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PSF
BRAZIL
PSF: Brazil Feder
Usamel 1-41
THE
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
May 29, 1941
My dear Mr. President:
I am enclosing for your information a copy of a
telegram sent to Ambassador Caffery on May 22, together
with the Ambassador's reply thereto under date of
May 28.
Believe me
A Faithfully yours,
Enclosures:
No. 331, May 22, 5 p.m.,
to Amembassy, Rio de Janeiro.
No. 544, May 28, 11 p.m.,
from Amembassy, Rio de Janeiro.
The President,
The White House.
no Destribution
TELEGRAM SENT
DES
This telegram must bE
clostly paraphrased bE-
May 22, 1941
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)
5 p.m.
AMEMBASSY
RIO DE JANEIRO (BRAZIL)
331
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE
UNDER SECRETARY.
Your 504, May 20, 7 p.m.
Please tell Aranha from ME personally that I very
deeply appreciate his message and I fully realize the
significance of the statements he has made to you.
Please make it clear to him that there is no gov-
ernment anywhere with which this Government regards
itself as being on more intimate terms of trust and
confidence than with the Government of Brazil. As
Aranha knows, I have made it a practice EVEr since I
have occupied this office to communicate to the Govern-
ment of Brazil all information which this Government
received which I have believed would bE of value to the
Brazilian Government. I also have been most grateful
for the information which Aranha has frequently given
to you and which has been most valuable to us here.
If this Government has failed at any time to make
its position fully clear to the Brazilian Government,
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
although
By J. Scheolle Onio FEB s 1972
-2-, #331 to Rio de Janeiro, May 22, 1941, 5 p.m.
although I do not think it has, I should bE the first
to regret it. I wish you would add in this connection
that any specific question that Aranha cares to ask
you or that his Ambassador here cares to ask mE would
bE immediately answered provided a definite answer is
possible. But I know that you will understand that
under present conditions questions as to what our policy
might bE under given contingencies cannot bE answered
yes or no because the problem is not as simple as that.
Answers to questions of that kind necessarily depend
upon many considerations and upon future developments.
I shall Endeavor to answer certain of the specific
questions raised in his message as follows:
The announcement a few days ago by Marshal Petain
of the intention of his Government to negotiate with
Germany for a new form of collaboration has raised very
strious questions and has naturally created very con-
siderable anxisty. ThE French Ambassador here has in-
formed this Government that the announcement to which
I have referred does not imply any departure from the
assurances previously given us, namely, that France
would never permit its fleet to pass into German hands
and that France would not agree to any form of coopera-
tion with Germany over and above the strict terms of
the
-3-, #331 to Rio de Janeiro, May 22, 1941, 5 p.m.
the Armistice agreement. Marshal Petain also recently
reiterated a previous assurance given, namely, that
France would never actively Engage in the war against
Great Britain.
This Government has requested that France's Exact
position be communicated to this Government officially
and in writing. The reply to this request is still
awaited.
The first fruits of the new negotiations for col-
laboration, however, have been Evidenced by instruc-
tions given by the Vichy Government to the French
authorities in Syria which have resulted in air bases
and other facilities being made available in Syria to
Germany for military operations against Great Britain.
This action on the part of the French Government is
not only a violation of the terms of the Mandate and
of the French Convention with the United States of 1924,
but is in the judgement of this Government clearly a
form of cooperation with Germany not foreseen in, nor
stipulated by, the terms of the armistice agreement.
WE are now awaiting further developments and some
positive information as to whether or not similar forms
of cooperation have been agreed to by the French Govern-
mEnt which would include French territories in northern
and
-4-, #331 to Rio de Janeiro, May 22, 1941, 5 p.m.
and WESTERN Africa.
With reference to the French colonies in the West-
Ern Hemisphere, this Government has not only stationed
in Martinique authorized observers and representatives
who are constantly watching the situation, but it has
likewise a patrol of naval plants and destroyers which
make it possible for us to know both day and night the
movements of the French VESSELS in the French Carib-
bean colonies. The French High Commissioner in Marti-
nique has informed us specifically that the new negoti-
ations with Germany have not modified in any way the
status quo in Martinigue. If this is true, there would
seem to bE no immediate reason to contemplate any inter-
American action with regard to the French colonies in
the Western Hemisphere and French Guiana is, of course,
included in this category.
With reference to the general situation in the
United States, the present attitude and intentions of
this Government, and the prejudicial Effect upon Bra-
zilian public opinion which recent German victories have
had, I may make the following statements:
The President has requested the Ambassadors and
Ministers of the other American Republics to meet with
him at the White House next Tuesday night when hE broad-
casts an address intended particularly for the people
of the
-5-, #331 to Rio de Janeiro, May 22, 1941, 5 p.m.
of the United States and the people of the other Ameri-
can REpublics. I believe that this address will an swer
many of the questions which may bE in Aranha's mind and
in the minds of many of the Brazilian people.
I think, however, that you should state to Aranha
that in our considered judguent the German Government
and its allies can never achieve victory so long as
they do not obtain mastery of the seas, and particu-
larly of the Atlantic. The United States will never
permit the passage of the control of the seas, and
particularly the Atlantic, into the hands of powers
which are clearly bent solely on world conquest and
world domination and which have as their major objec-
tive the enslavement of all free peoples, including
the twenty-one American nations. This is a fundamental
principle in our present policy since WE regard it as
the prime requisite for the insurance of the defense
and security of the United States and of the Western
Hemisphere.
With regard to this final point I leave it to your
discretion whether to communicate it to Aranha or direct-
ly to President Vargas. It is in the highest degree
confidential at this time, but the President personally
authorized me to communicate through you to President
Vargas the fact that a very considerable portion of
the
-6-331, May 22, 1941 to Rio de Jangiro
the United States fleet is now travelling under secret
orders from the Pacific to the Atlantic and that this
portion of the fleet will bE in the Atlantic by June 8.
The developments of the past WEEKS affecting the Atlantic
have caused the President to reach the decision that this
part of the fleet must without further delay bE utilized
in the Atlantic Ocean to safeguard the interests of the
United States and its American neighbors.
I shall appreciate it if after you have had your
conversation with Aranha or with President Vargas, you
will telegraph their reaction and any comment they may
make.
HULL
862.20232/206
U:SW:IJ
EH
This telegram must bE
Rio de Janeiro
closely paraphrased bE-
fore being communicated to
Dated May 28, 1941
anyone. (SC)
Rec'd 1:47 a.m., 29th.
SECRETARY of State,
Washington.
544, May 28, 11 p.m. (SECTION ONE).
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY.
Department's 331, May 22, 5 p.m.
I saw President Vargas this Evening and hE said:
"You can tEll President Roosevelt that I am in entire
accord with the point of view SET out in your telegram.
CAFFERY
CSB
DECLASSIFIED
State Divid eter, 1-11-73
FEB 4 1972
By J. Schauble Date
REP
This tele ram must be
RIO DE JAMEIRO
closely paraphrased before
being communicated to
Dated May 28, 1941.
anyone. (SC)
Rec'd 2:30 a.m. 29th.
Secretary of State
Washington.
544, May 28, 11 p.m. (SECTION TWO).
You can tell him furthermore that Brazil will
honor its obligations contracted at Panama and Habana.
In other words you can count on us".
HE said also that hE had listened with the great-
EST interest on the radio to the President's speach
which in his opinion was noble, practical, and timely
declaration.
(END OF MESSAGE).
CAFFERY
CSB
1
Brazil Folder
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
November 5, 1941
My dear Mr. President:
I am enclosing a copy of a personal letter which
I received from Caffery today which I believe will be
of interest to you.
Believe me
Nults
Enc.
The President,
The White House.
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Rio de Janeiro,
October 31, 1941
Dear Sumner:
Aranha told me today that without question the
moment the Germans moved into Portugal or northwest
Africa, the Brazilian Government would ask for imme-
diate military aid from the United States involving
the sending of our troops to the Natal region.
With all good wishes,
Yours very sincerely,
JEFFERSON CAFFERY
The Honorable
Summer Welles,
Under Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
Brazil Folder 1-42
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
February 18, 1942
My dear Mr. President:
I am sending you herewith a translation of a
confidential cable which the Brazilian Minister of
Finance received two days ago from President Vargas.
The reference in the first paragraph is to
Argentina.
Believe me
Enclosure.
The President,
The White House.
(TRANSLATION)
There continue to arrive additional reports on
activities of our neighbors to the South now in combi-
nation with Nazi agents.
Activities on our frontiers are not limited to the
substitution of the police force by an army force armed
and equipped for a campaign, but also include the
setting up of radio stations, the placing of speed
boats armed with machine guns in the Uruguay River,
the hasty construction of roads for wheeled vehicles
and of landing fields, groups of engineers making maps,
building bridges supporting great weight, storing war
materials in Posadas.
Gestapo agents disguised as Protestant missionaries
trying to penetrate the German colonies of Santa Rosa
and various other acts of espionage on our frontier
including an attempt to enter our barracks.
Krazil
Folder
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
February 19, 1942
My dear Mr. President:
In the event that this telegram has not been brought
to your attention, I would like to suggest that you read
it.
This message from Aranha is the clearest presenta-
tion of the difficulties of the moment in our relations
with the Brazilian Army that I have yet seen. It con-
firms the opinion I expressed to you yesterday that,
in order to get what we want in Brazil, we shall have to
move very carefully during the next few weeks.
The crux of the problem is to give the Brazilians
immediately concrete evidence that we are going to furnish
them with the minimum amount of arms they require in
their present situation. Once that is done, if we exer-
cise tact in asking for what we need in northeastern
Brazil, I think we can obtain our needs.
I am sending a paraphrase of this message to General
Marshall for his information.
Believe me
Enc.
The President,
Faithfully yours, Alls
The White House.
WM
Rio da Jentiro
This telegram must bE
clostly paraphrased be-
Dated February 18, 1942
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)
Rec'd 3:43 name, 19th
Secretary of State,
Washington.
478, February 18, 10 p.m., (SECTION ONE).
My telegram 471, February 18, 4 p.m.
Aranha showed me confidentially this morning
a com unication from the War Department to President
Vargas commenting adversely on our War Department's
proposal to Establish military observers (Department's
llos. 138, January 16, 9 p.m.; 172, January 27, 8 p.m.;
and 269, February 4, 11 p.m.). The Minister of War
observed that this would bE C. violation of Drazilian
soversignty C.S well as demonstrating a lack of con-
fidence in the ability and good faith of the Brazilian
military authorities. (Although as the Department is
aware, I have had no trouble getting naval observers
appointed wherever our navy wanted them.)
The President had given Aranha this communication
for comment. Arenha showed me the reply hE had drawn
up for the President, saying that while he disagreed
with the reasons set forth by the army hE agreed that
permission should not bE given for the appointment of
the military observers and furthermort hE believed
that Brazil
-2- #478, February 18, 10 p.m., (SECTION ONE), from Rio.
that Brazil should discourage our sending of so many
assistant military attaches here, giving as his reason
that other nations might want to do the same,
CAFFERY
KLP
TRB
Rio de Jansiro
This telegram must bE
closely paraphrased bE-
Dated February 18, 1942
fore being communicated.
to anyone. (SC)
Rec'd 4:09 a.m., 19th
Secretary of State,
Washington.
478, February 18, 10 p.m., (SECTION TO).
Aranha remarked to me that hE was doing this
not from conviction but "Every now and then I have
to give in to them on some small thing and this is
one of them. Particularly is this true in the bad
times WE are passing through now. I lnow that this
is an unheolthy situation but I believe that WE are
going to bE able to make a new start in regard to
relations between our military forces: very secretly
the President has agreed that I am to find a new job
for Goes Honteiro; also as soon C.S our army people
are really convinced that you are serious about
furnishing them arms (they are not convinced yet)
their whole attitude will bE changed."
HE then referred to conversations WE had months
ago and observed "if your army had followed the ad-
VÍCE I gave than and never again mentioned the question
of sending troops into Northeastern Brazil, they would
bE in the happy position now of having us ask for
your troops;
-2- #478, February 18, 10 p.m., (SECTION TWO), from
Rio de Janeiro.
your troops; in fact WE would have done so at the
time of breaking off relations; on the other hand, due
to the other tactics your people employed, they have
created a situation where WE can not ask for the
troops, at least not until the danger is much more
evident than it is now."
(END OF MESSAGE).
CAFFERY
KLP
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 22, 1942.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR YOUR INFORMATION
F.D.R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 22, 1942.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
FOR YOUR INFORMATION
F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 22, 1942.
MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL KING
The matter of the transfer of
two P-C boats to the Brazilian
Havy is, I know, serious from our
own operating point of view but
this is a matter of international
relations which has to be gone
through with regardless of the
purely military desirabilities.
F. D. R.
Brazil Folder
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
August 20, 1942
My dear Mr. President:
With reference to our telephone conversation of
Tuesday last, in which you authorized me to inform the
Brazilian Government that you had given instructions
that two PC boats should be made available to the
Brazilian Navy, I immediately informed the Secretary
of the Navy of your decision in this regard.
I have received today a reply from the Secretary
of the Navy, of which I enclose a copy for your infor-
mation. I believe it would be most helpful if you
could inform Admiral King yourself of your decision in
this regard and of your desire that the necessary arrange-
ments be concluded promptly.
Believe me
A yours, July
Enclosure
The President,
The White House.
COPY
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON
(SC)L11-7/EF12
(SC)037400A/GRC)
August 20, 1942
SECRET
My dear Sumner:
I have received your letter of August 18 relative
to the Brazilian situation. Although I have not had
any word directly from the President about it, I am
assuming that the order to give the Brazilians two of
our PC-boats stands. It is hitting us right where we
live at a time when we need them cruelly, but I have
initiated the necessary steps to see what can be done
to carry out the President's wishes.
As we approach wintertime when these little ves-
sels we are now using for escort purposes will no
longer be able to stay at sea, I daily grow more anxious
over what may happen. We are keeping the Atlantic Coast
free from serious inroads by the submarines now but we
are certainly going to be short of the requisite sea-
going escort vessels capable of meeting the winter
storms.
I can readily understand how helpful this proposal
to give the Brazilians a couple of our sub-chasers can
be right now. I hope that Brazil at last will take the
dive off the deep end and declare war.
Sincerely yours,
FRANK KNOX
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Honorable Sumner Welles
Date- 6-15-66
Under Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.
Signature- Darl Lipicer
Brazil folder 1-42
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
Lile
WASHINGTON
1
November 9, 1942
My dear Mr. President:
In the event that it has not been brought to
your attention directly, I am enclosing Caffery's
telegram of November 8 reporting his conversation
with President Vargas when Caffery delivered to the
President your personal message with regard to the
North African operations.
Believe me
A Faithfully yours, Dalls
Enc.
The President,
The White House.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
From: Reo de Janiero
Number: 4623 Dated: nov.8'4r
Code: se
Caption: Triple Preority
This telegram has been distributed to:
S
U
Please advise the Division of Com-
munications and Records if further dis-
tribution should be made.
The
R10 de Jansiro
This telegram must be
clossly paraphrased OE-
Dated November B, 1942
fort being communicated to
anyona. (SC)
Rec'd 9:33 p.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
TRIPLE PRIORITY
4623, November 8, 9 p.m.
Department's 3425, November 7, 11 a.m.
President Vargas asked 115 to thank the President
very sincerely for his message. HE asked me to tell
him that the news has been received here in Brazil
by him, his government and the population in GENERAL
with anthusissm and sympathy. Ht asked me to convey
his strong wishes for the success of the operation, the
importance of which for reasons which are obvious, it
is Easy for him to sotimats.
CAMMERY
WTD
(442)
Hon. Summer Wills hm for deliveny
Signed original others letter shill
Brazil folder 1-43
January 6, 1943
My dear Mr. President and friend:
It gave me great pleasure to learn from your
letter, handed me by Minister João Alberto Lins de
Barros, of your satisfaction with the accomplishments
of the United States Technical Mission in collaboration
with the Brazilian Technical Commission. I look
forward to receiving the full report of their work
with great interest.
I have enjoyed talking with Minister João Alberto
and am impressed with his energy and understanding of
economic problems affecting our two countries. I feel
confident that, under his able administration, the
integration of the Brazilian and United States economic
programs for both the immediate requirements of war and
the future will be rapidly advanced.
Mrs. Roosevelt joins me in sending warm regards
to you and Senhora Vargas.
with kind personal remembrances, believe me
Yours very sincerely,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
His Excellency
Getulio Vargas,
President of the United States of Brazil.
Rio de Janeiro,26 de Novembro de 1942
Eminente Amigo
Presidente Franklin Roosevelt.
A comissão chefiada pelo Senhor Lwellin
Morris Cook terminou os seus trabalhos no Brasil e es
tá de regresso, depois de uma permanência suficiente
para formar idea exata do que é a vida industrial e
comercial brasileira e indicar as providências indis-
pensaveis ao reforçamento da cooperação entre 05 nos-
sos dois países. o chefe da comissão e 05 seus com-
panheiros voltam deixando a mim e a todas as pessôas
com que trataram explêndida impressão, pela compe -
tência e espírito compreensivo demonstrados durante
o exame dos assuntos postos em discussão. Estou con
vencido de que êsses entendimentos, processados em am
biente de grande simpatia e cordialidade, influirão de
forma extremamente favoravel nas relações econômicas
(2)
entre o Brasil e 05 Estados Unidos.
Em companhia do Senhor Cook, e por su-
gestão sua, segue o portador desta carta - Ministro
João Alberto Lins de Barros que presidiu a comis-
são brasileira colaboradora da americana e exerce
o cargo de Coordenador da Mobilização Econômica. Vai
incumbido de tratar matéria relacionada com a sua
função. Apresentando-o, peço para êle o favor de
sua assistência e conselho.
De público já tive o prazer de mani-
festar-lhe - e da mesma forma às valorosas forças ar-
madas americanas os meus aplausos e dos brasileiros
pelo extraordinário feito que foi o ataque vitorio-
so à Africa. Aqui 05 renovo, cheio de admiração
por êsse empreendimento militar de que só é capaz
um grande povo servido por uma grande organização e
dirigido por um grande Chefe.
