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President's Secretary's File (Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration)
Diplomatic Correspondence
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PSF
A.J. D, Biddle, Jr, 1937-4)
PSF: Biddle Tolder
MEMORANDUM
A Digest of Opinion of Norwegian Informed
Observers Bearing on European Outlook and
War Tendencies.
General
In Norwegian Government circles it is generally
Opinion on
Next Two
felt that the present tense European situation will
Years,
be liquidated within the next two years, either through
statesmanship and diplomacy or by military force.
This will be for two reasons: first, all the lead-
ing European nations will have completed their arma-
ment within two years, thereby neutralizing the
advantage now held by the nations whose armaments are
more advanced than others; and second, it is held
here that beyond the next one and a half to two years,
the peoples of the variously heavily arming nations
will revolt against their Government's continued
exhausting taxation for armament purposes. They will
be no longer willing or able to bear the burden. The
Governments are beginning to realize this, and it is
felt that serious thought will soon be given to prepara-
tions to meet the situation. This, barring a war in
the meantime, will cause these Governments, in self
interest, to seek round-table discussions towards
liquidating top-heavy armaments.
Interesting
I beg to refer to my "Chart Showing Prices Paid
Views of
Munitions
for Dynamite-Glycerine (in Norwegian Currency, 1884-1936)"
Manufacturing
Circles re-
forwarded by me May 8, 1936. As then pointed out,
War Tenden-
cies.
munitions manufacturing circles here regard this chart
as a "war-tendency barometer". At date of my last
year's despatch, the price was approximately 130 øre
per kilo.
- 2 -
per kilo. At the turn of the year (1936-37) the price
had advanced above 2 kroner. At this writing the price
is approximately 3 kroner. - a new high since the period
1918-19 - and not a ton available for purchase. Until
December it could be purchased with difficulty in
Holland - but now, even that market is closed. Incident-
ally, the main Norwegian munitions plant has two years'
supply on hand, at low cost. Munitions circles here
look for this situation to continue thus for at least
two years. They do not necessarily, however, look for
a war in the interim, barring consequential incidents.
Past Two and
Norwegian business and other informed circles hold
Next Two
Years Expen- it will be difficult even to estimate what Britain's
sive for
Britain,
not having maintained an adequate defense has cost her
Resulting From Not Main-in prestige, intra-Empire disturbances, current extra-
taining Ade-
quate Defense.
ordinary defense expenditures under pressure, et cetera.
In the aggregate cost over the past two years and the
next two years, it is held that Britain must include
financial accommodation and economic assistance to other
nations - either to hold them as allies or hold them
off as potential enemies, until Britain will have
attained her own adëquate strength in striking power.
This will all be part of the price she must pay.
Naturally she would like her friends and neighbors to
contribute towards this "price" - but should they be
unable or unwilling to do so, she will have to bear
the burden herself - as her entire future is at stake.
As Norwegian
Referring to my cable of December 11, 1936, to the
Circles Viewed
Britain Short
Department, the following are excerpts:
and Long-Term
Objectives on
"The following comprises the British long-term
December 11,
objective in foreign policy: Britain aims acting in
capacity
- 3 -
capacity of honest peace broker towards eventual
general European agreement envisaging German and Russian
participation. Immediate objective: to break up
Italo-German combination through action favorable to
Italy (note: this was realized through subsequent
Mediterranean Paot). In connection therewith,
Vansittart's conviction gaining credence in high British
circles to effect: Germany should be regarded as
Britain's potential aggressor; this warning has
regard to British and German relative armed positions,
whereby estimated peaks are attainable in two years
and eighteen months respectively. British aim to block
Germany's increasing alliances to south and west, thus
hoping to get Germany eventually into general agree-
ment - also to block Italy's grabbing bases near
Gibraltar."
As regards Britain's holding off Germany until
she can rearm, Norwegian circles see Britain now
apprehensively looking at the German economic situation
with a view to conceiving means to avert a breakdown
and explosion.
Germany:
Generally viewed, the Spartan spirit has entirely
replaced the Athenian, which fact works for the
disadvantage of all Europe. In other words, a
thoroughly military-minded generation tends to create
a situation seething with potential repercussions.
Reported
Referring to my cable of December 19, 1936, to the
Russo-German
Secret Con-
Department, the following are excerpts:
versations.
"Reliable sources inform me secret German-Russian
conversations taking place envisaging cooperation at
price of neutralization of Polish and Japanese fronts.
This means Germany not to assist Japan against Russia
and
- 4 -
and Russia not to assist Poland or France against
Germany. British circles concerned lest this lead
to war through Germany's getting free hand. Under-
stand Russia would be prepared to tear up recent
agreements if Germany would do likewise. Such
arrangements would indicate Voroshilov's aims over-
shadowing Litvinov's objectives. Though indications
are reported to be of sufficiently definite character
to cause apprehension in Scandinavian and British
high circles, like all matters of such importance,
the reported plan is subject to change or abandonment
through terrific pressure which might be brought."
Since early December, 1936, rumors regarding the
possibility of an eventual Russo-German rapprochement
have come to me confidentially from four distinct sources:
quarters here identified with British, Finnish, Polish
and German high circles. Differing somewhat perhaps
in detail, they nevertheless all point to the same
possible outcome: an eventual Russo-German rapprochement.
I was at first inclined to classify information to
this effect, emanating from important and informed
Finnish and Polish communicants in Oslo, as home-
inspired, due to the geographic and political positions
of both these countries, and their possible desire
for focussed sympathetic attention. I may add that
information from the foregoing sources was obtained
subsequent to that which was transmitted to me by
circles here close to the British, and which prompted
my above cable of December 19th.
Now, however, in the course of the past few days,
comes fresh information of the same character from
informed Norwegian observers known to me to be close
to
- 5 -
to German governmental and banking circles. These reports,
in effect, point out that German high circles feel that all
indications point to Germany's being bottled up; she may
be compelled eventually to come to terms with Russia.
Having brought the colonial question to the fore, while
stressing it as the paramount issue of the day, Germany finds
Britain blocking her every day at every turn. Although Hitler
would still go far towards holding Britain's friendship, it
is conceivable, if present circumstances continue, that
Germany will have to resort to the alternative of alliances
unsympathetic to these nations now in control of Germany's
former colonies. In this connection, some German circles
are reported as discussing quite openly now the possibility
of a German break with Western Europe, and a new line-up with
Russia. They point to Stalin's growing tendency to nationalize
Bolshevism - to confine it within Russian frontiers. They
can foresee therefore a change in that system's complexion.
Anyway, Germany's hatred is directed against Bolshevism
solely, and not against Russia. It is conceivable that as
an emergency measure an economic-military arrangement might
be effected, exclusive of mutual acceptance of the respective
political principles of the parties. Besides, the General
Staffs of both countries have long advocated an amicable
tie-up on some basis, aside from political considerations.
In connection with the foregoing possibilities, informed
opinion here points out that any connection which might
eventuate between Germany and Russia, would be contingent
on what develops politically in Russia. Thus, a strengthening
of the Russian Government's position would probably lead to
an amicable arrangement with it. It is conceivable, however,
that if the Russian Government's position weakens, the
Germans might consider means of forcibly availing themselves
of
- 6 -
of Russian territories containing the raw materials and grain
they need, Such action would be to a large extent influenced
by Poland's attitude. Quarters here have no definite opinion
regarding Poland's probable attitude in such circumstances,
They feel, however, that Poland might be willing to throw
her support behind a German move, were she sufficiently
convinced of the likelihood of revolution within Russia result-
ing from an aggressive move against that country.
In this connection, a meeting of leading Swedish and
Norwegian shipowners recently took place here. The leading
Swedish representative expressed his opinion: to the effect
that Germany would turn to Russia in one capacity or another,
once she was convinced Britain would or could do no more
for her. Moreover, his information led him to believe that
the Stalin Government was so unstable that a revolution
paralyzing a united defensive front would take place almost
instantly in the event of Germany's taking action against
Russia. Though Germany could never absorb Russia in the
long run, her initial efforts would more than likely result
in occupation of the Ukraine, at least, without much
intensive fighting, and would afford Germany the opportunity
to reorganize Russia along different lines. He added that
perhaps, after all, it would be better to let this come
about.
Similar in general character were the observations
recently expressed to me by one of Norway's leading states-
men and by a prominent, well-informed officer of the
Norwegian Foreign Office. Both are regarded as intelligent
observers of international affairs, having importantly
participated at Geneva during recent years.
The former observed in effect that Germany was in
increasingly
- 7 -
increasingly precarious economic straits, resulting in a
growing schism in leading industrial and political circles.
The rate of concentration camp confinements has markedly
increased during the past several months, as a result of
a growing tendency toward recalcitrant public utterances.
The underlying political structure was weakening. It was
conceivable that as this weakened, the General Staff's hold
on the political situation would strengthen. If this con-
tinued, we might look for a growing tendency towards a
military deal with Russia irrespective of continued
political barking between the two countries.
My other above-mentioned informant (of the Norwegian
Foreign Office) referred to a conversation we had previously
had, bearing on the possibility of an agreement either of
an aggressive or non-aggressive nature between Germany and
Russia. He believed that even the complexities of the
political-economic arena of modern Europe had not succeeded
in dislodging Bismarck's influence from the minds of the
German General Staff. It was more than possible that the
latter and the Russian Staff could find common ground on
which to make an agreement - and that they would both con-
ceivably welcome the opportunity. He then drew my attention
to an article which appeared in a recent edition of the
League of Nation's press organ, citing a discussion of
recent date between a representative of an important French
conservative group and a French Government official. In
effect, this discussion disclosed that in reply to the
former's question as why France had effected a rapprochement
with Russia, and as to why M. Barthou, of all people,
should have been the one to advocate it, the Government
official explained that M. Barthou had urged the agree-
ment for the simple reason that it was, to his mind, the
only
- 8 -
only way of preventing a Russo-German rapprochement.
German short-
Practised in the art of "war threats" and
term "pin-
pricking" and
muddying European waters towards accomplishing his
long-term
policies as
successive objectives, Hitler, since late December
viewed here.
has been pursuing a "pin-pricking" policy, with an
understanding with the "General Staff", not to go so
far 8.8 to incur a major conflict. This intermediate
policy is aimed at his long-term objective: economic
assistance and colonies.
Recent Infor-
Recent confidential reports indicate this
mation re-
Hitler's
"pin-pricking" policy continues, and can be looked
Intentions re-
Spain - as a
for to have an important bearing on the Spanish
Part of Pin-
Pricking
situation. According to this information, the
Policy.
General Staff has persuaded Hitler not to send more
troops to Spain, because from Germany's standpoint
they consider it strategically advantageous to let
this Spanish conflict drag on through the summer.
It will provide an ever-ready spark when necessary -
an excuse always handy to throw a fire-brand into
the powder barrel - and a constant menace to the
allies. Besides, this would mean a prolongation of
the presence of a body of soldiers in France's
rear - an annoyance envisaged in the "pin-pricking"
policy.
Colohial
In connection with the question of colonies, I
Issue.
am confidentially informed 8.8 follows: Von Ribbentrop
has been instructed to take up the Colonial matter
generally - but not to press the issue.
Britain is adamant, and at present is determined
not to yield the colonies - under any circumstances.
She plans to counter with an offer of raw
materials - but through the League. This plan entails
advising
- 9 -
advising Germany to establish purchasing bureaus at
the required raw material points of origin throughout
the Colonies. In order to facilitate German purchases,
Britain is prepared to consider setting up a League
credit and the removal of trade restrictions.
The foregoing offer, it is understood, will be
advanced on the basis of the following understanding:
a) Contingent on its functioning through the League.
b) Part of the price of a general European
settlement.
o) It will involve no territorial changes,
Conclusion:
In conclusion, I might add that, taking into
Personal
consideration the foregoing, it is my belief there
Observations.
are three important factors which should not be lost
sight of, in considering the European outlook for
the next year:
a) The advent of another great war is not a
certainty. As a matter of fact, Hitler may be
compelled to change his policy, for its economic
results are so unfavorable as to have considerably
weakened even Germany's position as a political
factor. Both possible opponents and possible allies
are watching the economic development in Germany
with close attention and are drawing their con-
clusions accordingly.
b) Probable realignment in Europe resulting
from Britain's approaching rearmed position.
o) Britain's determined long-term objective,
envisaging a general European settlement.
A. J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.
PSF: Biddle Folder
file
Oslo, May 18, 1937.
My dear Mr. President:
Words fail me in describing how happy and
proud I am over my appointment as Ambassador to Poland.
I am deeply sensible of the great honor which you have
conferred upon me through this appointment, and I take
great pride in the confidence which you have thus placed
in me. It is a real privilege for me to serve under
you, for whom I bear the most genuine affection and
profound admiration. Moreover, it is a source of deep
gratification to continue as part of your Administration,
which under your courageous, farseeing, and able
guidance, has so effectively coped with the greatest
problems that ever faced our Nation. Indeed, it is
both gratifying and stimulating for both Margaret and
myself to feel that we are members of your official
family.
From the bottom of my heart I thank you, and
I assure you that I will do everything within my power
to justify the confidence which you have thus placed in
me.
Faithfully yours,
Touy Biddleg
The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
PSF; Biddle Folder
June 3, 1937.
Dear Tony:-
It is good to know that you are
proceeding to Warsaw and further that you
will soon come over here. I am very happy
that all has gone so well and it will be
good to see you and Margaret.
Always sincerely,
Honorable Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.,
American Embassy,
Warsaw,
Poland.
Oslo, May 20, 1937.
My dear Mr. President:
Supplementing my letter of May 18th, I hasten to
inform you that pursuant to a telephone conversation
between Bill Bullitt and John Cudahy in Paris and my-
self here, we arranged, with the subsequent approval
of the State Department, to meet in Paris for con-
sultations in respect to Polish affairs. The results
of our numerous conferences were, to say the least,
extremely helpful to me, for I was thus enabled to
acquire first-hand from John Cudahy an intimate back-
ground of the situation, both of the past and present,
in Poland. Moreover, Bill enabled me to get a very
clear picture as viewed both from Russia and Western
Europe. On one occasion, Bill very kindly invited the
Polish Ambassador to France, Mr. Jules Lukasiewicz, to
join our conference. This was also very helpful, for
the Ambassador discussed at length the political situ-
ation of his country. In a word, my talks with Bill
and John, as well as with the Polish Ambassador and
other Polish authorities in Paris, have proved very
elucidating and constructive. Meanwhile, Margaret and
I have read carefully every available book on the history
of, and present-day affairs in, Poland.
