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    "ocrText": "PSF Great Britain 1939\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nDIVISION OF PROTOCOL\nMr. Nordwhod\nMr. hannesman\ndirec\nRob\nPSF Partain\nDivisioner\nPROTOCOL\nbe TAN\nfor\nState\nOttawa, Canada.\nAT\nJanuary 13, 1939.\nRCB\nDear Mr. Summerlin:\nShortly after receiving your telephone call this\nmorning, I got into touch with Dr. Skelton by telephone,\nwho suggested that I might talk in regard to the\nmatters you discussed with Mr. Hugh L. Keenleyside of\nthe Department of External Affairs, who has been placed\nin charge of the arrangements for the King's visit to\nCanada.\nMr. Keenleyside called at the Legation this after-\nnoon and I advised him first of your suggestion as to\nthe advisability of utilizing for the United States the\nsame train which will bring the Royal party to the\nborder at Niagara Falls on the afternoon of June 7th.\nHe thoroughly concurred in this idea. I told him of\nthe information given to you by Mr. Bannerman, to the\nGeorge T. Summerlin, Esquire,\nChief, Division of Protocol,\nDepartment of State,\nWashington, D. C. U.S.A.\n- 2 -\neffect that it was your understanding that some\ncars on this train belonged to the Canadian National\nRailways, others to the Canadian Pacific Railways,\nand that there would probably be two private cars. He\nconfirmed the fact that there would probably be cars\nbelonging to both of these two railway systems, and\nhe estimated the number of private cars as three, or\nmore likely four, although he said that there was no\ndecision as yet regarding how many private cars there\nwould be.\nI told Mr. Keenleyside that the United States\nGovernment would pay all necessary expenses which\nmight be involved in the King's trip, from the moment\nthe train entered the United States until the time\nof the King's departure on his return to Canada.\nÁS to the number of persons who will be in the\nparty on the train when it enters the United States,\nMr. Keenleyside was unable to give me even an\napproximation. I asked him whether he thought that\nall those who were making the tour in Canada would\nenter the United States, or whether only a small\ngroup of them would do SO. He said that there would\ncertainly be a number of persons who would not proceed\n- 3 -\nfurther than the Canadian border on the downward trip.\nHe explained in this general connection that no estimates\nof the number involved could be attempted at the present\ntime since (1) they had as yet received no final word\nas to the composition of the English party and (2) there\nwas no final word as to the number of Canadians. He\nsaid that it was quite certain that the Prime Minister\nwould proceed with the party into the United States, and\nthat he would do so in his capacity of Secretary of State\nfor External Affairs rather than as Prime Minister. He\nsaid that the Prime Minister would certainly take with\nhim a personal staff of about three people. He said that\nthe protective staff for the King's party would accompany\nthe King only as far as the border and would be withdrawn\nthere. He also said that certain other \"supernumeraries\",\nsuch as the National Defence officer furnished by the\nCanadian Government, would be withdrawn. He said that\nhe himself would doubtless proceed on the trip all through\nthe United States and that probably Dr. E. W. Coleman,\nUnder Secretary of State, would also do so. He explained\nthat, as far as the Canadian trip was concerned, he would\nestablish a kind of business office on the train for\nhandling countless routine matters and making various\n- 4 -\narrangements for the trip. He said that this office\narrangement on the train would probably be continued\nthroughout the trip in the United States.\nMr. Keenleyside took the opportunity afforded by\nour conversation to ask me to let you know that it\nmust not be felt that all the Canadians who are going\non the trip through the United States will expect to be\nentertained, and he felt that you should know this in\norder to be relieved by any feeling of responsibility on\nthat score.\nHe said that it would be most useful for the Canadian\nGovernment to know as soon as possible the exact itinerary\nin the United States, including the various lines over\nwhich the President will wish to route the party, and\nevery other detail of the trip which can be made available.\nHe also said that it would be of great assistance to him\nto know the names of the American railway men with whom\nthe Canadian Government should correspond in relation to\nvarious details of the trip. He indicated that no\ndefinite plans for the trip could be made until the exact\nrouting and the names of the various lines could be ascer-\ntained, since certain railway cars could not be sent over\ncertain lines and this information would be indispensable\nas a basis for making further plans. I believe that a\n- 5 -\nrequest for information of this type has already\nbeen made by the Prime Minister direct to the President\nin a letter which he recently sent to the President\non these subjects.\nIn closing, I may add that the Prime Minister, in\ntalking with me at the State dinner at Government House\non January 11th, indicated that he would be very grate-\nful if any available information might be sent to him\nalong the lines of the inquiries on this subject con-\ntained in his recent personal letter to the President.\nVery sincerely yours,\nMinimons\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nWASHINGTON\nJanuary 16, 1939\nPR\nMr Summerlin;-\nHave noted contents of Mr Simmons confidential\nletter to yourself.\nIt is very important to have the travel routing\ndefinitely determined as soon as possible on account of\nthe correspondence neccessary to determine whether the\ncars to be used by the Royal Party will pass through\ncertain tunnels and bridges etc.\nI understand the Canadian raibway officials\nhave already decided that a second train to follow or precede\nthe Royal train will be neccessary in order to accommodate\nthe various railroad men, protection units, clerical and\npress staff traveling with the party.\n3063\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nDIVISION OF PROTOCOL\nMarive Niagans Falls, 4.05pm. June 7.\nheave\n\"\n4\n9.30 p.m. of \"\nIn the u.s. June 8, 9. 10 & ll.\nArrive Sherbrooke 11am, June 12.\nFebruary 4, 1939\nPERSONAL\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE SUMMER WELLES:\nI enclose herewith copy of your letter\nto the President of February third together with\nhis memorandum to me, which in self-explanetory.\nM. H. McINTYRE\nSecretary to the President\nRB/mma\nOriginal of Mr. Welles' letter retained.\n2/4/39. Memo for Mac: \"Tell Summer Welles, in regard to this, to\ntalk to George Summerlin about it as he knows all about it.\" F. D. R.\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nWASHINGTON\nFebruary 3, 1939\nMy dear Mr. President:\nThe British Chargé d'Affaires called to see me this\nmorning with a message which he had just received from\nthe private secretary to the King of England.\nMr. Mallet reminded me that in a letter which I had\nwritten to him by your instructions on December 24, I had\ntold him that you were writing a further letter directly\nto the King which would be transmitted through the Amer-\nican Embassy in London in which letter you would make cer-\ntain suggestions as to the precise arrangements for the\nKing's visit. Mr. Mallet said that this letter had not\nbeen received and since the King wanted very much to talk\nover with Sir Ronald Lindsay some of the suggestions made -\nbefore the latter leavesLondon on February 11 to return to\nWashington - he wondered whether it would not be possible,\nif your letter had been delayed and would not reach London\nbefore February 10, for the suggestions contained in your\nThe President,\nThe White House.\n-2-\nletter to be communicated to him by telegram either through\nthe British Embassy here or through the Ameri can Embassy in\nLondon.\nWill you let me know what answer you wish me to make\nto the British Chargé d'Affaires.\nBelieve me\nA Faithfully yours,\nhull\nPublished in\nForeign Relations of the U.S.\nVol.III, 1939, the Far East\nVOL. PAGES 5\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nMemorandum of Conversation\nDATE:\nFebruary 6, 1939\nSUBJECT:\nPARTICIPANTS:\nThe British Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. V. A. L. Mallet;\nthe Under Secretary.\nCOPIES TO:\nOPO 1-1493\nThe British Chargé d'Affaires called to see me\nthis afternoon with a strictly secret message from his\nGovernment. The British Government referred first of\nall to an article which had appeared in the NEWS CHRON-\nICLE in London on January 17 and stated that informa-\ntion which it had now received showed that that article\nwas true in part but only in small part.\nThe British Government had learned on authority\nit believed completely authentic that the Japanese\nGovernment was not prepared to accept the new form of\nalliance proposed by Germany and Italy; that it was\n-2-\nformulating counter-proposals and that these counter-\nproposals would envisage an alliance directed against the\nSoviet. The British Government believed that Japan was\ngreatly concerned at this moment by reason of the possi-\nbility that Great Britain and the United States would\nshut her off from raw materials and other supplies needed\nin her military campaign and that she was further of the\nopinion that if a general war broke out in Europe whether\nor not she was a partner in such an alliance as that pro-\nposed made no difference since in any event she could lay\nher hands upon such possessions of the other powers in the\nFar East as she desired.\nThe British Government went on to say that the German\npolicy unquestionably was to persuade Japan to enter this\nalliance in the new form proposed since, if war broke out,\nGermany desired Great Britain's attention to be focused in\nthe North Sea, in the Mediterranean and in the Far East and\ndesired for that purpose to utilize both Italy and Japan as\n\"junior partners\". Italy, on the other hand, believed that\nthe announcement of the alliance would cause Great Britain\nand the United States to bring pressure to bear upon France\nto grant the concessions sought by Italy in order to avert\nwar and that the mere announcement of the alliance itself\nwould have such an effect on public opinion in France as to\nbreak down any existing French determination to resist the\nItalian demands.\nU:SW: DMK\nPSF: St Britai\nfor file\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nWASHINGTON\nFebruary 7, 1939\nMy dear Mr. President:\nI have received this afternoon from the British\nCharge d'Affaires the texts of two messages which he\nhas received from Lord Halifax \"for the personal and\nsecret information of the President\". I am enclosing\nherewith copies of these two messages for your informa-\ntion.\nAs was the case with recent messages of the same\ncharacter, the texts of these messages have already been\ntelegraphed to the Department of State by our Embassy\nin London, and I understand that copies of these telegrams\nhave already been sent to you.\nBelieve me\nA Faithfully yours, Alls\nEnclosures.\nThe President,\nThe White House.\nPERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE FROM LORD HALIFAX\nHis Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom\nhave now given further consideration to the question\nreferred to in Lord Halifax's message contained in the\nBritish Embassy's aide memoire of January 30th and have\nreached the following conclusions.\na. His Majesty's Government confirm the view\nexpressed in paragraph three of the British Embassy's\naide memoire as to the threat that any German attack\non Holland would constitute to the security of the Western\nPowers and consider that in the event of a German invasion\nof Holland they would be obliged to go to war with Germany.\nb. In addition they consider that any attempt by\nGermany to dominate Holland by force or threat of force\nwould also have to be regarded as a menace to the security\nof the United Kingdom.\nc. A German attack on Switzerland would also be\nclear evidence of an attempt by Germany to dominate Europe\nby force and from this point of view a German attack on\nHolland and an attack on Switzerland are in the same\ncategory. Consequently if the French Government should\nenquire whether if Germany invaded Switzerland and France\n-2-\nthereupon declared war upon Germany we should go to the\nassistance of France our answer should be in the affirmative.\n2. In view of the general position His Majesty's Govern-\nment have decided to continue staff conversations with the\nFrench Government on broader lines than hitherto and to ex-\ntend their scope.\n3. His Majesty's Government are further considering\nmaking a public statement about their attitude in regard to\nthe Netherlands which, without being so specific as to con-\nclusions summarized above, would make plain that our interest\nin both the Netherlands and Belgium is so vital as to pass\nbeyond legal obligations and that His Majesty's Government\nwould therefore be bound to regard as affecting interests\nwhich are vital to the security of the United Kingdom any\nattempt to infringe or compromise the full independence and\nintegrity of the two countries.\nBRITISH EMBASSY\nWASHINGTON, D.C.\n7th February, 1939\nPERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE\nFROM LORD HALIFAX\nHis Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom\nhave now received the replies of the French and Belgian\nGovernments and some indication of the views of the\nNetherlands Government in regard to the matters referred\nto in Lord Halifax's message of January 30th.\nThe French reply states that their reports although\nnot confirmed are similar to those received by His Majesty's\nGovernment and afford the same justification for fears of\nGerman aggression towards the West either spontaneously or\nin support of Italian claims. The French Government con-\nsider that the Western Powers are all equally threatened\nwhatever the initial direction of a German or Italian at-\ntack and that this community of risk should logically en-\ntail a real solidarity in face of any unprovoked attack\nby Germany or Italy. On this understanding the French\nGovernment agree with His Majesty's Government in consider-\ning the contingency of an invasion of Holland as a casus belli\nalthough they point out that this would not involve any\ncontractual responsibility on the part of France and that\nher joint action with Great Britain would be of a preventive\ncharacter. The French Government have also requested an\nassurance that His Majesty's Government would regard an\ninvasion of Switzerland in the same light as an invasion\n-2-\nof Holland. The French reply finally welcomes His\nMajesty's Government's decision to accelerate their\ndefensive and counter-defensive measures and suggests\nthat conscription appears essential for effective British\nparticipation in the organisation of common defence on\nthe Continent. The French Government have also communi-\ncated the above views secretly to the Belgian Govern-\nment. The French reply 1s now being considered by His\nMajesty's Government.\nThe Belgian reply expresses gratitude for His\nMajesty's Government's message and asks for any similar\ninformation in the future but the only view expressed\nis that the Belgian Government resolutely maintain their\npolicy of independence which they claim to be unanimously\napproved in Belgium and to be best suited to the situation\nof Belgium and to the interests of Europe. When com-\nmunicating this reply the Belgian Minister for Foreign\nAffairs said that he could not believe Germany contemplated\nthe seizure of Holland but in any event the Belgian Govern-\nment were convinced that their only chance to maintain\nindependence and avoid invasion was to have no commitments\nat all with any country.\nOn the receipt of a telegram from the Netherlands\nMinister at Washington reporting his conversation with\nPresident Roosevelt on January 26th the Netherlands\nMinister for Foreign Affairs asked His Majesty's Minister\n-3-\nat The Hague whether His Majesty's Government could con-\nfirm the President's information. His Majesty's Minister\non instructions from His Majesty's Government informed\nDr. Patijn that some of the many reports received by H1s\nMajesty's Government suggested that Herr Hitler was con-\nsidering an attack on the Western Powers in the near future\nand that his plan might involve the occupation of Holland.\nSir Nevile Bland explained that His Majesty's Govern-\nment could not vouch for the reliability of any of these\nreports but that in view of their number it would not be\nsafe to ignore them and that His Majesty's Government were\ntherefore carefully considering the position. Dr. Patijn\ninformed Sir Nevile Bland that he was satisfied that there\nwere no German troop movements against Holland at the moment\nbut he added that his latest information had not reassured\nhim. He indicated that if the worst came to the worst the\nDutch would defend their front line defences as long as\npossible and then fall back and let in the water. They\nwere about to spend ten million florins to strengthen the\nfrontier and he estimated the period of possible resistance\nat three to four days. Dr. Patijn is visiting London on\nFebruary 14th for the Grotius anniversary celebrations\nand I hope to have a conversation with him then.\nBRIT ISH EMBASSY\nWASHINGTON, D.C.\nFebruary 7th, 1939\nPSF: sr. Britain\nJR\nGRAY\npain file\nLondon\nDated February 7, 1939\nREC'd 12:45 p.m.\nSecretary of State,\nWashington.\nRUSH.\n176, February 7, 3 p.m.\nSTRECTER CONFIDE HAL AND PERSONAL FOR THE SECRETARY\nAND UNDERSECRETARY.\nMy 175, February 7, 2 p.m.\nSir Alexander Cadogan furnished me with a copy of\nthe following second message sent last night to the\nBritish Charge d'Affaires:\n\"My immediately preceding telegram.\nOnE. The following message should also bE communicated\nto the State Department for the personal and secret\ninformation of the President.\nTwo. His Majesty's Government have now r ECEIVED\nthe replies of the French and B E lgian Governments and\nsome indication of the views of the Netherlands Govern-\nment.\nThree. The French reply states that their reports,\nalthough confirmed, are similar to those received by\nHis\n-2- #176, February 7, 3 p.m., from London.\nHis Majesty's Government and afford some justification\nfor fears of German action towards the west Either\nspontaneously or in support of Italian claims. The\nFrench Government consider that the VESTERN Powers\nare all Equally threatened whatever the initial direction\nof a German or Italian attack and that this community\nof risk should logically Entail a real solidarity in\nface of any unprovoked attack by Germany or Italy. On\nthis understanding the French Government would agree with\nHis Majesty's Government in considering the contingency\nof an invasion of Holland C.S. 2 casus bElli, although\nthey point out that this would not involve any contractual\nresponsibility on the part of France and that her joint\naction with Great Britain would bE of a preventive\ncharacter. The French Government have also requested\nan assurance that His Majesty's Government would regard\ninvasion of Switzerland in the same light ?S an invasion\nof Holland. The French reply finally welcomes His\nMajesty's Government's decision to accelerate their\ndefensive and counter defensive measures, and suggests\nthat conscription appears Essential for Effective British\n(in?)\nparticipation if the organization of common defense\non the Continent. The French Government have also\ncommunicated\n-3- #176, February 7, 3 p.m., from London.\ncommunicated the above views secretly to the Belgian\nGovernment. The French reply is now bEing considered\nby His Majesty's Government.\nFour. The Belgian reply Expresses gratitude for\nHis Majesty's Government's message, and asks for any\nsimilar information in future, but the only view Expressed\nis that the BElgian Government resolutely maintain their\npolicy of independence, which they claim to bE unanimously\napproved in BElgium, and to bE best suited to the\nsituation of BElgium and to the interest of Europe.\nWhen communicating this reply, the Belgian Minister for\nForeign Affairs said that hE could not believe that\nGermany contemplated the seizure of Holland, but in any\nEVENT the BElgian Government were convinced that their\nonly chance to maintain independence and avoid invasion\nwas to have no commitments at all with any country.\nFive. On receipt of a telegram from the Netherlands\nMinister in Washington reporting his conversation with\nPresident Roosevelt on the 26th January, the Netherlands\nMinister asked His Majesty's Minister at The Hague whether\nHis Majesty's Government could confirm the President's\ninformation. His Majesty's Minister, on instructions\nfrom His Majesty's Government, informed Dr. Patijn on\nJanuary\n-4- #176, February 7, 3 p.m., from London.