(3)
Minha Senhora cumprimenta-o e se faz
lembrar à Senhora Roosevelt, a quem apresento as
minhas respeitosas homenagens.
Tenho o prazer de reiterar-lhe 05
protestos de minha estima pessoal e alta conside-
ração.
A Sua Excelência o
SENHOR FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT
Presidente dos Estados Unidos da America
[TRANSLATION]
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC
Rio de Janeiro, November 26, 1942.
Eminent Friend
President Franklin Roosevelt.
The commission headed by Mr. Lwellin Morris Cook
has terminated its labors in Brazil and is returning,
after & sufficient stay to form an exact idea of what
Brazilian industrial and commercial life is and to
indicate the indispensable measures for strengthening
the cooperation between our two countries. The head of
the commission and his companions return, leaving a
splendid impression with me and all the persons with
whom they dealt, because of the competence and breadth
of mind demonstrated during the examination of the
matters brought up for discussion. I am convinced that
these understandings, worked out in an atmosphere of
great sympathy and cordiality, will influence in an
extremely favorable way the economic relations between
Brazil and the United States.
Mr. Cook, at his suggestion, is accompanied by the
bearer of this letter - Minister João Alberto Lins de
Barros - who was chairman of the Brazilian commission
collaborating with the American and who holds the office
of
- 2 -
of Coordinator of Economic Mobilization. He is charged
with treating of subjects relating to his office. While
presenting him, I beg for him the favor of your assistance
and counsel.
I have already had the pleasure of expressing to
you publicly and likewise to the valorous American armed
forces my applause and that of the Brazilian people for
the extraordinary exploit which was the victorious attack
on Africa. Here I renew my congratulations, being full
of admiration for this military undertaking of which only
a great people served by a great organization and directed
by a great Chief is capable.
My wife presents her compliments to you and asks to
be remembered to Mrs. Roosevelt, to whom I present my
respectful regards.
I have the pleasure of renewing to you the assurances
of my personal esteem and high consideration.
GETULIO VARGAS
TR:FGH:JMC
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
January 2. 1943
My dear Mr. President:
I am enclosing for your signature, if you approve,
a letter to President Vargas of Brazil in answer to his
letter to you of November 26, 1942. Upon his return to
Brazil Minister João Alberto Lins de Barros will carry
the letter to President Vargas.
A Faithfully yours, Alla
Enclosure:
Letter to President Vargas
of Brazil for signature.
The President,
The White House
Department of State
BUREAU
RA
DIVISION
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted
12/31/42
ADDRESSED TO
The President
: e . I I I
1-300
Brazil
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
personal. folder
January 8, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
I merely told Martins that if
I went to the West Indies this
Winter I hoped much President
Vargas could meet me in some
central location like Trinidad.
Nothing further.
F. D. R.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
January 7, 1943
My dear Mr. President:
I am sending you herewith a telegram from
Caffery in the event that it has not been brought
to your personal attention.
Believe me
A aithfully yours, Alb
Enclosure:
Telegram no. 65
from Rio de Janeiro.
The President,
The White House.
RE/.
Rio de Jansiro
This telegram must bE
closEly paraphrased be-
Dated January o, 1943
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)
REc'd 5:25 p.m.
SECRETARY of State,
Washington.
65, January 6, 5 p.m.
FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY
Aranha tells 1.1E Hartins reports President ROOSE-
velt told him to invite President Vargas "to meet him
at Trinidad" (when not known).
President Vargas says hE will bE glad to do it.
CAFFERY
REP
fieromal
Brazil forev
HJB
Rio de Janeiro
This telegram must bE
paraphrased before being
Dated January 31, 1943
communicated to anyonE
other than a Governmental
Rec'd 3:02 p.m.
agency. (BR)
SECRETARY of State,
Washington.
505, January 31, 2 pam.
FOR THE PRESIDENT
While Aranha, Ingram, Walsh, Et cetera were at dinner
at my house last night, VE received the good nEws of your
safe arrival in Washington in time for us to celebrate C.
part of your birthday. WE all sEnd our warm greetings and
again, congratulations: President Vargas could not bE more
pleased.
CAFFERY
DES
Brazil Personal
1-43
jul
(TRANSLATION)
W5 51
RIO DE JANEIRO BRASGOVT 2356 FEB 5 1943
HIS EXCELLENCY FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, WASHINGTON, D.C.
IN MY OWN NAME AND IN THAT OF MY FAMILY I VOICE MY THANKS FROM
THE HEART FOR THE PROFOUNDLY COMFORTING WORDS AND THE FULLNESS
OF SYMPATHY WHICH MRS. ROOSEVELT AND YOURSELF SENT ME ON LEARN-
ING OF THE DEATH OF MY SON GETULIO.
GETULIO VARGAS.
TR:JVM:DVA
mc
THE WHITE HOUSE
DIVICIOR
washington
February 8, 1943
FES 9 1943
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE STATE DEPARTMENT
For translation.
brace Gilly
GRACE G. TULLY
Private Secretary
Enclosure
AUREAU -
The am House
W5 51
Washington
RIODEJANEIRO BRASGOVT 2356 FEB 5 1943EB 5 7 45 AM 1913
S EXCELENCIA FRANKLIN D ROOSEVELT
PRESIDENTE DOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DA AMERICA WASHINGTONDC
EM NOME PESSOAL E NO DE MINHA FAMILIA AGRADECO SENSIBILISADO
AS PALAVRAS PROFUNDAMENTE CONFORTADORAS E CHEIA DE AMISTOSA
SIMPATIA QUE JUNTAMENTE COM A SENHORA ROOSEVELT ME ENVIOU
AO AO TER CONHECIMENTO DA MORTE DE MEU FILHO GETULIO
GETULIO VARGAS.
TRAN
PLCE
170
(591
Original of this letter, together with mineographed
him
copy of telegram from Coffery, Rio de Janeiro, Begil
dated 2/12/43 a copy 2 which has beek retained
follow
1-42
for 2/16/43, our file, returned 6 Hon Summer Wells,
hm
February 15, 1943
"S.O.R.
My dear Mr. President:
I believe that Aranha's suggestion as set forth in
the second paragraph of the attached telegram from
Caffery 1s desirable but before taking any action in
accordance with that suggestion I should like to know if
it meets with your approval.
If you feel the idea is a good one, it will prob-
ably be better for me to take the matter up with Halifax
here rather than to have it dealt with in London.
Believe me
Faithfully yours,
August Summer miller
Enclosure:
742, February 12, 4 p.m.,
from Rio de Janeiro.
The President,
The White House.
U:SW:IJ
P
Y
Rio de Janeiro
EJ
This telegram must be
Dated February 12, 1943
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
Rec'd 5:25 p.m.
to anyone. (SC)
Secretary of State,
Washington.
742, February 12, 4 p.m.
STATEM
1
L FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY.
My telegram 401 of January 30.
Aranha has been turning over in his mind ways and
means of putting into effect President Vargas' promise
to President Roosevelt that he would endeavor to per-
suade the Portuguese to allow him to send troops to
their islands: He has in mind now to send Joao Neves
at any early date 85 Ambassador at Portugal; and have
him endeavor to secure the permission from Salazar.
To view of the British alliance with Portugal
Aranha believes it well to endeavor to have the British
use appropriate good offices at Lisbon too. He is in-
forming the British Ambassador here and suggests that
you approach the British, either Lor Halifax or at
London. He will repeat, however, to Charles that Brazil
is lined up first with us and only in the second place
with other United Nations.
DECLASSIFIED
CAFFERY
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
JRL
By J. Schsuble Date FED 4 1972
Brazil folder 1.48
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 16, 1943
MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. SUMNER WELLES
To read and return.
F. D. R.
Enclosures
Two letters to the President from
Jefferson Caffery, Rio de Vaneiro
dated 2/9/43 and 2/10/43 re President
Vargas reactions to the President's
visit.
films
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
Brazil the folder 1.43
WASHINGTON
February 16, 1943
My dear Miss Tully:
I have read with interest the letter from
Mr. Caffery to the President of February 9, and
in accordance with the President's request I am
returning the letter herewith for his files.
Believe me
A Yours very sincerely,
Enclosure:
To the President
from Mr. Caffery,
February 9, 1943
Miss Grace G. Tully,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.
THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AMERICAN EMBASSY
PERSONAL AND
Rio de Janeiro,
February 9, 1943.
Dear Mr. President:
President Vargas was in high good humor on the
trip back from Natal. Aranha told me that he had
never seen him in such good spirits as he was the
afternoon and evening of his return here. He told
Aranha that he was highly pleased with the trip,
delighted with his conversation with you, and had
come back with his feeling of confidence in you even
stronger than it was before.
We returned to Rio on Friday evening and his
son died the following Tuesday. He was much affected
by this; and very appreciative of your telegram.
At the Cabinet meeting on Saturday last, he
put through the resolution to join the United Nations
as he said he would do.
We
The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
DECLASSIFIED
State Diar, Letter, 1-11-78
By J. Schauble Date
FEB
4 1972
-2-
We had more talk on the plane on the way back
about the naval matters you spoke to him about;
they are progressing satisfactorily.
The only matter that remains is that of the
Portuguese Islands and he says that he will endeavor
to see that through; although that is a tough one.
It is clear that the good effects of your
Natal meeting have been widespread, and notably, of
course, in Latin America: the Argentine press com-
ments are illuminating and you may have noticed that
Peru "in adhering to the Atlantic Charter" based the
action on the Natal meeting.
The thing that pleased President Vargas most
was your informal remark that you would like to have
him at your "side" during the peace conference.
Vargas would like nothing better, and, as a matter
of fact, there is something to it - what with his
prestige, Brazil's prestige, and the fact that at
this moment all Latin-America (except The Argentine),
and this perhaps is one of the principal results of
the
-3-
for and champion of the Americas
you.
the Natal meeting, look to Brazil birs
With all good wishes,
Faithfully yours,
THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AMERICAN EMBASSY
Rio de Janeiro,
February 10, 1943.
Dear Mr. President:
President Vargas is about to appoint a new
Ambassador to Portugal, João Neves da Fontoura. This
is a very satisfactory appointment from our point
of view. Vargas will instruct him to proceed at an
early date to Lisbon. At an appropriate date after
his arrival there, he will take up with Salazar the
matter you mentioned at Natal of Brazilian troops
being sent to the Portuguese Islands.
With all good wishes,
Faithfully yours,
The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
(1049)
hm
Brazil folders
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 12, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE:
Will you speak to me
about this?
F.D.R.
Letter from Hon. Sumner Welles, 5/11/43, to
the President, enclosing copy of letter
which Mr. Welles received from Hon. Jefferson
Caffery, Rio de Janeiro, 4/27/43, with attached
copy of Mr. Caffery's despatch of 4/26/43 to
the Secretary of State, in re Brigadier General
Eduardo Gomes' Trip to North Africa. Copies
retained for our files.
May 11, 1943
My dear Mr. President:
I have received today a personal letter from
Jeff Caffery referring to his despatch of April 26
to the Department, of which I enclose a copy for
your information.
In view of the fact that Caffery believes
that the War Department is pursuing a line which
is not in accord with the views you expressed in
Natal, may I have an indication from you as to the
nature of the reply which I should make to Caffery.
Believe me
Faithfully yours,
SUMNER WELLES
Enc.
The President,
The White House.
MASD VV
C
0
P
Y
THE FORETGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AMERICAN EMBASSY
Rio de Janeiro,
April 27, 1943.
Dear Summer:
You might have & look at my despatch No. 11004
of April 26th regarding General Gomes' trip to
North Africa which does not reflect the views ex-
pressed to me by President Roosevelt at Natal. If
there has been a change, I should be glad to know
of it.
With all good wishes,
Yours very sincerely,
JEFFERSON CAFFERY
The Honorable
Sumner Welles,
Under Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
Rio de Janeiro, April 26, 1943
No. 11004
SUBJECT: Brigadier General Euardo Gomes'
Trip to North Africa.
ORIGINAL AND TWO COPIES BY COURIER
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
Sir:
I have the honor to report that Brigadeiro
Eduardo Gomes, who just returned from North Africa,
remarked to me that General Mark Clark said to him
that he would like to see the Brazilian Government
send an expeditionary force of five thousand men
to North Africa. General Clark thought this would
have an excellent effect on the future relations of
our forces in North Africa with Spain as the Spanish
would never want to enter into action against Latin-
American troops in view of the implications on Spain's
relations with the Latin American countries. General
Gomes said that he told this to General Dutra who
said that the force should be larger than five thousand.
Respectfully yours,
Jefferson Caffery.
4 1972
By J. Schauble Date
T-104
Brazil folder 1-43
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 4, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL BROWN:
The President asks if
this message has been sent.
Grace Tully
Message, 6- -43, to U.S. Military Attache,
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, signed "Roosevelt",
quoting a message received Gen. Eisenhower
for transmittal to President Vargas signed
Marshall, thanking President Vargas for his
message of congratulations and commending the
qualities of Gen. Gomes and the other officers
of the Brazlian armed forces in the African
Theater.
1093
Brazil folder
has
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 21, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:
I read the proposed message
to Vargas to the Prime Minister and
the latter wants to discuss the pro-
cedure with his War Cabinet before
going any further. Therefore, I am
holding it until I hear further.
F.D.R.
ko he subtituted for yeterdays nemo
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
May 20, 1943.
Memorandum for the President
In accordance with our personal
conversation I herewith enclose a
draft of the proposed message from
you to President Vargas.
You will recall your conversa-
tion at Natal on this subject when
President Vargas is understood to
have been disposed to proceed with
this matter, but it was abandoned
because of the British desire not
to go along.
Please advise me as to whether
you approve its sending.
CH
T-147
Bragil folder 1-43
THE WHITE HOUSE
washington
September 28, 1943
MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. CORDELL HULL:
What do you think?
F.D.R.
Telegram, 9-25-43, to the Secretary of
State from Caffery, Rio de Janerio, re
hope of Aranha that Brazil will not be
forgotten in the organization of a
Mediterranean committee.
(2232)
Carbon copy 7 this message, returned to Brazil freder 1-43
hmb
the Secy. state as fer notation
hims 12/2043
C.H.
AMEMBASSY,
RIO DE JANEIRO (BRAZIL)
F.D.R.
STRICTLY 001
to FOR THE AMBASSADOR
I have discussed with the President the subject of your
5684 of December 11, 8 p.m. The President desires that you
express on his behalf his profound appreciation of President
Vargas' attitude in the matter of the resumption of diplomatic
relations between Brazil and the Soviet Union. You should point
out that the President believes this question to be one in which
the predominant considerations are the factors of direct concern
to Brazil which only the Brazilian Government can evaluate.
The President requests that you add that the fact of recog-
nition of the Soviet Union by the United States in 1933 (under
certain conditions with which President Vargas is undoubtedly
familiar), together with the close and effective cooperation of
the two Governments in the prosecution of the war against the
Axis, indicate the present attitude of this Government toward
the Soviet Union. However, the President wishes you to reiterate
that the determining factor must be the peculiarly Brazilian
aspect of the matter and that the broad international aspects
described in the previous sentence are not repeat not overruling.
You may assure President Vargas that when and if he desires
to take affirmative action, President Roosevelt will, of course,
be most happy to render all appropriate assistance.
DECLASSIFIED
Bate Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
FEB
4 1972
By J. Schauble Date
HIO
- 2 -
In the course of your conversation with President
Vargas, you should take every opportunity of stressing President
Roosevelt's likely appreciation of the value and sincerity of
President Vargas' support.
Telegram from ambassador Caffery returned s
Mr. 12/25/43 Renchard, state Dept, as per telephone request
hms.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
December 24. 1943
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Attached herewith is a telegram from
Ambassador Caffery in Rio de Janeiro quoting a
statement made to the Ambassador by President Vargas
regarding the resumption of diplomatic relations
between Brazil and the Soviet Union. I have pre-
pared a draft of a telegram, also attached, to
Ambassador Caffery, for your approval.
CH
Enclosures:
1. Telegram no. 5684,
December 11, 1943,
from Rio de Janeiro.
2. Draft reply to Rio de
Janeiro.
Department of State
BUREAU
DIVISION
}
RA
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted
ADDRESSED TO
The President.
a . -
I 1001
(2358)
Brazil focare t
hms
THE WHITE HOUSE
washington
January 10, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. HARRY HOPKINS
I agree with Cordell. Will
you take it up with the Munitions
Assignment Board as soon as you
can and let me have the enclosed
back for my files.
F. D. R.
Transmitting copy of letter which the
President received from the Secretary of
State, 1/8/44, in re revolution in Bolivia.
357)
Copy this letter returned to the Sey. state, as per
have
the Presedents notation 1/10/44
hub
CH
UK
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
January 8, 1944
My dear Mr. President:
The recent revolution in Bolivia has produced
deep anxiety among the other South American countries
because of their belief that it had the sympathy and
revolutions elsewhere.
that Argentina may have plans to encourage similar
support of the Argentine Government. They are fearful
I share this concern and believe that we should
take all proper and effective steps to support these
countries, some of which have declared war and others
broken relations with the Axis. The Good Neighbor
otherwise. Policy and our war effort might be seriously jeopardized
effect would be to provide Brazil with certain additional
A step that would have a most healthy psychological
arms and equipment.
that we are standing behind them in a realistic way and
In Brazil, it would show the Government and people
would permit Brazil to move forward with its preparation
to send an overseas expeditionary force.
The effect in neighboring countries would be salu-
tary. In particular, Paraguay and Uruguay, both of which
border on both Argentina and Brazil, would feel reassured.
would understand at once the import of this action.
The present military gang in control of Argentina
It
The President,
The White House.
-2-
It is therefore recommended that you strongly urge
the Munitions Assignment Board to assign to Brazil such
additional arms and equipment as the War Department may
feel it can spare without impairment to combat operational
requirements.