My first inclination, due to enthusiasm over my
appointment and my deep gratification to you, was to
proceed direct to Washington in order to express to you
personally Margaret's and my happiness, and to consult
with you as well as to receive whatever instructions
you might wish to give us. Moreover, I felt that I
should engage in consultations with Secretary Hull
and with other authorities in the Department.
The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
- 2 -
However, after my conversations in Paris and
additional studies, both from available books and with
the Polish Minister here, I felt that it would be more
desirable to proceed direct to Warsaw from here, in
that such procedure could enable me: a) to complete
my exchange of formalities; b) to make a study of the
current general Polish situation and local conditions;
and c) to make arrangements for our household. After
having accomplished the foregoing, I felt that I would
be in a position to discuss the situation in Poland more
intelligently with you and the Secretary. Bill Bullitt
and John Cudahy both agreed that this thought was a
constructive one.
Accordingly, I sent the following cable to the
Secretary:
"Having had elucidating and helpful conversations
with Ambassadors Bullitt and Cudahy concerning
background and current Polish situation, end hav-
ing read the contents of your telegram to Ambassador
Bullitt, if no objections are perceived by you I
propose to pursue the following program: May 23rd
sail from Copenhagen on the S.S. BATORY, arriving
the following day at Gdynia (not until June 15th
is there a like sailing); from thence I shall pro-
ceed to Warsaw to await arrival of credentials,
which I am told Department is forwarding at earliest
convenience to Ambassador Bullitt, who will send
them to Warsaw by plane. The following will also
be entailed by my program:
"(1) Completion of exchange of formalities in
Warsaw.
(2) Short study of current general Polish
situation and local conditions.
"(3) Household arrangements.
+(4) Proceed to State Department for consultation
and instruction.
"Leaving Paris Tuesday, May 11th, for Oslo in
order to have ample time before departure for
Copenhagen on May 21st to take leave formally."
In reply to the above cable, I received one from
the Secretary, stating in effect that he agreed that
my suggestion was a constructive one and giving his
approval thereof. Accordingly, Margaret and I will
depart from Oslo on the 21st of this month and will
sail aboard the S.S. BATORY on the 23rd from Copenhagen,
arriving in Warsaw on the night of the 24th. AS soon
as we shall have completed our formalities and shall
have
- 3 -
have assimilated sufficient of the atmosphere to have
become conversant with current Polish affairs, we plan
to return to Washington, with the hope of seeing you,
and of consulting with the Secretary and with the various
Divisions interested in Polish affairs.
I sincerely hope that the foregoing meets with
your approval.
In closing, I wish to take occasion to reiterate
to you the fact that from the bottom of my heart I am
deeply grateful for the confidence which you have placed
in me by appointing me as your Ambassador to Poland.
Moreover, I wish to reassure you that both Margaret and
I will do everything within our power to justify your
valued confidence.
Faithfully yours,
Tomy Biodle gr
Biddle folder
October 7, 1937.
Dear Daisy:-
Many thanks for yours of the twenty-
fourth of September, which I find on my return
to Washington from the trip to the Coast. I
am glad that things seem to be going well in
favor of the Secretary, and I wish I could do
something to help.
All goes well here in spite of the
Black episode and the customary attitude of
most of the Press about things in general.
The western trip was a tremendous sucfess.
Always sincerely,
Mrs. J. Borden Harriman,
American Legation,
Oslo,
Norway.
Oslo, September 24, 1937.
Dear Mr. President:
Since my letter to you of July 2, last, in regard to
the Nobel Peace Prize of 1937, there have been some further
developments. From confidential conversations held in the
last few days, I have learned that Lord Cecil's chances
of receiving the Prize have receded, and Mr. Hull's advanced.
However, there has arisen another and rather strong
competitor in the form of the Nansen Bureau at Geneva,
which takes care of 2,000,000 people who after the War
lost their nationality. Two members of the Nobel Com-
mittee are much interested in its promotion and especially
at the present time when it is in a rather difficult
financial situation. Professor Stang, Chairman of the
Nobel Committee, and another, I understand, favor Mr. Hull,
while Professor Keilhau of the Advisory Committee, who,
however, has no vote, will write his report in Mr. Hull's
favor. It is now a question of securing one more vote.
The President,
The White House.
- 2 -
The Norwegian Minister, Mr. Morgenstierne, has worked
unceasingly while he has been here to promote Mr. Hull's
chances, and is, I think, rather hopeful that he will
be successful.
I will keep you informed of any changes of
sentiment.
Faithfully yours,
Takey Harrinder
S
PSF: Biddle
Warsaw, November 10, 1938.
My dear Mr. President:
The plight of the Jewish populations as a
whole in Europe is steadily becoming so untenable,
and their hopes for some way out from their present
and increasing dilemma becoming so dim with the
passage of time, that I take the liberty of sending
you this confidential outline of my recent observa-
tions.
First of all, it is steadily becoming clearer
that you personally are the one to whom they all
look more and more to take the lead in finding a
solution for their unhappy situation. My impression
on this score is daily corroborated by requests on
the part of various Jewish factions here that I ask
you to receive their representatives, should they
proceed to Washington in the near future. Chief
amongst those who have pressed me along these lines
is one V. Jabotinski, leader of the Zionist Revisionists.
He is now in the course of attempting to organize a
Congress of Jews of this part of Europe, the total
amount whereof he puts at about 7,000,000. In fact,
he looks upon the Jews of this section of Europe as
constituting the object of concern on the part of
the Jews in the rest of the world - particularly in
the United States.
You may recall that from time to time I have
written and cabled regarding my conversations with
Jabotinski. He has a brilliant mind, and an en-
gaging personality, and has at his disposal a "grape-
vine" system for the gathering of information - hence,
he is extremely well-informed. Moreover, he is dia-
metrically opposed to the policies of Mr. Weisemann
and at heart extremely anti-British.
He
The President,
The White House.
- 2 -
He correctly predicted (a) the British Govern-
ment's scrapping the idea of partition in Palestine,
and (b) a general disapproval amongst the Jews of
the world to the idea of the Jews of Palestine as-
suming a minority position within the framework of
an Arab State. He now informs me that as regards
Palestine he felt the blackest of the menacing clouds
of a month ago had been removed; it seemed now that
the Jews were no longer faced with the prospect of a
drastic and radical liquidation of the Balfour pledge.
He felt that this intention had been frustrated and
averted owing to your intervention. He believed that
what is now likely to follow is a return to the status
quo ante - meaning "ante the Peel reports" - only per-
haps veiled by a display of "a few well chosen words"
intended to save everybody's face. According to his
opinion, most people in Britain would feel thankful
in that event and would "rest" - and the moment for the
big move would be lost; while the only thing that
would not rest would be the disease." Hence, he took
another occasion to state his fears that there was
only one factor left, one man who could prevent this
half-way stagnation, and this was President Roosevelt.
Naturally, in reply to his repeated question
whether there was any chance that you might be willing
to receive him, I stated that you had never lost sight
of the problem, and that you and your associates were
constantly engaged in a search for a solution. I did
not think this was the time to request an audience with
you - in fact, the committee which you had appointed
to study the problem, was in London, and diligently at
work.
I am aware that Mr. Jabotinski, like many of his
confrères, is concentrating his thoughts and energies
in an effort (a) to engage your good offices in calling
another world conference to consider territorial out-
lets for Jewish immigration and (b) to enlist your
influence and pressure upon a "Britain, desirous of
American cooperation", towards making a generous settle-
ment in Palestine.
Of importantly pertinent interest, usually well-
informed circles here impart to me that their reports
from London indicate that Chamberlain, or perhaps a
member of his Cabinet, might possibly accompany the
King
- 3 -
King and Queen to the United States for, among other
purposes, discussing the Palestine question along
the following lines: To retain Palestine as a Jewish
homeland would be impossible, if immigration were in-
creased. Hence, the British Government might be
willing to consider favorably, offering territory at
one or more points in their colonies for the purpose
of setting up a Jewish State - and, provided the
United States joined Britain in the guarantee of such
a state. This proposal, according to my informants,
might be expected to be a part of an envisaged plan
for a colonial settlement within the framework of a
general European settlement.
At the present moment the following are high
lights on developments in connection with the current
European Jewish problem (a) violent repercussions
against the Jews throughout Germany as a result of the
Jewish boy, Herschel Grunspan's murder of von Rath,
Secretary of the German Embassy in Paris, (b) signs
of an approaching storm over the community of Jews
in Rumania, and (c) difficulties encountered by the
Polish official representatives in their negotiations
in Berlin regarding the individual rights and proper-
ties of the Polish Jews recently ordered out of Ger-
many to Poland. (15,000 Jews recently crossed into
Poland under 24 hours' notice from the German Govern-
ment. From all accounts, German treatment of these
unfortunate people was nothing short of brutal. On
the other hand, the Polish Government went to great
lengths in an effort to extend humane treatment under
trying circumstances. See my cable No. 243 of October
29, 7 p.m.)
Hoping that the foregoing will prove enlightening
on developments described, and with every good wish,
I am,
Yours faithfully,
Tom Biddee gr
PSF. Biddle
RECEIVED J7N29 Jan is THE I << WHITE HOUSE
Folder
Fp
8601 Montgomery Avenue,
Chestnut Hill,
Philadelphia, Pa.
January 27, 1941.
My dear Mr. President:
Margaret and I tremendously enjoyed being with
you on Saturday for luncheon. It was a real treat,
and we apprecriated every minute of our time with you.
I cannot tell you how happy and proud I am that
you want me to continue as your Ambassador to the Polish
Government, and that in addition, you wish me to assume
the duties as your representative to the Belgian, Norwegian,
and Netherlands Governments. I am profoundly sensible of
this great honor, and of the confidence you are thus
placing in me. I want you to know moreover, that we
shall both do everything in our power to justify your
confidence and friendship, which we value so highly.
Margaret joins me in renewed thanks for the thoroughly
enjoyable and extremely interesting time spent with you
on Saturday, and in all good wishes.
Faithfully yours,
Tony Biddle, r'
The President
The White House.
PSF: PSF.Biddle drames Folder
March 4, 1941
Dear Margaret:
Before you and Tony leave, I
want particularly to ask you if in view
of your experience in Poland you will be
good enough to send me reports, from time
to time, on the work of the women of
England in home defense. I know this
will be of great interest to us.
It was grand to see you this
afternoon.
This takes you both my lowe
and good wishes.
As ever,
Mrs. Anthony Drexel Biddle, Jr.,
Carlton Hotel,
Washington, D. C.
mal/tmb
PSF: Biddle Folder
1-41 -
Original letter from King Haakon
to the President and carbon copy
as well as photostatice copy of
the President's reply fibed
"Famous People Folder"
THE WHITE HOUSE
March 19
WASHINGTON
1941
122y dear King Haabur
I was very happy to have your letter which
Mr. Hopkins brought over -- and I am really
encouraged by the news which he gives me of the
splendid resistance that is being put up by the
British and all of you who are working toward
the same end.
I think that Olav's visit here has been
thoroughly successful from the public point of
view, and 1t has been, of course, a great
comfort to his wife and those three delightful
children.
I had not meant to suggest that your
children should make any formal tour in our
West -- but I have felt that it is important
in this country to keep the names of the
occupied nations constantly before our public.
I say this because a strong public opinion
for the restoration of the complete independence
of the nations overrun by Germany will become
of especial moment when the time for peace
arrives.
I do not think you need to worry about
what any German broadcast stations say.
Everybody here is in accord that your daughter-
in-law and the children are properly on this
side of the water -- and the same thought
applies to the Princess Juliana and her
babies, and to the Luxembourg family, which,
after all, has no "raison d'etre" for main-
taining a Government in London.
At the same time, people thoroughly approve
your leadership of your Government in England, as
they do that of Queen Wilhelmina.
With your permission I will, of course,
continue to do everything possible in the way of
advising your family.
Their present abode, outside of Washington,
is just large enough, without being in any way
ostentatious -- and I hope that this Summer we
can make similar arrangements for them to go to
a fairly quiet seaside place, The children
especially should not spend the Summer here
because the climate is very enervating. I hope
they will all come to stay with us at Hyde Park
before they 80 to the seashore.
If, later on, the Scandinavians in the
Northwest should ask your daughter-in-law to
go there informally, as the Dutch have done
in several instances in the case of Princess
Juliana, I think it would be a good thing to
go. We must remember that your daughter-in-
law very clearly represents a combination of
Norway and Sweden and Denmark, which symbolizes
the independence of all three countries.
I hear from Canada that Olav's two
trips there did much good. He is a very fine
fellow, and it has been very delightful to
have him here.
Later - Dlau plans to leave Pater
a I am off today an a Tm day TriA
The Smith
for my sinces r I am Dure a
In him agains before he Two
the Clipper for Lisbon. You
will have Dgen my eparch about visistance in
occupied nations - I do wish There could b
more ofil in Doumark r Bilgiam Norway
- Holland are doing will - N2 are thitted
by the said an the Lofolan Islands
Krep up the splanded work you are
daing - IN. nob have Durg. Dn you
with my incle ligard
trithfully your
COPY
Feb. 2, 1941
England
Dear Mr. Roosevelt:
As Mr. Hopkins, who I saw on Thursday last, offered to
take any personal letter back with him, I take the opportunity
to write and thank you and your wife for all the help and kind-
ness shown not only to my daughter-in-law, but now also to my
son during his Christmas holiday and then there is another
thing I feel I mustot thank you for and that is for appointing
Mr. Biddle as Minister to Norway. He is a friend of mine since
he was in Oslo and I feel sûree he will do what he can for
Norway as he and his wife got very fond of Nowway during their
stay and I feel I personally can talk quite openly to him without
(having ?) him misuse my confidence.
