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President's Secretary's File (Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration)
Diplomatic Correspondence
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PSF
FRANCE: Wm. C. Bullitt
1938
PSF: France
Bullit
Personal and
Paris, January 10, 1938.
Conf id ent ial
Dear Commander-in-Chief:
Orders duly received and contents noted. Ob-
edience, however, impossible due to absence of second
in command who is in Switzerland taking care of his
sinus as usual.
Don't worry about me. There is lots of life in
the old carcass yet. The only time that I was really
unbearably overworked was this summer, when everyone
on earth was here for the Exposition. As you know,
I am going to take a long holiday this Spring beginning
about the first of March. I may, in addition, visit
Senator Cuttoli in Algiers for a week the end of this
month. That will depend on the date when Hugh Wilson
will pass through Paris.
As I wrote you before, I believe that there is a
real chance to bring France and Germany closer together
this
The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
The White House.
- 2 -
this year and I want to concert a lot of things with
Hugh.
I was, of course, delighted at Joe Kennedy's ap-
pointment to London and I wish that I could have & talk
with him before he goes to his post. There is a lot
of information about the Embassy plumbing that he ought
to have, and you and I are the only people I know who
are sufficiently low-minded to discuss drains with him.
You will, I assume, have Joe in Washington for several
weeks before he leaves and I hope you will have a chance
to remind him that (1) the British Government has every
code of our Embassy in London. (You will remember
Ramsay MacDonald's statement to me that every message
sent or received by our Embassy in London is decoded
at once and is on the desk of the Cabinet Minister
interested the following morning.) (2) It is highly
improbable that the British Government has missed the
opportunity to put the most efficient dictaphones in
our new Chancery, which is in a building only part of
which is rented by us. (3) There are probably dicta-
phones in the Ambassador's residence and certain members
of the staff of the Embassy are undoubtedly members of
the British Secret Service.
This
- 3 -
This is the kind of thing that the Department is
apt to consider too low to discuss with an Ambassador
but it is something that Every Young Man Ought To Know.
Salmon, the head of the code room in the Department,
is an admirable fellow and he has a number of new coding
devices which should be private for a few messages at
least. I think you ought to advise Joe to have a long
talk with Salmon and ask for some device which will
enable him, in time of need, to send you really con-
fidential messages. I also think you ought to have Joe
take to London the best expert on picking out dictaphones
that the Navy or Army can produce and have a thorough
inspection made both of his house and his office.
It is extremely difficult, of course, to discover the
damn things without tearing a house to pieces. For
example, recently in Moscow the French Embassy was about
to move into a new habitation which had been renovated
by Russian labor. The day the French Ambassador was to
move in, the ceiling of his office fell, revealing a
magnificent series of dictaphones established in the
walls and ceiling. You will recall the fishpole dicta-
phone that the Russians planted in the wall between Joe
Davies' bed and the desk where he dictated all his telegrams.
The
- 4 -
The British are not so crude as the Russians and an
investigation might yield nothing. Nevertheless, I
think it worth while to have one made.
Davies to Brussels was & stroke of genius. He
can not do much harm there. And as there is almost
no work to do he will be able to survive physically.
As you doubtless know, Pletnev, the great Russian heart
specialist told him that his arteries were in such shape
that any serious work would kill him.
If you have not yet picked the man to replace Davies
in Moscow, I suggest that you take an extremely stable
career officer. By all odds the best man, because of
his knowledge of the Far East, would be MacMurray. He
would doubtless hate to go there, as anyone else would,
but I think he would be excellent and the long suffering
staff in Moscow ought not to have to suffer the infliction
of another Davies.
I was most serious in my recommendation that Wiley
should be sent to Riga. He is in Class I and has done
service as Consul General in Antwerp. You will remember
that you announced that you required service as Consul
General as a prerequisite to appointment to the grade of
Minister. You haven't yet appointed one of the men who
has
- 5 -
has done service as Consul General. You have appointed
Atherton, without service as Consul General, to Sofia.
I enclose a letter from Wiley which will give you some
sense of his quality. Wiley knows the Russian scene
so well that there is no one else so well equipped for
the Riga post.
I have had another letter from Moore which is so
full of depression that I am honestly worried about the
old man. He seems to have been shelved completely and
feels it terribly. Can't you have him put on the Per-
sonnel Board? He can be put on as the Secretary's re-
presentative, or a little amendment could be put through
to the Foreign Service Organization Act to provide that,
in addition to the Assistant Secretaries, the Counselor
of the Department should be a member of the Personnel Board.
Your handling of the PANAY sinking was masterly.
To turn it from a MAINE to a LUSITANIA was all that could
be expected and you got more out of the Japanese than
anyone here believed you could.
Henceforth, your chief job is going to be to maintain
our national honor while avoiding involvement in war. The
best way to do that, I think, is to be as wise as the
serpent
- 6 -
serpent before the event, not after.
When Saint-Quentin comes to see you, you will
face the quintessence of the Quai d'Orsay. He thinks
the Treaty of Versailles was the best treaty that could
be devised under the circumstances and that French foreign
policy since that time has been intelligent. When I
asked him if he saw any possibility of preserving peace,
he said that he saw none. He did not feel that there
was anything that France and England could or should do
except wait. I said to him that this seemed to me not
the policy of a statesman but the policy of an undertaker.
He replied that after all human beings were so helpless
in the face of events that all they could do was to bury
the dead.
He is upright and honorable, and his point of view
and that of Léger and the rest of the permanent officials
of the Quai d'Orsay seems to me fatal. They have so
much obstructive power that it is doubtful that Chautemps
or Delbos or Blum or anyone else will be able to carry out
a constructive policy in the face of their intelligent and
well-informed negation.
I
- 7 -
I enclose the small word which I have sent to the
Department on Saint-Quentin. I think it might be useful
if you should say to him that the United States intends
to stay out of any war which may start on the continent
of Europe just as long as possible.
I am looking forward with the most intense eagerness
to seeing you in March. There is so much to talk over
each day that I wish that I could have a foot on each
side of the ocean.
Blessings and good luck.
Yours affectionately,
Bill
THE WHITE HOUSE
P.F-
WASHINGTON
January 13, 1938.
MEMORANDUM FOR
M. A. L.
Tell Bill that I shall be
delighted to see his "Old Testament
Duke" and that I am particularly
anxious to meet him because on
Christmas morning, having nothing
else to do, I read by pure chance,
before breakfast, his book "Les
Campagnes Ardentes,' If which was
crowned by the French Academy, and
his book "Francois Ier" which re-
ceived the Prix Gobert. I was so
much interested that after attend-
ing church I read those successful
and distinguished novels -- "Le
Papillon Noir", "Le Seigneur
Inconnu" and "Le Voyage de Satan."
Tell Bill that these are not
nearly as interesting as fifteen or
twenty of his other books, which I
trust Bill will read and memorize
before he gets here in March!
F. D. R.
PSF: France
Bullitt
Paris, January 3, 1938.
Dear Miss Le Hand:
Antoine Pierre Marie, Duke de Levis-Mirepoix,
an extremely well known French writer and historian,
and what is more unusual, one of the few.honest, au-
thentic, legitimate and certified dukes that still
exist in France, left for a tour of the United States
the other day on the same boat as Anne. He is going
to spend four months giving lectures all over the
United States to gatherings organized by the Alliance
Francaise. He called on me just before leaving and
said, as everyone does, that he would like to see the
President. I hope most heartily that the President
will see him if he can.
The
Miss Marguerite Le Hand,
Secretary to the President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
- 2 -
The Duke looks more Levi than Mirepoix, and per-
haps the family foot slipped somewhere, but I can assure
you that in spite of his looks he is a charming and in-
telligent gentleman and of real importance. The Presi-
dent may perhaps have read either his book, "Les Cam-
pagnes Ardentes," which was crowned by the Académie
Francaise, or his book, "Francois Ier," which received
the Prix Gobert. He has also written a number of highly
successful and distinguished novels, notably "Le Papillon
Noir," "Le Seigneur Inconnu" and "Le Voyage de Satan."
I told Levis-Mirepoix that he would, of course,
have to have his request for an interview with the Presi-
dent presented by the French Embassy and he said that
he had made all arrangements to have this done. He may
not be in Washington for some time but I hope that when-
ever he does arrive, you will be able to dig this letter
out of your memory and see that he has a glimpse of the
gentleman whom I assume I am now to call the Commander-
in-Chief.
Every possible good wish for the New Year.
Yours very sincerely,
William C. Bullitt.
PSF
Japrisonal
Bullitt
Paris, January 20, 1938.
Dear Mr. President:
You have doubtless followed with amusement the
gyrations which resulted in the calling of Monsieur
Chautemps to replace Monsieur Chautemps.
He has more common sense than any other French
politician but I wish his present Ministry were a bit
stronger. He and Delbos want to go ahead on the
policy of reconciliation with Germany; but they are
likely to be thrown out by the Communists and Socialists
if they go far.
The curious thing about the "crisis" was that no
one in France took it seriously. I have never heard
so many roars of laughter from the leading politicians
as during those days which were supposed to be critical.
When Herriot funked the Premiership, Central Europe
went over the dam. Austria will fall into the hands of
Germany,
The Honorable
Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
The White House.
- 2 -
Germany, and France will do nothing except protest
feebly. That, plus a prolongation of the present
line in Rumania, will give Germany a controlling
position in Central and Eastern Europe. If the
Germans should have the common sense to refrain from
violence in their dealings with Czechoslovakia, they
should be able to get what they want without war.
That is, I know, a big IF, and I remember that
everything was moving beautifully for Germany in
1914; but I feel that Hitler's present amiable atti-
tude vis-à-vis France is based on the conviction that
he will need to do nothing except be amiable in order
to get what he wants in Central Europe. Incidentally,
I believe that this outcome would be in line with the
real policy of Neville Chamberlain and the instructions
that he has given his Ambassador in Berlin. We may,
therefore, see peace preserved by the simple process
of England and France acquiescing in German domination
over Central Europe.
I have spent too much time lately thinking of what
you could do to help the chances of peace. I have come
to the unpleasant conclusion that you can do nothing
effective in Europe until you have an ambassador in
Berlin and one in London who can discover for you what
those
- 3 -
those Governments really want.
I remember talking over with you the idea that
you might call a world conference in Washington to
discuss international law. I feel now that, while
such an appeal would be acceptable to American public
opinion, it would seem an escape from reality to the
rest of the world. It would be as if in the palmiest
days of Al Capone you had summoned a national confer-
ence of psychoanalysts to Washington to discuss the
psychological causes of crime.
Van Zeeland's report, which I have just read,
seems cold porridge. It may have been a bit hotter
before Neville Chamberlain recooked it but I find it
difficult now to believe that it will excite the world.
I hope that you will consider with the utmost care
the question of Hugh Wilson's successor as Assistant
Secretary of State. Two requirements are absolute:
(1) He should be a New Dealer; (2) He should know
the difference between Budapest and Bucharest!
I have been told that you are thinking of appoint-
ing a well-known, though faintly disguised, Pennsylvania
Republican to that post. I hereby rise in righteous
indignation and inform you that he will be objected to
by the Democratic Senator from Pennsylvania, the
Governor
- 4 -
Governor of Pennsylvania, the entire Pennsylvania
Democratic organization, and yours truly. Do you
think that you could possibly persuade Roy Howard
to take the job? The best Democrats in the Service
now are, of course, John Cudahy and John Wiley.
I am leaving Paris tomorrow to spend three days
in Lorraine, in the course of which I shall have to
make eleven speeches at official functions and shall
be decorated with an LL.D., by the University of
Nancy.
Blessings and good luck.
Yours affectionately,
Bill
William C. Bullitt
file
1
PSF: Francitt folder
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
January 24, 1938.
My dear Mr. President:
It is probable that Bill Bullitt has written you
directly regarding the new French Ambassador to the
United States. In the event that he has not done so,
however, I am sending you a copy of his despatch to the
Department of January 10th, in which he gives us his
estimate of M. de Saint-Quentin. I believe you will
find it interesting.
Believe me
Faithfully D Kasha
The President,
The White House.
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Unnumbered
Paris, January 10, 1938.
Subject: Monsieur Doynel de Saint-Quentin.
STRICTLY CONFIDENTI FOR THE SECRETARY
AND UNDER SECRETARY
The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
Sir:
I have the honor to supplement my telegram
No. 19 of January 5, 7 P.M., with regard to Monsieur
Doynel de Saint-Quentin.
Monsieur de Saint-Quentin, as I telegraphed the
Department, is a charming gentleman who represents
faithfully and perfectly the ideas of the career
officials of the Quai D'Orsay. He enjoys the implicit
confidence of Alexis Léger, Secretary General of the
French Foreign Office, and may be expected to reflect
his views rather than those of the Minister for Foreign
Affairs or the Président du Conseil.
Monsieur de Saint-Quentin, who speaks excellent
English, has never been in the United States.
He
-2-
He is polite, intelligent, and cold. He meets a
question which he finds it impolitic to answer truth-
fully by diverting his reply into a collateral and
innocuous channel. Like Léger, he fears intensely that
the United States may become involved in war in the Far
East and may draw in England and the Soviet Union; and
as a result, that Germany will be able to overwhelm with
impunity Austria and Czechoslovakia. Like Léger, he 18
primarily interested in preserving the traditional power
and prestige of France in Central and Eastern Europe.
He believes that war with Germany cannot be avoided by a
policy of reconciliation but that if the United States
should allow Germany to believe that our intervention
in war on the continent of Europe would be almost
inevitable, Germany might fear to take aggressive
action. He believes that France and England should
have recognized Italy's conquest of Ethiopia in the
autumn of 1936 and thus have attached Italy to France
and England.
In a word, Monsieur de Saint-Quentin 1s an upright
and distinguished representative of those French diplo-
mats who are thinking primarily of preparing a perfect
White Book to be issued at the outbreak of the next
European war.
Respectfully yours,
WILLIAM C. BULLITT
PSF: Trance
Bullitt
Feb. 2, 1938
Telegram from Bullitt
to Sec. Morgenthau
In re-long conversation Marchandeau had with him.
SEE--Henry Morgenthau-Drawer 1--1938
fei confidential
COPY
ruchte
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED
FROM: American Embassy, Paris, France
DATE: February 24, 1938, noon
NO.: 294
RUSH
FROM COCHRAN.
