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President's Secretary's File (Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration)
Diplomatic Correspondence
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PSF Great Britain
1933-36
sR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
April 21, 1933
My dear Mr. President:
You asked me this afternoon for further
information in connection with our commercial
treaty with Great Britain. I enclose a brief
explanation of why the United States has up to
the present consented to the Imperial preferences.
Faithfully yours,
Enclosure:
Memorandum,
April 21, 1933.
The President,
The White House.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE ECONOMIC ADVISER
April 21, 1933.
Convention of Commerce and Navigation
with Great Britain - 1815
The essential provisions of the Treaty of 1815
are:
"There shall be between the terri-
tories of the United States of America,
and all the territories of His Britannick
Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty
of commerce",
and
"...No higher or other duties shall
be imposed on the importation into the
territories of His Britannick Majesty in
Europe of any articles the growth, produce
or manufacture of the United States, than
are or shall be payable on the like
articles being the growth, produce or
manufacture of any other foreign country."
In 1815 and for many years thereafter, the
present Dominions of the British Commonwealth cannot
have been regarded as being within the meaning of the
phrase "any other foreign country" as used in defining
the obligation of His Britannic Majesty in the
treaty. If at present it be arguable that the self-
governing Dominions are in fact foreign countries
in
-2-
in regard of Great Britain, it would still remain
true that the Treaty of 1815 must be construed as
a conditional most-favored-nation treaty in the
sense that the parties are not required to extend
free to each other any favor which they extend to a
third country in return for some reciprocal con-
cession or compensation. The Imperial preferences
granted by the United Kingdom to the Dominions are
part of a system of mutual concessions between
the United Kingdom and the Dominions. The Supreme
Court of the United States has construed the treaty
as "conditional".
EA:FL:Dry
72
NF
PSF:
The American Government in all friendliness and
in accordance with the candor that characterized the
recent conversations in Washington feels that it must
express to the British Government its concern over
certain of the features of the treaty between the
British and Argentine Governments, which has just been
announced.
It recognizes that tariff treaty making like
tariff making itself is a prerogative of each national
government and it is not desirous of questioning that
prerogative. But it is impelled to point out the possible
bearing of this treaty on the general aims and chances
of success of the projected Monetary and Economic Con-
ference and also upon American trade and commercial
policy.
The part of the treaty which particularly causes
it concern is that containing the exchange arrangements.
If the American Government understands these arrangements
aright, they mean that the Argentine Government obligates
itself
- 2 -
itself in the allotment of exchange under the exchange
for payment to British nationals
control, to allot to further payment of purchases of
British goods all exchange arising from the sale of
Argentine goods in Great Britain (after certain reason-
able deduction for debt payments).
This arrangement is a departure from the rules
which customarily govern either free exchange markets
or the normal operation of exchange control systems.
It introduces a preference based on the idea of direct
trade between two countries; or in other words, it
endeavors to direct trade so that it should be led
to balance between each separate pair of countries,
a tendency generally recognized to result in the
curtailment of all trade.
Furthermore, such arrangements once created in
favor of one country are almost certain to lead other
countries similarly circumstanced to ask the same
preference. We are informed, for example, that the
French Government is even now seeking from the Argentine
Government
- 3 -
Government similar preferential exchange treatment.
The result can only be to further deflect trade from
its ordinary economic channels, and by bargaining
pressure to create preferences.
The result in this particular instance may well
be deleterious to American trade. Such unfavorable
discrimination is almost certain to encourage opinion
in this country to fight discrimination of this kind
and to urge the American Government to seek similar
preferential treatment where and as it may be able
to secure it. But the American Government is not
raising the matter solely or even primarily because
of the effect of this particular treaty on American
trade with the Argentine. It is no less concerned with
its bearing upon the plans for the Monetary and
Economic Conference.
STRICTLY
stad
DEPENCE (F FRE DOM AND PEACE
The aim of British policy should be to maintain and
to defend the vital interests and the free civilization of Creat
Britain and the British Commonwealth and, in cooperation with other
countries, to safeguard peace.
The methods of attaining this aim are:-
(a) To ban aggressive violence from international
relations, to restore respect for treaties and coven-
ants, and for this purpose to raise and to keep the
armed strength of Great Britain and the Commonwealth
up to whatever level may be needed.
(b) To coordinate, through the League of Nations
and otherwise, political, economic and military
strength 30 as to deter and, if need be, to resist
armed aggression.
(c) To discountenance and to counteract aggression
in the form of propaganda.
(d) To promote impartial enquiry into international
grievances, and peaceful redress of proved wrongs.
While recognising that all civilized peoples are
entitled to choose their own political and social systems, British
-2-
policy must nevertheless seek to support at all times the positive
principles of responsible individual freedom under representative
democratic government upon which the British Commonwealth is
founded. Among these principles are respect for individual human
right, toleration of racial, religious and political differences,
and free association between the members and sections of a
community - all of which are essential conditions of the establish-
ment of peace.
British policy, therefore, must oppose in the
international sphere intolerance or recourse to arbitrary viblence.
It must favour methods of impartial enquiry and of peaceful
adjustment, and the willing acceptance of a common law of nations.
And it must be ready to join others in withstanding breaches of
this law as the only way to diminish armaments and to create peace.
PSF: G.Britain
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE ECONOMIC ADVISER
File
September 25, 1933.
Skeleton Outline of Alternative Approaches
to Possible Debt Agreement with
Great Britain
Section I
It is generally agreed that three courses are open
in regard to the handling of the impending debt dis-
cussions with the British: (a) Standing on the letter of
the bond, taking a passive attitude, and letting the
matter go to default; (b) Devising some further
temporary make-shift formula to carry past the next few
debt payments - that 18, some continuation of small
token payments (the danger in this, besides the
political difficulties, is that these small payments
may come to be regarded as normal and the debt will
become dead except for these small payments); (o) An
equitable offer or counter-offer for a permanent
settlement. Up to the present neither side may be said
to have made a fully equitable offer to the other.
The British now are likely to make another inequitable
offer (for example, payments intended to fit into the
Lausanne
2
Lausanne settlement. ) We might then be prepared to
put up to them an equitable counter-offer for reducing
the debt, refusal of which the British Government would
find it extremely hard to defend throughout the world.
The third course is certainly the most beneficial,
if it is possible. The suggestions below are merely in-
tended to illustrate the number of alternative lines along
which such an equitable offer might be worked out.
Section II.
Any offer that would be widely recognized as equit-
able in the present circumstances will call for a reduction
of the British debt. A reduction merely by writing down
the interest rate or even by completely wiping out interest
is, I think, virtually certain of refusal by Great Britain
and will not be convincing enough in general.
Of course, in considering any of these suggestions
the reception by American public opinion and the political
attitudes that have to be reckoned with have to be consider-
ed.
-3-
In addition it would be desirable that it have
some features that would facilitate transfer.
The following are merely possible elements that
are worth consideration:
(1) The principal might be written down in ao-
cordance with an index in the change in gold prices
since the period 1917-19 Bo that it can be claimed
that Great Britain was only being asked to pay back in
commodities and services exactly what had been loaned
them.
(2) Against the principal might be credited the
interest payments which the British have already paid
($1,912,000,000, reducing the principal from
$4,277,000,000 to $2,365,000,000).
(3) The principal could be divided into two parts:
(a) one part to be paid over a short period of years;
(b) a part that is to remain merely as a claim by the
United States collectible in kind under special cir-
cumstances, such as war, crop failure, or monetary
disturbance in the United States.
(4) More complicated applications of the same idea
whereby, for example, the principals contained in the
schedules might be divided into three parts: (a) the part
payable in a short number of annuities; (b) the part
giving us an indefinite claim on the special circum-
stances;
-4-
stances; (c) a part which could be used to finance
the travels of American tourists in the British Empire
under special arrangement; (d) a part that could be
used to carry out various projects such as a scheme
for seadromes for transatlantic aviation.
(5) Still another idea that could be introduced
to cover a small part of the debt is that it should be
collected by having Great Britain turn over to this
Government certain property in kind such as cable and
radio rights, fuel oil bunker stations. This would be
extremely difficult to arrange but it is worth con-
sideration as a minor element in the settlement.
(6) (a) An agreement containing any one of the
preceding elements might also have a feature increasing
or decreasing the amounts paid in accordance with the
degree of trade between this country and the United
Kingdom or between this country and the British Empire,
or (b) alternatively, some index of prosperity in
Great Britain.
This list could be greatly lengthened. There are
all possible elements of discussion that might be
brought into the arrangement if once the basic conten-
tion is defined.
EA:HF:Dry
[1932
MAJOR AMERICAN OBJECTIVES AND TACTICAL PROGRAM
DIVIDED INTO THREE GROUPS,
ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, DEBTS.