Mr. Hopkins mentioned during our talk that he thought
it would be a good thing if my daughter-in-law took a trip to
the different parts in America where there are descendants of
Norwegians. I am sorry to say I disagreed with him as first of
all, I think it is the best thing we can do under the present
circumstances is to keep quiet. I have to think of my people
at home and if they get the impression that we are only having
a good time out of the country, we may spoil everything for the
future. You must remember the Germans have told them that we
all of us ran away from duty and country and even now when Olav
left they gave it out in their radio that he left because of
fright for the air raids over this country. So you can see they
use anything and everything to
(defame ?) us in the eyes
of the Norwegians. I myself am keeping very quiet here and only
go and inspect our forces who are training here but say no to
any entertainment which is not strictly Norwegian.
It has been a very strenuous time for xx my daughter-in-
law ever since the war broke out and I am sure it would mean
more strain in case she was to undertake a trip as Mr. Hopkins
suggested. I feel you wont mind me explaining my point of view
on this subject but felt I had to put it to you as you might
advise my daughter-in-law if the question really should come up.
Thanking you again for all your sympathy not only to my
family but also to my country, I remain with kind regards,
Yours very sincerely,
Haakon R.
PSF: Biddle
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Ritz Hotel
London
March 26, 1941.
My dear Mr. President:
We arrived here safely, after a splendid trip. We
have installed ourselves in comfortable quarters at the
Ritz Hotel, where we intend to continue living.
I have already been received by the King of Norway,
and by the Belgian Government, and I await an audience
with Queen Wilhelmina tomorrow, to present my credentials.
King Haakon sends you his warmest compliments and
in response to my conveying your message regarding his
son and daughter-in-law, has already cabled them to visit
Norwegian-American areas, between now and the time of the
Crown Prince's return to London. I shall write you more
of this at a later date.
Already several leading members of the de Gaulle
movement here have contacted me discretely. During my
service with the Polish Government in France, as well as
during the time that I served with the French Government
at Tours and Bordeaux, I considered these particular
individuals to be serious, loyal Frenchmen, and patriotic
trustworthy officials of the French Government. They
have established many sources of information through highly
confidential channels, and I feel that the maintenance of
discrete contact with them on my part would lead to
enlightening intelligence, and a means of checking informa-
tion received through other channels, regarding activities
both in
The President
The White House.
- 2 -
both in occupied and unoce upied France. They have
already told me that they would consider it a privilege
to give me, in strictest confidence, benefit of any and
all information on this score.
In line with this, they conveyed to me the information
contained in the attached memorandum, which I consider
interesting in the light of its implications as to the
extent of "imposed economic collaboration" on the part
of unoccupied France with Germany.
With every good wish and with warmest personal
regards, I am
Yours faithfully,
Tomy Biddler
MEMORANDUM
[194]]
STRICTLY CONF IDENTIAL
According to information received through secret channels,
the following program was imposed by the Germans, upon
unoccupied France, from January 16 to March 1, 1941.* This
program called for the shipment to Germany of the following
items:
Bauxite clay - 30,000 tons
Aluminium - 10,000 tons
Magnesium - 8,000 tons. Absolute priority was demanded
for this item.
"Special Clay" - 2,000 tons
Hematite (A special type of iron ore) - 38,000 tons
Pig Iron - 9,000 tons
Special extracts for tanning - 1200 tons
Carbite of calcium - 4,000 tons
Rubber (Transhipped via Marseille) - 1700 tons
Wool (From Algeria via Marseille) - 10,000 tons
Pyrites (From Spain via Irun) - 10,000 tons. Absolute priority
The size of the program is such that it made impossible
delivery of French goods by French railroads; the Germans
demanded total priority.
- 2 -
Zinc ore (From Spain via Irun) - 8,000 tons. Absolute priority
Other raw materials (From Spain via Irun) - 22,000 tons
Iron, North African (Previously stored) - 1960 tons
Manganese ore, North African - 1995 tons
Nitrates, Chilean (Via Cette) - 2200 tons
Beans, sardines, turtles etc. (From Portugal via Irun) - 2800 tons
"Azote" (From Toulouse) 20,000 tons
Coffee (via Marseille) 3000 tons
Eggs (From unoccupied zone) 1200 tons
Sugar - 20,000 tons (From northern part of occupied France
and partly from unoccupied France)
Butter - 11,500 tons (From occupied and partly from
unoccupied France)
Dried vegetables - (From Marseille for army) 4,000 tons.
Note: The foregoing items are quite apart from those contained
in the "barter arrangement" just given publicity.
(copy in statedlept Dept in
Biddle Folder
1-41
folder w atles Fills)
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
April 24, 1941
My dear Mr. President:
I am returning to you herewith the letter
addressed to you under date of March 26 by Tony
Biddle and which you sent to the Secretary and
myself under date of April 8. The Department
has taken careful note of the information con-
tained in the enclosure to Tony Biddle's letter.
Believe me
Fai thrully yours,
Enc.
The President,
The White House.
PSF: Biddle Folder
Ritz Hotel,
London,
April 18, 1941.
My dear Mr. President:
I have just returned to London after interesting
visits with the Polish, and subsequently the Norwegian
Forces in Scotland.
For your information I am attaching hereto a
confidential memorandum covering my impressions. I
beg to draw your attention particularly to my observa-
tions regarding essential requirements. In the Polish
area, I accompanied the Polish President, Raczkiewicz;
in the Norwegian area, General Fleischer, Commanding the
Norwegian Forces. In both areas, I was permitted a
thorough observation of all phases of training and secret
defensive preparations.
With all good wishes, I am
Yours faithfully
Tony Biller.
The President
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
OBSERVATIONS ON THE POLISH AND
NORWEGIAN FORCES IN SCOTLAND.
MEMORANDUM, STRICTLY CONF IDENTIAL
[194]
I have just returned to London after interesting visits with
the Polish, and subsequently the Norwegian forces in Scotland. In
the Polish area, I accompanied the Polish President, Raczkiewicz; in
the Norwegian area, General Fleischer, Commanding the Norwegian
Forces. In both areas, I was permitted a thorough observation of
all phases of training and secret defensive preparations.
Polish Forces:
The Polish ground units comprise an experienced fighting
force, numbering about 20,000. Many of the officers and men are
veterans of the wars in Poland and France - some have fought
in Norway as well.
They have been assigned the defense of the Scottish east
coast, from the north bank of the Firth of Forth to Montrose.
Their activities are coordinated with those of the Home Guard
of that area.
Both morale and discipline are good.
The training is intensive and directed along lines of defense
against "blitz" tactics.
In general, these forces compose a well organized cadre of
seasoned officers and men, capable of handling some seven to eight
thousand additional troops. This increase would not only serve to
fill out the full corps complement, but would also permit greater
depth in the disposition of troops.
While the defense plan is well conceived, there is, in my
opinion, an insufficient number of men and field guns for so
extensive an area. Notwithstanding these disadvantages, the
strategic disposition both of troops and guns available
has
- 2 -
has been so carried out as to obtain the maximum effect. As
regards existing gun positions, they have been arranged in
such a way as to permit cross fire in defense of the more
vulnerable stretches along the coast. However, an effective
and necessarily prolonged defense against a "blitz" attack,
(probably consisting of wave after wave of landing parties,
coordinated with dive-bombers, as well as with transport planes,
and parachute troops, aiming to land behind the coastal defense
line), calls (a) for a larger quantity of 75's and heavier
calibre field guns, and (b) anti-aircraft guns to cover gun
positions and other vital factors from dive-bombing and
aerial machine-gunning.
Besides, there should be an increase in the number of
troops available, in order to render greater depth to the
defense position as a whole; moreover, these troops should
be trained and equipped as counter-shock troops and so equipped
as to be capable of a high volume of fire-power.
Essential requirements:
I find there is an urgent need of the following equipment:
Tanks (of a total of 200 required, only 6 have
been delivered to the Polish forces)
Anti-tank guns
Anti-aircraft guns
Signal apparati, especially field radio transmitting
and receiving sets. (While the
observation posts, gun positions, and
headquarters are connected by tele-
phone lines, experience in the
various
- 3 -
various "blitzes" on the Continent
has emphasized the importance of
radio apparati).
A considerable increase in stocks of 75mm shells
An extension of hospitalization for the corps area:
a minimum of 250 additional beds.
Norwegian Forces:
We went from Kincardine to Newhouse. Together with
General Fleischer, Commanding the Norwegian Forces, I inspected
part of his troops at Newhouse, Scotland, and subsequently
another part at Dumfries.
The Norwegian contingent consists of about 1,500 rugged,
experienced and well-trained troops. With the exception of
about 125 recruits recently arrived from Lofoten, the rest
of the men, and all of the officers, are veterans of the war
in Norway.
Part of the troops are mechanized, equipped with Bren
carriers, motor cycles, and motor trucks. There is a heavy
machine gun unit, a trench mortar unit, and a pioneer unit.
The remainder consists of infantrymen equipped with rifles
and Bren guns.
The training is thorough and vigorous. The marksmanship
both of the infantrymen and machine gunners was of high standing,
during the realistic exercises which I witnessed in the mountains
nearby the camps.
Special
- 4 -
Special attention is devoted to schooling the officers
and men for service as raiding parties. Many had already
successfully conducted several of these raids at points along
the Norwegian coast. In their training, emphasis is accordingly
placed on close combat tactics: with particular emphasis on the
use of the "tommy gun" (they told me that this had proven one
of the most useful weapons in carrying out their raids).
Efforts moreover, are directed towards schooling the men
in the use of all types of weapons in order to give them a well-
rounded knowledge of the use of all equipment applicable to
modern-day warfare. This is done with view to making them
capable of serving as non-commissioned officers and officers,
in event these units might serve as a cadre for expansion. The
morale and discipline are good, and I was impressed by the
enthusiasm with which the officers and troops engaged in the
exercises.
General Fleischer told me it was his earnest desire to
build up these units as a nucleus for expansion, in that he
felt it was essential that Norway should be represented here
by a ground force of considerable size. He therefore regretted
that from time to time he had to transfer some of his best
men to the Merchant or Trawlers fleets.
PSF: Biddle Fabler
1-41
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 24, 1941.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
Will you do the necessary?
F. D. R.
Cable from Ambassador Biddle
to the President, dated April 23,
1941, saying that May 3rd 1s
"Polish National Day" and asking
that the President send a message
to the Polish President on that
occasion.
Biddle Folder
Ritz Hotel,
London.
April 26, 1941.
My dear Mr. President:
For your information I am attaching
a confidential memorandum covering the opinion of the
military authorities of the governments to which I am
accredited in regard to Britain's current military position.
In effect they all concurred in the opinion I have set
forth in the memorandum.
Yours faithfully,
Touy Bidder or
The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM
In discussing Britain's military position with the
Military authorities of the Governments to which I am
accredited, they each independently expressed in effect
the following opinion:
This was a critical juncture for the British Empire.
Not only was the "Battle of the Atlantic" becoming daily
a more serious problem, but now, the "Battle of Egypt" was
rapidly looming as a crucial theatre of operations. So
much depended upon the outcome there. The British could
meet the Germans with numerical equality. However, they
could not match the Germans in terms of mechanized equipment -
particularly tanks.
If the Germans reached the Suez, Spain might fall to
German hands, Turkey might become more reluctant to resist,
and Japan might strike out at Singapore. Even Russia, which
might otherwise lend material aid to Turkey, might, in the
event of a German seizure of the Suez, make further joint
adventure with Germany.
Besides, the situation in Morocco was rapidly deteriorating.
Germans were infiltrating the country at a steadily increasing
pace - with little if any resistance on part of the French
authorities there.
The British forces in the Suez area would therefore
urgently need the speediest possible shipment of equipment
and supplies from the United States.
Reports on conditions in Syria were more encouraging, and
with British forces now in Iraq, Basra offered help as a port
of delivery, for that area.
What the British now needed most were tanks, anti-tank guns,
heavy bombing planes and transport planes.
From my own angle of observation, it would now appear that
Germany aims, on the one hand, at cutting off the fuel oil supply
from the Mediterranean Fleet, and even at bottling up the Fleet,
and on the other hand, at striking simultaneously at widely
separated vital points in order to disperse the British forces
and materiel. In connection with the latter objective, Germany
undoubtedly hopes to force Britain to weaken her home defenses
by drawing on man power and equipment here, This with a view to
attempting an invasion in a later stage.
agring
- 2 -
Meanwhile, in view of Casa Blanca's and Tripoli's
becoming more and more the gateways for German infiltration
into Northern Africa, I am inclined to look for the Dakar
area to figure more prominently henceforth in Germany's
forward-looking military program.
apply
PSF: Biddle Folder
fillemal
Ritz Hotel,
London,
April 26, 1941.
My dear Mr. President:
I completed the presentation of my credentials to the
Norwegian, the Netherlands and the Belgian Governments in
comparatively short order, after my arrival here.
Moreover, the Polish President Raczkiewicz, General
Sikorski, and their associates, received me with a hearty
welcome on the day after my coming to London.
Polish Government:
Both President Raczkiewicz, and General Sikorski wished
me to convey to you an expression of their profound gratitude
and that of their associates and armed forces, for your having
returned me near their Government.
Norwegian Government:
I presented my credentials to King Haakon. His greeting
was warm and most friendly. He wished me to tell you that he
was deeply appreciative of your having sent a representative
to him here, and especially, one who had already served in
Norway, and who was familiar with Norwegian problems and
Norwegian-American relations. News of my appointment had been
promptly radio-broadcast to the people in Norway, and through
secret channels, the King had received reports that the news
had proven a source of comfort and encouragement for the
people there. He could not too strongly emphasize how much
your action in this regard meant to his people, as well as to
himself, to his Government, and to his armed forces here.
He was most grateful moreover, for the gracious hospitality
which you and Mrs. Roosevelt had accorded the Crown Prince
and Crown Princess, and for the friendly personal interest
which
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
- 2 -
which you had taken in their welfare and activities. He
clearly understood, and greatly appreciated your point of
view regarding the advisability of the Crown Prince's and
Crown Princess' keeping alive in the minds of the people
in general, and of the Norwegian-Americans in particular,
"Norway's case". He had accordingly instructed his son to
postpone his departure from the United States, and to arrange
several visits amongst the Norwegian-American communities,
with a view to emphasizing to them the determination of the
King, the Government, the armed forces and the commercial
fleet, to maintain the freedom and the independence of Norway.
