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President's Secretary's File (Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration)
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PSF
China 1939-40
February 15, 1939
Original letter from General Chiang Kai-shek
with translation is in Famous People Folder-
Drawer 3-1939
this file
9/27/62 EBD
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 4, 1939.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE STATE DEPARTMENT
FOR PREPARATION OF THE
PROPER REPLIES.
F. D. R.
Letter from Honorable Nelson T. Johnson, State
Dept., 1/30/39 to the President, enclosing
a letter addressed to the President in Chinese
from Generalissimo Chiang Kal-shek, and English
translation attached, and a letter in English
addressed to the President by Dr. H. H. Kung,
President of the ExecutiveYuan and Minister of
Finance. These letters are dated December 11, 1938
extending Season's greetings and referring in
situation in China. The photograph of Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek, referred to in Mr. Johnson's
letter did not accompany these papers to the State
Dept.
china
February 14, 1939
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE:
I an sending you, for forwarding,
letters from the President to His Excellency
General Chiang Kai-shek, Chairman, National
Defense Council, and His Excellency Dr. H. H.
Kung, President of the Executive Yuan of the
Chinese Government.
M. H. McINTYRE
Secretary to the President
hm
Letters signed by the President 2/14/39 to the above sent
to Sumner Welles for forwarding.
February 14, 1939
My dear General Chiang:
I have received, through the courtesy
of Ambassador Johnson, your kind letter of
December 11, 1938, together with your photo-
graph. 1 appreciate very much the sentiments
expressed in your letter and I an pleased to
have the photograph which Ambassador Johnson
informs me is an excellent likeness.
In my conversations with Ambassador
Johnson I have been very glad to hear of you
and to obtain from him an expression of your
views.
with kind personal regards, I am
Very sincerely yours,
His Excellency
General Chiang Kei-shek,
Chairmen, National Defense Council,
Chungking, China.
RECEIVED
PARTMENT OF STATE
1939 FEB 6 AM il 03
The Executive Yuan
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
PERSONAL
AND RECORDS
Chungking, China.
December 11, 1938.
Dear Mr. President:
On the eve of Ambassador Johnson's departure for
Washington, I take great pleasure in sending this message of remembrance
and greetings to you, sincerely hoping that it will find you in the
best of health and cheer.
The spirit of the Season brings to me renewed
appreciation and pleasant recollections of the delightful visits I
had with you last year as well as the kind reception which you were
good enough to extend to me during my visit in your country. I wish
to assure you that I remember them and am grateful to you for them.
I take this opportunity to reassure you of the
deep appreciation which the Chinese Government and people feel for the
sympathy and moral support which your Government and people have
abundantly shown to us in our struggle for the rights of freedom and
independence as well as for the cause of peace and justice. Though
born of the people's inborn hostility against aggression, our national
resistence against the invader receives much encouragement from such
unfailing friendship as America has shown us under your illustrious
leadership.
No one is better qualified than Ambassador Johnson
to present you full and authentic information concerning the effects
of Japan's aggression on American interests in China as well as the
determination
The Executive Yuan
determination with which China is pursuing its campaign of resistence
and reconstruction. It is my sincere hope that the progress of events
in the Pacific will find our two Republics standing shoulder to shoul-
der and cooperating to the fullest possible extent in upholding and
safeguarding those ideals and interests which we 80 dearly cherish
in common.
Allow me to extend to you and Mrs. Roosevelt my best wishes
for a very Merry Christmas and Happy New Year.
I remain, Mr. President,
Sincerely yours,
(if H. H. Kung.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington, D. C.
U. S. A.
% *******
THE EXECUTIVE YUAN,
PERSONAL
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT,
CHINA.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt
President of the United States of America
Washington, D. C.
Kindness of Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson
PARTMENT OF
STATE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1939 FEB 6 AM 11 03
WASHINGTON
January 30, 1939.
My dear
COLVISIONS:
With reference to our conversation on the evening
of January 22, I am enclosing herewith letters addressed
to you and given to me the day of my departure from
Chungking. The letters consist of one letter addressed
to you in Chinese, with English translation attached,
by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and a letter in English
addressed to you by Dr. H. H. Kung, President of the
Executive Yuan and Minister of Finance. There is also
attached a photograph of the Generalissimo which the
latter desired that I convey to you. The Chinese inscrip-
tion on the face of the photograph is to the effect that
Chiang Chung Cheng (the Generalissimo's familiar name)
presents this photograph to President Roosevelt. It is
dated December 11, 1938, or the 27th year of the Chinese
Republic. I consider the photograph an excellent one of
the Generalissimo as I saw him last.
Faithfully yours,
Enclosures.
The President,
The White House.
14672
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
February 13, 1939
My dear Mr. President:
In response to your memorandum of February 4 there
are enclosed for your consideration a draft of a letter
to His Excellency General Chiang Kai-shek, Chairman,
National Defense Council, in reply to his letter of
December 11, 1938, and a draft of a letter to His Excellency
Dr. H. H. Kung, President of the Executive Yuan of the
Chinese Government, in reply to his letter of the same
date.
If you approve of these draft letters, I would
suggest that upon signature they be returned to this
Department for forwarding to General Chiang and to
Dr. H. H. Kung through our Embassy in Chungking. The
letters from General Chiang and from Dr. H. H. Kung,
together with Ambassador Johnson's letter transmitting
those letters to you, are returned herewith.
(For enclosures,
Faithfully yours, Wills
I
see following page.)
The President,
The White House.
-2-
Enclosures:
1. Draft of letter to
General Chiang Kai-shek.
2. Draft of letter to
Dr. H. H. Kung.
3. From General Chiang to
the President, December 11,
1938, returned.
4. From Dr. H. H. Kung to
the President, December 11,
1938, returned.
5. From Mr. Nelson T. Johnson
to the President, January 30,
1939, returned.
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Translation Tached. at
43
1
China- 1938
HEADQUARTERS OF THE GENERALISSIMO
(TRANSLATION)
Chungking,
December 11, 1938.
Dear President Roosevelt:
The Chinese Ambassador at
Washington has transmitted to me your kind message
of November 10 in reply to my telegraphic message of
October 15. I have read your words with great pleasure
and interest. I have since thoroughly discussed the
situation in the Far East with Mr. Nelson Trusler
Johnson, American Ambassador to China, and entrusted
him to present my views to you in person when he
arrives in Washington. I have also requested him
to bring you a copy of my picture as a token of my
admiration of your great ability and statesmanship.
With kindest regards,
Sincerely yours,
(Signed) CHIANG KAI-SHEK
His Excellency
Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States,
Washington, U. S. A.
P.F.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
March 3, 1939
My dear Mr. President:
On the eve of his departure for Cody, Wyoming,
the American Ambassador to China, Mr. Nelson T.
Johnson, left at the Department for transmission
to you the letter here attached.
Faithfully yours,
Enclosure:
From Mr. Johnson,
dated February 27, 1939.
The President,
The White House.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
February 27, 1939.
Mr. President:
The Chinese people under the leadership of the
National Government now temporarily seated at Chungking
and under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek
intend to continue resistance to the Japanese invasion of
China. It is my belief that the Chinese will be able to
continue this resistance indefinitely. Generalissimo
Chiang told me the day before I left Chungking last
December, and I know no reason to doubt the statement,
that his armies were intact and that they had military
supplies sufficient to carry them on for two years at
the present rate of guerrilla expenditure. They hope
for assistance from the outside world in the economic
field. Chinese Government supplies of silver are
practically exhausted and they will be put to it to
maintain China's currency in exchange for foreign currency.
Japan lost the war when it failed to obtain a peace
dictated on the basis of Japanese terms under the walls of
Nanking as the British did in 1842. When the Japanese
took Nanking, found the Government gone and the Chinese
armies
- 2 -
armies gone they were left with the alternatives of
consolidating their positions at Shanghai and in north
China and controlling an established Chinese Government
in the interior from the coast, or proceed to the conquest
of China. It is my conviction that the Japanese Army
chose the latter alternative. It has from time to time
announced, and continues to announce, that peace is not
possible until it has smashed the Chinese National Govern-
ment and Generalissimo Chiang. This announced policy and
the cruelties which have accompanied the Japanese advance
into the interior have done more to unite the people of
China behind the National Government and Chiang, who
symbolizes the Chinese desires for an independent national
existence, than anything else and I feel that the Japanese
Army has commenced something which it cannot finish. I
feel, however, that it is going to take a long time for
the military leaders of Japan to discover this, for the
Chinese are in no position to administer a decisive defeat
to the armies in the field. The struggle must go on as it
is now, the Chinese resisting by means of guerrilla tactics
which at best can only prolong the conflict to the point
where Japan will be exhausted economically, culturally and
physically. I sometimes wonder whether the East is not
threatened with the kind of collapse of civilization which
we have sometimes heard Europe threatened with if another
European
- 3 -
European war should commence. War is on in the East.
There is no leader in China who could make peace with
the Japanese and carry his people with him and there is
no leader in Japan who could make peace with the Chinese
on terms less than the Japanese Army desires and carry the
Army with him. The only hope that the Japanese have at the
present time is to make peace with a Japanese-fostered
régime or régimes in China but such a peace will of necessity
involve the Japanese in the responsibility of disarming the
people of China in order to make it possible for the writ
of such a Japanese régime to run beyond the walls of the
towns in which the régimes have their homes.
History will record that the outstanding event of
this decade was the end of the British Empire as a unit.
The Statute of Westminster marked that end. London is
paralyzed now in any decision that it may have to make for
it cannot make such a decision on the assumption that
Canada and Australia and South Africa will support its
decision without question. The frontiers of the United
States are the world. As the eldest son of the old British
Empire (a son, it is true, who ran away from home and set
himself up independently in business at the time when the
Empire was in the making) we must from now on share with
Canada, Australia and South Africa and England the
responsibility of maintaining the ideals which characterized
international
- 4 -
international intercourse during the years that the
British Empire was dominant in world affairs or see
those ideals lost. We are strong and capable and whether
we like it or not our decisions are looked for and listened
to with a great deal of respect. We must lead the world
out of the chaos in which it is now struggling. I feel
that the day of colonial empires is past. Japan must
slowly come to that realization. Japan has already
expended a greater sum upon its attempt to start an empire
in Asia than England spent as the initial cost of the
establishment of the British Empire. If civilization is
not to be lost, the United States must and will play a
greater part in its preservation than we now seem conscious
of the necessity for. Dictatorships such as that now
controlling Japan understand force and will yield only to
superior power. It is not a question whether we are going
to war or not. The question is whether we are ready to
fight for the ideals which we have hitherto held as
necessary to a peaceful existence. If the world and
particularly the dictatorships understand that we are
prepared to fight, they will exercise more care in their
relations with us and the rest of the world. You cannot
send a policeman armed with a truncheon to deal with a
gangster who is armed with a machine gun.
The situation demands that we, as the most powerful
unit in a world of nations, must begin now to consider
the
- 5 -
the part that we are to play. Unless we begin to show
our teeth now and indicate to the world and specifically
to Japan that we mean business we may forever find our-
selves estopped from taking action. We may perhaps find
ourselves with a Japan taking everything west of the
180th meridian as the Japanese sphere of influence and
interest within which we may neither improve or fortify
our own interests nor enter without Japanese permission.
Time is with China in its conflict with Japan but time
is with the totalitarian states in their relations with
the democracies. We should do what we can to assist and
encourage the Chinese in their fight for an independent
national existence. The Pacific area will be safer for
us and for the world if there are three nations involved,
namely, China, Japan and the United States, than if there
are but two, Japan and the United States. Japan cannot
complete its adventure in China without the financial
assistance of the United States and we as a government
should take such steps as may be necessary to discourage
financial assistance to Japan or to those régimes which
Japan may attempt to set up in China. We cannot afford to
wait upon other nations in regard to this matter. It is
not a question of saving British chestnuts, our own chestnuts
are involved.
Respectfully,
Nelson Trusler Johnson
ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
china
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
In reply refer to
July 29, 1939
FE 793.94/15242
My dear General Watson:
I enclose a copy of a note of July 21, 1939, from
the Chinese Ambassador forwarding for transmission as
indicated in the note copies of a telegraphic message
received by him from twenty-two organizations of the
Chinese people.
In accordance with the Ambassador's request I have
transmitted copies of the message also to Senator
Pittman and Mr. Bloom and have acknowledged the receipt
of the Ambassador's note informing him of the action
taken in response to his request. There appears to be
no further action in the matter required.
Sincerely yours,
Gordace Apree
Enclosure:
Note from Chinese Ambassa-
dor with enclosure.
Brigadier General Edwin M. Watson, U. S. A.,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.
Department of State
RUXESIX
DIVISION
}
Far Eastern
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted July 25
ADDRESSED TO
General Watson
Secretary to the President
The White House
U. 9. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1-1033
SBL
-
CHINESE EMBASSY
WASHINGTON
July 21, 1939
My dear Mr. Secretary:
I beg to inform you that I have received
the accompanying telegraphic message from twenty-two
organizations of the Chinese people for transmission
to the President of the United States, yourself, the
Honorable Key Pittman, Chairman of the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the United States senate and
the Honorable 901 Bloom, Chairman of the Committee
on Foreign Affairs of the United States House of
Representatives.
I shall be greatly obliged if you will be
good enough to forward the message to its respective
high destin tions.
I am, my dear MT. Secretary,
Very sincerely yours,
HU SHIH
Enclosure:
Copies of
telegraphic message
Honorable Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State.
TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE
FROM TWENTY-TWO ORGANIZATIONS
OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE
Imbued with the wild ambitions of attaining hegemony
in the Far East, Japanese militarists have used brute force
in invading our country. Wherever they went they cruelly
murdered our civilians and at the same time they caused
harm to the lives and property of citizens of friendly
nations in China and took discriminating measures against
their interests.
of late the Japanese invaders, having been made to
suffer repeated heavy losses as a result of our counter-
offensives, have deliberately picked on peace-loving
nations such as Great Britain, the United States and France
to give vent to their wrath. They have since illegally
blockaded the foreign concessions in Tientsin, searched
and arrested foreign nationals, prohibited the entry of
foodstuff and vegetable supplies, thus endangering the
livelihood of tens of thousands of people. In the name
of Chinese public organizations, they have engineered
and started anti-British movements. These foul violations
of laws were unprecedented in the past twenty centuries of
world history.