Today at eleven o'clock I saw Marchandeau, the
Minister of Finance. I made reference to our conversa-
tion of February 18 in which he asked whether the Ameri-
can Treasury was disposed to open with France and England
conversations under the Tripartite (see my telegram No.
268 of February 18, 6 p.m.).
I informed Marchandeau that his inquiry had been com-
municated to Secretary Morgenthau. I said that Secretary
Morgenthau had been away from Washington for a few days,
but that upon his return he had authorized me to inform
Mr. Marchandeau that we are ready at any time to listen
but that, in view of the international political atmos-
phere, it is essential that any consultations and con-
versations which may take place under the Tripartite should
be strictly confidential and of a technical nature.
Mr. Marchandeau agreed that it is very necessary that
the talks be secret, and that we use the methods of con-
tact and communication heretofore utilized in technical
monetary discussions. With this in mind, he said, Monick
is returning to Paris at the end of the week to report
- 2 -
any progress that he has made in London, although
Mr. Marchandeau said that in view of the British Cabinet
crisis he doubted whether much could have been accomplished.
After Monick has made his report the Minister will get
in touch with me again.
Yesterday the French control lost a little more than
1,000,000 pounds. The pressure on the franc was even
greater this morning. The control had yielded 400,000
pounds by 11:45 a.m, even though the rate had been per-
mitted to move to 154.45. My contact admitted that
the cracks in the French financial structure were becom-
ing obvious. Last night the Governor of the Bank of
France attended dinner at the Elysees. I understand he
gained the impression there that even Marchandeau's
Government associates and political friends do not accept
as serious measures toward reconstructing France's
finances the Marchandeau proposals which I reported
in my telegram of February 23, 4 p.m., No. 289.
BULLITT
EA:LWW
PSF
(France)
pullitt
RR
GRAY
Havre
Dated February 25, 1938
Received11:20 a. m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
RUSH Fabruary 25, 11 a. m.
PERSONAL AND 00 NF CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM
AMBASSADOR BULLITT.
"I could scarcely hear what you said on the tele-
phone last night and assume that you had Equal difficulty
in hearing ME. I tried to Express to you my profound
conviction that for me to leave the field of fortign
affairs at this critical moment in order to become Gover-
nor of Pennsylvania would DE an abandonment of duty. There
are a number of men in our party who would make EXCELLENT
governors of Pennsylvania, notably JOE Guffey and Dave
Lawrence. My entire interest at the present time is in
devising ways and means to keep the United States out of
the series of wars which are on the horizon; and, as I
said to you and perhaps you heard, if I should bE nomi-
nated today for the governorship and should receive a
wireless informing ME of the nomination, I should at once
refuse by wireless.
I
-2-
Fabruary 25, 11 a. m. from Havre
I shall come to the White HOUSE as soon as
possible after reaching NEW York and I hope that you
will not permit the party to put itself in the position
of being damaged by my refusal to run. I appreciate
greatly the interest of Earle, Guffey and Stern but
it seems to ME a peculiarly inappropriate time for a
man who is Experienced in foreign affairs to desert
them for domestic affairs.
As I have told you often, I shall always bE
ready to do anything that you wish me; but I ask you
to hear my views before making any decision. LOVE to
you all. Bill."
RR HPD
WILEY
PSF: France 11/958
Bullitt
attre teign
AMBASSADE DE FRANCE
AUX ETATS-UNIS
Washington, February 26, 1938.
Dear Marvin,
I am sending you herewith a personal
letter which M. Georges Bonnet, former Ambassa-
dor here, is addressing to the President. Will
you be kind enough to remit it to him.
M. Bonnet has asked me whether the Presi-
dent would consent to give him an autographed
picture of himself, in souvenir of his mission
to Washington. He would be greatly pleased and
I do hope it will be possible for you to secure
it.
I was precisely going to ask you the
same favor. As you know, I am leaving Washing-
Marvin H. McIntyre Esq.
ton
Secretary to the President
The White House
Washington D.C.
ton around March 15. Nothing would please me
more than to take back to France with me a
picture of the President, whom I met for the
first time during the War, whom I greatly
admire, and who has been extremely kind to
me on several occasions when I have met him.
With your permission, I shall go one
day to the White House to bid you good-bye
before leaving.
With my anticipated thanks for your
courtesy, believe me,
Very sincerely yours,
Tub Henry
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
3/9/38
Photographs delivered in person to Jules Henry
3/9/38
1. "For Georges Bonnet from his friend
Franklin D. Roosevelt"
2. "For Jules Henry from his old friend
Franklin D. Roosevelt".
TMB
Le Ministre Etat
Paris, le 13 ferrier 1958
Pecretariat Particulier
37, QUAI D'ORSAY (7)
Maineen 6 President,
A I herre on mon successeur wount Jon poste, /e
roudrais Yeres exprimer ma vire unn n naissance pour 6
bienveillance que vous n'ary tenniguee com me ambassader
de Trance a Washington
Le me rappellerai tougours are emotion l'accueil
que/ai trouke' daws a beau Pays que valls dirigez
arec cette ginerosite de were it cette claniay ance qui
bont, daus b monde, l'admiration de tous be
Dimocrates
Les Mois que f as 'passes a l'ambussade de
my/mg
Pan's
France a Washington sout les milleurs a ma vie
deet
politique. J'aurais souhaite' pouvoir y prolonger
longtences mon a ctivite. Maisjai du revenur en
France pour repondre à un affel anquel fe
he pourais has me derober.
En vous print de presenter a Madame
Roosevelt mes hom mages et any de ma fem me,
Le rous pree, monnerer 6 President, de him
vouloinagrees P'expression de ma profende grabitude
et de mon tres respectuency devorement
georges Bornet
So who
-
[April 1938:]
Id
impellitt
You tell the President that today in the Sudenten area,
for one reason or another there has been great disorder;
that the Sudentons have been marching around with flags and
there has been rioting and a large number of Sudentons have
been shot and wounded by the troops and the police.
At 5.30 the Sudenton leaders met and presented and 6-hour
4.-24
ultimatum to the Govt., which (ultimatum) expires tonight
at 11.30, that is to say in just about an hour and twenty
minutes from now.
The fact is this: That the ultimatum to the Govt. demands
the withdrawal of the Czech troops in the Sudenten area
and demands also that the authority in the Sudenton region
be ut in the command of the mayors. It amounts toa
withdrawal of Czech authority in the Sudenton region.
The Czech Govt. has already rejected this ultimatum but
has said that it does not consider negotiations closed.
There is considered to be and there is considerable possi-
bility that after the expiration of this ultimatum in an
hour and 20 min., German troops may cross the Czech border,
which means war.
The French Govt. has told the British that they should try
to get she German Govt. into a conference right away to
settle the question. There is no reply yet from the British
but one is expected any minute. There is as yet no French
mobilization.
I wish you would tell the President that there is something
which I would like to say personally and it is extremely
difficult for me to dictate it because he alone knows
the background. "
(Can be reached at his home in the country,
Chantilly 93. "It is important to have a
word with him, no matter what time."
"We may have a complete blow-up within the next few hours. 11
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE secretary
P.F
a
For the kind attention of
Miss Le Hand:
Telegram No. 776, May 17,
noon, from Paris.
5/17/38
Bullett
JR
GRAY
Paris
Dated May 17, 1938
Rec'd 8:03 a.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
776, May 17, noon.
PERSONAL FOR MISS MARGUERITE LE HAND:
The President said to me on the telephone last
night that hE had always intended to put through the
supplementary appropriation bill for foreign SERVICE
clerks. Indeed hE was under the impression that the
bill was already in Committee in Congress. When I
Explained to him what Messersmith had said to me
yesterday morning the President said that hE would take
action today.
Will you please get in touch with MESSERSMITH and
finish the business?
BULLITT
DDM:HPD
Bullit
printe files
JR
This telegram must bE
Paris
clostly paraphresed be-
fore bEing communicated
Dated May 17, 1938
to anyone. (D)
Rec'd 8:10 a.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
777, May 17, 1 p.m.
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY.
The Czechoslovakian situation is so critical that
while I will concede there is an EXCELLENT chance of
a peaceful settlement, I nevertheless believe the
Department should bE prepared to face a major European
war before August 15.
BULLITT
HPD
PSF:France
filence
Personal and
Paris, May 20, 1938.
Decrett
Dear Mr. President:
I hope this letter will reach you before Europe
blows up. At the moment, it looks to me as if the
Czechs had decided that in the long run it would be
better for them to have general war rather than give
the Sudeten a sufficient autonomy to satisfy either
Henlein or Hitler. They will shoot some Sudeten,
and Hitler will march across the Czech frontier.
The question of whether or not all Europe shall
go to war is, therefore, ceasing to be a question of
finding a basis for compromise between the Czechs and
Germany. It is becoming a question of whether or not
France will march when the Germans cross the Czech
frontier. Neither you nor I can decide that question
for the French Government; but we can both have a certain
amount of influence on the decision.
I feel that it would be an unspeakable tragedy if
France,
The Honorable
Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
The White House.
- 2 -
France, to support Czechoslovakia, should attack the
"Siegfried Line" between Strasbourg and Luxemburg,
which is the only point at which attack is considered
possible by the French General Staff. As you know,
French airplane production is now about 45 planes per
month; British about 80 per month. The Germans, at
worst, even when changing types, produce 300 per month
and at best 500 to 600 per month. The French have no
anti-aircraft artillery worth mentioning, and are just
beginning to produce it. There are only thirty thousand
gas masks available for the entire civilian population of
France. The slaughter of the entire younger generation
of France would be certain and every city in France could
be levelled to the ground by German planes. The French,
even under such circumstances, would hold out and the war
would be a long one, involving England and all Europe.
There could be only one possible result; the complete
destruction of western Europe and Bolshevism from one
end of the Continent to the other.
The chances are today that the French will carry out
their pledge to Czechoslovakia as a matter of honor -
whatever the cost. If you believe, as I believe, that it
is not in the interest either of the United States or
civilization as a whole to have the Continent of Europe
devastated
- 3 -
devastated, I think we should attempt to find some way
which will let the French out of their moral commitment.
I do not believe that any general appeal for peace
by you at the present time would be effective. Today
the governments of both Germany and Italy hate the
United States so heartily that neither one would accept
any such proposal as you were thinking of making last
January. Moreover, there would not be time to summon
representatives to Washington. Both Germany and Italy
might, however, accept a specific proposal of a limited
nature.
I am fully aware of all the objections to the sug-
gestion which I am about to make. If you should act on
it, you would be accused of involving the United States
in European politics and sacrificing another small nation
to Hitler. But I feel that when the people of the United
States realize, as they soon will, that general war in
Europe is imminent they will not only accept but will
demand some action from you which may promise to stop it.
If and when a German march across the border of
Czechoslovakia seems imminent, I think that you should
take action of the following nature:
Call to the White House the Ambassadors of England,
France,
- 4 -
France, Germany and Italy. Ask them to transmit to
Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler and Mussolini your urgent
invitation to send representatives at once to the Hague
to attempt to work out a peaceful settlement of the
dispute between Germany and Czechoslovakia. Add that,
if the four governments desire, a representative of
the United States will sit with them. You should also
make a personal appeal of the sort that you know best
how to make; referring to the fact that we are the
children of all the civilizations of Europe, that just
as we are grateful for Shakespeare, so are we grateful
for Beethoven; that just as we are grateful for Molière,
so are we grateful for Leonardo da Vinci, etc; that we
can not stand by and watch the beginning of the end of
European civilization without making one last effort to
stop its destruction; that you are convinced that the
only result of general European war today would be an
Asiatic despotism established on fields of dead.
After a general conversation with the four Ambassadors,
you might reinforce your action by personal conversations
with each Ambassador, stressing to the German Ambassador
the fact that France will fight and England will fight,
that war in Europe today can end only in the establishment
of
- 5 -
of Bolshevism from one end of the Continent to the
other, that your proposed conference will leave the
Bolsheviks beyond the swamps which divide the Soviet
Union from Europe and are Europe's real eastern boundary.
I think that even Hitler would accept under such cir-
cumstances.
The conference in the Hague would probably have to
recommend that a plebiscite be held in Czechoslovakia to
determine the will of the different peoples of that
country. If the Czechs should refuse to hold such a
plebiscite, the French would have an escape from their
desperate moral dilemma and general European war would
be avoided.
You would be accused, or the man sent to the Hague
as your representative, would be, of selling out a small
nation in order to produce another Hitler triumph. I
should not hesitate to take that brick on my head and I
don't think you should either if, thereby, you could avoid
a general European war.
I could make this letter fifty pages long filled with
explanations, but as between you and myself I feel no
explanations are needed. You, at least, will know that
I have not become either a cynic or a lover of Hitler.
I
- 6 -
I have thought this matter over night after night and
I am convinced that this highly unpleasant course is
the one that we should pursue and the only one that
offers a chance of success.
If you should consider that this proposal is sound,
I think you should work out at once your statement to the
Ambassadors in detail so that you can spring it at a
moment's notice. The moment has not yet arrived, but it
may soon.
It would be fatal, I believe, to communicate your
intention to any government, including the British. They
would at once relax their own efforts to reconcile the
Czechs and Germans because they would feel that at last
they were getting the United States tied up in European
political problems. Furthermore, they would, in confidence,
tell all their friends in Europe and you could certainly,
in that event, count on refusals from Hitler and Mussolini.
You would, of course, make it clear to the people of
the United States that your action was directed toward
this one emergency and that you had no intention of in-
volving the United States in all the disputes of Europe.
In addition, I believe that it would help immensely
if you should call in St. Quentin and tell him that you
hope
- 7 -
hope France will not commit suicide and if you would
authorize me to say the same thing for you to Daladier.
In any event, as soon as you have considered this
suggestion, will you please send me a telegram contain-
ing one word, either "affirmative" or "negative".
I would give anything to be with you in the White
House tonight so that we could talk over this proposal
and all the objections and difficulties. I am aware
of how intensely undesirable it is from a great many
points of view; but I believe sincerely that it may be
the only way to preserve from destruction the few shreds
of civilization that remain in the world.
Please telegraph me as soon as you can.
Love and every possible good wish.
Bill
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
d-sform
forevir
9-15-38
Memo. for Missy:
The President wants you to get
out of his confidential files, Bullitt's
letter to him of August 17th; also
letter of May 20th.