The Netherlands Government:
I presented my credentials to Queen Wilhelmina. She
extended me a warm and friendly welcome. She asked me to
convey to you an expression of deep gratitude on part of
herself, her Government, her armed forces and her nation,
for your having appointed a representative to her here, during
these trying times. She knew her people well, and she was
aware that those who were now suffering in German-occupied
Holland were equally appreciative, and had derived a real
sense of encouragement from this action on your part. She
moreover requested me to tell you how grateful she was for
yours and Mrs. Roosevelt's kind hospitality to Princess
Juliana and for your continued friendly and helpful interest
in her welfare and activities. The Queen derived a great
sense of comfort from the knowledge thereof, and you and
Mrs. Roosevelt had touched her heart deeply.
The Belgian Government:
In the absence of the King, it was decided by the Belgian
Government that Minister for Foreign Affairs, Spaak, should
receive my credentials. Minister Spaak's greeting was warm
and friendly. In behalf of his Government and himself, he
wished me to transmit to you an expression of theirs and his
deepest appreciation of your having appointed a representative
to the Belgian Government established in London. It meant a
great deal to the latter, and he was aware from reports that
the news concerning your action in this regard, which had been
radio-broadcast
- 3 -
radio-broadcast to the people in German-occupied Belgium,
had already had a stimulating and wholesome effect.
The British Prime Minister
Mr. Churchill:
Several nights after our arrival here, Mr. Churchill
invited Margaret and me to dine with Mrs. Churchill and
himself at 10 Downing Street. We were most warmly received
by them both, and during the course of a most enjoyable and
interesting evening, we were made to feel very much "at home".
As it turned out, it was the night of Wednesday, March 19,
which witnessed the worst aerial bombardment London had until
that time experienced. When, after dinner, I expressed the
desire to see for myself the strides which London had made in
air-raid precautions, the Prime Minister invited me to accompany
him to the roof. Wearing steel helmets, we spent about two
hours watching the attack. All the while, he received reports
at various intervals from the different sections of the city
hit by the bombs. It was intensely interesting, and I was thus
afforded the opportunity of seeing for myself the progress
which had been made here in A.R.P. (Air-raid precautions), as
against those I had witnessed on the Continent up to late June.
For example, the Prime Minister's reports showed that the
German bombs on that night had started 1700 fires, and that
the various A.R.P. organizations had succeeded not only in
rapidly extinguishing them, but also in preventing them from
spreading. The results to my mind, represented a great tribute
not only to the courage and spirit of the women, as well as of
the men, in the organizations engaged in these A.R.P. activities,
but also to the efficient coordination of action of these
organizations.
In illustrating the progress made since the December 29
Blitz over the "City", the Prime Minister pointed out that
that had happened on a week-end, when most of the offices
were closed down and the buildings locked up. Accordingly, the
bombardment had caught the district with a minimum of roof
watchers on the alert. Consequently, the 1500 fires directly
caused by bombs on that occasion, had spread to about 4000 fires.
He went on to point out, that the 1700 fires directly attributable
to bombs, this night when I accompanied him, had been held in
check, due to the effective A.R.P. measures adopted since last
December.
Having watched the bombardment for several hours, I
accompanied the Prime Minister to the cellar, which had been
reinforced with extra steel carrying-beams. and stanchions to
withstand heavy aerial seige. Together we visited the various
offices
- 4 -
offices established there for the purpose of keeping the
Prime Minister in constant touch with naval, aerial and
military activities in all theatres of operation. These activities
and the current positions of all British and Allied shipping
were indicated by appropriate markers on large maps hung on
the walls of the pertinent offices. Staff officers of the
night-watch, who were in frequent telephonic contact with the
War Office, the Admiralty, the Air Ministry, and the Ministry
of Shipping were busily engaged in marking up changes on the
maps. The Prime Minister showed and explained to me the
operations indicated on each of these.
I was greatly impressed by his clear grasp even of the
most minute details as well as of the big picture as a whole.
It did not take me long to discern in him the driving energy
and other qualities of courageous and determined leadership
which had from the moment of his ascendency to power, served
to arouse his countrymen from a state of comparative lethargy
and to spur them to meet the threat to their country with unity
and fighting spirit.
Before leaving the Prime Minister and Mrs. Churchill, he
expressed the hope that I would visit the Polish and other
forces connected with the Governments to which I was accredited,
as early as possible, for he felt that this would be appropriate
and helpful. He added that he hoped I might see my way clear to
visit these forces frequently. I told him this was my intention.
In fact, I had already made definite plans to visit the Polish
and Norwegian forces in the North, at an early date.
In conclusion, he said he and his Government were very happy
that you had sent a representative to the Governments to which
I was accredited here, and he assured me that I could count
upon the cooperation of himself and his Government.
With all good wishes, I am
Yours faithfully
Tony
Bidder
PSF: Biddle Fulder
slum
1.41
Filersonal
Ritz Hotel
London,
April, 30,1941
My dear Mr. President:
For your information, I am attaching hereto a
confidential memorandum covering the substance of
my recent conversations with the Polish Minister for
Foreign Affairs, and with the British Prime Minister's
confidential political-military liason officer with
the Allied Governments established here.
In that the information thus disclosed to me
comes from the Polish Ambassador to the Vatican, the
Polish Ambassador at Ankara, as well as from confidential
British sources in the Eastern Mediterranean and in Vichy,
and in that this information bears on Italian public
opinion, Tripoli-bound transport traffic, oil storage
at Monopolia, Turkey's position as reflected in Turkish
Foreign Minister's downcast attitude, Iraq and Syria,
and Marshal Petain's physical condition, I pass it on
in the thought that it might serve usefully in rounding
out the picture in-the-making.
With warmest regards and all good wishes, I am
Faithfully yours
Tony Biddee,
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
MEMORANDUM
REGRADED
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
Polish Foreign Minister, Zaleski, this morning
disclosed to me, in strictest confidence the following
substance of a cable just received from the Polish
Ambassador to the Vatican:
Observations
(a) In the opinion of the Polish Ambassador, the
of Polish
Ambassador
results of the war in Greece had served to boost
to Vatican
on Italian
Mussolini's stock in the eyes of the Italian people as
public
opinion.
a whole, notwithstanding their realization that Italy
had come under German control. This, to a measurable
degree, was attributable to wishful thinking on part
of the people. Accordingly, they were most hopeful that
the war might be brought to an early close, in which
event they believed 1/ Italy could retain her recent
gains; and 2/ The Germans would move out of Italy.
Italian Government circles however, did not share this
trend of thought. They looked for a war of long duration,
and were less optimistic than the people as to the
likelihood of an eventual German exit from Italy;
Tripoli-bound
(b) With reference to Germany's intensive effort to
traffic,and
fuel oil
gain control of the Suez, great quantities of German
storage at
Monopolia.
troops and mechanized materiel had been passing through
Italy
- 2 -
Italy to Italian ports. There was a "steady stream"
of transports leaving Naples, bound for Tripoli. Moreover,
an important storage of fuel oil had been established
at Monopolia.
In this connection, Vatican Diplomatic Circles were
surprised that the British Fleet and Air Force had not
already taken effective steps to obstruct this "stream"
of transports and to bombard the fuel storage at Monopolia.
Polish
Referring to this observation in the Ambassador's
Foreign
Minister's
cable, Minister Zaleski said that while British Foreign
remarks.
Minister Eden told him on April 23 that orders were given
the British Fleet, to go "all out" against the transport
of troops and materiel to Tripoli, he, Minister Zaleski,
supposed that during evacuation of British forces from
Greece, the British Fleet and Air Force had had little
time for action elsewhere in the Mediterranean. Since
conclusion of the evacuation, he was informed the Fleet
had been dealing more effectively with Tripoli-bound
traffic. His informants said it was a difficult task,
however, due to advantage afforded the adversary by short
runs between Sicily, Pantaleria, Tripoli, under cover
of darkness. While some ships were getting through, it
was believed they were small on the whole.
Minister
- 3 -
Depressed
Minister Zaleski has just informed me confidentially
attitude
and remarks
that the Polish Ambassador at Ankara had had a very
of Turkish
Foreign
recent conversation with the Turkish Minister of Foreign
Minister.
Affairs. He had never seen the Minister in such a depressed
state of mind. The latter spoke of the possibility of a
German attempt to by-pass Turkey, by making certain islands
in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as
Syria, serve as stepping-stones for an aerial-transport
invasion of Iraq. The Turkish Foreign Minister had then
remarked that Turkey's position was becoming rapidly worse.
He now feared, moreover, the possibility of Russian
connivance with Germany vis-a-vis Turkey.
Disclosures
Of connected bearing, I have just been informed by
of competent
source re:
the British Prime Minister's confidential political-military
Iraq,Syria
and atti-
liason officer with the Allied Governments established
tude of6
Syrian and
here, (a) that reports from Eastern Mediterranean sources
Vichy
Authorities
indicate the Germans were planning to dispatch about
10,000 troops by aerial transport into Iraq; the plan
envisaged using certain Greek Islands and Syrian air fields
as "stepping stones"; (b) that Dentz, the French Military
Authority at Beirut, had been questioned by British
Authorities as to what action he might be expected to
adopt in event of a German attempt to land transport
planes in Syria. The British authorities subsequently
cabled
- 4 -
cabled London that Dentz "says" he will resist aggression
from any and all sources in conformity with orders
originally given him by Vichy. However, upon further
questioning Dentz as to what action he would take, if
the Germans assured him that they want only the use of
three or four aerodromes for refuelling, Dentz replied
that in that case, he would have to ask for authority
from Vichy.
Marshal
Of connected bearing, my informant disclosed the
Petain's
health.
following additional information just received from a
confidential source in Vichy, which if true, would seem
to leave little room for British optimism as to possible
resistant action by Dentz, in event Berlin pressed Vichy
for permission to use Syrian aerodromes:
Marshal Petain was rapidly showing the strain of the
past several months. In fact, he was suffering from
Euremia, and was frequently given to fainting spells. He
was apparently worn out, and was rapidly falling into the
hands of Darlan, who, behind the scenes, was setting the
stage for "all-out" collaboration with the Germans.
Accordingly, Darlan now regarded General Weygand as
his main obstacle to gaining control over Morocco, as well
as over French unoccupied territory.
Ritz Hotel, London.
May 4, 1941.
Dear Mr. President:
We have been over here about seven weeks,
and are comfortably settled at the Ritz, feeling very much at
home as our sitting room is where we had our wedding breakfast
ten years ago. We have taken a small house in the country, but
up to now have spent only three weekends there.
I have never in my life had as interesting or
as busy a time. First of all we have had many hearty reunions
with our Poles and Norwegians, and have been getting acquainted
with the Dutch and the Belgians. We have spent eleven days in
Scotland with the Polish and Norwegian troops. (I talked to some
of the boys who took part in the Lofotan raid).
In addition I have been making a thorough survey
of the women's activities and have found that fascinating. I have
spent the greater part of each day studying the different organi-
zations and their functions, and will send you my report very
soon.
Last but not least, I have been endeavoring to
co-ordinate Polish relief from this side.
Shortly after our arrival a well known corre-
spondent wrote an article about Tony calling him "the Ambassador
to Freedom" and that title seems to be sticking to him.
Your speeches have been simply magnificent -
I only wish you knew how you are adored by all groups in England.
One night we went unexpectedly down to the worst shelter in
London near the docks. Tony was recognized right away and had
to speak in each section - they all cheered wildly for
"President Roosevelt". This was a spontaneous reaction as no
one knew ahead we were going down to that particular shelter.
The head Shelter Warden was a delightful energetic little man
called Mr. "Bubley" who is an auctioneer, and who has a loud voice
probably strengthened by his professional training, with a per-
suasive manner. In other words during the raid he "sells" the
people in the shelter the idea of calmness. Later on we went to
another downtown borough to see more shelters, stopping in to see
the Mayor of that borough where we had the most beautiful sand-
wiches. I later learned that the Mayor had been a plumber, then
a caterer - hence the artistic touch in the supper. He was a short,
stout, and very polite little man by the name of Mr. Dainty.
2.
The two main topics of conversation in a light vein
over here among the English are the daring exploits of the Poles -
their conquests in the air and their sentimental conquests in
Scotland, and stories concerning "that wonderful Mr. Campbell" -
the man who has an enormous farm in Montana. He has been a
tremendous success over here - one friend likened him to
Will Rogers. He has been a refreshing note during tense days.
In regard to the Polish aviators - they say that unless
the R.A.F. want the Poles to bomb Berlin they do not dare to give
them even enough petrol to reach Berlin. For once they have
enough petrol they go straight to Berlin, and don't worry if they
haven't enough to get home again. And then the Scotchmen say
that in order to get anywhere courting a Scotch Lassie they must
wear Polish soldiers' hats and speak broken English with a Polish
accent. There seems to be a natural tie between the Scotch and
the Poles - the Poles who have been learning to speak English
have a strong Scotch brogue, and they are almost impossible to
understand. The tradition of Polish-Scottish friendship dates
from the time several hundred hears ago when some Scottish kings
took refuge in Poland and were royally domiciled in Krakow.
They say that the popular songs of a period represent
the prevailing sentiments of the day - one of the most popular
songs here is "The King is Still in London Town". From what I
hear the greatest psychological blunder the Germans have made in
regard to England was the bombing of Buckingham Palace. That
unified in one night the determination "to stick it out".
has
Tony is as busy as a bird dog and never/he enjoyed any-
thing as much as this new job. He will be in his new office in a
few days. It is rather hard to get office equipment here, es-
pecially typewriters, so our two secretaries put their portable
typewriters and gas masks by their beds each night so that they
can grab them up in case there is a raid (that is how precious
typewriters are here).
Please forgive the length of this letter. I started
out with the intention of writing you a nice brief businesslike
letter, and I did not mean to let it reach these proportions.
My thoughts are with you so often and I only wish you
knew how grateful I am to you for sending us over here.
3.
Tony joins me in sending you our love.
margaret As always,
The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
PSF: F: Biddle Father
1-41
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 5, 1941.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE CODE ROOM
STATE DEPARTMENT
The President would like
you to send the enclosed cable
to Ambassador Biddle.