\nJanuary 30 that some of the many reports received by\nHis Majesty's Government suggested that Herr Hitler was\nconsidering an attack on the WESTERN Powers in the near\nfuture and that his plans might involve the occupation\nof Holland. Sir N. Bland Explained that His Majesty's\nGovernment could not vouch for the reliability of any\nof these reports, but in view of their number it would\nnot bE safe to ignore them and His Majesty's Government\nwere therefore carefully considering the position.\nDr. Patijn informed Sir N. Bland that hE was satisfied\nthat there were no German troop movements against\nHolland at the moment, but hE added that his latest\ninformation had not reassured him. HE indicated that if\nthe worst came to the worst, the Dutch would defend\ntheir front line defences as long as possible and then\nfall back and let in water. They were about to spend\nten million florins to strengthen the frontier and hE\nEstimated the period of possible resistance at three to\nfour days. Doctor Patijn is visiting London on\nFebruary 14th for the Grotius anniversary celebrations\nand I hope to have a conversation with him then. If\nThe British Government has not yet replied to the\nFrench communication referred to in numbered paragraph\nthree. With regard to the French suggestion that the\nBritish\n-5- #176, February 7, 3 p.m., from London.\nBritish should introduce conscription, the Under\nSecretary said that this suggestion of course was not\na new one but had bEEn broached in French circles\nfrom time to time. HE quite understood their attitude\nin view of the probability that if a war did break\nout involving both countries, the French would probably\nhave to suffer, as they did in the last war, appalling\nmilitary casualties on land before a British army\nwould bE ready. On the other hand, as hE has pointed\nout to the French Ambassador, the British carry a much\nlarger complement of men in their navy than the French\ndo; their air force is now not only larger but better\nthan the French; and there is no USE in talking in\nGreat Britain about conscription being introduced\nnow when there is not yet in Existence sufficient\nEquipment to fit out a conscripted army. The Under\nSECRETARY indicated that when a formal reply is made\nto the French the suggestion in regard to British\nconscription will not bE mentioned.\nSir Alexander further said that the French reply\nwas received before the Prime Minister's important\nstatement in the House of Commons yesterday (my 173,\nFebruary 6, 8 p.m.) and that hE felt that that statement,\nwhich\n-6- #176, February 7, 3 p.m., from London.\nwhich hE again characterized as something necessary\nand Extremely important, had done real good in France\nin allaying apprehensions. HE considers that the\npolitical situation in France under Monsieur Daladier\nhas greatly improved.\nJOHNSON\nPrivac\nFebruary 15, 1939.\nDear Roger:-\nMany thanks for your note and that extremely\ninteresting excerpt from Trevelyan.\nwho\nI wish the British would stop this \"We^are\nabout to die, salute thee\" attitude. Lord Lothian\nwas here the other day, started the conversation by\nsaying he had completely abandoned his former belief\nthat Hitler could be dealt with as a semi-reasonable\nhuman being, and went on to say that the British for\na thousand years had been the guardians of Anglo-\nSaxon civilization -- that the scepter or the sword\nor something like that had dropped from their\npalsied fingers -- that the U. S. A. must snatch\nit up --- that F. D. R. alone could save the world --\netc,, etc.\nI got mad clear through and told him that\njust so long as he or Britishers like him took that\nattitude of complete despair, the British would not\nbe worth saving anyway.\nWhat the British need today is a good stiff\ngrog, inducing not only the desire to save civili-\nzation but the continued belief that they can do it.\nIn such an event they will have a lot more support\nfrom their American cousins -- don't you think so?\nAs ever yours,\nProfessor Roger B. Merriman,\nMaster's Lodgings,\nEliot House,\nCambridge,\nMassachusetts.\nMASTER'S LODGINGS\nELIOT HOUSE\nCAMBRIDGE. MASS.\nFebruary 10, 1939\nHis Excellency The President of the United States\nExecutive Mansion\nWashington, D.C.\nDear Franklin:\nI have been following with interest and, on\nthe whole, with approval the course of your foreign\npolicy. The fact that I have had to speak so much on\nthe Spanish situation has kept me more closely in\ntouch with current events than I usually am. Arthur\nWillert spent twenty-four hours with me here a couple\nof weeks ago, and I shall be curious to know how he\nwill influence your views when he visits you at the\nWhite House.\nIn the meantime I send you a quotation from\na letter from one of my oldest English friends, George\nMacaulay Trevelyan, Regis Professor of History in the\nUniversity of Cambridge and author of many books most\nof which you have doubtless read. One has to \"make\nallowances\" in considering the verdicts of all Trevel-\nyans, but George is saner than most of them, closely\nin touch with the people who count in Downing Street,\nand not (like your old teacher) a \"mere don\".\nYours always,\nRoger B. Merriman\nExcerpt from a letter to Mr. Merriman from Professor George M. Trevelyan,\ndated January 28, 1939.\nYou ask for my 'views' on the world situation. I would not\nhave bothered you with them otherwise. They are of course very\ngloomy.\nI think Chamberlain was quite right not to have fought a war\nto 'save' Czecho Slovakia in October last, because the war must\nhave been unsuccessful. Russia is down and out and can be written\noff -- she won't or rather can't even save China from Japan. In\nthe Czech question the Germans had Poland and Hungary on their\nside and the Czechs would have been overrun at once by all three.\nThe only way to 'save' them would have been for France to break\nthe German lines in the West and with England's help conquer Ger-\nmany and Italy, aided by the Japanese fleet attacking our trade.\nIt would in short have been an offensive war on our part strategi-\ncally -- to smash through Germany to Czecho Slovakia, and our\nmilitary and well informed people all said and say it was hopeless.\nThe French found that out,- too late as usual. The Czechs were\ntheir 'allies' not ours, and they (and we) ought to have told them\nin the spring that we could do nothing for them and they must make\nthe best terms they could with Germany about their three million\nGerman subjects.\nIf, as I understand, your fellow citizens think we ought to\nhave fought this war, I think they misunderstood the possibilities,\nas you were to remain neutral yourselves. Munich saved the Czechs\nso far as it was possible to save them. But it does not follow\nthat if (as seems likely soon) Germany and Italy attack France and\nEngland, we shall be conquered in a defensive war. We may or may\nnot be, but we are preparing to die in the last ditch at worst.\nHowever, we may defend ourselves successfully. In any case noth-\ning will be left of civilization except machinery -- which I don't\ncare about -- after the war is over, whoever 'wins' it. The only\nthing that will stop a war coming pretty soon -- since Hitler and\nMussolini are both 'rabid' men -- would be the United States letting\nthem know that you will take part if they make aggression. But as\nI gather there is little chance of that, I think the prospects are\nvery black indeed.\nIn the last war England plus France plus Italy plus Russia plus\nJapan plus (half way through) the United States only just beat\nGermany and Austria. How do you expect England plus France alone to\n\"crush the dictators\" with Germany, Austria, Italy and Japan against\nus? If you don't want Europe and Africa to be prostrate at the feet\nof Germany and her allies, with Japan in possession of Asia, you had\nbetter be reconsidering your isolation policy before you are indeed\n'isolated'. Naziism, as contagious as Jacobinism of old, has al-\nready landed in South America I understand. But whatever you choose\nto do, we will put up a jolly old fight, in which everything I\ncare for will disappear.\nP.S. Remember that Russia, besides being internally rotten and\nincompetent for all offensive military purposes, has no longer\ngot a frontier coterminous with Germany. She cannot attack\nGermany across a hostile Poland and Hungary, who do not wish to\nbe Bolshevized. You must no longer think of the forces in terms\nof 1914.\nDearest love to you, your family, and your country.\n9-2\nPSF. GR Britain\nfile\nMASTER'S LODGINGS\nPersonal\nELIOT HOUSE\nCAMBRIDGE\nFebruary 17, 1939\nDear Franklin:\nA thousand thanks for your letter.\nI shall relay a copy to Trevelyan, but I\nshall tell him that it was marked \"Private\"\nso that he will use it with discretion.\nI think you are a bit hard on \"the\naverage Britisher\". Some of his itinerant\nexports over here are intolerable -- I see\nshoals of them and know whereof I speak --\nbut the bulk of the stay-at-homes are of\nbetter quality. The fact is I think that\na lot of those who come over here for the\nfirst time don't quite know how to behave\nwith us, and hit the wrong note at the out-\nset.\nI hope you will get a lot of fish.\nYours always,\nRoger B. Merriman\nHis Excellency The President\nof the United States\nExecutive Mansion\nWashington, D. C.\nPSF Great (2011\n1\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nWASHINGTON\nMarch 4, 1939\nMy dear Mr. President:\nIn accordance with the message from you which\nSteve Early gave me this morning, I have informed\nthe British Ambassador that you will receive him at\nthe White House tomorrow, Sunday, at 2:30 p.m.\nI am enclosing herewith a secret memorandum\nwhich the Ambassador left with me when I saw him a\ncouple of days ago, as well as a memorandum of my\nconversation with the Ambassador. I believe you\nmay wish to read these two papers before you talk\nwith the Ambassador.\nBelieve me\nFaithfully J yours,\nhalls\nThe President,\nThe White House.\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nMemorandum of Conversation\nDATE: March 1, 1939\nSUBJECT: Visit of King and Queen of England.\nPARTICIPANTS: Sir Ronald Lindsay, British Ambassador;\nthe Under Secretary.\nCOPIES TO:\nOFO 1-1493\nThe British Ambassador called to see me this morn-\ning. The Ambassador asked me to lay the following mat-\nter before the President upon his return. He said that\nwhen the King of England paid official visits to other\ncountries it had been the invariable practice from time\nimmemorial for the King to be accompanied by one of the\nmembers of the British Cabinet, normally the Secretary of\nState for Foreign Affairs. He said that Lord Halifax was\npersonally anxious to take the trip to the United States\nto accompany the King, particularly in order to have the\nopportunity of talking with the President and the Secre-\ntary of State, but that realizing that his visit to the\nUnited States might be misinterpreted by American public\n-2-\nopinion and might be understood as implying that the\nBritish Government was engaging in some secret negotia-\ntions with the United States at the time of the King's\nvisit, he desired to refrain from the visit if the Presi-\ndent believed that it was preferable for him not to come.\nI told the Ambassador that I would, of course, be\nglad to lay the matter before the President immediately\nafter his return and that I would advise the Ambassador\nin due course of the President's reaction.\nThe Ambassador asked me how I myself felt about the\nmatter. I said that of course I could only give him a\npersonal and snap judgment. I said that while I did not\nknow Lord Halifax personally I had always understood\nthat he gave the impression of being a very sincere and\nstraightforward man and that since I understood the King\nwould not receive American press correspondents, it would\nappear to me that if Lord Halifax were with the party and\ncould speak directly with the American press correspond-\nents he could make it clear to them that his coming with\nthe King was merely a matter of custom and that no nego-\ntiations of any kind with this Government were being\nundertaken. I said that of course I had no 1dea of what\nthe President's own opinion would be and that the matter\nwould, of course, have to be determined by him.\nMy dear Mr. President:\nIn accordance with the message from you which\nSteve Early gave me this morning, I have informed\nthe British Ambassador that you will receive him at\nthe White House tomorrow, Sunday, at 9:30 p.m.\nI as enclosing herewith a secret memorandum\nwhich the Ambassador left with me when I saw him a\ncouple of days ago, as well as = memorandum of my\nconversation with the Ambassador. I believe you\nmay wish to read these two papers before you talk\nwith the Ambassador.\nBelieve me\nFaithfully yours,\nThe President,\nThe white House.\nMESSAGE FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE\nMOST SECRET\nOur own reports on the European\nsituation have not been as pessimistic as those\nmentioned to His Majesty's Ambassador by the Under\nSecretary of State on February 20th. We now think\nthat it will be best to communicate in the utmost\nconfidence the following summary of our information.\n2.\nWhile we are not disposed to under-\nrate the latent danger in the present international\nsituation, our latest information inclines us to\nthink that Herr Hitler has for the time being\nabandoned the idea of precipitating an immediate\ncrisis such as he seemed to be contemplating at the\nbeginning of the year.\n3.\nOur information suggests that this\nis largely because the German Government has since\nJanuary been impressed by the firm attitude of the\nFrench Government towards the Italian claims, by\nthe progress of British rearmament and by the Prime\nMinister's statement of February 6th on Anglo-French\nrelations and not least by the recent attitude of\nthe United States Government. It may also be due\nin part to temporary deterioration in German railway\nsystem.\n4.\nAccording to reliable reports no\npreliminary signs of impending mobilisation are\napparent/\nREGRADED UNCLASSIFIED\napparent in Germany and there would not appear\nto be any special troop concentrations in Austria.\nThere has probably been an acceleration of arms\ndeliveries in Hungary which may have given rise to\nstories of assembly of material in the East.\nMeanwhile however the German army is working at\nhigh pressure and training of reservists is being\nexpedited but reports of special military prepara-\ntions would seem to be based on the probability\nthat the German army was warned to be prepared for\nall eventualities in the Spring and has been making\nthe necessary preliminary preparations. While\nrecent secret information suggests that any plan\nfor mobilisation in early March may have been post-\nponed, reports have recently reached us pointing to\nthe possibility of a military occupation of Czecho-\nSlovakia.\n5.\nHerr Hitler is clearly preparing for\nevery possible eventuality. Rumours of one or\nother of these plans are continually reaching us\nand cannot be lightly discounted. On the other\nhand there is no evidence at present that any one\nof them has been irrevocably adopted by Herr Hitler\nand a date fixed for its being put into force.\n6.\nSir Nevile Henderson had conversations\nwith Herr von Ribbenthrop, Field Marshal Goering\nand Baron von Weiszaker on his return to Berlin\nlast week and gained the impression that Herr\nHitler was at present planning no immediate\nadventure. But of course it was not possible for\nhim/\nhim to adduce positive facts in support of this.\n7.\nAgainst this Herr Hitler's pledge to\nItaly in his Reichstag speech of January 30th is\ndisquieting in view of the present state of Franco-\nItalian relations, particularly as Baron von\nWeiszaker replied to an inquiry regarding the precise\nsignificance of Herr Hitler's words that any close\nanalysis was superfluous since it was quite clear\nthat Germany would support Italy in the event of\nwar.\n8.\nAs regards Italy we believe the average\npeace strength of the Italian army at this time of\nyear, i.e. before the annual class of recruits\nhas joined the colours may be a little over two\nhundred and fifty thousand rising to as much as\nfour hundred and fifty thousand when the recruits\nhave joined. We believe that sixty thousand\nreservists of 1901 class have been called to the\ncolours but that many of them have been found unfit\nfor service or unable conveniently to leave their\njobs and have therefore been released; their\nplaces have however been taken by other reservists\nfrom later classes particularly that of 1902. We\nhave heard reports that 1918 class may join the colours\nin the immediate future instead of at the beginning\nof April which is the usual time. If definite\nevidence of this were obtained it might be a pointer,\nthough the presence of so many untrained recruits in\nthe army would temporarily decrease its efficiency.\nApart from this a number of individuals of various\nclasses have been called up but we have no informa-\ntion as to the numbers involved nor as to the use\nto/\nto which they will be put. We have no information\nto show that anything like three hundred thousand\nmen have been called up or that a general or even\npartial mobilisation is in progress.\n9.\nFact that thirty thousand of the sixty\nthousand men referred to above are to be sent to\nLibya is at first sight disquieting but it should be\nnoted that they are rather old for active military\nservice and have had only very scrappy training\nduring post-war period. It is of course possible\nthat despite the definite statements of the Italian\nGovernment younger men will be sent to Libya instead.\n10.\nIt appears to be true that some German\nexperts have been in Libya but we do not believe\nthat there can be any German military units there.\n11.\nRecently there have been some signs of\nunusual naval activity in Italy.\n12.\nOur general impression is that there has\nbeen an abnormal amount of military activity in Italy\nof late but that it is at least premature to deduce\nthat Signor Mussolini has decided to resort to war\nin the immediate future. The present activity may\nbe merely an insurance against unexpected developments\nin Spain or a prelude to an attempt to blackmail the\nFrench into meeting Italian demands; but such ex-\nplanations are of course highly speculative.\nCertain Italian officials have recently been asserting\nthat Signor Mussolini will make war on France if\nthe position of the Italian colony in Tunis is not\nsettled to his satisfaction. This may however\nmerely be part of a campaign to frighten the French\nand/\nand ourselves into meeting Italy's demands\nbut the situation certainly needs careful\nwatching. In this connexion there are\nreports from sources that cannot be ignored\nthat instead of risking a major war by pressing\nher demands on France Italy might seek cheap\nglory in annexation of Albania.\n13.\nWe still greatly doubt that Japan\nhas come into line over the anti-Comintern pact.\nOn the contrary Japan's counter proposals will\nonly be submitted early next month for considera-\ntion by the Germans and Italians. But this will\nof course not prevent the three Powers playing\ninto one another's hands as and when it suits\nthem to do SO. The Japanese diplomats' meeting\nin Paris last month attended by the Ambassadors\nfrom London, Rome, Brussels, by the Minister from\nBerne and by the Secretaries only from Berlin and\nParis did not we think make the recommendation\nattributed to them by the Under Secretary of State\nthough quite possibly the Ambassador from Rome in\na minority of one made the recommendation in the\nsense suggested.\nBRITISH EMBASSY,\nWASHINGTON, D.C.\nFebruary 28th, 1939.\nPst\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nMarch 9, 1939\nMEMORANDUM FOR MISS LE HAND:\nThe British Ambassador advises that\nin his conversation with the President, yesterday\nafternoon, he forgot to say that he hopes the program\nof the King and Queen will not be released or any-\nthing pertaining to it given out for publication\nuntil there has been an opportunity to submit it\nto the King and to obtain his approval.\nThis for the President's information.\nPSF: St. Britain\nTHE\nUNDER SECRETARY OF STATE\nWASHINGTON\nMarch 21, 1939\nMy dear Mr. President:\nIn accordance with our telephone con-\nversation, I am sending you the confidential\nmessage from Lord Halifax which I have just\nreceived from the British Ambassador.\nBelieve me\nEnclosure:\nFaithfully A yours, Halles\nFrom the British\nEmbassy, March 21,\n1939.\nThe President,\nThe White House.\nST SECRET\nPERSONAL MESSAGE FROM LORD HALIFAX FOR THE\nCONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OF THE PRESIDENT.