RB
/
Bullitt
Mrs. Larrabee:
For your confidential files.
roberta
Couf
NAVAL MESSAGE
Bullitt
COPY
First
(NAVY DEPARTMENT)
[71/ay 21, 1938 [TITay 1938 i]
To
From
The White House
ACKNOWLEDGE
Released by Forster
ACTION
The President,
PRIORITY
(Signature) (Ext. No.)
U.S.S. Potomac.
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4-7702
SECRET CODE
m 2
UNLESS DESIGNATED OTHERWISE TRANSMIT THIS DISPATCH AS NITE.
TEXT
THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF TWO TELEGRAMS JUST RECEIVED
IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT TONIGHT FROM BULLITT IN PARIS WHICH
IS BEIMG SENT TO YOU AT THE REQUEST OF SECRETARY HULL
IN THE TELEGRAM DATED SEVEN PM TONIGHT BULLITT REPORTED THAT
THE POLISH AMBASSADOR IN PARIS WHO HAS JUST RETURNED FROM WARSAW
TOLD HIM THAT UNDOUBTEDLY POLAND WOULD IMMEDIATE,Y DECLARE WAR
ON THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD THAT COUNTRY ATTEMPT TO SEND TROOPS
ACROSS POLAND TO SUPPORT CEECHSLOVAKIA THE POLISH AMBASSADOR ADDED
THAT IF RUSSIAN PLANES SHOULD CROSS POLAND IENROUTE TO CZECHSLOVA
KIA THEY WOULD AT ONCE BE ATTACKED BY POLISH PLANES AND THAT THERE
WAS A CONSIDERABLE CONCENTRATION OF POLISH WARPL ANES NEAR THE POL
ISH - ROUMANIAN FRONTIER FOR THIS SPECIFIC PURPOSE PERIOD
THE POLISH AMBASSADOR STATED THAT HE WAS CERTAIN ROUMANIA WOULD
IMMEDIATELY DECLARE WAR ON THE SOVIET UNION IF RUSSIAN TROOPS
SHOULD ATTEMPT TO CROSS RUMANIAN TERRITORY ENROUTE TO CZECHSLOV-
(Deliver to Communication Office.)
2
U.S. BOYERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
flow
NAVAL MESSAGE
(NAVY DEPARTMENT)
To
From
ACKNOWLEDGE
Released by
ACTION
PRIORITY
(Signature) (Ext. No.)
ROUTINE
Date
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ACKNOWLEDGE
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4-7702
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TEXT
IAKIA AND THAT IN THAT EVENT POLAND WOULD DECLARE WAR SIMUL
TANEOUSLY ON THE SOVIET UNION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POLISH
ROUMANIAN ALLIANCE THE POLISH AMBASSADOR SAID THAT IT WAS NOT
EXCLUDED THAT THE POLISH AIRFORCE WOULD SEND SUFFICIENT PLANES
TO ROUMANIA TO ASSIST THE ROUMANIANS IN ATTACKING RUSSIAN
PLANES ATTEMPTING TO CROSS ROUMANIA ENROUTE TO CZECHSL0VAKIA
BULLITT BELIEVES THAT BONNETX S PREDICTION IS WELL FOUNDED
THAT AN ATTEMPT BY THE SOVIET UNION TO AID CZECHSLOVAKIA
WOULD RESULT IN DECLARATIONS OF WAR BY POLAND AND ROUMANIA
AND BULLITTS FEELINGS REGARDING THE GRAVITY OF THE PRESENT
SITUATION HAS NOT DIMINISHED IN A TELEGRAM DATED NINE PM TONIGHT
BULLITT REPORTED THAT THE CZECH MINISTER IN PARIS TOLD HIM
THAT THE CZECH GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE THE FOLLOWING CONSES IONS
TO THE SUDENTENS ONE GERMAN TO BE USED AS AN OFFICIAL LANGUAGE
IN THE LAW COURTS ETCETRA TWO COMPLETE CONT OL BY THE SUDENTENS
(Deliver to Communication Office. Will be returned to File Room after message has been transmitted.)
3
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
NAVAL MESSAGE
(NAVY DEPARTMENT)
To
From
ACKNOWLEDGE
Released by
ACTION
PRIORITY
(Signature) (Ext. No.)
ROUTINE
Date
To
If restricted, indicate below:
INFORMATION
ACKNOWLEDGE
PRIORITY
If SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL, use special blank.
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4-7702
UNLESS DESIGNATED OTHERWISE TRANSMIT THIS DISPATCH AS NITE.
TEXT
OF THEIR OWN SCHOOLS THREE REPRESENTATION OF THE SUDENTEN IN
LOCAL ADMINISTRATION IN PROPORTION TO THEIR NUMBERS THE CZECH
MINISTER STATED THAT QUOTE THEY ARE TO BE TREATED NO LONGER AS
A MINORITY BUT AS A NATIONALITY UNQUOTE THE MINISTER TOLD
BULLITT THAT WHILE HIS GOVERNMENT HAS FELT THAT THESE CONCESSIONS
WOULD BE A CCEPTED BY THE SUDENTENS THE PICTURE HAS SINCE CHANGED
HE SAID THAT HODZA HAD INVITED HENLEIN TO COME TO PRAGUE FOR A
DISCUSSION BUT THAT HENLEIN HAD DISAPPEARED AND HODZA HAD ORDERED
THE CZECH POLICE TO SEARCH FOR HIM DURING THE NEXT TEN DAYS
THE CZECH GOVERNMENT HE SAID WOULD ANNOUNCE THESE CONCESSIONS
WHETHER OR NOT THE SUDENTEN ACCEPT THEM THE CZECH MINISTER TOLD
BULLITT THAT ABOUT A WEEK AGO HIS GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED THAT
THE DEFENSESEXON THE GERMAN FRONTIER WERE NOT ADEQUATELY MANNED
AND THAT IT MUST CALL OUT ONE CLASS OF RESERVES TO AVOID A
SURPRISE ATTACK THIS ACTION WAS NOT THEN A REPLY TO GERMANYS
(Deliver to Communication Office.)
2
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
starr
/
blow
naval MESSAGE
(NAVY DEPARTMENT)
To
From
ACKNOWLEDGE
Released by
ACTION
PRIORITY
(Signature) (Est. No.)
ROUTINE
Date
To
If restricted, indicate below:
INFORMATION
ACKNOWLEDGE
PRIORITY
If SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL, use special blank.
ROUTINE
(DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE)
4-7702
UNLESS DESIGNATED OTHERWISE TRANSMIT THIS DISPATCH AS NITE.
TEXT
STATIONING TROOPS ON THE CZECH BORDER YESTERDAY THE CZECH
May=1
MINISTER TOLD BULLITT THAT THE TWO GERMANS KILLEC IN BOHEMIA
TODAY HAD BEEN DISTRIBUTING NAZI PROPOGANDA THEY TRIED TO ESCAPE
ON MOTORCYCLES AND REFUSED TO STOP WHEN ORDERED TO DO so THEY
WERE THEN FIRED UPON AND KILLED THE MINISTER TOLD BULLITT
THAT CZECHSLOVAKIA IS DETERMINED TO FIGHT TO THE LAST MAN
SHOULD GERMAN TROOPS CROSS THE BORDER HE SAID THAT UNDER NO
CONDITIONS WOULD THE SUDENTENS BE PERMITTED TO FORM QUOTE
STORM BATTALIONS UNQUOTE OR TO ARM THEMSELVES BULLITT ASKED
IF THE MINISTER DID NOT FEEL THAT WAR WAS IMMINMENT AND HE
REPLIED THAT WE MIGHT BE AT THE VERGE OF A WAR WHICH WOULD RESUL
IN THE DESTRUCTION OF ALL EUROPE HE FELT THAT GERM ANY COULD
NOT BE SCARED OFF UNLESS ENGLAND AND FRANCE SHOULD UNITEDLY
EVOKE THAT THEY WOULD MARCH TO DEFEND CZECHSLOVAKIA THE MINISTER
SAID HE THOUGHT FRANCE WOULD MARCH BUT HE WAS DOUBTFUL ABOUT ENGI
- AND BULLITT TOLD THE MINISTER THAT IN HIS OPINION ENGLAND
(Deliver to Communication Office.)
2
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
p2
from
NAVAL MESSAGE
(NAVY DEPARTMENT)
To
From
ACKNOWLEDGE
Released by
ACTION
PRIORITY
(Signature) (Ext. No.)
ROUTINE
Date
To
If restricted, Indicate below:
ACKNOWLEDGE
INFORMATION
PRIORITY
If SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL, use special blank.
ROUTINE
(DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE)
4-7702
UNLESS DESIGNATED OTHERWISE TRANSMIT THIS DISPATCH AS NITE.
TEXT
WOULD NOT MARCH IN DEFENSE OF CZECHSLOVAKIA THE MINISTER SAID
THAT IN THAT CASE WAR WAS INEVITABLE HE BELIEVED THE SOVIET
UNION WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SEND TROOPS TO CZECHSL0VAKIA BUT THAT
THE SOVIET AIRFORCE MICHT BE OF CONSIDERABLE ASSISTANCE BULLITTS
CONCLUDING SENTENCE READS AS FOLLOWS QUOTE THE IMPRESSION I
GATHERED FROM THIS CONVERSATION WAS THZT THE CZECHS PREFER TO
SEE THEIR NATION SUCCUMB IN A CONFLAGRATION WHICH WILL DESTROY
ALL EUROPE RATHER THAN TO MAKE THE LARGE CONCESSIONS WHICH ALONE
WOULD SATISFY HITLER AND THE SUDENTENS
(Originator's Desk Copy. Deliver to Communication Office. Will be returned to Originator after message has
been transmitted.)
4
Bullitt
TELEGRAM
Reed ting Hick state Ersor LEFT
11:58pm
The White House
The President Mashington
Deld naval to watson
Licut. 12:20am CM
telearans Just recd it
Joe fs is a furning of two
the state DEPT tonight
from Bulatt in Paris
which in being Dent to
you dig Hull,
at the require
In a Agm date/
tonight
repader
the polick amber
in pain
Tully 1938
ELEGRAM
2
The White House
Mashington
who ha June returned
for warsow bed hing they that
and
wd was
on the Doniel Union
fround that Country
attempt to send troops
acean paland to
Improved CZ VIU = #
The Palut amd
added that if
Runna plane
ELEGRAM
The White House
3
shoned Mashington Cren Paland
Euronte to Cz Whi
atonce te
plana that there
and Polip
lvan a Charle
was plane near
Concernation of Palish
Rounamia
spacific Parpare
fronting for the
EC
ELEGRAM
I
The White House
Mashington
The polit ambr
stated that he
was CErtain Rounama
and in declare an
if Runian troop
on the doriet Union
Id attempt to Cren
Roumena territary
and that th that
Enroste to ezvlia
drelare has
Event Poland evd
ELEGRAM
The White House
5
Mashington
onther Someth
lusion in acde with
alliance The
they Polict Roamenia
Polit amb Said
that it was not
Excladed that the
Pobil air face
lud Dend bufficied
Planets Roumania
ELEGRAM
The White House
k
Mashington
is attacing
to asseit the Roumenians
Attempting to Cren Roamanic
Enronts to Oz Mia-
Bullitt believe the Bonnets
predictin is will
by the Joniet
founded that an allempt
Union to aid
CA Vilia has result
in declarations of was
ELEGRAM
The White House
by poland Mashington and Rounamic
and Bullitt's feshag
of the present Litaction
regarding the gleavity
has not diminished
In a a tym dated
reported that the
9 pm tongle Bullet
Iach ministry th
Paris told him
ELEGRAM
The White House
8
Mashington
that the CZECK
good will make
following
Concerning to the
Sudstens: detens:
/- Jerman to be used
an an official language
in the law Count Etc
2 - Complete Contral by
the Sudetens of
their own School
ELEGRAM
4
The White House
Mashington
3 Representating
the Suketen is
local adra in
prop number ation to their
The creck menita stated
that" They are to be
treated no longer an
a nationality minority but ara
ELEGRAM
10
The White House
Mashington
The Minister tald
Bullitt that while
hit for it her felt
that there Concersions
the Ludeters the
Wd be accepted by
Ricture has Since
Clanged HE taid
that. Hodza had
invated Hendeirto
ELEGRAM
11
The White House
Mashington
a discussion
but that Henlern
Rad
Hodza had Ordered
the Creck police
to teach for him
D During the next
ten days the CEER
the there Sand wd
Concerrious
whether a not KE
Sudater accept
ELEGRAM
The White House
12
Mashington
The CIECH Michists
told Bullett that
about a WEEK ago
decided that the
his for it had
Terman frontier
day Enser on the
Were not adequated
manned and that
it must Call
out One clarge
RESERVEN to avoid
ELEGRAM
The White House
a 13 Surprise attack
Mashington
This action was not
thermony is stationing
reply
berder yestaday.
frosh on the Czech
The Creck minutei
fold Bultit that
the two Fermans
killed is Bohemia
to day
ELEGRAM
Red been Mashington distributing
14
The White House
Nazi Propaganda D They
ordered to do to They
and refund to Stop when
tried to Every on Metercycler
liene killed then fined upon and
The ministas teld Bulutt
that ervicia is declarated
to fight to the last man
should Krma troop
Cress HE Bader Ble
land that under no
Sudstens Condit toms would the
IELEGRAM
The White House
15 oz permitted Mashington to form
11 Storm Battalions' orto
arm themoelver
Bullitt arked if the
minuter did not feel
that War
imminent at was her
replied be WE
might at the
which wd result
VErgE of a Way
in the Intruction of
all Europe #
EΓE
TELEGRAM
16
The White House
Mashington
He felt that Jernary
Cd not fe Scared
France should unitedly
off unlen England +
Eroke that they w/d
March to defend
ezvkiao The minita
faid RE thought France
and march but RE
way doubtful about
England Ballett told
the miniter
TELEGRAM
17
The White House
Mashington
that in his Opinia
Ensland not March
in defense of or Vkia
The Minista Dard that
in that CASE was
war in Evitable
Ate believed the Soriet
Union hd not on
to Czvkia but that
able to And troops
the Soriet an
force might be of
Consideafle arristance
ELE
ELEGRAM
18
The White House
Mashington
Bullitt's Concluding
Sentence read an
falloas " He impression
gathered from this
Knv was that the
Oceds prefer to ARE
their nation Income
in a Conflagation
which will
large Concerning
than to make the
TELEGRAM
19
The White House
Mashington
which alone wd
falisfy Hit to and
the Andeters" r
Foreth
The white House
1938
PSF France Bullitt
DRAFT
I am frankly disappointed to receive the suggestions contained in
your 101 as they raise many doubts in my mind. Not only did Rueff's
suggestion which you telephoned to me on Thursday appear unsound and in
fact unreasonable, but I find no satisfactory explanation for today's
suggestions. While this Government has made the efforts with which you
are familiar to cooperate with the French Government in its desire to
achieve exchange stability, and will continue to cooperate in this field,
I do not feel that any of the recent suggestions fall within the spirit
of the Tripartite agreement or the proper field of operations of the
Stabilization Fund. Whereas some mention might be made of the discussions
in Congress at the time of the passage of the Johnson Act it is clearly
not the policy of this Government to extend unsecured credits for
currency stabilization or other purposes to governments of countries
in default on their obligations held by this Government.