For already two years, we, the Chinese people, have
been resisting the invaders. In the present blookade of
foreign concessions in Tientein, we are deeply sympathetic
to the foreign nationals concerned in their forbearance and
courageous stand against the brutalities of the Japanese
militarists.
Though
- 2 -
Though remote from the scene, we solemnly pledge to
them our moral support. This telegram is sent you with the
request that you, on behalf of the American Government and
people, use all power at your command to condemn all brutal
actions taken by the Japanese militarists to banish Third
Power interests from China, and that you cooperate with
other countries unanimously to enforce economic sanctions
against Japan in order to hasten the collapse of the
aggressor nation.
On our part, we, a nation of 450,000,000 people, swear
to continue the struggle in collaboration with all peace-
loving peoples in the world, until Japan, Public Enemy of
Mankind, is expelled beyond the comity of civilized nations.
The Chinese public organizations which jointly sent
the above telegram are:
Chekiang People's Enemy-Resisting and
Self-Defense Committee,
Chekiang Farmers' Association,
Chekiang Chamber of Commerce,
Chekiang Women's Committee,
Kiangsi Mobilization Committee,
Kiangei Federation of Enemy-Resisting and
War-Aid Associations,
Kiangsi Women's New Life Movement Promotion Association,
Fukien Mobilization Committee,
Fukien Federation of Enemy-Resisting and
War-Aid Associations,
Kiangsu First District Mobilization Committee,
South Anhwei People's General Mobilization Committee,
South Anhwei Tea Trade Union,
Branch of the National Relief Commission in the
Third Relief Area,
Chekiang Wartime Cultural Enterprises Committee,
Southeastern Daily,
Frontline Daily,
Kiangsi Min Kuo (People's) Daily,
Anhwei Daily,
Sin-Chow Daily,
Southern Daily,
North Fukien Daily,
South Kiangsu Daily.
VOID
china
August 5, 1939
Message from Navy Dept--Confidential
In re-future moves of Chiang-Kai-Chek
See-Havy folder-Drawer 1-1939
ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
china
yile
Phonel
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
[8/9/39]
In reply refer to
FE 711.942/213
My dear General Watson:
I enclose a copy of 8. note of July 31, 1939 from
the Chinese Ambassador forwarding for transmission to the
President two telegraphic messages which the Ambassador
has received from the representatives of Chinese nationals
in Singapore, Straits Settlements, and Ipoh, Malay States,
relating to the note sent on July 26 to the Japanese
Ambassador in regard to the Treaty of Commerce and Naviga-
tion between the United States and Japan signed in 1911.
There appears to be no action required in the matter other
than to acknowledge the Ambassador's note, which I have
done.
Sincerely yours) TL
Acting Secretary Kills
Enclosure:
Note from Chinese
Ambassador, July 31, 1939.
Brigadier General Edwin M. Watson, U.S.A.,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.
Department of State
BUREAU
DIVISION
}
FE
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted
ADDRESSED TO
General Watson.
F. . returns office
1-1053
CHINESE EMBASSY
WASHINGTON
July 31, 1939
My dear Mr. Secretary:
I beg to inform you that I have received
for transmission to the President the two following
telegraphic messages from the representatives of
Chinese nationals in Singapore, Straits settlements,
and Ipoh, Malay States, respectively:
(1) on behalf of eight million
overseas Chinese in Southern Asia, we con-
gratulate and thank you for giving notice
to Japan terminating the 1911 Treaty of
Commerce and Navigation. We consider it
a great step forward in the cause of
humanity and world peace. It is our
ardent hope that you will soon see your
way to convene a conference under the
Nine-Power Treaty.
Tan Kah-kee, Chairman of the
Federation of China Relief Funds
of Southern Asia.
(2) In support of the telegraphic
message from the Chairman of the Federa-
tion of China Relief Funds of Southern
Asia, we beg to add that your courageous
determination in abrogating the American-
Japanese Commercial Treaty is a great
contribution toward the cause of righteous-
ness and justice and to hope that you will
continue
Honorable Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State.
- 2 -
continue your efforts in curbing aggressors.
Leong Hsin-nan, Chairman of the China
Relief Funds Committee, Ipoh,
Valay States.
I shall be much obliged if you will be good
enough to have the massages forwarded to their high
destination.
I am, my dear Mr. Secretary,
Very eincerely yours,
HU SHIH
PSF: China
CJ
This telegram must bE
PARIS
clossly paraphrased bE-
fore being communicated
Dated August 28, 1939
to anyone. (D)
Rec'd 8:15 a.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
1621, August 28, noon.
SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT.
Discussions with those French outside the Government who
have done the most to assist Chiang Kai Shek in his resistance
to Japanese aggression reveals the opinion that the present
opportunity should bE taken to obtain a statement from
Chiang Kai Shek as to the minimum terms on which hE would
conclude a peace with Japan which would present the independ-
ENCE and possibility of free development of China. It has
been suggested to me that this initiative should bE taken by
the United States through our Ambassador to China and that
you should attempt to bring about the End of the war in
China and the alignment of Japan with France and England
against Germany.
I understand that fear of Russian attack is now great
in Japan and believe that you should consider most carefully
the advisability of some sort of action of this kind. The
French and British have their minds too fixed on Germany to
handle this problem adequately.
BULLITT
KLP:HPD
Infedential
PSF: China
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
September 7, 1939
My dear Mr. President:
With reference to my letter of May 29 and other
correspondence in regard to the Yunnan-Burma Highway,
there is enclosed a further memorandum on the same
subject embodying information recently received in the
Department.
Faithfully I yours, Halls
Enclosure:
Memorandum.
The President,
The White House.
Department of State
BUREAU
DIVISION
}
FE
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted
9/6/39
ADDRESSED TO
The President
8. . SEVENTMENT nome office
1-1033
September 6, 1939
During the latter part of June the American Consul
at Yunnanfu made the journey from that city to the Burma
border in three days' driving time. Although the rainy
season had started several weeks previously, the general
condition of the highway was found to be good and the
Consul concluded that it would be possible to keep the
road open during the rainy season, but that great diffi-
culties would be encountered during August and September.
The western part of the road 18 the weakest section and
operations on this section are handicapped by lack of
sufficient personnel for road work.
The Consul found the organization of the highway 8.8
a military road decidedly faulty. One of the principal
difficulties appeared to be the fact that there is a
division of responsibility for the operation of the high-
way between the Yunnan-Burma Highway Bureau operating
under the Ministry of Communications and the Southwest
Transportation Company which 1s under the Military Affairs
Commission.
An American traveler (Richard Watts, Jr., dramatic
critic of the New York Herald Tribune) who arrived in
Rangoon on August 9 after a seventeen-day journey from
Yunnanfu, found the western section of the highway
between Lungling and the Burma border in very bad con-
dition. He stated that war supplies were only "dribbling
through",
-2-
through", that all traffic might be stopped by further
damaging rains, and expressed the opinion that the highway
as a life line for China 18 "very weak".
According to information obtained from the Defense
Department of the Government of Burma, the Burma section
of the highway, about 120 miles in length, 1s to be made
into a first class road, not only metalled for its entire
length, but also surfaced with asphalt, tar, or other
bituminous material. As much as possible of this improve-
ment work will be done during the next dry season.
The Consul at Yunnanfu reports that the first ship-
ment of export goods over the Burma road left Yunnanfu
on August 12, 1939, and consisted of 53 tons (106,000
pounds) of tung oil in 277 standard steel gasoline drums
consigned to the Universal Trading Company in New York.
The principal reason for shipping this oil through Rangoon
is believed to be the superior terminal facilities there.
Actually there is no shortage of freight space on the
Yunnan-Indochina railway, but the congestion of inward
freight at Haiphong makes it difficult to handle export
shipments rapidly and efficiently.
Dr. R. C. Robertson, head of the Division of
Pathology and Sciences in the Lester Institute of Medical
Research in Shanghai, and Commissioner, League of Nations
Anti-Epidemic Unit No. 2, recently made an inspection
trip
-3-
trip over the highway. In an article describing this trip
he explained that the valleys of the large rivers flowing
south through Yunnan had always shown a heavy incidence
of malignant malaria, and toward the southern and western
parts of the Province, where an annual rainfall of
120 inches 1s common, malaria 18 endemic to a "disastrous"
extent. He asserted that mortality among workmen on the
Yunnan-Burma highway has been very great, that the Burma
section of the road passes through "some of the worst
malaria districts of the world", and that reports of many
fatalities were still coming in, especially from the dis-
tricts near Mongshih, "where malignant tertian malaria
is rife".
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
May 24, 1939
My dear Mr. President:
I believe that you will be interested in the
attached copy of a memorandum prepared in the Department
under date May 18, on the basis of information from
American diplomatic and consular officers, in regard to
the operation of the Yunnan-Burma Highway during the
approximately five months that it has been open to
traffic.
Faithfully A yours, hells
Enclosure:
Memorandum of
May 18, 1939.
The President,
The White House.
Department of State
BUREAU
FE
DIVISION
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted
ADDRESSED TO
The President.
F - - DATA
I-1633
COPY
May 18, 1939
Yunnan and Burma Highway
It is felt that the following brief survey of the
operation of the Yunnan-Burma highway during the approxi-
mately five months that it has been open to traffic may be
of interest at this time.
Arrival of munitions in Rangoon
The first vessel carrying war materials for China was
reported to have arrived in Rangoon on November 3, 1938.
(1)
By January 18 it was reported that there were 9,000 tons
of war materials at Rangoon; (2) on March 16 the Chinese
Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that approximately
15,000 tons had arrived at that port of which some 2,000
tons had been shipped to Lashio; (3) and by April 13 it was
reported in Chungking that there were 30,000 tons of
munitions at Rangoon awaiting shipment (4) into China and
a Southwest Transportation Company officer stated that
3,600 tons had been shipped to Lashio. (5) Calculated on a
basis
(1) Rangoon's November 3, 5 p.m.
(2) Rangoon's despatch 143, January 18, 1939.
(3) Rangoon's March 16, 5 p.m.
(4) Chungking's 260, April 13, 1 p.m.
(5) Rangoon's despatch 170, April 8, 1939.
-2-
basis of duty paid the value of war materials formally
cleared for shipment from Rangoon up to March 4 was
estimated at about United States $9,676,800.
(6)
The
Consul
at Rangoon reports that munitions continue to arrive at
that port direct and in relatively small amounts via
Singapore and Colombo.
(5)
The amount of Burma customs duty payable on war
materials reexported overland to China (in most cases
slightly over 3% ad valorem) constituted a burden to the
Chinese but recent reports from Rangoon indicate that the
Governor of Burma has now ordered that duty on such goods
shall not exceed 1% ad valorem.
(7)
Munitions are said to include high explosives, machine
guns and ammunition, shells, anti-aircraft guns, small arms
and ammunition, trench mortars, two tanks and a few field
guns. They are reported to be of Russian, German,
(6)
Czechoslovakian, Italian and French origin.
Transport facilities
High explosives have been stored in a barge in the
Rangoon River and storage facilities for other war materials
have been established at Rangoon. Storage facilities for
about
(5) Rangoon's despatch 170, April 8, 1939.
(6) Rangoon's despatch 160, March 18, 1939.
Rangoon's despatch 153, February 18, 1939.
(7) Rangoon's November 12, 1938, 8 p.m.
Rangoon's April 23, 4 p.m.
-3-
about 6,000 tons of both dangerous and non-dangerous goods
are reported to have been established at Lashio and for
1,500 tons at Chefang. (8) Most of the war supplies are sent
by rail from Rangoon to Lashio and from there are transported
by a Rangoon haulage contractor, who is reported to be
employing 185 Chevrolet trucks in this service, to Chefang,
some 150 miles from Lashio and 24 miles across the Chinese
border. From Chefang they are carried on to Yunnanfu and
other parts of China in Southwest Transportation Company
trucks.
(9)
By April 8 over 500 American truck chassis had
arrived in Rangoon and more were reported to be en route.
They are being supplied with bodies and reportedly put
into service by the Southwest Transportation Company
(10)
between Chefang and Yunnanfu.
It is reported that many truck chassis as well as
large quantities of petroleum products are being purchased
in the United States under the Export-Import Bank credit to
(11)
the Universal Trading Corporation.
In this connection it is of interest to note that the
Consul at Yunnanfu reports that grading work on the proposed
Burma-
(8) Rangoon's despatch 170, April 8, 1939.
Rangoon's despatch 160, March 18, 1939.
(9) Rangoon's despatch 170, April 8, 1939.
(10) Rangoon's despatch 168, April 8, 1939.
(11) Rangoon's despatch 168, April 8, 1939.
Rangoon's despatch 157, March 2, 1939.
-4-
Burma-Yunnan Railway is progressing rapidly but that in as
much as there appears to be no bridge or culvert construc-
tion carried on there is no assurance that the roadbed will
(12)
be completed at an early date.
Movement of war materials into China
Reports from Yunnanfu indicate that during December
small shipments of supplies arrived in that city from Burma
over the new road, but it is believed that the road was
later closed to heavy traffic for a short period and that,
due principally to lack of trucks, regular transport of war
materials did not start until March. (13)
Reports from various sources indicate that although
the transport is not very well organized or very efficient
some 900 to 1200 tons of war supplies per month are arriv-
ing in Yunnanfu. There have been no reports of any export
produce carried by the trucks on their return journeys
toward Burma, most trucks observed while returning over the
Yunnanfu-Hsiakwan section of the road having been carrying
motor fuel. (14)
By way of comparison it may be noted that over 5,000
metric
(12) Yunnanfu's despatch 153, March 23, 1939.
(13) Yunnanfu's despatch 136, January 31, 1939.