\nThe Rumanian Minister told me on March\n17th that he understood that the Rumanian Government\nhad been asked by the German Government to agree to\ngive the latter a monopoly of Rumanian exports and\nto accept measures of industrial restriction inside\nRumania in German interests. On this basis Germany\nwould guarantee the Rumanian frontier.\nThe Rumanian Government, he said, were\ndisposed to regard this as in the nature of an\nultimatum though I understand that on their refusal\nto accept these terms further terms had been suggested.\nThe Rumanian Minister, emphasising the\nextreme urgency, proceeded to ask whether His Majesty's\nGovernment in the United Kingdom would be able to give\na precise indication of their position in the event of\nRumania becoming the victim of German aggression.\nHe\nenquired whether it would make it easier for His\nMajesty's Government to do this if Poland and Rumania\nagreed to make the treaty provisions between them\nclearly applicable as against German aggression and\nif the Balkan Entente proclaimed their joint determina-\ntion to guarantee each other's frontier.\nI told the Minister that I should report\nwhat he had said urgently to the Prime Minister and\nmy/\nREGRADED UNCLASSIFIED\n-2-\nmy colleagues but that I anticipated that an\nessential element in their judgment would be\nthe knowledge, if it could be supplied, of what\nin fact would be the attitude of the Polish,\nTurkish, Greek and Yugoslav Governments in the\ncircumstances foreshadowed.\nHis Majesty's Representatives in these\nfour countries were then instructed urgently to sound\nthe governments to which they are accredited. His\nMajesty's Ambassador at Moscow was also instructed\nto inform the Soviet Government of the Rumanian\ndémarche and to enquire whether they could give any\nindication that they would, if requested by the\nRumanian Government, actively help the latter to\nresist German aggression. His Majesty's Government\nalso consulted the French Government with a view to\nconcerting policy.\nSubsequent information has cast doubt\non the accuracy of the account given by the Rumanian\nMinister of what had passed between the German and\nRumanian Governments. None the less His Majesty's\nGovernment have thought it essential in view of the\nsituation resulting from the German action in Czecho-\nslovakia to pursue their enquiries in the capitals\nchiefly concerned. They have therefore instructed\nHis Majesty's Representatives in Paris, Moscow and\nWarsaw in the following terms:-\nIn spite of doubts as to the accuracy of\nreports of a German ultimatum to Rumania, the recent\nGerman/\n-3-\nGerman absorption of Czechoslovakia shows clearly\nthat the German Government are resolved to go\nbeyond their hitherto avowed aim of the consolida-\ntion of the German race. They have now extended\ntheir conquest to another nation and if this should\nprove to be part of a definite policy of domination\nthere is no state in Europe which is not directly\nor ultimately threatened.\nIn the circumstances thus created it\nseems to His Majesty's Government in the United\nKingdom to be desirable to proceed without delay\nto the organisation of mutual support on the part\nof all those who realise the necessity of protecting\ninternational society from further violation of the\nfundamental laws on which it rests.\nAs a first step, they propose that the\nFrench, Soviet and Polish Governments should join\nwith His Majesty's Government in signing and pub-\nlishing a declaration the terms of which they\nsuggest should be on the following lines:\n\"We the undersigned, duly authorised to\n\"that effect, hereby declare that inasmuch as peace\n\"and security in Europe are a matter of common\n\"interest and concern, and since European peace and\n\"security may be affected by any action which con-\n\"stitutes a threat to the political independence of\n\"any European state, our respective Governments\n\"hereby undertake immediately to consult together\n\"as to what steps should be taken to offer joint\n\"resistance to any such action.\"\nIt/\n-4-\nIt appears to His Majesty's Government\nin the United Kingdom that publication of such a\ndeclaration would in itself be a valuable con-\ntribution to the stability of Europe and we should\npropose that publication should be followed by an\nexamination by the signatories of any specific\nsituation which requires it with a view to\ndetermining the nature of any action which might\nbe taken.\nPlease endeavour immediately to obtain the\nviews respectively of the French, Soviet and Polish\nGovernments. His Majesty's Government in the\nUnited Kingdom would be prepared to sign the\ndeclaration immediately the three other Governments\nindicated their readiness to do so.\nInstructions in the above sense have been\nsent to His Majesty's Ambassadors in Paris, Moscow\nand Warsaw. His Majesty's Representatives in\nAthens, Bucarest, Angora, Belgrade, Cairo, Lisbon\nand Bagdad have also been informed of the position\nand told that His Majesty's Government propose that\nnothing shall be said to the Governments to which\nthey are accredited until the French, Soviet and\nPolish Governments have agreed with His Majesty's\nGovernment on the declaration. His Majesty's Chargé\nd'Affaires in Berlin has also been informed of the\nposition.\nBRITISH EMBASSY,\nWASHINGTON, D.C.\nfile\nPSF: Gt Britain\n3/23/39\nSECRET\nPERSONAL MESSAGE FROM LORD HALIFAX FOR THE\nCONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OF THE PRESIDENT.\nHis Majesty's Minister at Bucharest was\nassured on March 20th by King Carol that there had\nat no moment been any question of a German ultimatum\nalthough there was much that was unpalatable in\nGerman proposals. King Carol stated that Roumania\nwould resist German pressure but could not do so\nindefinitely without support. King Carol hesitated\nhowever to give His Majesty's Minister detailed\ninformation of the German proposals. Roumanian\nGeneral Staff also remained worried at the news of\nmobilisation preparations in Germany and troop\nmovements in Czechoslovakia which they consider\ngreater than are warranted by recent events. They\nare convinced that Hungary would not resist passage\nof German troops through that country.\nPreliminary replies have now been received\nto the enquiries mentioned in paragraph 5 of Lord\nHalifax's message of March 21st. The Greek Prime\nMinister stated that in the event of aggression\nagainst Roumania, Greece would fulfill her obligations\nunder the Balkan Pact. As regards the guarantee of\nthe Roumanian frontier, which went beyond limits of\nthe Balkan Pact, Greece would examine objectively and\nin collaboration with Turkey and Yugoslavia any\nRoumanian proposal, while taking deep account of\neventual attitude of Great Britain and France. In\nhis/\nREGRADED UNCLASSIFIED\n-2-\nhis view everything depended on Yugoslavia since\nwithout its support it would be impossible for Greece\nand Turkey to guarantee military assistance to\nRoumania.\nThe Prince-Regent of Yugoslavia in his\nturn made a similar enquiry regarding the intentions\nof His Majesty's Government. He expressed surprise\nthat the Roumanian Government had not approached him\nand subsequently confirmed that no ultimatum had been\npresented to the latter.\nThe Turkish reply also states that no\ncommunication had been received from Roumanian Govern-\nment but that the Turkish Government would study in\na friendly spirit any proposal His Majesty's Government\nmight wish to make and would carry out theirobligations\nunder Balkan Entente.\nThe Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs\nalso doubted whether an ultimatum had been delivered\nand stated that if so he would have to go into the\nquestion fully with his own Government and the Roumanian\nGovernment before expressing any view.\nThe Soviet Government have replied expressing\nsurprise that the Roumanian Government had not approached\nthem but proposing a conference of British, Soviet,\nFrench, Polish, Roumanian and Turkish representatives.\nThe French reply states that their informa-\ntion generally agrees with that received by His\nMajesty's Government. They were making enquiries of\nthe Polish, Yugoslav and Soviet Governments whose\nreplies would have an important bearing but they\nconsidered it to be the last obstacle to the triumph of\nGerman Imperialism and therefore declared themselves\nready/\n-3-\nready to assist Roumania if she were the object of\nGerman aggression. The question of assistance was\nhowever dependent on common Franco-British resistance\nand the French Government were therefore ready to\ncollaborate with His Majesty's Government in an\nexamination of concerted action. His Majesty's\nMinister at Paris was assured verbally that France\nwould go to Roumania's assistance irrespective of\nPolish, Yugoslav and Soviet replies.\nThe above views represent the reactions\nto our first enquiries based on the Roumanian\nMinister's disquieting information regarding German-\nRoumanian economic negotiations as described in the\nopening paragraphs of Lord Halifax's message of March\n21st. No final replies have yet been received to the\nlater proposal (summarized in paragraphs 6 to 12 of\nLord Halifax's message of March 21st) which relates\nnot only to aggression against Roumania but to any\naction threatening independence of any European state.\nBRITISH EMBASSY,\nWASHINGTON, D.C.\nMarch 23rd, 1939.\n-\nPSF:St. Britain\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nTHE SECRETARY\nMarch 25, 1939.\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nI enclose herewith a\nfurther message from Lord Hall-\nfax received through the British\nAmbassador.\nC IT\nImate s\nPersonal and\nI\nMarch 25th,\nDear Mr. Secretary.\nI enclose herein a further\nmessage for the President from Lord\nHalifax regarding the European situation.\nYours sincerely,\n(Sgd.) R.C. Lindsay.\nThe Honourable\nCordell Hull,\nDepartment of State,\nWashington, D.C.\nRCL:FRHM:R:\nMOST\nSHORT\nPERSONAL MESSAGE FROM LORD HALIFAX FOR THE\nCONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OF THE PRESIDENT.\nHis Majesty's Government in the United\nKingdom have now received the final replies of the\nFrench and Soviet Governments to the proposals\nsummarized in my message of March 21st. They have\nalso received a preliminary indication of the views\nof the Polish Government.\nThe Soviet reply expresses agreement and\naccepts the text of the proposed declaration which\nthe Soviet Government will sign as soon as France\nand Poland have accepted. The Soviet Government are\nanxious that not only the Balkan but also the Baltic\nand Scandinavian countries should be invited to\nadhere after publication.\nThe French reply expresses entire assent.\nIn conversation with the Prime Minister and myself\nin London the French Minister for Foreign Affairs\nhas however emphasized the importance of Polish\nparticipation and the difficulty of securing this\nin view of Soviet participation.\nThe Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs\ninformed His Majesty's Ambassador at Varsaw on\nMarch 21st that the proposal demanded very serious\nconsideration. His chief preoccupation was the\nsuggested participation of the Union of Soviet\nSocialist Republics in view of which Polish\nparticipation/\nregraded iniclassteted\n-2-\nparticipation would definitely range Poland in the\nSoviet camp against Germany. He has instructed\nthe Polish Ambassador in London to propose that\nHis Majesty's Government and the Polish Government\nshould enter into a secret agreement of consultation\non the lines of the suggested declaration. This\nwould not however prejudice any official decision\nregarding the declaration on which he would communicate\nthe views of his Government later. Nor would it affect\nthe position of France as the existing Franco-Polish\ntreaty already contains a consultative clause. His\nMajesty's Ambassador at Warsaw has suggested that\npublication with Polish consent might be possible if\nPoland were assured that the Western Powers\ncontemplated effective and immediate steps to resist\nGerman aggression.\nThe present difficulty is therefore to\nreconcile the Polish and the Soviet positions.\nExtensive mobilization measures have been\nundertaken in Hungary and Roumania and although both\nGovernments deny any aggressive intentions the\nposition is dangerous. The Roumanian army now has\napproximately 450,000 men under arms. His Majesty's\nGovernment and the French Government are doing their\nbest to urge moderation and demobilization in Budapest\nand Bucharest and the Polish Government appear to be\nvery active in this direction. The Polish Government\nhave invited categorical assurances from the\nHungarian Government that they have no bellicose\nintentions towards Roumania and the Hungarian military\nauthorities/\n-3-\nauthorities have categorically stated that no\nnegotiations are proceeding between Hungary and\nthe German Government regarding the passage of\nGerman troops through Hungary.\nI informed the Turkish Ambassador\ngenerally of our proposals for a joint four-Power\ndeclaration on March 21st. Emphasizing that he was\nspeaking with full knowledge of the policy of the\nTurkish Government, the Turkish Ambassador replied\nthat they would be prepared to go all lengths with\nGreat Britain if assured of British support and of\ndirect British assistance if they were themselves\nattacked in the Mediterranean. This attitude was\nunconditional regardless of the Polish and Russian\nreplies. Apart from this Turkey would in all cases\nobserve all her existing treaty obligations.\nBRITISH EMBASSY,\nWASHINGTON, D. C.,\nMarch 25th, 1939.\nOriginal on exphalet E.R Gallery\nPSF Gh Britain\n1939\nThey\nPersonal\nParis, March 23, 197\nDear Mr. President:\nI have the honor to submit herewith to the Chief\nof State in accordance with his request made to = at\nWarm Springs, Georgia, the recommendations as to the\npersonal needs of Their Royal Majesties, George :-\nand Elizabeth, King and Queen, By the Grace of Go!,\nof Great Britain, Ireland and of the British Dominions\nBeyond the Seas, King and Queen Defender of the Paith,\nEmperor and Empress of India.\nI may add that my most onerous diplomatic labor\nsince reaching Paris has been the extraction of these\nrecommendations and that I expect you to decorate ne\nat once with the Order of the Royal Bathtub.\nI ask for this particular decoration because the\nPresident of the French Republic, at vast expense, had\ninstalled in the Palais d'Orsay for the reception of\nTheir\nThe Honorable\nFranklin D. Roosevelt,\nPresident of the United States of America.\nWashington, D. C.\n- 2 -\nTheir Royal Majesties two superb bathrooms containing\nmosaic tubs with gold faucets which, during the stay\nof Their Royal Majesties, were never once used!\nI may add that it has been indicated to me by\nthe Government of the French Republic that the pre-\nferences of Their Majesties in the way of wines do\nnot go beyond Veuve Clicquot and Pommery-Greno cham-\npagne of the best years. I have, therefore, prepared\nagainst the arrival of Their Majesties in Washington,\none hundred bottles of Pommery-Greno, 1928, which I\nshall be glad to place at your disposal provided the\nsituation in Europe should seem to indicate that there\nray be some chance of Their Royal Majesties going to\nAmerica. My parsimony is motivated by the fact that\nthe grand smash seems fairly imminent. I prefer,\ntherefore, to restrain the departure of these bottles\nuntil my next departure for the United States in the\nhope that we may drink them together.\nWith my profound obeisances, I am,\nYour humble and obedient servant,\nJilliam\nlosure\nSUGGESTIONS FOR THE FURNISHING OF HER MAJMETY'S ROOM.\nLarge bed\nNo bolster - two pillows\nBed cushion supplied by Her Majesty's maid\nLight, but warm, blankets with a silk cover\nNo eider down coverlet - a soft silk cover folded in\nfour on the foot of the bed, with one corner\nturned up.\nBedside table with lamp.\nBathroom\nA large dressing-table, or a table for the bottles.\nFour glasses, one of which is graduated.\nBathrobe type of bath towel.\nQuantities of hand towels.\nBasket for putting linen after use.\nBath thermometer.\nSeveral spoons, large and small.\nDressing-room or Boudoir\nDressing-table perfectly lighted day and night, with\narmchair of corresponding height.\nNear the dressing-table a small table with drawers for\nhairdressing and toilet articles. This table\nshould be easily removable.\nVery comfortable settee with soft linen blanket.\nOne or two ash trays and matches for the King. The\ndoes not smoke.\nOn the desk:\ninkstand with blue ink\nthin penholder with \"J\" pen (or similar make) :\nmedium size\nred pencil\nblue pencil\nordinary black pencils with very sharp points\nordinary, and typewriter erasers.\nSUGGESTIONS FOR THE FURNISHING OF HIS MAJES\nLarge bed \"de milieu\" (in center of panel) with the :-:1\nagainst the wall. (Never with the side along the n:\nNo bolster - two pillows.\nSpecial bolster supplied by His Majesty's valet.\nWarm, but light, blankets, with a silk cover.\nVery soft eider down quilt, which can be accordion-pleated\nat the foot of the bed.\nOn each side of the bed a bedside table with a lamp.\nIn the bathroom or bedroom (according to possibility and\npreferably in a window recess on account of light,\na\ndressing table with a triple mirror, high enough to\nenable contemplating oneself when standing.\nVery comfortable settee.\nAsh trays, matches, cigars, and cigarettes for the guests,\nHis Majesty having his own cigarettes.\nGreat number of hangers: some of them very wide with the\nback slightly curved; others with a double bar for\ntrousers; no special clip hangers for trousers.\nOn the desk an inkstand with two inkwells: one full of\nblue-black, the other of red ink.\nNo toweled bathrobe. His Majesty prefers large bath towel\nTo be ready to supply, if requested, garnet-red and W ite\ncarnations for boutonnières.\nOGÉ\ntransmission to the President, by the\nForwarded to the secretary for PSF: St. Britain\nconfidinted\nBritish Embassy\non march 29, 1939.\nMOST SECRET\nMESSAGE FOR THE PERSONAL AND\nCONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OF\nTHE PRESIDENT.\nThe situation as His Majesty's Government\nin the United Kingdom see it is that the absorption\nof Czechoslovakia has clearly revealed Germany's\nintentions. It marks the first departure from the\nNazi racial theory and there is little reason to\nsuppose that it is not Germany's intention to extend\nover other countries in Europe, notably Rumania and\nPoland, a control equivalent to that obtained over\nCzechoslovakia.\nIt is of importance to Germany to avoid a\nwar on two fronts and her recent behaviour has\nstiffened the attitude at any rate of Poland and\ncreated strong apprehension in other countries in\nCentral and Eastern Europe. It is Germany's purpose\ngradually to neutralize these countries, to deprive\nthem of their power of resistance and to incorporate\nthem in the German economic system.\nWhen this has been done the way will have\nbeen prepared for an attack on the Western European\nPowers.\nGermany may seek to achieve her aims\ndirectly by way of military attack, or indirectly by\nundermining the independence of other countries by\neconomic penetration or national disintegration or\nthreat of force.\nHis Majesty's Government in the United\nKingdom/\nREGRADED UNCLASSIFIED\n-2-\nKingdom have and are still engaged in consultation\nwith a number of other governments on the present\nsituation which is one of grave potential menace to\nthe countries of Western Europe and of the whole\nBritish Commonwealth.\nThe policy of His Majesty's Government in\nthe United Kingdom has been described by the Prime\nMinister in his statement in the House of Commons on\nMarch 23rd as follows: \"I wish to make it clear\nhowever that there is no desire on the part of His\nMajesty's Government to stand in the way of any\nreasonable efforts on the part of Germany to expand\nher export trade. Nor is this Government anxious to\nset up in Europe opposing blocs of countries with\ndiffering ideas about the forms of their internal\nadministration. We are solely concerned here with\nthe proposition that we cannot submit to a procedure\nunder which independent States are subjected to such\npressure under a threat of force as to be obliged to\nyield up their independence and we are resolved by\nall the means in our power to oppose attempts if\nthey should be made to put such a procedure into\noperation.\"\nThe purpose of the consultations upon which\nHis Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are\nengaged is to fortify by as wide a measure of\ninternational collaboration as may be achieved the\nnatural resistance which States are bound to offer\nto attempts that may be made to constrain them\ndirectly or indirectly to yield up their independence.