1. ECONOMIC
We want to raise the world price level. In order
to accomplish this we have various steps to suggest, some of
which we are prepared to advocate as out-and-out suggestions,
others constitute points which we know we want, but for which
we feel we should obtain a trading advantage. Those in black
fall into the first category; those in red fall into the
second.
A. As to the reestab ishment of gold as the
measure of international exchange values: We favor such
reestablishment when the desired price improvement is in
prospect. But we are not willing to return to a gold
standard unless we obtain complete cooperation from other
nations. I "A gold standard" does not necessarily mean
at the old parities.)
B. Assuming that we are assured of the willingness
of other nations to return to a gold standard, we suggest:
1. Uniform bullion cover for all countries.
2. That this uniform ratio be lower than
the present average of existing ratios (for example, 25% gold).
3. A superimposition of a 5% additional
bullion reserve in gold or optionally in silver, below a
price to be agreed upon. WE WANT THIS, BUT IF WE CAN, WE WANT
TO AVOID HAVING IT REGARDED AS A CONCESSION BY ALL THE OTHER
NATIONS. FRANCE WANTS IT. CANADA WANTS IT. JAPAN, CHINA
AND
- 2 -
AND ENGLAND WOULD PROBABLY BE AGREEABLE TO IT. BUT ALL OF
THEM WILL DESIRE TO MAKE IT A CONCESSION TO OUR WHIMS.
4. Remonetization of debased subsidiary
coinages. (We have not debased and we have every moral
justification for suggesting remonetization.
5. We suggest tentatively, for considera-
tion, spreading the gold import and export points, without
stressing this as something that we are very keen on. (This
idea originated with Keynes.)
6. We endorse the reoommendation of the
economic experts that exchange restrictions must be removed.
This involves the prior funding of the excessive part of the
short-term debts of some countries such as Germany and the
entire re-organization of the debt structure of other
countries such as Chile and Greece. We are prepared to
cooperate in the accomplishment of both of these prior
conditions in so far as a government can influence private
creditors, and have developed certain ideas which we are
prepared to discuss at the proper time.
a). The British will suggest some
form of international lending, probably under the heading of an
international exchange equalization or normalization fund.
This is a polite way of inviting France and ourselves to make
additional loans to countries with weak exchanges. Our answer
should be that we will under no circumstances consider making
such loans until the conditions precedent to removal of
exchange restrictions have been fulfilled and that we will
make no promise to make such loans even after they have been
fulfilled.
- 3 -
fulfilled.
b.) In order to take the edge
off this attitude we might indicate our willingness to consider
cooperation with the British in bringing about a de facto
stabilization of the sterling-dollar rate without reference
to gold.
7. We suggest a correlated central bank
policy with uniform practice, so far as this is practically
possible, and we suggest that for the immediate future, the
uniform policy be one of easy money, for the purpose of
8. developing plans for a synchronized
program of government expenditure, in order to stimulate the
natural sources of employment by government aid to industry,
public works, - such as housing, - or any other feasible
methods.
9. We suggest a tariff truce to go into
effect with the acceptance of the invitation to the Conference
and lasting at least for the duration of the Conference.
a.) This truce must include
quotas, export subventions and other restrictions.
10. We suggest the immediate negotiation of
bilateral treaties to reduce tariffs and other restrictions.
11. We suggest ultimate removal of quotas.
(Great Britain will agree. France will disagree.)
12. We are willing to continue the principle
of the unconditional Most Favored Nation Clause. But this is
a point which we can well make a concession rather than a
demand on our part.
13. We are willing to discuss restriction of
wheat
- 4 -
wheat production, but we do not think it belongs in the
Economic Conference. Apart from wheat and silver, we do not
believe that any commodities are suitable subjects for discussion
with the British.
- 5 -
II. POLITICAL
1. The British will want to talk about security
guarantees to a certain extent, but not as much as the
French. We are willing to reaffirm the first half of the
Stimson Doctrine, that is, our willingness to consult with the
others who signed the Kellogg Pact in the event of a threat of
war. We are not willing to reaffirm the second half of the
Stimson Doctrine, to the effect that we will not recognize
conditions brought about by means in contravention of the
Kellogg Pact.
2. We are willing not to push for disarmament
so long as the German situation remains as dangerous as it is
now; but this is a very good point to use as something we
have conceded in anticipation of a similar attitude of
cooperation on the part of other European countries, particu-
larly France, along other lines.
3. The British may very easily ask us, probably
in a perfectly casual way, to agree not to recognize Russia
while they are on bad terms with Russia. It is best not to
agree to anything like this. A non-committal answer is the
best sort of a trading weapon.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Pulpit Harbor
6/24
with
Miss LeHand:
File in Confidential File.
FDR
DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
April 7, 1933.
Dear Mr. President:
I think that I have covered very fully in
my dispatches to the Secretary of State the substance of my
conversations with Mr. MacDonald and some of his colleagues
relative to his proposed visit to the United States. Since
it has now been decided that the Prime Minister is to go it
is perhaps well for me to give you certain "high spots" which
may be of some assistance in the conversations which you are
to have.
In our first talk after my arrival in London
I discovered that the Cabinet had been quite opposed to his
making the visit and that while the opposition was diminishing
it still existed. The chief opposition was from the Tories,
who being in the majority were afraid that the visit, if a suc-
cess, would increase MacDonald's prestige, and if a failure
would weaken that of the Government. Chamberlain was the prin-
cipal obstruction because he wanted to go himself and also be-
cause he was determined to try to force a debt settlement prior
to the Conference or at least to get an assurance that we would
not ask for any payments during the Conference negotiations and
would carry on debt negotiations concurrently with those of the
Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
-2-
Conference.
They contended that it would be most danger-
ous for MacDonald to go to Washington to negotiate an agreement
without some previous assurance that there was a basis for agree-
ment. I told them that if he should go solely for the avowed
purpose of a general exchange of views with you, and not to nego-
tiate specific agreements himself, it would seem that their pre-
occupation should disappear. This seemed to satisfy them some-
what but they then raised the question that 1t would be risky for
MacDonald to go unless there were at least some assurance as to
a postponement of the June 15th payment, intimating that it would
make their position more embarrassing if they were afterwards
called upon to pay. In other words they seemed to think that if
they should decide to default they could do so with better grace
if he had stayed at home. I explained to them that I was satis-
fied you would not give any such assurance and that I would not
be willing to even put such a suggestion up to you, which I thought
was unreasonable, with which MacDonald agreed. As they pressed
for this 1t became more necessary for me to fall over backwards
because, as I told them, in view of the position they had taken,
anything that was said that could be construed as holding out any
hope whatever that the Prime Minister's visit might result in a
postponement of the June 15th payment, might lead to a misunder-
standing and that in my judgment they should merely decide whether
or not an exchange of views between you and the Prime Minister on
other matters, which were of more vital importance to the two
countries, would not justify the trip.
-3-
I succeeded in convincing MacDonald, and I
think all of them, except perhaps Chamberlain, that recovery
from the depression must be put in the foreground and debts more
or less in the background. While I personally think that it
would be advisable for you to get authority, if possible, to
prevent any serious situation arising with regard to the June 15th
payments, because it would put us in a better trading position
later on if we do not get in a Jam at that time, I have not told
them so and I have not said or done anything which could be con-
strued as any commitment whatever.
In one of my talks with MacDonald, at which
Simon was present, he was laying much stress upon the importance
of getting beyond the June 15th payment without raising serious
political difficulties. He said, in fact, that the problem was
most serious because, in the present state of mind in both coun-
tries, it was as much of a political difficulty for them to get
the approval of Parliament to pay as it was for you to get the
approval of Congress to postpone payment, but that it was of the
utmost importance to find some way to get beyond this without a
real crisis. He then inquired what I thought could be done about
it. I told him that it seemed to me that it ought to ease the
situation in both countries if we would concentrate our efforts
in pulling out of this depression; that if this were done it
might possibly somewhat change the attitude of Congress and also
the attitude of Parliament; that so far as the British debt was
concerned I personally had always felt that after we had made a
better settlement with the French than we did with the British
-4-
it would have been fair and logical to put the British debt on
the same basis and that it might have been done had it not been
for the Balfour note which had been a deterring factor. He then
told me that when he was at Rapidan in 1929 Hoover told him he
thought the British loan ought to be put upon the same basis as
the French and indicated that it would be done but that nothing
was ever done about it. Simon then spoke up and said that it
would not solve the problem even if that were now done because
it would not relieve the situation on June 15th with regard to
the French. He thus indicated it might put them in an embarrass-
1ng position as regards the French if we were to do this. I
then said that while I had thought at one time that a readjust-
ment of the British debt on that basis might be one thing which
Congress would be inclined to do I had no idea what its attitude
would be, especially now, and furthermore that what I had said
was a purely personal and unofficial view and not intended in
any way as even a tentative proposal. I also said that in fact
I had no idea how you would feel about even considering such an
approach to the problem and could not speak for you. I mention
this to you because subsequently, in the last talk which I had
with MacDonald, at his request, and at which Baldwin, Chamberlain,
Runciman and Simon were present, he raised this question in such
a way as to try to infer that I had advanced it as a proposal.