Rangoon's despatch 160, March 18, 1939.
(14) Rangoon's despatch 170, April 8, 1939.
Yunnanfu's despatch 153, March 23, 1939.
Press reports.
-5-
metric tons of freight per month enter Yunnan over the
Yunnan-Tonkin Railway and that from May to September 1938
an average of 90,000 tons of goods per month were reportedly
(15)
moved on the Canton-Hankow Railway.
It is thus apparent
that the new highway is as yet far from being a supply
route over which any considerable volume of war materials
enters China.
Future Prospects
It appears to be generally admitted that the road
will in all probability be damaged by landslides and wash-
outs during the rainy season which lasts from May or June
through November but many observers are hopeful that some
traffic will be possible during this period. An agent of
the Bank of China who recently traveled over the road
stated that there are 20,000 men employed in improvement
and reconstruction and 10,000 in road maintenance work.
It is the opinion of Consul Meyer at Yunnanfu that the
present force will have to be considerably augmented if
even the Yunnanfu-Hsiakwan section (first opened to traffic
about three years ago) is to be kept open during the rainy
(16)
season.
In any event it appears probable that the small
stream
(15) Yunnanfu's annual commercial report, February 28, 1939.
Press reports.
(16) Rangoon's despatch 173, April 13, 1939.
Yunnanfu's despatch 153, March 23, 1939.
-6-
stream of war supplies now reaching China via Burma will,
within the next month, dwindle to nominal proportions until
near the end of the year at which time, with the advent
of the dry season and with additional trucks available, it
may be expected to resume its flow at substantially above
the present volume.
fullomed
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
May 29, 1939
My dear Mr. President:
With reference to my letter of May 24 transmitting
a copy of a memorandum on the Yunnan-Burma Highway, there
is enclosed a supplementary memorandum on the same subject
embodying information received in the Department within
the past few days.
Faithfully yours, Maths
Enclosure:
Memorandum of
May 29, 1939.
The President,
The White House.
May 29, 1939.
Confidential statistics of the Defense Department
of the Burma Government show that during the period
December 15, 1938, to April 23, 1939, war materials to
the value of 37,623,000 rupees or more than US$13,000,000
were passed by the Rangoon customs for transit through
Burma to China. These supplies consisted chiefly of
machine guns, shells and cartridges. Czechoslovakia is
named as the country of origin of more than 30 percent,
France and Russia more than 22 percent each, the United
States more than 12 percent, Belgium nearly 9 percent
and Denmark more than 3 percent in addition to small
quantities from Great Britain and Germany.
By May 1, 1,386 American trucks were reported to have
arrived in Rangoon and assembly of these trucks, which
had been delayed by labor troubles, was expected to start
shortly. Additional American trucks were expected to
arrive in Rangoon soon, as were 300 five-ton Thornycroft
trucks, the first shipment of what was reported in the
press to be an order of 1,300 of these trucks placed by
Chinese interests under a British credit.
According to a memorandum written by the Rangoon
representative of the Foo Shing Trading Corporation
(associated with the Universal Trading Corporation of
New York)
- 2 -
New York) the Foo Shing organization will maintain a thousand
American trucks on the Yunnan-Burma highway to transport
wood oil for export and it is estimated that this number of
trucks will be able to keep 108 tons of goods per day moving
in each direction. The highway between Lashio and Yunnanfu
will be divided into four sections and storage facilities
will be constructed at the termini of each section so that
if one section of the road is closed, goods may be kept
moving over the other sections. It is expected that trucks
will make the entire trip between Lashio and Yunnanfu in
seven days. So far there has been no cooperation between
the Southwest Transportation Company (engaged principally in
the transport of war materials into China) and the Foo Shing
Corporation. However, the Rangoon representative of the
latter concern suggests in his memorandum that an immediate
effort be made to come to an agreement with the Southwest
company providing for the cooperative utilization of the
transportation facilities of the two companies.
(Rangoon's despatches nos. 178 of May 1 and 179 of
May 2, 1939, and telegram of May 27, 5 p.m.)
file infertial
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
January 25, 1939
My dear Mr. President:
I believe you will find interesting the attached
copy of a memorandum on the subject of the Burma Road,
prepared by Major J. M. McHugh, U.S.M.C., Assistant
American Naval Attaché in China. Major McHugh accom-
panied Ambassador Johnson on his recent trip by motor
car from Chungking to Rangoon, and the memorandum is
based on observations made during that trip.
You will find attached to the memorandum a brief
explanatory comment prepared by Ambassador Johnson.
L Faithfully yours
halls
Enclosures:
1. Memorandum by
Major McHugh.
2. Comment by
Ambassador Johnson.
The President,
The White House.
COPY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
January 20, 1939.
PA/H:
Mr. Hornbeck.
//
In the conclusions set forth on pages 9 E
to 12 of the attached report there occur the
following sentences in reference to the road
to Burma:
"That it can and will be
completed to this point in time to
be of any real value during the
present conflict is open to grave
doubt. "
"The volume of war material
which can be transported over this
route and the overhead incident
thereto is a matter of simple
arithmetic which can easily be
computed from the basic statistics
of mileage and gasoline consumption
of our trip alone -- and the result
is not encouraging."
By way of comment I desire to say that
these statements result obviously from a
consideration of the length of the road,
statistics which we compiled regarding our
own consumption of gasoline and the numerous
difficulties obviously to be overcome in
putting the road into condition for the
handling of the amount of heavy traffic
necessary to move large quantities of goods
in
- 2 -
in trucks. The present conflict, in my
opinion and in the opinion I am sure of Major
McHugh, is going to last for a considerable
period of time and we did not intend by these
statements to convey the idea that the road
would be of no service whatever in assisting
the Chinese in their resistance. It is our
feeling that the road will be of considerable
assistance; that this assistance will increase
as time goes on and as effort is made to
improve the condition of the road and to supply
it with the necessary equipment to handle
traffic over it. Neither McHugh nor I wish to
leave any doubts in the minds of anyone as to
the difficulties involved.
FE:NTJ:REK
COPY
AMERICAN CONSULATE
RANGOON BURMA
31 December, 1938.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE AMBASSADOR
Subject: The Burma Road
The following is a brief report of our recent trip
over the new motor road connecting KUNMING, YUNNAN, with
LASHIO, BURMA:
A. DETAILS OF THE JOURNEY
(1) Dates We left CHUNGKING at 7:30 A.M., December 12,
1938, and arrived at LASHIO at 6:30 P.M., December 26, 1938,
travelling by way of KWEIYANG, KUNMING, HSIA KUAN (TA LI FU),
PAO SHAN, LUNG LING and MANG SHIH. Actual travel time was
ten days, as follows: CHUNGKING to KWEIYANG, two days;
KWEIYANG to KUNMING, three days; KUNMING to HSIA KUAN, two
days; and HSIA KUAN to LASHIO, three days. Three additional
days were required to drive from LASHIO to RANGOON. Stop-
overs to exchange necessary official calls and service our
transportation were made as follows enroute: one day at
KWEIYANG, three days at KUNMING and one day at TA LI FU.
(2) Mileage and Gasoline The following table shows
the mileage between the various points enroute as measured
on the speedometer of our car. This varies only slightly
with information supplied us from Chinese, British and
French sources, the differences being due either to mechanical
variation in instruments or the exact location of points from
which readings were taken:
CHUNGKING
CO
- 2 -
CHUNGKING TO KUNMING
726 miles
KUNMING to HSIA KUAN
264 "
(TA LI FU is 7 miles to the north
of HSIA KUAN, off of the main road)
HSIA KUAN to LASHIO
480 "
Total
1,470 miles
(LASHIO to RANGOON - 612 miles)
We consumed sixty five (65) gallons of gasoline from
CHUNGKING to KUNMING and seventy five (75) gallons from
KUNMING to LASHIO. Gasoline is available at certain points
along the route between CHUNGKING and KUNMING, but is issued
only against written authority from the Liquid Fuels Division
of the Ministry of Finance at CHUNGKING or by local authority
of Provincial Governments. Ordinery travellers cannot pur-
chase at random nor can they easily procure such authority.
I had already taken steps to procure permits to purchase
gasoline along this section of our route for a trip to
KUNMING prior to receipt of orders to make the trip to BURMA
and it had required eight days for the passes to be issued
even though permission to obtain them had immediately been
granted upon receipt of my request. There are no stocks of
gasoline available, however, along the KUNMING. LASHIO
route at present, not even as far as HSIA KUAN. We were
accompanied on this latter stage by Mr. T'an Po-ying, the
newly appointed Managing Director of the road who is taking
over control from the Yunnan Government as of 1 January, 1939.
He was sent to KUNMING by plane by the Minister of Communice-
tions to facilitate our journey in any way possible and took
the occasion to make his first inspection of the route. It
was necessary, however, for him to bring along a truck to
carry gasoline supplies for the outgoing and return journeys
of
- 3 -
of the cars. The local representatives of the foreign oil
companies in KUNMING have no stocks along the route nor any
concrete plans as yet 88 to when they may locate same.
(3) Transportation for the trip The car used by us was
a 1935 model, Ford V-8 Sedan, which I had purchased second
hand in HONGKONG in September, 1938, and had driven from there
via CANTON to HANKOW, thence back to CHANGSHA and on to
CHUNGKING. We carried with us in this car a Chinese mechanic
and our personal baggage and bedding plus spare parts and
surplus gasoline in B. limited quantity. I had had this car
thoroughly overhauled in HONGKONG despite the fact that it
had only been run 8,500 miles; had had 8 special carrier
built on the rear capable of carrying thirty (30) gallons
(3 Cases) of extra gasoline; had had the springs reinforced;
and had had the car equipped with spere parts for every
conceivable emergency. We also carried a set of blocks and
tackle, tow rope and pick and shovel. Spare parts are not
evailable at points in Central China, except at KUNMING in
very limited and uncertain quantity. Had it not been for
the availability of this car at CHUNGKING when the question
of this trip arose, it is doubtful if the trip would have
been attempted, for commercial transportation is not only
scarce, but mechanically unequal to the strain of such a
trip. Mr. T'an commandeered for his use a brand new 1938
Ford V-8 Sedan and a new Dodge truck yet had recurring
trouble with both all along the route due to the careless-
ness of his chauffeurs and their failure to service their
equipment carefully at the end of each day's run.
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE ROUTE
(1) CHUNGKING to KUNMING The road from CHUNGKING to
KUNMING,
- 4 -
KUNMING, although taken for granted by those who have not
travelled it, is a very difficult route. There are five
mountain passes between CHUNGKING and KWEIYANG and six more
between KWEIYANG and KUNMING. In the former group, starting
with an altitude of approximately 400 feet at CHUNGKING,
one attains altitudes up to 3,500 feet and in the latter
group, from an altitude of 2,600 feet at KWEIYANG, one
reaches 6,600 feet on one pass. (Altitudes were taken by us
all along the route and were found to agree substantially
with those shown on maps and engineering blueprints). The
road has a rock base throughout, but the surface has been
largely washed away by the long rainy season and by heavy
traffic in recent weeks and is very jagged and uneven,
especially between KWEIYANG and the YUNNAN border. Grades
are steep and curves are sharp, many of them requiring on
the ascent full power in low gear on a Ford V-8. Just west
of AN NAN in western KWEICHOW one descends the side of a
mountain over a very rough road in twenty five successive
and very sharp curves, losing 2,000 feet in three kilometers,
and then immediately regains this altitude plus another 300
feet in a climb of five kilometers on the opposite mountain.
Chinese trucks are nevertheless negotiating this road
regularly, albeit with frequent breakdowns and casualties.
It is no exaggeration to state that at least fifty percent
of the total distance traversed was in second gear due either
to escending or descending slopes or to uneven road surfaces.
(2) KUNMING to HSIA KUAN This section of the road is
less than two years old although it is an old caravan route.
Prior to the outbreak of the present war there were very few
cars in YUNNAN and little demand for improvement of this
section. Its development, therefore, is practically concurrent
with
- 5 -
with the HSIA KUAN - LASHIO section. There are two main
passes to cross, the second being the highest of the entire
route - 8,600 feet. Part of this road is in excellent
condition and part very poor. The latter is especially true
through the first pass which lies between KUNMING and CH'U
HSIUNG where several serious slides have occurred. Here,
as in similar situations further along, it will not only be
necessary to slope the cuts back to a more normal angle of
repose, but likewise imperative to maintain a constant patrol
and repair gangs. Work on widening and improving these cuts
is already in progress. Driving along this section of the
road is, however, relatively easier than on the KWEICHOW
roads due to the excellent condition of the latter part
over the second pass.
(3) HSIA KUAN to LASHIO This section also is in reality
the general line of a very old caravan route. The motor
road, while following roughly this line, is in the main a
virgin road which has literally been carved out of the sides
of mountains. Starting from an altitude of 6,400 feet at
HSIA KUAN, the road traverses seven passes to the BURMA
border and two more between that point and LASHIO. Work on
this section was first started in December, 1937, and the
road was initially declared open in July, 1938. Serious
slides during the wet season forced its closure, however,
and the metalling of the surface was likewise far from com-
plete so that the road was only again opened to passage
shortly prior to our trip. Work is in progress all along
the route widening it, surfacing it, completing bridges and
coping with slides. It is by no means finished and its
ultimate utility as an artery for heavy and continuous
traffic depends entirely on how assiduously and vigorously
its
- 6 -
its improvement is pushed.
There are certain sections through which the road
passes where the geology 1s such that constant patrolling
end repair will be required. These points principally are,
(a) the first pass south of HSIA KUAN between there and the
YANG P'I river, (b) the beginning of the ascent to the
MEKONG DIVIDE, (c) recurring sections on both slopes of the
SALWEEN DIVIDE, (d) the entire LUNGLING - MANGSHIH section
and (e) the LUNG (SHWELI) river divide just north of the
BURMA border. In these sections the geology is of a con-
glomerate composition -- either talus or detritus, resembling
the deposit of a flood despite the fact that it is several
thousand feet high, and is constantly crumbling and slipping.