\nAt/\n-3-\nAt the recent conversations with the\nFrench Minister for Foreign Affairs in London\ngeneral agreement was reached between the French\nGovernment and His Majesty's Government in the\nUnited Kingdom as to the best course of action to\nadopt in view of the reluctance of the Polish\nGovernment to accept the proposed four-Power\ndeclaration.\nInstructions have accordingly been\ndrafted for His Majesty's Ambassador at Warsaw and\nHis Majesty's Minister at Bucharest prescribing the\nlines of an approach they are to make to the Polish\nand the Rumanian Governments.\nThe purport of these instructions is\ngiven in an appendix to the present message. The\nintention is that approach to the Polish and Rumanian\nGovernments should be made in similar terms by the\nBritish and the French representatives at Warsaw and\nBucharest. The terms of these instructions have been\nsubmitted to the French Government for their assent\nand if the French Government agree the British and the\nFrench representatives at Warsaw and Bucharest will\nbe requested to act accordingly.\nIt has been pointed out to the French\nGovernment that the Soviet Government while not\nassociated directly with the proposed arrangements\nwould be kept in touch with developments and invited\nto undertake to lend their assistance in certain\ncircumstances in the most convenient form; and His\nMajesty's/\nAPPENDIX\nPROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS FOR HIS MAJESTY'S\nAMBASSADOR AT WARSAW AND HIS MAJESTY'S\nMINISTER AT BUCHAREST.\nEnquiries in the various capitals\nconcerned have shown that it will not be\npossible to proceed without modification with\nthe proposed four-Power declaration. While\nthe French Government have accepted the proposal\nand while the Soviet Government have accepted,\nsubject to acceptance by France and Poland, the\nPolish Government are reluctant to associate\nthemselves with the Soviet Union in a public\ndeclaration of this kind.\nIt is becoming clear that our\nattempt to consolidate the situation will be\nfrustrated if the Union of Soviet Socialist\nRepublics is openly associated with the\ninitiation of the scheme. Recent reports from\na number of His Majesty's Missions abroad have\nwarned us that the inclusion of Russia would not\nonly jeopardize the success of our constructive\neffort but would tend to consolidate the\nrelations of the parties to the Anti-Comintern\nPact as well as to excite anxiety amongst a\nnumber of friendly governments.\nSome alternative method of approach\nmust therefore be sought. In any scheme the\ninclusion/\nREGRADED UNCLASSIFIED\ninclusion of Poland is justifiable as one of\nthe strong Powers bordering on Germany in the\nEast and the inclusion of Rumania is also of\nthe first importance since Rumania may be the\nstate primarily menaced by Germany's plans for\neastern expansion.\nHis Majesty's Government in the\nUnited Kingdom have therefore decided to make\nan approach to the Polish and Rumanian\nGovernments in the following sense:-\n(a) Germany may either direct attack on\nPoland or Rumania or may undermine either\ncountry's independence whether by processes\nof economic penetration or national\ndisintegration as in the case of Czechoslovakia\nor by indirect military pressure which in the\ncase of Rumania might take the form of\nHungarian troop concentrations. Are Poland\nand Rumania respectively prepared actively to\nresist if their own independence is threatened\nin any of these ways?\n(b) If so, Great Britain and France\nwould be prepared to come to the help of the\nthreatened State. It would be understood\nthat as a counterpart for an undertaking by\nGreat Britain and France to support Poland\nand Rumania, Poland and Rumania would keep\nGreat Britain and France fully and promptly\ninformed of any developments threatening their\nindependence.\n(c)/\n(c) The assurance offered in (b) is\ndependent upon Poland coming to the help of\nRumania if the latter is the State threatened.\nWe should wish to know whether Rumania would be\nprepared to come to the help of Poland if the\nlatter were the State threatened.\n(d) (Present section (d) of the\ncommunication is to be made to the Polish\nGovernment only since Poland, unlike Rumania,\nhas a treaty of mutual assistance with France\nand is a stronger military power than Rumania).\nThe undertaking given by Great Britain and\nFrance under (b) would be given as part of a\nreciprocal arrangement by which if Great\nBritain or France were attacked by Germany or\nif they went to war with Germany to resist\nGerman aggression anywhere in Western Europe\nor Yugo-Slavia, Poland would come to their help.\nIf the position of Poland and\nRumania can be consolidated Turkey and Greece\ncould more easily be rallied to the common\ncause and would more likely be able to make an\neffective contribution.\nIt is important that the Polish and\nRumanian Governments should be made aware of\nthe manner in which we would preserve the\ninterest of the Soviet Union in this scheme.\nThe intention would be at some convenient\nmoment in the discussions to explain to the\nSoviet Government that it was proposed in\nthe first place to proceed with the\nGovernments of the two countries nearer to\nGermany/\nGermany and most likely to be affected by a\npotentially dangerous situation. In the event\nof an attack on Poland or Rumania there would\nbe good reasons on the merits of the case\nfor trying to secure some measure of Soviet\nparticipation. We believe that even the\nbenevolent neutrality of the Soviet would\nbe to the advantage of these two countries\nin case of war and that they might indeed be\ngrateful in an emergency to have at their\ndisposal such war material as the Soviet\nindustry would be in a position to furnish.\nWe are disposed in the first place to\nascertain the views of the Soviet Government\nas to their likely attitude to this market.\nIt is important not to reinforce their\ntendency towards isolation and we propose to\nconsider in due course how best to retain\ntheir close interest which is after all to\ntheir own general advantage.\nIt is essential of course that the\npresent approach to the Polish and Rumanian\nGovernments should be kept secret as well as\nany negotiations that may follow it. Once\nhowever agreement has been secured it would\nbe necessary for constitutional reasons\nthat some statement should be made in\nParliament. His Majesty's Government would at\nany rate have to state in public the\nassurances which they had given to the Polish\nand Rumanian Governments. It is possible\nthat/\nthat the Polish Government might be reluctant\nto agree to make public such counter-assurances\nas they would have given us but His Majesty's\nGovernment would certainly be pressed to say\nwhether any such counter-assurance had been\ngiven and they would very much hope to be in a\nposition to announce the fact.\nYour French colleague will receive\nsimilar instructions and you should after\nconsulting him speak to the Minister for\nForeign Affairs in the sense of the present\ntelegram.\nPsF\nquit Barlie\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nWarm Springs, Ga.,\nApril 4, 1939.\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nMR. SUMMERLIN\nI have talked with Governor\nLehman, Mayor LaGuardia and Dr.\nButler on the telephone and you\ncan now go ahead and make arrange-\nments with them.\nF.D.R.\nmemofe Mm I Hand\nfor Summerlin\nthought puhaps\nThe President Shondd\nthis called to his\nattention bafor ling\nfor warning\nEvent.\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nDIVISION OF PROTOCOL\nMarch 27, 1939.\nMemorandum for Colonel Watson:\nIn drawing up detailed plans in connection with the\nvisit of the King and Queen of Great Britain, we have come\nto the matter of visiting \"The Battery\" in New York City.\nIn one of the conferences the President stated that\nhe would get in touch with Governor Lehman and Mayor LaGuardia\nabout the kind of ceremony to be held, but last Thursday the\nPresident indicated that he had not yet written to these\nofficials, and he intimated that he might have them come to\nWashington for a short conference in regard to the matter.\nPossibly the President might wish to telephone the Governor\nand the Mayor.\nAlso, we know nothing as yet about the ceremony to\ntake place at Columbia University, in honor of the King and\nthe Queen, on the afternoon of June 10th.\nGSS\nGeorge T. Summerlin.\n-\nPSF:st. Britain\nMOST SECRET\nMESSAGE FROM LORD HALIFAX FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL\nINFORMATION OF THE PRESIDENT.\nWe do not regard Hitler's speech at\nWilhelmshaven as at all reassuring and all our\ninformation goes to show that he is irritated\nwith us for our efforts to organise a common\nresistance against his aggressive policy.\nThe German press warns us that Germany\nintends to take preventive action against the so-\ncalled \"encirclement policy\" of England. One news-\npaper even maintains that our \"effort to confine\nGermany's living space through alliances with smaller\nstates is an unprovoked attack by Britain on German\nfreedom and equality of rights\".\nOur Embassy at Berlin inform us that the\nattitude of the press accurately reflects Hitler's\nframe of mind. They add that they learn from a\nreliable source that the first sign of German intentions\nwhich will be kept secret until the last moment will be\na lightning attack on the British fleet with the object\nof delivering a knock-out blow. There will be neither\nan ultimatum nor a declaration of war but Hitler alone\nwill decide the time for action and will personally\nissue the vital order without consulting his military\nadvisers.\nWe are arranging to take suitable precautionary\nmeasures.\nBRITISH EMBASSY\nWASHINGTON, D.C.\nGRADED UNCLASSIFIED\nApril 5th, 1939.\nPSF:Gh Britain\nLondon, April 6, 1939\nDear Mr. President,\nI am enclosing herewith a most secret\nreport of British aviation and their estimate\nof German aviation. Sir Kingsley Wood, after\ntalking with the Prime Minister and Lord Hali-\nfax, decided to send this on to you for your\nown personal information. No one, not even\nthe members of the Cabinet, has this informa-\ntion in detail.\nSir Kingsley Wood wished you to have it\nfor your own information, so that you would\nhave a more complete idea of what was going\non here.\nI have not given it to anybody in this\noffice, nor have I shown it to any of the Army\nor Navy Officials. No copy is being made and\nI am not advising anybody that you have it.\nAll this is at their request.\nFaithfully yours,\nJae\nThe President,\nThe White House.\nMOST SECRET\nCopy No.1.\nMEMORANDUM ON THE BRITISH AND GERMAN AIR PROGRAMMES\n1.\nThe German Programme\nDetails of the German air programme are a well kept\nsecret. Nevertheless, a wide variety of information is\navailable to the Air Ministry from which it is possible to form\ncertain deductions. By a process of checking and cross\nchecking a reasonably firm estimate an be made of the first\nline strength* of the present German Air Force, and a forecast -\nnecessarily more conjectural - of future intentions.\n2.\nThe Air Ministry believe that the first line strength\nof the German Air Force on the 1st April 1939 was approximately\n3,750 aircraft. They also believe that, unless there is some\nradical change in German plans, the first line strength in\nFebruary 1940 will not exceed 4,500 aircraft.\nIt is believed\nto be the German aim to hold 100% of modern reserves behind this\nfirst line. These estimates are believed to be reliable; they\nfit in with the available evidence and they have been duly\ncorrelated with figures of present and estimated future German\naircraft production.\n3.\nThe Air Ministry have made a detailed analysis of the\nvery considerable mass of information available about German\naircraft production. On the basis of the most up-to-date\ninformation in their possession the Air Ministry believe that\nthe rate of production of all types of aircraft for the German\nAir Force (a figure which is generally exaggerated by visitors\nto Germany) probably averaged 700 per month during 1938 and that\na monthly average of 900 to 1,000 may be achieved in 1939. As\nthe output of first line types represents about two-thirds of\nREGRADED UNCLASSIFIED\n*\nSee note at end of Paper.\nthe total production of all types for the German Air Force the\nabove output amounts to about 7,500 first line types during the\nyear. With such an output of first line types it would be\npossible to raise the first line strength to the 4,500 mentioned\nin paragraph 2, to re-equip 50% of the existing first line and to\nraise the reserve to about 100 modern types as well as meeting\nnormal wastage requirements.\n4.\nBritish policy vis-à-vis the German air threat\nThe policy adopted by the British Government to meet\nthe situation brought about by the expansion of German and other\nair armaments was explained to the House of Commons by the\nSecretary of State for Air on 10th November, 1938. The Secret-\nary of State described our objective as an Air Force adequate\nfor our necessities: our necessities, as previously defined by\nthe Prime Minister, being the protection of the United Kingdom,\npreservation of the trade routes, defence of British territories\noverseas, and co-operation in the defence of the territories of\nour Allies in case of war. The Secretary of State added that\nthe policy aimed at producing a sound and balanced force for\nwar, adequate for our strategic necessities and with the depth\nbehind it to enable it to sustain its efforts should we be\nattacked.\n5.\nIt is clear from this definition that the British\nGovernment do not regard parity of numbers of first line\naircraft as a satisfactory test of what is adequate for a sound\nair defence. The test of parity in first line has, in fact, no\nstrategic basis, a formidable first line, lacking depth, is no\nmore than a facade which will melt and disappear under conditions\nof war wastage*.\nAgain, the strength of the aircraft\nrequired in the different categories will vary widely from one\nwar wastage rate of 50% per month can be regarded as normal\ncountry to another. A country dependent upon its trade routes\nmust provide large numbers of aircraft for trade defence:\nanother country with large land forces must devote a correspond-\ningly large proportion of its aircraft to Army Co-operation\nduties. Even a numerical comparison of bomber forces will be\nmisleading unless due weight is given to such factors as range\nand bomb load. In fact, in comparing bomber forces total\nbomb-liftis probably a better yardstick than numerical strength.\nThese considerations show that the problem of defining what is\nnecessary for an adequate air defence system is not one to be\nresolved by asimple reference to numbers of first line aircraft;\nand this fact should be taken into account in connexion with\nthe outline of the British programme set out below.\n6.\nThe British Programme.\nBy the spring of 1940 the Metropolitan* Air Force will\nhave reached a strength of 2,370 first line aircraft. Behind\nthis first line there will be reserves amounting to nearly 150%,\nand all aircraft (including reserves) will be of modern types.\nThe first line will be organized in 138 squadrons: - 70 bomber\n40\nsquadrons, fighter squadrons, and 28 squadrons of Army Co-\noperation and General Reconnaissance aircraft. In addition some\n47 Balloon Barrage squadrons will have been created.\nBy the same date the Royal Air Force abroad will\nconsist of some 500 first line aircraft stationed at the vital\nstrategic points on the Empire trade routes. The overseas\nsquadrons will also be equipped with war reserves.\nMention should also be made of the Fleet Air Arm which\nis expected to reach a first line strength of about 500 early\nin 1940.\nThe exact strength will, however, depend on the rate\nof commissioning of ships.\ni.e. that located in the United Kingdom\n7.\nImplementing the programme.\n(a) Aircraft and Engines.\nOne of the great difficulties of expansion has been\nthat the dictator countries were able to plan their programmes\nin secret, with the result that, by the time their full\nintentions had become apparent, they had received a valuable\nstart. A vast programme designed to overcome this serious\nhandicap has been planned and is now making rapid progress.\nIn 1934, when expansion began, there were 15 aircraft firms\nand 4 engine firms producing material for the Air Ministry. In\naddition to these firms - and apart from the very large\nexpansion effected in their own capacity - there are today 13\ngovernment factories manufacturing aircraft, engines, airscrews,\ncarburettors and bombs, while the general basis of production\nhas been immensely broadened by introducing into the field of\naircraft production such large engineering enterprises as\nVickers-Armstrong, Associated \"lectrical Industries, John Brown\nand Company, Messrs. Harland and Wolff, Messrs. Denny Bros., and\nthe English Electric Company. Use is also being made of some\nthousands of firms for sub-contracting work for aircraft\nproduction, designed to cover 35% as a minimum, of the total\nman-hours involved in construction. An indication of the\nextent to which the basis of airframe production has been\nexpanded, can be obtained from the following figures of\nemployment:-\nMen engaged in the airframe indumstry, including\nsub-contracting, on the following dates:-\nJanuary 1936\n30,000\nJanuary 1937\n40,000\nJanuary 1938\n50,000\nJanuary 1939\n90,000\nJanuary 1940\n170,000 (estimate)\n/(excluding)\n(excluding men employed in the production of engines, equipment\nand fittings).\nTo achieve the necessary level of production the number of\ntypes of aircraft in production has been reduced to a minimum\nand a new system adopted whereby groups of firms concentrate\non particular types.\n(b) Dominion and foreign production\nApart from the above sources of production in the\nUnited Kingdom arrangements have been made to develop production\ncapacity in Canada, where orders have been placed with the\nCanadian Associated Aircraft Ltd. and the Canadian Car & Foundry\nCo., and negotiations with a third firm are proceeding. An\nAir Ministry Mission is at present visiting Australia and New\nZealand with the purpose of negotiating similar arrangements.\nAn order has also been placed in the United States of America\nwith the object of overcoming deficiencies in certain training\nand reconnaissance types.\n(c) Deliveries and Orders.\nThe drastic measures taken to increase the basis of\naircraft production referred to earlier in this Note are now\nstarting to produce their full effect. The rate of production\nis at present in the neighbourhood of 700 per month and is\nexpected to approach 1,000 per month towards the end of the\nyear.\nFor some months past actual deliveries have tended to\noutstrip production forecasts and estimates of future production\nmay therefore be regarded as reliable. The total number of\nmilitary aircraft of all types on order by the Air Ministry (or\nfor which orders have been authorised) is in excess of\n20,000. Of this number it is anticipated that some 9,000 will\nbe delivered during the financial year 1939.\n(d) War Potential\nWhile the increase in production now being effected\nconstitute what is virtually an exercise in production on a\nwar scale, the quantities of airframes, engines and equipment\nof all kinds estimated to be required to meet wastage in war\nnaturally represent an even greater production problem.\nAccordingly in the development and creation of productive\ncapacity for the current programme, close attention has been\ngiven to the war supply problem and allowance made for the\ngreater demands for war. Plans are being developed not only\nfor increasing the productive capacity of the professional\nindustry and its present outside helpers, but also for securing\nthe assistance of further outside organisations. Perhaps the\nmost important factor in obtaining an immediate increase in\nproduction on the outbreak of war is the existence of adequate\njigs and tools. To this end, orders have been placed for\nadditional jigs and tools for the new types coming into\nproduction, thus providing in advance, what, in effect, would be\nan essential instrument for additional war potential. Other\nsteps that have been taken in this direction include the\nduplication of existing factories that are located in vulnerable\nsituations, and the provision of increased capacity for the\nproduction of light metal strip and sheet, which will represent\na 50% increase of the total estimated British output of\naluminium alloys.\n(e) Personnel.\nOne of the most remarkable features of the expansion\nhas been the response to the recruiting programme. In 1934\nthe strength of the regular air force was some 30,500, of whom\n2,900 were trained pilots and 300 were under training as pilots.\nBy the Spring of this year the corresponding figures will be\n104,000, including 6,800 trained pilots and 1,650 under training\nas pilots; and by the Spring of 1940 it is estimated that the\nstrength will be 130,000, of whom 8,300 will be trained pilots\nand 1,650 under training as pilots.