GRACE G. TULLY
STANDARD FORM No. 14A
APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT
MARCH 10, 1926
FROM
The White House
Mashington
TELEGRAM
OFFICIAL BUSINESSGOVERNMENT RATES
...
CABLE
May 5, 1941.
BIDDLE
LONDON
YOUR LETTER OF APRIL 23RD. PLEASE INFORM H. M.) THE QUEEN
OF THE NETHERLANDS, THAT WHOLLY APPROVE AND AM MADE VERY
HAPPY
ROOSEVELT
Ritz Hotel,
London,
April 23, 1941.
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
file
file
My dear Mr. President:
I have just come from a meeting with Queen Wilhelmina.
She reiterated what she had formerly said to me upon the
occasion of presenting my credentials: (a) She was grateful
for your having appointed a Minister to her Government
established here; and (b) She was deeply moved by your interest
in her nation, by your friendly consideration of herself, and
by yours and Mrs. Roosevelt's great kindness and hospitality
to her daughter, Princess Juliana. Besides, she greatly
appreciated your helpful interest in her daughter's welfare
and your valued counsel to her concerning constructive
activities in behalf of her nation's interests.
The Queen went on to say she had just received a letter
from her Foreign Minister, Mr. van Kleffens, written after
his meeting with you. In effect, he had underlined what I
had formerly conveyed to her, i.e.; your sense of satisfaction
over Juliana's efforts to keep the "Netherlands' case" a
live issue in the minds of the people in general, and of the
American citizens of Netherlands' extraction in particular -
and your hope that she would continue in these efforts.
The Queen asked me to tell you that she understood and
appreciated your point of view in this regard, and was deeply
grateful.
She then earnestly requested me to treat in strictest
confidence what she was about to say, and asked me that in
conveying it to you, I beg of you to treat it likewise.
Moreover,
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
REGRADED
UNCLA SSIFIED
- 2 -
Moreover, she earnestly hoped you would not mention the
matter even to her Foreign Minister, Mr. van Kleffens, (if
and when you might receive him again), or even to the
Netherlands Minister Dr. Loudon. The Queen thereupon told
me the following:
It was her sincere hope that she might pay you a visit
at some time in the not too distant future, in order to
express to you personally her gratitude. Her visit, of course,
would depend, on the one hand, upon the course of the "Battle
of the Atlantic", and on the other hand, upon developments
on the continent; that was to say, if Germany showed any signs
of an "internal collapse", she would have to remain nearby
her country. If, however, conditions permitted her visit, she
would go to the United States via Canada. Moreover, she would
prefer to meet with you at Hyde Park, rather than at the White
House, for, out of respect for her suffering people in occupied
Holland, she would not want her visit to entail official
receptions; in fact, she hoped that such a visit might be
carried out with the maximum of simplicity. She added that
in conducting themselves, she and her daughter had constantly
kept in mind the sufferings of their people, and had accordingly
been careful to do nothing which might offend their feelings,
such as giving the impression of "having a good time".
In conclusion, she said it was her most earnest hope that
conditions would permit her meeting with you, for not only did
she wish to convey to you personally an expression of gratitude
in behalf of herself and her nation, but also she felt confident
that an exchange of views would prove constructive and mutually
interesting.
Finally, she reemphasized her hopes that you would treat
this as a matter strictly between you and herself, and guard
it in utmost confidence.
With my every good wish, I am
Faithfully yours,
Tony Biddeer
The President
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
PSF: Biddle
Ritz Hotel
London,
May 7, 1941.
My dear Mr. President:
For your information, I am forwarding hereto attached
a memorandum covering information received by Polish Foreign
Minister Zaleski regarding Hitler's plan in connection with
former Polish Foreign Minister Beck and other statesmen and
diplomats of belligerent powers who had already, and who
might in the future, become prisoners of war.
With every good wish, I am
Faithfully Touy Bidder. yours
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
MEMORANDUM.
5th May, 1941.
Polish Foreign Minister Zaleski tells me he
has recently received information that Former Polish
Foreign Minister Beck was still in Rumania. Further
information which had come to Minister Zaleski wi thin
the past few days indicated that Hitler now planned to
hold as prisoners of war former Minister Beck and other
statesmen and diplomats of belligerent powers who had
already fallen into German hands.
This also would apply
to statesmen and diplomats who might be captured in future.
The plan, moreover, envisaged trying these men before a
court at conclusion of hostilities on charges of "war-guilt".
Minister Zaleski added that this information had come from
several usually reliable sources.
PSF: Biddle
Ritz Hotel,
London.
9th May, 1941.
My dear Mr. President:
As of possible interest, I am attaching
hereto, a copy of a cable sent me from Brazzaville,
by Mr. Ben Lucion Burman, representative of the North
American Newspaper Alliance.
I crossed on the Clipper with him and
his wife and in response to his suggestion, I said I
should be very glad to receive from time to time, some
word as to his reactions and observations, concerning
the situation in French Equatorial Africa.
It is clear from his message, that he is
very favorably impressed by the spirit of the Free French
forces.
With warmest regards, I am
Faithfully yours
Tom Bildder
The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
MEMORANDUM
9th May, 1941.
Copy of a Cable sent me from Brazzaville by Mr. Ben Lucien
Burman, representative of the North American Newspaper
Alliance.
As you requested I have made a close study of de Gaulle's
movement and of officials here. They represent the finest
French. Magnificent spirit, young and old, like early American
patriots. They represent every quality cherished by Americans.
They are coming here every day, scientists, students, generals,
labour leaders, priests and simple soldiers surmounting terrific
obstacles to fight Germany. Many lose their lives in the
attempt.
I think it of enormous importance that if formal recog-
nition is impossible a formula be devised to establish official
contact.
It is vital that aeroplanes and arms should be sent
immediately. They are waiting and eager to fight but lack the
material. I urge and urge again that you send them some aid.
Supplies need not be in such vast quantities as to affect those
to British but merely enough to equip some troops here and to
maintain the morale of these truly heroic figures.
It is of great importance that they should not feel
themselves deserted by the United States. As I have been able
to see for myself, they have already accomplished much starting
-2-
with practically nothing and with our aid they can be an
enormous factor in saving France and restoring her self-respect,
to say nothing of her potential war-contribution,
Importance of movement and its great strategical value
in African and Mediterranean campaigns has passed completely
unnoticed in the United States because of lack of publicity,
French here having been doing job and not talking about it.
I have gone over the situation carefully with British
officers and officials here who confirm these facts. I am sure
that you have found the same opinion in consulting British
Foreign Office as to their views.
As you asked me I have looked at the situation here with
the utmost objectivity and I am sending you this cable because
of tremendous and far-reaching issues involved. I urge you to
get this message to Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt at
once.
I am on the spot watching events develop minute by minute
and I cannot over-estimate world importance of the situation
I have tried to describe here. If the de Gaulle movement is
given even some slight measure of support from the United States,
it can be of vast influence in rebuilding the morale of defeated
French people throughout the world.
PSF teiddle folder)
Ritz Hotel,
London.
10th May, 1941.
My dear Mr. President:
As of possible interest, I am forwarding
hereto attached, a copy and translation of the text
of the secret minutes of a meeting of the Chamber of
Commerce of Danzig, held under the Chairmanship of
Herr Schnee, President of that body. A copy of these,
among numerous other minutes of this organization, was
obtained by a Polish secret service agent.
In going through his confidential files
recently, a high ranking official of the Polish Government
found this, among other documents, and handed me a copy
in the thought that it might prove of interest to my
Government. I beg to draw your attention particularly
to that section of the minutes which deals with Colonel
Lindberg.
With every good wish, I am
Faithfully yours,
Tomy Bideer
The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
MEMORANDUM.
10th May, 1941.
Translation of the Text of the Secret Minutes of a Meeting of the
Chamber of Commerce of Danzig, held under the Chairmanship of
Herr Schnee.
Meeting of the local group Heeresanger
(suburb of Danzig), at the elementary school, November
18, 1939, speaker, von Schnee.
The hall was well filled, and after the Party
books had been remitted, the leader of the local group greeted
the speaker and the assembly and invited Herr von Schnee to speak.
"Politics is the knowledge of the laws of life, not only for indivi-
duals, but for all Germans and in general for all the people.
That is why politics must be conducted in every country. At the
beginning the policy of our Fuhrer was to fight unemployment and
by his power to assure the security to his people. Thus has
developped Germany's powerful position which is envied by all
those who do not belong to our people. Economically speaking -
I speak about the Reich, not about Danzig - what is important is
that extremely favorable conditions have been created, and so our
colonies have achieved a standard of life of which no other
country can be so proud. The speaker spoke on production, on
making petrol, rubber and wool, then he passed to politics. "The
Fuhrer knows how best to exploit time, he does not lose any
opportunity - should he lose such a moment, who knows what course
the history of the world would take. We must imagine Germany as a
large garden, the fruit is ripe, one must pick it, otherwise it
will fall down and rot. You understand now why the Fuhrer takes
-2-
this particular moment under consideration.
England is now
in a mouse-trap - We are circumventing her. At Munich we pro-
voked her in order to test her power. She failed miserably.
Thus we see that she is not so powerful as she appears to be.
Our friend Mussolini supports us helpfully and by his speeches
and attitude we can see that he can be trusted - although a
distrust of him will never disappear. He rules the
Mediterranean now and so, England has lost her Empire there,
and as one hears, she will disappear from Europe altogether.
But these are only presuppositions, and it would perhaps be
better for her. Now we must show an example, which must
certainly occur because it would serve us to achieve what we sing
in our songs: "Let us go to the East, let us drive to the East."
I must be very cautious in my lecture, in order to avoid politics
and not to anticipate Adolf Hitler's policy. When the Rumaniah
goes to England in order to make a loan he will probably not
have great success, because the English have enough products
from India and their colonies - but Germany needs his vineyard
and something more.
We have conducted favorable commercial
treaties with Bulgaria and other gipsies like the Yugoslava, but
they are nothing but gipsies (loud laughter). So now- again I
must express myself very carefully - we want to create a great
customs union and in this we also shall be successful. You see,
when the Japanese provoked quarrels with Russia, it happened on
Germany's request in order to test their army. The result was
-3-
that Russia miserably failed and later it was at our request
that Lindbergh went to Russia in order to learn more about the
Russian air force.
He brought us the news that Russian planes
would be a complete failure, so again We have nothing to fear
from this side. Lithuania has now taken an example from the
Sudeten-Germans. Kowno assures the people of Memel that the
Germans are conquering there.
It is not nice what I must say
now, but it would be better for us should the Lithuanians kill
in Memel, at least 20 Germans, then we would be nearer our target,
for although they disarmed us by their friendly attitude towards
Memel yet one day we shall get them alright. Now a word about
Danzig. Danzig is like a child born after 7 months. It lives
by Polish food, yet miserably as Warsaw does not altogether cut
its vital artery so it may yet breathe. I want to ask you to
behave very quietly, to develop the national community
(Volksgemeinschaft) and thus to be united in one totality. The
most important aim now is the reunion of all Germans in Danzig,
and so shall we go forward, only by great union and then one
day the frontier post will fall down and it will be called
Germany."
10th May, 1941.
MEMORANDUM
Copy of the Text of the Secret Minutes of a Meeting of the
Chamber of Commerce of Danzig, held under the Chairmanship of
Herr Schnee.
VERSAMMLUNG DER ORTSGHUPPE HEERESANGER (Danzig)
in der Grundschule am 18.11. 1938; Redner V. Schnee.
Die Aula war gut besetzt, nach Ueberreichung neuer
Mitgliedsbuecher und Parteibuscher, begruesste der Ortsgruppen
Leiter den Redner und die Versammelten, dann gab er dem Redner
V. Schnee das Wort. Politik ist das Wissen der Lebensgesetze
nicht nur fuer jeden Eingelnen sondern fuer alle Volksgenossen,
ueberhaupt fuer alle Menschen. Darum muss such in einem jeden
Staat Politik gefuehrt werden. Die Politik unseres Fuehrers war
von Anfang an die Bekampfung der Arbeitslosigkeit und die
Sicherstellung seines Volkes durch seine Macht, so hat sich eine
Machtstellung Deutschland entwickelt um die uns ein jeder der
nicht zu unserem Volke gehoert, beneidet. Was wirtschaftlich
anbelangt ist im Reich, ich spreche vom Reich, nicht von Danzig,
die ausserst guenstigsten Verhaeltnisse geschaffen worden, denn
unsere Kolonien die wir im Reich geschaffen haben, haben einen
Lebensstandard herausgebildet, die es nun kein anderes Land
verzeichnen kann. Nun sprach er wieder von den Erzeugnissen, von
der Herstellung des Benzinkautschucks und Wolle, dann ging er
in die Politik ueber. Der Fuehrer weiss die Zeit auszunuetzen,
er laesst keine Gelegenheit vorbergehen, wenn er diesen
-2-
Zeitpunkt verpasst, wer weiss wie dann die Weltgeschichte aussehen
wuerde denn sehen Sie, man stelle sich vor, um Deutschland ware
ein grosser Garten, die Fruechte sind reif, man muss sie jetzt
pfluecken, denn fallen sie ab so verfaulen sie. Sie verstehen
warum nun der Fuehrer diesen Zeitpunkt wahrnimmt. England be-
findet sich jetzt in einer Mausefalle, diese umgehen wir, ein-
mal in Muenchen haben wir ihn herausgefordert um seine Macht-
stellung zu erproben, er hat klaglich versagt, also sehen wir,
dass es nicht so machtig ist, wie es zu sein scheint. Unser
Freund Italien Mussolini unterstuezt uns hilfreich, durch seine
Reden und Handlugsweise ersehen wir, dass man ihm wohl vertrauen
kann, obwohl ein Misstrauen ihm gegenueber wohl nie ganz ver-
schwinden wird. Er beherrscht jetzt das Mittelmeer, so
dass England die Herrschaft dort verloren hat, wie man hoert,
will es ganzlich aus Europa verschwinden, aber das sind nur
Mutmassungen, besser waere es allerdings fuer ihn. Wir muessen
jetz ein Exempel statuiren, das muss Kommen, denn es dient uns
dazu um das durchzufuehren, was man in den Liedern besingt;
nach Osten lasst uns schreiten, nach Osten lasst uns ziehn. Sie
verstehen was ich meine, ich muss sehr vorsichtig reden, um
keine Politik zu machen und der Politik A. Hitlers vorzugreifen.