Faithfully yours,
j
Brazil factor us
file Perend,
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 10, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Lube called in regard to the memo-
randum you sent Harry about getting muni-
tions to Brazil. Lube said he can handle
it tomorrow at a meeting with the Inter-
national Division of the Army, if you
approve of his so doing -- then the O.K.
is automatic with the Munitions board
itself.
GGT
FILE MEMO:
The President directed me to
call Dr. Lubin and tell him this was O.K.
but to be sure and keep the Secy. of State
in touch.
GGT
Brazil
January 12, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:
During the last two or three days, I have had
several conversations in regard to Argentina, Bolivia and
neighbors which make me more disturbed in regard to the future.
It is not yet proved in the sense that we have full documentary
evidence, but I believe that the plot is more widespread than
most people believe; that it has direct ramifications in
Paraguay and that a great deal of preliminary work has been
done in Uruguay, Chile, and Peru.
Therefore, I an in hearty accord with the
thought that this trend should be nipped in the bud and that
we should proceed with the Argentine in strong ways.
At the same time, I think it is essential that
we make a move at once to build up the strength of Brazil.
This should cover American arms and munitions and possibly
more Army instructors, so as to give Brazil an effective
fighting force near the Argentine border such as two or three
divisions of motorized regiments.
Furthermore, I am inclined to think that we
should let Brazil have some Lend-Lease cargo ships to take the
place of the many Brazilian ships which have been sunk.
It would be possible to pursue one of two
courses -- either announce the whole thing publicly, or let
it leak out -- which would occur in a very short time.
F.D.R.
(orig. filed - Hull folder, 2-VV)
Brazil fredu
ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
January 22, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Thank you for your memorandum regarding the assign-
ment of additional military supplies to Brazil. Ambas-
sador Caffery, who will be back in Brazil about Janu-
ary 26, will personally tell President Vargas the good
news. Since Ambassador Caffery's conversation with you
the War Department has decided to construct two good air-
ports in southern Brazil, one at Florianópolis and the
other at Porto Alegre. All of these measures should have
a very reassuring effect.
CH
FORVICTORY
BUY
UNITED
STATES
DEPENSE
BONDS
AND
STAMPS
T-203
Brazil folder 1-44
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 14, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:
I have & memorandum from Mr.
Lubin saying that the Ground Committee
of the Munitions Assignments Board has
assigned tanks, armored cars, and
various types of guns to Brazil.
I hope this will see things
through and do a lot of good.
F.D.R.
S
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 13, 1944
MEMORANDUM
TO:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
MR. LUBIN or
SUBJECT: ATTACHED LETTER FROM SECRETARY HULL
I have been in touch with the Army and, as the result of
an arrangement reached today, the Ground Committee of the Muni-
tions Assignments Board have assigned the following to Brazil:
129 Light tanks with armament
53 Medium tanks with armament (M4)
54 Armored cars, T17, with armament
67 37mm Guns (substitute for 57mm)
36 75mm Howitzers, pack MIAL
129 .30 cal. Machine Guns, heavy, flexible w/mt.
155 .30 cal. Machine Guns, light, flexible w/mt.
133 .50 cal. Machine Guns, H.B., flexible w/mt.
The necessary ammunition will automatically also be
assigned.
The arrangement is to have one-half of these materials at
the depots ready for packing on February 1, and one-fourth on March
1 and April 1.
I am notifying the Secretary of State of these facts.
DECLASSIFIER
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 1972
SECTION
The Department of State
"C.H.
Washington
O.K.
January 8, 1944
F.D.R."
My dear Mr. President:
The recent revolution in Bolivia has produced deep anxiety
among the other South American countries because of their belief
that it had the sympathy and support of the Argentine Government.
They are fearful that Argentina may have plans to encourage
similar revolutions elsewhere.
I share this concern and believe that we should take all
proper and effective steps to support these countries, some of
which have declared war and others broken relations with the Axis
The Good Neighbor Policy and our war effort might be seriously
jeopardized otherwise.
A step that would have a most healthy psychological effect
would be to provide Brazil with certain additional arms and equip
ment.
In Brazil, it would show the Government and people that we
are standing behind them in a realistic way and would permit
Brazil to move forward with its preparation to send an overseas
expeditionary force.
The effect in neighboring countries would be salutary. In
particular, Paraguay and Uruguay, both of which border on both
Argentina and Brazil, would feel reassured.
The present military gang in control of Argentina would
understand at once the import of this action.
It 1s therefore recommended that you strongly urge the
Munitions Assignment Board to assign to Brazil such additional
arms and equipment as the War Department may feel it can spare
without impairment to combat operational requirements.
Faithfully yours,
(signed) CORDELL HULL
Brazil freder
file THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 18, 1944
MEMORANDUM
TO:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
MR. LUBIN
K
SUBJECT: WAR MATERIALS FOR BRAZIL
In addition to the tanks, guns and other
materials assigned to Brazil last week, the Muni-
tions Assignments Board has just approved the transfer
to Brazil of six training planes, which, apparently,
the Brazilians wanted very badly.
DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stowart Date FEB 4 1972
I
Brazil folder 1-44
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 24, 1944
MEMORANDUM
TO:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
MR. LUBIN,
SUBJECT: MUNITIONS ASSIGNMENTS
TO BRAZIL
You might be interested to know
that additional assignments have been made
to Brazil for the month of February. The
items are listed in the attached which is a
copy of my letter to the Secretary of State.
January 24, 1944
The Honorable
The Secretary of State
My dear Mr. Secretary:
In making its regular monthly assignments for
the month of February 1944, the Munitions Assignments Board
filled in & number of the gaps on the new Brazilian Program,
a first report on which was sent to you some days ago.
The items assigned out of February production
include the following:
Rocket launchers (Bazookas) & Ammunition
Ammunition for the small arms assigned
two weeks ago
Miscellaneous automotive equipment (motor
cycles, jeeps, cargo trucks, wreckers,
and service vehicles)
Helmets
Miscellaneous signal equipment
Miscellaneous engineer equipment
Explosives
Bleaching material.
Very sincerely,
Isador Lubin
DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 1972
CEGRET
VEGIC
C
Brazilfrau 1-44
0
P
Y
February 19, 1944.
My dear President Vargas:-
Mrs. Roosevelt is starting
early next month to visit our soldiers and sailors
who are on duty in many places south of the con-
tinental limits of the United States. She is
going down by way of Puerto Rico, the Virgin
Islands, Antigua, Saint Lucia, Trinidad and the
Guineas to Belem, Natal and Recife. She has
wanted most anxiously to go on as far as Pio
but because it is most desirable that she be
back in Washington in three weeks, T have felt
that she ought not to spend two or three extra
days in going to Rio at this time.
On the return she plans to
visit Curacao, Barranquilla, Salinas (Ecuador),
the Galapagos Islands, Panama, Guatemala, Jamaica
and Cuba.
I know you will understand
how difficult it would be for her to visit the
Capital of Brazil and I am wondering whether, if
Madame Vargas is free around the fourteenth or
fifteenth of March, she could find it possible
to join my wife at Belem or Natal or Pecife to
spend a day or two with her in Brazil, I think
my wife is writing to Madame Vargas.
T think it would be a
wonderful thing if our wives could spend a few
days together.
(aris of this of capy of Mrs. R's letter, 2/15/6 The bargasfiled- Mrs.
Rossevelt folder, dr. 4-44
I much wish that T could 20 with
her but, as you know, I am in the midst of arranging
operations to be conducted in Europe and in the
Pacific, and I do not dare to be away for more than
a day or two at a time.
Incidentally, I feel that things
are on the whole going well -- only I wish that Argentina
would behave herself!
also, do not forget that I count
on your coming to the United States to visit me at
Washington and Hyde Park. It would be delightful to
see you again.
With my warm regards,
Your old friend,
His Excellency
Getulio Vargas,
President of the United States of Brazil,
Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil.
12835
ruy
Thms
ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. c.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
Carboy 46/44
April 7, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
MILITARY AVIATION AGREEMENT WITH BRAZIL
Under your directives of January 7 and February 1,
1944, Ambassador Caffery is negotiating for our postwar
military use of air bases in Brazil.
These negotiations disclose that President Vargas
appears ready to give us what we desire provided that we
give Brazil benefits of protection analagous to the secu-
rity benefits we derive from our continued use of Brazil-
ian bases. President Vargas wants 1) 8 continuing guaran-
tee of assistance to Brazil in the event of attack not
only by an extracontinental power but by any other coun-
try of this hemisphere and 2) & continuing flow of arma-
ment to Brazil.
Both of these desiderata are primarily directed
against one potential enemy, Argentina. President Vargas
believes that the all-out cooperation of Brazil with the
United States during the war has aggravated the long-
standing tensions between Brazil and Argentina. He thinks
that the United States should help make Brazil secure,
just as by granting us permanent military use of the air
bases he is helping to make the United States secure.
With your approval, I propose to meet President
Vargas' request as follows:
One. Abrogate the politico-military agreement of
May 27, 1942, which was in effect an outright alliance
with Brazil, and replace it with a new agreement placing
our intention to assist Brazil in the event of aggression
upon it within the general framework of our inter-American
FORVICTORY
undertakings regarding hemisphere defense, security, and
solidarity.
BUY
UNITED
DECLASSIFIED
STATES
DEPENSE
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
Two.
BONDS
AND
STAMPS
FEB
By J. Schwuble Date
4
1972
-2-
Two. Provide Brazil in the future with armament in
accordance with the following general propositions, which
in essence are identical with those contained in my
letter to Admiral Leahy of February 29, 1944 (copy at-
tached):
(1) That it is to the interest of continental
security that the Brazilian Army be maintained on
an efficient basis;
(2) that the Brazil - United States Joint
Defense Commissions be continued at Washington and
Rio;
(3) that the Commissions make recommendations
regarding Brazilian needs for equipment and similar
military technical matters;
(4) that the equipment be furnished under a new
agreement to replace the existing lend-lease agree-
ment;
(5) that familiarization and refresher courses
for Brazilian officers in the United States, and
vice versa, be continued as part of military coopera-
tion for hemisphere security.
The main virtue of such an arrangement would be its
applicability in varying degress to other American repub-
lics.
I am studying the necessity and desirability of sub-
mitting the agreement to the Senate for its consent and
ratification.
CH
Enclosure:
To Admiral Leahy,
February 29, 1944.
DMZ)
February 29, 1944.
My dear Admiral Leahy:
I acknowledge herewith receipt of your letter of
December 30, 1943, with which you enclosed a copy of a
report by the Joint Advisory Board on American Republics.
I note that this report has been approved by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
This Department has given the report most careful
consideration. We are in entire agreement with the view
implicit in it that the continuance of close military
and naval collaboration among the American republics
is desirable in the future in order to ensure the secu-
rity of the continent from external aggression. The
Department also concurs in the opinion that the defense
of the hemisphere and the effectiveness of collaboration
would be materially furthered by the standardization of
certain types of equipment, particularly combat matériel,
among the armed forces of the American republics members
of the inter-American system. Since the other American
republics must import the greater part of their military
matériel, we would therefore favor from the viewpoint of
military considerations appropriate measures designed to
equip their armed forces in the greatest possible propor-
tion with United States - manufactured matériel.
I am pleased to inform you that the Department con-
curs with the recommendations contained in paragraph 5(a)
of the Joint Advisory Board report, respecting the policy
to be pursued henceforth in regard to the furnishing of
military supplies and equipment to other American repub-
lics under existing Lend-Lease agreements. I believe it
would be desirable in this connection for the State, War
and Navy Departments to cooperate in the drafting of a
statement of this new policy, together with the reasons
for its adoption. This statement should be placed in the
hands
Admiral William D. Leahy, U.S.N.,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy,
2166 Florida Avenue,
Washington, D. C.
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date
FEB
4
1972
-2-
hands of all officials of this Government concerned with
problems relating to the procurement of Lend-Lease sup-
plies for the other American republics, for their general
guidance and for use in conversations they may hold with
representatives of other American republics on this sub-
ject.
The Department appreciates the need for revising
existing Lend-Lease agreements with the other American
republics and is in accord with the recommendation of the
Advisory Board that revised agreements be negotiated at
the earliest possible date.
While realizing that revision must be formalized
prior to June 30, 1944, unless Congress takes action
before that date to extend the Lend-Lease Act, I believe
that the agreements cannot be revised until after the
situation has been thoroughly and carefully studied.
For that reason, I consider it highly desirable that ex-
ploratory bilateral joint staff conversations with cer-
tain of the other American republics be undertaken imme-
diately. These conversations should, in my opinion,
cover the following points:
a. The nature of thearmed forces which the
respective states contemplate maintaining after the
present emergency;
b. Questions relating to the procurement of
armaments and matériel for the armed forces of the
American republics;
C. Matters relating to the work of United
States military, naval and air missions in those
countries where they are now established, and to
the possibility of sending such missions to coun-
tries which do not now have them; training and tech-
nical educational facilities in the United States
which it may seem desirable to make available to
military and naval personnel from the other Ameri-
can republics.
It will be very difficult to reach agreement with
all of the republics on these points, especially on (a)
and (b). Few attributes of sovereignty are as highly
prized by states as that of determining the size, strength
and organization of their armed forces, and the same is
true of the freedom to purchase equipment wherever they
may choose.
I realize
-3-
I realize that in view of the President's letter to
Secretary Hull of January 7, 1944, concerning air bases,
the question of future arrangements respecting the main-
tenance and use of certain operational facilities for
purposes of hemisphere defense cannot be appropriately
discussed with military representatives of the other
American republics at the present time in as much as no
decision has as yet been reached regarding fundamental
questions of policy in this connection. However, it is
my opinion that this problem is one which those officers
who will carry on staff conversations should have con-
stantly in mind as & part of the background of their dis-
cussions. It is my hope that before long the situation
will be such that conversations on this subject can be
held with the other American republics.
This Department, while wishing to allow adequate
latitude in the staff conversations, considers it appro-
priate to state its belief that, in approaching the mili-
tary and naval authorities of the other American repub-
lics, the United States representatives should express
themselves approximately along the lines set forth below:
8. The United States military (or naval) au-
thorities, realizing that the threat of aggression
upon the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the American republics has been largely removed, but
mindful of the importance of joint action for mutual
protection in the future, believe it timely to con-
sider the problem of the postwar military security
of the hemisphere. They wish to do so in accordance
with the principles of inter-American collaboration
embodied in the "Declaration of Lima" and underlying
both Resolution XV of the Second Meeting of Foreign
Ministers at Havana and Resolution XXXIX of the
Third Meeting at Rio de Janeiro.
b. When the security of the hemisphere was
endangered in 1940, military officials of the United
States and of most of the other American republics
held discussions regarding the best means to meet
the common dangers which confronted them. The mili-
tary authorities of the United States believe that
the time has now come to re-examine, in the light
of changed conditions, the arrangements which re-
sulted from those discussions and again to exchange
information regarding future hemisphere defense.
To this end they are holding or will shortly hold
bilateral joint staff conversations with each of the
republics, except Argentina and Bolivia.
C. It
-4-
C. It is the belief of the United States mili-
tary authorities that the American republics should
be assured of the minimum supply from a secure source
of arms adequate for them to share in the defense
of the continent and to carry out responsibilities
within a general security system.
(1) The amount and character of arms
necessary for this purpose should be the sub-
ject of inter-American understanding, subject
to the considerations set forth in (d) below.
(2) Adequate control of the supply of
arms should be established in such a manner
as to contribute to the further growth of col-
laboration and mutual confidence.
d. The staff conversations should be conducted
in the light of, and any understandings reached in
or as a result of these conversations with other
American republics should be subject to the over-
riding considerations of, any eventual system of
general security and arrangements for international
regulation of armaments which may be brought about.
e. In order to accomplish these purposes the
military authorities of the United States wish to
discuss the nature of the forces to be maintained in
each of the republics and to reach understandings
regarding other forms of military cooperation, as,
for example, the manner in which arms might be sup-
plied by one republic to another, military missions,
et cetera.
(1) In the interest of further collabora-
tion, the United States would consider continu-
ing to furnish arms to the other republics
under mutually satisfactory terms.
(2) The United States believes that true
integration of the inter-American defense
system would be facilitated by the adoption of
standard equipment by the armed forces of the
American republics and to attain this objective
is prepared to cooperate with the other Ameri-
can republics.
In the event that the question of the mutual use of
certain operational facilities for purposes of future
hemisphere
-5-
hemisphere security is broached by representatives of any
of the other American republics, I believe that the United
States representatives should merely state that they
assume that this Government is studying this matter but
that they are not informed in the premises.
I believe that the War and Navy Departments jointly
should make the decision as to whether Army and Navy
staff conversations along the above lines should be con-
ducted jointly or separately. Both Departments will natu-
rally wish to have their conversations carried on by the
best qualified officers who can be made available. It
is of the utmost importance that the officers who are to
engage in such conversations discuss the problems thoroughly
with the proper officers of the Department prior to their
departure, as well as the selection of the countries to
be visited and the order in which the visits might take
place. The Department will be pleased to have the Embas-
sies in the field prepare the ground with the respective
Governments for these visits.
I shall be glad to make specific recommendations re-
garding the revision of the existing Lend-Lease agree-
ments once the Department has had an opportunity to study
the results of these proposed conversations.
Sincerely yours,
E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 20, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
R
R
Will you get together and
draw up a nice personal letter
for me to send to President Vargas?
F. D. R.
6/8/44
file Brazil
Signed on June 8, 1944
My dear Mr. President:
I have received from the hands of Vice Admiral Ingram
your very interesting and cordial letter of April 13, 1944
in which you set forth the need of the Brazilian Havy to
strengthen its resources in order to meet the requirements
of hemispheric defense. I was much impressed with your
clear exposition of the strategic factors relating not
only to the safety of South American waters but to Brazil's
responsibilities as well in the more comprehensive problem
of hemispheric security.