This whole area is apparently under terrific strain for the
sedementary rock has been bent and crushed until it has
little cohesion. It is exactly 88 though the road had been
cut along the slopes of a mound of granulated sugar which
constantly melts or slips from under it. Only constant
supervision such as has been exercised for years in the
Panama Canal will keep the road open through these areas.
(4) Present condition for traffic The road is not yet
in condition to handle heavy traffic and it is impossible
to predict when this condition will be attained. Work is
progressing all along it although the number of workmen em-
ployed is obviously insufficient and apparently considerably
less than that mobilized to break the ground earlier in the
year. The people are turned out for work on the road by the
magistrates of their respective districts as a form of
taxation and get neither pay nor food for their efforts.
No call upon their services is possible during the summer
months when the crops need attention for they will not turn
out
- ? -
out then and the road will obviously go out of commission
during the rainy season of the coming year for there are
places that will not yet be in condition by that time to
withstand the weather and there will be very little if any
local labor to commandeer for such emergencies. Mr. T'an
spoke of bringing in a large number of experienced road
builders from KIANGSI Province in order not only to improve
the quality of the work, but to have permanent crews avail-
able. This is quite possible to do and if done will be a
distinct asset, for KIANGSI was where the Generalissimo
started his road building program and there are undoubtedly
large numbers of refugees from there available for this work.
Many very substantial stone and concrete bridges have
already been built while others are in process of construc-
tion. Present by-passes around these, however, will be
closed by the advent of the coming rainy season in April if
any remain uncompleted by that time. The suspension bridge
over the MEKONG river is rated at seven and one half tons
and appears serviceable if properly watched. The reinforcing
of the suspension bridge over the SALWEEN is already 75%
complete and will be finished very shortly. It is rated
at fifteen tons and will be superior to the MEKONG bridge
when finished. We did not note any sharp or difficult
approach to this bridge as reported in November by Mr. Hunter
of the Central Aircraft Factory.
The chief point where difficulty will probably occur
for heavy trucks seems to be in the elbows of curves at
the tops of valleys where the road winds from one mountain
to the next. There are a multitude of these in any ascent
or descent and in many cases the turn is far too sharp and
the culvert or fill not only too narrow, but not squared to
the
- 8 -
the normal approach of the vehicle. Work is already in
progress at many places to correct this, but the bridges
where necessary have already been located and some may
have to be rebuilt. The road needs widening in many places
not only to permit the free passage of vehicles, but to
strengthen it. Work on this is already in progress in
frequent instances but the number of workmen is at present
insufficient to guarantee completion prior to the coming
rainy season. It was interesting to remark the migration
of a large number of Yunnanese into northern BURMA for road
work where they obtain substantial remuneration for their
services.
C. CONCLUSIONS
The building and opening of this road is obviously
the result of a pressing need on the part of the Chinese
who now find themselves practically cut off from the outside
world. The work to date - the mere fact that a road has
been built through such formidable terrain -- is a distinct
credit to the Chinese. The BURMA Government is, in fact,
behind schedule in the development of their section of the
road from the obvious fact that they never believed the
Chinese could and would build this road. With continued
improvement and constant supervision over dangerous sections
the road has every possibility of becoming a serviceable
artery for traffic. That it can and will be completed to
this point in time to be of any real value during the present
conflict is open to grave doubt. And when the present
conflict is settled, the question remains, Will the Chinese
continue to improve this route? Once the pressure is removed
and negligence sets in, the route will close. Only one slide
unattended is necessary to produce this.
But
- 9 -
But the future cannot be predicted. The pressure to
develop and use the road is stronger than ever at present
and there certainly is no sign as yet of any settlement of
the present war nor any clue as to how it might come about.
The new Managing Director of the road, Mr. T'an, is a very
well educated engineer of German training who appears to
possess an unusual amount of energy and common sense. He
informed us that he had just been granted an allotment of
forty thousand pounds sterling of foreign exchange with
which to buy further road equipment and is now enroute to
HONGKONG to arrange for these purchases. He likewise appears
to have under him several competent and industrious engineers.
He has already had considerable experience in the Northwest
in opening up the routes to the U.S.S.R. and there therefore
is no ground on which to discount the present intentions or
ability of the Chinese to go ahead with the development of
the road.
A high official in the BURMA Government informed me
that there is not enough potential commerce or mineral
wealth in YUNNAN to justify the continued development or
use of the road after the present war. He admitted, however,
that if it could be kept open clear into SZECHUAN it might
succeed commercially. Whether he is right remains to be seen.
It has always been assumed that there is considerable unde-
veloped mineral wealth in the western part of China, but it
is doubtful if any accurate and comprehensive survey has
ever yet been made. The road would appear to be worth the
gamble as a commercial venture alone, not to mention its
political possibilities as an offset to the French influence
in YUNNAN.
As to the volume of traffic it can carry, the Chinese
are
- 10 -
are already talking of 150 trucks per day in each direction
and making plans to employ the thousand new trucks recently
reported to have been obtained on credit from the U.S.A.
Obviously, the installation of efficient service crews and
stations plus large stocks of fuel all along the route will
be necessary to maintain such traffic, and these precautions,
other than for limited fuel stocks and a branch garage of
the Southwest Transportation Corporation at Kweiyang, do not
now obtain on the older section of the route from KUNMING to
CHUNGKING. There is a very evident and crying need along
that route for the coordination and servicing of motor
transport. Likewise, very strict discipline and schooling
of chauffeurs will be required and thus far no such move has
been made elsewhere to any appreciable degree in this respect,
not to mention the fact that proper care and routine servicing
of machinery is not an inherent trait of the Chinese. An
efficient despatching system for the control of traffic will
also be required especially since the Chinese plan to
utilize a large amount of native transport. In this latter
respect Mr. T'an has plans for an improved native two-
wheeled cart, animal drawn, with steel axle, pneumatic tires
and ball-bearings recovered from broken trucks. He claims
he has already employed this successfully in the Northwest
each vehicle transporting one and one-half tons of gasoline.
The idea itself appears possible of some success, but its
installation along the route we have just travelled would
obviously produce a hopeless traffic jam unless very rigid
despatching and control were exercised.
The volume of war material which can be transported
over this route and the overhead incident thereto is a matter
of simple arithmetic which can easily be computed from the
basic
- 11 -
basic statistics of mileage end gasoline consumption of
our trip alone -- and the result is not encouraging.
Respectfully submitted,
J. M. McHUGH
Major, U.S.M.C.
Assistant Naval Attache
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
September 22, 1939.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
The attached memorandum has
been received from the Chinese
Ambassador with the request that
it be passed on to you.
CH
china
According to a report, dated September 18, of Chinese
official source in Moscow, the Soviet Government gave the
following assurances:
(1) The declaration of Soviet Russia's readiness to aid
China in her military resistance will be followed by facts.
Russia will in no way change her original plan. There is no
reason for China to entertain any fear and suspicion.
(2) Japan has not yet proffered any suggestion to nego-
tiate for a non-aggression pact. The Soviet Government would
certainly keep General Chiang informed through the Chinese
Ambassador, should any such suggestion be received in the
future. Japan does not seem to have such intention.
(3) The Red Army's march to Poland is solely for the
protection of Russian minorities and for the security of the
frontier, and certainly does not mean Russian participation
in the European conflict.
(4) The attitude of Soviet Russia toward Great Britain
and France will, in a way, be decided on the basis of the
attitude of the latter two countries toward Soviet Russia.
If they fail to understand Russia's position in Poland and
take a belligerent attitude, Russia will be prepared for such
an eventuality.
September 21, 1939.
761.94/1141
china
October 20, 1939.
Letter from Sec. Hull to the President
In re-attached cablegram from the Secretariate of State of
the Holy See whi ch was left by Monsignor Ready at the
State Dept.
Subject:Secretariate of State of Holy See received information
from Unknown source that Chinese officials "desire the.
Holy See to take steps to establish peace between
China and Japan".
See Hull also encloses for the President an analysis of the
above subject. Both the cablegram and analysis were
returned to the State Dept.
See: Italy folder-Drawer 1-1939
+
DCR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
November 1, 1939.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Reference, the call which Dr. W. W. Yen, former
Chinese Minister to the United States, is to make on you
on November 2, at twelve-thirty, noon.
Dr. Yen will present to you a letter, dated July 20,
from Chiang Kai-shek, a copy of which, as supplied for your
advance information by the Chinese Ambassador here, is
hereunder attached. Chiang Kai-shek has asked Dr. Yen to
793.94/15483
"exchange views with you concerning the general situation
in the Far East".
In the letter under reference, Chiang Kai-shek states
that the main points of his thought relate to: (1) the
upholding of the principles of the Nine Power Treaty, with
emphasis upon adoption by this Government of economic
measures against Japan; (2) China's need of material
assistance; and (3) the European situation in relation to
DEC9 - 1939
OHILI
the Far East.
The Department offers comment as follows:
With regard to Chiang Kai-shek's first point, it is
believed that the attitude and position of this Government
F/FG
with regard to the question of treaty observance and with
regard
- 2 -
regard to the principles which this Government believes
should govern relations between and among nations have
been made clear in many public statements by high officials
of this Government, and that this Government's attitude and
position remain unchanged. With reference to the suggested
adoption by this Government of economic measures against
Japan, it is believed that the whole question of our future
commercial relations with Japan must, naturally, depend upon
developments. Both the executive and the legislative
branches of the Government have been giving consideration to
this subject. Suggestions for action by this Government are
examined in the light of the traditional policies of the
United States and of the current attitude of the American
people, and within the framework of the laws of this
country. Chiang Kai-shek also suggests that this Government
might call a conference either to bring about a settlement
of the Far Eastern situation or as a preliminary to the
taking of economic measures against Japan. It is believed
that until Japan's military leadership shall have become
convinced of the necessity of modifying its objectives and
altering its methods, action by the Government of the United
States directed toward bringing about an adjustment of the
Sino-Japanese conflict by diplomatic processes would be
inopportune: such an adjustment, if achieved, could only
be on a basis which would have the effect of assisting
Japan
- 3 -
Japan toward acquisition of a legal title to some portion
of what the Japanese armies have seized (and are by no means
sure of holding) by force. It is believed that the calling
at this time of a conference as a preliminary to the taking
of economic measures against Japan would have little or no
chance of serving a useful purpose, especially in view of
the preoccupation of other powers with military operations
in Europe and prevailing uncertainties regarding current
diplomatic moves and developments.
With regard to Chiang's second point, China's need of
material assistance, it is understood that this Government
desires to be constructively helpful where it is appropriate
and possible for it to act within the framework of the
established policies and laws of the United States.
With regard to Chiang's third point, the European
situation in relation to the Far East, it is to be noted
that Chiang's letter was written before the outbreak of war
in Europe. After the war began, the Chinese Government
appeared for some time to be apprehensive lest the foreign
relations of Great Britain and France, and possibly develop-
ments between the Soviet Union and Japan, might assume an
orientation unfavorable to China. On September 5, the
American Ambassador to China called on Chiang Kai-shek and
communicated to him, under instruction from the Department,
a statement that we had no indication of any material
developments
- 4 -
developments which would seem to make warrantable the
apprehensions of which Chiang had given an intimation.
This Government has constantly exchanged with the British
and the French Governments information in regard to the
Far Eastern situation; our attitude and position in regard
to features of that situation have on numerous occasions
been made known to those Governments; and it is believed
that our views are clearly understood by them. During
recent weeks various developments in China have given the
Chinese Government renewed confidence in the capacity of
China to resist; developments in relations of other countries
have tended to allay the Chinese Government's apprehensions
referred to above; and Chiang Kai-shek has repeatedly
affirmed that China has no intention of making peace on the
basis of Japanese terms as currently (and more or less
vaguely) outlined by Japanese spokesmen or agents.
CH
Enclosure:
Copy of letter from
Chiang Kai-shek,
July 20, 1939.
(Copy of Translation)
Strictly Confidertial
Chungking, July 20, 1939.
My dear President Roosevelt:
I wish to thank you, first of all, for your kind
letter of April 18 replying to my message of March 25, and
to express my deep appreciation for your approval of cer-
tain remarks which I had occasion to make in the interests
of international order and justice.
I am now sending Dr. W. W. Yen, who served for
several years as China's diplomatic representative in the
United States, to washington to see you and, on be-half,
You
exchange views with A concerning the general situation in
the Far East. I have also asked him to bring you this
letter in which, with your permission, I am going to set
forth my points of view for your consideration.
The main points of my thought relate to the follow-
ing: first, the upholding of the principles of the Nine
Power Treaty: second, China's need of material assistance:
and third, the European situation in relation to the Far
East.
Regarding the first point, it is quite clear that
Japan has in no way changed her untenable attitude toward
international treaties. She is not more inclined now than
at the time of the Prussels Conference to show any respect
to the Nine Power Teraty which she freely signed. What Japan
fears, however, is strong insistence backed by effective
His Excellency
Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D. C.
weapons upon the observance of treaty rights and obligations
which she considers herself able to ignore with impunity, as
long as the parties concerned only voice their dissatisfac-
tion by words. She has even been encouraged to believe that
violations of teraties might become faits accomplis which
would eventually obtain recognition by the Powers.
In your speech delivered before Congress on January
4, you spoke of the "many methods, short of war, but stronger
and more effective than mere words, of bringing home to aggres-
sor governments the aggregate sentiment of our people". I am
sure that all such methods must have been thought out and care-
fully examined by you and your Government. I venture to think,
however, that there are certain measures which may be found
particularly efficacious and which may therefore hasten the ter-
mination of the present conflict.
Now, the weaponat the disposal of the United States
which will prove effective necessarily include the absolute pre-
hibition of the exportation of materials and implements of war
to Japan, especially iron and petrol, the prohibition of the im-
portation of staple Japanese products, the increase of tariff rates
on those products 88 has been done in the case of German imports,
the closing of certain ports to Japanese ships, and other measures
of B. similar nature. There are, of course, stronger and more
effective weapons. But these economic reprisals which are fully
justified in international law and, 1 believe, also permissible
under American domestic law, will be sufficient to bring home to
Japanese militarists the weight of public opinion of the United
States which they cannot afford to ignore.