I then made it very clear that I had done nothing of the kind.
Nevertheless, my reaction was that such an arrangement would ap-
peal to all of them except Simon and to a lesser extent MacDonald
who would be rather embarrassed because of the United Front Agree-
ment.
-5-
I may say, however, that I am more than ever
convinced that it would be good strategy, if you think it advis-
able to ask for authority from Congress, for us, of our own voli-
tion, to announce that as a matter of fair play, we were going
to stop this discrimination and put the British debt on the same
basis as the French, making the adjustment retroactive. I am
satisfied this would have such a good effect in England that it
would greatly weaken the sentiment in favor of defaulting and
would disrupt the united front. It would, in fact, put the Brit-
ish Government on the defensive. While it would not take care of
the French and other payments maturing on June 15th, in case you
should not get authority to deal with those as you see fit, it
would relieve the tension with regard to the British payment,
which is much more than all the others put together. If the Brit-
ish debt were readjusted as indicated it would give them a credit
of something like $900,000,000. My idea would be to apply most
of this to reducing the capital indebtedness and merely to set
enough aside to cover say the next two installments.
Another thing which you may bear in mind is
the possibility that MacDonald may not last much longer unless
he can do something in the near future to strengthen his hand.
I am sorry because I am extremely fond of him. He has much imag-
ination and ability and back of his ministerial exterior he has
a subtle capacity for trading.
I am inclined to think that it was not neces-
sary for him to act in such a hurry in submitting the British
Proposal recently in Geneva and that his visit to Rome was mainly
-6-
with a view of strengthening his hand. If something comes of
the proposal and of the proposed Four Power Pact 1t will help
him. If not, it will do the opposite. I am satisfied it would
have been better for them to have waited for us and to have put
in a joint proposal which would have had a much greater chance
of success.
There are many excellent features in their
disarmament proposal, most of which in fact are not new. They
have not laid enough stress on the strengthening of the defen-
sive position of nations and the weakening of their powers of
offense and I think it 8. mistake to propose a five year instead
of a ten year treaty. As soon as I have had some further talks
with the French and get a better line on the German situation I
may make some suggestions for your consideration. I am inclined
to think that the time may come within the next few weeks when
you could give the necessary push to get through a real disarma-
ment agreement which, of course, would do more to insure the suc-
cess of the Economic Conference and restore confidence and good
will than almost anything else.
I hope also within a few days to give you my
considered views about the so-called Four Power Pact. Just now
it looks as if it would not be born - certainly not without con-
siderable change.
To return to the debt question England and
France can think of nothing but debts. Many of their papers have
in every way tried to give the impression that I have been discus-
sing debt settlements although I have scrupulously refrained from
-7-
doing so and have insisted that any negotiations about debts
must be carried on in Washington. This has been done, I am sure,
to keep the debt question before the public and to embarrass us.
Nearly every move they make has some relation to debts. The Brit-
ish and French Treasuries are acting very closely together, in
fact much more so than the political sides of the two Governments.
I have a very strong suspicion, based upon considerable circum-
stantial evidence, that the British Treasury has encouraged the
French in their continued failure to make the December 15th pay-
ment.
Strange as it may seem, one of the chief causes
of the failure to make the payment now is due to the fact that
Herriot, who is the leader of the majority political party, has
stated that he would not assume the leadership of the Government
again as long as it is in default on these payments. Many of his
political enemies, and in fact some within his own party now, who
wish to hold office and who by conviction are not opposed to pay-
ing, are refraining from giving their approval just in order to
keep Herriot out of power.
It may interest you to know that you have caught
the imagination of Europe to a remarkable extent. It makes me
proud as an American to have a President with so much prestige and
to feel that this may enable you to exercise an effective influence
in coping with the critical world situation. The excessive amount
of publicity which I am at present getting - much to my dislike -
is largely due to the fact that I am looked upon as your direct
representative.
I am sorry to burden you with such a long let-
ter but hope it may be of some use.
With warmest personal regards and best wishes
to Mrs. Roosevelt and yourself, in which Mrs. Davis joins me, I am,
Faithfully yours,
NHD/EH
DEAGY
BUCKINGHAM PALACE
Nowh 25th 1933.
D ear Mr President
I mite to thank
you for your friendly
letter of Nov: 5ᵗʰ K for the
envelopes, showing the
amusing K varied manner
in which you are addressed
by some of my Puessed subjects
I can sympathise with
you in this extension of
your letter mail, as I taa
suffer in the same way.
I am glad ta feel that
Jan K I have common
interests to which you
refer. I am sure that
R.P.K 64-393/21
the influence of the
tmerican Navy, like my
own, will always he used
a support of peace r
happiness. It was indeed
good of you to invite
Admiral Draa to the
White House K I feel
cartain that Jam kind
hospitality was much
appreciated I ohare
your disaffisintment that
the I ebt negatiations
did not result in any
permanent salution.
B ut I appreciate the
helpful way in which
you agreed to a further
APPLY
temporary arrangement,
& mith you I hope that
the time may not be
far distant when a
final settlement may be
found possible
We all like your
Amhassadar k WD ingham
very smuch K they are
very Japular in this
country, where he is
well known as a good
spartsman k an escellent
shat. I hope that his
health, which has not
been tao good since
his arrival, is nom
completely restared.
heavy responsibilities
I fully realise your
at the predent time
NPX by 393(1)
K trust that Jan may
he given health &
strength to carry
ant your difficults task
B aliene me
with the expression
of my sincere esteem
your good friend
GeorgeR.,I
BUCKINGHAM PALACE
November 25th 1933.
Dear Mr. President:
I write to thank you for your friendly letter
of Nov. 5th and for the envelopes, showing the amusing
and varied manner in which you are addressed by some of
my oversea subjects. I can sympathise with you in this
extension of your letter mail, as I too suffer in the
same way.
I am glad to feel that you and I have common
interests to which you refer. I am sure that the in-
fluence of the American Navy, like my own, will always
be used in support of peace and happiness. It was in-
deed good of you to invite Admiral Drax to the White
House and I feel certain that your kind hospitality
was much appreciated. I share your disappointment that
the Debt negotiations did not result in any permanent
solution. But I appreciate the helpful way in which you
agreed to a further temporary arrangement, and with you
I hope that the time may not be far distant when a final
settlement may be found possible.
We all like your Ambassador and Mrs. Bingham
very much and they are very popular in this country,
where he is well known as a good sportsman and an
excellent shot. I hope that his health, which has not
been too good since his arrival, 1s now completely re-
stored.
I fully realise your heavy responsibilities
at the present time and trust that you may be given
health and strength to carry out your difficult task.
Believe me with the expression of my sincere
esteem
Your good friend
George R. I.
PSF
December 4, 1933.
Dear Mr. President:
Your letter made me quite happy and I am looking
forward eagerly to seeing you on December 22nd.
I did not deliver the packages to the King
in person, as I should have liked so much to do, because he
has not been well, and I did not want to delay the delivery.
Therefore, I delivered them to Sir Clive Wigram. I am sure
both your letter and the interesting and very amusing envelopes
will be heartily appreciated.
I am glad that you have gotten rid of Sprague.
Through his pomposity and vanity he made a fool of himself here
during the Economic Conference. I should have written you
directly about him except that I was assured the facts would
reach you through two men whom we both could trust, and thought
that was a better method than writing you about him.
The conditions in our country have been persistently
misrepresented in the press here, especially by Wilmot Lewis.
When you established the method of gold purchases he sent a
dispatch to the Times to the effect that you had adopted a
policy of "Suicide or murder". I communicated with Sir
Campbell Stuart, whom I have known for a long time, and he came
out at once to see me, and before I had said a word, he told
me how disturbed he was over Lewis's dispatches. I told
him that, through Lewis, his newspaper was persistently and
constantly misleading the British public, and he agreed with
me. Two or three days later Lewis sent over a dispatch
in which he rather lamely climbed down from his position,
and since then his dispatches have not been so bad, but there
is an underlying hostility in all that he sends over here. In
addition, the financial newspapers publish a lot of stuff
they get out of the Mellon-Mills den in New York. As a result,
on Thanksgivings night, when I had to speak to the American
Society, I took occasion to deal with the subject of con-
ditions in America since your inauguration, and apparently
with some good results.