Bullit
File
France
Personal
Paris, May 27, 1938.
Dear Mr. President:
As you know, I traveled to France via England
and was in London when the PARIS-SOIR published the
supposed interview at Havre with me which I enclose.
I had no idea that it was even worth bothering about
until a few days ago the American papers began to
comment and I saw that the imaginary interview had
been reproduced all over the United States. I don't
know how it is possible to be discreet about inter-
views in countries where you are not. If you have a
formula for this, I wish you would let me have it.
I hope it didn't cause you any annoyance.
Good luck and love to you all.
Yours,
Enclosure.
Bill.
The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
M. Roosevelt
deur fut battu présidentiellement par
M. Franklin Roosevelt.
viendra à Paris
Mais M. Bullitt a rapporté un pro-
pos fort intéressant du président.
Vous pouvez être sür, lui dit ce
en 1940
dernier, que je ne me représenterai
pas en 1940. La première chose que
Le Havre vient de voir débarquer
je feral en quittant la Maison Blan-
une importante « cargaison a de per-
S.S.B.
sonnalités dont M. William Bullirt,
ambassadeur des Etats-Unis à Paris,
Jean Kiepura, sa femme Martha Eg-
gert, M. Jules Michel, secrétaire géné-
ral honoraire de l'Elysée, etc...
Naturellement, au cours du gala
rituel au bénéfice des ceuvres de men
Jean Kiepura chanta. M. Jules Michel
lui demanda s'il avait déjà chanté à
l'Elysée.
Non, réponditil, mais c'est mon
plus grand désir depuis que j'ai chan-
té à la Cour de Hollande.
Quant à M. William C. Bullite, il
3
conta qu'il avait péché le saumon à
Warm-Springs avec M. Franklin Roo-
sevelt, leur pêche avait fait l'objet
d'un véritable championnat, l'ambassa-
Sur cette photographie. is
président Roosevelt semble
bien perplexe.
che, ce sera de prendre le bateau et
d'aller de nouveau visiter Paris que
j'ai bâté de revoir...
PSF
Bullitt
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
June 3, 1938.
bin
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.
F. D. R.
Letter from Ambassador Bullitt, May
12, 1938, in re his talk with Guy
La Chambre, the new French Minister
for Air.
Bueitt
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
Dear Mr. President:
I return herewith Bullitt's
confidential letter of May 12 with a
suggested
reply. 122 Faithfully yours, Kalls
Enclosures:
Letter from
Ambassador Bullitt,
May 12;
Draft reply.
The President,
The White House.
Dear Bill:
I was greatly interested in your letter of
May 12 in regard to the condition of the French Air
Force and its plans to purchase planes in this country.
Do you think it possible that La Chambre can accelerate
French production sufficiently to have 2,600 first-line
planes in condition for battle next spring? The 1,500
already on hand, plus the 100 which the French are
purchasing here, plus 45 per month for the next ten
months would bring the figure only up to 1,850. Where
are the remaining 750 to come from? Unless further
orders are placed in this country immediately, our
factories, which already have almost as many orders as
they can handle, could not manufacture for delivery
in France by next spring any considerable fraction of
that number. Do you think that the French monthly
production of 45 can be materially increased in no
short B. time?
Since your letter was written, the French have
closed their contract with Curtiss-Wright for 100 planes
of the type P-36, deliveries to begin in November of
this year and to be concluded in April 1939, and they
have arranged with J. P. Morgan to effect cash payments.
Saint-Quentin called at the State Department last week
and outlined the plans of the two French air missions
which are coming here to make trial flights and to
supervise the production of the Curtise planes. The
State Department 1s asking Var and Navy to treat these
missions as liberally as possible. In fact, all along
re have done everything we properly could to facilitate
French purchases of planes in this country. The delays
which have ensued have been due to their own dilatory
methods of doing business and not to any lack of
reasonable cooperation on our part. I do not believe,
however, that we can, with propriety, permit the
diversion to the French of P-36 planes already under
construction
The Honorable
William C. Bullitt,
American Ambassador,
Peris.
-2-
construction under contract for our Army. To
do 80 would contravene & wise policy of long
standing to which no exceptions have been made
since 1932. On general principles, I do not
believe that TO should permit the diversion to
other governments of planes manufactured under
contract for this Government unless the interests
of our own national defense are directly involved,
but should we in this case decide to make an excep-
tion as a friendly gesture to the French the result
would probably be disadvantageous to the French
themselves. The fact could not be kept secret.
Everything of importance that happene in the aviation
industry is known to everyone in the industry within
& few weeks, end therefore sooner or later to the
press. You can imagine what some sections of the
press would do if they got hold of a story that we
were actively aiding French rearmsment to the extent
of allowing planes constructed for our Army to be
delivered to them. That would mean embarrasement to
us, and in the long run to the French in their efforts
to purchase arms in this country.
You did well to try to set Le Chambre right on
the question of the Neutrality Act. I hope that you
cleared up any misconception which he may have had.
AB long as that not remains in effect, it would have
to be applied to any major European war, and we
could not conceivably connive at violations of the
embargo provisions in favor of any particular power.
Affectionately yours,
Personal and
Paris, May 12, 1938.
Confidential
Dear Mr. President:
For four hours last night Guy La Chambre, the
new French Minister for Air, gave me the low-down
on the French air force. In spite of the fact that
the Germans probably know as much about the French
air force as La Chambre himself, I feel that I should
not pass along anything by cable to the Department
and shall, therefore, bury in my memory and yours
what he had to say.
Briefly, the situation is this. The French
General Staff estimates that at the present moment
France must have for war with Germany a minimum of
2600 first-line planes. At the moment, France has
1500
The Honorable
Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
The White House.
- 2 -
1500. The present French rate of production is
about 45 a month. La Chambre has promised the Gen-
eral Staff to have 2600 first-line planes in condi-
tion for battle by next Spring.
The weakest hole in the French air force is the
almost total lack of pursuit planes. La Chambre
is interested in getting pursuit planes from America
immediately. He has not yet signed his contract
with Curtis-Wright for the P-36s. Curtis-Wright
proposed to him first to deliver three hundred planes
in the autumn of 1939, beginning their construction
after the delivery of similar planes to the United
States Army, using the same machinery, at a cost of
$28,000 per plane. La Chambre has preferred to work
out a contract for the delivery of 100 planes in
April 1939 at a cost of $34,000 per plane. This
will require the installation of additional machinery
by the Curtis-Wright people and there will be a sup-
plementary contract providing that the French may
purchase this machinery after the delivery of these
planes and may request its delivery either in France
or Canada, or any place else that the French Govern-
ment
- 3 -
ment may select.
La Chambre does not believe that it will be pos-
sible to set up factories operated on American lines
in France as he feels that French industrialists
and workmen are entirely incapable of using American
methods at the moment. He may, however, set up in
Canada a factory for Potez--the most successful of
the French constructors--where American methods might
be used, and the Curtis-Wright machinery may be trans-
ferred to Canada.
I was shocked to discover that in spite of every-
thing that I had said to de la Grange and that the
Department of State had said to him, he had said to
La Chambre, who incidentally is an especially fine
young fellow aged about forty, that if Germany and
France should go to war, you would certainly circum-
vent the Neutrality Act and would continue deliveries
of planes to France. I told La Chambre that in case
of war between France and Germany, public opinion in
America would be overwhelmingly in favor of applica-
tion of the Neutrality Act and that you would have no
choice
- 4 -
choice but to apply it and prevent the delivery of
planes and munitions.
British plane production has fallen off ter-
ribly due to change in models and defective organiza-
tion, so that at the present moment, British produc-
tion is about eighty a month. The British, however,
hope within six months to get their production up
again to two hundred and fifty planes per month.
Meanwhile, the Germans are producing between
three hundred and five hundred planes per month, and
the bottle neck in Germany is no longer the produc-
tion of planes but the training of pilots.
Incidentally, the French have just enough trained
pilots to handle the planes they now have ready for
war. They have not yet trained pilots to handle
their new program. The French have been shopping
all over the world for planes but have found only
one that they desire to purchase: a Dutch pursuit
plane made by De Schelde. Fokker has two good
planes that the French would be glad to purchase
except for the fact that the chief engineer of the
Fokker
- 5 -
Fokker works is a German and the French have no de-
sire to permit a German to work intimately with
the French aviation industry.
La Chambre is not interested at the moment in
the purchase of any planes in America aside from
the P-36. Incidentally, toward the close of our
conversation last night La Chambre said that he had
asked the Curtis-Wright people if they could not de-
liver to the French Government two P-36s next month
so that the French might familiarize themselves with
the planes before delivery should begin. He said
that the Curtis-Wright people had replied that all
the production of these planes was contracted for
by our Army and that they could not deliver any of
these planes except from the stock produced for our
Army with full consent and approval by our Army.
He asked me if it might not be possible to obtain
such consent and approval. I replied that I felt
it would be most indiscreet for him to make any
such request officially and added that I felt it
would be extremely difficult to obtain such consent.
I
- 6 -
I told him, however, that I would let you know that
he was most anxious to have two P-36s as soon as
possible and I advised him to let the matter drop
with his request to me. I said that you might do
something about this and might not; but in any case
action would have to come from you personally, and
if the matter could be arranged I was certain that
you would let me know for a direct personal communi-
cation to him without intermediaries. Please consi-
der and answer this.
La Chambre also said that he was going to con-
centrate all purchases of planes in the United States
and all negotiations for purchases in the hands of
a new Air Attaché to the French Embassy in Washing-
ton who would be appointed this coming week. As
the matter stands, it appears that the American plane
manufacturers have become much too excited over the
prospect of French orders. The essential French
need is for planes to be delivered at once and none
of our manufacturers is in a position to deliver
planes of the highest quality immediately.
La
- 7 -
La Chambre expressed the opinion that the blow
to French honor would be so great if Germany should
march into Czechoslovakia that France would declare
war. I employed Daladier's words, "With what?", in
asking him to develop this thought. He said that
the French General Staff at the present time admitted
that it was impossible to attempt to attack Germany
on the line of the Rhine between Switzerland and
Strasbourg. Gamelin, however, believed that it was
still possible to make a further attack on the "Sieg-
fried Line", between Strasbourg and Luxemburg.
The "Siegfried Line" was already a most formidable
fortification. Within a year it would be as impreg-
nable as the French Maginot Line. It was not yet
impregnable and Gamelin had prepared plans for a
frontal mass attack on the "Siegfried Line." Such
an attack obviously would mean the most terrible
French casualties and probably could be held by the
Germans with one-third of the present German Army,
leaving two-thirds free for operations elsewhere,
since General Gamelin estimated that one soldier
behind
- 8 -
behind the present fortifications of the "Siegfried
Line" would be worth four soldiers attacking.
I asked La Chambre if he did not feel that the
Germans were 80 superior in the air that they might
be able to drive the French completely out of the
air after a few weeks of fighting. He admitted that
this was a possibility but insisted that, even without
an aviation force, the French Army could still attack.
La Chambre was rather contemptuous of the effi-
ciency of the Russian air force. He said that the
Russians had killed every airplane engineer and con-
structor that they had. They had no new planes and
the best that they had were their imitations of
American models four or five years old. The imita-
tions were not nearly as good as the originals and
in addition the officers corps of the Russian air
force had been annihilated so completely that he did
not believe the Russian air force could be considered
an effective fighting force in spite of the number
of planes it contained. Moreover, he did not believe
that the Russians would decide to make war on Germany
to
- 9 -
to support Czechoslovakia.
Good luck.
Yours affectionately,
Bill
PSF: Fuance
Bullitt
CONFIDENTIAL
June 15, 193
Dear Bill:-
I have not talked with the Secretary but
Sumner tells me that the Secretary believes that
our friend in Vienna worked with the crowd that was
against him at London at the Conference in 1933 --
also that his habits were not of the best during
the Conference.
This just for your information, and I
suggest that you do nothing further about it until
I have talked with the Secretary because you have
no way of knowing the above, and, frankly, I do
not know if the Secretary himself will substantiate
this as a reason against wiley's appointment.
As ever yours,
Honorable william C. Bullitt,
American Embassy,
Paris,
France.
dr presisible
oc
till
1
Personal and
Paris, June 30, 1938.
Comf id ent
Dear Mr. President:
I enclose herewith a copy of a letter which I
have just written to the Secretary. I don't know
whose diseased brain invented the idea that Wiley
was an associate of Moley's and hostile to the
Secretary. The fact is that Wiley had no personal
relationship with Moley, and after seeing Moley in
action in London, said to me that he thought Moley
was a wild man, neurotic and unreliable, who knew
nothing of how to conduct himself. I recall, however,
that Hugh Cumming organized a private espionage on
me, going so far as to order my private secretary to
communicate to him everything that I wrote and said,
and I suspect that the diseased brain is to be found
in the head of that young man or one of his associates
in the year 1933.
I hope the Secretary will have no more doubts
about
The Honorable
Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
The White House.
- 2 -
about Wiley and that you will announce his appointment
forthwith. But if such doubts should remain, I feel
that, in justice, Wiley should be informed of the
allegations against him and should demand an immediate
inquiry and confront his accusers in Washington.
I should, of course, accompany Wiley and the result
might be a very healthy purge of rats. A career officer
can have his life ruined by lies whispered in secret;
but I know too much about the facts in this case to be
able in honor to permit the wreckage of Wiley's career.
The comic element in this matter is that Wiley,
instead of being an enemy, has great admiration for the
Secretary!
Blessings and good luck.
Yours affectionately,
Bill
William C. Bullitt.