I have noted with particular satisfaction the words
of high praise in which you have referred to Vice Admiral
Ingram and to the manner in which he has collaborated with
the Brazilian Navy in the South Atlantic. It is gratifying
to know that in his work in Brazil Vice Admiral Ingram has
been true to the traditions of the American Navy.
I have discussed your letter in considerable detail
with Vice Admiral Ingram. I can assure you that Brazilian
requirements of additional warships are being given the
most careful consideration by the appropriate officers of
the United States Navy.
While, as you point out, your request for naval ships
is not great in comparison with the size of the United States
Navy and its construction program, I feel certain that through
your appreciation of the scope of the struggle in which we are
presently engaged you will be aware of the fact that we are
now employing our ships, particularly such types as cruisers
and aircraft carriers, to the utmost. The extent of our con-
struction program must be considered in the light of the
stupendous and still uncertain demands of future operations.
As you are aware, however, four ships of the destroyer escort
type will shortly be transferred to Brazil under Lend-Lease.
Furthermore, you may rest assured that the full naval require-
ments of Brazil will receive primary consideration at the
first favorable moment.
I am not unmindful of the important role which Brazil
must continue to play in securing this Hemisphere against
possible future aggression. It necessarily follows that
Brazil must be equipped in such a manner as to discharge so
vital a responsibility promptly and effectively, should OC-
casion arise. While it is with deep regret that I have to
inform you that the strategic situation will not permit the
transfer to Brazil at this time of the floating equipment
requested, I suggest that conversations be undertaken between
representatives of the armed forces of Brazil and the United
States to make plans for the required degree of coordination
- 2 -
and unity of action in both the immediate and the long-range
future.
When such staff conversations are held, it would appear
desirable to consider, not only naval strength, but also the
strength of ground and air forces. All three branches of
the armed forces should be given consideration, in order
that total fighting strength may be determined on the basis
of the guiding principle of hemispheric defense. It seems
obvious to me that some voluntary control along these lines
is a condition precedent to laying the foundation for future
peace. I make this suggestion because I want you to be
assured that the United States has a direct interest in
seeing that Brazil is adequately equipped to carry out its
part in any arrangements that may be agreed upon.
History will surely take note that the turning point
of the war in the European theater was coincident with the
action of your government in providing bases and facilities
which contributed so materially to the African campaign. I
am deeply conscious, not only of the generous mannor in which
these bases and facilities were made available, but also of
the efficient cooperation between the armed forces of Brazil
and those of the United States in driving the enemy from the
South Atlantic. It is my desire, therefore, that Your
Excellency, and through you the people of Brazil, understand
the appreciation of this Government, and of the American
- 3 -
people, for the very vital aid that Brazil has contributed
to our common fight against the Axis powers.
With renewed assurances of my high esteem and best
personal wishes, I am
Sincerely,
FRANKLIN D2 ROOSEVELT
His Excellency,
Getulio Vargas,
President of the Republic of Brazil.
- 4 -
file 6-9-44
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
In accordance with your memorandum to me and to
the Under Secretary of State, dated May 20, 1944, I
am transmitting herewith a proposed reply to the letter
from President Vargas of Brazil, also attached.
The State Department has collaborated in the prepa-
ration of the reply and Mr. Stettinius has expressed his
approval thereof.
Respectfully,
James Forces tal
Op-13/eah 6-7-44
Serial No. 22818 039713
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
In accordance with your memorandum to me and to
the Under Secretary of State, dated May 20, 1944, I
am transmitting herewith a proposed reply to the letter
from President Vargas of Brazil, also attached.
The State Department has collaborated in the prepa-
ration of the reply and Mr. Stettinius has expressed his
approval thereof.
Respectfully,
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 2-10-70
Signature- 9102
Petrópolis, 13 de abril de 1944
Eminente Amigo
Presidente Franklin Roosevelt
o Almirante Ingram, da grande Mari-
nha Americana, é um conhecedor profundo das necessida-
des de segurança do Atlântico Sul e, especialmente, do
litoral brasileiro e da sua defesa. Vem de longa data
colaborando com a Marinha Brasileira e durante 0 perio
do de ameaça mais aguda à navegação dos nossos mares
assumiu a direção geral dos serviços de patrulhamento.
A sua ação eficiente e as suas altas qualidades de co-
mando tornaram-no um chefe estimado pela alta oficiali
dade brasileira. Tudo isso o credencia, portanto, para
ser, junto ao Eminente Amigo, o embaixador cordial e
bem informado do que carecemos e do modo por que podem
05 Estados Unidos cooperar com 0 Brasil relativamente
à segurança marítima e manutenção da paz entre as Na-
ções Latino-Americanas.
Segundo o plano do Almirantado e do
nosso Ministro da Marinha, conhecido e aprovado pelo
-2-
nosso comum amigo Almirante Ingram, cifram-se as nossas
mais urgentes necessi dades na cessão, pelo lend-lease ou
pela forma que parecer mais conveniente, de certo número
de vasos de guerra:- 2 cruzadores pesados e 2 cruzado-
res leves,3 contra-torpedeiros condutores de flotilha,
12 unidades menores do tipo de 1500 toneladas, 2 porta-
aviões, 4 varredores de minas,1 tender de contra-torpe-
deiros, 1 tender de rêdes, 1 navio lança rêdes e 3 rebo-
cadores de alto mar. Da alta decisão de Vossa Excelên-
cia depende a consecução dêsse desiderato, desejo legí-
timo dos marinheiros do Brasil, que, de forma exemplar,
veem cooperando com a esquadra norte-americana nas ope-
rações contra o inimigo comum.
Ha um fato histórico de acentuado re
1êvo político continental que convem relembrar nas pre-
sentes circunstâncias. Faz sete anos Vossa Excelência,
com o dom de previsão dos verdadeiros estadistas, sen-
tiu que a guerra mundial estava próxima e não era possi
vel deixar a América do Sul à mercê dos inimigos poten-
ciais. Ofereceu Vossa Excelência, naquela oportunida-
de, para o adestramento dos marinheiros brasileiros,na-
vios fora de uso na esquadra norte-americana e que, sem
fazer falta aos Estados Unidos, constituissem um peque-
no núcleo de treinamento para as nossas fôrças navais
-3-
completamente desaparelhadas. A República Argentina ve
tou essa operação natural e de todo ponto aconselhável
e, para não criar agravos nem afetar a política de bôa
vizinhança, não foi ela executada, o que seria a anteci-
pação do lend-and-lease, fórmula providencial da politi-
ca exterior do seu Govêrno para auxiliar as nações ami-
gas em perigo eventual ou atual. Os acontecimentos pos-
teriores vieram confirmar a sabedoria e a previsão de
Vossa Excelência. No momento trágico e decisivo, quan-
do a unidade continental exigia o concurso de todos, foi
precisamente a Argentina quem rompeu a frente única. o
bom vizinho, que assim se proclamava para impedir um a-
to de simples e livre convênio, deixou-nos sós no campo
de luta. Em nada pudemos, nos dias trágicos que antece
deram e sucederam Pearl Harbor, contar com êle. En-
quanto isso, a velha e pequena esquadra do Brasil, ca-
indo aos pedaços, contando mais com a bravura e perícia
do seu pessoal do que com o material, arrastou-se nos
mares, comboiou navios mercantes e transportes de tropa,
defendendo a navegação aliada e a sua própria, também ao
serviço dos Estados Unidos, contra 05 submarinos e cor-
sários do Eixo.
Tudo o que ocorreu desde 1937 trans-
formou a promessa amiga do Presidente Roosevelt ao Bra-
sil em reivindicação histórica. 0 Chefe de Estado que,
-4-
naquela época, teve um pensamento generoso de congra-
çamento e sacrificou a sua promessa à visão ampla da
unidade continental, tornou-se depois o homem chave
na luta política mundial que deflagrou a maior guerra
de todos 05 tempos a verdadeira guerra dos continen
tes. Quem sofreu a afronta de ver as aspirações jus-
tas do seu pais vetadas por um terceiro que não tinha
motivos para fazê-10, sem ao menos a alegação de não
dispôr de iguais elementos de guerra naval, é o mesmo
que atendeu ao apêlo do Presidente Roosevelt e cedeu
bases aéreas através das quais 05 Estados Unidos pude
ram socorrer com eficiência 05 seus aliados no momen-
to de maior risco, quando as bandeiras eixistas domi-
navam as costas do Mediterrâneo, mudando assim franca
mente o curso da guerra e reabrindo a rota do Orien-
te.
o que o Brasil agora pleiteia não
representa muito, nem para as nossas necessidades, nem
para 0 rítmo de construção da Marinha Americana.
É
na realidade, convem notar, pouco mais do que nos fô-
ra oferecido naquela circunstância de 1937. A promes
sa inicial compreendia cruzadores e mais tarde, para
atender às nossas exigências ocasionais, se transfor-
mára em oferta de contra-torpedeiros, em face das pon
derações dos chefes navais norte-americanos, que pre-
-5-
feriam entregar destroyers sem comissão nos portos do
Pacífico. Sobreleva acentuar, ainda, que êstes na-
vios, cedidos ao Brasil, aliado e colaborador dos Es-
tados Unidos antes e depois da guerra, são, bem pen-
sando, uma forma de aumentar a segurança do continen-
te americano, porque a prova da nossa cooperação leal
e franca já está feita. Em quaisquer novas emergên-
cias seguiremos a nossa tradição de política exterior
ao lado da Nação Americana e prontos a colaborar na
defesa do continente e a garantir a paz entre as na-
ções latino-americanas.
A lúcida compreensão de Vossa Ex-
celência não escapará o alcance dêste ajustamento prá
tico inicial dos nossos recursos de vigilância mariti
ma. Diante das incertezas do futuro e das duras pro-
vações que estamos sofrendo 05 Estados Unidos e 05
demais países civilizados seria oportuno pensar nu-
ma cooperação permanente, em que não sòmente as nos-
sas chancelarias, mas também os elementos militares,
navais e aéreos das duas Nações, pudessem estabelecer
maior e mais forte colaboração. Estou certo de que
o Almirante Ingram, tão ao corrente da situação da
Marinha Americana e da nossa futura participação nas
tarefas de guardar a paz, poderá explicar, com maior
-6-
minúcia, 05 elevados objetivos que temos 0 direito
de pretender para o maior progresso de toda a Amé-
rica e maior segurança das nações amigas.
Reitero ao Eminente Amigo
as
expressões de minha grande estima e alto aprêço
pessoal.
AS/
TRANSLATION
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC - Petropolis, April 13, 1944.
Eminent Friend
President Franklin Roosevelt
Admiral Ingram, of the Grand American Navy, is a deep
connoisseur upon the South Atlantic safety requirements, espe-
cially upon the Brazilian coast and its defense. Since a long
time, he and Brazilian Navy are working together and, all the
time long the most acute menace to the navigation of our seas,
he assumed the patrol services general control. His efficient
action and fine qualities of Command made him a Chief esteemed
by the higher Brazilian officers. All that entitles him to be,
therefore, in the presence of the Eminent Friend, the hearty
and full informed ambassador about our needs and how it would
be possible to the United States cooperate with Brazil in re-
ference to the maritime safety and maintenance of peace among
the Latin-American Nations.
In accordance with the Admiralty and our Navy Minis-
ter's plan, know and approved by the friend of us Admiral
Ingram, our more pressing requirements are the cession, under
the lend-lease or through other means, judged more convenient,
of a certain number of warships: 2 heavy cruisers and 2 light
cruisers; 3 destroyers leaders of flotilla; 12 smaller uni-
US01139
(Translation)
- 2 -
ties, 1500 tons type; 2 aircraft carriers; 4 mine-sweepers;
1 destroyer tender; 1 net tender; 1 net layer and 3 fleet tugs.
The realization of that desideratum depends on the high deci-
sion of Your Excellency, being such a thing a just wish of the
Brazilian sailors, who, exemplarily, have cooperated with the
North American Squadron, and so continue, in the operations
against the comon enemy.
There is a remarkable and historical fact in the conti-
nental policy, good to remember at the present circumstances.
Seven years ago, Your Excellency, with the power of forecast,
proper to the real statesmen, perceived that the world war was
near and it would be not possible to leave South America at the
mercy of the potential enenmies. At that opportunity, for ins-
truction to Brazilian sailors, Your Excellency offered ships
out of comission in the North American Fleet, unnecessary to
United States, in order to constitute a small nucleus to traim
up our naval forces quite unprovided. Argentina Republic coun-
teracted that natural and wise step, not realized in order to
avert grievances and preserve the good-neighbour policy. Such
a step would be the anticipation of lend-and-lease, providen-
tial formula to the foreign policy of Your Excellency Govern-
ment, aiming to help the friendly nations in actual or even-
tual danger. Later events confirmed the wisdom and prevision
(Translation)
- 3 -
from Your Excellency. At the tragic and decisive moment, when
the continental unity required the general cooperation, Argen-
tina broke the unique front, just at that moment. The good
neighbour, so proclaimed by himself, intending to hinder an
act of simple and free agreement, left us alone on the battle-
field. During the days before and after Pearl-Harbor, we could
not rely upon him. In the meanwhile, the old and small fleet
of Brazil, in a precarious condition, depending more on the
bravery and skill or the crews than on the material, hardly cros-
sed the seas, escorted merchant and troop-ships, defending the
allied and our own navigation, also at the United States ser-
vice, against submarines and corsairs of the Axis.
All occurrences since 1937 changed the friendly promi-
se from President Roosevelt to Brazil in a historical revendi-
cation. The Chief of State who, at that time, had a generous
thought of cohesion and sacrificed his promise at the wide
sight on the continental unity, became after the key-man in
the world political struggle that deflagrated the greatest war
of all times - the real war of the Continents. Who was affron-
ted, seeing the just wishes of his country counteracted by a
third who had no reasons to do so, including an unmade allega-
tion on inferiority around resources for naval war, is just
the same who attended the appeal from President Roosevelt and
(Translation)
- 4 -
conceded air bases through which United States could efficient-
ly assist the allies at the most dangerous moment, when the flags
of the Axis were dominating the Mediterranean coasts, changing
openly, therefore, the course of the war and opening the rout
to the Orient.
Now, what Brazil pleads is not so much, nor for our
needs neither for the rhythm of construction in American Navy.
Really it is - notice - a little more tham that was offered
to us at 1937 circumstances. The original promise included
cruisers, and later, to supply our occasional requirements, it
was converted in an offer of destroyers, because of the ponde-
rations from the North American Naval Chiefs who prefered to
deliver destroyers out of commission in ports of the Pacific.
It is noticeable that, on the other hand, these ships conceded
to Brazil, cooperator and ally of United States before and after
the war, are means that increase the safety of the American Con-
tinent, since the proof of our loyal and spontaneous cooperation
is already made. At any new emergency we shall follow our tra-
ditional foreign policy by the side of the American Nation,
ready to cooperate in the defense of the Continent and to sup-
port the peace among the Latin-American nations.
To the lucid comprehension of Your Excellency the reach
of this initial and pratical adjustment of our maritime vigi-
(Translation)
- 5 -
lance resources will be clear. Before the uncertainties of the
future and the hard probations we are suffering - United States
and the other civilized countries - it would be opportune to
think of a permanent cooperation, including not only our chan-
celries but also individuals from the Army, Navy and Air For-
ces of our two nations, could settle a greater and stronger
collaboration. I am sure that Admiral Ingram, well informed on
the situation of the North America Navy and on our future par-
ticipation in the tasks to preserve the peace, is in position
to explain, minutely, the high objectives we have the right to
pretend for greater progress of all America and greater safety
of the friendly nations.
I renew to the Eminente Friend the expression of my
great esteem and high personal regards.
(S.) Getulio Vargas.
Revised
TRANSLATION
April 13, 1944.
Eminent Friend,
President Franklin Roosevelt:
Admiral Ingram, of the great American Navy, is a
profound authority on the security requirements of the
South Atlantic and, especially, of the Brazilian Coast
and of its defense. For a long time he has been col-
laborating with the Brazilian Navy and, during the
period of most acute threat to navigation in our waters,
he took over the general direction of patrol services.
His efficient action and his high qualities of leader-
ship have made him a Chief esteemed by the Brazilian
High Command. These are his credentials, therefore, to
my Eminent Friend, as friendly Ambassador, well informed
of what we require and of the ways in which the United
States can cooperate with Brazil in relation to maritime
security and the maintainence of peace among the
Latin-American nations.
According to the plan of the Navy Staff and of our
Ministry of Marine, known to and approved by our mutual
friend Admiral Ingram, our most urgent requirements are
considered to be the cession, by lend-lease or by other
means which may seem most appropriate, of a certain
number of warships: two heavy cruisers and two light
cruisers, three escort destroyers, twelve smaller units
of the 1500-ton type, two aircraft carriers, four mine
sweepers, one destroyer tender, one mine tender, one
mine layer and three seagoing tugs. Upon the high de-
cision of Your Excellency depends the attainment of
this desideratum, legitimate aspiration of Brazilian
sailors, who, in an exemplary manner, are cooperating
with the American fleet in operations against the common
foe.
There is a historical fact of outstanding political
and continental importance which it is appropriate to
consider under the present circumstances. Seven years
ago, Your Excellency, with the gift of foresight of true
statesmen, felt that world war was near and that it was
not
-2-
not possible to leave South America at the mercy of
potential enemies. On that occasion, Your Excellency
offered, for the training of Brazilian seamen, vessels
of the American fleet which were not being used and
which, without any deprivation of the United States,
would constitute a small training nucleus for our entire-
ly unequipped naval forces. The Argentine Republic
objected to this natural and, from all points of view,
desirable proposal and, in order not to create incidents
or affect the Good Neighbor Policy, it was not carried
out, al though it would have been in anticipation of
lend-lease, far-sighted formula of the foreign policy of
your Government to assist free nations in eventual or
actual danger. Later events confirmed Your Excellency's
wisdom and far-sightedness. In the tragic and decisive
moment, when continental unity demanded the adhesion of
all, it was Argentina herself that broke the common
front. The good neighbor, which had so proclaimed itself
in order to prevent an act of simple and free agreement,
deserted us on the field of battle. In no way, in the
tragic days which preceded and followed Pearl Harbor,
have we been able to count upon her. At the same time,
the antiquated and tiny fleet of Brazil, ill-conditioned,
counting more on the bravery and skill of its personnel
than on its equipment, took to the open seas, convoyed
merchant vessels and troop transports, in the defense of
allied and its own navigation, also at the service of
the United States, against the submarines and raiders of
the Axis.