These measures, which will have the effect of weaken-
ing Japan's sinews of war and her general economic conditions,
will inevitably compel her to take the only safe coures left her
by agreeing to solve all problems concerning China and other
interested Powers at the council table. It will then be possible
for the United States, by virtue of the mine Power Treaty or
her well recognized position 8.8 8. peace-promoting State, to
call & conference at which the participating Powers may be
able to seek, by processes of free negotiation, a settlement
based on reason and justice. Measures of reprisal are thus
only the means to an end - an end desired by all peace-loving
nations and bound to be accepted even by aggressor nations.
The termination of the conflict by conference may
perhaps be brought about in another way. The Government of
the United States may first invite the Powers chiefly concern-
ed to a conference at Washington or elsewhere and, in the
event of Japan declining to participate, would be the more
justified in applying to a recalcitrant country the measures
outlined above. The enforcement of such measures even for a
brief space of time will surely bring Japan back to her senses
and ultimately make her accept the conference proposal. Thus,
the principles of the Mine Power Treaty may be upheld.
The second point of my thought relates to China's
need of material assistance. After about two years' hard
struggle for national existence, China, I believe, is now in a
much better position than at any time during that period, The
morale of our people as well as our army is excellent; the
whole nation is more firmly united than ever: and the strength
of our armed forces, in consequence of their recent reorganiza-
tion and intenstive training, is much greater than ever before.
I state these facts because I know that, as the most trustworthy
friend of China, you are deeply concerned with the outcome of
our struggle.
I do not mean to say, however, that we are without
serious handicaps. Owing to financial and transportation
difficulties, our army 18 not yet adequately equipped as it
should be. Furthermore, in the event of a European war, new
difficulties are bound to arise in the matter of transporta-
tion, and any material aid which friendly nations may then be
willing to accord to China, will certainly meet with more obs-
tacles in reaching its destination.
Having enjoyed the benefit of America's moral
support and financial help in the form of commercial credits,
China looks forward with great earnestness to further timely
material assistance from the American Government and finan-
ciers. Substantial amounts granted at this juncture would be
of inestimable value to us in view of Japan's attempt to under-
mine our currency and economic fabric.
China is traditionally a peace-loving country.
Relentless and ceaseless pressure of Japanese aggression in
China has forced us to take up arms to resist, for we realize
that as long as Japanese aggression persists, no peace conso-
nant with justice and in conformity with the principles of the
Nine Power Treaty can be attained. Unless and until such a
peace is secured, China is determined to fight on and will
never yield or surrender. If material assistance to China by
friendly nations can be assured, there will not be the slightest
doubt that she can and will curb the ambition of the Japanese
militarists. In this way, China will be enabled not only to
protect her own territorial and political integrity, and the
rights and interests of the Western Powers in China, but also
to contribute a large share to the maintenance of international
peace and order.
The third point of my thought concerns the European
situation in relation to the present conflict in the Far East.
The present situation in Europe seems to be very discouraging.
Should war break out, involving all the great democratic Powers
in Europe, it is & certainty that Japan would employ all means of
coercion and intimidation vis-avis Gerat Britain and France in
order to bring about & change of the attitude they have hitherto
assumed toward the Sino-Japanese conflict.
In such an eventuality, the attitude and action which
the American Government may take, will prove to be the decisive
factor in the shaping of future events in the Pacific. The
recent transfer of the American fleet to the Pacific demonstrates
your great statesmanship and proves that you are fully aware of,
and prepared to assume, the responsibilities which will fall upon
your great country in the Pacific region when war breaks out in
Europe. In that event, I sincerely hope that your country will
exercise its best influence on the democratic Powers in Europe 80
that they may not come to any understanding with the aggressor
nations in the Far East, which would be contrary to the spirit of
the Nine Power Treaty, detrimental to the rights and interests of
China and prejudicial to the successful prosecution of China's war
of resistance.
The calling of a conference to settle the present bloody
conflict, the enforcement of measures of reprisal against & treaty-
breaking Power as & means to an end, the rendering of further assis-
tance to & nation that is fighting for the maintenance of law and
ordre among nations as well as for its own existence, the assuming
of more responsibilities in the Pacific region in case of war in
Europe, and any other possible methods, short of war, for securing
peace are consistent, I suppose, with the laws of the United States
and the current opinion of the American people, and mayalso, I
venture to hope, be considered within the bounds of practicability.
I have no doubt that you have been giving serious consi--
deration to the various aspects of these measures. What I feel in-
clined particularly to emphasize is the importance of the time fac-
tor. We have already fought for two years a war of resistance which,
on account of Japan's increasing pressure, political, economic
as well 88 military, 18 now entering its most critical stage.
I therefore cannot refrain from expressing the fervent hope
that your Government will take some positive action in dealing
with the aggressor and giving further assistance to the defen-
der before the end of the present year. I trust that other
signatories of the Nine Power Treaty will not fail to follow
your lead.
The attitude and action of the United States, with
all her prestige, strength and resources, constitute a factor
which Japan, however defiant and desperate she may be, must
reckon with. The United States is at present the only country
which Japan yet respects and to whose admonitions she cannot
refuse to listen. You therefore hold the key to the solution
of all Far Eastern problems, and consequently other problems
of the world.
Knowing that you are endeavouring to achieve the same
end as we are now fighting for, namely, the upholding of the
sanctity of treaties and the maintenance of international peace
and order, and confidently believing that your great country is
China's real friend in time of crisis, I take the liberty of
writing you this confidential letter, setting forth unreservedly
for your kind consideration my personal views which, I am sure,
represent the unanimous sentiment of the Chinese people. Any
views which you may express to Dr. Yen in his capacity as my
personal representative will be deeply appreciated and will
receive my closest attention.
Very sincerely Yours,
(Signed) Chiang Kai-shek.
[non.9,1939]
My dear General Chiang:
I acknowledge the receipt of your letter
of July 20, 1939, which was delivered to me
on November 3 by your distinguished country-
man, Dr. W. W. Yen, who was at one time
Chinese Minister to the United States.
I greatly appreciate receiving through
your letter and through Dr. Yen an expression
of your views in regard to various aspects of
the situations in the Far East and in Europe.
As the situations have changed in important
respects since your letter was written, espe-
cially by reason of the outbreak of hostili-
ties in Europe, and as Ambassador Johnson
called upon you on September 5 and, under in-
struction, discussed various questions bear-
ing upon those which you mention, I shall not
attempt to comment in detail on the views
expressed in your letter.
I assure you that, as stated to you by
Ambassador Johnson, the fundamental and tra-
ditional foreign policy of the United States
is unchanged. Our attitude and position in
regard to the situation and problems in the
Far East have on numerous occasions been made
known to various of the other governments
concerned.
I have had several pleasant conversations
with the present Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Hu
Shih. Officials of the Department of State
are at all times accessible to him, and the
agreeable relations which he maintains in
Washington provide continuous opportunity for
helpful exchanges of views in regard to all
aspects of the situation in the Far East,
which situation continues to receive the
closest attention of a number of officials of
this Government including myself.
I have greatly enjoyed meeting and
talking with Dr. Yen.
Very sincerely yours,
His Excellency
General Chiang Kai-shek,
Chairman, National Defense Council,
Chungking, China.
Department of State
BUREAU
DIVISION
}
FE
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted
11/7/39
ADDRESSED TO
The President
B. a. INTERESENT OFFICE
1-1033
(TRANSLATION)
Chungking, July 20, 1939.
My dear President Roosevelt:
I wish to thank you, first of all, for your kind
letter of April 18 replying to my message of March 25, and
to express my deep appreciation for your approval of cer-
tain remarks which I had occasion to make in the interests
of international order and justice.
I am now sending Dr. W. W. Yen, who served for
several years as China's diplomatic representative in the
United States, to Washington to see you and, on my behalf,
exchange views with you concerning the general situation in
the Far East. I have also asked him to bring you this
letter in which, with your permission, I am going to set
forth my points of view for your consideration.
The main points of my thought relate to the follow-
ing: first, the upholding of the principles of the Nine
Power Treaty; second, China's need of material assistance;
and third, the European situation in relation to the Far
East.
Regarding the first point, it is quite clear that
Japan has in no way changed her untenable attitude toward
international treaties. She is not more inclined now than
at the time of the Brussels Conference to show any respect
to the Nine Power Treaty which she freely signed. What Japan
fears, however, is strong insistence backed by effective
His Excellency
Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D. C.
-2-
weapons upon the observance of treaty rights and obligations
which she considers herself able to ignore with impunity, as
long as the parties concerned only voice their dissatisfac-
tion by words. She has even been encouraged to believe that
violations of treaties might become faits accomplis which
would eventually obtain recognition by the Powers.
In your speech delivered before Congress on January
4, you spoke of the "many methods, short of war, but stronger
and more effective than mere words, of bringing home to aggres-
sor governments the aggregate sentiment of our people". I am
sure that all such methods must have been thought out and care-
fully examined by you and your Government. I venture to think,
however, that there are certain measures which may be found
particularly efficacious and which may therefore hasten the ter-
mination of the present conflict.
Now, the weapons at the disposal of the United States
which will prove effective necessarily include the absolute pro-
hibition of the exportation of materials and implements of war
to Japan, especially iron and petrol, the prohibition of the im-
portation of staple Japanese products, the increase of tariff
rates on those products as has been done in the case of German
imports, the closing of certain ports to Japanese ships, and
other measures of a similar nature. There are, of course, stronger
and more effective weapons. But these economic reprisals which
are fully justified in international law and, I believe, also
permissible under American domestic law, will be sufficient to
bring home to Japanese militarists the weight of public opinion
of the United States which they cannot afford to ignore.
These measures, which will have the effect of weaken-
ing Japan's sinews of war and her general economic conditions,
will inevitably compel her to take the only safe course left her
by agreeing to solve all problems concerning China and other
interested Powers at the council table. It will then be possible
-3-
for the United States, by virtue of the Nine Power Treaty or
her well recognized position as a pease-promoting State, to
call a conference at which the participating Powers may be
able to seek, by processes of free negotiation, a settlement
based on reason and justice. Measures of reprisal are thus
only the means to an end - an end desired by all peace-loving
nations and bound to be accepted even by aggressor nations.
The termination of the conflict by conference may
perhaps be brought about in another way. The Government of
the United States may first invite the Powers chiefly concern-
ed to a conference at Washington or elsewhere and, in the
event of Japan declining to participate, would be the more
justified in applying to a recalcitrant country the measures
outlined above. The enforcement of such measures even for a
brief space of time will surely bring Japan back to her senses
and ultimately make her accept the conference proposal. Thus,
the principles of the Nine Power Treaty may be upheld.
The second point of my thought relates to China's
need of material assistance. After about two years' hard
struggle for national existence, China, I believe, is now in &
much better position than at any time during that period. The
morale of our people as well as our army is excellent; the
whole nation is more firmly united than ever; and the strength
of our armed forces, in consequence of their recent reorganiza-
tion and intensive training, is much greater than ever before.
I state these facts because I know that, as the most trustworthy
friend of China, you are deeply concerned with the outcome of
our struggle,
I do not mean to say, however, that we are without
serious handicaps. Owing to financial and transportation
+
difficulties, our army is not yet adequately equipped as it
should be, Furthermore, in the event of a European war, new
difficulties are bound to arise in the matter of transporta-
tion, and any material aid which friendly nations may then be
willing to accord to China, will certainly meet with more obs-
tacles in reaching its destination:
Having enjoyed the benefit of America's moral
support and financial help in the form of commercial credits,
China looks forward with great earnestness to further timely
material assistance from the American Government and finan-
ciers. Substantial amounts granted at this juncture would be
of inestimable value to us in view of Japan's attempt to under-
mine our currency and economic fabric.
China is traditionally a peace-loving country.
Relentless and ceaseless pressure of Japanese aggression in
China has forced us to take up arms to resist, for we realize
that as long as Japanese aggression persists, no peace conso-
nant with justice and in conformity with the principles of the
Nine Power Treaty can be attained. Unless and until such a
peace is secured, China is determined to fight on and will
never yield or surrender. If material assistance to China by
friendly nations can be assured, there will not be the slightest
doubt that she can and will curb the ambition of the Japanese
militarists. In this way, China will be enabled not only to
protect her own territorial and political integrity, and the
rights and interests of the Western Powers in China, but also
to contribute & large share to the maintenance of international
peace and order:
The third point of my thought concerns the European
situation in relation to the present conflict in the Far East.
The present situation in Europe seems to be very discouraging.
Should war break out, involving all the great democratic Powers
-5-
in Europe, it 1s & certainty that Japan would employ all means
of coercion and intimidation vis-a-vis Great Britain and France
in order to bring about a change of the attitude they have
hitherto assumed toward the Sino-Japanese conflict.
In such an eventuality, the attitude and action which
the American Government may take, will prove to be the decisive
factor in the shaping of future events in the Pacific. The
recent transfer of the American fleet to the Pacific demonstrates
your great statesmanship and proves that you are fully aware of,
and prepared to assume, the responsibilities which will fall upon
your great country in the Pacific region when war breaks out in
Europe. In that event, I sincerely hope that your country will
exercise its best influence on the democratic Powers in Europe 80.
that they may not come to any understanding with the aggressor
nation in the Far East, which would be contrary to the spirit of
the Nine Power Treaty, detrimental to the rights and interests of
China and prejudicial to the successful prosecution of China's war
of resistance.
The calling of a conference to settle the present bloody
conflict, the enforcement of measures of reprisal against a treaty-
breaking Power as a means to an end, the rendering of further assis-
tance to a nation that is fighting for the maintenance of law and
order among nations as well as for its own existence, the assuming
of more responsibilities in the Pacific region in case of war in
Europe, and any other possible methods, short of war, for securing
peace are consistent, I suppose, with the laws of the United States
and the current opinion of the American people, and may also, I
venture to hope, be considered within the bounds of practicability.