Personal, Private
Paris, June 30, 1938.
and Confidential.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
The President informed me some time ago that he
intended to appoint John C. Wiley, Minister to Riga,
in recognition not only of his distinguished service
as Counselor of Embassy in Madrid, Berlin, Warsaw and
Moscow, but also because of the exceptional work which
he did in Antwerp as Consul General and the magnificent
service he has rendered during the past year in Vienna.
The President has now let me know that you feel somewhat
doubtful about Wiley because you were told at the time
of the Economic Conference that he had worked with Moley
and his associates who were hostile to you, and that his
habits were not of the best during the Conference.
I feel that it is an imperative duty for me to remove
your doubts with regard to Wiley, not only in justice to
him but also in justice to our relationship which has
remained so clear in spite of the efforts of Drew Pearson,
Hugh Cumming, and others to wreck it. As you know,
Wiley
The Honorable
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State.
- 2 -
Wiley served as my assistant at the Economic Conference
and lived across the hall from me and was in contact
with me constantly. I feel, therefore, that & shadow
is cast on my own honor and my loyalty to you by any
cloud of doubt with regard to Wiley.
I am under the impression that Wiley never talked
with Moley until Moley descended on London. They may
have been introduced before that but had no personal
relationship. I remember clearly that after talking with
Moley in London, Wiley expressed to me an extremely low
opinion of Moley, whom he considered neurotic and un-
trustworthy. I recall that Wiley had to see Moley in
London twice in the line of his official duty, but I
know that there was never any personal social contact
between them on any occasion. I am absolutely certain
that Wiley was never a member of any group that was
working against you. Indeed, in all the years I have
known Wiley, I have never heard him express anything but
admiration for the manner in which you have carried out
the duties of your great office. Recently, when Wiley
came to Paris for a conference with Amgassador Hugh Wilson
and myself, he said that he considered you had achieved
the greatest position of any Secretary of State since Seward.
As
- 3 -
As to Wiley's habits during the London Conference,
I am well informed. He was at the time head over heels
in love with the lady whom he married subsequently who
was living in Paris. On the moral side his life was
irreproachable. I never saw Wiley under the influence of
liquor on any occasion in London or at any subsequent time.
One of his greatest assets, indeed, is his ability to keep
his head when others have lost theirs.
I feel very deeply about this matter as I am certain
that Wiley is the superior, as a Foreign Service Officer,
of any man who is not today chief of mission. He has de-
voted his entire life to the career service and I can
not endure the thought that his career may be wrecked be-
cause of statements which may have been made to you, which
bear no relation to the truth.
If you should still have any doubts, I should like
to return to the United States immediately to discuss
the matter with you personally.
With every good wish to you and to Mrs. Hull, I remain,
Yours heartily and sincerely,
William C. Bullitt.
CC
due
Personal and
Paris, June 14, 1938.
Cont idential
Dear Mr. President:
I have never been much angrier in my life than
when you told me that some
had been
trying to kill Wiley's appointment to Riga by alleging
that he was & drunkard. As you know, I worked in-
timately with Wiley from the time of the Economic Con-
ference in 1933 until 1936 when he left Moscow for
Antwerp. I visited him several times when he was Con-
sul General in Antwerp and he has visited me many
times in Paris. I have never, on any occasion, seen
Wiley drunk or anything like drunk.
The allegation is an outrageous lie and a foul
slander. I feel so strongly about the matter that I
am determined to sail for the United States tomorrow
afternoom on the QUEEN MARY to get to the bottom of it
unless I get a telephone call for which I am now waiting
from Miss Le Hand to tell me that you are going to put
through the appointment.
Wiley's qualifications for Riga are extraordinary.
He
The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House.
- 2 -
He knows Russia intimately and knows Poland and Ger-
many intimately. He has served as Counselor of Embassy
at all three posts. In addition to French, he speaks
perfect German, which is the language used to conduct
business and social life in Riga and he has close
friends in that part of the world.
Don't let anybody persuade you to send him to
South America. We need in Europe today every man we
have who understands fully the European situation. I
know no man who is better in a crisis than Wiley or
more level-headed. He has a greater understanding than
any member of the career service of European political
and economic problems. In addition, he has filled with
great distinction & consular post and you will remember
that you informed the Department of State that you would
appoint as Ministers only men who had had consular ex-
perience. You will also remember that he was the man
who broke up the Belgian alcohol smuggling ring which was
giving Henry Morgenthau so much trouble and that he
received special commendations from the Secretary of
State and the Secretary of the Treasury. As to his work
in Austria - at least fifty persons have said to me in
the past two months that Wiley's handling of the situation
in Vienna has been masterly and he has brought great
credit
Kennedy
Bill.
- 3 -
credit to the United States.
Mrs. Wiley has turned out to be one of the most
attractive and helpful wives possessed by any Foreign
Service Officer and incidentally, she speaks perfect
Polish, Russian and German to say nothing of French
P.S. hiss <ettand and telephoned through. that Papa will attend thanks
and English.
I hope that you will have sent Wiley's appointment
to the Senate before this letter reaches you. Riga has
many
awaited a Minister for over a year and ought not to be
made to wait longer. Incidentally, if you want any
political support for Wiley, I can guarantee to have
twenty Senators storming your office within twenty-four
The
hours, to say nothing of a batch of Governors, headed
by George Earle!
putit
I am sorry to sound so insistent but my hatred of
attempts to kill a man's career by lies of this sort is
so profound that I am ready to jump on the QUEEN MARY
Bless you
tomorrow to spend two days and return on the same boat,
although my daughter Anne is due to arrive here at the
appointment
end of this week.
Kick the
hard for me and shoot Wiley's
appointment to the Senate.
Yours affectionately,
Bill
Fuance
P.S.F.
Bullitt
Paris, June 21, 1938.
Personal error
Confidential
Dear Mr. President:
This is a very private letter which requires no
answer.
Some days ago I received a telegram from Mrs.
Roosevelt informing me that Hall was coming to Paris
and asking me to do anything that I could for him.
This morning at 10 o'clock Bonnet told me that the
Spanish Ambassador had informed him that the Spanish
Government could buy more than one hundred planes in
the United States at once for immediate delivery to
Spain via France and had berated him for agreeing to
the closing of the French frontier to military shipments.
Bonnet added that the Spanish Ambassador had asserted
that you personally had approved the sale of these
planes to the Spanish Government and that you were ar-
ranging for the evasion of the Neutrality Act involved
in their shipment to France, knowing fully that their
destination would be Spain. I expressed my skepticism
to
The Honorable
Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
The White House.
- 2 -
to Bonnet and telegraphed the Department for immediate
instructions, leaving out of my telegram, for obvious
reasons, any indication that the Spanish Ambassador had
alleged that you personally had approved this deal.
(See my telegram No. 970, June 21, 12 Noon.)
Shortly after I had sent this telegram, Hall tele-
phoned to me, whereupon I invited him and his son to a
ball. He said he wanted to talk to me at once. I asked
him to come to the office this afternoon.
When Hall came in at 4:15 this afternoon, he said
that he, acting through Harold Talbot of Cleveland, had
managed to gather for the Spanish Government approximately
150 new and second-hand planes of various makes -- all of
which he specified. He said that he had discussed this
transaction fully with you and that it had your entire
approval. He stated that you and he and Jimmy had discussed
all the details and that you had agreed to wink at the
evasion of the Neutrality Act involved, because of your
interest in maintaining the resistance of the Spanish
Government against Franco, and on Monday, June 13th, had
sent for Joseph Green, who is in charge of such matters
in the Department of State, and had ordered him to permit
the export of these planes and to accept such falsified
papers as might be presented and not scrutinize the entire
matter
- 3 -
matter too carefully.
I expressed no opinion whatsoever to Hall with
regard to these statements; but informed him that my
instructions from the Department indicated that the
policy of our Government was to oppose absolutely the
giving of licenses for shipments of planes to Spain via
France, and that I had had no intimation of any change
in this policy. He replied that you had thought of
writing to me; but that since he would arrive in Paris
as quickly as a letter you had preferred to have him ex-
plain the matter to me by word of mouth.
I informed Hall also that the French Government had
closed the frontier to Spain absolutely; that the French
Government had a real hope that the volunteers might be
withdrawn at last from both sides in Spain and that the
British were pushing for an armistice pending the withdrawal
of volunteers. I told him that I could not imagine a moment
more unpropitious for an attempt to organize the shipment
of planes to Spain in contravention of the wishes of the
British and French Governments and our own Neutrality Act.
I also told Hall about the conversation I had had
this morning with Bonnet (omitting mention of your name)
and the telegram I had sent to the Department asking for
instructions.
- 4 -
instructions. He said he would come in to see me to-
morrow morning and that he would telephone to Jimmy
with great discretion this afternoon and say that the situation
seemed to have changed since he had left America.
Shortly after Hall had left me, I received a reply
to my telegram No. 970, June 21, 12 Noon, in two forms:
First, a telephone call from Green, saying that there
had been no change whatsoever in the opposition of our
Government to the shipment of planes to Spain via France;
that our Government was fully aware of the attempt that
certain people were making to ship a large number of
second-hand planes to Spain, and had definitely decided
to refuse export licenses for the shipment of such planes.
Later I received a telegram from the Department signed
Welles, Acting, which confirmed Green's statements.
Tomorrow morning I shall show Hall the telegram signed
by Welles.
I have not the slightest desire to know what lies be-
hind this expedition of Hall's, and I am writing this letter
for your own eye and no one else's, merely because I feel
that since your name has been used by the Spanish Government
in its conversations with the French Government, you ought
to have a full account of the facts.
Good luck and every good wish.
Yours always,
Bill
PSF: Bullitt
June 25, 1938.
Dear Bill:-
Ever so many thanks for yours of
the thirteenth. May God in His infinite
wisdom prove that you are wrong. I know
you share this hope with me.
All well but terribly rushed
cleaming up.
As over yours,
Honorable William C. Bullitt,
American Embassy,
Paris,
France.
PSF: Bullitt
Paris, June 13, 1938.
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
Dear Mr. President:
Here at Chantilly this evening with the night-
ingales singing and the river pouring its white
cascade below the still woods, I feel like a parti-
cipant in the last days of Pompeii.
I have talked with General Gamelin, Chief of
the French General Staff, twice this week, and with
General Requin, who is in command of the French
Army in the single area where attack on Germany
remains possible-- the "Siegfried Line" sector be-
tween Strasbourg and Luxemburg.
You probably knew Requin as intimately as I
did when he was in Washington during the war as re-
presentative of the French General Staff. A few
nights
The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
- 2 -
nights ago at Chantilly he showed me the map which
he carries in his breast pocket, even when he is
absent from the front, on which he has marked the
lines of French attack against the "Siegfried Line",
and of possible German attack against France.
As I have cabled, public opinion in France has
solidified to such an extent that if the German Army
should cross the Czech frontier, France would mobilize
at once and march against Germany. Gamelin is cer-
tain of this and 80 is Requin, and there are few
politicians who disagree.
Requin, who will command the French troops,
looks upon this prospect of a frontal attack on the
"Siegfried Line" with absolute horror. He expects
to be able to advance, especially in the Saar dis-
trict, twenty or thirty miles before he is stopped.
He said that the battle in thatarea would resemble
the Battle of the Somme on a much larger scale. It
would be direct frontal attack on fully prepared
positions. The chief advantage of the French would
be the possession of tanks which are far superior to
the German tanks. The casualties of the attacking
side
- 3 -
side, that is to say, the French, would be three
to four times the casualties on the German side.
"It means," he said, "the death of a race." The
attack finally would be stopped and the armies would
face each other in a deadlock. Gamelin agrees en-
tirely with the foregoing estimate and both Gamelin
and Requin believe that the Germany Army could hold
such an attack of the entire French Army with from
one-third to one-half of the German forces.
Both Gamelin and Requin agree that the German
forces left free to attack Czechoslovakia would be
sufficient to overwhelm the Czech armies in the
course of two or three weeks at most. Meanwhile,
both generals agree that German preponderance in
the air would be such that Paris would be destroyed
by air raids. They both feel that the French would
continue to hold out on the Maginot Line and would
wait for the pressure of the blockade - since they
both assume that England would be in the war from
almost the first day to strangle Germany.
Gamelin
- 4 -
Gamelin is much more optimistic than Requin
in his estimate of the time that would be required
for the blockade to reduce seriously Germany's
power to fight. Gamelin insists that even though
the Germans should be able to acquire full control
of the Rumanian and Polish oil fields, and even
though they have considerable stocks of petroleum
on hand and are meking synthetic fuel, the ability
of the Germans to continue the war would diminish
rapidly after approximately two years. Gamelin
said to me last night that he had had this subject
studied with the utmost care and he was convinced
that, if one should assume that the war-time need
of Germany for oil would be twelve, the Rumanian
and Polish oil, plus stocks on hand, plus the Ger-
man production of synthetic fuel, would cover only
four, leaving a gap of eight which would paralyze
German aviation and German mechanized equipment
after two years. He added that if Italy should en-
ter the war on the side of Germany, the problem
would be aggravated since Italy would be unable to
obtain oil except from Poland and Rumania. He
insisted
- 5 -
insisted that the Italians and Germans would have
to have access to the oil of Iraq and Persia in
order to continue to fight after two years. He
was convinced that France and England could continue
to resist that long, although both countries would
suffer horribly from aerial bombardment.
Requin is not nearly so confident that the oil
factor would come into play so soon or that it
would be so decisive, and is much more apprehensive
than Gamelin that the civilian population of France
and England might suffer a collapse of morale in
the face of daily bombardments of the most horrible
sort which would make the bombardments in Spain
seem infantile by comparison. He expects a war
of at least six years.
Gamelin insists that if Italy should come into
the war, French forces in North Africa would be
sufficient to take Libya almost at once and consi-
ders that the Italians in Ethiopia could be iso-
lated and destroyed. He also believes that the
Germans and Italians could be prevented from
reaching
- 6 -
reaching Iraq and Persia. And he considers that
no merchant ship of any country could use the Medi-
terranean.
The number of unpredictable factors is enor-
mous. The French might jump at once on Spanish
Morocco, which they believe they can take in a
very few days. They would also probably despatch
sufficient troops and munitions to wipe out Franco.