All that has happened since 1937 has transformed
the friendly promise of President Roosevelt to Brazil
into historical vindication. The Chief of State who, on
that occasion, had a generous thought of conciliation
and sacrificed his promise for the purpose of continental
unity, became later the key-man in the world political
struggle from which grew the greatest war of all time -
a true war of the continents. He who suffered the
affront of seeing the just aspirations of his country
opposed by a third who had no reasons for such action,
without even the allegation that he did not dispose of
equivalent elements of naval warfare, (1.e., without even
complaining that he did not possess naval strength com-
parable to that of Argentina), is the same one who
answered President Roosevelt's appeal and granted air
bases across which the United States was able, with ef-
ficiency, to deliver assistance to its allies in the
moment of greatest peril, when Axis banners were
dominating
-3-
dominating Mediterranean shores, thus completely
changing the course of the war and reopening the route
to the Far East.
What Brazil is now asking for does not represent
very much, either for our own requirements or in relation
to the pace of construction of the American Navy, It is,
in reality, it should be noted, little more than what
was offered to us on that occasion in 1937. The original
promise included cruisers and later, in order to provide
for our eventual requirements, was converted into an
offer of torpedo-boat destroyers by reason of the de-
cisions of the American Naval High Command which
preferred to deliver decommissioned destroyers then in
Pacific ports. Furthermore, it should be emphasized
that these vessels, ceded to Brazil, ally and collaborator
of the United States before and after the war, represent,
in a clear way of thinking, one way of increasing the
security of the American continent, because the proof of
our loyal and open cooperation has already been given.
In any new contingencies we shall follow our traditional
foreign policy at the side of the American nation, ready
to collaborate in the defense of the continent and to
guarantee peace among the Latin-American countries.
The effect of this initial practical adjustment in
our resources for maritime vigilance will not escape the
clear understanding of Your Excellency. In the face of
the uncertainties of the future and of the difficult
trials which we are sustaining - the United States and
other civilized countries - it would be opportune to
give thought to permanent cooperation in which not only
the foreign offices but also the military, naval and air
forces of the two nations could establish greater and
stronger collaboration. I am sure that Admiral Ingram,
so well informed of the situation of the American Navy
and of our future participation in the tasks of keeping
the peace, will be able to explain in greater detail the
high objectives to which we have a right to aspire for
the greater progress of all of America and the greater
security of friendly nations.
I reiterate to my Eminent Friend the expressions of
my highest esteem and personal appreciation.
Getulio Vargas
Translated by:
BA:POChalmers:FCS
- Secy, Navy)
Brazil freder
1-44
46955 - Under Secy. ) State)
hms
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 20, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
Will you get together and
draw up a nice personal letter
for me to send to President Vargas?
F. D. R.
Original of this memorandum, together with
letter in Spanish and translation of same from
Hon. Getulio Vargas, 4/13/44, to the President,
asking for various warships, etc., under Lend-
Lease, sent to the Secretary of the Navy; copy
of the memorandum and explanation of enclosure
sent to the Under Secretary of State.
(3153)
hm
Signed original of this "letter r letter SBrezil form
the President of Brazil sent to the
office of the 6/27/44 Sey. State for delivery.
hims
June 21, 1944
Dear Jeff:
I have just been informed of the successful con-
clusion of the long and sometimes tortuous negotiations
of a military aviation agreement with Brazil.
I an fully aware of the many difficulties and set-
backs you have encountered and of the skill with which
you have kept things in line and brought the negotis-
tions to a successful conclusion.
I feel that this is a model setting 6 pattern for
the maintenance through cooperative asssures of security
of the Hemisphere after the war. I also feel that other
nations may draw a useful lesson from this example of
projecting war-time military cooporation into peace-time
cooporation. I as satisfied that the results will be
beneficial not alone to the United States and to Hrazil,
but also to the Western Hontaphere, and to the mainton-
ance of general world peace.
Please convey my congratelations and ware good
wishes to President Verges and to Aranha and deliver to
the President at a suitable opportunity the letter which
accompanies this one,
with all good wishes,
Sincerely yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
Enclosure:
Letter to Prosident Vargue
The Menorable
Jefferson Caffery,
American Ambassador,
Rio de Janeiro.
53)
has
June 21, 1944
My dear Mr. President:
I have just learned with great pleasure of the
signature in Rio de Janeiro by representatives of
your Government and by the American Ambassator near
Your Excellency of the agreement regarding strategic
airports and reciprosel privileges in Brazil and the
United States of military aircraft of the two
countries.
I should like to express az deep personal autis-
faction that Brazil and the United States are again
showing the way in useful cooperation. Although the
agreement is between Bresil and the United States,
the benefits of It will not be confined to the two
countries. The assurance of homisphere security and
of maintenance of peace in the world is carried a
long step forward by this first model agreement de-
signed for the period after the var.
The next step in this joint collaboration of
your country and the United States should, In my view,
include allitary staff discussions for the continued
association in security and defense activities of the
APHIES, Sevior and AIr Forces of the two countries.
These discussions should cover questions of equipment
and matériol, as well as surface craft and aircraft.
Another step which I have already authorized Ambas-
sador Caffery to discuss with you is a model security
agreement to assure collaboration against aggression
directed against either country, or the Henisphere.
I believe
dia Excellency
Ostulio Vargas,
President of the United States of Brazil,
Rio de Janeiro.
-2-
I believe that these discussions should in-
clude examination of Brasilian participation in
estra-continental ********* arrangements such as
Ar. Caffery VOI authorized to mention 20 you,
personally and confidentially.
Perhaps you sould give se your own views la
order that representatives of our too Governments
may nap out a program of action.
Era. Roosevelt joins no in sending you and
Medane Varges our ware personal good wishes.
Ver, sincerely yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
9/10
- OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
I di di
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
June 19, 1944
My dear Mr. President:
I refer to your directives of January 7 and
February 1, 1944 and to your personal instructions
of last January to Ambassador Jefferson Caffery to
negotiate with the Brazilian Government an arrangement
by which we might enjoy military use of certain Brazil-
ian air bases after the war.
I am happy to inform you of the signature of an
agreement in this sense on June 14 by Foreign Minister
Aranha and Ambassador Caffery.
The Brazilian Government asks that the agreement
be kept secret until the two Governments decide other-
wise.
I am sending you herewith an informal copy of this
agreement. I am also sending a copy to the Chairman
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, with whom
we had previously exchanged views.
In brief, the agreement allows our service aircraft
to make free use of eight strategic air bases in north
and northeast Brazil for a period of ten years, or
longer if not denounced by either Government. It pro-
vides for our maintenance of service personnel for our
aircraft at those airports and calls for establishment
of & joint commission to superintend, maintain and
operate these airports. Provision is also made for the
use in each country of other airports by military air-
craft of the other country.
Owing in part to a series of untimely comments by
persons and periodicals in the United States, Brazil
and Argentina regarding our intentions in respect of
these airports after the war, President Vargas and his
service
The President,
The White House.
-2-
service ministers have had to proceed with extreme caution.
The course of the negotiations was often difficult as
a result. However, Ambassador Caffery has handled the
situation with consummate skill, subtle tact and end-
less patience.
Accordingly, I attach a suggested letter for your
signature, if you approve, to the Ambassador.
Because there is a feeling among some of the Brazilian
Ministers and military authorities that this agreement
provides far greater advantages to us than to Brazil, I
also think that a letter from you to President Vargas,
along the lines of the attached draft, would be useful.
Faithfully yours,
Attachments:
1. Copy of aviation agreement
2. Letter to Ambassador Caffery
for signature
Department of State
BUREAU
-BA
DIVISION
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted
ADDRESSED TO
The President,
The White House
. . - - -
1-1000
Whereas, the United States of America and the United
States of Brazil at the Eighth International Conference of
American States at Lima reaffirmed their purpose to defend
the principles of continental solidarity and absolute
sovereignty against all foreign activity that might threaten
them; and
Whereas, the United States of America and the United
States of Brazil in pursuance of resolution XV of the second
meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American
Republics at Habana entered into various agreements deemed
necessary to organize cooperation for continental defense and
mutual assistance against extra-continental threats of
aggression; and
Whereas, among the several agreements entered into
and measures adopted through mutual consultation by the
United States of America and the United States of Brazil none
has been more effective in fortifying the continent against
external aggression and in strengthening the extremely close
political and military relations, which have always existed
between the United States of America and the United States of
Brazil, than the Joint brazil-United States air, military
and naval arrangements entered into in connection with the
present conflict; and
Whereas, prudence and the responsibilities within
the system of their own and the continental defense freely
assumed by the United States of America and the United States
of Brazil demand of the two countries that they take the
necessary measures to promote their mutual security and to
defend their territories and areas of mutual interest against
possible threats of aggression following the cessation of
hostilities, and that the two governments commit themselves
to strengthen the close political and military cooperation
already existing between the two countries; and
Whereas, because of the great development in aerial
warfare that has already taken place and that may be expected
in the future, the foregoing defense policy requires, as a
first step (without prejudice to similar understandings re-
garding other military departments) from the standpoint of
the protection of both countries and the continent, the
continued maintenance of strategic military airports for the
joint use of both governments, without in any manner imply-
ing the permanency of the Armed Forces of the United States
of America at the air bases in question which are enumerated
in exhibit No. 1 to this document; and
Whereas, of the factors of location, military strength
and resources which determine the military value of an air-
port, brazil is able to furnish, among other things, certain
strategic locations, adequate personnel for defense and
certain resources, and the United States is able to furnish,
among other things, the material of the military strength
factor and many resources that will not be available in
Brazil for some years, and it therefore would be to the
mutual advantage of both countries for each to contribute the
elements which each is best able to supply in order that they
may together maintain bases for their mutual defense; and
Whereas,
-2-
Whereas, the Government of the United States of
Brazil is the sole owner of the airports enumerated in Ex-
hibit No. 1 to this document and under the terms of Decree
No. 3462 of July 23, 1941, these airports will be under its
exclusive command, flag, symbols and military regulations;
Therefore the Governments of the United States of
America and of the United States of Brazil, firmly resolved
to take every measure toward contributing to the maintenance
of world peace and to defense against any aggression, agree
upon the following terms for continuation of their military
air cooperation in the post-war period.
Article First: The territories affected by the present
agreement are:
(A) In the case of the United States of America, con-
tinental United States, Puerto Rico and the Virgin
Islands;
(B) In the case of the United States of Brazil, con-
tinental brazil and Pernendo Noronha Island.
Article Second: For the purpose of the present agreement
"military aircraft" are defined as aircraft of the army, navy
or air forces of either government, and civil aircraft operated
in military traffic under contracts with the armed forces of
either government, in no case as common carriers;
Article Third:
(A) The Airports and their appurtenances described in
Exhibit No. 1, and facilities necessary for their
operation (hereinafter referred to as the
"strategic airports"), and any other airports
located either in the territories described in
Article First or elsewhere outside the continent
which, by future agreement between the two Govern-
ments may be designated as strategic airports, may
be freely used by the military aircraft and person-
nel of both Governments in accordance with the laws
of the respective countries and in compliance with
the present agreement. The exact boundaries of
the aforesaid airports described in Exhibit No. 1,
their appurtenances and facilities shall be deter-
mined by & Technical Commission for the Conserva-
tion of Airports hereinafter provided for, with the
approval of the Minister of Aeronautics.
(B) The radio, meteorological, communications, repair,
storage and other equipment and facilities con-
structed or installed at any strategic airport,
or which may hereafter be constructed or installed
thereat, together with any gasoline storage
facilities, equipment and pipe lines now or here-
after constructed or installed at or in the
vicinity of any strategic airport for use in
connection with its operation, may be freely
used by the air forces of each country during
the life of this agreement. Such equipment and
facilities shall be considered an integral part
of such strategic airports.
(c) Either
-3-
(c) Either government may maintain at each strategic
airport such personnel as may be necessary for the
servicing and maintenance of the airport and of
such of its military aircraft as may from time to
time be located at or making use of the airport.
Article Fourth: In view of the joint use for defense
of the strategic airports and facilities contemplated by the
present agreement, the two Governments agree that each should
participate in the responsibility for the maintenance of the
strategic airports and facilities. In order to discharge
their joint responsibility and to provide for the efficient
maintenance of the said airports, although the airports con-
tinue to belong to the Government of Brazil and subordinate to
the Ministry of Air, the two Governments hereby establish a
Technical Commission for the Conservation of Airports composed
of equal numbers of representatives of the Brazilian Air
Force and of the Armed Forces of the United States of America.
The Commission shall determine its procedure.
Article Fifth: The two Governments agree that:
(A) The Technical Commission for the Conservation of Air-
ports, which will have its headquarters at the
Ministry of Aeronautics, shall superintend the opera-
tion and maintenance, and shall prescribe regulations
for the use, of each strategic airport and its facili-
ties;
(B) The Commission shall recommend to the two Govern-
ments a formula for the equitable distribution
between the two Governments of the costs of main-
tenance and operation of the strategic airports;
(c) The Commission will propose additional equipment
and facilities which it may be advisable to con-
struct or install at any of the strategic airports
by and at the expense of either Government subject
to the approval of the Governments;
(D) The Commission shall formulate plans for expansion
of the training already initiated in Brazil and in
the United States for the preparation of Brazilian
technicians in the operation of airports and faci-
lities. The Government of the United States of
America will make available suitable facilities at
its disposal to provide such training.
Article Sixth: The use of the strategic airports and
facilities by civil aircraft as now and hereafter permitted
by the brazilian Government shall not be affected by this
agreement, but operations of such aircraft shall be subject to
the provisions of Paragraph (A) of Article Fifth.
Article Seventh: The military aircraft of each
Government shall, subject to the limitations of the present
agreement, be permitted to fly into, over and away from the
territory under the jurisdiction of the other Government. Sub-
ject to the provisions of the present agreement and to the laws
of the respective countries, the military aircraft of each
Government shall further be accorded the right to land at and
facilities, within the territory of the other open to its own
take off from airports, and to use all airport and navigational
military aircraft.
Article
-4-
Article Eighth: The military aircraft of each govern-
ment and the military, naval, air forces and other official
personnel and official supplies, equipment and material
carried on such aircraft, while within or over the territory
of the other country, shall not be exempt from the laws in
force in that territory, except as otherwise provided in
this agreement.
Article Ninth: Each government reserves the right, for
considerations of military security or in the interest of public
safety or for other sufficient reasons, to restrict or prohibit,
over zones each government may from time to time define, air
traffic by military aircraft of the other government. Each
government shall promptly communicate to the other information
regarding such zones and regulations it may adopt in connection
with them.
Article Tenth: No import, excise, consumption or other
tax, duty or impost shall be charged by either party on
material, equipment, supplies or goods brought into its
territory for the use of the other party, under the present
agreement, or for the official use but not for private and
personal use of its armed forces or its civilian personnel
on the territory by reason of employment under the present
agreement.
Article Eleventh: No member of the armed forces of
either party and no civilian personnel of either party
resident on the territory of the other by reason of such
employment under the present agreement shall be liable to
pay income tax on income derived from the government by
which he is employed, unless he is a national of the country
on whose territory he is serving.
Article Twelfth: The present agreement shall be-
come effective upon signature and shall run for ten years,
unless the two Governments agree to the contrary. It shall
thereafter remain in effect until twelve months after the day
on which one of the governments advises the other of its
intention of terminating it.
Brazil freder 44
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
files
July 5, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR
Miss Tully:
The attached photostat copy of
the recent U.S.-Brazil military airport
agreement was informally referred by the
President to Admiral Leahy "for whatever
action that is necessary.'
This has been studied by the
J.C.S. and Admiral Leahy is advised that
no action at present appears necessary,
and that the possibility of necessary
post-war action is under study by a com-
mittee. To date Admiral Leahy has not
discussed the matter with the President.
The attached papers are returned
to your files.
Respectfully,
of
V.Smith
Smith
Lt. Commander, USN
Aide
as OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, a c.
25
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
In reply refer to
BA
June 29, 1944
My dear Mr. President:
With reference to my letter to you of June 19,
1944 informing you of the signature in Rio de Janeiro
of a military airport agreement, I take pleasure in
transmitting herewith a photostatic copy of the
original signed agreement together with an English
translation thereof.
Sincerely yours,
Enclosure:
Copy of despatch no. 16411, June 14,
from Rio de Janeiro enclosing photostatic
copy of original signed agreement and
English translation.
The President,
The White House.
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
J. scheuble
By
Date
2-4-72
department of State
BUREAU
Ba
DIVISION
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted
6.26.44
ADDRESSED TO
The President
. * - - -
1-1000
Published in
Foreign Relations of the United States
1944 Vol. VII The American Republics
pp. 560-566.
BA
EMBASSY of THE
No. 16411
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Rio de Janeiro, June 14, 1944.
SUBJECT: Transmitting Text of Secret Military
Aviation Agreement.
BARN:
The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
Sir:
With reference to my telegram No. 2175 of
June 14, 5 PM, reporting the successful conclusion
of the negotiations for the military aviation agree-
ment, I have the honor to transmit herewith the
original of the Portuguese text handed me by Aranha
and copies of the English text which I handed to
Aranha, together with the text of the covering notes
which was suggested by Aranha and to which I took
no objection.
Respectfully yours,
Jefferson Caffery.
Enclosures:
1. Original Portuguese text of
Note from Minister for Foreign
Affairs dated June 14, 1944 to-
gether with aviation agreement.
2. English text of note to Minister
for Foreign Affairs dated June
14, 1944 together with aviation
agreement.
