that Mussolini is making real efforts to bring Hitler to moderation but have no in- dication ⑉2⑉ #1183, August 17, 10 p.m., from London dication as to the effect on Hitler. Best-informed opinion, Cadogan said, believes that if there is to bE a war the turning point will bE either on the amiversary of the battl- of Tannenberg at the end of this month or at the annual Nuremberg Congrass on September 3. Whether or not a war results they believe that the crisis will certainly reach its climax at that time. They have no information as to the substance or results of the conversations at 762.65. Salzburg between Ribbentrop and Ciano nor have they any reliable information which would lend color to speculative reports that Hitler is using the Danzig issue as & feint to conceal intentions for a surprise attack in the direction of Hungary and Rumania. Cadogan said that yesterday he told the Rumanian Minister, who was nervous, that British secret reports of the movements and disposition of German military forces do not indicate that there is any immediate military move contemplated in that direction; however with 2,000,000 Germans under arms it would bE folly to proceed on the assumption that they could not be switched to any objective. The Government here is convinced apparently that Mussolini does not want a war and that Hitler probably does not want one, but what worries them is what Hitler can do if hE does not go to war as they SEE no alternative open to him EXCEPT one of receding from what he has declared to bE unalterable objectives. The Under Secretary again emphasized ⑉3⑉ #1183, August 17, 10 p.m., from London emphasized to me what he has several times said before, 741.62 that the British Government is making no proposals to Hitler and that no unofficial communications are being exchanged. The position of the service departments is that they are "standing by" in readiness for action on the basis of a war being possible at any moment. Many of the top men are out of London on holiday but in a position to return on a few hours' notice. Most of the leading poli- tical personalities are also away but in constant touch with their offices. The Prime Minister, however, is re- turning to London on Monday and there will bE a cabinet meeting on Tuesday. The Prime Minister may then resume his holiday, depending on the situation at the time. As indicated in recent instructions sent to the British Ambassador in Warsaw (my 1172, August 16, 6 p.m.) EVERY effort is being made to keep the Poles in line and the Under Secretary said that they are particularly Empha- sizing to Colonel Back the absolute necessity for prior consultation with the British Government before Poland commits herself to any action. HE said incidental ly that he thought that, considering Everything, Back and the Poles had behaved extremely well. From my own conversations with British officials, well-informed diplomatic colleagues and others, I am convinced -4- #1183, August 17, 10 p.m., from London convinced that what Cadogan has said to me represents the consensus of sober and informed opinion. Press corres- pondents uniformly Express the opinion that they are up against a "stone wall". Many of these nen are extremely active and ordinarily well-informed. After reciting the obvious dangers of the present Emotional and physical set up, with nearly 2,000,000 men under arms in Germany, they 20E unwilling in private conversation to speculate on what is going to happen. This has not, however, pre- vented the London press in the past rtnight from giving vent to EVERY sort of rumor as to Gernan and Italian intentions. Many of throe articles have been wrong on facts and indicate a tendency to speculation which out- rides the real opinion of the writers. Cadogan spoke today of press reports that Mussolini and Hitler had made an approach to the Vatican, and said that the British Minister to the Holy SEE received yesterday a categorical denial from the Vatican itself that any such approach had been made. (END SECTION ONE). JOHNSON NPL TELEGRAM RECEIVED PAP LONDON This telegram must bE closely paraphrased be- fore being communicated Dated August 19, 1939 to anyone. (A) FROM Rec'd 9:25 a.m. Secretary of State jii Washington 1197, August 19, 2 p.m. STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL PERSONAL FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY The following information has I know been telegraphed to Sir Ronald Lindsay and may be known to you. It SEETS to ME however too important to take any chance. Pressed by the British Ambassador at Berlin to make Great Britain's determination clear to Mussolini, the Italian Ambassador there, who is shortly to SEE Mussolini, emphasized (a) that