Ramsay MacDonald has lost out completely here, I
think, and is a mere figure head, and many of the Conser-
vatives, with their large majority in the House of Commons,
are opposed to continuing the pretense of the national
government, (which is a mere pretense). They are split
among themselves on the question of continuing MacDonald as
Prime Minister, and Simon and other Liberals in Cabinet
positions, but they are nervous and frightened over the great
increase in the labor vote, and they attribute their own
losses and labor's increases to the fear on the part of the
public that the Conservatives may adopt a war-like policy, which
the British people, as a whole, seem determined to avoid. This
attitude, of which the government is completely conscious, should
result in their making much greater efforts to cooperate with you
in the only policy which holds out real assurance for peace,
namely, in the abolition of offensive armament, leading on, as
it will inevitably do, to reduction even in defensive armament.
Referring again to Wilmot Lewis, whose misrepresen-
tations I deeply resent, I have had two more talks with Sir
Campbell Stuart on the subject, and one with Mr. Brand, who
married PhyllisLanghorne, and is a director of the Times, and have
discussed the subject also with Lord and Lady Astor, who perhaps
have more influence with Geoffrey Dawson, the Editor of the Times,
than any one else. All four of these people with whom I have
discussed the subject, are disturbed over it, and seem to resent
it as much as I do. I saw Geoffrey Dawson at a luncheon given
for me by the Times management, and he said to me, "I don't
understand your President's policy", and I told him that from what
had appeared in his newspaper, it was perfectly obvious he did
not understand it, as otherwise he would not have permitted the
foolish and misleading things to appear in the Times which he had
allowed to be printed.
On the whole, however, I believe practically everybody
here wants to see you perform your great task successfully. Some
of this feeling grows out of a decent, friendly attitude, but most
of it is due to the fact that they are afraid a failure would have
a bad effect on themselves.
I must thank you again for your letter. It makes me
happy to feel that you think I am getting on with my job here.
As I shall see you soon, I shall reserve some of the things I
might write about until that time.
My wife joins me in cordial greetings to you and Mrs.
Roosevelt.
Very sincerely,
The President,
The White House,
Washington.
PSF great Antographs ? sain
BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.
December 11th, 1933.
Dear Mr. McIntyre:
I shall be grateful if you would
place in the hands of the President the
enclosed letter to him from the King which
has been sent to me in the pouch by the Private
Secretary at Buckingham Palace.
Yours sincerely,
R.C. humay
Marvin McIntyre,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
PSF F Gr. Britain - 1934
March 28, 1934.
Dear Miss Lehand:
When Isaw the President just before
Christmas he told me of a letter he had received from
the King which he said he wanted to show to me, but it
was not then immediately available. If he does not
object, I should be very glad indeed to have a copy
of it, or at least of the part which he said he
wanted to show to me.
With kindest regards,
Sincerely yours,
Rohnth Bugham
Miss Marguerite Lehand,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
April 26, 1934.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.
I attach for your information
a memorandum of an interesting
conversation which Mr. Phillips
had with the British Ambassador
this afternoon.
C.H.
File Lendsay
PSF
Bitter
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIA
April 26, 1934.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR
APRIL 26, 1934.
The British Ambassador called this afternoon and,
with reference to the attitude of his government to the
Far Eastern situation, said that they were opposed to
any concerted action. They believed that each power
should state its own views.
Sir Ronald then went on to say that he was prepared
to read to me the instructions which had been sent to
the British Ambassador in Tokyo and which he understood
were delivered yesterday, as follows:
"The Japanese statement is of such a nature
that we cannot leave it without comment."
The Ambassador was told "to point out that the
Nine Power Treaty guarantees equal rights to its
signatories and Japan is a signatory. His
Majesty's Government of course must continue to
enjoy all the rights in China which are common
to all the signatories or which are otherwise
proper, except in so far as they are restricted
by special agreements or in 80 far as Japan has
special rights recognized by other powers and
not shared by them.
"It
-2-
"It 18 the aim of His Majesty's Government
to avoid all the dangers to the peace and
integrity to China on which the statement
purports to be based. We could not admit
Japan's right to decide alone whether anything
such as technical or financial assistance
promotes such a danger. Under the Nine Power
Treaty Japan has the right to call attention
to any action which may appear to her inimical
to her interests and this provides Japan with
safeguards. We assume that the statement is
not meant to abridge the common rights of
other powers or to infringe Japan's treaty
obligations."
I thanked Sir Ronald for this communication and
asked whether it was the intention of his government
to give publicity to it. He said that in all probability
the substance of these instructions would be given to
Parliament; that since nothing had been given today
presumably there would be no publicity until Monday when
Parliament again meets. He was very anxious that we
should keep him advised of any step which we might make;
he was leaving for New York tomorrow not to return until
Tuesday;
-3-
Tuesday; but in his absence Mr. Osborne would be glad to
communicate any message to him.
William Phillips.
PSF: 9.13
May 1, 1934.
My dear Mr. President:
In my last letter to you I told you I would
write you about the conference I expected to have with
Sir Robert Vansittart on Sunday, April 29th, but that
engagement has been postponed until Sunday, May 6th,
as the Vansittarts were invited for that week-end to
Windsor Castle.
My wife and I went there on Thursday, the
26th. After dinner I had about an hour alone with the King.
He spoke of the coming Naval Conference and of the situation
produced by the recent statement by the Japanese. He said
that his government had had a satisfactory treaty arrangement
with the Japanese, which had been abrogated because the
British believed that we wished them to do 80; that he thought
our interests were similar, if not identical, in the Pacific,
and that he hoped that we would be able to cooperate in main-
taining trade and maintaining peace. I assured him that we
shared this hope.
He then said that he had received a charming
letter from you, containing a. number of envelopes addressed
to you by his subjects in the various parts of the Empire,
which were very amusing indeed; that he was grateful for this
letter and especially for the fact that you had said you
thought it would be possible to work out a settlement of the
debt question; that this was the only real difficulty and
trouble between our countries now. Without attempting to
discuss the details of the creation of the debt, and without
attempting to discuss the obligation on the part of the British,
the King said that he felt that the British people were entirely
unable to pay this great sum of money in money, and that they
were prevented from payments in goods and services; that if
some settlement of this question could be made which the British
could take care of, it would remove the only serious difficulty
existing between us and make practicable a measure of cooperation
which otherwise would be difficult to bring about. He assured
me he did not mean to bring it up in any official way, but
only referred to it because of his gratification at your reference
to it in your letter to him. I told him I was not authorized
in any way to discuss this subject officially, and personally
I considered it a question requiring the exercise of supreme
statesmanship, which would understand the great difficulties
and complexities inherent in the situation on both sides, and
that certainly the British must realize the difficulties
with which we were confronted. He assured me that he
realized this situation himself and agreed with what I had
said.
He asked me a number of questions about the
progress we had made in restoring confidence and prosperity
to the country, and expressed himself as being delighted
at the report I gave him. He asked, with great interest,
about your health, and asked me to present his cordial
regards to you.
With kindest regards,
Sincerely yours,
To the President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
PSF Britain
London, May 8, 1934.
Dear Mr. President:
I am enclosing a copy of a telegram I sent to
the Department of State on May 2nd for Norman Davis in
reply to a message from him. I have marked the section
which I particularly want you to note.
I spent some time in the country on Sunday with
Sir Robert Vansittart, the most able Under-Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs. Insofar as he went I am cer-
tain he was sincere in what he said, but one always has
to form an opinion in such situations as much by what
is not said as by what is actually said. This interview
convinces me that I had sensed correctly the change in
the British attitude since the latest Japanese outbreak,
as expressed in the enclosed telegram. Up to the time
when the Japanese Foreign Office spokesman made his first
statement I am satisfied that the British intended to go
along with us in preparation for the coming Naval Confer-
ence as far as they could without giving offence to the
The President,
The White House,
Washington.
-2-
Japanese. Now I am convinced that unless conditions
should change meanwhile, they expect to cooperate with
us ultimately, but they are not willing to adopt any
Anglo-American policy that might be interpreted as 00-
ercion in Japan and solidify the control of the mil1-
taristic element.
Sir Robert said he thought the danger now was
in Europe, and from Germany; that the Germans were not
only arming generally, but in particular were building
a large number of heavy bombing planes; that the French
know this, and it was this knowledge which caused them
to decline to go further with the British and ourselves
on disarmament and produced their last Note to the
British practically ending disarmament proceedings. I
gathered from what he said that for the present the
British considered that the Russian and Chinese (and
obviously the United States) attitude in the Far Eastern
situation would deter Japan from taking any immediate
action. However, he realized that the Japanese had never
abandoned for a moment their twenty-one demands they served
on the Chinese in 1915, and he had no doubt they would not
only put these demands in force but add others in the event
of the outbreak of war in Europe.