\nService flying training\nis already being undertaken at over 40 civil and service schools.\nGreat assistance has been afforded by the Dominions in the\nmatter of candidates for flying posts in the Royal Air Force.\nSubstantial progress has also beenmade in the vital matter of\nbuilding up an adequate reserve of pilots. The total of\nreserve pilots (including pilots under training) has been\nraised from 1,400 in April, 1934 to a present level of roughly\n5,000, while a strength of 8,300 will be achieved by April,\n1940.\nIn addition some 4,000 pupils are at present undergoing\ntraining in the Civil Air Guard, and the total by April 1940,\nshould be at least 5,000.\nApart from pilots, all classes of the reserves are\nbeing strengthened and new categories created where necessary.\nThe total personnel reserves of all classes (including\nAuxiliary personnel), which numbered some 10,600 in 1934, will\nhave been raised to nearly 96,000 by 1940.\n(f) The post-1940 programme\nFurther stages of the programme, in the financial\nyears 1940 and 1941, although making only a relatively small\nchange in first line strength will profoundly increase the\nwar strength of the force. During these two years there will be\na concentration on re-armament with new and more powerful types\nof aircraft and the provision of yet greater depth of reserves.\nAt the end of the period the Metropolitan Air Force will possess\na hitting power and endurance out of all proportion to the\nForce which will exist in 1940.\nCost of the Programme.\nAn index of the magnitude of the effort now being\nis afforded by comparison of the level of Air expenditure\nsuccessive financial years, as follows: -\nMillion.\n1933 (pre-Expansion)\n16-3\n1934 (Scheme A)\n173\n1935 (Scheme c)\n27½\n1936 (Scheme F)\n50\n1937\n814 *\n1938 (Scheme L)\n126¹ (estimated)\n1939 (Present Scheme)\n2081 (estimated)\ncluding a proportion from the Defence Loan.\nNOTE ON FIRST LINE STRENGTH\nAs the term \"first line strength\" is employed in\ndifferent senses by different authorities it is necessary to\ndefine the sense in which the phrase is employed in the fore-\ngoing memorandum and elsewhere in Air Ministry announcements.\nThe aircraft provided for a Royal Air Force squadron\nfall into four categories:- (1) the Initial Equipment aircraft,\n(2) the Immediate Reserve, (3) the Workshop Reserve, and (4) the\nStored Reserve. Only \"Initial Equipment\" aircraft are operated,\nand the various categories of reserves are maintained to ensure\nthat the \"Initial Equipment\" is kept up to establishment in\npeace and war. Thus the \"Immediate Reserve\" represents a\nreserve of aircraft kept with a squadron to make good loss by\ncrashes, etc; the \"Workshop Reserve\", as the name implies,\nthat margin of aircraft which experience shows will normally\nbe under repair at any one time. Finally, the \"Stored Reserve\"\nis the provision made to meet war wastage until such time as\nit is covered by war production.\nThe \"Initial Equipment\" of a squadron is thus its\n\"first line\"; and all other aircraft which are provided for the\nsquadron, though identical in type with the initial equipment\naircraft, have no other function than to preserve the first\nline intact against wastage. The first line strength of a\nsquadron is thus the number of initial equipment aircraft it\npossesses - a number standardised for each type of squadron.\nThe first line strength of the whole Air Force is the aggregate\nof the initial equipment of all operational squadrons. The first\nline strength thus excludes reserves of all categories and\ntraining aircraft of all categories.\n1.\nPSF\nfor\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nPR\nWarm Springs, Ga.,\nApril 7, 1939.\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nMR. SUMMERLIN\nWill you speak to me\nabout this?\nF. D. R.\nPARTMENT OF RECEIVED STATE\nii ??\n841.001 GEORGE VI/457\nMAY 3 AM\nAND RECORDS ACCATIONS\n1939\nColumbia University\ninthe Sity of NewPork\nPRESIDENT'S ROOM\nApril 4, 1939\nTo The President\nWhite House\nWashington, D. C.\nMy dear Mr. President:\nIt was most kind of you to take the trouble to\ntelephone me yesterday evening from Warm Springs to tell\nme of the arrangements you are making for the visit of\nthe King and Queen to New York City and to Columbia Uni-\nversity. The arrangements as you have outlined them seem\nwholly admirable and we shall do our best to meet your\nwishes and expectations. The plan you propose for the\nreception at Columbia University is ideal. Granted good\nweather, the occasion may well be a memorable one to\nrecord and to remember.\nAs I said by telephone, it is particularly appro-\npriate that Their Majesties should come to Columbia since\nthis corporation was founded by Royal Charter under date\nof October 31, 1754, as King's College in the Province of\nNew York. Their Majesties may see not only the original\nCharter but the iron King's Crown which accompanied it, a\nreproduction of which we so often use upon our official\npublications and stationery. Everything can readily be\nF 841.001 GEORGE VI/457\naccomplished in fifteen minutes as you propose and there-\n-2-\nfore there will be no appreciable delay in Their Majesties'\nmotor trip from the World's Fair to Hyde Park.\nI assume that the Protocol Division of the State\nDepartment will keep me advised if additional information\ncartin\nreaches them or in case there should be any change whatever\nin the arrangement.\nIt occurs to me to suggest that perhaps it might be\nple asanter for Their Majesties to leave the West Side Parkway\nat 72nd Street and then to drive east into Central Park at\nthe 72nd Street entrance, swinging around southward and then\nnorthward on the east side of the Park, until they should\nleave it at 110th Street and Lenox Avenue, at which point\nthey would swing over toward the East River to take the\nTriborough Bridge to the World's Fair. This little detour\nwould not take more than five to eight minutes but would\nshow them Central Park in its best early summer guise, and\nwould bring them near enough to many of the distinguished\nhigh buildings of that portion of the city to give a pretty\nvivid impression of them. The drive east through 110th\nStreet would, I fear, be a rather tiresome alternative as\nthere would be practically nothing characteristic of the\ncity for Their Majesties to see.\nWith warmest regards and every good wish, I am\nSincerely yours,\nC\nhave Parther\nJune 20, 1939.\nMy dear Dr. Butler:\nThank you very much for your letter of\nJune twelfth concerning the visit to Columbia\nUniversity of Their Majesties the King and Queen\nof Great Britain.\nI had heard that all had gone splendidly\nconcerning their visit there, and am glad to\nhave this confirmation.\nMay I take this occasion to express my appre-\nciation of your fine contribution to the success\nof the visit.\nVery sincerely yours,\nNicholas Murray Butler, Ph.D.,\nPresident, Columbia University,\nNew York, New York.\nJune 12, 1939\nThe President\nWhite House\nWashington, D. C.\nMy dear Mr. President:\nYou will be glad to know that the visit to\nColumbia University on Saturday last of Their Majesties,\nthe King and Queen of Great Britain, was quite perfect\nin every detail. The very admirable and entirely\nrepresentative audience assembled in honor of Their\nMajesties was deeply moved, and the impression pro-\nduced will last through the lifetime of each one of\nthem.\nYou and the country as a whole are to be\ncongratulated upon the significance of this royal\nvisit. It goes far beneath the surface of things.\nIt indicates that deep down in the heart and life\nof the American people there is profound respect\nand affection for the great political traditions\nof the English-speaking peoples, which are in all\nessentials our own.\nWith renewed congratulations and every good\nwish, I am\nFaithfully yours,\nC\nNichales hundredler\nPSF: St. Britain\nHandes Mr Mmoh 3\nHnga Millar 4-8-39\nDelivered to Secretary Hull\nCONF IDENTIAL\nfor forwarding to the President at\n1.\nAs a result of conversations held in\nLondon on April 4th to April 6th, 1939 between\nthe Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs on the\none side and the Prime Minister and the Secretary\nof State for Foreign Affairs on the other the\nPolish Government and His Majesty's Government\nin the United Kingdom record the following\nconclusions:\nI.\n2.\nThe Polish Government and His Majesty's\nGovernment in the United Kingdom have decided to\nplace their collaboration on a permanent basis by\nthe exchange of reciprocal assurances of assistance.\nThey are accordingly prepared to enter into a formal\nagreement on the following basis:\na. If Germany attacks Poland His Majesty's\nGovernment in the United Kingdom will at once come\nto the help of Poland;\nb. If Germany attempts to undermine the\nindependence of Poland by processes of economic\npenetration or in any other way His Majesty's\nGovernment in the United Kingdom will support Poland\nin resistance to such attempts. If Germany then\nattacks Poland the provisions of paragraph (a)\nabove will apply. In the event of other action by\nGermany which clearly threatened Polish independence\nand was of such a nature that the Polish Government\nconsidered it vital to resist it with their national\nforces His Majesty's Government in the United\nKingdom/\nREGRADED UNCLASSIFIED\n-2-\nKingdom would at once come to the help of Poland;\nC. Poland reciprocally gives corresponding\nassurances to the United Kingdom;\nd. It is understood that the Polish Government\nand His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom\nwill keep each other fully and promptly informed\nof any developments threatening the independence\nof either country.\n3.\nAs an earnest of their intention to enter\ninto a formal agreement to render assistance to\nPoland in the circumstances contemplated above\nHis Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom\nhave informed the Polish Government and have stated\npublicly that during the period required for the\nconclusion of the formal agreement outlined in\nparagraph 2 above in the event of any action which\nclearly threatened Polish independence and which the\nPolish Government accordingly considered it vital to\nresist with their national forces, His Majesty's\nGovernment in the United Kingdom would feel\nthemselves bound at once to lend the Polish\nGovernment all support in their power.\n4.\nThe Polish Government for their part give\nHis Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom a\nreciprocal undertaking to the same effect which is,\nin the same way as the undertaking given by His\nMajesty's Government, already in force and will\nremain in force during the period required for the\nconclusion of the formal agreement outlined in\nparagraph 2 above.\nII./\n-3-\nII.\n5.\nThe following points remain to be settled\nbefore the formal agreement can be concluded:\na. His Majesty's Government desire that the\nformal agreement should provide that if the United\nKingdom and France went to war with Germany to\nresist German aggression in Western Europe (the\nNetherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark) Poland\nwould come to their help. (M. Beck appreciated the\nvital importance of this question for the United\nKingdom and undertook that the Polish Government\nwould take it into serious consideration.)\nb. The obligations which His Majesty's\nGovernment have accepted towards Poland during the\nthe\nperiod necessary for the conclusion of A formal agreement\nhave also been accepted by France. It is understood\nthat the obligations to be accepted by His Majesty's\nGovernment in the formal agreement itself should\nalso be accepted by France; the method of arranging\nfor this would be a matter for discussion with the\nFrench Government.\nIII.\n6.\nHis Majesty's Government wished it to be\npart of the formal agreement that Poland should come\nto the help of Rumania if the latter were the State\nthreatened. The Polish Government, while respecting\nto the full the obligations of mutual assistance\nwhich exist between Poland and Rumania, thought it\npremature to express a definite opinion as to the\ndesirability of including the case of Rumania in the\nformal agreement. They consider that they should\ntreat/\n-4-\ntreat the matter in the first instance directly\nwith the Rumanian Government and the Hungarian\nGovernment. They will in the meantime immediately\nconsult His Majesty's Government should developments\nin relation to Rumania or Hungary render this\ndesirable.\nIV.\n7.\nIt is understood between the Polish\nGovernment and His Majesty's Government that the\nconclusions recorded above do not preclude either\nGovernment from making further agreements with other\ncountries for the purpose of safeguarding their own\nindependence or that of other States.\n8.\nIt is the intention of His Majesty's\nGovernment in the United Kingdom for their part:\na. to continue the exchange of views which\nthey have already initiated with the Rumanian\nGovernment with the object of developing collaboration\nbetween the United Kingdom and Rumania and other\npowers for the purposes set forth above;\nb. to initiate exchanges of views for a similar\npurpose with the Governments of other members of\nthe Balkan Entente.\n9.\nHis Majesty's Government while realizing\nthe difficulties standing in the way of associating\nthe Soviet Government with action such as is\ncontemplated above are further persuaded of the\nimportance of maintaining the best possible relations\nwith the Soviet Government whose position in this\nmatter could not be disregarded.\n10.\nThe Polish Government for their part\ndeclare/\n-5-\ndeclare that should His Majesty's Government in the\nUnited Kingdom assume further obligations in Eastern\nEurope these obligations would in no way extend the\nobligations undertaken by Poland.\n11.\nThe Polish Government emphasize the\nimportance, in the consideration of any attempt to\ndevelop collaboration, of taking into account the\nposition of the Eastern Baltic States.\nBRITISH EMBASSY,\nWASHINGTON, D. C.,\nApril 8th, 1939.\nPSF\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nApril 10, 1939.\nASK UNDERSECRETARY WELLES AND MR. SUMMERLIN\nThe President would like to order\nfive sets of his books in sheets, have\nthem specially bound in full morocco\nwith the seal of the country or the\nroyal family and the Presidential seal\nboth on the front cover. He would\nlike to give them to the two Crown\nPrinces, the President of Nicaragua,\nPresident de Valera and the King.\nWhat do you think of the idea, the\nState Department to pay for them.\nAlso Mrs. Roosevelt to have one of\nher books specially bound for the\nCrown Princesses, Madame Samoza,\nMrs. de Valera (?) and the Queen.\nPSF are\nEX\nBarta\nfile\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nMay 16, 1939.\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nTHE PUBLIC PRINTER\nThe enclosed is what we are\ngoing to use on the books for the\nKing and Queen. For the set of the\nPresident's books you will use the\nCrown with G. R. I. underneath it\nand for the Queen's book - THIS\nIS MY STORY - you will use the\nCrown with E. R. underneath it.\nYou will note how they arrange the\ninitials.\nI hope this is clear.\nMany thanks,\nfee\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nBriter\nDIVISION OF PROTOCOL\nMEMORANDUM\nJune 3, 1939\nMiss Tully,\nThe White House.\nIn answer to your request for our suggestions\nconcerning inscriptions to be used on the book the\nPresident is to present to King George VI, and on\nthe book Mrs. Roosevelt is to present to Queen\nElizabeth, I would suggest that for the King's book\nthe President use either \"To George VI from his Good\nFriend,\" or \"To my Good Friend George VI with my warm\nand sincere greetings.\"\nFor the Queen's book, I would suggest that Mrs.\nRoosevelt use \"To Queen Elizabeth from Eleanor Roosevelt,\"\nor \"To Queen Elizabeth with sincere greetings from\nEleanor Roosevelt.\"\nGHI\nGeorge T. Summerlin\nSw\nPR: WOODWARD MEM\n[4-20-39\nPSFiDreat Britain\nLONDON. - PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN ANNOUNCED IN COMMONS BRITAIN'S\nLATEST IMPORTANT STEP TOWARDS WAR PREPARATION--CREATION OF A MINISTRY OF\nSUPPLY.\nTHE MINISTRY WOULD TAKE OVER WAR STORES AND WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE\nFOR PURCHASE AND MAINTENANCE OF RESERVES OF ESSENTIAL METALS AND\nOTHER RAW MATERIALS FOR DEFENSE.\nTHE NEW MINISTER WILL BE LESLIE BURGIN, LIBERAL NATIONAL, WHO WILL\nHAVE FULL CABINET RANK. HE WAS FORMERLY PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY OF THE\nBOARD OF TRADE AND NOW IS MINISTER OF TRANSPORT WITHIN THE CABINET.\nTHE MINISTRY OF SUPPLY, CHAMBERLAIN SAID, WILL DEAL WITH PROBLEMS\nOF SUPPLYING THE ARMY, WHICH HAVE BECOME MORE PRESSING BY THE RECENT\nDECISION TO INCREASE THE ARMY'S STRENGTH, NOTABLY AN INCREASE OF THE\nTERRITORIAL ARMY (HOME GUARD) TO 340,000 MEN.\nHE ADDED THAT THE MINISTRY WOULD ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR CERTAIN\nWAR STORES WHICH THE WAR OFFICE NOW SUPPLIES TO THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE\nAS WELL AS THE ARMY.\nCHAMBERLAIN INDICATED THAT THE MINISTRY IN TIME OF EMERGENCY WOULD\nBE TRANSFORMED INTO A MINISTRY OF MUNITIONS, HAVING THE POWER TO\nENFORCE PRIORITY FOR GOVERNMENT ARMS ORDERS.\nTHE NEW MINISTRY WILL TAKE OVER FROM THE WAR OFFICE THE BRANCHES\nRESPONSIBLE FOR RESEARCH IN DESIGNING EXPERIMENT, PRODUCTION,\nINSPECTION AND ROYAL ORDNANCE FACTORIES,\nCHAMBERLAIN'S ANNOUNCEMENT WAS EVIDENCE THAT A BIRTHDAY MESSAGE\nOF CONGRATULATION WHICH KING GEORGE SENT TODAY TO ADOLF HITLER WAS NOT\nAN INDICATION OF A WEAKENING OF BRITAIN'S EFFORTS FOR AN ANTI-AGG-\nRESSION FRONT OR ITS URGENT RE-ARMAMENT.\nCHAMBERLAIN DISCLOSED THAT A NEW MINISTER OF TRANSPORT WILL BE\nAPPOINTED WHEN HE TOLD A QUESTIONER IN COMMONS; \"OBVIOUSLY THE MINISTER\nOF SUPPLY COULD NOT ALSO CARRY ON THE DUTIES OF MINISTER OF TRANSPORT.\n4/20--R1228P\n1\n[1939]\nMemo to the President\nFrom Cordell Hull\nMay 16, 1939\nAttaches two statements of the British\non the Jewish-Palestine situation\naccompanied by an analysis of their\nproposals. Pres. reply to Hull of May 17, 1939\nSee Palestine folder-Foreign file-Drawer 1-1939\n25 F great Britain\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nMay 18, 1939.\nMEMO. FOR MISS. TULLY.\nREMINDER TO CALL COL. HALSEY.\nTEL. & TEL.\nMC*\nMEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT\nI spoke with Colonel Halsey this\nmorning and told him that you and\nMrs. Roosevelt had suggested asking\nthe wives. He said the space would\nnot permit asking many more people\nand that they thought only of asking\nMrs. Garner and Mrs. Bankhead. They\nhave it under consideration but are\nmuch afraid they will run into all\nkinds of difficulties unless they are\nable to ask all of the wives.\nThis letter declared\nby the Presedent for\nGeneral Watson's signature\nMay 24, 1939.\nMy dear Bishop Manning:-\nThe President asks me to\nthank you for your letter of May twenty-\nthird. The program of the King and Queen\nfor Saturday, June tenth, was under dis-\ncussion for several months and the problem\npresented was that of outting down the\nmany appealing visits which many of us\nwanted our guests to make in the City of\nNew York.\nThe time was limited\nby the earliest hour they could leave the\nWorld's Fair and the latest hour they\ncould arrive at the President's house at\nHyde Park in time for dinner. This has\nmeant that there will be time only to\nstop for about ten minutes at Columbia\nUniversity where the King and Queen will\nview the original Charter of King's\nCollege, the predecessor of Columbia.\nI understand, however,\nthat the route to be taken will pass the\nCathedral. I regret that it is impossible\nto make any change at this time.\nVery sincerely yours,\nSecretary to the President\nThe Right Reverend William T. Manning,\nBishop of New York,\n1021 Amsterdam Avenue,\nNew York, N. Y.\nDiorese of New York\nTHE BISHOP'S OFFICE\nTHE SYNOD HOUSE\n1021 AMSTERDAM AVENUE, NEW YORK CITY\nMay 23rd, 1939\nThe Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,\nPresident of the United States.\nMy dear Mr. President:\nAt a meeting of the Board of Trustees of the\nCathedral of St. John the Divine held to-day, May 23rd, a\nresolution was adopted requesting me to write and ask you\nif it can be arranged for Their Majesties, the King and\nQueen of Great Britain to stop for a few minutes at the\nCathedral when they are here in New York.\nAs a Trustee of the Cathedral you will I am sure\nfeel as fully as we do the appropriateness of this,\nespecially in view of the close relations between the\nEpiscopal Church and the Church of England.