Italy is bound hand and foot to Germany; (b) the position of both sides being clear, the British and Italian Governments must wórk bogether for релое; (c) Great Britain must realize that Hitler 13 not to be intimi- dated by the DEACE front, Re feels humiliated by having to watch its negotiations and would not wait indefinitely. The Italian Ambassador further asked, speaking privately, whether 1f approached by Mussolini the Prime Minister would feel able to make & MOVE in conjunction with him. Lord Halifax 1s returning to London on Monday and I have an appointment to SEE him. filed JOHNSON CSB TELEGRAM RECEIVED RFP This telegram must be London closely paraphrased bE- fore being communicated From Dated August 23, 1939 to anyone. (A) Rec'd 6:19 p.m. Secretary of State SECRE TAX OC-SIA Washington AUG f 1939 NOTED RUSH. 1219, August 23, 7 p.m. 166621 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE Embassy's 1211, August 22, 7 p.m. I'OES 28/11/2919 I have just seen Halifax. HE told me of Seeds' repor received this morning regarding his visit to Molotov. Molotov admitted that agreement had been reached to sign a nonaggression pact with Germany and said that their communique represented the facts. When Stads asked him whether the agreement would contain the usual clause in 5361 7. AUG FILED Russin noraggression pacts, that is that if one of the parties committed an act of aggression on another country the pact would automatically bE dissolved, Molotov seemed very Embarrassed and said, "WE will have to wait and SEE what happens later on." Holifax told ME that Vansittart believes there is a provision in the agreement providing for the fourth division of Poland. CONFIDENTIAL FILE A point which Molotov raised with considerable 731.61 the bitterness was that the British and French had rejected the repeated GML RFP -2- #1219, Lugust 23, 7 p.m. from London rejected the repeated Russian request regarding the passage of Russian troops through Polish and Rumanian territory. Holifax says that whether this is really 0. valid EXCUSE on the part of Molotov or not, it serves to give Russin a righteous feeling of indi gnation against Poland who 30 far has been adamant in refusing this permission to Russia. The Russian reply could hardly bE more unsatisfactory. Molotov rejected the British accusation of bad faith, refusing to admit their right to use such an expression or to stand in judgment on the Soviet Government. HE also repudiated any suggestion that Russic was under obligation to have warned the British Government and said the British Government did not inform the Soviet Government of modifications in its own policy. The Ambassador's reply was that he was not talking of changes in general policy in normal times but of C. change at the very height of negotic- tions. Molotov reminded the Ambassador that he himself had reproached the British throughout the negotiations with a lack of sincerity and argued that the height of this in- sincerity had been reached when the Anglo-French military mission arrived in Moscow without anything concrete to offer and not ready to deal with basic points on which the question of reciprocal assistance depended. HE referred in particular to RFP -3- #1219, August 23, 7 p.m. from London to the passage of Russian troops through Polish and Rumanian territory and pointed out that the Soviet delegation had asked this question again and again and had always been put off. Finally he said the Soviet Government had made up its mind that it was being played with and accepted the proposals made to them by the German Government, The British Ambassador rebutted the accusation that the military mission had arrived emptyhended but denied that they Ere competent to deal with any question of the passage of troops through the territory of a third state. Molotov waived the point aside and said that the French Government at least knew that the point at issue was of capital importance; it had been raised on many occasions in the past by the restrictions imposed, in particular at the time of the Czechoslovakia crisis, and that the French Government and military authorities had never thought fit to give a clear answer. (END SECTION ONE.) KENNEDY NPL REB TELEGRAM RECEIVED This telegram must bE closely paraphrased be- LONDON fore being communicated to anyone. (A) FROM Dated August 23, 1939 Rec'd 7:38 p. me Secretary of State, Washington. SECRETARY V OF SIA All 1939 NOTED 1219, August 23, 7 P. me (SECTION TWO) Molotov apparently reiterated the foregoing statement several times. The British Ambassador then asked liim just what the German proposal amounted to and olotov pointed to the Tass communique. The Ambassador observed that there was more than one