Wenn nun der Rumane nun nach England gefahren ist um eine
Anleihe zu machen, so wird er wohl keine grossen Erfolge er-
zielen, denn seine Erzeugnisse hat der Englaender zur Genuege
aus Indien und seinen Kolonien, wir aber brauchen seine Wein-
trauben und noch andres. Wir haben Handelvertraege mit Bul-
-3-
garien und den anderen Zigeunern wie Jugoslavien guenstig
abgeschlossen, na ja es sind doch Zigeuner (grosses Gelachter)
Und so wollen wir, ich muss das auch wiederum sehr vorsichtig
betonen, eine grosse Zollunion schaffen, es wird uns auch
dieses gelingen. Sehen Sie wenn der Japaner Streitigkeiten mit
den Russen hervorrief, so tat er es auf Geheiss Deutschland
um seine Armee zu erproben, der Erfolg war der, dass der
Russe klaglich versagte, dann ging auf unser Geheiss Lindbergh
nach Russland um seine Flugzeuge kennen zu lernen. Er brachte
uns die Nachricht, dass diese Flugzeuge voellig versagen wer-
den, also auch hierin nichts zu befuerchten ist. Litauen hat
sich nun an den Sudetendeutschen ein Beispiel genommen, es
gewahrt Kowno jetzt den Memellandern alle Massnahmen die die
Deutsch en dort ergreifen, es ist nicht schoen, was ich jetzt
sagen muss, aber es ist fuer uns besser, wenn die Litauer
in Mmemelland mindestens 20 Deutsche erschlagen wurden, dann
waren wir schneller am Ziel, so entwaffnen sie uns mit ihren
Freundschaftsbeziehungen zu den Memellandern, aber einmal
packen wir sie doch. Nun zu Danzig, Danzig ist wie ein
sieben Monatskind, es lebt wohl hervorgerufen durch die
Ernahrung von Polen, aber klaglich, denn Warschau schneidet
ihm die Lebensader nicht ganz durch, so dass es noch atmen kann.
Ich moechte Sie nur bitten, sich ganz ruhig zu verhalten, die
Volksgemeinschaft so zu pflegen und sich so zu einem Ganzen zu
vereinigen, das ist jetzt die wichtigste die Zusammenfassung aller
Deutschen in Danzig, dann werden wir vorwarts kommen, nur durch
die grosse Einigkeit, dann wird auch einmal der Grenzpfahl fallen
und der heisst Deutschland.
PSF: PSF:Biddle Flder Biddle Folder
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 14, 1941.
MEMORANDUM FOR
UNDERSECRETARY WELLES:
For preparation of reply.
F. D. R.
Letter from Hon. Tony Biddle, Ritz Hotel,
London, 4/22/41 to the President, forwarding
a copy and translation of the text of a
letter he received from Alexander Bobkowski,
son-in-law of Mr. Moscicki, the former Presi-
dent of Poland. The letter decribes the
whereabouts and critical position of the
members of the former Polish Government.
PSF:
Ritz Hot cl,
London.
15th May, 1941.
My dear Mr. President,
I beg to refer to my letter and enclosure
of May 12, concerning "The German Threat to French
Africa", and, for your further information to convey
the following substance of information and observations
confidentially disclosed to me by informed Allied
Governmental sources here.
(These include the de
Gaulle Administration established in London).
With warmest regards, I am
Faithfully yours,
The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
May 15, 1941.
MEMORANDUM.
CONFIDENTIAL
Supplementing the information contained in the
memorandum attached to my letter of May 12, 1941, regarding
"The German threat to French Africa", I beg to report the
following substance of information and observations confidentially
disclosed to me by informed Allied Government Sources here.
( These include the de Gaulle Administration established in
London.)
It is believed by my informants that in attempting to
estimate what might be expected of France, one should bear in
mind that Admiral Darlan visualized France's replacing Italy
in a "No.2" role in a "New German Order" with Spain a possible
"No.3" and Italy at the bottom of the list. He moreover pictured
himself the "No.1" of the sea forces of such an alignment.
Contributing to this turn of mind, it is believed that Darlan
felt that a France restored in a democratic sphere of influence,
would be discredited for several generations; that her prestige
would likewise have seriously suffered throughout her Colonial
domain to the extent that Frenchmen even there, would be the
objects of ridicule.
On the other hand, however, a France reconstructed within
the framework of & "New German Order" would, by reason of effective
French collaboration towards a German victory, enjoy the support
of German force and prestige throughout the French colonies - the
colonial native populations would be made to respect the French.
Most recent news indicated that the French military
authorities in Syria had for some time been shipping to the
Raschid Ali forces in Iraq, important quantities of guns and
ammunition which had been stored in Syria. This, together with
an expected rapid increase in German aerial invasion of Syria,
might force the British to action in that country. Were this to
come about, it is believed that Britain would have to count with
the likelihood of Darlan's using this as a pretext to turn the
French Fleet against Britain.
Of connected bearing, several of my informants, and
especially the official of the de Gaulle Administration,
expressed the opinion that after witnessing events in France and
Syria, there was little if any reason to expect Morocco, any more
REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
-2-
than Vichy or Syria, to resist German pressure when Hitler
was ready to exert it thereon in full. At any rate, it was
wiser from a tactical point of view, to expect nothing from
Morocco in the form of resistance and to set up the
strategical plan accordingly.
In connection with this opinion, my informants drew
my attention to the steady, infact increasing, infiltration
of Germans into Morocco, as well as to a confidential report
they had recently received indicating that General Weygand had
turned down the offer of the officer commanding the Spanish
troops in Spanish Morocco, to consult with a view to setting
up the framework of collaboration in event it became necessary
to defend their respective territories against potential German
action.
The substance of the foregoing disclosures, which I
am hereby passing on in the thought that it might prove helpful
in piecing together the picture in the making, indicates to my
mind that developments are now leading to an early show-down
between the British and the French.
Ritz Hotel,
London,
May 12, 1941.
My dear Mr. President:
For your information I am attaching hereto, a
confidential memorandum containing in substance, certain
intelligence reports and observations concerning the
"German threat to French Africa", as imparted to me by
M. Rene Pleven, Director of Foreign and Economic Affairs,
and Secretary General of the Council of Defense of the
Empire of the de Gaulle forces, (previous to France's
collapse, he was a member of the Joint Anglo-French
Purchasing Commission). I beg to draw your particular
attention to this memorandum.
Attached moreover to this memorandum are Annexes
(A) Juridical position of France in relation to Morocco;
(B) A report on the situation in French West Africa (Dakar);
(c) Position of the French Fleet under the control of
Vichy (as of early April, 1941).
In stating the "de Gaulle" case, M. Pleven emphasized
that from the very outset, Brazzaville's road had been
marked by "tough sledding". The British had straight-a-way
extended a friendly and encouraging hand, and, within the
limits of their capacity, material assistance. Brazzaville
was deeply appreciative. The men and women who composed the
French forces were real people - French patriots of intelligence
and backbone - people annimated by the same kind of spirit
which had inspired our people in their struggle for the
independence and liberty of the United States.
The position occupied by the de Gaulle forces in
French Equatorial Africa was, from the strategic standpoint,
becoming more and more important vis-a-vis Morocco, as well
as the Dakar area - not to mention the air routes from
Takoradi to Khartoum. In fact, were the German air force
to engage in a Morocco-based aerial thrust in the direction
of
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
- 2 -
of Takoradi or even across the routes leading therefrom,
it might become necessary to establish an alternative
aeroplane assembly plant at Pointe Noire, French Equatorial
Africa. In such case, this center could be made to serve
the same purpose as does Takoradi at present. Besides,
there was a railway from Pointe Noire to Brazzaville, and
river transportation thence to Benan.
M. Pleven ventured the hope on part of himself and his
associates, that Washington might see its way clear to
make some gesture of sympathy and understanding to Brazzaville.
In this connection, he said Brazzaville found itself
constantly faced with difficulties. For example, about
four weeks ago, the authorities concerned in Washington, had
refused Export Licences for shipment of Iron Hoops for
cotton bales to French Equatorial Africa. Arrangements
for their shipment therefore, had had to be made to a
British colonial port, costly in terms both of loss of
time and added expense.
He then pointed out that recent reports indicated that
the United States was shipping to Morocco 10,000 tons of
petrol, 6,000 tons of kerosene, and 1,000 tons of lubricants.
Other reports indicated the shipment of cotton goods to
Dakar. This would add to Brazzaville's difficulties in that
Nazi agents in their machinations vis-a-vis the Cameroons and
Equatorial Africa, would more than likely attempt to sew
seeds of discontent amongst the latter by playing up the
benefits thus accruing to the natives as well as the White
populations of Morocco and Senegal.
Of connected bearing, he said that while Brazzaville
purchases were handled by the British, it would greatly
simplify and facilitate business between French Equatorial
Africa and the United States, if Washington might see its
way clear towards approving the setting up of "Special
Accounts" in the names of French Equatorial Africa and
of the French Cameroons.
He earnestly hoped moreover, that Washington would
honor the passports issued at Brazzaville, for French law
provided for the issuance of passports by the Governor of
a French colony, during a period of emergency.
Then too, there was the question of several ships which
the Free French forces had commandeered in order to prevent
their falling into German hands. These were formerly the
property
- 3 -
property of the Messagerie Maritime. Brazzaville would now
like to assign them as carriers in the chrome and nickel
trade from New Caledonia. This desire however, gave rise
to a serious question, i.e. whether the authorities of the
United States would treat the ships as free from impeachment.
In conclusion, I should like to point out that the
fact that M. Pleven has from time to time disclosed confi-
dential information to me, is in part due to our former
close contact previous to France's collapse. At that time,
he was a member of the Joint Anglo-French Purchasing Commission,
and on several occasions his cooperation served very helpfully
towards my carrying out my Mission near the Polish Government
at Angers. Moreover, I subsequently came into frequent
contact with him during the period of my Special Mission to
the French Government - up to the date when he left for
Brazzaville to organize the de Gaulle Administration there,
I regarded him as a serious, sincere, courageous and
intelligent patriot.
With warmest regards, I am
Faithfully
Tony yours, Biddler
May 12, 1941
MEMORANDUM
The German threat to French
Africa, as confidentially
disclosed to me by Monsieur
Rene Pleven, Director of
Foreign and Economic Affairs
and Secretary General of the
Council of Defense of the
Empire, of the de Gaulle
forces, Attached hereto is
Annex A, covering the Juridical
position of France in relation
to Morocco; Annex B. 4 report on
the situation in French West Africa
(Dakar); Annex C, position of the
French Fleet under the control of
Vichy. (às of early April,1941).
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
In handing me the aforementioned and attached reports,
Mr. Pleven expressed the belief that the substance thereof
might prove of interest to my Government. At the same time,
he urged that they be treated in utmost confidence.
Be then confidentially revealed that information he had
received during the past few days indicated that the German
hold over the Protectorate of French Morocco had seriously
increased. This deterioration of the situation had been
marked by the following factors:
1) The personnel of the Armistice Commission had been
raised to more than 200. Whereas until now, it had been
centered in Casa Blanca, it would soon establish itself
at Fedala, Marrakesh, Fez, Meknes, and Rabat. A General
would shortly be appointed at the head of the Commission,
and was said to be arriving about May 15.
2)
- 2 -
2) Rumors were circulating in the Protectorate to effect
that 200 Gorman airmen were expected in Casa Blanca. Moreover,
according to unconfirmed reports, the German delegates at
Wiesbaden had declared their intention of setting up an airbase
in Casa Blanca.
3) Vichy - and especially M. de Brinon, was issuing 41
large number of visas to Germans of all categories who were
sent to strengthen the 5th column in the Protectorate.
General Nogues and General Weygand were trying to restrict the
number of these arrivals by stressing the great feeling aroused
among the population, and the harmful activity of the Germans
among the natives. Several cases had arisen over people coming
from Tangiers with visas signed by de Brinon and being refused
entry to the French Protectorate. The vast majority of the
Germans arrived by Algiers - where Darlan's vassal, Admiral
Abrial, was in command, or by Ujda. Weygand and Nogues were
powerless to stem the tide.
4) German propaganda among the natives was being steadily
intensified. Moreover, the German officials made no secret
of this fact. During a recent interview, the German consul
in Tetouan declared to his French colleague, that the
representatives of the Reich could not be held responsible
for the spontaneous feelings of good will manifested to them
by the native population. A German officer had made contact
with the Glaowi of Marrakesh, but had apparently received a
cool reception.
5)
- 3 -
5) The great majority of the population was not deceived
by the intense anti-British and anti-de Gaulle propaganda in
which Vichy was indulging. 90 percent of the people continued
to regard a British victory as their only hope of salyation -
and desired it ardently. The French radio broadcast programs
from London were always listened to with great attention.
However, by replacing certain officials by its own men, and
above all, thanks to the spirit which prevailed in the navy,
the Vichy Government had succeeded in establishing in Morocco
a regime similar to that of the Gestapo. Any demonstration
of feeling in favor of Great Britain or of General de Gaulle
was virtually prohibited.
The population did not however hide its anti-German feelings.
In the various Governments of the Administration, despite the
changes made since the Armistice, a large number of officials
remained hostile to the policy of Vichy, and this hostility
increased as the German hold became stronger.
This state of mind might one day become a factor of
Prime importance.
6) In January last, when German uniforms had first made
their appearance in Casa Blanca, the reaction of the French
population was expressed by the often repeated wish: "if only
the Americans would come and rid us of these people". The
latest reports from Morocco confirmed the fact that this feeling
had been steadily growing. The prestige of the United States
was
- 4 -
was very high in the Protectorate and, in respect of the
Americans, there existed none of that suspicion which Vichy
had managed to arouse in certain quarters vis-a-vis the British.
With the exception of the navy, the French authorities in
Morocco had received very favorably the suggestion. made by
M. Monick, Secretary General of the Protectorate, of close
economic collaboration with the United States which would
result in a virtual "commercial invasion" of the Protectorate
by the United States, and would thus hold the Germans in check.