\nOn their way to Columbia University the King and\nQueen will pass right by the doors of the Cathedral and a\nbrief stop could therefore be arranged without any dis-\nturbance of the program and with practically no delay.\nThe Trustees will very greatly appreciate it if\nyou can arrange this for us and a letter which I have re-\nceived from the Archbishop of Canterbury gives me every\nreason to believe that such an arrangement will be quite\nacceptable to the King and Queen.\nFaithfully yours,\nWilliam J. Manning\nBishop of New York.\nPSF great\nBritaci\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nJune 3, 1939.\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nMRS. HELM\nThe pionic list at Hyde\nPark is O.K. emcept for the\none change I have indicated --\nThe Secretary of the Treasury\nand Mrs. Morgenthau come before\nBishop Tucker.\nF.D.R.\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nJune 3, 1939.\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nMRS. HELM\nTHE POTOMAC LIST IS O.K.\nF.D.R.\nfile llwen\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nJune 3, 1939.\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nMRS. HELM\nWhy 1s Lady Nunburnholme\nleft off the list for the Tea\non Friday afternoon, June ninth?\nShe is staying in the house.\nF.D.R.\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nJune 3, 1939.\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nMRS. HELM\nAdmiral Byrd does not occupy\nany official position, as he is on\nthe Retired list and not an employee\nof the Government. I have numbered\nthe others the way they should rank.\nyou R si 7\n/\n#\n/ / HOMEL /\n24\nHO\nLine\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nJune 3, 1939.\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nMRS. HELM\nWill you put General and Mrs.\nWatson right after Secretary and\nMrs. Early, and put Captain Callaghan\nright after Dr. McIntire?\nF. D. R.\n/ /\n/\n// / THE / MOUNT\n&\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nJune 3, 1939.\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nMRS. HELM\nHow about Franklin, Jr.\nfor one of the dinners at Hyde\nPark?\nF. D. R.\nPSF quat\nBritain\nLE CONVOI ROYAL\n[6-11-39]\nCANADA\nDran Mr President.\nGesterday I found\na most delightful present,\nWhen lgot back to the train.\nI could not have used\nanything which could hase\ngiven her here pleasure\nIshale value it all hey\nlife as a websents of a bey\nhonderful Event an hold\nhistory!\nFurther than that\n190 away with a Sicture\nof a huly Corable family\nradiating such a Lappy\njoyful atmosphere = an\natmosphere which hurst\nblen all (tore who are\npriviliged to Enter in\nas one of those prinleys\nones - it will always zelues\nthe as a treasured back\nground to a honderful four\ndays visit\nI hut, M: President,\nthat [on hill torgin this\nfrank hat very Sincere\nand Lumble tribute from\none the has gained a freat\ndeal of happy hope to the\nfuture from this visit\nwith deepect respect\nL\n1.\nto you, Mr. President.\nlaw.\nGr. huts.\nAutie\nUNITED STATES\nPOSTAGE\n3. NTS\nROYAL TRAIN JUNE 11 R.P.O.\nRAILWA\nMAIL\n1939\nU.S.A.\nSERVICE\nThe\nNEW WORLDS YORK FAIR 1939\nPresident\nof the United States\nof america\nThe white Hour\nquis\nWashing ton\nD.C.\nPSF great\nBritais\n-\nfill\nand\nThe Canada Royal Train\nJune 124/39\nDear her Pressurity\nwill you\nplease accept my most\nSincere thanks for your\nf hospitality during our historic\nVisit to your country σ for\nthe portrait of Jourself & is\nCharming inscreption which\nfor were so good as 15\nSend me.\nwe all have Grought away\nwith us the most pleaswable memores of our\nvisit 19 + my family will always treasure\nthe portrait as a lasting Thefor souvenies\nof our stay in your hospitable land\nBelive The Junes very survey\nGeo.\nTo Prodent Roosevert\nPersonal\nCANADA\nPOLITY JUN\nIIII\n43\n3\nTo The Presedent CANADA of the limited\nStates of america\nWhite House\nWashington\nW.S.A.\nPSF PS F\nGreat Brilain\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nJune 14, 1939\nMEI ORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:\nAttached are copies of letters to\nand from Mr. Bernheim which have to do\nwith the silver frames for the President's\nphotographs for the Pres. of Nicaragua and\nthe King of England.\nR.F. Bruns\nApril 19, 1939\nMy dear Mr. Bernheim:\nI am sending on this copy of the\nPresident's seal which is to be placed on the\nsilver frame for the President's picture, just\nas the Roosevelt crest goes on the frame for\nMrs. Roosevelt's picture.\nA photograph of the President goes\nto you under separate cover today. This is\nbeing sent so that you may have the proper\nmeasurements. The President has asked that\nthe picture be framed close, leaving suffi-\ncient room at the bottom for his signature.\nWill you please return both photo-\ngraphs as soon as you have taken the measure-\nments, as they will have to be autographed\nbefore they are framed. Will you also return\nthis cut of the President's seal.\nThis order is for one frame for the\nPresident's picture and one frame for Mrs.\nRoosevelt's picture, in case I have not made\nit clear. Of course these C ests go at the\ntop of the frames, in the center. Needless\nto say, we need these frames as soon as possible.\nSincerely yours,\nMrs. J. M. Helm\nSecretary to Mrs. Roosevelt\nMr. M. Bernheim\n347 Fifth Avenue\nNew York, N. Y.\nEnclosure\nCOPY\nApril 20, 1939\nDear Mr. Bernheim:\nI have just consulted with Miss Tully, the President's\nSecretary, who tells me that the President wishes that his\nphotograph be framed in fairly close, leaving enough white on\neither side proportionately and at the top to make it attractive.\nThere should be enough white left at the bottom to enable him to\ninscribe a long name and his signature.\nYou are to make one frame to fit the President's picture\nand one frame to fit Mrs. Roosevelt's picture. The frame for the\nPresident's picture is to have his seal, a likeness of which was\nsent you yesterday, engraved in the center of the frame at the top.\nCan this seal be reduced sufficiently to bring in the details and\nnot make too wide a frame?\nMrs. Roosevelt's picture is to be framed the same as the\nPresident's, with white on either side, at the top and sufficient\nat the bottom to allow for a name and signature. The frame for\nher picture is to have the Roosevelt crest, which you have already,\nengraved in the center of the frame at the top.\nThe photograph of the President that you now have is the\none he wished to be used as a sample. However, to avoid any possible\nerror, I am sending you the actual photograph which he will autograph\nlater and which will be framed in the frame you are making.\nAs soon as you have finished with both photographs of the\nPresident and the one of Mrs. Roosevelt, will you return them to me, as\nthese are the only photographs that I have and it is imperative that\nnothing befall them. The frames are to be sent to me at the White\nHouse as soon as they are ready. The bill for the frames is to be\nsent to the State Department in Washington, attention of Hon. George\nT. Summerlin. If this is not perfectly clear, would you mind tele-\nphoning me.\nSincerely yours,\nMrs. J. M. Helm\nSecretary to Mrs. Roosevelt\nMr. M. Bernheim\n347 Fifth Avenue\nNew York, N. Y.\nCOPY\nWOODSIDE STERLING CO.\n347 Fifth Avenue\nNew York, N.Y.\nApril 22, 1939\nMrs. J. M. Helm\nWhite House\nWashington, D.C.\nDear Mrs. Helm:\nI have both your letters of the 20th and 21st before me, and am\nvery sure that we understand you perfectly. The two frames have\nbeen put in work and the photographs themselves will be returned\nto you by insured mail on Monday. How, in regard to a few tech-\nnical details.\nThe silver on the frame for the President's picture will be one\ninch wide, which is not too wide for a frame of this size, and at\nthe same time will allow for engraving EN the President's shield\nin all its detail. The silver on the frame for Mrs. Roosevelt's\nphotograph will be 7/8 of an inch wide. You were quite right in\nassuming that we have a copy of the Roosevelt Crest.\nIn regard to the backs on the frames, unless it does not meet with\nyour approval, these will be made of bakalite. This is superior\nto velvet, inasmuch as the frame can be cleaned without soiling\nthe back, and there is no chance of its becoming loose or warped\nas is often the case where there is a velvet back.\nWe expect to make shipment of both of these frames by the latter\npart of next week, which we hope will be in ample time for your needs.\nSincerely,\nM. Bernheim\nCOPY\nApril 24, 1939\nMy dear Mr. Bernheim:\nThank you very much for your letter\nin regard to the frames. I have passed on this\nletter to Miss Tully, who will show it to the\nPresident. It will be perfectly all right to\nmake the backs of the frames of bakelite.\n*******\nSincerely yours,\nMrs. J. M. Helm\nSecretary to Mrs. Roosevelt\nCOPY\nWOODSIDE STERLING CO.\n347 5th Ave.\nApril 29, 1939\nMrs. J. M. Helm\nThe White House\nDear Mrs. Helm:\nAs is not unusual in special order work, we were somewhat delayed\nin making these two special frames, but the result has proved\nvery satisfactory. They are both finished and now comes the\nquestion of engraving. In one of your letters, you asked that\nwe be sure that they get all the detail of the President's shield.\nIn going over the matter with the engraver, who by the way makes\na specialty of this sort of work, he tells us that while all the\ndetail can be put in by engraving it flat, the effect will be\nmore or less lost. On the other hand, the background is cut away,\ngiving the shield a raised effect, thus making the detail come\nout strongly and clearly. Now as to the cost. The flat engraving\nwill cost approximately $15.00 while the style suggested by the\nengraver will cost about $22.00. Inasmuch as this will be held\nup until we hear from you, would you let us have an answer quickly.\nWe have told our engraver to hold himself in readiness for this\njob, and he will stop any work he may have on hand. So you see,\nit will only be a short time before we make shipment after hearing\nfrom you.\nSincerely,\nMay 6, 1939\nMEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:\nWe will need another frame for the\nPresident's picture for the King.\nIs it all right to order it now?\nMRS. HELM\nN.B. Miss Tully said \"Yes\" and it was ordered\nas per letter of May 6th.\nMay 6, 1939\nDear Mr. Bernheim:\n******\nThere will be two more frames to be made ⑉ one\nfor the President's photograph just as you made this past\none, and one for Mrs. Roosevelt's picture which I will\nhave to have made just the right size to fit the frame.\nWill you please let me know exactly the dimensions it\nshould be.\n-*******\nSincerely yours,\nMrs. J. M. Helm\nSecretary to Mrs. Roosevelt\nWOODSIDE STERLING CO.\n347 Fifth Avenue\nMay 8, 1939\nMrs. J. M. Helm\nThe White House\nDear Mrs. Helm:\nIt was very nice of you to let us know that the frames proved\nsatisfactory. It is just too bad there was all the misunder-\nstanding.\nWe have put the two frames that you ordered in work, and would\nappreciate so much your letting us know just when you wish same\ndelivered. In regard to the President's seal, we still have\nthe original here and would like to keep it until the second\nframe is finished so that we may check all the detail. However\nwe have a copy of it and if you want yours back, we will gladly\nsend it.\n******\nSincerely yours,\nM. Bernheim\nMay 9, 1939\nMy dear Mr. Bernheim:\nCertainly, keep the President's seal until\nthe second frame is finished in order to check all\nthe details.\n*****\nI am sending on today by insured mail the\nPresident's photograph for the large frame that you\nare making. I think it will be easier for you to put\nthis in the frame and return it framed for the Presi-\ndent's autograph.\nI have asked Harris & Ewing to send you Mrs.\nRoosevelt's photograph as soon as it is finished, for\nyou to frame and return to me for her autograph. Will\nyou please deliver these as soon as they are finished.\nSincerely yours,\nMrs. J. M. Helm\nSecretary to Mrs. Roosevelt\nRSF great\nBritan.\nTHE ROYAL CANADA TRAIN June 14.1939.\nDear Mr President,\nI am so my song\nthat oning to the rush at the\nlast moment I had to get\ninto the hain without saving\nfoodbye to you. - In thanking\nyou for the quat Kindness and\nhospitality which you extanded\nme, may I also add that\nit the memory the oceasion\nwill Eur mmain with me.\nI am apaid that I\ndid not have the opportunity\nof Ca anking you for the\nmy Kind sift of your\nblutopaph which I shall\nlicasure as a heppy\nSoursnir if a must delight\nful and unique visit.\nBelieve me\nm dear MY President\nJunes sincerely\nPeris Lagh.\nPersonal\nTHE\nCANADA\nRU\n1939\nJ\nass\nCE\nCA\nThe Prident\nPOSTES\nCENT POSTAGE\n1\n2\nCENTS\nUnited Statis A America\nthe White House\nwashington\nD.S.\nPSF quat Britain\nTHE ROYAL TRAIN\nCANADA\nJuneisth 1939.\nDear Mr President\nI should like\nonce again to thank\nyou very much for your\nkindness to me, for\nyour gift of asiqued\nphoto graph of yourself.\nThis I shall always\nvalue sheep bq me in\nhours. memory of some happy\nBelieve me, Mr President,\nYour Kapecifully\nH.E.Y. Y. White\nPenoval\nCANADA\nROA RO TAL JUN TR 15 AIN Z\n6 PM TRANNING\nyes\nCANADA\n3\n3\nMe President of the United Stales\nof america\nThe White House\nWashington\nDC.\nU.S.A.\nT\nJune 15, 1939.\nDear Bill:-\nI am especially glad that Eugene Ware's\npoetry has been put together in a book -- and\nthankful to you for sending it to me. I have\nknown some of the verses -- and it has seemed to\nme that in some ways \"Ironquill\" has much of\nthe combined philosophy of two other friends of\nmine -- William Allen White and will Rogers.\nIt is worth preserving and fostering it.\nI wish you could have met the young\ncouple from England. They had a real under-\nstanding not only of foreign affairs but also\nof social problems. I think they enjoyed the\nrather successful mixture of adequate formality,\nplus informal family life, which we managed to\nwork out for them during those four days.\nAs ever yours,\nWilliam Allen White, Esq.,\nThe Emporia Gasette,\nEmporia,\nKansas.\nTHE EMPORIA GAZETTE\nJune 8, 1939\nDear Miss LeHand:\nI am sending the president a book\nthat 1 think he will enjoy. It is not a\nserious book. It is a book of verse, gay,\nhumorous. beautiful and It sometimes is written satirical by an an ar and man, a\ngrand old man who died a quarter of a cen-\ntury ago. Enclosed I am sending a letter\nto go with the book and I am doing so be-\ncause at one time or another the President\nhas suggested this way as a sure way to\nget to him.\nto A White Respectfully yours\nTHE EMPORIA GAZETTE\nBritain\nW.A. WHITE, EDITOR AND OWNER\nK. W. DAVIDSON. BUSINESS MANAGER\nEMPORIA, KANSAS\nJune 8, 1939\nMy dear Mr. President:\nWhat you need just now is a little poetry. You are\ngoing too hard and too seriously. So I am sending you a book\nof verse written by a Kansan, Eugene F. Ware, former Commissioner\nof Pensions under Theodore Roosevelt. T. R. greatly admired\nEugene Ware and used to quote these verses on many occasions in\nprivate conversation.\nPutnam's are bringing out a new edition and I have\nwritten a little introduction for this new edition. I have\nmarked in the Table of Contents some of the verses that I think\nyou might read happily. They are gay, satirical, sometimes a\nbit tragic but always most humorous and frequently full of the\nrobust humor that men had in the seventies, eighties, nineties,\nof the old century. It was not Elizabethian but it had the\nsame gusto.\nBefore closing will you permit one who differed with\nyou about the court plan and who bats his eyes and swallows and\ngasps a bit as our debts mount to say that I think you did one\nswell job entertaining the King and Queen from England. No\nother President in my memory, excepting Theodore Roosevelt ond\npossibly Benjamin Harrison, could have given such social\ndistinction as you gave to the occasion of this week. I'll bet\nyou sent George VI home wondering what George III was thinking\nabout to overlook this American bet. With warm personal regards,\nI am\nPresident Franklin D. Roosevelt\nWhite House, Washington, D. C.\nAlways WAWhite most cordially yours,\nWAW/AS\nfile\nR.M.S. Empress of Baitan\nat Sea:\nPS F, Bilani\nHalifasc N.S. to\nSr.Johns, Newtaundland.\n16th th June, 1939.\nDear m ! President,\nConditions in the tram and\nthe somembat full programme\nof the last few days in Canadar\nhave priched me hom writing\na letter to which I gni areat\nimportance\nIt is very difficult for me\nto commy the quat pleasure 2\nfelt on receiving from you your\nphotograph. I shall always\nvalue it, not only as a rememberance\nof having the honour of meeting\nyou Sir, but also as a mements\nof the historic visit of Then\nmajostics to your very great country.\nIt mill bring to my mind the\npicture of H Potomac folying\nthe Presidential and Rmal Standards\nat the Same time; sunch a sight\nof the atmost significance in their\ntimes. and not H least to\nhelp me to recollect they de Park\nand a family who made me\nLeel immediately \"at 'home in a strange\ncountry and in enicumstances\nwhich H. world generally would\nnot Himh such a conditions easiy\nachenid.\nIdo thank 20 McProsident. for\nHis photograph and for m star in\nH. United states of America from th\nbotton of my hant.\nYours sincerely\nh.th\nNEWFOUNDLAND\nNEWFOUNDLAND\nPLYMOUTH\nJNE\nSTACE 3\nPOSTAGE\nPOSTAGE\nPOSTAGE\nPO\nOT\nDEVUN.\nA.\n910)\nTHREE CENTS\n36\n2 TWO CENTS\n2\nS\nThe President of the\nUnited states of America,\nThe White House,\nU.S.A.\nWashmigton,\nD.C.\nJune 22, 1939.\nDear Mrs. Helm:-\nI know how happy you must be\nto be back in Grayville after the hectic\nweeks which ended the so-called social season.\nI want to tell you that I fully realize what\ndifficult days they were for you and that I\nappreciate and am grateful for the fine work\nwhich you and the Social Bureau did.\nI do hope you will have a\ngrand Summer.\nMy very best wishes to you,\nAlways sincerely,\nMrs. James M. Helm,\nGrayville,\nIllinois.\nJune 22, 1939.\nDear Gus:-\nI want to send you this personal note\nto tell you what an excellent job I think you\ndid on the books and frames for the Royal\nvisitors. They were perfect in every detail\nand we were all much pleased with them. Many\nthanks to you and your Staff for such efficient\nservice.\nMy best wishes to you,\nVery sincerely yours,\nHon. Augustus E. Giegengack,\nThe Public Printer,\nGovernment Printing Office,\nWashington, D. C.\nJune 22, 1939.\nDear Jo:-\nI know how much you helped to make\nthe books and frames for the Royal visitors\na real success, and I am very grateful to\nyou for your fine cooperation and assistance.\nMy best wishes to you and I hope\nto see you one of these days.\nVery sincerely yours,\nMiss Jo Coffin,\nAssistant to The Public Printer,\nGovernment Printing Office,\nWashington, D. C.\nJune 24, 1939\nMemo for Gen. Watson\nFrom Summer Welles\nAttaches conf despatches from Amb Biddle marked\nfor the President\nNo. 1069, dated June 1, 1939 concerning the pos-\nsible reopening of negotiations affecting Danzig\nand the Corridor;\nNo. 1072, dated June 3, 1939 reporting the sub-\nstance of a conversation with the Polish Ambassa-\ndor to Great Britain on Anglo-German differences:\nNo 1074, dated June 3, 1939 concerning status of\nPolish attempts to obtain British financial\nassistance.\nNo. 1075, dated June 3, 1939 concerning reaction\nin official Polish circles to Molotov's address\nof May 31, 1939.\nSee Poland folder-Foreign File--Drawer 1--1939\nPF :\nGreat Bitals\nOFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER\nCANADA\nOltawa, July 3, 1939.\nDear me. President,\nThe privilege of being\nintroduced to Wws. Roosevelt and yourself,\nsuring to visit of the King and even\nto the United States, will be kept doubly\nfresh in the memories of those of US to\nwhom you 10 graciously presented photographs\nof yourself with to characteristically\njenesous unscription\nI think that a express the\nfuling Common to all who WHI present\nin washington and at styde Park in\nrecalling that livily sense of great and\njood events which charges the while\natmosphere and made such a lasting\nimpression spow JS all\nAs one of the two Reanadian members\nof tis Majesty's suite, the first one b\nCoulse being my Trime Minister I should\nlike to express my Jup gratitude to you,\nsid, for your personal Kindness and\nhospitality and even more for your\ngreat service to the Cause of friend liness\nletween the two inlat nations with which\nwe are most closely associated.\nI an sil,\nwith great respect and Kind wishes,\nyours truly\nA) Heeney\nThe 1\n- s The\nWas\n&\nPersonal\nJuly 6, 1939.\nDear Jimmy:-\nI well remember that when you went to\nthe Coronation I asked you to suggest to the King\nthat if he went to Canada he should come to visit\nus in Washington; that you spoke to him about it\nand that he said he would be delighted to.