I have no doubt that you have been giving serious consi-
deration to the various aspects of these measures. What I feel in-
clined particularly to emphasize is the importance of the time fac-
tor. We have already fought for two years a war of resistance which,
-6-
on account of Japan's increasing pressure, political, economic
as well as military, is now entering its most critical stage.
I therefore cannot refrain from expressing the fervent hope
that your Government will take some positive action in dealing
with the aggressor and giving further assistance to the defen-
der before the end of the present year. I trust that other
signatories of the Nine Power Treaty will not fail to follow
your lead.
The attitude and action of the United States, with
all her prestige, strength and resources, constitute a factor
which Japan, however defiant and desperate she may be, must
reckon with. The United States is at present the only country
which Japan yet respects and to whose admonitions she cannot
refuse to listen. You therefore hold the key to the solution
of all Far Eastern problems, and consequently other problems of
the world.
Knowing that you are endeavouring to achieve the same
end as we are now fighting for, namely, the upholding of the
sanetity of treaties and the maintenance of international peace
and order, and confidently believing that your great country is
China's real friend in time of crisis, I take the liberty of
writing you this confidential letter, setting forth unreservedly
for your kind consideration my personal views which, I am sure,
represent the unanimous sentiment of the Chinese people. Any
views which you may express to Dr. Yen in his capacity as my
personal representative will be deeply appreciated and will re-
ceive my closest attention.
Very sincerely yours,
(Signed) Chiang Kai-shek.
IAF
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[ nov. 9, 1939]
My dear Dr. Kung:
I have received and I appreciate the kind
remarks contained in your letter of August 17, 1939,
which was presented by Dr. W. W. Yen with whom I
had a pleasant conversation on November 3.
I was gratified to note in your letter the
statements of appreciation of the position and
attitude of this Government. I need not reaffirm
at length that we are giving the closest attention
to developments in the Far East and that the
attitude and policy of this Government remain
unchanged.
With kind personal regards, I am
Very sincerely yours,
His Excellency
Dr. H. H. Kung,
President, Executive Yuan,
Chungking, China.
China - 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
November 9, 1939
My dear Mr. President:
In response to your memorandum of November 4,
1939, there is enclosed for your consideration a draft
of a letter to General Chiang Kai-shek, Chairman of
the National Defense Council of the Chinese Government,
in reply to his letter of July 20, 1939, which was
handed to you November 3 by Dr. W. W. Yen, former
Chinese Minister to the United States. There is also
enclosed a draft of a letter to Dr. H. H. Kung, President
of the Executive Yuan of the Chinese Government, in reply
to his letter of August 17, 1939, which Dr. Yen also
presented to you.
If you approve of the draft letters, I would
suggest that upon signature they be returned to this
Department for forwarding to General Chiang and Dr. Kung
through
The President,
The White House.
-2-
through our Embassy at Chungking. The letter from
General Chiang and that from Dr. Kung are enclosed here-
with.
Faithfully yours,
Groceshuee
Enclosures:
1. Draft of letter to
General Chiang Kai-shek.
2. Draft of letter to
Dr. H. H. Kung.
3. From General Chiang to
the President, July 20,
1939, returned.
4. From Dr. H. H. Kung to
the President, August 17,
1939, returned.
Copy
November 4, 1939.
Respectfully referred to the Department of
State for preparation of reply.
F.D.R.
The Executive Yuan
PERSONAL
Chungking, China.
August 17, 1939.
The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
The White House, Washington, D.C.,
U. S. A.
Dear Mr. President:
I take great pleasure in sending you this
message of remembrance and greetings through Dr. W. W. Yen,
former Chinese Ambassador to Washington, who is on his way to
attend the Institute of Pacific Relations Conference in Victoria
as head of the Chinese Delegation.
Allow me to thank you for your esteemed
letter received sometime ago through the courtesy of the American
Embassy here and for your kind sentiments expressed therein to-
ward the Chinese Government and people. Through Ambassador John-
son I was glad to learn also that you were enjoying good health
and giving close and sympathetic consideration to the situation
in China.
It is a source of satisfaction to me, as it
must be to you also, to note the extension of economic cooperation
between our two countries, particularly at the present moment.
For your leadership which has made such friendly cooperation possi-
ble, I wish to assure you of my hearty appreciation.
I cannot let this opportunity pass without
expressing my high admiration of the courageous and statesmanlike
step you have recently taken in declaring the abrogation of the
American Trade Treaty with Japan. Prompted though it was by the
necessity of protecting America's commercial interests, this timely
measure was heartily welcomed and appreciated in China, especially
as it came at a time when international developments were none too
encouraging. I cannot sum up the reaction of the Chinese nation
better than to quote Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek who, only a few
days before the world knew of your historic move, expressed the fol-
lowing belief: "The power making for justice held in the hands of
friendly nations is now in process of gathering energy, and when
the fitting moment comes it will make itself felt in a very effec-
tive manner. We believe that no friends will abandon or betray us
while we ourselves remain sound and upright."
To
The Executive Yuan
The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt -- (pp. 2)
17/8/39
To you, Mr. President, I need hardly say that
China is in effect fighting the battle of all democratic nations.
The oft-recurring incidents in which the Japanese have trampled
upon Americanrights and interests with impunity make me feel in-
deed sorry that our invaders have, in their undeclared war in this
land, brought American rights and interests within the ambit of
their lawlessness and aggression. Clearly, for America to help
China financially and otherwise in checking the aggressor's am-
bition is to safeguard the security of America itself. On the
other hand, I feel confident that if America should exert the full
weight of its economic pressure on Japan, the latter's feet of clay
must give way.
I look forward to ever closer friendship and
cooperation between our two countries under your illustrious leader-
ship.
With kindest personal regards,
Sincerely yours,
H.\H. Kung
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY filemal
WASHINGTON
December 14, 1939
My dear Mr. President:
I am sending you herewith copy
of a cable from Dr. Kung concerning
the production of tungsten and tin in
China. With it I am sending a map
showing the producing centers.
Sincerely yours,
The President,
The White House.
COPY
Translation from Chinese
December 11, 1939
Cablegram received from Dr. H. H. Kung, Chungking, China
To Mr. K. P. Chen, Washington, D. C.
Telegram December 8th received. Based on present mining
and transportation conditions, total production of tungsten is
estimated at minimum 10,000 tons for next year. This may possibly
reach 12,000 tons if conditions are favorable.
Sometime ago the National Resources Commission appointed
the Peking Syndicate, a British firm in China, as selling agents of
tungsten abroad. Sales were to be limited to the amount not needed
by the Government. Any amount may be reserved by the Government for
its disposal.
Next year about 5,500 tons will be required for barter
purposes for delivery to Russia; 500 tons earmarked for Great Britain
under the British credit arrangement; and 1,000 tons contracted to
sell to France for cash. This leaves an estimated balance of
about 3,000 tons. All the available balance, if any, may be shipped
to the United States for sale.
At present the principal port of shipment is Haiphong.
Small quantities can also be shipped from the ports of Kwantung
and Chekiang Provinces.
Total annual production of tin is about 10,000 tons, and
has been entirely turned over to the Central Government. Inasmuch
as Kwoh-Chiu, the producing center of Chinese tin, lies close to
the Yunnan- Indo-China Railway, transportation is convenient and
regular delivery of tin is assured.
Please convey this information to Secretary Morgenthau.
he'll
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
COMMEDENTIAL
October 13, 1939.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
will you speak to me
about this?
F. D. R.
Memo from Lauchlin Currie
to the President re Navy purchases
of tungsten. Also memo from Ray
Spear of the Bureau of Supplies
and Accounts in the Navy Department
in re bids on tungsten ore.
Copy
china
The Secretary of the Treasury
Washington
December 14, 1939
My dear Mr. President:
I am sending you herewith copy of a cable
from Dr. Kung concerning the production of tungsten and tin in
China. With it am sending a map showing the producing centers.
Sincerely yours,
H. Morgenthau Jr
The President
the White House
See:Morgenthau folder-Drawer 1-1939
TSINGHAI
KANSU
too ANDMETERS
HONAN
0081-
SHENSI
KIANGSU
ANHWEI
MINIME
SNANDARI
HUPEH
YANG YSR KIANA
NEMBOR
CHENOTU
SIKANG
SZECHWAN
-
CHEKIANG
NANCHANG
CHANGESHIP
YOURILING
HUNAN
KIANGSI
KWEICHOW
FUKIEN
AND
BAKWAN
KILOMETERS:
o
RWEILIN
KUNNING
CHK-No
100
XX
BANMO
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LIUCNOW
YUNNAN
KWANOSI
KWANGTUNG
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DISN'TURE
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TWUCESTEN
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KWOH-CARU
LASMO
NARNING
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MANDALRY
MAP OF HIGHWAYS AND
RAILROADS IN
SOUTH-WESTERN CHINA
LEGEND:
HIRHWAY COMPLETED
COMPLETED
F
INDO-CHINA
INTERNATIONAL
e
HANAN
PROVINCIAL BOUNDRY
1919
SCALE: 114,000,000
January 6, 1940.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM CAPT CALLACHAN
Encloses Memo of Jan 5, 1940 tc Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral Stark,
Subject:-Japenesse Diplomatic Pressure on France.
Japanese Minister outlined steps that would be
necessary for France to take if their relations
were to be improved.
See:Jan 6th memo-Navy folder-Drawer 1-1940
sport's OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
January 30, 1940.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Reference aide-mémoire handed to you January 27 by
the Chinese Ambassador in company with Dr. W. W. Yen, and
your query whether there is any need to do anything in
reply.
It is our judgment that the aide-mémoire does not
call for a reply. The only matters discussed in the aide-
mémoire not mentioned in recent communications to you from
General Chiang Kai-shek are: (1) the terms reputedly
agreed to between Mr. Wang Ching-wei and the Japanese, and
(2) General Chiang's request that this Government make
known its attitude toward the projected Wang Ching-wei
régime. No reply specifically on the question of the
first point would seem to be needed. The question whether
this Government should make some sort of declaration in
regard to the projected Wang régime is being given careful
study in the Department. It is believed that while a
statement by the President would not seem to be called for,
a statement by the Secretary of State, perhaps in the form
of a formal reservation of rights, may probably be found
advisable some time in the course of the development of
this
- 2 -
this situation. The Department will continue to give
careful attention to this matter.
The original of the aide-mémoire and the text of
the reputed agreement of December 30, 1939, between Wang
Ching-wei and the Japanese are returned herewith.
Enclosures:
1. Aide-mémoire,
January 26, 1940.
2. Text of reputed
agreement of
December 30, 1939.
CH
Department of State
BUREAU
DIVISION
}
FE
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted
1/29/40
ADDRESSED TO
The President
# . - - -
1-1992
AIDE-MEMOIRE
1. General Chiang Kai-shek acknowledges the receipt
of the letter of the President of the United States, dated
November 9, 1939, and the telegram of the President, trans-
mitted by the American Embassy, in reply to his telegram of
December 19, 1939, and thanks the President for the same.
2. General Chiang feels deeply grateful to the
President for pursuading sometime ago the Premier of the
French Republic to maintain an attitude of consistent and
continuous assistance to China with regard to transportation
facilities over Indo-China, and is happy to inform the
President that conditions have now somewhat improved.
3. General Chiang hopes that the President will,
after the expiration of the American-Japanese Treaty of
Commerce and Navigation of 1911, use his best efforts to
curb Japanese aggression and render all assistance possible
to China, as General Chiang had intimated in his letter
brought in person to the President by Dr. W. W. Yen.
General Chiang also hopes that, especially as China's
finances will meet with increasing difficulties with the
approach of February, the President will see his way to
render immediate financial assistance to China.
4. General Chiang wishes to inform the President
that the text of the secret treaty entered into by Wang
Ching-wei and the Japanese, as published in Hongkong on
January 22, is strongly supported by external evidence and,
as far as his knowledge goes, is absolutely authentic.
5. With
- 2 -
5. With the publication of the Wang-Japanese secret
agreement, General Chiang earnestly hopes that the United
States Government, or the President himself, will in one form
or another make known publicly and solemnly the attitude of
the United States, as hitherto consistently maintained, a.s
regards this matter and the proposed new puppet government
which Japanese machinations have been busily engaged in mak-
ing. In General Chiang's opinion, such a declaration will
not only raise the morale of the Chinese people, soldiers
and civilians alike, but will also serve as 8. great blow to
Japanese militarist ambitions, thereby contributing in no
small degree to the benefit of Chinese resistance and the
general situation in the Far East.
Washington, January 26, 1940
TEXT OF A TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM
THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, CHUNGKING
January 23, 1940
The full text of the agreement signed on December 30, 1939,
between Wang Ching-wei and the Japanese revealed by Kao Tsung-
wu and Tao Hsi-sheng:
Fundamental points for readjustment of the new Sino-
Japanese relations:
(1) The Governments of Japan and China, in accordance
with the principles prescribed in Annex One, re -
adjust the new relations between the two countries.
(2) The Chinese Government recognizing the existing
facts accomplished during the incident and prior
to the restoration of reace between contracting
parties gradually readjust on the basis laid
down in the above Article their relations 80 far
as permitted by circumstances.
(3) The Chinese Government shall recognize the con-
tinuance of special state of affairs given rise
to by forces of circumstances during the incident.
(4) The said special state of affairs is to be pro-
gressively adjusted according to the principles
for readjustment of the new Sino-Japanese re-
lations and in consordance with changing events and
general settlement of the incident.
(5) As to the execution of the two aforementioned
Articles the ways and means are to be decided upon
separately.
I
The principles for readjustment of the new 3inc-Jananese
relations with a view to ettaining common goal of establishing
pence and new order in the Par East, Japan, China and Manchukuo
shall maintain among themselves neighborly relations and close
cooperation. The basic principles, therefore, are as follows:
(a) To establish on basis of reciprosity general cooperation
between Japan, China and Manchukuo, especially friendly
relations common from against Communism and economic
collaboration.