Poland remains in a tragic quandary. There
would be an enormous sentiment in Poland for war
with Germany, but there would be an equally enormous
fear that if Poland should become involved in war
with Germany, Russia would enter Poland from the
east. The Polish Ambassador stated categorically
to Gamelin in my presence two days ago that Poland
positively would not march with France and posi-
tively would not declare war on Germany if France
should go to war to defend Czechoslovakia. More-
over, the Poles and the Rumanians have both stated
officially that if the Soviet Army should attempt
to march across their territory to get to Czecho-
slovakia, both would declare war on the Soviet
Union.
It
- 7 -
It is my impression, however, that neither
the Poles nor the Rumanians would resist if the
Russians should send planes to Czechoslovakia,
flying them along the border between Poland and
Rumania at night. Hungary, whose relations with
Poland at the moment are close, would probably
remain neutral as Poland would, during the first
weeks or months of the war.
There is beginning to be a general conviction
throughout Europe that the United States will be
drawn into the war, if it starts, after a compara-
tively brief period. This conviction is helpful
in so far as it may tend to diminish the readiness
of Germany to go to war; but we shall find our-
selves violently unpopular in both France and Eng-
land when it becomes clear that we intend to main-
tain our neutrality. Day in and day out, I say to
the French that, if war should come, the United
States would declare immediate neutrality and the
Neutrality Act would come into force at once. The
answer invariably is, "Yes, we know that; but the
Germans will behave in such a way that you will
soon
- 8 -
soon be drawn in."
I remain as convinced as ever that we should
not permit ourselves to be drawn in. I believe that
if war starts, the destruction on the Continent of
Europe will be so great that, unless we are able
to remain strong and relatively untouched, there
will be no nation on earth left to pick up the
pieces. If we should go in, we would make a mess
of our own country. If we should stay out, we could
at least help to keep alive whatever human beings
may remain alive in Europe.
You perhaps saw the telegram in which I gave an
account of Francois-Poncet's intention to attempt to
work out a settlement of the Czech-German dispute
by direct negotiations between France, England
and Germany--represented by himself, Henderson and
Ribbentrop. His idea, which is the idea of the French
Government, is that the Czechs should be compelled
to grant full autonomy to the Sudeten geographic
area and that Czechoslovakia should become a neu-
tralized state, of the sort that Belgium was before
1914
- 9 -
1914, its independence guaranteed by England, France
and Germany. He said he had no great hope that
it might be possible to succeed in this negotiation,
but he could see no other way to avoid war.
I understand perfectly the dilemma in which
Benes finds himself. All his life he has been an
adventurer and a courageous one. He knows that
if he grants autonomy now to the Sudeten Germans,
the Sudeten some day will vote themselves out of
Czechoslovakia and into Germany, and he will go down
in history as the man who began the disintegration
of the Czechoslovak State. On the other hand, if
he refuses to grant autonomy and makes only conces-
sions which the Sudeten will reject and war comes,
he will be the hero who resisted against great odds,
and he will be able to fly at the last moment to
the Soviet Union.
I have information from a number of reliable
sources which indicates that Hodza and Krofta are
much more inclined to make concessions to the Sude-
ten than Benes. Their view is that Czechoslovakia
would be demolished by Germany and that, even if
the
- 10 -
the allies of the Czechs should win the war, nobody
would ever again be so silly as to put together
Czechoslovakia in its present form. The most they
could hope for would be a small Czech state. They
are, moreover, inclined to believe, as most people
in France are, that the war would inflict such
suffering on all the civilian populations of Europe
that communist revolutions would take place from
one end of the Continent to the other. Neither
Hodza nor Krofta is anxious to see his country a
Czech Soviet Socialist Republic directed from Moscow.
This letter will, I am sure, seem to you unduly
pessimistic. I can assure you that it gives a faith-
ful picture of opinion and atmosphere here. I know
no informed Frenchman who does not feel that he is
living in the last days of his civilization which is
so lovely and which he loves so much.
The only cheery bit of news I have to communi-
cate concerns your new Ambassadress to Belgium.
She has taken a large house in Paris, ostensibly
for one of her daughters, and is having it done
over for her own occupancy. One of the boys who
has
- 11 -
has just been yachting with her and her consort
in the Black Sea came to Paris yesterday and in-
formed me that she had said to him that she knew
she would be bored by Brussels, so she had decided
to spend all her time in Paris: War will, at least,
save me from that. I don't know what else will,
unless you tell the lady and gentleman that the Bel-
gians will expect them to stay in Belgium, and
that you will too.
I had Ickes and his little wife and Frances
Perkins at dinner two nights ago. Mrs. Ickes is
charming. How Ickes accomplished that is beyond
me. I took the Ickes from the door of their plane
to my house in the country and then put them in
a small hotel, so that they haven't been found by
the reporters and have had a happy time. Frances
Perkins seemed well and lively and I kept her smo-
thered in orchids the day she was here.
If I cable you that the Germans are about to
cross the Czech frontier, I hope that you will is-
sue an immediate appeal to the British, French and
Germans
- 12 -
Germans to meet at once at The Hague with a repre-
sentative of the United States. You might be able
to get a settlement on the basis of autonomy for
the various minorities in Czechoslovakia, plus neu-
tralization of Czechoslovakia and a guarantee of
Czechoslovakia as an independent state by England,
France and Germany. That might be the beginning
of something like peace in Europe. At any rate,
I can think of nothing else that you could do that
would have the slightest chance of success, and
we should not wash our hands by a pious and futile
gesture.
I wish you could be here with me tonight.
This place is so beautiful that you would forget
even your stamps for an evening.
Blessings!
Yours affectionately,
Bill
cc
PSF: France : Bullett
if
Paris, July 19, 1938.
Dear Miss LeHand:
The Ambassador has handed to me your letter of
July 7th regarding Mr. Robert L. Grière, a colored
gentleman who wants a job in this Mission as messen-
ger.
For your personal information, Grière is an
American negro (high yellow). He came to Paris
several years ago to live permanently because "the
French don't discriminate against the black race
like the Americans do".
While Grière was living here he had an affair
with a very charming Norwegian girl of very good
family and, when the girl became pregnant and pro-
duced a child, there was quite a scandal involving
the girl's family, the Norwegian Legation in Paris,
and Grière.
If, in view of the above, you still think
Grière
Miss Marguerite LeHand,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
- 2 -
Grière ought to be hired by the Embassy, let me know
and I will have his name put at the top of the eligible
list.
With every good wish and kindest regards, I am,
Very sincerely yours,
Carmel offie
Carmel Offie.
P.S.
S.C.B.
PSF: France: Bullett ce
by
Personal and
Paris, August 31, 1938.
Conf Idential
Dear Mr. President:
I have your little note of August 15th appending
Cordell's letter of July 21st - which I return herewith.
The upper brackets of the Foreign Service contain
many morons, fairies and neurotics; but this is such a
rare bouquet that I wonder who put it over on Cordell.
I happen to know all the men but one personally, and I
know a lot about that one; so here goes:
(1) John Campbell White - is Uncle Henry's moron
son who has an excellent English accent and a large
income but no other visible assets except a brother-in-law,
Pierrepont Moffat, who doubtless was responsible for
his heading the list. He is a snob and an ass.
(2) Clarence E. Gauss - is the prime Baptist
veterinarian
The Honorable
Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
The White House.
- 2 -
veterinarian of the Service. As Consul General in
Paris he was totally incompetent, mean, back-biting,
jealous, full of hatred and malice toward everyone.
He was a total failure as Consul General here, and was
hated by all his colleagues and subordinates, and loathed
by Jesse Straus. He can do an adequate job as Consul
General in China where there are many missionaries to
whom a man of his stripe is not unendurable. Anyone
less qualified to get along with foreigners of any
sort or indeed, Americans outside the Monkey Trial Bible
belt, I do not know. He speaks no language except bad
English. His wife is & sour Mrs. Grundy and the pair
might have been models for that superb painting of Grant
Wood's "The Daughters of the American Revolution."
(3) Alexander Kirk - has been a comic fairy since
his childhood. He was a class ahead of me at Yale and then
at the Harvard Law School. He was the joke of both univ-
ersities, and found it amusing to emphasize his effeminacy.
He has lots of money, which comes from soap, and when I
asked him years ago why he had gone into the diplomatic
service, he replied, "To wash off the smell of soap. It
is the only way I can meet ladies and gentlemen." He has
been
- 3 -
been at that occupation, especially gentlemen, ever since.
He has a certain cleverness, and since his mother's death
a year ago he has been much more serious, as they had always
lived in the same house and her death made him feel lost.
The last time I saw him he seemed to have dropped his
manner of extreme effeminacy. Intellectually, he is the
best man on the list, which does not say much, but I would
rather let the Republicans promote him as they always have
in the past. Incidentally, there is no reason why he should
not be left as Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow for as long as
he can stand it. He has always picked his own posts and
it's time he showed he can stand a hard one.
(4) Louis G. Dreyfus - I have never met. But he
worked for some years with Herbert Feis in the Department
of State and Herbert, in whose judgment I have confidence,
has said to me that he is an amiable idiot without a trace
of brains. From other sources I have heard endorsement of
the idiot end of this phrase, but I have heard the adjective
amiable replaced by non-Jews with such adjectives as sly,
fawning and undesirable. Why you should appoint a brainless
Jew Minister at this moment, I can't see.
(5) Coert du Bois - is a neurotic. He has always
been intensely severe with his subordinates and family, and
the double suicide of his daughters in England drove him
naturally
- 4 -
naturally into a queerer state than before. I talked with
him in 1935 in Naples and investigated him thoroughly
because the Department had suggested that I should take him
on the staff in Moscow in order to improve his state of mind.
I decided then that he ought to be in a sanitorium and not
a Mission, and that he would be a bad member of any official
family. I think he ought not to be made Chief of Mission
anywhere.
(6) Douglas Jenkins is a mediocre little southerner
who means well and can conduct a consulate with a fair degree
of efficiency. I have seen him frequently and feel that if
you had seen him as I had, you would be certain that he
did not have the personal qualities to represent the United
States except in a very minor post.
As you know, the weakest part of the Foreign Service
is Class I, II, and III. There are few competent men in
those classes and fewer still who have any distinction. The
classes from IV downward contain many more men of ability.
If you have to fill legations at the moment, I think you
would be fully justified in taking men outside the career
service.
Incidentally, when I was dictating to Offie a moment
ago about Kirk, I began to wonder whether or not you intend
to send an Ambassador to Moscow. If you do decide to send
one,
- 5 -
one, you should send an extremely experienced, reliable
Foreign Service Officer. The burden of Moscow plus an
Ambassador like the late eminent Joe Davies is too much
for any staff to bear. Cruel and unusual punishment is
forbidden by the Constitution! You will remember that
when we discussed this question sometime ago, I said to
you that MacMurray, now Ambassador in Turkey, was un-
questionably the man best fitted for the Moscow post. He
would hate to go there but he would do a better job for
the U. S. A. than anyone else I can think of, and I fail
to see why Foreign Service Officers should be permitted
to refuse ambassadorships unless there is some extremely
important personal reason. Dislike of a post is not im-
portant.
I have just had Joe Kennedy and Hugh Wilson staying
with me in Paris. I think that they are both doing fine
jobs and are the best men available for their posts. If
you can find men of Joe's quality to take vacant legations,
I hope you will appoint them. This is no time, however, to
send out modern replicas of Pindell of Peoria.
Love and good luck.
Yours affectionately,
Bill.
William C. Bullitt.
rl
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONF IDENTITAL
August 15, 1938.
MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. WILLIAM C. BULLITT
I send you this in
strict confidence of course.
What do you think of them?
F. D. R.
Letter from Secretary Hull in re
list of Foreign Service officers
who have demonstrated special capacity
for promotion to the grade of Minister.
Bullitt
Paris, August 17, 1938.
Personal and
Strictly Conf idential
Dear Mr. President:
The French Government is now convinced that there
will be another crisis during the first weeks of
September. If it should appear that war is imminent,
you will be urged to take all sorts of actions by all
sorts of people. I have two suggestions to make - the
objections to which will be as obvious to you as they
are to me so that I need not detail them.
Fear of the United States is unquestionably a
large factor in Hitler's hesitation to start a war.
If, in September, Europe should again appear to be
on the verge of war, a quiet conversation between
you and the German Ambassador in the White House
might have more effect in deterring Germany from
acting against Czechoslovakia with armed force than
all the public speeches you or anyone else could make.
You
The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D. C.
- 2 -
You would not have to say anything except recite a
few facts. Suppose you were to say that you hoped
Germany was not about to place you in the same posi-
tion in which President Wilson was placed in 1914.
Suppose you should add that he must be as aware as
you were that although public opinion in America
before the commencement of the war in 1914 had been
very favorable to Germany, public opinion in America
was now most hostile to Germany; and that he must be
as aware as you were that if war should begin between
England and France on one side and Germany on the
other, there was a possibility that the United States
would be drawn in.
You might add that you would be glad if he would
transmit what you had said to Hitler and bid him good-
bye.
You would have done nothing except call his at-
tention to certain facts which are public property
and you would have committed yourself to nothing. I
think the effect of such a conversation in Germany
would be immense.
If events should go further and the mobilization
stage should be reached or even hostilities commenced,
I think you should propose at once a conference of the
sort that I suggested to you before the crisis of last
May 21st. You will recall that at that time I wrote
that
- 3 -
that if the worst should come to the worst, you should
make a public appeal for an immediate conference at
The Hague of representatives of England, France, Germany,
and Italy to find ways and means of settling the dispute
between Czechoslovakia and Germany; adding that a re-
presentative of the United States would participate in
the conference if the four Powers should desire.
I think you should not take either of these steps
unless Runciman should fail and war appear to be imminent.
I will let you know at once if I think that moment has
come. Meanwhile, I should appreciate it if you would let
me have a line to tell me whether or not you consider these
ideas cockeyed and if you have any alternatives in mind.
Blessings.
Yours affectionately,
Bill
William C. Bullitt.
Fold are Last in
Bullitt
Paris, August 23, 1938.
Dear Miss LeHand:
Monsieur Georges Rivollet, former French Minister
of Pensions, is sailing soon for the United States to
attend the 1938 National Convention of the American
Legion in Los Angeles as the representative of the
National Federation of French War Veterans. I am en-
1/
closing herewith his schedule while in America. He
will be accompanied by his daughter, aged nineteen.
Monsieur Rivollet is Secretary General of the
above Federation which corresponds to our American
Legion. This organization has no president and is,
therefore, directed by Monsieur Rivollet. Conse-
quently, he is very important politically.