form of non-aggression treaty and inquired if the one now proposed was designed to allow the Soviet Government to continue the policy which the British Government had always considered to bE the Russian policy, that is the protection of victims of aggression; and he asked if it would mean that Russia would stand by and allow Poland to bE overrun, Molotov showed his dislike of this questioning and said only that the British must wait MNTOI INCO and SEE how things worked out. Sir William Seeds continued his questioning, however, and asked whether all that had been achieved in the way of setting up a system of general defense against aggression was now to bE of no account and whether REB 2-#1219, From London, Aug.23,7p.m. (Sec. Two) whether it were possible to continue along that line? Molotov said that Everything depended upon the German negotiations and that perhaps after a WEEK or so WE might SEE. The Ambassador observed that he greatly regretted the report which hE would bE compelled to send to his Government but above all the aspersions made on British sincerity and on the military missions. HE referred to the long peries of concessions on the part of the British and French which had been made during the past months to meet the Soviet point of view, Ending up with the really great concession of agreeing to send military missions before the negotiations for a political agreement had been concluded, Molotov then said that hE was not so much interested in the past as in the all-important display of insincerity, that is in the failure to answer the Soviet question in regard to the passage of troops. The Ambassador refused to admit this point and pointing out that the acknowledged negotiators had not asked for any assistance beyond the Soviet power to give and that in actual fact the Anglo-French suggestions had always been that Russian troops should stand by on the frontier ready for action if necessary; that in fact they had REB 3-#1219, From London, Aug.23,7p.m. (Sec. Two) had asked for less than Russia had been prepared to give. The Ambassador reminded Molotov of his having spoken of "sesing in a WEEK'S time" and said hE EXPECTED that the answer would most probably bE known by then. Molotov said WE will SEE and the interview terminated. As to the Polish situation, Halifax yesterday con-. veyed to Back Mussolini's statement of the night before to the Effect that it was absolutely Essential for the Poles to get in touch with the Germans at once EVEn if they were not ready to discuss Danzig at the moment, to start a discussion on minorities or on some other subject that would provide SCOPE for talk, Halifax, however, is of the belief that the Poles are not inclined to do this. HE says that England will definitely go to war if Poland starts to fight. However, I have a distinct feeling that they do not want to bE more Polish than the Poles and that they are praying the Poles will find some way of adjusting their differences with the Germans at once. Halifax is definitely of opinion that Mussolini is working for peace and goes so far as to say hE does not believe Mussolini will get in the fight when it starts. Summing REB 4-#1219, From London, Aug,23,7p,m. (Sec. Two) Summing all this up, I asked Halifax what hE thought of the situation. HE said, "My reason shows me no way out but war, but my instincts still give me hope." (END OF MESSAGE) KENNEDY NPL TELEGRAM RECEIVED DIV OF EUROPF AFFAIR Entin AUG 2 FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE This telegram must bE closely paraphrased be- LONDON fore being communicated to anyone (D) Dated August 24, 1939 Rec'd 5:55 a.m. Secretary of State SECRETARY OF STATE Washington AUGR 1939 LOTED /*001 RUSH 1223, August 24, 11 name PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE. Sir Hornce Wilson called me this morning and told me hE saw no hope of avoiding war unless the Poles were willing to negotiate with the Germans. As things stand now that is the place to apply pressure. The British are in no position to press the Poles strongly, but if anything is to bE accomp- lished action must bE taken at once, as the Prime Minister feels the blow is fairly near. KENNEDY AUG 9-5-1939 FILED CFW CA Confidential File G/HC TELEGRAM RECEIVED CJ This telegram must bE LONDON closely para phrased be- FROM fore being communicated Dated August 24, 1939 to anyone. (D) Rec'd 11:05 a.m. Secretary of State, Washington. 