In order to roalise this idea - excellent in itself - &
long lapse of time was unfortunately necessary. German pene-
tration was taking place so rapidly, and threatened to take a
form such that an economic conquest of Morocco by the United
States could not be achieved in time. In addition, it would be
ineffective against the military menace and would probably
merely accelerate the German seizure of Morocco. Already, the
German hold over the country was such that it could be argued
that there was very grave danger in a policy of sending supplies
to Morocco. In present circumstances and in view of the develop-
ing threat, the supply of petrol, for instance ran the risk of
providing fuel for the squadrons of the Luftwaffe, for the
German mechanized units : which might come across Spain, or for
the Vichy troops which might on instructions from the Germans,
tryato to reconquer the colonies which Free France was keeping
outside the sphere of the Armistice.
From the United States, a visit which would be at the
same
- 5 -
same time 6 demonstration of friendship and a display of
strength would meet more effectually the needs of the moment.
It would be received with relief and great joy, both by the
French and by the native population of Morocco.
The difficulties with which Germany was meeting in Egypt
and in the Near East, might provide a favorable occasion for
such a move.
Collaboration on an important scale from the high ranks
of the Administration and the army would undoubtedly be given
to whom ever would deliver Morocco from the German menace.
7) From the military point of view, the following
figuresscould be given.
One Commander in Chief of the French army in Morocco,
General Verges - a man of weak character - disposed of about
50,000 men, divided up fairly evenly over the Protectorate.
In case of need, these troops could be reinforced by the calling
up of reservists, and by Moroccan formations. However, they
had little amunition and practically no modern materiel (anti-
tank guns, anti-aircraft guns, mechanized transport).
They had only about 100 tanks or armored cars.
In early April, the French naval forces stationed at
Casa Blanca consisted of: a 35,000 ton battleship, the "Jean-Bart",
not yet completed; 4 destroyers, 3 torpedo boats, and 15 submarines
under the command of Admiral d'Harcourt, in his own words, "the
least anti-British of the French Admirals."
The air force's (600-700) machines, to a great extent
paralysed
- 6 -
paralysed by German supervision, were under the command of
General d'Astier, a brave soldier and a good Frenchman who
was doing his best.
In the Spanish zone, including Tangiers, there were about
120 - 130,000 men, both Spanish and natives, among whom & few
Gormans had maneged/insinuate themselves. These troops had a
certain amount of mechanized transport but practically no air-
craft apart from the German machines which could be sent from
the bases established in southern Spain.
8) German penetration in other parts of Africa:
(a) French West Africa (Dakar) - see Annex B attached.
(b) Southern Algeria and the Sahara. AS a result of
the visit of Admiral Platon at the beginning of
April to Southern Algeria, the Schore, and the
Niger, it Was reported that 300 German experts
were expected to arrive in the Colomb-Becher
region to carry out preliminary work, in connection
with the Trans-Scheran Railway. This obviously
furnished di convenient pretext for German penetra-
tion into the very heart of Africa.
(c) Rio de Oro. Moreover the arrival of El large number
of Germans in Rio de Oro - between Moroceo and
French West Africa was reported from Portuguese
sources. Already Ville-Cisneros was said to have
been transferred into 4b submerine base.
- 7 -
ALL these feets to which should be added the exception of
Libya - showed that the Germans definitely intended to gain con-
trol of North and West Africa. Prompt action alone could pre-
vent the realization of 4a. plan which, if successful, would
greatly influence the future development of the war,
In this respect it should undoubtedly be recognized that
the Allies were faced with a wholly unscrupulous adversary. Shen
Germany was in need of a strategic base she 610 not hositate to
occupy a country by force if necessary. Such methods were very
regretful; but nhoewver wanted to win this war could not rule
them out completely; no, no more then he could do without tanks
and planes.
ARNEX A
NOTE ON THE JURIDICAL POSITION OF
FRANCE IN RELATION IV THE MOROCCAN EMPIRE
in her efforts to establish her protectoreto of Morocco,
France proceeded by stages. During the first period, marked by
the conferences of Madrid (1880) and Algesiras (1808), she took
part in the establishment of a regime of international control
of the Morocean Empire. At that time, she particily succeeded
in obtaining the recognition of hur special political interests
resulting from her common frontier with Algeria.
in the second period, from 1904 to 1022, Propee
endesvoured to obtain recognition, from the Powers which had
political or economic interests in Morocco, of her right to
complete liberty of action. To that one, she 205 obliged to
conclude agreements with each of these Powers, often at the cost
of considerable sacrifices, By the Convention of April 8th, 1904,
Great Britain declared that she Was not opposed to the development
of the French political influence in Morocco. In exchange,
France allowed England full liberty of action in Egypt. The
Franco-Spanish convention of 1904, completed by the Agreement
of 1905, recognised France's special rights in Morocco, result-
ing from her position as a neighboring Power with an extended
common frontier, Spain, for her part, was grented rights on
the coast of North Africa.
By the Franco-German Agreement of 1909, Germany
declared that she had no political interest in Morocco. The
French Government, resolved to sefeguard economic equality in
the Morocca n Empire, stated its intention not to interfere with
Germany's commercial and industrial interests.
A second Franco-German treaty, signed on November 4th
1811, gave France complete freedom to assist the Moroccan Govern-
ment. In exchange for the "protective rights" thus obtained
over the Moroccan Empire, France ceded to Germany vast territories
in Equatorial Africa.
Once assured of her liberty of action vis-a-vis the
other Powers, France had then to have her protectorate accepted
by the Moroccan Empire itself. For this purpose, & treaty Was
concluded at Fez on March 30th 1912. This agreement, which
defined the juridical relations between France - the protecting
Power - and the Moroccan Empire - the protected Power - confirmed
the Sultan's acceptance of the provisions of the France-Gersan
Treaty of 1911. Its principal clauses were designed:
1) to allow the French Government to introduce administra-
tive, legal, scolastic, economic, financial and military
reforms;
2) to permit French military occupation of 42 part or of the
whole of the Moroccan territory;
3) to oblige the French Government to safeguard the religious
position, the respect and traditional prestige of the Sultan,
the exercise of the Musuimen religion and the functioning
of the religious institutions;
0) to oblige the French Government to protect the Sultan
or his successor, at all times, against any attempt on
his person or his throne, or compromising the security of
his States;
5) to allow the French Government the initiative as regards
all measures nocessitated by the Protectorate regime and
having to be enacted by the Bultan;
6) to entrust the task of representing the French Govern-
ment to a Resident-General with full powers to act in
Morocco in the name of the Republic.
(The Resident-General is the Bultan's only inter-
modiary in his relations with the representative of
Foreign Powers and in their relations with the Govern-
ment of Morocco. de is, above all, responsible for all
Questions connected with foreigners in the Morocean
Empire.
He has power to approve and to promulgate, in the
name of the French Government, all decrees enseted by
the Sultan).
7) to entrust the French diplomatic and consular agents
with the representation and the protection of Moroccan
subjects and interests abroad.
8) to forbid the Sulten to conclude any Act of on inter-
national character without the previous consent of the
French Governor.
The establishment of the Protectorate has left France
with a certain mumber of restrictions imposed upon her by the
international agreements she had previously signed. For instance,
in the economic sphere, her liberty of action 10 limited by the
obligation to maintain complete equality of treatment between
all nations, to which she subscribed in the Franco-British Treaty
of 1904 and in the Franco-Gersan Agreement of 1911. Restrictions
are also imposed upon her in the financial sphere, especially
as regards the operation of the State Bank of Morocco.
From the political standpoint, the position is dif-
ferent. In view of the reminciation by the other States of the
right to exercise any political influence over Morocco, France
is free to act as she thinks fit in this domain. The only
limitations which can be imposed on her are those resulting from
the Protectorate Treaty itself.
It follows that, should France not fulfill her obliga-
tions ES a protecting Power, no other nation would have the
right to take her place. Even Spain - who, through her goo-
graphical situation and the zone of Morocco which she possesses,
might be considered to be in a privileged position - cannot
invoke any clause which would allow her to take the place of
France should the latter default.
(As far as the United States are concerned, they
definitely affirmed at the Conference of Algesiras in
1906, their political disinterestedness in Morocco.
A declaration by the United States delegate which figures
as an annex to the final Act of the Conference, stressed
the fact that the American Government had no political
interests in Moroceo and that in participating in the
work of the Conference it had morely wished to help to
ensure to all nations the most complete equality in
Morocco as regards commerce, treatment and rights.
Consequently, the American Government declined any
obligation or responsibility at the time when the
settlements adopted by the Conference would be put
into force).
Could the Sultan take advantage of the non-observance
by France of her obligations under the Treaty (in particular,
those of Article 6 which states: the Government of the Republic
agrees to protect His Majesty the Bulton of Morocco at all times
against any attempt on his person or his throne, or compromising
the security of his States) to declare the Treaty to have lapsed
and to ask for the protection of enother Power?
Theoretically, there is nothing to prevent it. But it
should be observed that the Protectorate Treaty contains no
stipulations regarding any differences which might arise 65 to
its interpretation or its application and that, on the other
hand, there is no international authority competent to decide
on the observance or non-observance by France of the obligations
which she undertook by the Treaty of 1912.
On the other hand, the fact that during the Conference
of Algesiras, America made it absolutely clear that from the
political standpoint she had no interests in Morocco, can be
considered as conferring upon her & greater liberty of action
to take, as regards Morocco, whatever measures the security of
the American continent might necessitate,
ARNEX B
FRENCH WEST AFRICA
L. State of Public Opinion
The sttitude of weekness and inortis displayed by the
population of French dest Africa as 8. whole erises out of the
fact that this population feels itself to be very for from
Europe end is quite unconscious of the danger of the Germens
seizing control. "Why begin the struggle again since we are
fortunately out of danger" is & very common expression.
on the shole, public opinion is in favor of Free France
and the Allied cause, but this feeling 10 no more then passive
and purely platonic.
AS in North Africa, the upper ranks in the Army and
the Administrations remain feithful to the Vichy Government.
The Same is, of course, true of the navel officers.
II. Germen Penetration in West Africa.
Long before the war, & veritable Fifth Column existed
in French Test Africa, composed or Germans end Italians, osten-
sibly Jews, anti-Fascists and anti-Nazis. It had many accom-
plices - both witting and unwitting - in the Administration
and the Police. Since the Armistice, these agents have redoubled
activity. Dr. Klaube, ex-director of the Lufthansa at Bathurst,
is at their head. He has at his disposal a widespread Intelli-
genee Service, and co-ordinates the work of Italian and German
agents. Ho makes frequent visits to Morocco by sir.
the method of penetration is as follows: Officers
and N.C.O.S are despatched in civilian clothes, with the
complicity of the local Administration, -hich thus concilistes
its attitude - apparently irreproschable - with what it terms
"the necessities of the Armistice and of defeat". ALL the Germen
supervisory agents have foreign passports (Swise, Belgion,
Swedish, etc.). They arrive in Dakar either by 'plane or amongst
the passengers on French ships coming from Morrocco; they land
under cover of darkness, holped by the police of the port. On
arrival, they are immediately taken to the homes of "roliable"
persons.
During the months of January, February one March, six
additional naval officers arrived in this manner. The German
agents manage to mingle with the Jewish refugees who have arrived
in recent months, a fact which makes it difficult to track them
down.
The end of March Saw the srrivel of on Austrian
officer of the Gorman navy, sent to "control and organize supplies
for German submerines off Deker and at - point on the coast
where this officer is to set up a supply base with the help of
agents on the spot whose mission it was to prepare the ground".
None of the German or Italian officers or N.C.O.'s
wears uniform.
To sun up, it can be said that:
(a) The Italians are in the subordinate role of
agents;
(b) The Germans (alone accredited to e. very small
number of high military end civilian personalities)
contralize and make use of the information obtained;
(c) 4 certain number of exports (about 4 dozen German
navel officers) propare the ground for the
subsequent transformation of the region of Daker
into a supply-base for submarines. Their method
is to camouflage this base to as great an extent
as possible, with the aid of the means indicated
above. They are above all suspicious of the
friends and "connections" of the American consul
in Dokar, who is closely watched.
III. Military situation
The military and naval forces are at present of the
following order of magnitude:
(a) Army
25,000 - 30,000 men, mostly natives, 1th white officers
and NoC.0.'s. They are well-armed and well-equipped, but have
practically no mechanized forces. There are about 25 tanks and
50 armoured cars. Stocks of munitions 412 petrol are abundant.
(b) Avistion
There are et present very few aeroplanes stationed in
French West Africa, but it must be remembered that, by air,
North Africa is only - few hours away. The Air Force in North
Africa is estimated at about 800 'planes, about 500 of which are
said to be in running order. In West Africa, there are considerable
stocks of aviation potrol and several excellent aerodromes.
(e) Havy
une 35,000-ton battleship ("Richalieu"), out of
commission and able to be used only as & floating
battery.
Two 8,000-ton cruisers
One repair ship for submarines (the "Julos Verne")
Two destruyers
One torpodo-bost
Right to ten submarines
Six sloops.
In addition to the cross of these ships, large numbers
of navel personnel have been taken to Doker since September 1940.
They are said to amount to at least 15,000. Appropriately embodied,
this element could constitute shock troops, more effective per-
haps than all the native Army troops whose morale is only mediocre.
ANNEX 0.
PSF PSF Biddle .
Position of the
"mench Fleet under the control of Vichy.
(as of ears, April, 1941.)
I) TOULON:
2 Bettleships ("Stresbor and "Provence")
4 Cruisers of 10,000 tons.
3 Cruisers of 8,000 tons.
I7 Torpedo-boat destroyers.
12 Torpedo-boats.
20 Submarines.
2) ORAN:
r
I Battleship ("Dunkerque"), of which the repaire
are greatly advanced, and oan soon
be put into service again.
2
3 Torpedo-boats.
4 Submarines.
3) BIZERTE:
6 Torpedo-bosts,
6 Submarines.
4) BEYROUTH:
Biddle
2 Torpedo-boat destroyers.
4 Despetch-boats,
6 Submarines.
5) CASABLANCA:
I Battleship of 35,000 tons ("Jeen-Bart"), which
has been actively worked upon, but
which is not yet ready.