I don't think the President would have any special
pleasure in seeing him but if the French Embassy in
Washington requests an appointment for him with the
President and it is accorded you will find him
personally
Miss Marguerite LeHand,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
- 2 -
personally agreeable.
With every good wish, I remain,
Yours very sincerely,
William Billitt
William C. Bullitt.
Enclosure:
Schedule of M. Rivollet.
ITINERARY FOR VISIT OF MR. GEORGES RIVOLLET TO CONVENTION
OF THE AMERICAN LEGION IN LOS ANGELES.
September 7th: Sails aboard S. S. Normandie from
Havre for New York.
September 12th: Arrives in New York.
September 13th: Free.
September 14th: Free until 11:35 P.M., when he takes
train for Los Angeles.
September 18th: Arrives in Los Angeles at 8:30 A.M.
September 19 - 20 - 21 : Attends convention.
September 22nd: Leaves Los Angeles for New York.
September 26th: Arrives in New York. Day free.
September 27th: Free.
September 28th: Sails aboard S. S. Normandie at noon
from New York for Havre.
October 3rd:
Arrives at Havre.
PSF
Bullitt
Paris, August 31, 1938.
PERSONAL AND PRIVATE.
Dear Mr. President:
Before you get this letter Europe will pro-
bably be even closer to Hades than it is today,
and it is close enough. As you know, the Getrians
have one million eight hundred thousand men mobi-
lized. Hugh Wilson, who has just been here, informs
me that under the new German system of "mobilization
en-route," men join their regiments while those regi-
ments are on their way to the frontiers. The time
between Hitler's decision to make war and the firing
of the first guns on the frontier will be, there-
fore, not more than eight hours.
If we intend to do anything at the last moment
to try to stop the holocaust, we shall have an al-
most impossibly brief period in which to work. Hugh
has
The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
- 2 -
has promised to phone me instantly if he gets word
that Hitler has made the decision. I shall phone
you at once, and I hope that you will send for the
German Ambassador immediately and talk to him in the
manner I suggested in my letter of August 17, 1938.
Guy La Chambre, Minister for Air, explained to
me last night the condition of the French frontier de-
fenses. The Garde Mobile is now on the alert at all
frontiers. In every village or hamlet close to the
frontiers there is one house which has been soaked
with concrete and filled with machine guns. It is
expected that the Garde Mobile could hold up any sur-
prise attack for forty minutes. At the end of 40
minutes, the first frontier guards would be in po-
sition and at the end of two hours the Maginot Line
and all other defenses would be fully manned.
Every road leading from every frontier is heavily
mined and could be made unusable for a time.
Bonnet is inclined to believe that Germany will
not risk war with France and England in the month
of September, but many other Ministers believe that
Hitler has already decided to strike in September.
My
- 3 -
My guess is that Hitler stands such & chance of
drawing Hungary into the Nazi ranks before the first
of January, 1939, that he will not make war in Sep-
tember. But the German mobilization has produced
such excitement in Czechoslovekia that a false re-
port may make the Czechs strike first and give the
German Army an opportunity to strike back. If I
were betting today, I should bet that there were
fifty-five chances that there would not be war in
September against forty-five that there would be.
If war should begin, the result would be such
9 devastation of Europe that it would make small
difference which side should emerge the ostensible
victor. I am more convinced than ever that we should
attempt to stay out and be ready to reconstruct
whatever pieces may be left of European civilization.
I remember that I promised you to be in Washing-
ton again by September 25th at the latest. I want
to come home very much as I am extremely tired and
need a holiday and want to see you all; but I do
not see the slightest possibility of leaving Paris
at the moment. If there should be a settlement
of
- 4 -
of the Sudeten dispute I would jump on the first
boat, and I have engaged passage on both the NOR-
MANDIE sailing September 21st, and the MANHATTAN
sailing September 23rd. Anne must take one or the
other to get back to school in time. If I feel
it would not be a neglect of duty, I shall leave
with her on one or the other; but the chances look
black at the moment.
Love and good luck.
Yours affectionately,
Bill
index Bullitt
JR
A portion of this tele-
Paris
gram must bE closely
paraphrased before being
Dated September 7, 1938
communicated to anyone.
(br)
Rec'd 2:15 p.m.
SECRETARY of State,
Washington.
RUSH.
1409, September 7, 7 p.m.
I learned last night through inquiries made of me by
the International NEWS Service at the Express request of
Mr. Hearst that the Associated Press despatch reporting
my remarks at the banquet at Bordeaux on the evening of
September 3 credited me with the following ridiculous
statement: "(GRAY) France and the United States are
indefectively (sic) united in war as in peace. " I of
course said nothing of the kind. I spoke extemporansously
at the banquet on the subject of French wines. I then
read a quotation from Thomas Jefferson and concluded
with the following words:
"It is no secret that the people of the United States
today feel for the people of France the most profound
sympathy. WE are united by our devotion to liberty,
democracy and peace. WE are united by our old friendship,
by
-2- #1409, September 7, 7 p.m., from Paris.
by the aid that each has brought to the other in an
hour of need. Today WE are working together to
preserve peace. May WE bE as successful in that
task as WE have been in the past when WE have marched
together under the flags of war!" (END SECTION ONE).
CSB
BULLITT
under
JR
This telegram must bE
Paris
closely paraphrased bE-
fore being communicated
Dated SEPTEMBER 7, 1938
to anyone. (br)
Rec'd 3:20 p.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
RUSH.
1409, September 7, 7 p.m. (SECTION TVIO).
As I read this last passage from a manuscript which
I gave to the journalists at the banquet there is no
EXCUSE whatsoever for the falsification of my remarks.
These remarks were correctly reported in the lending
Bordeaux newspaper LA PETITE GIRONDE and also in
LA LIBERTE DU SUDOUEST, but LA FRANCE DE BORDEAUX
carried the erroneous report which was repeated to
the Paris office of the Associated Press by the writer
on that paper who is also the Associated Press spot
man at Bordeaux. The Associated Press desk man questioned
the authenticity of the report but his efforts to verify
the statement did not go further than to query the
Bordeaux spot man, who stuck to his story.
The Associated Press is today wiring a correction
reporting my remarks ns they were actually made.
The Chief of the Paris Bureau has informed me that hE is
taking
-2- #1409, September 7, 7 p.m. (SECTION TTO) from Paris.
taking disciplinery action against his Bordeaux man
which will probably result in his immediate dismissal.
(END MESSAGE).
BULLITT
PEG: CSB
PSF: Bullit
85 offer
iem gove dest w the Justmith put
of
stamp
Paris, September 12, 1938.
Dear Miss LeHand:
1/
I take pleasure in enclosing herewith a stamp
issued by the Soviet postal authorities in comme-
moration of the North Pole flight by the noted
Soviet pilot, S. A. Levanevski.
As you know, Levanevski actually started this
flight in 1935 but was forced to turn back after
covering a little over a quarter of the way. This
flight was postponed until 1937, and if you will re-
member, he took off last year and has not been heard
of since. There were a hundred stamps issued in con-
nection with this flight and this is one of the hun-
dred.
I know that the President relies on you to get
him really rare stamps and this, I assure you, rates
that classification.
You must all be having a very trying time these
days
Miss Marguerite LeHand,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
- 2 -
days with primary elections and Jimmy Roosevelt's ill-
ness but I can assure you I'd much rather be in your
boots than to be sitting here listening to people
trying to figure out what Hitler is going to say or
do next.
If Mr. Hitler permits, I ought to be seeing you
about the early part of October. Otherwise, we will
probably be blown into the air.
Every good wish to you.
Yours always,
(1 Office
Carmel Offie.
Enclosure:
Levanevski stamp.
Read the neods page
By the way, there is a marvelous joke which I heard
on your Boss which will amuse you:
One night Hitler, Mussolini, and President Roosevelt
were dining together. Mussolini remarked, during the
course of the dinner: "Gentlemen, I am pleased to inform
you that I shall soon be the ruler of the world".
Mr. Hitler replied: "You will not. I shall soon be
the ruler of the world."
Mr. Mussolini folded his arms and replied: "And by
whose help?"
And Hitler, with that mystic look on his face, and
throwing his fist into the air, said: "By the help of
God."
President Roosevelt, who happened to be munching on
a chicken bone at the time, suddenly looked up and said:
"I will not!"
Paris, September 26, 1938.
Dear Miss LeHand:
I am taking time out during this mad period to
1/
send you the latest stamps from the Soviet Union
for the President's collection. The subjects of
these issues are children's hobbies. They were
issued on September 15, 1938, and I thought they
might be of interest to the Great White Father.
Yours always,
C. Offie
Carmel Offie.
Enclosure:
Envelope containing 7 stamps.
Miss Marguerite LeHand,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
Hyde Park, New York
October 18, 1938
Dear Mr. Offie:
The President asks me to tell you
that he is very sorry for not having written
you before to thank you for the stamps which
you were good enough to send him. He is delighted
with both groups and they are all safely tucked
away in his albuns.
The President asks me to tell you
that he hopes very much that he will have the
pleasure of seeing you while you are here.
Very sincerely yours,
M. A. LeHAND
Private Secretary
Carmel Offie, Esq.,
Secretary to Ambassador Bullitt,
State Department,
Washington, D. C.
mal/tmb
France
freisme
Bullitt
Paris, September 20, 1938.
PERSONAL AND CONTIDENTIAL
Dear Mr. President:
I write you this while the Czech Govern-
ment is considering what reply to make to the
British-French proposal. It seems to me that
the French and British Governments have mis-
handled the matter abominably. They have acted
like little boys doing dirty things behind the
barn.
You may be sure that I will come home as
soon as I feel I can, as I am dead tired. Mean-
while the prospects for Europe are so foul that
the further we keep out of the mess the better.
The
The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
- 2 -
The moral is: If you have enough airplanes
you don't have to go to Berchtesgaden.
Good luck.
Yours affectionately,
Bill
PSF: Bullitt
A Inco
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 23, 1938.
Bill Bullitt just telephoned the
following which he thinks you should
have during Cabinet meeting in order
to telephone him back immediately.
He has just been informed by
the British Ambassador that Chamber-
lain is having conversation with
Hitler and is returning to London.
twnightx The news is very bad. He
and all of his party are returning
by airplane tomorrow morning. It &s
the belief that ****** this ends the
negobiation but this is not certain.
It is said that Hitler wishes his
troops to occupy the Sudeten. Resist-
ance and war will follow. It is
-2-
3ajoH 3TIHW 3HT
also certain that the Polish troops
will march at the same moment. That
may happen tonight and it is now
9.15 here. It may happen after
Chamberlain sees Hitler this evening.
Bullitt believes that the subject you
and he have talked and written about
should not be delayed. It should be
arrenplishedxhyx accompanied by a
statement about no troops crossing
frontiers. X
xthat
Bullitt believes that this
should be seen by you immediately
in Cabinet meeting and asks you
please to call back immediately. I
have given Hack the elephone number.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
9/23 - 4.50 P
Bullitt:
"This is what I wanted to say (to the
President:
"The British Ambassador has now com-
municated to me a telegram which he has just
received from Chamberlain.
"This telegram shows that the situation
is not so hopeless as it appeared to be from
the communication that the British Ambassador
here rec'd from the foreign office in London.
"It appears that there will not be
an entry of German troops immediately into
Czechoslovakia. The dispute is on the question
of how soon those troops should enter and how
far they should enter and on the withdrawal
of Czech police from the Sudeten regions.
"Chamberlain will return to London
tomorrow morning, arriving about Noon in
London and he will. have with him at that time
written statements of Hitler with regard to
exactly what he wants, with respect to the
questions I have just given you.
"The result is that the situation, as
shown by this communication from Chamberlain,
is not so desperate as the situation previously
shown by the communication from the foreign
office in London.
"Therefore please say to the President
right away that I do not feel that, in the
light of this latter communication direct from
Chamberlain, war is likely to break out within
the next 24 hours. I think there still a
breathing space and that therefore feel that
he still has time to consider things.
K
PSF: Belitt
file
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation
DATE:
September 27, 1938.
SUBJECT:
Telephone conversation.
9:45 a.m.
PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Bullitt;
Under Secretary Welles.
COPIES TO:
... 1-1493
MR. BULLITT: Have you read Hitler's reply to the Presi-
dent? It was sent to you last night.
MR. WELLES: I have read it. Have you read it?
MR. BULLITT: Yes. It is, of course, ... ultimatum.
Have you heard yet that Chamberlain 18 to speak tonight.
MR. WELLES: Yes.
MR. BULLITT: The time 18 getting shorter and shorter
and therefore any action to be taken will have to be
thought about with great speed. I am thinking of an
alternative which I should like to suggest to you to
get your reaction.
MR. WELLES: Please do.
-2-
MR. BULLITT: In the first place I believe that the French
Government this afternoon will issue a statement on all
points of Chamberlain's statement of last night in which
he said that the British Government would guarantee that
the Czechs would carry this out rapidly and fairly. There
is also discussion going on here of an attempt to appoint
an international commission at once. I doubt if this can
be done today. It will possibly take until tomorrow.
Meanwhile time presses. I have of the following - that
the President might very well reply to the Chancellor's
note saying that he thanks him for his reply but everyone
must recognize by this time that the conditions of peace
laid down in 1919 did not produce happiness and tranquil-
lity on the Continent. Many things have changed already
and remain to be changed. The Czech Government ****
The French and British Government have promised to see they
are handed over expeditiously and fairly. The Chancellor
takes the position that this handing over can take place
at only the time and in exactly the manner which he him-
self orders, of one man deciding what appears to plunge
the entire continent into war. The President suggests
that a conference should be held to settle this and cor-
related questions. He suggests that on the 29th there
should meet representatives of England, France, Germany,
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. I have thought very
-3-
carefully about this. Italy is left out, Russia 18 left
out.
MR. WELLES: Give me the list again.
MR. BULLITT: France, England, Germany, Poland, Czecho-
slovakia and Hungary and a representative of the United
States, if these powers 80 desire, will also be present.
We suggest such a meeting at The Hague on the 29th. Such
a meeting would mean that no troops would cross the border.
We should be very glad to receive the Chancellor's reply
if such a conference would be acceptable to him. He would
immediately get great pressure from Poland and Hungary to
accept it which would put him in a bad spot. Have you
received all the telegrams sent last night.
MR. WELLES: I have read them all very carefully. The
second one is extraordinarily interesting.