\nIt is just as well that this be put\non paper for future generations, though I see no\nparticular reason for making any announcement\nabout it'now.\nThereafter I was more or less in touch\nwith Mackensie King, and last Summer when I dedicated\nthe International Bridge at the Thousand Islands\nhe told me that the King and Queen would in all\nprobability visit Canada in 1939. Thereupon I\nstarted a personal correspondence with the King\nhimself -- and the rest is now history.\nIt was grand to see you the other day.\nAs ever yours,\nHonorable James W. Gerard,\n40 Wall Street,\nNew York City,\nNew York.\nMy dear Franklin:\nYou may remember that when I went\nover to represent you at the Coronation you gave\nme one job, namely, to ask the acceptance by the\nKing of your invitation to visit you in the\nUnited States.\nI talked to the King directly and\nhe accepted your invitation and I so informed you.\nOf course, I have never publicly quoted\nanything about this but talking to Sir Richard Tute,\nformerly Chief Justice of the Bahamas, yesterday\nhe told me that he thought it would be a good thing\nif you announced this because as he said many people\nbelieved that the visit at this time was something\narranged recently for purely political purposes.\nI have no opinion myself one way or\nthe other but am inclined to agree with Brad Sit Richard.\nYours very Jane sincerely,\nJan\nThe President,\nThe White House,\nWashington, D. C.\nMemo for Watson\nFrom Sumner Welles\nJuly 11, 1939\nAttaches conf despatch No 1082-June 7, 1939\nfrom Amb. Biddle for the President\nSubject-discussion which took place between\nBiddle and the newly appointed Russian Amb.,\nSharonov and his observations of the Soviet\nmbassador in Warsaw on current Anglo-Soviet\ndiscussions.\nSee Poland folder-Foreign File --Drawer 1--1939\nPSF: st. Britain\nPRIME\nMINISTER\n?\n10, Downing Street,\nWhitehall.\n25th August, 1939.\nmy draw the President,\nThe Secretary of State for Air informs me that the\nUnited States Navy Department have developed a new type\nof automatic air bombsight known as the Norden bombsight,\nand I understand that this sight (together perhaps with a\nsimilar development of the United States Army Air Corps)\nis the most efficient instrument of its kind in existence.\nWe are therefore most anxious to obtain details of the\nsight and have inquired urgently through our Air Attache\nin Washington whether they can be given to us. For\nreasons which I can readily imagine the Air Authorities\nof the United States have not felt able to accede to our\nrequest.\nIn normal times I should not make a direct approach\nto you in such a matter, but in the present grave\nsituation I venture to ask you whether you could help us\nto obtain the information we desire. I make this urgent\npersonal request to you because Great Britain today faces\nthe possibility of entering on a tremendous struggle,\nconfronted\nPRIME\n2\n10, Downing Street,\nThiteball.\nconfronted as she is with a challenge to her fundamental\nvalues and ideals. Moreover, I believe they are values\nwhich our two countries share in common, and I am\nconvinced that if there is a certainty, it is that our\ntwo countries will never go to war with one another.\nShould the war which threatens break out, my\nadvisers tell me that we would obtain a greater\nimmediate increase in our effective power if we had the\nNorden bombsight at our disposal than by any other means\nwe can foresee. Air power is, of course, a relatively\nnew weapon which is so far untried on a large scale;\nthere is the danger of unrestricted air attack which we\nfor our part would never initiate. I am however most\nanxious to do all in my power to lessen the practical\ndifficulties which may arise in operations even against\nlegitimate military targets, and I feel that in air\nbombardment accuracy and humanity really go together.\nFor this reason again I am certain that you would\nrender the greatest service if you could enable us to\nmake use of the magnificent apparatus which your\nServices\nServices have developed.\nI need hardly say how grateful I shall be if\nyou can see your way to help us.\nYours sincerely\n. Chamburlain\nThe President of the\nUnited States of America.\nTHE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE\nWASHINGTON\nAugust 28, 1939\nMy dear Mr. President:\nI am sending to you herewith a per-\nsonal letter addressed to you by the\nBritish Prime Minister of which I spoke\nto you on the telephone.\nBelieve me\nFaithfully yours, Rells\nThe President,\nThe White House.\nAugust 31, 1939\nMy dear Mr. President:\nI have dictated & suggested reply for\nyou to send Mr.Chamberlain in accordance\nwith your suggestions as communicated to me\nby Captain Callahan. I think that your\nreply to Mr. Chamberlain might best be sent\nthrough Lord Lothian.\nBelieve me\nFaithfully yours,\nSummer Welles\nEnclosure.\nThe President,\nThe White House.\nMy dear Mr. Prime Minister:\nI have been very glad indeed to receive\nyour letter of August 25 and to hear from you\ndirectly with regard to the question set forth\nso clearly and so movingly therein.\nThe initial survey which I have had made\nof the situation and which I have myself studied\nvery carefully leads me to the conclusion that\nunder the existing legislation of this Government\nthe request you make could not be granted unless\nthe sight desired by the British Government were\nmade available to all other governments at the\nsame time it was made available to Great Britain.\nThis clearly would not be in the interest of the\nUnited States, nor for that matter, I believe\nyou will agree, in the interest of Great Britain.\nI am sending you this preliminary reply to\nyour letter because of my knowledge that you\ndesire some indication from me in response to\nyour request at the earliest moment. I may\nassure you, however, that I shall give continued\nconsideration to the request you have made and\nto the possibility of acceding to it either under\npresent conditions or under such new conditions\nas may arise, and that I shall write you again\nupon this subject as soon as a final decision\ncan be reached.\nBelieve me\nYours very sincerely,\nThe Right Honorable\nNeville Chamberlain,\nP.C., F.R.S., M.P.,\nPrime Minister,\nLondon.\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nDIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS\nReceived from the\nBritish Embarry at 8:25 p.m.\naug. 28.\ngot\nCOPY\nPS.BUTAM\nTelegram of August 28th\n[1939]\nFollowing 1s substance of His Majesty's Government's\nreply to Herr Hitler's communication of August 25th.\n1. His Majesty's Government reciprocate Chancellor's\ndesire for Anglo-German understanding.\n2. Chancellor's message dealt with two groups of\nquestions.\n(1) Matters in dispute between Germany and\nPoland.\n(2) Ultimate relations between Germany and\nGreat Britain.\n3. His Majesty's Government are prepared to discuss\nquestions raised by Chancellor 1f German-Polish differences\nare peacefully composed.\n4. His Majesty's Government agree that German-Polish\nsettlement is first essential but everything turns on nature\nof settlement and method by which it 1s to be reached.\nChancellor says nothing on these points and an understanding\non both is essential to further progress.\n5. His Majesty's Government intend to honour their\nobligations to Poland and would not for any advantage to\nGreat Britain acquiesce in a settlement jeopardising Polish\nindependence. His Majesty's Government consider that German-\nPolish differences could find reasonable solution on lines\nof sefeguarding Poland's essential interests. But it must\nbe understood in advance that any settlement would be\nguaranteed by other Powers. His Majesty's Government would\nbe prepared to participate in such guarantee. His Majesty's\nGovernment\nGovernment think that the next step should be direct\nGerman-Polish discussions on foregoing basis. His\nMajesty's Government have made representations to Polish\nGovernment that they should express willingness to enter\ninto discussions on this basis and hope that German Govern-\nment will do the same.\n6. His Majesty's Government agree that:\n(1) Principal danger in German-Polish situation\nis reports of treatment of minorities. Present\nstate of tension, frontier incidents and in-\nflammatory propagenda are a danger to peace.\nThese with incidents should be suppressed in\norder to give time without provocation on either\nside for examination of possibilities of a settle-\nment. His Majesty's Government are confident\nthat both the Polish and German Governments are\nalive to these considerations.\n7. Because His Majesty's Government are scrupulous\nconcerning their obligations to Poland this does not mean\nthat they are not anxious to use their influence to assist\nthe achievement of a solution commending itself both to\nGermany and to Poland.\n8. Such a settlement is essential not only for its\nown sake but in view of wider considerations. The advantage\nof a peaceful settlement over the resort to force is obvious.\nThe results of a decision to use force have been made clear.\n9. If a settlement were reached the possibility of\npractical measures to effect transition from preparations\nfor\n-3-\nfor war to normal activities of peaceful trade. (some\nwords omitted). Reference in Chancellor's message to\nlimitation of armaments is noted.\n10/ Failure to secure a just settlement of German-\nPolish differences would ruin hopes of an Anglo-German\nunderstanding and might lead to war with untold suffering\nand loss to many countries.\nefreat Bitain ,\nCopy of Memorandum for the President\nFrom Gen Watson\nAugust 30, 1939\n\"\nThe British Embassy phoned that they find they only\nhave the substance of Hitler's reply to the English,\nand not the full text. Lord Lothian gave the\nPresident the impression that perhaps the Embassy\nhad the full text, which is erroneous.\"\nSee: Watson folder-Drawer 2-1939\nAugust 31st 1939.\nDear Mr. Secretary,\nI enclose herein the text of a\nmessage for the German Chancellor which was\nsent on the afternoon of August 30th to\nHis Majesty's Ambassador 1n Berlin with\ninstructions that he should not deliver it\npending a further communication from London.\nI also enclose the text of a\ntelegram sent at the same time to His\nMajesty's Ambassador 10 Warsaw. He too\nwas informed that no action should be\ntaken on this telegram pending further\ninstructions.\nBelieve me,\ndear Mr. Secretary,\nYours very sincerely,\nonourable\nordell Hull,\n(SGD) LOTHIAN.\nSecretary of State of the\nUnited States,\nWashington, D.C.\nMESSAGE TO THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR\n1. His Majesty's Government appreciate the\nfriendly references in certain sentences of reply of\nGerman Government to latter's desire for an Anglo-\nGerman understanding and to their statement of the\ninfluence which this consideration has exercised\nupon their policy.\n2. His Majesty's Government repeat that they\nreciprocate the German Government's desire for\nimproved relations, but it will be recognised that\nthey could not sacrifice the interests of friends in\norder to obtain that improvement. They fully under-\nstand that the German Government cannot sacrifice\nGermany's vital interests, but the Polish Government\nare in the same position, and His Majesty's Government\nbelieve that the vital interests of the two countries\nare not incompatible.\n3. His Majesty's Government note that the\nGerman Government accept the British proposal and are\nprepared to enter into direct discussions with the\nPolish Government.\n4. His Majesty's Government understand that\nthe German Government accept in principle the condition\nthat any settlement should be made subject to an inter-\nnational guarantee. The question of who shall\nparticipate in this guarantee will have to be discussed\nfurther, and His Majesty's Government hope that to\navoid loss of time the German Government will take\nimmediate steps to obtain the assent of the Union of\nSoviet Socialist Republics whose participation in the\nguarantee/\nguarantee His Majesty's Government have always\nassumed.\n5. His Majesty's Government also note that\nthe German Government accept the position of the\nBritish Government as to the Polish Government's\nvital interests and independence.\n6. His Majesty's Government must make express\nreservation in regard to the statement of particular\ndemands put forward by the German Government in an\nearlier passage in their reply. They understand\nthat the German Government are drawing up proposals\nfor a solution. No doubt the latter's proposals will\nbe fully examined during the discussions. It can then\nbe determined how far they are compatible with the\nessential conditions which His Majesty's Government\nhave stated and which the German Government express\ntheir willingness to accept.\n7. His Majesty's Government are at once\ninforming the Polish Government of the German Govern-\nment's reply. The method of contact and the arrange-\nments for the discussions must obviously be agreed\nwith all urgency between the German Government and the\nPolish Government. But in His Majesty's Government's\nview it would be impracticable to establish contact\nso early as to-day.\n8. His Majesty's Government fully recognise\nthe need for speed in the initiation of the discussions\nand they share the apprehensions of the Chancellor\narising from the proximity of two mobilised armies\nstanding face to face. They would accordingly most\nstrongly/\n-3-\nstrongly urge that both parties should undertake\nthat during the negotiations no aggressive military\nmovements will take place. His Majesty's Government\nfeel confident that they could obtain such an under-\ntaking from the Polish Government if the German\nGovernment would give similar assurances.\n9. Further His Majesty's Government would\nsuggest that a temporary modus vivendi might be\narranged for Danzig which might prevent the occurrence\nof incidents tending to render German-Polish relations\nmore difficult.\nTELEGRAM TO HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR IN WARSAW\n1. My telegram to Berlin gives the text of the\nreply of His Majesty's Government to the German\ncommunication which has been repeated to you.\n2. Please communicate it to M. Beck. In doing\nso you should point out that whilst the first part of\nthe German Government's reply consists of an indefensible\nand misleading presentation of the German case, the\nreally important part of the reply consists in Germany's\nacceptance of proposal for direct discussion of\nsuggestion of proposed international guarantee, and\nGermany's assertion that she intends to respect Poland's\nvital interests.\n3. It is perhaps unnecessary to take exception\nat this stage to much that finds place in the German\nreply, of which His Majesty's Government would be as\ncritical as they have no doubt would be the Polish\nGovernment, but His Majesty's Government have made an\nexpress reservation in regard to the statement of\nparticular demands put forward in the German note.\nPoint that seemed to call for immediate comment was the\nGerman demand that a Polish representative should\npresent himself at Berlin to-day. M. Beck will see\nthe line which we have taken on this and the further\nreference we have made to the point in our reply to\nthe German Government's latest communication. The\nGerman Government are now drawing up proposals for a\nsolution and it will be in the light of these and of\nother developments that the decision as to future\nprocedure including the place and conditions of discussion\nwill/\nwill have to be taken.\n4. M. Beck will see from the reply of His Majesty's\nGovernment that the proposal has been made for a military\nstandstill during the discussions to which His Majesty's\nGovernment earnestly hope that the Polish Government will\nhave no objection.\n5. His Majesty's Government will be glad to have\nthe views of the Polish Government urgently. In view of\nthe fact that the Polish Government have authorised His\nMajesty's Government to say that they are prepared to enter\ninto direct discussions with the German Government, His\nMajesty's Government hope that provided the method and\ngeneral arrangements for the discussions can be satisfactorily\nagreed to, the Polish Government will be prepared to do so\nwithout delay. We regard it as most important from the\npoint of view of the internal situation in Germany and of\nworld opinion that so long as the German Government profess\nthemselves ready to negotiate no opportunity should be\ngiven to them for placing the blame for a conflict on\nPoland.\n6. You should of course emphasise that His\nMajesty's Government have made it quite clear to Herr\nHitler that they are sincerely determined to implement\ntheir obligations without reserve. on this point there\nis no misunderstanding in Berlin. The position of the\nPolish Government is very different from that which hey\noccupied last March since it is now supported both by\ndirect British guarantee and promise of British participation\nin the guarantee of any settlement reached on the bases\nindicated and the conversations would be carried on\nagainst/\nagainst this background.\n7. Another consideration present in our\nminds 1s that reliable information from Berlin gives\nus reason to suppose that German territorial demands\ndo not represent Herr Hitler's last word. on the\nother hand a blank refusal to negotiate is likely to\nincrease the German forces working for war and will\nenable Herr Hitler to place the onus of breakdown\non Poland.\nBirtish refly to Presidents massage-\n(Dicated over telephone 5 Bated Entony wale\nto Stite left- Formal note entrodying Dani & GAT &\nPlease deliver to the President the following message\nin the name of His Majesty's Government:\n\"His Majesty's Government welcome the weighty and\nmoving appeal of the President of the United States\nagainst the bombardment from the air of civilian popula-\ntions or of unfortified cities. Deeply impressed by the\nhumanitarian considerations to which the President's\nmessage refers, It was already the settled policy of\nHis Majesty's Government should they become involved in\nhostilities to refrain from such action and to confine\nbombardment to strictly military objectives upon the\nunderstanding that those same rules will be scrupulously\nobserved by all X their opponents. They had already\nconcerted in detail with certain other governments the\nrules that in such an event they would impose upon them-\nselves and make publicly known.\"\nCOPY\nBRITISH EMBASSY,\nWashington, D.C.\nSeptember 1st 1939.\nCONFIDENTIAL\nMy dear Mr. Secretary,\nYesterday I gave Mr. Sumner Welles a copy of a\ntelegram addressed to the Foreign Office by His Majesty's\nAmbassador in Warsaw reporting M. Beck's reactions on\nbeing shown a copy of His Majesty's Government's latest\ncommunication to Herr Hitler, a copy of which I sent to\nyou in my letter of August 31st.\nI have now been instructed to send you the enclosed\nsummaries of four further telegrams:\n(A) A telegram dated August 31st from His\nMajesty's Ambassador in Warsaw, reporting\na conversation with M. Beck when the latter\ncommunicated the Polish Government's reply\nto our representations.\n(B) A further telegram from His Majesty's\nAmbassador in Warsaw dated August 31st,\ngiving the text of this Polish reply.\n(c) A telegram to His Majesty's Ambassador in\nBerlin sent on August 31st.\n(D) Text of telegram sent to His Majesty's\nAmbassador in Warsaw on August 31st.\nI have been particularly asked to emphasise the con-\nfidential nature of the two telegrams from Warsaw.\nBelieve me,\nMy dear Mr. Secretary,\nYours very sincerely,\nLOTHIAN\nThe Honourable\nCordell Hull,\nSecretary of State of the United States,\nWashington, D.C.\nSummary of telegram of August 31st\nfrom His Majesty's Ambassador\nin Warsaw\nM. Beck has just handed me written Polish reply\nto my representations of last night. Translation 1s\ngiven in my following telegram. M. Beck particularly\nasked that it should be treated as highly confidential.\n2. I asked Minister for Foreign Affairs what action\nhe proposed taking to establish contact with German\nGovernment. He replied that he would now instruct\nPolish Minister in Berlin to see either Minister for\nForeign Affairs or State Secretary, in order to say\nthat Poland had accepted the British proposals set\nforth in your telegrams. I urged him to do this at\nonce.\n3. I then asked what line M. Lipsky would take if\nHerr von Ribbentrop, or whoever else he saw, handed\nhim German proposal. M. Beck said the Ambassador would\nnot be authorised to accept such a document since in\nthe light of previous experience it might be accompanied\nby some sort of ultimatum. He felt it was essential\nthat contact should be made first of all and that then\ndetails should be discussed as to where, with whom, and\non what basis negotiations should be begun.