Meanwhile he saw no immediate danger in the Far
Eastern situation and believed any disturbance there was
-3-
unlikely until and unless Germany precipitated war in
Europe.
The only deduction, in my opinion, to be drawn
from his statement was that the British Government has
made up its mind to run no risk, so far as the Far East-
ern question is concerned, at this time, and to concen-
trate all of its efforts upon trying to keep peace in
Europe. He said he was going to Geneva, but that he
thought that nothing could be accomplished there. That
the Germans were training their children from the age
of two years up, for war; were teaching them from babies
that they were mentally and physically superior to other
peoples, and that their mission was to conquer and con-
trol the world, giving the world the benefit of control
by the noble and superior Germans.
In conclusion he added that British public opin-
ion had advanced or developed to the point that it would
approve stronger forms of sanction with regard to France
in view of the German menace.
In my opinion we should leave the preliminary
discussions of the coming Naval Conference where they
now lie and make no further effort at this time to press
the British to go ahead with them until they voluntarily
re-open the subject with us after the Cabinet Council
which has this particular situation in review has com-
LLON PIS statement 182 CUE
Lue ODJ's gegnott
AUFTI ang avjsse e
Entobe
-4-
pleted its labors. I am advised that it is impossible
to determine how early such a decision may be reached.
With kindest regards,
Very sincerely yours,
PARAPHRASE
SECSTATE
WASHINGTON
219, May 2, 3 p.m.
For Mr. Norman Davis.
I have seen Craigie at the Foreign Office with
reference to your telegram No. 168, April 28, 6 p.m.
He states that the Admiralty are studying their re-
quirements and a British Cabinet Council have under
consideration the whole question of preliminary con-
versations. Craigie will advise me further when the
Cabinet Council have concluded their discussions.
I venture to point out for your guidance that
possibly since your departure an important section of
British official opinion has formed very definite views
with respect to the Japanese situation. My understand-
ing of these is that as events in the Far East are over-
shadowed here by the threats inherent in the European
situation, until the menace of the Japanese policy is
more actually pressing the British would be against any
appearance now of such Anglo-American cooperation and co-
ercion vis-à-Japan as allegedly would strengthen the
hands of the militarists in Japan and weaken the civilian
element which is reportedly recovering political strength.
It is my belief that British policy regarding the recent
Japanese statement can be best understood with this back-
ground and I feel certain that in contemplating the forth-
-2-
coming naval conversations there is an element here
that would prefer to abandon the idea of a subsequent
conference than to attempt to force Japan into a ratio
agreement by Anglo-American coercion which would arouse
national resentment in Japan. Furthermore, there is a
naval group here that deplore any more naval discussions
on the lines of the London Naval Agreement.
It is Craigie's belief that Japanese naval officers
have been inspired to increase their demands by the de-
mands for parity by Germany and Italy, but that once Japan
realizes the additional expenditure required, if success-
ful in her latest naval pretensions, rather than assume
the burden of competitive cruiser building she would pre-
ferably accept some solution that did not destroy her
amour propre.
BINGHAM.
PSF: quat Brilain
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY
May 11, 1934.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR.
The British Ambassador said that he understood
a number of his colleagues had made inquiry of the
Department with respect to the applicability of the
Johnson Act and that, inasmuch 8.8 some of them un-
doubtedly expected Great Britain to take the lead, he
felt it was up to him to make similar inquiries.
I admitted that one or two of his colleagues had
already ventured to remark that their Governments would
undoubtedly follow whatever action Great Britain decided
to take. I then gave the Ambassador the same informa-
tion which I had given the other diplomatic representa-
tives to the effect that all countries which had made
payments on account were regarded as not in default,
but that on and after June 15th next the terms of the.
Johnson Act would apply and that it would no longer be
possible thereafter for the President to announce that
those Governments which had made "token" payments on
June 15th were not in default; I said, however, that
the President desired that it should be clearly under-
stood that all debtor countries were able to approach this
Government with any proposal which they desired to make
and that all such proposals would be carefully considered.
The
-2-
The Ambassador said he understood the situation
which, in brief, was to the effect that Great Britain
would be regarded in default on June 15th next unless
she paid her full installment.
The Ambassador said that there wa.s another side
to the matter which was probably not worth touching
upon, but, nevertheless, he would ask what would happen
in the event of a full payment of the June 15th install-
ment as everyone knew Great Britain was in arrears in
its past payments; would the full satisfaction of the
June 15th payment clear the British Government from the
stigma of default or not? I replied that that was a
point on which I could not give him a definite answer,
but it seemed to me possible that, inasmuch as the
British Government was not now in default, it could
scarcely be regarded in default if it should make full
payment of its June 15th installment. I said that, if
possible, I would be glad to give him a more definite
answer on this point. Sir Ronald replied that the point
he had raised was really an unimportant one and gave me
the impression that any payments on account were now
exceedingly doubtful; he added, "I suppose you realize
the feelings which will be created by the application
of the Johnson Act and the repercussions which will
occur. If I replied that it was better not to talk about
repercussions, that there were certainly enough of them
running
-3-
running around the world at the present time and that
further repercussions would not get us anywhere. The
only reply that the Ambassador made was to the effect
that none the less repercussions might be expected.
(Signed) William Phillips.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
May 17, 1934.
My dear Mr. President:
Inasmuch as you are going to receive the British
Ambassador this afternoon, it occurs to me that you
might be interested to glance through a memorandum of
conversation which I had with him on May 11th. Sir
Ronald's question as to whether full satisfaction
of the June 15th payment would clear the British
Government from the stigma of default (in view of the
fact that Great Britain is in arrears on past payments)
has been put up to the Attorney General and we are
still awaiting his reply.
Faithfully yours,
Enclosure:
Whan Rullipt
Memorandum of conversation.
The President,
The White House.
PSF
TELEGRAM
plese. Britain .1934
The White House
Mashington
NA4P0. RA. 34- 9:40 a.m.
Buckingham Palace, London, June 3
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
I warmly thank you for the kind congratulations and good
wishes expressed in your message on my birthday which I heartily
appreciate.
GEORGE, R. I.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
June 27, 1934.
My dear Mr. President:
The British reply to our debt note was
delivered to me today at noon and has already
been handed to the press for publication in
tomorrow morning's papers. Thinking that
you may care to see it, I enclose a copy here-
with.
Faithfully yours,
The President
The White House.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOR THE PRESS
JUNE 27, 1934.
CONFIDENTIAL
FUTURE RELEASE
NOTE DATE
CONFIDENTIAL - TO BE RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN MORNING
PAPERS OF ALL COUNTRIES ON THURSDAY, JUNE 28,
1934. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED
FROM OR USED IN ANY WAY.
TEXT OF NOTE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM THE
BRITISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, MR. F. D. G. OSBORNE.
BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D, O.,
June 27th, 1934,
Sir,
After careful consideration of the note which you
addressed to Sir Ronald Lindsay on June 12th, His Majesty's
Government in the United Kingdom feel that there are two
questions to which it may be useful to make further
reference.
In the first place, His Majesty's Government would
observe that in their note of June 4th they did not state
that payment of the British War Debt was legally contingent
upon payment of the debts due to them. What they said was
that it would be impossible for them to contemplate a situ-
ation in which they would be called on to honour in full
their war obligations to others, while continuing to suspend
all demands for payment of the war obligations due to them,
This was a statement not of law but of fact.
Secondly, as regards the suggested payments in kind,
His Majesty's Government would recall that the experience
of German Reparations showed that transfer difficulties
are not solved by a system of deliveries in kind. As the
Committee presided over by General Dawes pointed out in
1924: "In their financial effects deliveries in kind are
not really distinguishable from cash payments". In fact
the economic objections to cash payments would apply with
equal force to deliveries in kind, unless those deliveries
were
The Honorable
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State of the United States,
Washington, D. C.
-2-
were to consist of indigenous products of the debtor country
(excluding re-exports), and unless they were to be accepted
by the creditor country and consumed by it in addition to
the goods taken from the debtor country in the normal course
of trade. If the United Kingdom were not to receive payment
for goods exported on commercial account, her exchange re-
sources available to purchase cotton and other goods from
America would be still further diminished. Therefore, while
not unwilling to give further consideration to possibilities
in this direction, His Majesty's Government do not at
present see any method of putting such a plan into practice
which would be likely to commend itself to the Government
of the United States of America.
In the view of His Majesty's Government, the primary
question for settlement is the amount that should be paid,
having regard to all the circumstances of these debts.