7600.62 1229, August 24, 2 p.m. FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE. 841.2271131 Referring to Underscorstary WElles letter of August 14 to Mr. Johnson, I talked personally to Sir Kingsley-Wood 7600.6 /960 this morning and Explained the situation to him and he thoroughly understands, I will not put an answer in writing unless you authorize it but I do not think it is necessary. STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. Incidentally, he is very DES- STATILS simistic about the situation. HE said they called up al 1 their air-force last night and Everybody is standing by. I asked him what he proposed to do from the air point of view to help the Poles and he said that as far as he could SEE the only thing they could do would be to bomb the Ruhr at once, I asked if that WERE likely and hE said no; that they would try to KEEP away from bombing that might Conth ential File affect civilians, if it is at all possible. My own belief is that a lot of plans will be made when war is declared; that GVHC -2- #1229, August 24, 2 p.m., from London that now they talk about what'they might do but have not come down to really making it definite, always with the hope in their hearts that somehow war will bE averted. KENNEDY PEG TELEGRAM RECEIVED CA GRAY LONDON FROM Dgted August 25, 1939 Rec'd 7:37 a.m. Address: info State taston DIVISION Of EUROPPAN AFFAIRS RATHLE PRIORETY AUG 25 1939 3543, Micust 25, 1 p.m. DEPARTMENT OF STATE CONSIDENTIAL just TERRNED from the Foreign office that Herr has sent ser Ambassad T Hunderson to SEE him at 1:30. 7600.32/973 the 1300 that in the resson for the summers. It.may KENNEDY CA. FILED DIVISION OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED EUROPEAN AFFAIRS GRAY AUGES 1239 LONDON ARTMENT SINED FROM Dated Augustries, 1939 Resid 11:05 n.m. Slots any of State beson mathy 82L anday Antrast 25, 2 D.m. the text OF the German Soviet pact became available yesterday the first editorial comment appears in this morning! press. It is recognized that the text of the pact 128 more unfayorable than was at first imagined and that 11 containo none of the redeeming featurssiwhich the hontful Rad assumed. The TIMES diplomatic correspondent refers to the pact as "an unraraltlled Example of international duplicity" As regarin its immediate Effects, it is the con- sensus of opinic, that Germany has been left a complete free hand acoinst Poland, that the pact signifies the End of any Anglo-Soviet agreement, and that it implies the demise of the existing French Soviet treaty. Commentators are convinced that Russia must have obtained a substantial quid pro quo. Speculation on this point ranges from a belief that a partition of Poland has been agreed upon to the assumption that an agreement has been reached FILED 61 under which the Baltic states, are to bE a Russian sphere of influence, Germany renounces all interest in the Ukraine, " and NC ⑉2⑉ #1244 from London, August 25, 1939 and is to be returned to Russia. The press finds some solace in the belief t' t the anti-Comintern pact is now disclosed EVEN to 1ts lesser collaborators Japan, Spain, and Hungary, as a mask for hxis, particularly German, designs; that the pact cannot b.E agree- able to Janan and that it may lead to a realignment of forces in the Oright. The press suggests that as clause 2 or the phot, appartntlydeprives Poland of Russian help in the EVENT of war with Germany, it Equally deprives Japanief ermain help in the EVENT of armed conflict with Russin, There is no doubt that the pact has been 2 severe disillusionment to British opinion. The press however notes, as though it were a hopeful sign, that the British and French missions have postponed their departure from Moscow which was fixed for last night. KENNEDY CSB DIVISION OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED AFFAIR CJ PLAIN 1939 LONDON DEPARTMEN FROM Dated: Augus 1009 REC'd 12:22 p.m. Secretary of State, Washington. 1252, August 25, 5 p.m. 760c.62. The united support given by all parties yesterday to the Prime Minister's speech in the House of Commons, in which hE Emphasized that Great Britain, while still hoping that sanity and reason might prevail, would immediately ful- fil her pledges to Poland if she were attacked by Germany, is fully reflected in the press today. While there is un- 7600.62/996 divided support for the Government's position that the coun- try could not with honor go back on its repeated pledges to help the Poles defend their independence, there is also unrelieved pessimism regarding the situation. AUG 26 is filed The press finds that the debit side of the ledger extremely heavy; that the Berchtesgaden conversations be- tween the British Ambassador and Hitler.offered no hope of compromise; that the illegal transformation of the Danzig Government yesterday portends its Early incorporation in the Reich; that the Russo-German Pact can only increase GErmany's freedom of movement and confidence; and that Germany's mili- tary dispositions are