(b) To establish a zone of strongest Sino-Jananese
solidarity in North China and Mongolia with regard
to national defense and economics development.
For the reason of checking the spread of Communism,
Mongolia shall be designated 8.8 an area where Japonese
paramount position both militarily and politically
shall especially be established.
(o) To establish a zone of strongest Sino-Japanese
economic solidarity in lower Yangtze Valley.
(a) To establish Japanese paramount position in certain
designated islands along the sea coast of 3outh
China.
(e) As for the details for the execution of the afore-
said Articles the contracting parties agree to
take
-2-
take as basis the principles embodied in II
II
The main itoms for the readjustment of the new Sino-
Japanese relations.
A. Rogarding the principle of Friendly and neighborly
relations. In order to affirm their respect for
intrinsic intimacy of their relationship to achieve
general and harmonious cooperation to safeguard
ponco in the For East and to provo thoir neighbor-
liness by concreto fects, Japan, China and Monchukuo
shall Book for ways and monns to establish a solid
block among themselves through mutual assistance and
promotion of friendly rolations.
(1) China shall recognize the Empire of Menchukuo.
Japan and Menchukuo shall respect the territory
and soverignty of China. Javan, China end
Manchukuo shall establish their new relation.
(2) Japan, China and Manchukuo shall abandon all
those nots nd causes relating to politics,
diplomacy, education, propagande, trade and 80
forth that are detrimental to mutual friendship.
Such notarnd causes shall nlso be prohibited
once for t.11 in future.
(3) Japan, China and Manchukuo shall herenfter con-
duct their diplomacy or. basis of mutur.1 coopern-
tion. In their relations with third Powers they
shall not not contrary to such basic principle.
(4) Japan, China cità Manchukuo shall coopernte to
amalgamnte, create and develop their culture.
(5) Japan is to appoint necessary advisers to
new Central Government to participate in its
work of reconstruction. In those organizations
loonted in zones where strongest Sino-Jopanese
solidarity is to be maintained and other
specially designated areas, Japanese advisers
and staff members are to be placed,
(6) Following progressive and concrete realization of
neighborly relationship between Japan, China and
Menchukuo, Japan will accordingly give considern-
tion for restoration of concessions and abolition
of extraterritorinlity.
B.
Regarding the principle of mutual defense. Jopen,
China and Manchukuo shall cooperate in checking the
apread of Communism and in maintaining common pence
and order.
(1) Jepan, China and Manchukuo shall undertake to weed
out in their respective territories Communists
and Communist organizations, They shall also
cooperate and mutually assist in Anti-Communist
propaganda and intelligence work and other
related atters.
(2) Japan and China shall jointly execute their Anti-
Communist program. In order to attain this aim
Japar. shall station necessary troops at strategic
points in North China and Mongolia,
(3) Separate Anti-Communist Alliance shall be concluded.
(4)
-3-
(4) According to actual situation either in whole
or in part those troops stationed outside of areas
designated in article two shall be withdrawn as
ravidly as warranted by circumstances. But all
Japanese troops now stationed in North China and
the lower Yangtze Valley shall remain until peace
end order are firmly reestablished.
(5) In order to jointly maintain peace and order, China
shall concede Japan the right to station troops
and warships at certain specially designated points
along the Yangtze Valley and in certain specially
designated islands along the sea coast of South
China,
(6) Japan reserved for hereself the right to claim
and supervise for military purposes those rail-
ways, air lines, postal and telegraphic services,
important harbors, and water routes' in those
areas garrisoned by Japanese troops.
(7) The Chinose police, Army and other armed forces
and their equipments and military establishments
within the areas garrisoned by Japanese troops
should be reduced temporarily to minimum require-
ment for internal order and national defense.
Japan will participate in China's efforts to
organize her army and police through appointment
of advisers and training officers and supply of arms
and munitions.
C. Regarding the principle for economic cooperation. To
prove their solidarity of interest and determination
for mutual defense by concrete facts and to make up
their mutual deficiencios, Japan, China and Manchukuo
agree to adopt the guiding principle of reciprocity
in developing their industries and promoting their
economic welfare.
(1) To put the afore-mentioned principle as well as the
following stipulations into practice, Japan,
China and Manchukuo shall conclude necessary
agreements with regard to the development of re-
sources, customs, revenues, trndo, aviation,
communications, postal and telegraphic services,
astronomical and general surveys and 80 forth.
(2) In view of economic solidarity and common defense,
China shall grant Japan special privileges and
facilities to develop and utilize resources es-
pecially those underground resources in North
China and Mongolin. Agnin in view of somo economic
solidarity, Jepan should have necessary facilites
for development and utilisation of specially
designated resources ever. in areas outside of
North China and Mongolia,
(3) In all other industries, Japan will accord
China necessary aid for their development. with
regard to agriculture, Japan will assist China
in its improvement 80 as to increase its pro-
duction and stabilize the livelihood of the
people.
(4) Japan will accord China necessary aid for formu-
lation of China's financial and economic policy.
(5) With regard to trade, China shall e dopt appro-
priate tariff rates and customs system to promote
commerce in general between Japan, China and
Manchukuo.
At the
-4-
At the same time, China shall facilitate and
rationalize supply and demand of raw materials
between Japan, China and Manchukuo especially
with reference to North China.
(6) With regard to the dewlopment of China's com-
munications, postal end telegraphic services,
astronomical and general surveys, Japan will
lend China the necessary assistance and even
active participation. The development of
Aviation in whole China, railroads in North
China (including Lunghai Line), ocean trans-
portation between Janan and China and that along
the Chinese coast, river transportation in the
Yangtze, and postal and telegraphic services in
North China ar.d the lower Yangtze Valley should
be the main items for Japanese active partici-
pation in the field of communications,
(7) Japan and China shall cooporate in reconstructing
New Shanghoi.
Articles Attached:
(1) The New Central Government shall indemnify those
Japanese nationals who have sustained in China losses
in rights and privileges since the beginning of the
China incident.
(2) Prior to the establishment of the new relations be-
tween Japan and Chine the Few Central Government shall
confidentially consult Japan with regard to all
important matters affecting Japan.
Additional stiublations regarding the fundamental points for
the readjustment of the new Sino-Jayanese relations:
A. The main provisions rega ring the readjustment of
relations with provisional government:
(1) The term "North China" herein employed is intended
to designate in general the Hopei, Shansi end
Shantung Provinces situated south of The Great
Vall (The Grost Wall itself is not included) and
that part of the Honan Province lying north of the
old course of the Yellow River.
(2) Ir. view of special character of North China, in
that it is the zone where absolute solidarity
between Japan, China and Manchukuo exists, ospecially
with reference to national defonse and oconomic
development, and in accordance with the principles
Inid down for the readjustment of the r.ow Sino-
Japanose relation, the Politionl Council of North
Chira shall be established for the purpose of
sottling locally those matters vis-n-vis Janen and
Menchukuo.
(3) The matters regard ing authority and organization of
the said Politionl Council in North Chine shall be
discussed and determined in the Control Politionl
Council, such mattors shall be token up for agreement
between Wang Ching-wei and Wang Koh-ming.
(4) The Authority and organization of the Political
Council of North China shell be fixed in such n Weg
ns to onable it to nocomplish concretely the following
tasks when now Sino-Jamnose relations have boen
normalized. Even prior to that timo, however, offorts
shall be mado to bring about the progrossively
desired
prior, however, to the establishment of the Central
Political Courcil.
-5-
desired objective. The name of Provisional
Government shall be abolished. The Political
Council of North Chira should temporarily permit
the continued existerce of those accomplished facts
in order to effect smooth transfer of political
authority so that the people will not suffer fromation
change.
1. Regarding common defense especially Japanese
participation in checking Communism and main-
taining order:
8. Relating to the settlement of matters con-
nected with the stationing of Japanese
troops:
b. Relating to the settlement of matters connected
with Japanese perticipation in checking
Communism and maintaining order:
C. Relating to the settlement of matters connected
with military cooperation between Japan and
China.
2. Regarding economic cooperation especially the
development and utilization of underground
resources and supply and demand of raw materials
and commodities between Janan, China, Manchukuo
and North China:
8. Relating to the settlement of matters raised
by the problem of according Japan necessary
special facilities in develoning and utilizing
underground resources;
b. Relating to the settlement of matters raised
by the problem of rationalization of supply
and demand of raw materials and commodities
between Japan, Menchukuo, Mongolia and North
China:
C. Relating to the settlement of matters connected
with Jacanese participation in regulation of
currency and exchange between Japan, Manchukuo
Mongolia and North China;
d. Relating to the settlement of matters connected
with Sino-Japanese cooperation in aviation.
railway transportation, postal and telegraphic
services, and ocean transportation along main
trado route.
3. Regarding the settlement of matters connected
with the employment of Japanese advisers and
staff members.
4. During the period when there is need for perpotua-
tion of Federal Reserve Bank system and other
systems therewith connected, the Central Government
shall lend to it necessary assistance.
5. The temporary regulations governing the mein
matters of division of powers between the Political
Council of North China and the New Central
Government:
a. In order to defray necessary expenses and
safeguard necessary income, the Politionl
Council of North China shall be temporarily
entitled
- 6 -
entitled to certain stipulated amount of
surplus of customs revenues and of salt
tax and entire yields from consolidated
tax, though the said revenues and taxes
are, in principle, the sources of income
for the Central Government: the power of
supervision over the above-mentioned
national taxes shall be entrusted by the
New Central Government to the Political
Council of North China:
b. The Political Council of North China shall
be given the right to float loans within
certain limits;
C. The Government properties shall belong
to the Political Council of North China as
they do at present, but new arrangements
regarding those properties shall be made
gradually;
d. The customs, postal service and aviation
should eventually be placed under the control
of the New Central Government, but the change
of the present state of affairs shall be
effected progressively;
e. The administration and the management of
transportation on the Lunghai Railway shall
be placed under the Politionl Council of
North China:
f. Excepting officials of Ministerial rank,
the authority for appointing all its officials
shall be given to the Political Council of
North China:
8. Diplomatic negotiations with third Powers shall
be conducted by the Central Government.
Nogotiations for the settlement of local
affairs with Japan and Manchukuo shall, how-
ever, be undertaken by the Political Council
of North China.
B. Main provisions regarding the readjustment of relations
with the Reformed Government.
(1) Though the Reformed Government should be induced to
smalgamate eventually with the Central Government,
its stand shall be respected so that it can re-
main stable and discharge of duties prior to the
establishmont of the New Central Government.
(2) Though the establishment of the Political Council
after the inauguration of the New Contral Govern-
mont, the prostige and standing of important
members of the lattor organization should be given
full consideration by Wang Ching-wei.
(3) Aftor the establishment of the New Central Government
and dissolution of the Reformed Government, the
former shall tomporarily permit the continued
existence of the sccomplishod facts so that the
transfor of the politionl authority will be smoothly
made and the people will not suffer from the sudden
change
(4) In the area of the lower Yangtzo Valley whore the
str ongest Sino-Japanese economic solidarity is to
be realized, Japan's special demands are as follows:
1.
* CPL be spared by virtue of the New Contral Government,
- 7 -
1, Regarding New Shanghai:
a. Relating to matters connected with Japanese
participation in reconstructing a New Shanghai:
b. Relating to the settlement of matters connected
with the stationing of Japanese troops in
New Shanghai:
C. Relating to matters connected with Japanese
participation in establishing and improving
aviation important ocean transportation,
and postal and telegraphic services:
d. Relating to the settlement of matters con-
nected with Jamnese participation in other
enterprises in New Shanghai.
2. In order to expedite realization of the above -
mentioned Japanese demands, necessary arrange-
ments for establishing Sino-Jepanese economic
consultative organization and the like should
be planned and put into effect.
C. Main provision regarding the readjustment of
relations with the United Autonomous Government of
Mongolia.
(1) The term "Mongolia" herein employed is intended
to designate in general the territory north 0-
the Inner Creat Wall (The Inner Great Wall itself
is included).
(2) In view of the special character of Mongolia
in that it is the zor.o where the strongest
solidarity between Japan, China and Manchukuo
in matters relating to national defense and
economic devolopment exists and in the fields
outside of diplomacy (negotintions with Japan
and Manchukuo to be excepted), such 3 adminis-
tration, legislation, jurisdiction, military
affairs, and negotiations with Outer Mongolin,
The Contral Government shall recognize that
Mongolia should possess broad autonomous powers
and should form highly Anti-Communist autonomous
aroa on the basis of the acomplished facts.
(3) In order to establish the relationship between
the United Autonomous Mongolian Government and
the Central Government prior to the convoca-
tion of the Central Political Council, the follow-
ing items shall be agreed upon in written documents
botwoon Weng Ching-wei or his representative and
Prince Toh or his reprosentative in conference:
0, The Central Government rocognizes the fact
of the United Autonomous Morgolian Government's
being highly Anti-Communist and autonomous.
b. Relating to the edjustment of the relations
between the two regimos, separato agreement
shall be mnde after the establishment
of the New Contral Government with the present
understanding AB c. basis.
(4) After the above-mentioned understanding is mnde
the United Autoromous Mongolian Government
shall despatch delegates to participate in the
Central Political Council.
(5)
- 8 -
(5) In the Central Political Council no discussion
shall be allowed on matters lying outside of the
scope prescribed by the understanding embodied
in Article three.
D. Regarding Amoy. Wang Ching-wei shall recognize the
fact that Amoy is a special administrative area.
E. Regarding the specially designated islands along
the sea coast of South China. Among the specially
designated islands along the sen coast of South
China, the Hainan Island shall be given a local
administrative organization (including departments
for military affairs) placed directly under the
control of the New Central Government. In view
of the paramount position that Japan enjoys in that
island the said political organization shall be
empowered to dispose of the following matters raised
by Japanese demands:
(1) Those connected with the stationing of Jamanese
troops:
(3) Those connected with the development and
utilization of specially designated resources
indispensable for national defense:
(2) Those connected with the Sino-Jamnese 00-
operation in military affairs and in the main-
tonance of order:
(4) Those connected with eviation, nostal and tele-
graph services, and ocean transportation.