MR. BULLITT: Daladier is perfectly magnificent. I am
sending a telegram almost at once incorporating these
ideas. I have Just formulated them because I have just
seen and been able to digest Hitler's message. I don't
know whether this line of thought appeals to you. The
only other line for the President would be to deliver in
his reply to Hitler a terrific statement of what the con-
sequences will be and where the responsibility will lie.
I do not think this would be desirable. It would drive
Hitler into immediate action.
-4-
MR. WELLES: I think it 18 out of the question. It is
not constructive. More than that it puts this Government
definitely in & position of partiality which we don't want
to take.
MR. BULLITT: At the time the President considers appealing
for a conference he might send for the German Ambassador and
say to the Ambassador some very simple things, cite some
facts well known to him - Germany's popularity in the United
States in 1914, their popularity at moment well known to him,
firmly trusts that Herr Hitler will not place him in the
same position that Woodrow Wilson was placed in and with
circumstances much more difficult today than they were at
that time. I think a simple statement like that to the
German Ambassador might have a very great effect. Any
further conversation I think might suggest a modification
of the Neutrality Act.
MR. WELLES: That cannot be undertaken at this moment.
I am convinced of that. If you were here you would agree
with me. Your first suggestion is in entire accord with
my own inclination. I will take them up at once. I haven't
seen the Secretary this morning. I will see the President
in the next hour. I will take this up with him and see
where we get.
MR. BULLITT: He may wish to wait for Chamberlain's state-
ment tonight at eight o'clock. I think this is the only
line of action which gives a further chance for peace. If
Chamberlain speaks at eight o'clock tonight here - that
-5-
will be three o'clock in the afternoon with you - there
will be plenty of time tonight after that to decide and
get something out.
MR. WELLES: If anything is to be done it will have to
be done in next twenty-four hours.
MR. BULLIT: It will also have to ask representatives of
those six powers to be present on the morning of the 29th
of September. Acceptance of this conference would of course
mean that troops wouldn't crose the frontier. I have talked
with Kennedy in London and there they are thinking about
nothing except how fast they can get ready for war. He
hasn't been able to see anyone of importance.
MR. WELLES: The only two people mentioned in his cable
were Oliver Stanley and someone else - no one of importance.
MR. BULLITT: Here there is still some slight hope that by
pushing this matter of a statement to guarantee to Hitler
* * *. I doubt very much if it will be effective. I be-
lieve the chances are about ninety-five in a hundred of war
beginning midnight Friday. I should appreciate it if you
will call me back giving some inkling of the way your
thoughts are running.
MR. WELLES: I will naturally call you back.
MR. BULLITT: Thank you very much.
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
Frank
WASHINGTON
September 27, 1938
My dear Mr. President:
I am returning herewith
Ambassador Bullitt's letter to you
of August 8th, concerning proposed
credit for China.
Sincerely yours,
The President,
The White House.
Published in
Foreign Relations of the U.S.
1938
VOL III PAGES 544-545
the Far East
PSP
France Bullit
Paris, August 8, 1938.
Personal and
56.1001, Confidential
Dear Mr. President:
From a multitude of reliable sources, I have
been informed during the past two months that the
Chinese will be at the end of their financial re-
sources by the first of next January, unless they
can obtain credits abroad. Chiang Kai-shek's will
to fight and the courage of the Chinese people re-
main unbroken; but there will be just no money to
buy anything. I have had this information in a
series of messages from Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong,
and Doctor Kung transmitted to me by the Chinese
Ambassador here, and I have had the same information
from a horde of detached observers.
As you will recall, some months ago Bonnet said
to me that he hoped it might be possible for the
United States to extend some sort of a credit or
loan
The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
The White House.
- 2 -
loan to China and that he was certain that if we
should be willing to act, both France and Great
Britain would act simultaneously though not
jointly. Two days ago, Bonnet reiterated this to
me. He added that he was certain that either
England, France, or the United States could give
credits to China without provoking any serious
Japanese reaction. The Japanese were too involved
in China and were too fearful of Russian attack to
dare to act against either England, France, or the
United States.
This reasoning seems to me sound. I believe
we should, however, avoid putting ourselves out on
any long limb. I do not think we should sell the
Chinese arms or munitions on credit, but I believe
we should give the Chinese Government a credit of
one hundred million dollars for the purchase of flour
and gray goods in the United States.
We shall have to take a loss on our wheat and
cotton anyhow. If we sell the Chinese Government
flour instead of wheat and gray goods instead of
cotton, we shall get the benefit of the first pro-
cessing and even if we should lose the hundred million,
it would be money well spent.
I
- 3 -
I have talked over this idea with Henry Morgenthau
and find that he is entirely in accord with me. As you
know, he suggested to the Chinese Ambassador in Paris
that the Chinese Government should send K. P. Chen to
Washington and I have just received information that
Chen will reach Washington about the same time that
Henry returns.
If you should approve of this proposal, I suggest
that you should let me know in advance so that I could
try to push Bonnet into making good his statements to
me with regard to the readiness of the French Govern-
ment to take simultaneous and similar action.
I have thought about this a lot and I feel certain
that we ought to do it. I hope you will too.
Love and good luck.
Yours affectionately,
Bill
William C. Bullitt.
France
PSF: Bullitt
Paris, September 28, 1938.
Secret and Personal
Dear Mr. President:
The enclosed telegram I was about to send to you
when the news came that Hitler had invited Chamberlain,
Daladier, and Mussolini to meet him in Munich tomorrow
at two o'clock. Inasmuch as the message contains mili-
tary secrets of the highest importance, I felt that it
was desirable, in view of the change in the situation,
to send it to you by mail rather than by telegraph.
Please keep it for your most private eye, and please
give me an immediate reply - I mean immediate - to the
question with regard to how far it might be possible to
export parts of planes and motors and machine tools from
the United States to Canada in time of war.
It is just as vital to have this information imme-
diately now as it was when it seemed that war was
certain; because it remains vital for France to start
building
The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D. C.
- 2 -
building planes on this scale at once. Unless France
and England can manufacture in this way and on this
scale, the time will soon come again when Hitler will
issue a ukase, and make war when it is not obeyed by
France and England.
I am so relieved this evening that I feel like
embracing everyone and wish I were in the White House
to give you a large kiss on your bald spot.
Love, good luck, and hurrah.
Bill
Encl.
France
PSF: Bullitt
SECSTATE
WASHINGTON
RUSH - September 28, 3 P.M. 1938
The following message is to be decoded by Mr. Salmon
or the Acting Chief of the Code Room and carried to the
President by him, and no copy made under any circumstances.
SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Guy La Chambre, Minister for Air, has just given me
the actual figures on the aviation situation.
If war should begin on the first of October, the
French would have six hundred battle planes. This includes
pursuit planes and bombers.
The British have agreed to send to France to support
the French Army one hundred and twenty light bombing planes
at the end of the first week, and one hundred and twenty
more at the end of four weeks.
To the certain knowledge of the French Military In-
telligence, the Germans have ready for battle at this
moment six thousand five hundred planes of the very
latest types. The division of these planes is believed
to be two-thirds bombers and one-third pursuit planes.
The Italians have of the very latest types eight
hundred pursuit planes and twelve hundred bombers.
Both the Germans and Italians have large quantities of
planes, not of the latest types.
The Soviet Government was asked recently by the
French
- 2 -
French Government if Soviet planes could fly to France
in case of need. The reply was that no Soviet plane
had sufficient radius of action to fly to France.
The Minister for Air said that it was certain that
the German planes would be able to bomb Paris at will.
The French pursuit planes were so insufficient in numbers
that they would all have to be assigned to protecting the
observation planes of the Army. There would be no planes
for the defense of Paris.
Anti-aircraft artillery was also most inadequate in
quantity. There would be a certain amount of anti-aircraft
artillery available for the defense of Paris but almost
none for the defense of other points and none to protect
French troop concentrations.
The Minister for Air felt certain that the destruction
in Paris would pass all imagination. He said that he had
sent his wife and child to Brittany already, and he be-
lieved that every woman and child who could leave Paris
should do so at once and every man who had no urgent
reason to be here should do likewise.
The Minister for Air went on to say that there was
no protection whatsoever against the large-sized German
bombs except a shelter covered by at least fifteen feet
of reinforced concrete. It was obviously impossible to
create many such shelters. There were, however,
comparatively
- 3 -
comparatively few German or Italian bombing planes which
could carry bombs of the largest size. Most of the
German bombing, he expected to be done with small in-
cendiary bombs weighing about twenty pounds. It would,
therefore, be useful to have plenty of sand in houses
since these bombs could be put out by two shovelfuls
of sand but an unconquerable fire would result if water
was spread on them.
The Minister for Air went on to say that the safest
place for the next two years in France would be a trench
provided one was equipped with a gas mask; that we should
provide ourselves with gas masks immediately and we should
dig trenches in whatever gardens might be available. A
trench would be a sufficient protection except in case of
a direct hit and in case of a direct hit, there would be
no protection. He advised me urgently to have American
women and children sent out of Paris at the earliest pos-
sible moment.
I have accordingly today given instructions to
Murphy to inform each member of the staff personally
and quietly that I believe he should send his wife and
children out of Paris at the earliest possible moment.
The Minister for Air went on to say that the esti-
mates of the General Staff of the French Air Force were
that, at the end of a month under the present circum-
stances,
- 4 -
circumstances, France could not have more than three
hundred planes and that if good weather should continue
for very long, a time might come when the number of
French planes would be altogether negligible.
He felt personally that the General Staff of the
Army was underestimating the importance of the air
factor and he thought that it would be most dangerous
to add another frontier by an attack on Spain, even
though this frontier might be in existence for only a
brief period because Franco had many planes.
We then discussed at length the problem of pro-
ducing a sufficient number of planes to overcome German
and Italian superiority in the air. The Minister for
Air was of the opinion that such planes could only be
produced on the continent of North America and by
American manufacturers. Since the Neutrality Act
would prevent the manufacture of such planes in the
United States, he proposed at once to attempt to build
huge factories for planes in Canada, possibly just op-
posite Detroit and Buffalo, so that American workmen
living at home could be utilized readily. He asked me
for suggestions as to the persons to take in hand this
immense program of plane construction on the success
or failure of which, in his opinion, the outcome of the
war would depend. He added that it was, of course,
vital that it should be possible to ship machine tools
and
- 5 -
and plane parts and instruments from the United States
to these Canadian factories.
La Chambre asked me if I could obtain in strictest
confidence information for him if and to what extent it
might be possible to export parts of planes and motors
and machine tools from the United States to Canada without
violating the Neutrality Act.
I believe that we should go to the extreme limit
compatible with a reasonable interpretation of the law
to permit such exports to Canada.
Will you please have someone study this question
with the idea in mind that it may affect the whole
future of freedom in the world.
Please give me an answer on this point at the
earliest possible moment as no plans can be carried
further until La Chambre knows the answer to this
question.
La Chambre continued our discussion by asking me
for my opinion as to the men best qualified to organize
this effort on behalf of France. I suggested Jean
Monnet (not repeat not Monick) who, as you know, has
been an intimate friend of mine for many years, whom I
trust as a brother. Monnet organized and directed the
Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council; the wheat and
shipping pool and all the vast other Inter-allied
organizations
- 6 -
organizations during the war when he was only a man of
twenty-eight. He then became Under Secretary of the
League of Nations and for many years has been engaged
in private business.
Guy La Chambre was pleased by this idea and I
suggested that Lindbergh, who is an intimate friend
of Monnet's, should be associated with Monnet in this
work. I suggested further that a French airplane
constructor or expert should be added to Monnet and
Lindbergh with Monnet as absolute boss. La Chambre
was pleased by this idea and asked me to get in touch
with Monnet and Lindbergh at once.
La Chambre also said that he had an option on
one hundred more P-36s for delivery next spring and
asked me if I thought he should exercise it in view
of the terms of the Neutrality Act. I told him that
I could make no predictions as to what would happen
to the Neutrality Act, but I advised him to take his
chance and put in the order.
I realize that at the present moment it may be
impossible to modify the Neutrality Act in any way;
but my personal feeling is that the horror and hatred
evoked by German bombings will be so great that the
people of the United States by next spring will not
feel inclined to prevent planes purchased before the
outbreak
- 7 -
outbreak of war from being sent to defend whatever may
be left of France from further German bombings.
I realize how carefully it is necessary to tread
in this matter, but my personal feeling is that if war
should break out this week, we should at the earliest
possible moment permit the French and British to purchase
for cash in our ports and carry in their own ships as
many planes, munitions, and guns as they have money to
pay for.
I thank you for your personal message which I re-
ceived this morning. I was a great deal prouder of you
today. Your second telegram to Hitler was a masterpiece.
Congratulations and love to you all.
BULLITT.
J.P.B.
security. time
Bullitt
se
EG
GRAY
Paris
Dated September 29, 1938
Rec'd 7:03 a.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
1640, September 29, 10 a.m.
Your 716, September 29, 2 s.m.
Please inform the White House that I communicated
with Miss Elsanor Roosevelt, the President's nisce,
last Monday and made reservations for her on the
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT sailing today. I have also ar-
ranged for her friend Miss Nathalis Coolidge of
Boston to accompany her.
BULLITT
RR
PSF:
PSF:Bullitt
EDA
This telegram must bE
PARIS
closely paraphrased
before being communi-
Dated DECEMBER 13, 1938
cated to anyone (BR)
RECEIVED 6:12 p.m.
Secretary of State
Washington
2107, DECEMBER 13, 7 p.m.
Your 915, DECEMBER 6, 5 p.m.
FOR BULLITT.
Vincent Shegan who has just returned to Paris tells
Murphy that hE is writing Miss LE Hand that his telegram
concerning the treatment of the returning American volun-
teers from Spain was sent in a moment of agitation upon
learning that hE could not interview in Paris the group
which arrived December 2. The group was on a through
train to Havre without stopover at Paris. The men
were accompanied from the Franco Spanish frontier by
two of our consular officers and met upon arrival at Havre
by Consul Wiley who maintained contact with them through-
out their stay there. Sheean says hE will Explain to
Miss LE Hand that the men were not held incommunicado,
that they were included in a blanket transit visa good
only for passage through France to the port of departure,
and at Havre were allowed to circulate freely while
awaiting sailing which was delayed by the seamen's strike.
During that time they were provided comfortable accommo-
dations at the EXPENSE of the French line.
WILSON
CFW:RR