dangerously complete. It finds no corresponding entries on the credit side though it still OH/D clings ⑉2⑉ #1252| August 25; 5 p.m., from London clings to the hope that a way out may bE found. Typical comment is found in the NEWS CHRONICLE which states: Black though the prospect is, there is still a possibility of discussion on the matters in dispute provided that the threat of force is removed, The world has not yet abandoned itself to the cataclysm, The Prime Minister and Lord Halifax have made it elear that the door is still open; abroad President Roosevelt, King Leopold a. 2 the Pope have all made efforts for a peaceful settlement. But if all attempts at conciliation fail Britain is now quietly resolved to do its duty. KENNEDY ALC NC w wirm. TELEGRAM RECEIVED E LONDON Dated Aumist 25, 1939 FROM Rec'd 2 p.m. Secretary of State Washington TRIPLE PRIORITY. f 1259, August 25, 8 p.m. STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR DEE SECRETARY OF STATE. My 1243 August 25, 1. Pame I have just DEED who told THE bedrould let me know Ithir was next couple of hours what he could or Henderson's renort. HE did tell me, however, that they live received message from BEC: by which Beck gives time comminer thit EVEN 11 Dansig should attempt to become dart of the Reich, Poleni would not Attempt military mensures until they had the site tion with the Britich Government. KEM EDX OSB OHN TELEGRAM RECEIVED NC This tele cram must be LONDON clostly paraphrased before bring communicated FROM Dated August 25, 1939 to anyont. (7) Rec'd 8:15 p.m. Secretary of State Disaine Washington DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS RUSH OVADG 26 1939 1262, AM ust 25, midnight, DEPARTMENT or STATE I have just been at 10 Downing Street with Prime Minis- ter Helifax, Codogan, and Horace Wilson. They have dis- cussed with at the Henderson interview. Hitler accord calm and Earnest. He pointed out that he always wanted a deal with Great Britain but he was not deterred by YES to Britain's actions of yesterday. HE was indignant with the Poles for their perdecutions of his FILED people, firing on airplanes, Et cetera, crid if they said they did not, it showed they had no control over their subordinates. HE was going to have his rights in Poland even 1f it treant a great war, from which England would suffer much more than Germany. HE now had Russia to back him up with supplies and therefore he could go on. If, however, he could get straightened out in this Folish business he would make a deal with England that would guarantee the British Empire forever. HE would limit armaments and then Germany and England could proceed Confidential File G/ HC to Economic satisfaction. Henderson kept pointing out that G/HC England NC -2- #1262 from London, August 25, 1939 England could not make any deal that the Poles did not want, and Hitler said he did not want England to break her word and in the next breath said that Poland had no future anyway because Russia and Germany would settle Poland. This last remark WAS said to Henderson but was left out of report of meeting which Hitler sent to Henderson after the meeting which purported to be the gist of the conversation. Hitler urged Henderson to fly home to persuade Britcin to occent his proposition which w.s: OnE. That Poland ndjust her differences with Germany ct once. Two. England agree and urge this and in return Germony would agree to respect and even fight to preserve the British Empire. Three. Hitler would limit armaments, 30 br.ck to penceful pursuits, and become an rtist, which is what hit wanted to bE. (Aside by Kennedy, he is now but I would not care to any what kind). Four. If this W.S not agreed it VIC.S going to be a wer worse than fourteen-sighteen, Writing this out.it looks like C. ridiculous proposition to make Great Britain quit or cut away from the Poles but to hear the text as rend it seems much more reasonable. Chamberl in and others do not know just whether the proposition is (one) throw sand in their EYE while he merches in NC ⑉3⑉ #1262 from London, August 25, 1939 in or (two) whether hE really does not want a fight with England or (three) whether it is a proposition on which something can be done. They are going to listen to Hender- son in the morning and then probably say. We certainly will not agree to permit Poland to bE carved up by you and Russia. Nor are WE illing to force Polend to make concessions based on these probably ridiculous charges of cruelty but WE are willing to help negotiate fair deal and perhaps with All other powers work out some Economic future for the world. Incidentally Hitler asked for a settlement from Britcin on the colonits but on & time basis and C.S. a hE said by fair