The above-mentioned governing principle will be applied to
our demands which should be agreed upon later between Japan and
Chiragd also to mattors connected with China's internal
affairs that should be regulated by herself.
The Chinese Embossy,
Washington, D. C.
ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE RECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
file fill mal
chenge
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
In reply refer to
PR 893.51/7048
March 15. 1940
My dear Miss LeHand:
I am enclosing for the information of the Presi-
dent a copy of a note dated March 11, 1940, which the
Secretary received from the Chinese Ambassador, re-
questing that the telegraphic message from General
Chiang Kai-shek quoted therein be transmitted to the
President.
In as much as the Ambassador has been informed
that General Chiang's message has been transmitted to
the President, it is believed that there is no need for
further action.
Sincerely yours,
Chief of Protocol
Enclosure:
From the Chinese
Ambassador, March 11.
Miss Marguerite A. LeHand,
Private Secretary to the President,
The White House.
Department of State
PR
BUREAU
DIVISION
}
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted
ADDRESSED TO
Miss LeHand
V.S. SOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1-1033
COPY: LAW: PR
CHINESE EMBASSY
WASHINGTON
March 11, 1940.
My dear Mr. Secretary:
I have the honor to inform you that I have
received from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek the
following telegraphic message, dated Chungking,
March 9, 1940, for transmission to the President of
the United States:
To the Chinese Government and people
who are fighting in resistance to aggression,
the newly announced Export-Import Bank credit
will mean not only fresh material assistance,
but also new moral encouragement. All this
has been made possible only by your leadership
and direction. Please accept my sincere ex-
pression of appreciation and gratitude.
I shall be greatly obliged if you will be good
enough to transmit the above message to the President.
I am, my dear Mr. Secretary,
Very sincerely yours,
HU SHIH
Honorable Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State.
Published in Foreign Relations of
the U.S., 1940, Vol. IV - The Far East,
pp. 656-657.
7/18/56 RLJ
almay
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 1, 1940.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
FOR YOUR INFORMATION
F. D. R.
CHINESE EMBASSY
WASHINGTON
5-28-40
telegram TO
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT FROM GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK
CHUNGKING, MAY 17, 1940.
The Chinese Government and people, in their bitter
struggle against aggression and lawlessness in international
life, deeply appreciate the valuable friendship and assistance
which the American Government has shown them in the past.
Japan's military advance having been bogged down, her
undeclared war on China has developed into primarily an
economic warfare. Recently the strain on our currency has
been aggravated by the announcement of the possible creation
of a puppet bank of issue at Shanghai and by the worsening
of the European situation, resulting in unprecedented rise
of prices and fall of exchange. Unless our exchange resources
are strengthened, deterioration of conditions would continue
to the further disturbance of trade, while the collapse of
our currency would inevitably discriminate against American
economic interests. The recent spontaneous appeal of the
American Information Committee at Shanghai, urging your
Government to extend loan for the support of Chinese currency,
was undoubted prompted by the conviction that Japan's
renewed attack on Chinese currency is seriously detrimental
to American trade.
To meet the present situation the Chinese Government
has taken action to curtail all postponable expenditures
and reserve internal credit, and to carry out internal po-
licies designed to help upholding the value of the currency.
The Chinese
-2-
The Chinese Government has also augmented the stabili-
zation fund, chiefly from the resources of Chinese banks, but
also with a contribution from a British bank.
While these measures should permit the tiding over of
immediate difficulties, China needs further cash resources
to cope with possible developments after the present funds
are exhausted and to slow down the rate of deterioration.
I therefore earnestly hope that the American Government
under your illustrious leadership can at this strategic time
see its way clear to broaden the scope of financial assistance
to China by taking into consideration the possibility of
supporting the Chinese currency by a cash loan or by other
effective means which your financial experts may suggest.
I trust that you, Mr. President, will not hesitate to
help our national cause to the fullest extent, particularly at
a time when our staunch struggle is approaching the decisive
stage of success or failure. If, as I hope, you are favorably
disposed to these proposals in principle, I shall be glad to
appoint a representative for the negotiation of detailed
arrangements.
The Chinese Embassy,
Washington, May 28, 1940.
china
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 13, 1940.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
In view of this apparently
indiscriminate bombing of Chung-
king without reference to military
objectives, should we call 1t to
the attention of the Japanese
Government?
F.D.R.
Dispatch from Johnson in
Chungking in re Japanese planes
bombing Chungking.
OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
full
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
June 13. 1940
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Before your memorandum of June 13 in regard to
the apparently indiscriminate bombing of Chungking was
brought to my attention, I issued to the press a state-
ment on this subject, a copy of which is enclosed for
convenience of reference. In the light of your memo-
randum, I am also telegraphing Ambassador Grew at Tokyo
to bring that statement to the personal attention of the
Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.
three
Enclosure:
Press release,
June 13, 1940.
Department of State
FE
BUREAU
DIVISION
}
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted
ADDRESSED TO
The President
-- - - -
1-1033
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOR THE PRESS
JUNE 13, 1940
No. 287
In response to inquiries from correspondents in regard
to reports of the bombing of Chungking yesterday, the Secretary
of State said that according to information which has reached
the Department from official and unofficial sources, Chungking
has boen extensively bombed on each of several recent days and
yestorday was intensively and indiscriminately bombed by more
than one hundred Japanose planes; that yesterday's casualties
among the civil populace will probably number several hundred;
that various buildings of the American Methodist Mission,
including a church, wero damaged by concussion; and that two
groups of Japanese planes flow over the American Embassy
promises but no bombs foll in the immodiate vicinity of the
Embassy. The Secretary added that the attitude and the position
of the people and the Government of the United States toward
ruthless bombings of civilian populations have been made abund-
antly and frequently clear, and that we wholcheartodly condomn
such practices wherever and whenever thoy occur.
***
Chungking, June 14, 1940
Dear Mr. President,
World events are transpiring with such violence
and rapidity that more than ever I feel impelled to seek
your counsel and assistance. Being unable to come to
Washington personally I am requesting Mr. T. V. Soong,
with whom you are already well acquainted, to come in my
stead.
I have given Mr. Soong full authority to discuss
and negotiate on behalf of the Chinese Government. Need-
less to say, he ha S my entire confidence and may discuss
with you matters which I would entrust to no other person.
He has full knowledge of our internal situation, and of
our relations with foreign Governments, and I beg you to
accord him the same kind consideration as you would to me
personally.
With kindest regards, I am
Yours faithfully,
Chieng Kai-shek
His Excellency
President Franklin D. Roosevelt
Present
His Excellency
President Franklin D. Roosevelt
Present
Kindness of
Mr. T. V. Soong
ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
& Burnd Cnf
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
October 11, 1940
My dear Mr. President:
It is believed that you will be interested in ar
excerpt from a report of September 7, 1940, received
by mail from the American Consulate at Rangoon, as
follows:
"The Burma-Yunnan highway has been in much
better condition during the rainy season this
year than it was last year. Although the surfac
of the road is very rough, and landslides and
washouts have caused temporary delays, the road
has remained open throughout the rainy season,
and it is understood that the highway has been
open to traffic from Lashio all the way to
Yunnanfu."
Faithfully A yours, Kills
The President,
The White House.
chenge
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 22, 1940.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
I have a hunch that we
ought to do something in regard
to the Chinese loan quickly or
not at all -- because I have
real fear that the domestic
situation in free China will
deteriorate unless we do some-
thing fast. Will you work on
this?
F. D. R.
knn
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
WASHINGTON
OFFICE OF THE LIBRARIAN
November 20, 1940
Dear Missy:
I hope you won't think this is a ride around
Haines Point, but I have something so heavily on my mind tha
I must say four words about it. You will decide, of course,
whether you think it belongs in the waste basket.
I have word from Dr. T. V. Soong that he receiv-
ed yesterday morning a cable from China indicating that the
domestic situation in free China is deteriorating very
rapidly and that the necessity for the loan which the
Chinese Government has requested is critical. Obviously I
know little or nothing about the loan, itself, except that
it has been discussed. It is, however, my impression that
the application has had sympathetic attention everywhere
but that no one either in the Treasury or in the Export-
Import Bank or any other agency possibly involved has been
willing or able to see the thing through. If we should fail
to do in time what we have every intention of doing some-
time, it would be a very sad thing.
I repeat that I know nothing about the negotia-
tions for the loan but I do feel that Dr. Soong's report
should be made available in case it is of importance.
It was lovely seeing you.
Faithfully yours,
aidine
Archibald MacLeish
Miss Marguerite Le Hand
The Personal Secretary
The White House
Washington, D. C.
ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
china
WASHINGTON, D.C.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
In reply refer to
November 23. 1940
PR 811.001 Roosevelt, F.D./6757
My dear General Watson:
I am enclosing herewith a copy of a note dated
November 7, 1940 from the Chinese Embassy at Washington,
together with a translation of a telegram enclosed
therewith addressed to the President by Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek. There is also enclosed a copy of the
Department's reply to the Embassy and a copy of a tele-
gram sent to the American Embassy in Chungking request-
ing that the message quoted therein be transmitted to
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on behalf of the President.
Sincerely yours,
J.
George T. Summerlin
Chief of Protocol
Enclosures:
Copies of four communications.
Major General Edwin M. Watson,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.
Department of State
BUREAU
PR
DIVISION
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted
11/20/40
ADDRESSED TO
General Watson
.
. . INTERVEDIT PARTIES -
1-1032
COPY GLG
CHINESE EMBASSY
WASHINGTON
November 7, 1940
My dear Mr. Secretary:
I beg to enclose herewith a telegram, with
English translation, addressed to President Roosevelt
by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek congratulating the
President on the occasion of his reelection.
I shall be greatly obliged if you will be so
kind as to transmit the message to its high destination.
I wish to take this opportunity to join in the
sentiments expressed by the Generalissimo.
I am, my dear Mr. Secretary,
Very sincerely yours,
For the Ambassador:
Liu Chieh
Enclosures:
Telegram from Chungking,
November 6, 1940
Translation of telegram
Honorable Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State
COPY GLG
TRANSLATION OF TELEGRAM
CHUNGKING, NOVEMBER 6, 1940
My dear Mr. President:
It is with the greatest gratification that
I learn of your reelection for a third term as
President of the United States. This is good tidings
for the cause of human justice and world peace. Not
only the American Government and people are to be
congratulated for the able leadership they have found
in you, but their rejoicings are shared by all those
nations who love freedom and are striving to defend
themselves. I wish to offer you my sincerest
congratulations.
Chiang Kai-shek
COPY GLG
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TELEGRAM SENT
GRAY
November 15, 1940
8 p.m.
AMEMBASSY
CHUNGKING (CHINA) VIA NAVAL RADIO
190.
The following telegram addressed to the President
by General Chiang Kai-shek has been received from the
Chinese Embassy:
QUOTE It is with the greatest gratification that
I learn of your reelection for a third term as President
of the United States. This is good tidings for the cause
of human justice and world peace. Not only the American
Government and people are to be congratulated for the
able leadership they have found in you, but their
rejoicings are shared by all those nations who love
freedom and are striving to defend themselves. I
wish to offer you my sincerest congratulations. UNQUOTE.
Please transmit to General Chiang Kai-shek in
reply a message from the President, as follows:
QUOTE I greatly appreciate the congratulatory
message which you were so kind as to send. Your good
wishes are most heartening both as a personal expres-
sion and as renewed indication of the friendship which
has traditionally existed between the American and
the Chinese peoples. UNQUOTE.
WELLES
ACTING
811.001 Roosevelt, F.D./6757
PR:HCS:GLG/HES
FE
PA/H
COPY GLG
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
November 20, 1940
My dear Mr. Ambassador:
With reference to the Embassy's note of November 7,
1940, enclosing a telegram addressed to the President
by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, congratulating the
President upon his re-election to the Presidency of
the United States, I have been pleased to transmit
the telegram to the President.
The Department is transmitting the President's
message of acknowledgment through the American Ambas-
sador at Chungking.
Sincerely yours,
George T. Summerlin
Chief of Protocol
His Excellency
Dr. Hu Shih,
Chinese Ambassador.
811.001 Roosevelt, F.D./6757
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.A.
PR
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
Major General Edwin M. Watson,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.
ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
1-40
December 20, 1940.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
There is enclosed, for your information, a copy of
a note from the Chinese Ambassador dated December 16,
1940, together with a copy of its enclosure, a transla-
tion of a telegram to me from General Chiang Kai-shek
in which General Chiang, inter alia, extends to you an
expression of his gratitude for the recent action of
this Government in announcing loans to China.
I am asking Dr. Hu Shih to convey to General Chiang
our appreciation of his message, and I believe that no
further action in regard thereto is needed.
Enclosure:
From Dr. Hu Shih,
December 16, 1940,
with enclosure.
CH.
CHINESE EMBASSY
WASHINGTON
December 16, 1940
My dear Mr. Secretary:
I take pleasure in forwarding herewith a
telegram from General Chiang Kei-shek, President of
the Executive Yuan, under date of December 12th, in
which he expressed his appreciation to you personally
in connection with the loans recently announced by
the President.
I wish to join in the sentiments expressed
in the General's telegram.
I am, my dear Mr. Secretary,
Very sincerely yours,
HU SHIH
Enclosure:
Telegram
Honorable Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State
¿COPY:FE:MHP]
TRANSLATION OF TELEGRAM TO HONORABLE CORDELL HULL FROM
GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK, CHUNGKING, DECEMBER 12, 1940.
I feel deeply grateful for the practical measures
which President Roosevelt and yourself have adopted in
order, on the one hand to aid China, and on the other, to
suppress the aggressor. The loans recently announced in
Washington 1s another evidence of the readiness on the
part of the United States to sustain China in her struggles
for complete national independence. Every further step
which the United States takes in regard to the Far Eastern
situation tends to increase the sense of gratitude of the
Chinese people towards the United States, and at the same
time strengthens their determination to fight on till
final victory is won.
I wish to take this opportunity to express to you my
sincerest thanks.