They regret that up to the present it has not been possible
to make further progress in this matter, but they will
welcome the opportunity of rosuming the discussion whenever
it may appear that the present abnormal conditions have so
far passed away as to offer favourable prospects for a
settlement, since they are always anxious to remove from
the sphere of controversy all or any matters which might
disturb the harmonious rolations between the two countries.
I have the honour to be,
With the highest consideration,
Sir,
Your most obedient,
humble servant,
(Signed) D. G. OSBORNE.
***
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
December 10, 1934.
Dear Mr. President:
I am enclosing herewith a copy
of a note which was left today by the
British Ambassador in reply to a state-
ment which we recently gave to the Govern-
ment indicating the amounts owing to this
country on December 15th.
By arrangement with the Ambassador,
this note will be given to the press tomorrow
at eleven o'clock, which will in effect give
simultaneous release for publication both
here and in England.
Faithfully yours,
1 enclosure.
The President
The White House.
BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON D. C.
No.394.
December 10, 1934.
Sir:
In accordance with instructions from His
Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to acknowledge
the receipt of your note of November 22nd enclosing
a statement of the amounts due from His Majesty's
Government in the United Kingdom under the provisions
of the Debt Agreement of June 19th, 1923 and of the
Moratorium Agreement of June 4th, 1932.
His Majesty's Government welcome the assurance
that the United States Government are fully disposed
to discuss any proposals that may be put forward in
regard to the payment of this indebtedness and that
such proposals would receive careful consideration
with a view to their eventual submission to Congress.
In June last His Majesty's Government explained
the circumstances which had forced them to decide to
suspend
The Honourable
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State of the United States,
Washington, D.C.
2
suspend payments under the Funding and Moratorium
Agreements pending the final revision of the War
Debt settlement. In that note it was stated that
recent events had shown that discussions with a view
to a final revision of the settlement could not at
that time usefully be renewed.
His Majesty's Government have again most care-
fully reviewed the position, but they regret that they
have reached the conclusion that the considerations
which governed their decision six months ago apply
with equal force today. Accordingly they feel that
it would be useless and, therefore, unwise to initiate
negotiations at present; but they will continue to
watch for any effective opportunity of taking teps
in that direction.
I have the honour to be,
With the highest consideration,
Sir,
Your most obedient,
humble servant,
(SGD) R. C. LINDSAY.
file
PSF hear Bretam -1936
A
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
January 17, 1936
My dear Mr. President:
There is transmitted herewith a copy of
a letter, dated December 15, 1935, from the
American Minister at Bern, which I believe will
be of interest to you.
Sincerely yours,
Enclosure:
Copy of letter
from American
Minister at Bern,
dated December 15.
The President,
The White House.
X 20
X652
X 547-A
Department of State
WE
BUREAU
DIVISION
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted January 15/36
ADDRESSED TO
The President
The White House.
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1-1033
United States of America.
COPY
Bern, December 15, 1935.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
It is difficult to judge the extraordinary events
of the last few days in the atmosphere of Geneva. I
have therefore awaited my return to Bern to endeavor to
write you with a degree of perspective. Sentiment at
Geneva, particularly in the League Secretariat, is clear
cut; it has swung from adulation of Great Britain to
complete condemnation. The Secretariat sees no mitigating
circumstances and attributes what has happened to a sinister
manoeuvre of the British Government, which won its election
on lip service to the League and once the election over,
came out in its true colors of imperialistic conservatism
and sympathy for fascism. This picture seemed far too
simple. I was convinced that no government, and certainly
not the British Government, would deliberately and cynically
alienate a large section of its own public as well as
that
The Honorable
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington.
- 2 -
that of a strong portion of the Continent, without what
it considered, rightly or wrongly, as sufficient and valid
reason. I assigned myself the task of trying to ascertain
that reason.
In my two telegrams 356 of December and 359 of
December 13, I reported as adequately as I could through
that medium, two of the most illuminating conversations
which I had. With these and others in mind I shall try
to set down what seems to me the explanation of so con-
fusing an incident.
Some of the British Cabinet were certainly impressed
with the continued reports from Italy that Mussolini and
the Italian people were in a state of mind to assault
Great Britain if the petroleum embargo went through. Even
those who did not believe that he would resort to this
folly could not guarantee to their people that it would
not occur. This caused the Cabinet to pull up and take
stock of their position and they found it grim. They
found that in spite of French Government assurances, the
French people could not be counted on; they found that
they had neglected or failed to get from Spain, Greece,
Turkey, specific assurances as to their respective atti-
tudes in the event of hostilities; they found their fleet
in a position peculiarly vulnerable to Italian air attack;
they found growing in Italy an intensity of hatred for
Great
- 3 -
Great Britain that excluded other members of the League
from the hatred and even pushed the Ethiopian campaign
into the background; they found that the Italian nation,
instead of breaking down under pressure, was becoming
daily more solid and determined to the extent of prefer-
ring suicide to humiliation. Something, the British Gov-
ernment decided, had to be done, and it must be something
that gave a chance for a peaceful solution of the conflict,
and 1f that were impossible, would relieve Great Britain
from its unpleasant and dangerous prominence and make the
other members of the League share in the dangers which
had arisen. What, Sir Samuel Hoare may have argued, could
be so well designed to fit these circumstances as to make,
together with Laval, a conciliatory gesture to Mussolini?
If the League States would not accept the suggestion and
insisted on further embargoes, then Great Britain could
also insist that it should not bear the risks alone.
The French public would be more ready to accept respon-
sibility if Mussolini refused their conciliatory offer
and the League States, if they extended their embargo,
could only do so by spreading the risk, instead of the
risk being concentrated, as st present, upon Great
Britain alone.
I believe that the foregoing is a justifiable
assumption of the type of thought which brought about the
action
- 4 -
action of Sir Samuel Hoare, especially when it is con-
sidered in the light of the very pregnant statement made by
Mr. Baldwin in the House of Commons to the effect that he
regretted that his lips were sealed because if he were
able to speak he was sure that no member would go into
opposition against the Government. There may, of course,
have been other influences at work. For instance, rumor
has it that the City is bringing vigorous pressure to
bear on the Government both because of its dislike of the
interference of trade brought about by sanctions, but
more especially because of the fear that a breakdown of
the Italian financial and monetary regime might have
widespread reverberations similar to the crash of the
Creditanstalt in Vienna in 1931. I feel, however, that
the primary impulse of Hoare's decision lay in a sudden
realization of the exposed and dangerous isolation of
Great Britain if something were not done to bring the
States of the League into a sharing of the risk.
But if one can understand the motives which impelled
Hoare to accept Laval's plan, it is difficult nevertheless
to understand why Sir Samuel did not foresee the storm
of opposition which he would arouse and why he felt it
necessary to accomplish his purpose by 8 method so awkward
and so dangerous to the prestige of his Government both
internally and externally. It may be that Hoare's
temperament
- 5 -
temperament, a mighty intellect without emotionalism,
lacked the imagination which is necessary to foresee
waves of popular opinion.
You will remember, Mr. Secretary, that I reported
very confidentially certain indications of Eden's personal
attitude. An entirely unconfirmed report of what took
place in London after Hoare's negotiation with Laval may
have elements of truth. It is reported that when Eden
learned at the Cabinet meeting of the agreement between
Laval and Hoare, he protested emphatically, and was sup-
ported in his protest by the two MacDonalds, Lord Halifax
and Neville Chamberlain, and even threatened to leave
the Cabinet; that Mr. Baldwin then induced His Majesty
to summon Eden and to point out to him that the abandon-
ment of the Cabinet by a British Minister in a period
of international crisis would be sternly condemned by
the British public; that following this conversation Eden
made an admirable defense in the House of Commons and has
subsequently made the best of the circumstances. As I
say, I cannot vouch for a word of this. I can, however,
state that Eden is greatly perturbed at the situation
and that in my opinion he by himself would never have
accepted the plan in which Sir Samuel acquiesced.