File No. 879.6
JC:LEF
Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No.
16411 of June 14, 1944 from the
Embassy at Rio de Janeiro.
ENGLISH TEXT
Rio de Janeiro, June 14, 1944.
-
Excellency:
I have the honor to confirm the agreement
which has been reached by the Governments of Brazil
and the United States of America, the text of which,
consisting of nine pages, and one exhibit consist-
ing of four pages, all of them initialed, I here-
with transmit to Your Excellency.
The present agreement will be kept secret until
decision to the contrary by both Governments.
I avail myself of this opportunity to renew
to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest
consideration.
JEFFERSON CAFFERY
His Excellency
Dr. Oswaldo Aranha,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Rio de Janeiro.
WHEREAS the United States of America and the
United States of Brazil at the Eighth International
Conference of American States at Lima reaffirmed their
purpose to defend the principles of continental soll-
darity and absolute sovereignty against all foreign
activity that might threaten them; and
WHEREAS the United States of America and the
United States of Brazil in pursuance of Resolution XV
of the second meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Af-
fairs of the American Republics at Habana entered in-
to various agreements deemed necessary to organize
cooperation for continental defense and mutual assis-
tance against extra-continental threats of aggression;
and
WHEREAS among the several agreements entered in-
to and measures adopted through mutual consultation
by the United States of America and the United States
of Brazil none has been more effective in fortifying
the continent against external aggression and in
strengthening the extremely close political and mili-
tary relations which have always existed between the
United States of America and the United States of
Brazil, than the joint Brazil-United States air, mili-
tary and naval arrangements entered into in connection
with the present conflict; and
HEREAS, prudence and the responsibilities within
the system of their own and the continental defense
-2-
freely assumed by the United States of America and
the United States of Brazil demand of the two countries
that they take the necessary measures to promote their
mutual security and to defend their territories and
areas of mutual interest against possible threats of
aggression following the cessation of hostilities, and
that the two Governments commit themselves to strengthen
the close political and military cooperation already
existing between the two countries; and
WHEREAS, because of the great development in aerial
warfare that has already taken place and that may be
expected in the future, the foregoing defense policy
requires, 8.8 a first step (without prejudice to similar
understandings regarding other military departments),
from the standpoint of the protection of both countries
and the continent, the continued maintenance of stra-
tegic military airports for the joint use of both gov-
ernments, without in any manner implying the permanency
of the armed forces of the United States of America at
the air bases in question which are enumerated in Ex-
hibit No. I to this document; and
WHEREAS, of the factors of location, military
strength and resources which determine the military
value of an airport, Brazil 1s able to furnish, among
other things, certain strategic locations, adequate
personnel for defense and certain resources, and the
-3-
United States is able to furnish, among other things,
the materiel for the military strength factor and
many resources that will not be available in Brazil
for some years, and it therefore would be to the mu-
tual advantage of both countries for each to contrib-
ute the elements which each is best able to supply in
order that they may together maintain bases for their
mutual defense; and
WHEREAS the Government of the United States of
Brazil 18 the sole owner of the airports enumerated in
Exhibit No. I to this document and under the terms of
Decree No. 3462 of July 25, 1941 these airports will be
under its exclusive command, flag, symbols and military
regulations;
THEREFORE the Governments of the United States of
America and of the United States of Brazil, firmly re-
solved to ake every measure toward contributing to
the maintenance of world peace and to defense against
any aggression agains t their territories and also to
keep danger from continental shores, agree upon the
following terms for continuation of their military air
cooperation in the post-war period.
ARTICLE FIRST
The territories affected by the present agreement
are:
(a) In the case of the United States of America,
-4-
continental United States, Puerto Rico and the Virgin
Islands;
(b) In the case of the United States of Brazil,
continental Brazil and Fernando Noronha Island.
ARTICLE SECOND
For the purposes of the present agreement "military
aircraft" are defined as aircraft of the Army, Navy or
Air Forces of either Government, and civil aircraft op-
erated in military traffic under contracts with the
armed forces of either Government, in no case 88 com-
mon carriers.
ARTICLE THIRD
(a) The airports and their appurtenances described
in Exhibit I, and facilities necessary for their op-
eration (hereinafter referred to as the "strategic air-
ports"), and any other sirports located either in the
territories described in Article First or elsewhere
outside of the continent which, by future agreement be-
tween the two Governments may be designated as strate-
gic airports, may be freely used by the militery air-
craft and personnel of both Governments in accordance
with the laws of the respective countries and in com-
pliance with the present agreement. The exact boundaries
of the aforesaid airports described in Exhibit No. I,
their appurtenances and facilities shall be determined
by a Technical Commission for the Conservation of Air-
ports hereinsfter provided for, with the approval of
-5-
the Minister of Aeronautics.
(b) The radio, meteorological, communications,
repair, storage and other equipment and facilities
constructed or installed at any strategic airport, or
which may hereinafter be constructed or installed
thereat, together with any gasoline storage facilities,
equipment and pipe lines now or hereafter constructed
or installed at or in the vicinity of any strategic air-
port for use in connection with its operation, may be
freely used by the Air Forces of each country during
the life of this agreement. Such equipment and facilities
shall be considered an integral part of such strategic
airports.
(o) Either Government may maintain at each stra-
tegic airport such personnel as may be necessary for
the servicing and maintenance of the sirport and of
such of its military aircraft as may from time to time
be located at or making use of the airport.
ARTICLE FOURTH
In view of the joint use for defense of the stra-
tegic airports and facilities contemplated by the pre-
sent agreement, the two Governments agree that each
should participate in the responsibility for the main-
tenance of the strategic airports and facilities. In
order to discharge their joint responsibility and to
provide for the efficient maintenance of the said air-
ports, although the airports continue to belong to
-6-
the Government of Brazil and subordinate to the Min-
istry of Air, the two Governments hereby establish a
Technical Commission for the Conservation of Airports,
composed of equal numbers of representatives of the
Brazilian Air Forcet and of the armed forces of the
United States of America. The Commission shall deter-
mine its procedure.
ARTICLE FIFTH
The two Governments agree that:
(a) The Technical Commission for the Conservation
of Airports, which will have its headquarters at the
Ministry of Aeronautics, will be able to superintend
the operation and maintenance, and shall prescribe reg-
ulations for the use, of each strategic airport and its
facilities;
(b) The Commission shall recommend to the two
Governments a formula for the equitable distribution
of the costs of maintenance and operation of the stra-
tegic airports;
(c) The Commission will propose additional equip-
ment and facilities which it may be advisable to con-
struct or install at any of the strategic airports by
and at the expense of either Government subject to the
approval of the Governments.
(d) The Commission shall formulate plans for ex-
pansion of the training already initiated in Brazil and
-7-
in the United States for the preparation of Brazilian
technicians in the operation of airports and facil-
ities. The Government of the United States of America
will make available suitable facilities at its dis-
posal to provide such training.
ARTICLE SIXTH
The use of the strategic airports and facilities
by civil aircraft as now and hereafter permitted by
the Brazilian Government shall not be affected by this
agreement, but operations of such aircraft shall be
subject to the provisions of paragraph (a) of Article
Fifth.
ARTICLE SEVENTH
The military aircraft of each Government shall,
subject to the limitations of the present agreement,
be permitted to fly into, over and away from the ter-
ritory under the jurisdiction of the other Government.
Subject to the provisions of the present agreement and
to the laws of the respective countries, the military
aircraft of each Government shall further be accorded
the right to land at and take off from airports, and
to use all airport and navigational facilities, within
the territory of the other open to its own military
aircraft.
ARTICLE EIGHTH
The military aircraft of each Government and the
-8-
military, naval, air forces and other official per-
sonnel, and official supplies, equipment and material
carried on such aircraft, while within or over the
territory of the other country, shall not be exempt
from the laws in force in that territory, except as
otherwise provided in this agreement.
ARTICLE NINTH
Each Government reserves the right, for consid-
erations of military security or in the interest of
public safety or for other sufficient reasons, to
restrict or prohibit, over zones each Government may
from time to time define, air traffic by military air-
craft of the other Government. Each Government shall
promptly communicate to the other information regarding
such zones and regulations it may adopt in connection
with them.
ARTICLE TENTH
No import, excise, consumption or other tax,
duty or impost shall be charged by either party on
material, equipment, supplies or goods brought into
its territory for the use of the other party, under
the present agreement, or for the official use but
not for private and personal use of its ermed forces
or its civilian personnel on the territory by reason
of employment under the present agreement.
-9-
ARTICLE ELEVENTH
No member of the armed forces of either party
and no civilian personnel of either party resident on
the territory of the other by reason of such employ-
ment under the present agreement shall be liable to
pay income tax on income derived from the Government
by which he 18 employed, unless he 18 a national of
the country on whose territory he is serving.
ARTICLE TWELFTH
The present agreement shall become effective upon
signature and shall run for ten years unless the two
Government agree to the contrary. It shall thereafter
remain in effect until twelve months after the day on
which one of the Governments advises the other of its
intention of terminating it.
EXHIBIT I
The airports and appurtenances constituting the
strategic airports referred to in the foregoing agree-
ment are 88 follows:
AMAPÁ LANDPLANE BASE
The landplane airport located approximately 6 miles
from the village of Amapá (lat. 2°06'N. Long. 50°51'W).
BELEM LANDPLANE AND SEAPLANE BASE
The landplane and seaplane airport known as VAL DE
CAES FIELD located approximately 6 miles north of Belém
(Lat. 1°23's. Long. 48°28'W).
SÃO LUIS LANDPLANE BASE
The landplane airport known as TIRIRICAL FIELD, lo-
cated approximately 5 miles southwest of São Luis (Lat.
2°35's. Long. 44°13'W).
FORTALEZA LANDPLANE BASE
The landplane airport known 8.8 ADJACENTO FIELD,
located approximately 1 mile east of Fortaleza. (Lat.
3°44'S. Long. 38°40'W).
NATAL LANDPLANE BASE
The landplane airport known as PARNAMIRIM FIELD lo-
cated approximately 9-1/2 miles southwest of the city of
Natal (Lat. 5°53'S. Long. 35°14'W).
NATAL SEAPLANE BASE
The seaplane airport located approximately 1/2 mile
-2-
north of Natal on the R1o POTENGI (Lat. 5°46'S. Long.
35°12'W).
RECIFE LANDPLANE BASE
The landplane airport known as IBURA FIELD located
approximately 9 miles southwest of Recife (Lat. 8°6'8.
Long. 34°59'W).
FERNANDO DE NORONHA LANDPLANE BASE
The landplane airport located on the Island of FER-
NANDO DE NORONHA (Lat. 3°51'18"S. Long. 32°25'56"W).
BAIA LANDPLANE BASE
The landplane airport known as IPITANGA AIRFIELD
located approximately 15 miles northeast of 8ão Salvador
(lat. 12°54'S. Long. 38°20'W).
BAIA SEAPLANE BASE
The seaplane airport known as ARATU SEAPLANE BASE
located approximately 12 miles south of São Salvador on
Itapagipe Bay (Lat. 12°34'S. Long 38°30'W).
APPURTENANCES
All appurtenances, located at or in the vicinity of
each of the above named airports, which have been con-
structed or installed under the supervision of the United
States Army or Navy or for their account and which the
United States Army or Navy has heretofore used or 18 now
using by arrangement with the Brazilian Government for
purposes relating to the present conflict, including
-3-
without limiting the generality of the foregoing des-
cription all of the following: runways, taxiways, and
parking, fueling and repair aprons; seaplane ramps;
lighter-than-air landing and take-off mats and mooring
out circles; hangars and nose hangars; airport lighting
equipment; meteorological equipment; radio transmitting,
radio receiving, radio range and direction finder build-
ings and equipment; operations, administration and of-
fice buildings; warehouses, depots and magazines; helium
storage buildings, surface and underground petroleum
storage tanks and fueling facilities; barracks, mess
halls and recreation buildings for officers and enlisted
personnel and for civilian personnel; refrigerator
buildings; hospitals and infirmaries and all buildings
used in connection with their operations, chapels,
auditoriums, and motion picture theaters; and all related
buildings, structures and installations constructed or
installed in the manner and for the purposes above stated.
Also all facilities for the storaging, transporta-
tion and delivery of petroleum which by arrangement
with the Brazilian Government have been constructed or
installed under the supervision of the United States
Army or Navy by Standard Oil Company of Brazil for the
purpose of supplying petroleum to the airports at Belém,
São Luiz, Fortaleza, Natal, Fernando de Noronha, Recife
and Baía, including without limiting the generality of
the foregoing description all of the following: surface
-4-
and underground petroleum storage tanks, whether lo-
cated at said airports or at the seacoast or at other
points; pipe lines for transporting petroleum from
ship, railroad or other point to storage tanks and
from storage tanks to the airports; dooks, railroad
sidings and loading platforms; drum filling, dumping,
and cleaning houses; garages, shops and warehouses;
water tanks, water pipe lines and other installations
for fire protection; office and administrative buildings;
service stations, testing laboratory, generator houses;
and all related buildings, structures and installations
constructed or installed in the manner and for the pur-
pose above stated.
Rio de Janeiro, em 14 de Junho de 1944.
Excelentíssimo Senhor Jefferson Caffery,
Embaixador dos Estados Unidos da América.
Tenho a honra de confirmar o acôrdo a que
chegaram os Governos do Brasil e dos Estados Unidos da
América, cujo texto, constituido por sete púginus e un
2/2
Anexo com quatro páginas, todas rubricadas, junto remeto
a Vossa Excelência.
2.
Con esta nota e & resposta correspondente
de Vossa Excelência entrará em vigor o presente acôrdo,
que permanecerá secreto até decisão en contrário de ambos
os Governos.
Aproveito a oportunidade para reiterar OS
protestos da mais alta consideração com que me subscrevo
De Vossa Excelência
L.B.
CONSIDERANDO que os Estados Unidos da América e os
Estados Unidos do Brasil na Oitava Conferência Internacional de
Estados Americanos em Lima reafirmaram o seu propósito de defen-
der os princípios de solidariedade continental e absoluta sobe-
rania contra qualquer atividade do exterior que possa ameaçá-los;
e
CONSIDERANDO que os Estados Unidos da América e os
Estados Unidos do Brasil em cumprimento da Resolução XV da segun-
da reunião dos Ministros das Relações Exteriores das Repúblicas
Americanas em Havana celebraram vários acôrdos julgados necessá-
rios para organizar a cooperação para a defesa continental e as-
sistência mútua contra ameaças de agressão extra-continentais;
e
CONSIDERANDO que, dentre os diversos acôrdos cele-
brados e medidas adotadas por meio de consulta mútua pelos Esta-
dos Unidos da América e os Estados Unidos do Brasil nenhum tem
sido mais eficaz para o fortalecimento do continente contra
agressão do exterior, e para o estreitamento das relações polí-
ticas e militares muito íntimas que sempre existiram entre os
Estados Unidos da América e os Estados Unidos do Brasil, do que
os entendimentos mútuos aéreo, militar e naval Brasil-Estados
Unidos realizados em consequência do atual conflito; e
CONSIDERANDO que a prudência e as responsabilidades,
dentro do sistema de defesa própria e continental livremente as-
sumido pelos Estados Unidos da América e pelos Estados Unidos do
2.
do Brasil, exigem que os dois países adotem as necessárias medi-
das para promover a sua segurança mútua e defender seus territó-
rios e áreas de interêsse mútuo contra possíveis ameaças de agres-
são, após a terminação das hostilidades, e que os dois Governos
se comprometem a reforçar a íntima cooperação política e militar
já existente entre 08 dois países; e
CONSIDERANDO que, devido ao grande desenvolvimento
já alcançado pela guerra aérea e os que se podem esperar no futu-
Γo, a mencionada política defensiva requer, como primeiro passo
(sem prejuizo dos entendimentos da mesma natureza dos outros de-
partamentos militares), do ponto de vista da proteção dos dois
países e do continente, a manutenção contínua de aeroportos mili-
tares estratégicos para o uso conjunto dos dois governos sem que
de maneira nenhuma isso implique na permanência de forças arma-
das dos Estados Unidos da América nas bases aéreas em apreço,
que vao enumeradas no Anexo No.I a êste documento; e
CONSIDERANDO que dos fatores de localização, pode-
rio militar e recursos que determinam o valor militar de um
aeroporto, o Brasil está em condições de suprir, entre outras
coisas, certas localidades estratégicas, o pessoal adequado para
fins de defesa, e certos outros recursos, e os Estados Unidos
estão em condições de suprir, entre outras coisas, o material pa-
ra o fator de poderio militar e muitos recursos que provavelmen-
te não estarão disponiveis no Brasil durante alguns anos, e que
portanto seria de mútua vantagem para os dois países o contri-
buirem com 08 elementos que cada um pode da melhor maneira su-
prir afim de que juntos possam manter bases para a sua mútua de-
fesa; e
CONSIDERANDO que o Govêrno dos Estados Unidos do
3.
do Brasil é o proprietário exclusivo dos aeroportos enumerados
no Anexo No. I a êste documento e, nos termos do Decreto n°
3.462 de 25 de Julho de 1941, ficarão os mesmos sob seu exclu-
sivo comando, bandeira, símbolos e ordenanças militares.
PORTANTO os Governos dos Estados Unidos da América
e dos Estados Unidos do Brasil, firmemente resolvidos a tomarem
todas as medidas no sentido de contribuir para a manutenção da
paz mundial e para a defesa contra quaisquer agressões aos seus
territórios e mais afastar o perigo do litoral do continente,
acordam nos seguintes termos para a continuação da sua coopera-
ção aéro-militar no período de após-guerra.
ARTIGO PRIMEIRO
Os territórios compreendidos pelo presente acôrdo
sao:
(a) No caso dos Estados Unidos da América, os Esta-
dos Unidos continental, Pôrto Rico, e as Ilhas Virgens;
(b) No caso dos Estados Unidos do Brasil, o Brasil
continental e a Ilha de Fernando Noronha.