(no ammunition)
4 Torpedo-boat destroyers.
3 Torpedo-boats.
I5 Submarines.
6) DAKAR:
I Bettleship of 35,000 tons ("Richelieu"),
Immobilized, can only serve ns 8
floating battery.
2 Cruisers of 8,000 tons.
I Submerine training ship, ("JULES-VERNE")
2 Torpedo-boat destroyers.
I Torpedo-boat,
8 or IO Submarines.
6 Despatch-boats.
7) MADAGASCAR - EXTREME-ORIENT.
6 Submarines.
PSF: Biddle folder
Ritz Hotel
London,
May 15,1941.
My dear Mr. President:
While the British press in its first wave of reaction
treated the dramatic arrival of Herr Hess in Scotland as
an event in effect, worth more than a military victory in
the field, my experience in observing Nazi Germany's subtle
machinations from several now German-occupied European
capitols, led me to keep an open mind as to the real signifi-
cance of this event.
Accordingly, I felt that while Herr Hess might conceivably
be a refugee from Nazi Party conflict, as a result of oppo-
sition to closer collaboration with Russia, the possibility
should not be overlooked that his sudden arrival here might
be a subtle card played by Herr Hitler on the one hand, to
inspire confusion in England and doubt as well as confusion
in Turkey, Spain and France, and on the other hand, as a spur
to the isolationists in the United States.
In a desire to ascertain the reaction of someone in whose
judgment of Nazi mentality I had confidence, I consulted
Lieutenant Joseph S. Lipski, former Polish Ambassador to Germany,
and now Aide-de-Camp, in capacity of political adviser, to
General Sikorski.
Emphasizing that in effect his views were in accord with
mine, as above set forth, he pointed out that the alleged
discovery of letters in Germany after the departure of Herr Hess
was characteristic of Nazi technique. This "discovery" had
afforded Berlin radio pretext to play up the alleged disclosure
of the letters - that the purpose of Herr Hess' daring voyage
had been to discuss peace. This was all part of the game to
inspire confusion and doubt here and abroad.
Lipski then said that in watching carefully for further
traces
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
- 2 -
traces of Nazi technique, he had found that while the first
German communique had implied that Herr Hess was mentally
deranged, the subsequent communique had significantly ceased
to stress this point. Still later communiques marked him down
in effect as an idealist.
Moreover, further word coming out of Germany had given
the impression that about the only serious complaint against
Herr Hess was his disobedience of Herr Hitler's rule against
his officials' traveling by air.
My informant moreover pointed out the significant absence
of news as to resultant purge of any importance. My informant
felt moreover that in conceiving this dramatic move, Herr
Hitler had been motivated mainly by dread of America's possible
entry into the war. Hence, he had timed it in advance of
President Roosevelt's awaited speech. Moreover, Hitler's timing
had perhaps, from the standpoint of its potential effect on
British public opinion, even had regard for his heralded meeting
with Stalin.
In view of the foregoing, among other points, my informant
was unhappy over the scope and tone of publicity play-up which
the British press had devoted to the event. It had lacked
organized thought, - in fact, it had merely played into Herr
Hitler's hands. He felt that Mr. Churchill would do well to put
an end to this press play-up, and at the earliest moment make
some statement which would serve once and for all, to clear any
doubts and confusion which might have arisen both here and
abroad as a result of the incident. On the other hand, if
subtly handled, Herr Hess' presence here could be made to serve
most usefully.
Lipski then revealed that General Sikorski had requested
him to render a full report of his observations for Mr. Churchill.
With warmest regards, I am
Faithfully yours,
Tony Billegr.
PSF: Brand (Biddle folder)
Ritz Hotel,
May 17, 1941.
London.
My dear Mr. President:
For your information, I am attaching hereto a
confidential memorandum setting forth certain
information from Allied Government sources, bearing
directly and indirectly upon Russia's position - and
my personal observations thereon.
In that this information comes to me from officials
of Allied Government circles who have long been students
of Russia's position and of affairs bearing thereon, and
who have their own secret channels of intelligence
reporting, I feel that their disclosures might conceivably
prove helpful in rounding out the picture in the making.
With warmest regards, and every good wish, I am
Faithfully yours
Tour Bidder r
The President
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
May 7,1941
MEMORANDUM
Information from Allied Government
sources bearing directly and indirectly
on Russia's position.
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Information from Czeck sources and observations regarding:
1) Moscow's position in light of Stalin's internal-Political
move.
2) Information from Polish sources and observations
(a) on reports in Turkey, as of last Autumn, indicating
Berlin pressure on Moscow for collaboration in
further Middle Eastern adventures;
(b) regarding repercussions in Teheran;
(c) concerning still unconfirmed reports of early
attempt by Stockholm to bring Helsinki into a
"Friendship and Guaranty" Pact.
3) Concerning concentration of about 3 divisions of
German troops in Tromsoe-Kirkeness Area of Norway.
1) - Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr.
Hubert Ripka, today informed me that his Government had
received information
(a) that in April, German technicians had been sent
into German-occupied Poland and into Rumania with orders
to
- 2 -
to complete the perfection of communications by May 15;
(b) that there had arisen a difference of opinion
in military and inner political circles in Russia as to the
merits of Russia's collaboration with Germany.
He then pointed out that there were now, large con-
centrations of German troops in Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria.
Taking these, among other indications into consideration,
and having an understanding of the Russian mentality, he was
inclined to interpret Stalin's recent assumption of Office of
Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars, as a move
to gain a tighter grip on internal affairs - preparatory to
meeting a nearby crisis - whether he decided to trade or fight
it out with Germany.
He thought moreover, that Hitler would consider it
necessary to bring Moscow to an early definite understanding
in order, among other reasons,
(a) to assure access to fuel and grain sources
essential to conduct of a prolonged war; and
(b) to minimize the risk of a two-front conflict
in event of an attempted German invasion of England.
2) Of pertinent bearing, Polish Undersecretary of State
for Foreign Affairs, Arciszewski, revealed
(a) that as far back as late Autumn, 1940, when he
was in Turkey, there was considerable talk that Germany was
urging
- 3 -
urging Russia to collaborate in a thrust to the Middle East,
scheduled to commence May 15th;
(b) Today a cable from the Polish Minister in
Teheran indicated that an atmosphere of panic prevailed there.
It was felt by the people that with further trouble in Iraq,
and in event the Iraqian forces gained the upper hand, the
Russians would seize the northern position postion of Iran.
Minister Arciszewski went on to say that, taking these and
other items of information into consideration, both he and
Polish Foreign Minister Zaleski, were inclined to believe
that Germany's play vis-a-vis Russia, envisaged forcing her
into a more than hitherto positive form of collaboration, in
terms, both of assured German access to Russian fuel and grain
supplies, and of further joint adventures in the direction
of India;
(c) Of connected bearing, Minister Arciszewski then
said that his Government's still unconfirmed reports from
Helsinki and stockholm indicated 1/ that Swedish Foreign Minister
Gunther, was due to arrive in Helsinki tomorrow (May 8) with
a view to inviting Helsinki into a "Friendship and Guaranty"
Pact; 2/ that Stockholm's move in this regard had been encouraged,
if not inspired, by Moscow; 3/ that Finland had recently come
distinctly under German influence; and 4/ that this condition,
together with a growing spirit of revenge against Russia, left
little
- 4 -
little ground for hope that Helsinki would accept Stockholm's
offer.
3) - Of further connected bearing, the Norwegian Foreign
Minister, Lie, disclosed that a Norwegian observer, recently
arrived here from Finland, after journeying through that
country from Tromsoe, reported the following; (I immediately
transmitted this information to General Lea, Military Attache
at the American Embassy to the Court of St. James.)
(a) Concentration of about 60,000 (young) German
troops, or three divisions with full equipment in the Tromsoe-
Kirkeness area;
(b) The presence of a number of transport ships off
the coast of that area;
(c) His belief that these troops had been shipped
there by boat from southern Norway;
(d) The purchase of several hundred pairs of skiis
in Finland, for use of these troops. (He had seen a large
shipment of them in transit).
Commenting on the foregoing, Minister Lie said that in
attempting to interpret the purpose of this move, he and his
associates felt that while on the one hand, it might envisage
a thrust in any one of the following directions: Iceland, or
Spitsbergen (including the islands of Jan Mayen and Baer), or
Greenland, on the other hand, it might be aimed as a move to
bring
- 5 -
bring pressure on Sweden and Finland directly, and on Russia
indirectly. With reference to Spitsbergen, the Minister
pointed out that an airbase there could, among other purposes,
be made to serve as a link in air traffic between Germany
and Japan, in event that traffic across Russia were interrupted.
In this connection, I am personally inclined to feel that
this troop concentration envisages serving a two-fold purpose
by stages: in the first, or present stage, pressure directly
on Sweden and Finland - and indirectly on Russia; in the second
stage, a pivotal spring-board for northern or westward action.
The foregoing, among other information, does not to my
mind, necessarily indicate immediate German action vis-a-vis
Russia; rather, it suggests a characteristic German play for
pressuring position (bearing in mind, however, that the plan
undoubtedly envisages a position sufficiently strong to afford
effective action, if pressure failed to attain desired results).
At the same time, reports from many informed sources
indicate to my mind, that Russia is neither ready nor willing
to become envolved in military action at this time, and that
Mr. Stalin would go far to appease Herr Hitler. Whether, however,
appeasement might take the oft suggested form either (a) of
permitting German railway brigades and "technicians" to take
over supervision of transportation as well as fuel and grain
resources in the Ukraine, as a means of guaranteering German
access thereto; or (b) collaboration in further eastward-bound
adventures; or both, remains to be seen.
Several
- 6 -
Several points which from Herr Hitler's standpoint seem
to be taking on more definite color are (a) his effort to
prepare the basis for a war of longer duration; and (b) that
he may be expected to exploit Russia's apparent weakness to
the maximum degree.
Among other reports which contribute to my reactions
on this score are the following:
(a) Stalin's recent closing down of the Norwegian and
Yugoslav Missions in Moscow. In this connection, Norwegian
official circles here attribute this directly to German pressure;
(b) The retention in office of Molotov who has been so
closely associated with the policy of collaboration with Germany;
(c) Polish Abbey Kaczynski's statement to me concerning
the observations of his brother, one of Warsaw's foremost
electrical engineers, after his escape from Russia where he
had been held prisoner: After his brother was taken captive
during the war in Poland, he was placed in a prison camp. One
day when the Russian authorities discovered he was an expert
on electric power plants, they took him out of the camp, and
placed him in charge of a large public utility plant in one of
the larger centers near the frontier. A man of military ex-
perience, as well, he had the opportunity to observe the character
and condition of Russian military forces, not only in Russian-
occupied Poland but also behind this area. He said that while
what he saw in the Polish area was impressive, it might be
marked down as a "show window" - for the troops behind this area
might best be described as "sloppy", and poorly equipped. He was
convinced that Russia was not ready to deal with a characteristic
German Blitz attack.
fulmal puso onal
PSF. Biddle Folder
May 20, 1941.
Dear Margaret:
Thank you ever 80 much for your
letter which was most interesting. Please
do it often.
AS you may know, I have had to
take it easy for the last couple of weeks
but I an feeling very much better now and
an starting in again with & regular schedule.
I hear such nice things about both
you and Tony and 1t is certainly a comfort
to know that you are both there. Do take
care of yourselves and write me again soon.
Affectionately,
Mrs. A. J. Drexel Biddle,
The Ritz Hotel,
London, England.
mal/dj
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 19, 1941
MISSY:
To prepare a nice letter to
Margaret from me.
F.D.R.
Polisin Scotland
according To a
Polish artist
AnthonyJ Dreael Biddle Jr.
Ambassador of the United States of America
Mrs. Biddle
I
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1)Leaving France
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3. First meating in m Scotland
3) First meeting
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PSF: reddle Folder
File personal
Copy of Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal's
last words to Bomber Command upon leaving
and taking farewell of the Officers.
If you can keep yourself from going crackers
At all the things that you're advised to do:
When Hitler sends his horrid air attackers
With squibs and bombs to try and frighten you;
If you can hear that hellish Banshee warning
Without that sinking feeling in your breast;
If you can sleep in dugouts till the morning
And never feel you ought to have more rest;
If you can laugh at every blackout stumble
Nor murmur when you cannot find a pub;
If you can eat your ration and not grumble
About the wicked price you pay for grub;
If you can keep depression down to zero
And view it all as just a bit of fun;
Then, Sir, you'll be EL bloody hero,
And what is more, you'll be the only one!
may Lindm. 271941
Dear mr. President
I am enclosing
a little poem which
I thought might amuse
40n. most 8 the people. in
Lindm will be up very
We are all setting
early Tomorrow morning. our
alarm clides so as
to hear your "Fireside
talk"- -
my core to you- -
as always,
MargareBiddle
PSF: Biddle Folder
Ritz Hotel,
London,
May 29, 1941.
My dear Mr. President:
I had the pleasure of an hours' audience with King George
yesterday. My visit took place just after he had heard a
full recording of your historic and magnificent address. He
was discernibly moved and described your speech as a momentous,
powerful, and stiring utterance, which he and his people
greeted as a welcome encouragement at this critical period
of the war.
The rest of our conversation might be characterized as
a "Tour d'horizon", and I noted with interest his clear grasp
of current developments as well as his realistic outlook in
relation to those in the making.
Please accept Margaret's and my most sincere congratulations
on your truly magnificent message. We were deeply moved and
genuinely thrilled by this further mark of your courageous
intelligence and grand leadership.
With warmest regards and every good wish, I am
Faithfully yours,
Touy Bidde,
The President
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
PSF:Biddle Folder
snower 1-41
Hyde Park, N. Y.,
May 31, 1941.
Dear Tony:-
Your notes and memoranda sent
about May seventh are of extraordinary
interest. Ever so many thanks. Keep up
the good work.
My love to Margaret.
As ever yours,
Honorable J. Anthony Drexel Biddle,
Rits Hotel,
London,
England.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 31, 1941.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
I think these letters
from Biddle will interest you.
Please let me have them back
for my files.
F. D. R.