negotiation, They OPE not zoing to give this message to Either (?) or French until, they have thought it but very carefully and have heard Henderbon. During the conversation Wilson asked whether the Prodident hed received any anower from Hitler. I said I had not heard of any. Chanber,lain held un Henderson's wire and said "This is the chawer". KENNEDY NRL TELEGRAM RECEIVED UNDER-SECRITARY a CJ PLAIN FROM LONDON S WASLIS Fa Undated Rec'd August 26, 1939 2:35 p.m. Secretary of State, 62 Washington. PERSONAL FOR THE UNDERSECRETARY. Following is JOE'S account of hás visit to General that I spoke to you ab ut: "I have just come back from a trip to Munich, Berlin and Hanburg. I am sure that the German people do not want & war and are bretty well convinced that there will be are war. Firstly hey think that the signing of the Russian Pact will make England back down and that a war ith Poland will be just a question. of a week or ten days. Some 10 the told me that before the signing of the Pact with Russia the thought that's general war night r cult new they were sure that it wouldn't. It is hard to Believe that they are confident th t there will be no war. I think that the mounting of anti-dircraft guns in Berlin nade some invres- sion upon the DE ple-but on the whole they don't DE line the seriousness of the situations In Humburg where e nnecti and with the outside are much el over the fact that the British whine -2- From London, Undated, Rec'd August 26 ships steamed out and the constant influx of Danish papers which are widely read has made them fully conscious of the danger but I did not meet one who believed that war would. J result. They felt that EVEN 1f British stood behind Poland that the Fuhrer would find some other way out of it. The Russian Pact has had a terrific psychological effect in that now they are confident that England and France can do nothing, Most of them are baffled, but they feel that it was = very clever diplomatic nove. Many of them ridicule it and I have SEEN the closed fist given in salute quite openly amongst friends. The press have dons a complete about face and are now praising the scenery in the crimea and the immense potential business with the Soviets. All of this yet they have not caught up with it in time to stop a moving picture disclosing the Russian element in Spain which is being shown in some of the thratres as propaganda against the REd Government. It has been such a turn a bout that I don't think that the Germans will swallow it whole. How- EVER it is so inportant strategically that for the time being they are accepting it on this basis and shaking their heads. The. anti-Polish campaign is beyond description. Every edition of the newspapers has C. more grussome tale to tell of Polish outrages against the Germans, of planes being attacked and of German soldiers tortured. In the nEWS reel about -3- From London, Received August 26, about ten minutes WGS- given over to showing the real German background of the city of Danzig. The Nazi banners, the Fuscist salute and the goose stepping soldiero were all featured. After this they showed the women and children who had been turned out of their homes by the Poles. With tears streaming down their checks they bawled into the microphene their tales of grief. Even children told theirs. In the middle of their speech they would break down in a flood of tears and the Effect of this must be most powerful. Hitler has ne 30 far with his people now that it is An- possible for hir: to back down. The people are behind him and I don't think there will bE any reaction against him EVEN though he leads then into war at least for some time. They dislike the Poles anyway, they feel that Danzig is a German town, they have Russian backing, and they have faith that Hitler won't lead them on the wrong course. This is supported by the most powerful propaganda I have seen any- where, and you may bE sure that if war breaks out the Poles will bE shown to bE the aggressors, and it will bE the duty of EVEry German to stop them." KENNEDY DDM DIVISION OF /FIROPFAN AFFAIRS AUG 26 1939 TELEGRAM RECEIVED Sa/pm DEPARTMENT OF STATE TARY UF FROM SEAR free PA 1939 SS. NOTED This telegram must be el SETY par phrased be- LONDON fers being accurante ted to vnyohk (D) Dated August 26, 1939 Rec'd 6:25 n.m. Decretory you St te Smokinchen He >>) 2. 