ARTIGO SEGUNDO
Para os fins do presente acôrdo, "aeronaves milita-
res" são definidas como aeronaves do Exército, Larinha ou Forças
Aéreas de cada Govêrno e aeronaves civís empregadas em tráfego
militar em virtude de contratos com as forças armadas de cada um
dos Governos, porém em caso algum como transportes comuns.
ARTIGO TERCEIRO
(a) Os aeroportos e seus pertences descritos no
Anexo I, e as facilidades necessárias para a sua operação (dora-
4.
(doravante denominados "aeroportos estratégicos"), e quaisquer
outros aeroportos localizados quer nos territórios descritos no
Artigo Primeiro ou noutro local fora do continente que, por acôr-
do futuro entre os dois Governos, possam ser designados como aero-
portos estratégicos, podem ser livremente utilizados pelas aerona-
ves e pessoal militares de ambos os Governos obedientes às leis
dos respectivos países respeitado o presente acôrdo. Os limites
exatos dêsses aeroportos descritos no Anexo I, seus pertences e fa-
cilidades serão estabelecidos por uma Comissão Técnica de Conserva-
ção de Aeroportos, prevista no presente acôrdo, com aprovação do
Ministro da Aeronáutica.
(b) Os aparelhos e facilidades de rádio, meteorolo-
gia, comunicações, reparos, depósito e outros, construidos ou ins-
talados em qualquer aeroporto estratégico, ou que possam futuramen-
te ser nele construidos ou instalados, juntamente com as facilida-
des para a armazenagem de gasolina, aparelhagem e encanamentos
atualmente ou no futuro construidos ou instalados nos aeroportos
estratégicos ou suas proximidades para fins de sua operação, podem
ser livremente utilizados pelas forças aéreas de cada país durante
a vigência dêste acôrdo. Os equipamentos e benfeitorias serão consi-
derados como parte integrante dos referidos aeroportos estratégicos.
(c) Qualquer dos dois Governos poderá manter em cada
aeroporto estratégico o pessoal que se tornar necessário ao abaste-
cimento e manutenção do aeroporto e das suas aeronaves militares que
possam de tempos a tempos estacionar em tal aeroporto ou dêle se
utilizar.
ARTIGO QUARTO
Em vista do uso conjunto, para fins de defesa, dos
aeroportos estratégicos e facilidades previstos no presente acôr-
do, os dois Governos concordam que cada um deverá participar da
5.
da responsabilidade para a manutenção dos aeroportos estratégi-
COS e facilidades. Afim de desempenhar a sua comum responsabi-
lidade e providenciar para manutenção eficiente dos referidos
aeroportos, embora os aeroportos continuem pertencentes ao Govêr-
no brasileiro e subordinados ao Ministério da Aeronáutica, fica
estabelecida pelos dois Governos a constituição de uma Comissão
Técnica de Conservação de Aeroportos, composta de igual número
de representantes da Força Aérea Brasileira e das forças armadas
dos Estados Unidos da América. A Comissão determinará o seu re-
gimento.
ARTIGO QUINTO
0a dois Governos concordam que:
(a) A Comissão Técnica de Conservação de Aeroportos
que funcionará no Ministério da Aeronáutica, poderá superinten-
der a operação e manutenção, e prescreverá as regras para o uso,
de cada aeroporto estratégico e as suas facilidades;
(b) A Comissão recomendará aos dois Governos uma fór-
mula para a distribuição equitativa, entre os dois Governos, das
despesas de manutenção e operação dos aeroportos estratégicos;
(c) A Comissão proporá a aparelhagem e facilidades
adicionais que convenham ser construidas ou instaladas em qual-
quer dos aeroportos estratégicos por qualquer dos dois Governos
por sua conta própria, dependendo da aprovação dos Governos;
(d) A Comissão formulará planos para a expansão do
treinamento já iniciado no Brasil e nos Estados Unidos para o pre-
paro de téonicos brasileiros para a operação dos aeroportos e fa-
cilidades. o Govêrno dos Estados Unidos da América fará dispo-
nível as facilidades adequadas de que dispoe afim de fornecer êsse
treinamento.
6.
treinamento.
ARTIGO SEXTO
A utilização dos aeroportos estratégicos e facilida-
des por aeronaves civis já permitida e no futuro pelo Govêrno bra-
sileiro nao será afetada pelo presente acôrdo, ficando, porém, as
operações de tais aeronaves sujeitas às disposições do parágrafo
(a) do Artigo Quinto.
ARTIGO SÉTIMO
Será permitido às aeronaves militares de cada Govêr-
no, de conformidade com as limitações do presente acôrdo, sobrevoar,
descer e sair do território sob a jurisdição do outro Govêrno.Obser-
vadas as disposições do presente acôrdo e respeitadas as prescrições
legais de cada país, as aeronaves militares de cada Govêrno terao
ainda o direito de pousar e decolar de aeroportos e de utilizar to-
das as facilidades aeroportuárias e de navegação dentro do territó-
rio do outro país à disposição de suas próprias aeronaves militares.
ARTIGO OITAVO
As aeronaves militares de cada Govêrno e as forças
militares, navais e aéreas e demais pessoal oficial, e fornecimentos,
equipamento e material oficiais transportados em tais aeronaves não
ficarão isentos, enquanto dentro de ou sôbre o território do outro
país, das leis em vigor naquele território exceto por disposição em
contrário no presente acôrdo.
ARTIGO NONO
Cada Govêrno reserva o direito, por considerações de
segurança militar ou no interêsse da segurança pública ou por outros
motivos suficientes, de restringir ou proibir o tráfego de aeronaves
militares do outro Govêrno sôbre zonas que cada Govêrno possa de tem-
7.
tempos a tempos definir. Cada Govêrno comunicará imediatamente ao
outro as informações referentes a tais zonas e os regulamentos que
possa adotar e com respeito às mesmas.
ARTIGO DÉCIMO
Nenhuma taxa, direito ou imposto de importação, tri-
buto, consumo ou outro será cobrado por qualquer das Partes sôbre
material, aparelhagem, fornecimentos ou mercadorias transportadas
para o seu território para o uso da outra Parte, sob o presente
acôrdo, ou para o uso oficial, mes não para o uso pessoal e parti-
cular, das suas forças armadas, ou pessoal civil no território por
motivo de emprêgo sob o presente acôrdo.
ARTIGO DÉCIMO-PRIMEIRO
Nenhum membro das forças armadas de qualquer das
Partes e nenhum pessoal civil de qualquer das Partes que reside
no território de outra Parte por motivo de emprêgo sob o presente
acôrdo ficará sujeito ao pagamento de imposto sôbre a renda deriva-
da do Govêrno pelo qual é empregado a não ser que seja nacional do
país em cujo território esteja servindo.
ARTIGO DÉCIMO-SEGUNDO
o presente acôrdo entrará em vigor por ocasiao da
sua assinatura e continuará em efeito durante dez anos, salvo en-
tendimento em contrário dos dois Governos. Depois desse prazo
permanecerá em vigor até passados doze meses após a data em que um
dos Governos notifique ao outro a sua intenção de dá-lo por termi-
nado.
ANEXO I
Os aeroportos e pertences que constituem os aeropor-
tos estratégicos a que se refere o Acôrdo que a êste precede são
os seguintes:
BASE DE AEROPLANOS di AMAPÁ
0 aeroporto para aeroplanos sito aproximadamente a 6
milhas da vila de Amapá (Lat. 2°06'N. Long. 50°51'0).
BASE DE AEROPLANOS E HIDROAVIÕES KM BELAM
0 aeroporto para aeroplanos e hidroavioes denominado
CAMPO VAL DE CAES, sito aproximadamente a 6 milhas de Belém (Lat.
1° 23'S. Long. 48°28'0).
BASE DE AEROPLANOS A. SÃO LUIZ
0 aeroporto para aeroplanos denominado CAMPO TIRIRICAL,
sito aproximadamente a 5 milhas ao sudoeste de São Luiz (Lat.2°35'S.
Long. 44°13'0).
BASE DE AEROPLANOS EM FORTALEZA
o aeroporto para aeroplanos denominado CAMPO ADJACENTO,
sito aproximadamente a 1 milha ao leste de Fortaleza (Lat. 3°44'S.
Long. 38°40'0).
BASE DE ARROPLANOS EM NATAL
o aeroporto para aeroplanos denominado CAMPO PARNAMIRIM,
sito aproximadamente a 9 1/2 milhas ao sudoeste da cidade de Natal
(Lat. 5°53'S. Long. 35°14'0).
BASE DE HIDROAVIÕES EM NATAL
0 aeroporto para hidroavioes sito aproximadamente a 1/2
milha ao norte de Natal no Rio POTENGI. (Lat. 5°46'S. Long.35°12'0).
2.
BASE DE AEROPLANOS di RECIFE
o aeroporto para aeroplanos denominado CAMPO IBURA sito
aproximadamente a 9 milhas ao sudoeste de Recife (Lat. 8°6'S. Long.
34°59'0).
BASE DE AEROPLANOS EM FERNANDO DE NORONHA
0 aeroporto para aeroplanos sito na Ilha de FERNANDO DE
NORONHA (Lat. 3°51'18"S. Long. 32°25'56"0.).
BASE DE AEROPLANOS A. BAIA
0 aeroporto para aeroplanos denominado CALPO AÉREO DE
IPITANGA, sito aproximadamente a 15 milhas ao nordeste de Sao Salva-
dor (Lat. 12°54'S. Long. 38°20'0).
BASE DE HIDROAVIÕES EM BAIA
o aeroporto para hidroavioes denominado BASE PARA HIDRO-
AVIÕES ARATU, sito aproximadamente a 12 milhas ao sul de Sao Salva-
dor na Baía de Itapagipe (-at. 12°34'S. Long. 38°30'0).
PERTENCES
Todos os pertences situados em cada um dos aeroportos
acima mencionados ou nas suas proximidades que foram construidos ou
instalados sob a supervi são do Exército ou Marinha dos Astados Uni-
dos, ou por sua conta, e que o Exército ou Marinha dos Estados Uni-
dos têm utilizado até o presente ou está atualmente utilizando por
entendimento com o Govêrno Brasileiro para fins que se relacionam
ao atual conflito, inclusive, sem limitar a generalização da descri-
ção acima, o seguinte: pistas, para rolamento e estacionamento,
pontões de abastecimento e reparos; rampas de hidroavioes; pontões
de aterrisagem e decolagem de dirigíveis e círculos para amarrar;
hangares e barracões de reparos; aparelhagem para iluminação dos
3.
dos aeroportos; aparelhagem de meteorologia; construções e equi-
pamento de rádio transmissão, rádio recepção e rádio goniometria,
edifícios de operações, administração e escritórios; armazens, de-
pósitos e paióis; edifícios para armazenagem de helium; tanques
para a armazenagem de petróleo na superficie da terra ou subterrâ-
neos e facilidades de abastecimento; quarteis, refeitórios e edi-
fícios de diversões para os oficiais e soldados e pessoal civil;
edifícios de refrigeração; hospitais e enfermarias e todos OB edi-
fícios utilizados com respeito às suas operações; capelas, auditó-
rios e cinemas; e todos os edifícios, construções ou instalações
congêneres construidos ou instalados na maneira e para os fins aci-
ma expostos.
Outrossim, todas as facilidades para & armazenagen,
transporte e entrega de petróleo que, por entendimento com o Govêr-
no brasileiro, têm sido construidas ou instaladas sob a supervisão
do Exército ou Marinha dos Estados Unidos pela Standard 011 Company
of Brazil para o fornecimento de petróleo aos aeroportos de Belém,
São Luiz, Fortaleza, Natal, Fernando de Noronha, Recife e Baía, in-
clusive, sem limitar & generalização da descrição acima, o seguinte:
tanques de superfície ou subterrâneos para a armazenagem de petróleo,
quer situados nos aeroportos em apreço ou no litoral ou em outros
pontos; encanamentos para o transporte de petróleo de navios, estra-
das de ferro ou outro ponto para os tanques de armazenagem e dos tan-
ques de armazenagem para os aeroportos; cais, desvios e plataformas
de carga; barracões para o enchimento, esvasiamento e limpeza de
tambores; aparelhagem para carregamento e esvasiamento; bombas e
instalações de bombas, garages, oficinas e armazens; tanques para
água, encanamentos para água e outras instalações para proteção con-
tra fogo; edifícios de administração e escritórios; postos de ser-
viço; laboratório de análises; usinas geradoras e todos os edifícios,
4.
edifícios, construções e instalações congêneres construidos ou ins-
talados na maneira e para os fins acina expostos.
THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AMERICAN EMBASSY
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,
July 12, 1944.
Dear Mr. President:
Your letter of the 21st ultimo regarding the
conclusion of the negotiations of the Military
Aviation Agreement with Brazil, gave me a great
deal of pleasure and I appreciate more than I can
say your thoughtfulness in writing it.
I conveyed your "congratulations and warm good
wishes" to President Vargas and Aranha, and I deliv-
ered to President Vargas the letter which accompanied
the one you wrote me. He was delighted with it.
He called a meeting yesterday of his National
Security Council, which comprises all of the Cabinet,
all of the Chiefs of Staff and a few other notables -
the first time the Council has been called together
since Brazil's declaration of war - and read your
letter to them. This was followed by a general dis-
cussion of Brazil's relations with the United States
and it was unanimously agreed that your was
to be regarded as a sort of Charter of rela-
tions.
With many thanks and all good wishes,
Respectfully yours,
The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
Brazil folder 1-44
DEPARTMENT
INCOMING
DIVISION OF
OF
COMMUNICATIONS
STATE
TELEGRAM
AND RECORDS
NCB-189
Rio de Janeiro
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
Dated August 19, 1944.
fore being communicated
to anyone.
I
Rec'd 3:10 p.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
2980, August 19, 2 p.m.
Aranha sent word to Vargas through "Benjamin"
that he did not want the letter mentioned in the
first paragraph of my telegram 2955, August 18, 3 p.m.
Aranha tells me this morning that he will wait
until Monday for President Vargas to act. I asked
him just exactly what he wants President Vargas to do.
His reply showed that he does not have in mind any
one particular definite step but what he wants is
for the President to take some definite action against
the Marcondes group.
I continue to tell Aranha that his resignation
would prejudice his country's interests.
CAFFERY
LMS
WTD
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
FEB 4 1972
By J. Schauble Date
2582
Carbon of this letter was returned to mr. Beale
hmo
10/14/14
Brazil freder
St
or, 1.44:72
1-44
di
J. Schauble Date
FEB 4 1972
"CH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OK
FDR"
WASHINGTON
October 12, 1944
PRIVATE AND CONVEDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
Brazilian Transport Crisis
You have been told informally about the crisis in Bra-
zilian transport. It is now approaching the breakdown stage.
We sent observers, including a competent man from O.D.T.,
who confirmed this conclusion: see more formal memorandum
attached. Vargas has now sent a special representative
here about it.
Bluntly, they need 7,000 trucks and 1,500 diesel motor
buses, to be delivered before July 1. A thorough personal
study demonstrates to me an absolute necessity to get this
done. Nor have we time to repeat the six months' wearisome
procedure which produced nothing. The Secretary sends the
attached request for a directive from you. This will not
cut into military supplies, though it may slow up the Ameri-
can domestic program.
I cannot promise that O.D.T. will not oppose. But this
is not a situation we can fool with; Caffery and others say
the stake might very well be the continuance in power of the
Brazilian Government.
Enclosure:
GaB
Memorandum.
Adolf A. Berle, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary
COPY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
October 11, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
The Brazilian transportation situation, under the
stress of war demands and aggravated by lack of materials
for maintenance and replacement, has reached the stage
where assistance to the required extent cannot be given
under existing procedures. While the problem involves
highway transport, railways, shipping, and fuel, this
memorandum relates only to the most urgent phase, that
of motor transport.
At the request of this Department, a highway
transport engineer, selected by the Office of Defense
Transportation, proceeded to Brazil and has prepared an
objective report listing the minimum of new equipment
necessary to avert a collapse. He has reported, in
substance, that the situation is "ominous". This con-
firms what the Embassy has reported and what the
Brazilian Government has been at pains to emphasize.
President Vargas is deeply concerned and has dis-
cussed the matter at length with Ambassador Caffery.
There is attached a schedule of proposed motor chassis
equipment representing the lowest possible estimate of
equipment required, not to maintain Brazilian economy
but simply to stave off a breakdown. It should be noted
that timing is no less important than quantity.
The materials requested are in critically short
supply, but this must be weighed against the conse-
quences of a major breakdown in Brazil which would have
most serious repercussions not only in Brazil but
throughout Latin America as well. I should like to
have your authority (a) to take the necessary steps to
assure receipt by Brazil of the materials set forth in
the attachment within the indicated time limits, and
(b) to prevent any interference with this schedule.
Enclosure:
Schedule.
C. H.
COPY
BRAZIL
(Note: The chassis described below are to be furnished without
tires, tubes, batteries, cabs, bodies or seat cushions.
Provision should be made, however, for reasonable quanti-
ties of spare parts.)
I. 1500 standard type bus chassis, diesel-powered.
Delivery:
By January 31, 1945
-
300 units
& March 31
-
500 " (additional)
If June 30
700
11
-
(additional)
Total
1500 units
II. 7000 commercial truck chassis (medium), with standard
gasoline engines (Chevrolet, Ford or International).
Delivery:
By March 31, 1945
-
4000 units
A
June 30
-
3000 If (additional)
Total
7000 units
III. 6500 commercial truck chassis (medium), as in II above,
for delivery during the third and fourth quarters of
1945.
IV. Spare parts, to the reasonable extent necessary to
maintain existing equipment.
V. Increased allocation of fuel, as may be reasonably re-
quired for efficient operation of existing and addi-
tional equipment, to be determined under established
procedures.