I want to digress for a moment to discuss a phase
of this matter of peculiar interest to the student of
European international policy. Since the existence of
the
- 6 -
the Third Republic in France, French governments, while
facing continual internal disturbances, have nevertheless
felt free to plan and to carry through their foreign
Policy without taking great thought as to whether the
French public would follow. While French policy during
this period has fluctuated, it has never deviated in its
broad general lines and the French people have never failed
to give ultimate approval to the Government's acts within
the domain of foreign affairs. Now, for fifteen years,
the Government, relying on this same acquieseence on the
part of its people, has struggled for and largely built
up the system of collective security for France. The
system involved of course obligations as well as recom-
penses for France. The first test of this system involves
obligations only and serious ones affecting their rela-
tions with one of their great neighbors. The recompenses,
if any, lie in a dubious future. It looks as if the
French public in this instance is definitely refusing to
accept these obligations. It may be that the public can
be taught and persuaded. It may be, on the other hand,
that a change is taking place in French democracy which
will place upon the French Government the same limitations
in foreign fields as are imposed by public opinion on the
Governments of Great Britain and the United States. The
principal reason why both Anglo-Saxon countries have
steadily refused to accept automatic obligations is because
they
- 7 -
they know that their action must be determined at a moment
of crisis by what the public demands at the time and not
by what may have been planned in advance. If it be that
the French public will demand. for itself the same final
veto in a moment of crisis, then the whole political
structure of Europe will have to be revamped and the
binding arrangements between France and her allies will
no longer be the dominating feature of the Continent.
To revert to the present dispute, I would not be
bold enough to endeavor to predict what will happen.
I do not know whether the impressive momentum of collective
security, gathering impetus through September, October,
November, has been definitely checked by what has just
happened or whether, through the revolt, in British public
opinion and among the League States, the march will be
resumed with an even greater determination.
Respectfully yours,
(Signed) Hugh R. Wilson.
- I. Bitam 1/20/36
m. President -
The ap confirms
king George
report that
died at 1155pm.
London time.
fer mal
AMERICA is. (2y936 Biotain
PSF quot
DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
file
(s
Claridge's Hotel,
London,
February 3, 1936.
Personal and C
My dear Mr. President:
In conversation with King Edward on the
night of January 28 when he received at Buckingham
Palace the heads of the visiting delegations to
the funeral of King George, he asked me particular-
ly to tell you that he had been deeply touched by
the manifestation of sympathy in the United States
over his father's death and also to tell you that
you could not have appointed as your personal repre-
sentative at the funeral anyone that would have
been more acceptable.
In referring to a talk which he and I had
at the Guildhall Reception only a few days before
his father's death, he said "how little did we know
when we last met how soon this great tragedy and
sorrow would come". He said he had been particular-
ly impressed at the feeling shown to his father in
the United States because his father had never even
The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House.
-2-
visited America.
He then abruptly asked me when can the United
States and Great Britain get definitely together.
I replied that while we were getting closer to-
gether, it was not possible to get together by one
particular act or agreement; that it was more a
matter of the spirit which had to be nurtured; but
that two things had happened recently which had done
more to bring us together than any agreements could
do, namely, the way we had stood together in the
Naval Conference and the spontaneous sympathy and
sorrow manifested by the American people over the
death of his father. He said that was encouraging
but that the only hope for us and for the world was
to stand together. He then remarked that Great
Britain is facing some very difficult problems and
situations. He intimated something about his own
responsibility. I told him that while I sympathized
with him in his deep sorrow and the great responsibility
that had fallen upon him, I felt assured that he would
discharge it with great credit to himself and with
great benefit to his Empire and to the world as a
whole. He said it was encouraging to him to have me
say that, that his responsibility was indeed a heavy
one but fortunately he had three brothers with
whom
-3-
whom he was very close and who would counsel with
him and support him in every possible way. He then
said he wanted me to know his brother, the Duke of
York, who was standing near and whom he brought into
the conversation and to whom he remarked that I was
a very good friend and he wanted his brother and me
to know each other. After a few moments of general
conversation, I said goodnight and left.
As ever,
Faithfully yours,
Department of State
BUREAU
DIVISION
}
NE
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted
ADDRESSED TO
The President,
The White House.
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1-1033
P.F
Braver Butan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
July 27, 1936
My dear Mr. President:
In Judge Moore's absence I have received your
memorandum of July 21, 1936, addressed to him and en-
closing correspondence regarding the concern of Jewish
leaders with respect to the reported proposal of the
British Government to suspend Jewish immigration into
Palestine.
As you know, for several months the Arabs have
been on a general strike in Palestine and have engaged
in widespread attacks, not only against individual Jews
and Jewish property but against the constituted British
authorities. The Arab leaders have insisted upon the
suspension of Jewish immigration and a prohibition against
further sale of land to Jews. The British Government some
time ago announced that it proposed to send to Palestine
a Royal Commission of Inquiry to make a thorough investiga-
tion of the situation and report the facts. Upon the basis
of these facts future British policy in Palestine, within
the terms of the Mandate, would presumably be based. The
British
The President,
The White House.
- 2 -
British have made it clear, however, that they will not send
the Commission to Palestine until the Arabs cease their
attacks and bring an end to the general strike. The Arabs,
on the other hand, have refused to take these steps until
Jewish immigration is suspended. It is presumably with a
view to ending this deadlock that the British Government
is now considering suspending, temporarily, Jewish immigra-
tion into Palestine. It is assumed that once such immigra-
tion is suspended the Arabs would cease their attacks and
the Royal Commission of Inquiry could then proceed with its
undertaking.
As you know, our Consul General at Jerusalem has been
most active during recent months in demanding protection for
the approximately 10,000 American nationals in Palestine. On
one occasion his representations were strengthened by our
Embassy at London. Under the circumstances it would seem
to be unwise for us to insist that the British follow a
particular course of action in their present difficulties.
They might very well respond that if we insisted upon their
following a particular course they could not assume responsi-
bility for the protection of our nationals in Palestine. ob-
viously their position there is extremely difficult since
they must endeavor to hold a balance between two factions of
the population. Any interference from the outside would only
make their task more difficult and would aid in no way in the
solution
solution of their problem.
It seems to me that the situation might be met by ask-
ing Mr. Bingham, entirely personally and unofficially, to
mention to Mr. Eden the concern of Jewish circles in the
United States at the reported proposal to suspend Jewish
immigration into Palestine. I believe that Mr. Bingham,
in such a conversation, should stress the fact that he is
not presuming in any way to interfere with British policy
in Palestine or to offer advice thereon, since it is recog-
nized that the administration of that country is wholly a
British responsibility. He might add that he is bringing
to the attention of Mr. Eden the fact that Jewish circles
here are deeply concerned in this matter merely for such
consideration as it may merit. I am sending Mr. Bingham
instructions in this sense and asking him to be particular-
ly careful to point out that he is speaking entirely in a
personal capacity and not on behalf of this Government.
I am returning herewith the letter and enclosures sent
to you by Mr. Rosenman.
Faithfully yours,
Enclosure:
From Mr. Samuel Rosemman,
July 16, 1936, with en-
closures.
SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN
60 CENTRE STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y.
July 16th, 1936.
The President,
White House,
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. President,
MR. Simon Rifkind, who, you know, is
Senator Wagner's partner and was formerly his secretary
in Washington, phoned me yesterday and read me the inclosed
cable which he received from London. In view of the fact
that the Senator was on the high seas on his way to Europe,
he was at a loss as to how to proceed, and, so, he called me.
I do not know whether Frankfurter has
communicated with you concerning this matter or not; and
I do not know whether you would wish the State Department
to do anything at all in the matter. Naturally a great
deal seems to be involved, if the cable is correct, so
that I am much interested.
I am sending it to you, knowing that you
will want to do what you think is proper and possible in
the premises.
We are having a grand rest. Missy is
developing into quite a bass fisherman. She had one on
her line yesterday, and I have never seen her as excited
since the night that Walsh beat Shouse as permanent chair-
man of the 1932 convention.
We all hope that you get more tuna than
she does bass. With love from Dorothy and Missy,
Yours most cordially
Typing by. S.Y.R.
fam
From Desk of
S. H. RIFKIND
I have just heard from Morris
Rothenberg of the Z. O. A. to
the effect that he had received
a cablegram from Wise suggest-
ing that he (Rothenberg) com-
municate with me with respect
to the Palestine immigration
situation. That should con-
firm the official character of
the cablegram, copy of which
is herewith being transmitted
to you.
I believe that it is of the ut-
most importance that the matter
be made known to the President
as I know that his response to
these matters is much more
warm-hearted than that of some
of his official family.