1939 TUSTI SIAT 1263, 25, nonn. STRICTLY COMPLETTIAL FOR: THE SECRETARY osë number 1262, August 25, radnight, yes tur i morrant the HENDERS n's message stated Hitler the ane to benefit var between Gerriany And England be 3 pan who night very well become the donin- time $5,000 rid. KENNEDY FILED Confidential File G/HC DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS TELEGRAM RECEIVED VM AUG 29 1939 London This message must bE PaiD closely paraphrased be- DEPARTMENT OF STALE Dated fore being communicated to anyone. (D-1) FROM Rec'd 2:55 p.m. Secretary of State. Washington, 6 1278, August 27, 8 p.m. SECTION ONE PERSONAL AND STR CTLY CONFIDE TIAL FOR THE SECRETARY I fust saw Halifax, Henderson returning tomorrow. They received advice last night from erlyn that there was no need to burry him back because they wanted the ritish Cabinet to give their propositions full consideration. That coupled with the fact that the British waited to play for time made it acceptable all around, The ritish propose to answer F tler and tell him that they were lod to receive his communication; that they are very anxious, 08 WELL to have good relations between Germony and England, necessity that they cannot compromist viti nny terms the UNITA not protect their commitments to Poland. "Thersfore they ask Hatler just what he has in mind for is formula to work out the Polish S. tuntion, because this will increase the delow besides making itler pay what he will do. hopes will reiterats the offer to Poland that yes refused -7'3" the Poles before and perhops it could be dressed on with three Cont teritial File internet VM -2- 1278 widnust 27, 8. p.m., from London. inter ational agreements and save face all around. If a plan could be worked out that. would be agreeable to Foland, Ingland would DE happy to participate in an international agreement. They have also had a good deal to say in the realy to Hibler about the treatment of minorities. (ZED\SECTION ONE). KENNEDY KLP:CSB TELEGRAM RECEIVED paps NJD FROM LONDON This belevram must be Dated Aurust 27, 1939, closely paraphrased before heins communicated Rec'd. 3:25 D. ID. to gnyone. (D) Secretary of State from Washangton, 1278, August 27, Bip: Ma (SECTION 1.70) The success of the answer and negotiations Halifax Crols is baied on one of two things: Does Hitler dislike the prospect of a world war suffi icntly to CIVe Prind a square deal. The information they have received from very A1059 33C.2 good And confidential sources in the last 60 hours Indi- cates that there are two different schools of thought in the Hitler group. Halifax feels that this is caused by the fact that Hitler finds himself for the first time up against a new propesitien--that there is a re 1 prospect of a world war, (END SECTION TWO.) KENNEDY HPD G/HC TELEGRAM RECEIVED Poto ND London This telegram must bE Dated August 27, 1939. closely paraphrased From LV before being communicated Rec'd. 3:50 D. M. to anyones (D) Secretury of State, ibligton. bit Triple ribrity. 1878, August 27, 8 prom. (SECTION THREE) There re three factors that give him some honsfulness, yexy confi ,Entinity Cinno telephoned at 2:30 this afternoon 7600.62/1059 $EC.3 3 Quesdlini who very grateful to the British for keeping him jombed on Hitler's proposuls and ht hastened to add that ne Jermans had sivised him also AS to the proposals. But what he runz un particularly to say was th t Mussolini DATES the risish not to make 21 flat rebudi tion of Hitler's diverstions. Halifux assured him that the British had no 1 tention of turning down Hitler's proposition but rather In Fesbed eint they wented Hitler to advise them on what Sests Whey their differences. Halifax said is no Goubt in his mind that Mussolini intends to stay neutral and Hollfax shid he has no dection to that provided Muscolini is not planning at 7 later date to Enter the struggle on therwrom: side and this would CE a matter to be looked into very completely. Dut be SEED no advantage in pressing OH/O MJD ⑉2⑉ No. 1278, August 27, from London, pressing that at this time. The second hopeful sign is that Spain has advised France they will remain neutral. The third and the one to which hE attaches a great deal of importance is that the Far Eastern situation is coming along beautifully and there is reason to believe that to- morrow the Cabinet will be thrown out in Japan and a Cabinet more partial to England and the United States nut in power. HE thinks 111 of these things will have & definite effect on Hitler. Summing it all un Halifax said "I think things look a little less hopeless (repent hopeless)" but again it depends on which Hitler wants mest--Friendshit with England, fair deal for Poland and no theral war on the one side or on the other to act what RE wanted, the destruction of Poland and a, world war. This reply will be sent to the Poles tomorrow and Halifax дока not anticipube there will be any objections on their pert. I drove Halifax to his home--going to bed for two hours and figurts tomorrow will be very visa day and Tuesday will pet the reactions, (END OF MESSAGE) KENNEDY HPD