7/1/20/44
Brazel-1944 1944
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
November 3, 1944
"Ile S.T.E.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. EARLY
I think you will want to take a look at the
attached paraphrase of a cable from our Embassy in
Rio summarizing an interview Aranha has given to the
Time correspondent there. It is full of dynamite.
x2442
Ea
x20 X
x366
X11 X
X x4675. b.F. State World Nar II
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED
FROM:
American Embassy, Rio do Jeneiro
TO:
Secretary of State, Washington
DATED:
November 2, 1944
NUMBER:
3930
US URGENT
There follows the summary which was asked for in message
from the Department dated November 21, No. 3313.
It is reported that Arenha has been very critical of
xpr74380
the policy of Mr. Hull towards Argentina for the reason that
he felt it VSD a mistake to apply policy of pin pricking
and because it was alienating the friendship of the Argentine
people. Aranha told the interviewer that this policy might
drag Brazil into the war and he stated that we should make
a big point of showing our liking for the Argentine people
as contrasted with their Government, that we should deal
kindly, and that we should make friends with Argentina.
He is reported to have made the claim that he could settle
the whole thing in three days, if he were given the task.
Although he thought that Mr. Wellos might have been
correct in his views, he was critical of him for disloyalty
to his Department. Re was reported as being worried about
the Germans going into Argentina after the war, but he did
not appear to showsuch concern over the ideological aspects
of the present regime in Argentina. His belief that
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
Argentine's
By J. Schauble Date FEB 4 1972
-2-
Argentine's 13,000,000 people were as powerful as the
45,000,000 in Brazil was expressed, also his envy for the
richness of the country.
The United States was criticized by Arenha for continuing
to send materials and machines to Argentina; he pointed out
that the only material which Argentina lacked seriously was
rubber, the one article which Brazil had agreed not to furnish
her. When Brazil had agreed not to ship rubber to Argentina,
the United States had bound itself to suspend its shipments
to Argentina also, according to Aranha.
Aranha referred in the interview to a previous explanation
made to Admiral Ingram when Admiral Ingram expressed regret
at his resignation and states that the incident of t he
closing of the Society of Friends of America and events
X
subsequent thereto were solely designed for the purpose of
demoralizing him and that he was not going to be demoralized
by anyone at all, Vargas included; the fact was that he could
not work with the men now surrounding Vargas.
Aranha is reported to have made reference to practical
considerations which made Vargas take on Fascist ways in
1938 which he himself (Aranha) always stood out for United
States support because of ties that were traditional.
Aranha ran the risk of being shot he was told, and he said
that he realized that he would be shot in front if Germany
won and in the back if it lost. This is what happened to
Willkie and Welles, he said.
The
-3-
The National elections may be put off, Aranhe claims,
and the device of declaring war on Japan is an act which
would run against the Brazilian tradition of not declaring
war unless Brazil is attacked; here he made reference to a
conversation with Marcondes Filho who indicated that it
X
was his opinion that the war would not be over until Japan
had been defeated.
Aranha in the interview is reported as being favorable
toward Roosevelt for President of the world, but that he
would not vote for him for & fourth term because he believes
that other trees in a forest cannot grow when there is one
big tree in the forest. This is obviously simed at Vargas,
the reporter continues, and I made the suggestion that the
United States was not the best example of this effect;
he emphatically agreed with me.
DONNELLY
x
x4166-leon a
If:
419
Brazil folder 1-44
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 14, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. E. R. STETTINIUS:
Who have you got in mind
for Ambassador to Brazil? I have
no candidates.
In considering the matter,
think of Bob Scotten, now Ambassador
to Ecuador. He was Charge in Brazil
at one time.
F.D.R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 29, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
You will remember that I told you
Ed Flynn telephoned to remind you that
he spoke to you about Bob Scotten, who
is in Ecuador. He was Charge in Brazil
at one time. He thought it would be a
good thing if you could appoint him in
Caffery's place there.
G.G.T.
Brazil freace 1-44
SECRET
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
December 14, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY
Subject: Conditions in Brazil
I return herewith the enclosures on
labor conditions in Brazil which were for-
warded to me on December 5 to read and
return.
DECLASSIFIED
State Dest. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 4 1972
It is extremely gratifying to see the strong stand of Senator
Kilgore on the Rye Conference. I had heard down at Allied Labor News
of the make-up of the Conference and the arrival of Alex Orandro Shaw.
It was slightly hair raising. One correspondent who sat through it told
me that without turning your head you could see Nazis to right and left.
the Fight against cartels is an important one and PM is doing a good job
in educating people on it. There is still one extremely important point
that is at the heart of it all. How to get the British over their determina-
tion to go on with the old system. I think the point I made in my last letter
becomes clearer and clearer.
Arthur Horner who is a powerful union man in Britain as head of
the mine workers says that unless drastic steps are taken 10 or 15 million
Britons must emigrate with the closing down of their plants. Britain will not
joyfully commit suicide. It is right that a forward looking world should
deprive her of her Empire in the old sense but some sort of trade agreements
must be made which reassure her that she won't be swamped in "Free Competi-
tion". Without British agreement, Teheran falls apart and with it everything
else. To get British agreement on everything including air routes now being
discussed an attitude much less obtuse than Mr. Berle's must be sought. Mr.
Berle does not mind scrapping Teheran. He has made that quite clear for a
long time. Mr. Sumner Welles was all wrong on the Argentine and I sincerely
hope the "Liberal" suggestion of making him successor to Mr. Hull never comes
to pass but in order to prevent the British from having the same attitude on
the Argentine, etc., there must be a Trade Conference in the nature of Mr.
Kilgore's suggestion. The only way to stymie behind the scenes agreements
between the worst of our own, British and German industrialists is to put
Britain in a position where Churchill is free to act in a progressive manner.
Not a simple affair but the most pressing. Right now in Brazil, for instance,
interesting Economic developments have come to the surface lately which show
the hand of the British there as also "Anti Yankee". This will continue unless
there is an economic reason for stopping it. No moral, high sounding phrases
make any difference. The News out of Montevedeo is that because Brazil is
balancing her budget and measuring the National Debt, Walter Sarmanjo - who
returned there from here, published a statement that the 115 billion debt
could not be met with an inflationary situation which he critizized. He
sharply criticized the Finance Minister for inflation. Their imports being
greater than exports, etc., they either have to borrow abroad again, restrict
import or raise internal loan. He was for the last. The Finance Minister
complained to Vargas. Sarmanjo emphacized the dependence of Brazil on U.S.
-2-
rather than France and Britain. Sermanjo leans toward us but there is
increasing evidence that Vargas and his Finance Minister lean toward
Britain.
It is being emphacized that we have no ambassador there and that
theirs has not returned to us.
The British Ambassador has just made an ostentatious visit to
San Paulo leading Industrial State, was received with banquets and official
celebrations. Also Canada's representative Jean Desy went in the same way
to Rio Grande (?) on an official visit.
Why, says the correspondent from Brazil, this siplomatic tourism
unless it has an economic meaning. He also points to the agreement between
Vargas and the British raising exchange value from 65 to 80 on the Pound
Sterling and at the same time Brazilian credit is being frozen in England.
This, I believe, may be compared to the Rumanian-Roca agreement
in Argentina in 1932. It is quite significant. There are comments made
constantly, verbal and written, down there to the effect that the conservation
of Britáin and (?) is closer to Brazil. That neither have had an election
in seven years, etc.
On the good side there was great popular rejoicing over our election
for the same reason. I saw the text of a touching message sent the President
by the popular movements and probably never seen by him. They rejoiced in the
Democratic victory.
3784
THE WHITE HOUSE
5621
WASHINGTON
December 5, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE x20
TO READ AND RETURN FOR
MY FILES.
F. D. R.
xPP72
Copy of ltr of 11/27/44 to Mrs.
Roosevelt from Josephine T. Adams,
441 W. 21st St., N.Y.; original re- #
tained in file.
FOR THE PRESIDENT.
Material just in from Brazil
to Allied Labor News.
COPY
x 11-A
X
441 West 21st Street
New York City, N. Y.
November 27, 1944.
Dear Mrs. Roosevelt:
Sincerely yours,
/sgd/ Josephine Truslow Adams.
C
0044
o
P
Y
material just infrom
Beazil to Alled Labor
news, X president
441 West 21 st Street
new your City n.y.
November 27, 1944
The
mrs Roosevelt:
It is extremely gratefying
to see the strong stand of Senator Filgou
on the Rye conference. 4 had heard downat
alled Labor newsfthe make ref of the conference
and the annual of alextrandro show. Itwas
shght hairscring am comes pondent who
sat terrough it told me ten at without turning
your head you could see nagiv' to right and
left. The fight against eartels is an
importantone and P.m. No doing a good job
in & ducating people on it. There is still one
extremely import ant point that is attere
heart of t all. How to get the Rutish overthin
determination to go on with the old system
Itema the pomt & made in my last letter
becomes Clearerand clearer.
atthm Horner who is a powerful
linion man in Butain as head of the
mine Workers says the at unless drastu
steps are taken 10 a 15 million Buton
must emigrate with the closing down
of then plants Butain will not
x277
x407
has
joyfully commut spicide. 9tm right that a
forward looking world should defense of
her Empire in the old sense but some sort
of Irade agreements must be made which
reasonse her that she wont be croamped
in me Competition". litter out Butish agreement
Teheran fall agent and with it every They else.
To get Butsh agreement on every they including
an routes now being dis cussed an attitude
much less obtuse than mr. Berle's must be
songht. mr. Berle does not mind
scrapsing Telderan He has made that
quite Clear for or long time m Summer
Welles was all wrong on the argentmend
9 smerldy hope the "Siberal suggestion of
malary lum successo to mr. Hull never
Comes to pass but in order to prevent the
British from having the same attutude on
the Argenture etc. there must be a Trade
Conference in the nature of mr. Rilgores
suggestion: The only way to stymie behind the
scenes agreements between the worket of our
own, Butish and German Industrialists
1sts put Butain m a position where Chunchill
is fus to act in a perogressive mamr not
a simple affair but the most pressing.
-
10
Right now in Brazil for matance interesting
Economic developments have come to
lately which show the hand of the Butish
there as alco " ante yanksee". This will
Continue unless there is an P conome
reason for stopping it. no moral high
sounding felnases male any difference.
the new of out of montinedes is that
because Brazil is balancing her budyet and
measuring the national Debt. walter
Sarmanjo -who returned there from here
published a statement that the 115
bellion delt could not be met with
an inflationary extration which he enticyed.
the sharply ent cazed the inance minister
for inflation. Shin imports being greater than
ex ports itc they enther have to berow abroad
again / Restruct Import or raise internal Form.
He was for the last. The Finance minister
Complained to Vargas. Sermanjo emperagized
the defendence of Brazil on u.s. rather
than France and Butim Sermanjo leans
toward us. but there is increasing evidence
that Vargas and his Frnance munster lean
toward Butain
It is being emphasyed that we have
no ambas add there and that them
has not returned to no.
I he Butish ambuss ador has just made an
astentation visit to San Paulo leading Industrial
state, reas received with banquets and
official electrations also Canadas representative
Jean D eay went mothe same way to Riogrande
de sud on an official creat.
why says the corres pondent from Brazie
this deplomates Sourism unless it has an
economic meaning. He also points to the
agreement between Vargas and the Britch
raising exchange value from 65to 80 on
the Pand Sterling and at the sometime
Brazelian credit is being frozenin England.
This be compared tothe
Runcriman - Roca agreement in argentina
in 19 32. It no quite significant. There are
Comments made constantly verbal and
written down there to the effect that the
Conservation of Butain and Chmdull is
Caren to Brazil. That neither liave drad
an ele tion m Seven years. etc.
on the good side there was guat popular
rejoring over our election for the same reason.
9 saw the text of a touching message sent the
Presi dent by the popular movements and
probably never seen by lim. they regorred in
the Democratic victory.
sincerely your
Josephine Imalow adams
WEEKLY COMMENT
Anglo-American Problems
X144-A
x48-A
by EARL BROWDER
x3997
WHILE most American newspapers are
this answer is a sentence of death to her
international affairs on
industrial position in the world. And
Explains
the assumption that problems to be set-
British industrialists, backed by their
tled between our country and the Soviet
government and most of the people, are
behavior now
not going to accept a death sentence.
Union are in the spotlight, they are merely
They are preparing to fight for a position
m Brazil,
hiding from the public
in the world market, and as they are at
the really acute inter-
a distinct disadvantage in fighting eco-
Argentina,
Allied differences which
nomically in free competition with
are between Britain and
America, they are therefore seizing every
Bolivia. also
the United States.
political instrument at hand with which
Illustrative of the na-
settlement of
to conduct the struggle. They are pre-
ture of the Anglo-
paring to tighten, rather than relax, the
this prerequate
American differences, is
ties of the Empire over the world in rela-
the problem of Argen-
tion to trade monopolies. They are enter-
& drapping of
tina. The hard fact is
ing into collaboration with those groups
that the Brftish have
monarchy drums
which, as in Latin America, are operating
assumed protection of
on the basis of fighting "Yankee imperial-
of Churchill for
the semi-fascist military
ism," regardless of their past ties with
dictatorship there, and are preventing the
Europe and for
the Nazis. For the same reasons they
effective application of American policy
the settlement
cling to Franco in Spain. All of this is
for restoration of democratic government
part of a desperate determination at all
in that country. As Nazi influence evapo-
of tar Eastern
costs to maintain a position in the post-
rates the British take over again the
question
war world markets against the threat of
hegemony of these same circles which
destructive American competition.
played the Hitler game, and use them for
their own purposes. This tendency is wit-
nessed not only in Argentina and other
South American countries but also in Eu-
S°,
LONG as America continues to re
teed
Economist
rope. Along with this, British imperialist
fuse the slightest guarantee of security
control in Asia and Africa tends to harden
to the British postwar market position,
upurth
article
and become more uncompromising as vic-
so long all American criticism of British
interdes
tory in the war in Europe approaches.
Innumerable points of friction between
policy will fail to modify it favorably, but
Britain and America are flaring up and
will, on the contrary, drive the British to
origingest
threatening to crystallize into major con-
more stubborn old-style imperialist re-
flicts of policy.
action.
Economic
It is time for this problem to be more
widely and intelligently discussed in
0
N THE surface it appears that Ameri-
America. It is time that the question be
ca has an invulnerable moral position
faced practically, without the fog of moral
on most particular questions involved in
flub-dub with which it is surrounded at
this developing conflict, while Britain ap-
present. If we want the British govern-
pears as the power obstructing forward-
ment and people to take a forward-looking
figures
Figures of
looking solutions. But the matter is not
and progressive stand, America must show
so simple. In the last analysis it is the
them how that is possible without closing
of artha
arteur
United States which must give the only
down their industries and sending 10 or
answer that solves these problems, and
15 million British workers into emigra-
Horna
Horner
this answer has been consistently refused
tion to other lands.
so far. It is the answer to Britain's ques-
of man
of mine workers
That is the kernel of Anglo-American
tion as to what will happen to her indus-
problems, and until the U.S. faces the
Makers
now Putch
tries in the postwar world.
question frankly and gives an answer the
Up to this moment America has an-
lewon
delagate t A.FL,
British can accept, our mutual relations
swered Britain to the effect that she must
will continue to go from bad to worse.
nown
take her chances in unlimited free com-
And that will threaten the breakdown of
petition in all markets with America's
all plans for a durable peace and postwar
mass production industries. For Britain
prosperity.
This does not mean retreat on Cartel question
Brazil folder 1-44
fele SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
December 26, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Brazilian Political Conditions
The enclosed telegram from our Embassy in
Rio de Janeiro describes the rather uneasy political
situation in Brazil at this time.
Enclosure:
Copy of telegram
no. 4522 from Rio de
Janeiro, December 23, 1944.
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
FEB 4 1972
By J. Scheuble Date
DEPARTMENT
INCOMING
DIVISION OF
OF
COMMUNICATIONS
STATE
TELEGRAM
AND RECORDS
MB-956
Rio de Jangiro
This telegram must bE
clostly paraphrased bE-
Dated DECEMBER 23, 1944
fore being communicated
to anyone.
I
Rec'd 1:39 a.m., 24th
Secretary of State,
Washington.
4522, DECEMBER 23, 5 p.m.
MEllo Franco has been recently in Sao Paulo and
while there the police (my 4504, DECEMBER 22, 4 p.m.)
allege he-contacted individuals known to bE conspiring
against the government. The government charges that
the other 4 persons arrested are involved in the
distribution of anti-Vargas propaganda and "stirring
up a war of nerves against the administration".
There have been no other arrest of prominent citizens.
Great pressure is being brought to bear on the government
for the release of MEllo Franco and the others and it is
believed that they will not bE detained for any length
of time. The government claims that it has been long
suffering in this matter and now apparently desires to
impress upon its EnEmies that it is aware of their
activities and that it is prepared to take "tough"
measures. Outwardly complete calm reigns here and the
government insists that plans for the impending Elections
are being completed.
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
FEB 4 1972
By J. Schauble Date
-2- 4522, DECEMBER 23, 5 p.m., from Rio dE Janeiro
are being completed. Marcondes, the Minister of
Justice, left this morning for his home in Sao Paulo
and will return to Rio on January 2. A reliable
source reports that he is preparing the Electoral code
and amendments to the constitution and both will bE
promulgated by decree law early next month.
Aranha and his racing partner PEIZOTO de Castro
purchased a Rio de Janeiro newspaper "A VANGUARDA"
yesterday. It is believed that Aranha does not intend
to support the government on the other hand Flores
da Cunha, & leading anti-Vargas grucho politician
who was until recently close to Aranha, has made his
place with Vargas.
The "political pot" is beginning to boil and
surprises and alignments pro and against Vargas are
taking place. In all this the Army is calm but not
detached. For Example the assistant chief of the
general staff said yesterday "the army is very political
minded and greatly interested in the Elections. If
Vargas holds the Elections now he will bE ELECTED;
if hE waits until the war is over he may bE defeated."
Incidentally the President is signing tomorrow one of
the longest army promotion lists in several years.
DONNELLY
MJF