Cordially,
G01 LX212 LONDON 148 1/53 11
NLT RIFKIND 410 CENTRAL PARK WEST NY
SERIOUS SITUATION HERE CONCERNING PALESTINE STOP BRITISH
CABINET NEAR DECISION TO SUSPEND JEWISH IMMIGRATION PALES-
TINE THO SUSPENSION MEANS YIELDING TO ARAB VIOLENCE STOP
SUSPENSION WOULD LAST DURING INVESTIGATION AND REPORT
ROYAL ENQUIRY COMMISSION BUT SUSPENSION MEANS STOPPING
ONLY AVENUE ESCAPE GERMAN POLISH JEWS FURTHERMORE
SUSPENSION MIGHT PROVE DIFFICULT TO LIFT AND MIGHT
PROVOKE JEWISH REPRISALS PALESTINE WITH DISASTROUS
CONSEQUENCES AFTER CONTINUED AMIRABLE JEWISH RESTRAINT
STOP CONFERRING WITH STEPHEN WISE IN LONDON WHO WITH
FRANKFURTER HERE HELPING WEIZMANN STOP EXPECT YOU WAGNER
POSSIBLY BULKLEY OTHER LEADERS URGE ADMINISTRATION MAKE
INFORMAL REPRESENTATIONS LONDON AGAINST PROPOSED SUSPENSION
STOP SUCH REPRESENTATIONS WOULD STRENGTHEN BRITISH GOVERN-
MENT IMPRESSION THAT ANGLO AMERICAN RELATIONS MIGHT BE
INJURED STOP PERSUADED WHITE HOUSE WOULD SYMPATHETICALLY
RESPOND TO YOUR APPEAL STOP WE INCLUDING WISE LEAVING
EVERYTHING AMERICA TO YOU STOP AMERICAN JEWRY INCLUDING
WISE WOULD GRATEFULLY REMEMBER YOUR WAGNERS INTERVENTION
WILL ROSENBLATT
How Samuel Resuman
Blue mountain hake
my.
Parta P.
P.S.F
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
August 1, 1936
Highly Confidential
My dear Mr. President:
In continuation of my letter of July 27, 1936, re-
garding the reported proposal of the British Government
to suspend Jewish immigration into Palestine, I think
you would wish to know that Ambassador Bingham mentioned
the subject to Mr. Eden on July 28. The Ambassador was,
as you will recall, instructed to inform Mr. Eden, en-
tirely personally and unofficially, of the deep concern
in influential Jewish circles in the United States over
the possible consequences of suspending Jewish immigration
into Palestine.
Ambassador Bingham has reported that Mr. Eden thanked
him for the information but gave no indication as to what
the policy of his Government would be.
I have today asked Mr. Bingham whether we are correct
in assuming that the recent announcement of the membership
and of the terms of reference of the Royal Commission of
Inquiry to ascertain the underlying causes of the dis-
turbances that have broken out in Palestine indicates that
the
The President,
The White House.
Cp
IH
- 2 -
the British Government has abandoned, at least for the
time being, any plan it may have had to suspend Jewish
immigration into Palestine temporarily. I shall of course
inform you as soon as Mr. Bingham's reply is received.
Faithfully yours,
ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Infidual file
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
yest PsF. Phane Brites
WASHINGTON
August 6, 1936.
Highly Confidential
My dear Mr. President:
As you will recall from the Secretary's letter of
August 1, 1936, Ambassador Bingham was asked whether we were
correct in assuming that the recent announcement of the
membership and of the terms of reference of the Royal
Commission of Inquiry to ascertain the underlying causes of
the disturbances that have broken out in Palestine indicates
that the British Government has abandoned, at least for the
time being, any plan it may have had to suspend Jewish im-
migration into Palestine temporarily. Mr. Bingham has now
replied to this query. A copy of his telegram is enclosed.
Faithfully yours,
Enclosure:
From London, No. 388,
dated August 5, 1936.
The President,
The White House.
MED
A portion of this
LONDON
telegram must be
closely paraphrased
Dated August 5, 1936
before being communi-
cated to anyone (a)
Received 2:55 p.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington
388, August 5, 6 p.m.
PERSONAL FOR THE SECRETARY. (Grey)
Your 293, August 1, noon.
In the House of Commons on July 22nd in reply to
a direct question whether the Secretary of State for the
Colonies would assure the House that no change in the
declared policy of the Government with respect to
immigration of Jews into Palestine would take place
until after the Royal Commission had reported, Mr.
Ormsby-Gore said begin underscore inter alia end
underscore:
"As regards, however, the suggestion that
there should be a temporary suspension of immigration
while the commission is carrying out its inquiry, I
am not at present in a position to make any statement
as to the intentions of His Majesty's Government
beyond saying that their decision will be taken in due
course on the merits of the case and that there is no
question of it being influenced by violence or attempts
at intimidating".
MED - 2 - #388, August 5, 6 p.m. from London
at intimidating".
On July 30th the Secretary of State for the
Colonies was akked in the House of Commons whether
he could give an assurance that there would be no
restriction of Jewish immigration into Palestine
pending the investigation and report of the Royal
Commission. Mr. Ormsby-Gore in reply invited the
attention of the questioner to the reply given on
July 22nd and said that in that reply he had made
it clear that he could not give a definite reply
and that "the matter has not been and will not be
decided". (END GRAY).
CONFIDENTIAL With reference to these state-
ments in the House of Commons the matter was taken up
informally this afternoon at the Foreign Office which
confirmed the statement of the Colonial Secretary
that no decision has been made.
BINGHAM
KLP
September 24, 1936.
Memo sent to McIntyre
From Henry Morgenthau
Ultra-Conf. memo from
Chancellor of the Exchequer in England
In re-France going off the Gold Standard and her
oral explanations and outline of proposals.
See--Treasury Folder-Drawer 1--1936
PSF:
fullowse
st.
Britain
London, December 11, 1936.
Personal and Confidential
Dear Mr. President:
I arrived here in the midst of the domestic crisis
and was present yesterday in Parliament when the King's
message of abdication was read. I have never been
present at a more moving scene than these people,
inarticulate as they are, deeply moved by the dramatic
turn of events which seems to jeopardize the Throne.
There was one story current that behind the drama of the
King's personal life was a significant political conflict.
Che Victorian Cabinet was not only unsympathetic to the
King, but regarded him as a dangerous influence in the
country and entirely "New Dealish" in his ideas. There-
fore they were determined to oust him, and took the
affair with Mrs. Simpson as a pretext.
But it is my belief that this suggestion can be
disregarded. The facts are that the young King is
completely/
President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House.
-2-
completely infatuated by the lady and seems abjectly
hypnotised by her. That is the whole story and there
is nothing more to it. The story is openly circulated
among the upper classes that the King lived with Mrs.
Simpson, and in flagrant bad taste, for the past two
years. Substantial, well-informed Englishmen have
told me that was the gist of the unyielding opposition
to Mrs. Simpson as Queen or morganatic wife.
There is no question but that the people have been
deeply stirred, but life goes on in even tenor and the
sun is shining today for the first time after a gloomy
week. I am certain the mental processes of these
strange people will adjust themselves to the new turn
of events and everything will go on undisturbed. They
insist upon proceeding with the Coronation ceremony and
already are starting to beat the drum for George VI.
Ambassador Bingham tells me he expects to see you
early next month and will discuss important matters he
has spoken about to me.
I had a memorably pleasant hour with your great
Mother the day before I sailed.
I hope you will give
her my kindest remembrances.
I wonds if you found
astor time s to broad listen cash to to hady
John Undity Respectfully yours,
the s.a which I antlined
for he. She says she is an old friend
PSF
FAST
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THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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1936 DEC 14 FM i 05
WASHINGTON
AT
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I THANK YOU MOST WARMLY MR PRESIDENT FOR YOUR KIND MESSAGE OF GOOD WISHES ON
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FORM 112WN-W
December 28, 1936.
AMEMBASSY
LONDON (ENGLAND)
Your 624, December 24, 11 a. m.
You are requested to present the following note
to the British Government:
One. The Government of the United States of
America acknowledges the receipt of the note, dated
December 23, 1936, from His Majesty's Government in
the United Kingdom, stating that His Majesty's Govern-
ment considers that the requirements of national se-
curity necessitate the retention of five cruisers of
sub-category (b) of the "C" class over and above the
total tonnage which may be retained by the British
Commonwealth of Nations on December 31, 1936, under
the provisions of the London Naval Treaty, 1930.
Two. This Government notes that the British
Government undertakes that(a) the five vessels shall
be retained for a maximum of five years' peace service
and
- 2 -
LONDON-
and (b) they will be used not as cruisers but as anti-
aircraft ships, which will involve the substitution of
& lighter armament for the existing 6 inch gun armament.
yu rew of the decision of the Britide will exeruse
Government Article 21 to cievokg Three. This Government ree PAGE the right to in-
crease by e proportionate amount its tonnage in the cruiser
which is notto GE efreeded in the Crinser
category over and above the total tonnage allowed on Decem- category
ber 31, 1936, under the provisions of the London Naval
Treaty, 1930.
For your strictly confidential information, we do Caunet
not necessarily propose to avail ourselves immediately
of Course
of the right increase our cruiser tonnage but in the
event that it is decided to build more cruisers the exist-
ence of our right to increase in this category must be on
record before December 31, 1936, in order that the terms
of the Vinson Bill may be operative.
ACTING
WE:RTP:NNB