\n4. He pointed out that the situation in Danzig was\nbecoming extremely serious. Polish officials were being\narrested, railway traffic was held up, and he felt it\nessential that immediate measures be taken to set up a\nmodus vivendi in order to allow the release of the arrested\npersons\npersons and the resumption of railway traffic. He\nsuggested that M. Burckhardt might effect this.\n5.\nThe Minister for Foreign Affairs confirmed that\nno other serious incidents had taken place but added\nthat he feared that in connexion with any negotiations\nhe would have to appeal to the intervention of His\nMajesty's Government.\n6. M. Beck added that if invited to go to Berlin\nhe would of course decline as he had no intention\nof being treated like President Hacha.\nSummary of telegram of August 31st\nfrom His Majesty's Ambassador\nat Warsaw.\nFollowing is the text of the Polish reply dated\nAugust 31st, 1939.\n1. Unconditional confirmation of their already\nexpressed willingness for a direct exchange of views\nwith the German Government naturally on the basis\nsuggested by the British Government.\n2. The Polish Government are also prepared\non a reciprocal basis to give a formal guarantee that\nif negotiations are held, Polish troops will not\nviolate the German frontier provided that a corres-\nponding guarantee is furnished regarding the non-\nviolation of the Polish frontier by German troops.\n3. In the present circumstances it is essential\nthat a simple provisional modus vivendi be set up in\nDanzig.\n4. As regards the suggestions communicated to\nthe Polish Government, a request has already been made\nto the British Ambassador for an explanation of what\nthe British Government understood by international\nguarantees in regard to the relations between Poland\nand Germany. In the absence of an answer to this\nfundamental question, the Polish Government feel\nobligated entirely to reserve their attitude towards\nthe matter until they have received fuller explanations.\n5. The Polish Government trusts that if conver-\nsations with Germany are initiated, they may continue\nto enjoy the good offices of His Majesty's Government.\nTelegram to His Majesty's\nAmbassador in Berlin,\nof August 31st.\nPlease inform the German Government that His\nMajesty's Government understand that the Polish Govern-\nment are arranging to establish contact with them\nthrough M. Lipski in Berlin. Please enquire whether\nin view of the serious situation in Danzig they agree\nto the necessity for setting up an immediate provisional\nmodus vivendi. We have already made this suggestion to\nthe German Government in paragraph 9 of our recent com-\nmunication. Would they agree that M. Burckhardt might\nbe employed in this connexion if it were possible to\nsecure his services.\nSummary of telegram of August 31st\nto His Majesty's Ambassador\nat Warsaw.\n1. His Majesty's Government are gratified to\nlearn that the Polish Ambassador in Berlin has been\ninstructed to get into contact with the German Govern-\nment.\n2. His Majesty's Government fully agree as to\nthe need for discussing detailed arrangements regarding\nthe negotiations and as to the undesirability of M.\nBeck's visiting Berlin.\n3. On the other hand, His Majesty's Government\ndo not understand why the Polish Government should find\nit difficult to authorise M. Lipski to accept document\nfrom the Germans and they sincerely trust that they\nmay feel able to amend their instructions in this matter.\nNo ultimatum was mentioned in the report on the German\nproposals furnished to His Majesty's Government and the\nsuggestion that the demand that Polish representative\nshould be in Berlin by August 30th was equivalent to an\nultimatum was definitely repudiated by German Foreign\nMinister in talking with Sir Nevile Henderson. If the\ndocument were to contain an ultimatum, Poland would\nnaturally refuse to discuss it until ultimatum was with-\ndrawn. On the other hand, for them to refuse to re-\nceive the proposal would arouse grave misunderstanding\nby outside opinion.\n4. It would seem M. Lipski could surely be\ninstructed to receive and forward the document and\nsay (a) if it contained anything like the expected\nultimatum\n-2-\nultimatum the Polish Government would certainly be\nunable to discuss on such a basis, and (b) that in\nany case in the Polish view matters such as the venue\nof the negotiations, the basis on which they should\nbe held and the individuals who should take part in\nthem should be discussed between the two governments.\n5. If negotiations are begun, His Majesty's\nGovernment in the United Kingdom will at all times be\nglad if desired to lend any assistance they can to\nachieve a just settlement.\n6. As regards an international guarantee, this\nmatter will no doubt have to be discussed at length.\nWhat His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom\nhad in mind was a guarantee of the full and proper\nobservance of any settlement reached.\n7. Regarding Danzig, His Majesty's Government\nentirely share M. Beck's views as to the importance\nof establishing some modus vivendi. They have already\nmade a suggestion to this effect to the German Govern-\nment and will do so again. If the Germans agree, they\nwill approach M. Burckhardt.\nPlease speak to the Polish Foreign Minister\nimmediately in the above sense.\nCOPY\nfillsnal\nPSF:\nBRITISH EMBASSY,\nWASHINGTON, D.C.\nSeptember 1st, 1939.\nMy dear Mr. Secretary,\nI have received instructions to inform you\nthat the following communication is being made to\nthe German Government by His Majesty's Ambassador in\nconjunction with his French colleague this evening.\n\"On the instructions of His Majesty's\nPrincipal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I\nhave the honour to make the following communication.\nEarly this morning the German Chancellor issued a\nproclamation to the German Army which indicated clearly\nthat he was about to attack Poland. Information which\nhas reached His Majesty's Government in the United\nKingdom and the French Government indicates that German\ntroops have crossed the Polish frontier and that attacks\nupon Polish towns are proceeding. In these circumstances\nit appears to the Governments of the United Kingdom and\nFrance that by their action the German Government have\ncreated conditions viz. an aggressive act of force\nagainst Poland threatening the independence of Poland\nwhich call for the implementation by the Governments of\nthe United Kingdom and France of the undertaking to\nPoland to come to her assistance. I am accordingly to\ninform Your Excellency that unless the German Government\nare prepared to give His Majesty's Government satisfactory\nassurances that the German Government has suspended all\naggressive action against Poland and are prepared\npromptly\nThe Honourable\nCordell Hull,\nSecretary of State of the United States,\nWashington, D.C.\n-2-\npromptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory\nHis Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will\nwithout hesitation fulfill their obligations to Poland\".\nSir Neville Henderson has been instructed to ask\nfor an immediate reply and to report the result of his\ninterview, when he will be sent further instructions.\nHe has been told that in reply to any question he may\nexplain that the communication is in the nature of a\nwarning and is not to be considered as an ultimatum.\nBelieve me, My dear Mr. Secretary,\nYours very sincerely,\nLOTHIAN\nPSF:\nBRITISH embassy,\nWASHINGTON D.C.\nSeptember 3rd, 1930.\nNo.369.\nsir,\nI have the honour under instructions\nfrom His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State\nfor Foreign Affairs to inform you that the\nfollowing declaration has been made on behalf of\nHis Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom\nand the French Covernment:-\n#\nThe Governments of the United\n\"Kingdom and France solemnly and publicly\n\"affirm their intention should a war be\n\"forced upon them to conduct hostilities\n\"with a firm desire to spare the civilian\n\"population and to preserve in every way\n\"possible those monuments of human achieve-\n\"ment which are treasured in all civilized\n\"countries. In this spirit they have\n\"welcomed with deep satisfaction President\n\"Roosevelt's appeal on the subject of\n\"bombing from the air. Fully sympathising\n\"with the humanitarian sentiments by\n\"which that appeal was inspired they have\n\"replied to it in similar terms. They had\n\"indeed some time ago sent explicit\n\"instructions to the commanders of their\n\"armed forces prohibiting the bombardment\n\"whether from the air, or the sea, or by\n\"artillery/\nThe Honourable\nCordel 2 Hull,\nSecretary of State of the United States,\nWashington, D.C.\n&\n\"artillery on land of any except strictly\n\"military objectives in the nerrowest sense\n\"of the word. Bombardment by artillery on\n\"land will exclude objectives which have no\n\"strictly defined military importance; in\n\"particular large urban areas situated\n\"outside the battle sone. They will further-\n\"more make every effort to avoid the\n\"destruction of localities or buildings\n\"which are of value to civilisation. As\n\"regards the use of neval forces, including\n\"submarines, the two governments will bide\n\"strictly by the rules laid down in the\n\"submarine protocol of 1936 which have been\n\"secepted by nearly all civilized nations.\n\"Further they will only employ their aircraft\n\"against merchant shipping at sea in conformity\n\"with the recognised rules applicable to the\n\"exercise of maritime belligerent rights by\n\"warships. Finally, the two allied governments\n\"reaffirm their intention to abide by the\n\"terms of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 pro-\n\"hibiting the use in war of asphyziating or\n\"poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological\n\"methode of warfare.\n#\nAn enquiry will be addressed to the\n\"German Government as to whether they are\n\"prepared to give an assurance to the same\n\"effect.\n\"It/\nBRITISH embassy,\nWASHINGTON D.C.\nNo.369.\nSeptember 3rd, 1939.\nsir,\nI have the honour under instructions\nfrom His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State\nfor Foreign Affairs to inform you that the\nfollowing declaration has been made on behalf of\nHis Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom\nand the French Government:-\n#\nThe Governments of the United\n\"Kingdom and France solemnly and publicly\n\"affirm their intention should a war be\n\"forced upon them to conduct hostilities\n\"with n firm desire to spare the civilian\n\"population and to preserve in every way\n\"possible those monuments of human achieve-\n\"ment which are treasured in all civilised\n\"countries. In this spirit they have\n\"welcomed with deep satisfaction President\n\"Poosevelt's appeal on the subject of\n\"bombing from the air. Fully sympathising\n\"with the humanitarian sentiments by\n\"which that appeal was inspired they have\n\"replied to it in similar terms. They had\n\"indeed some time ago sent explicit\n\"instructions to the commanders of their\n\"armed forces prohibiting the bombardment\n\"whether from the air, or the sea, or by\n\"artillery/\nThe Honourable\nCordel 2 Hull,\nSecretary of State of the United States,\nWashington, D.C.\n-3-\n#\nIt will of course be understood\n\"that in the event of the enemy not observing\n\"any of the restrictions which the Govern-\n\"ments of the United Kingdom and France\n\"have thus imposed on the operations of\n\"their armed forces these governments reserve\n\"the right to take all such sction as they\n\"may consider appropriate\".\nI have the honour to be,\nwith the highest consideration,\nSir,\nYour most obedient,\nhumble servant,\nTHAIN\nSeptember 11, 1939.\nMy dear Mr. Chamberlain:-\nI need not tell you that you\nhave been much in my thoughts during these\ndifficult days and further that I hope you\nwill at all times feel free to write me\npersonally and outside of diplomatic pro-\ncedure about any problems as they arise.\nI hope and believe that we\nshall repeal the embargo within the next\nmonth and this is definitely a part of the\nAdministration policy.\nwith my sincere regards,\nFaithfully yours,\nThe Right Honorable\nNeville Chamberlain, M.P.,\nPrime Minister,\nLondon,\nEngland.\n-\nCopy :FDRL:11-30-55:cdm\nPSF:\nGreat kritain\nDOCUMENTS ON\n9-20-38\nBRITISH\n9-21-38\nFOREIGN POLICY\n9-23-38\n1919-1939\nEdited by\nE.L. WOODWARD, M.A., F.B.A.\nand\nROHAN BUTLER, M.A.\nAssisted by\nANNE ORDE, M.A.\nThird Series\nVolume VII\n1939\nLONDON\nHer Majesty's Stationery Office\n1954\nCopy :FDRL :11-30-55\n627\n(v)\nSir R. Lindsay (Washington) to Viscount Halifax\n(Received September 20, 10.40 a.m.)\nNo. 349 Telegraphic [A 7504/64/45]\nWashington, September 20, 1938, 2.30 a.m.\n1. The President telephoned to me himself this afternoon to call on\nhim at the White House in the evening, and I had a long conversation.\nHe emphasized the necessity of absolute secrecy. Nobody must know I had\nseen him and he himself would tell nobody of the interview. I gathered\nnot even the State Department.\n2. He said the Anglo-French note to Czechoslovak Government\" 1 was the\nmost terrible remorseless sacrifice that had even been demanded of a\nState. It would provoke a highly unfavourable reaction in America. He\nhimself was not disposed to blame the French or British Governments whose\ndifficulties he completely understood. He spoke in a most friendly and\nappreciative manner of the Prime Minister's policy and efforts for peace.\nIf the policy now embarked on proved successful he would be the first to\ncheer. He would like to do or say S omething to help it but was at a loss\nto know what. He had no illusions as to the effect in Europe of his pre-\nvious public statements. Today he would not dare to express approval of\nthe recommendations put to the Czecholoslovak Government. He would be\nafraid to express disapproval of German aggression lest it might encourage\nCzechoslovakia to vain resistance. He thus felt unable to do anything and\nthought at his press conference tomorrow (he has postponed the last two)\nhe would confine himself to refusing to make any comment at all.\n3. As to the immediate future the first possible case he would deal\nwith was that Czechoslovak Government should acquiesce, but that he re-\ngarded as virtually impossible. They would fight and his general staff\ntold him they would be overrun in three weeks. Hungary and Poland would\njoin in the pillage. And even if Czechoslovakia did acquiesce in the de-\nmands made, would Germany rest there? Had Herr Hitler given any pledges\nto the Prime Minister as to the future? He was sure that other demands\nwould follow elsewhere: Denmark, the Corridor or most likely of all a\ndangerous and forcible economic or physical penetration through Roumania.\n4. The second case that he examined was that the present policy fail-\ning the Western Powers would find themselves at war with Germany and prob-\nably Italy sooner or later, but as he thought sooner. In this case, in\nhis opinion, even if Great Britain and France and Russia were fighting\nloyally together they would be beaten if they tried to wage war on classi-\ncal lines of attack. They would suffer terrific casualities and would\nnever get through.\n5. He therefore came to the third case. This is the very secret\npart of his communication and it must not be known to anyone that he has\neven breathed a suggestion. If it transpired he would almost be impeached\nand the suggestion would be hopelessly prejudiced.\n1 See Volume II of this Series, No. 937.\n628\n6. Assuming present expedients would only delay crisis for a short\ntime if at all, Western Powers might choose to call a world conference\nfor the purpose of reorganizing all unsatisfactory frontiers on rational\nlines. They should invite active heads of States to attend including Herr\nHitler. He himself would be willing to go to it but not if it was held\nin Europe. That he would never do. But he would go half way and attend\na conference in the Azores or some other Atlantic island. This part of\nhis idea viz. the calling of a conference was not strongly emphasised.\n7. But assuming Western Powers would find themselves forced to war he\nbelieved that they should carry it on purely by blockade and in a defen-\nsive manner. He had spoken about this to Lord Runciman when he visited\nhim at the White House. The Powers should close their own frontiers to\nGermany, stand on an armed defensive and call on all other States adjoin-\ning Germany to adopt the same line of non-intercourse. The blockade line\nshould be drawn down the middle of the North Sea through the Channel to\nGibralter and the Mediterranean should be closed at the Suez Canal.\nShould any of the adjoining Powers refuse to join in this policy of non-\nintercourse it should be informed that its supplies from overseas would\nbe rationed. He believed that they would indeed protest against this,\nbut that they would acquiesce fairly easily, and would make the ration-\ning system work as it did in the last war. (In passing it is possible\nthat this is what was in the President's mind when he talked about 'quar-\nantine' in his Chicago speech.)\n8. To my suggestion that this was reminiscent of sanctions he said that\nany suggestion of sanctions must be most carefully avoided. Blockade must\nbe based on loftiest humanitarian grounds and on the desire to wage hos-\ntilities with minimum of suffering and the least possible loss of life and\nproperty, and yet to bring enemy to his knees. In this connection he men-\ntioned bombing from the air. He said only defence to this was to retali-\nate in the same way; but bombing from the air was not the method which\ncaused really great losses of life.\n9. This method of conducting war by blockade would in his opinion meet\nwith approval of the United States if its humanitarian purpose were\nstrongly emphasised. Though he himself could not possibly take any initi-\native in the matter he pointed out that it is entirely within the consti-\ntutional prerogative of a President on his own authority, to declare that\na blockade was of an effective character. He could thus help blockading\nPowers and would be willing to do so, in the absence of unfavourable cir-\ncumstances. Under the Neutrality Act he was empowered to forbid United\nStates vessels to enter a danger zone except at their own risk.\n10. On this we came to some discussion of the Neutrality Act, and in\nreply to my questions he was very hesitant indeed as to the possibility\nof the United States Government turning a blind eye to any evasion of\nprohibition of exports of arms and ammunition in our favour. But he in-\nsisted that we should be free to export parts of munitions to Canada to\nbe set up there. But he urged with some emphasis that if possible West-\nern Powers should turn this difficulty by not declaring war on Germany\n629\nat all. Let them call it defensive measures or anything plausible but\navoid actual declaration of war. He had already been able to give him-\nself wide latitude in the interpretation of the Neutrality Law in the\nFar East and in Ethiopia and if the law was not changed he would be dis-\nposed to do 80 again. He even indicated that even if Germany declared war\non us and we refrained from doing sp he might yet be able to find that we\nwere not at war, and that the prohibition of export of arms need not be\napplied to us.\n11. Present German aggression would awaken similar tendencies elsewhere\nperhaps not in Italy though she would have to be watched, but very likely\nfrom Japan. He was convinced that the Japanese Government was bound by\na secret treaty to come to German support in case of war. It was quite\npossible that they would extend their operations to Canton or even seize\nIndo-China or Hongkong. In reply to my enquiry he said that seizure of\nHongkong would make a very profound impression on the United States but\nhe was very hesitant indeed as to whether they would do anything about it.\nHe finally said it would take some time before they would do anything.\n12. Several times in the conversation he showed himself quite alive to\nthe possibility that somehow or other in indefinable circumstances the\nUnited States might again find themselves involved in an European war.\nIn that case he regarded it as almost inconceivable that it would be possi-\nble for him to S end any American troops across the Atlantic even if his\nprestige were as high as it had been just after the 1936 elections. But\nit was just possible that if Germany were able to invade Great Britain\nwith a considerable force, such a wave of emotion might arise, that an\nAmerican army might be sent overseas.\n13. Much of what the President said as reported above was elicited by\nmy questions. His tone throughout was marked by utmost friendliness. I\ndo not think he expects any particular answer.\n(vi)\nSir R. Lindsay (Washington) to Viscount Halifax\n(Received September 22, 1.20 a.m.)\nNo. 351 Telegraphic [A 7504/64/45]\nWashington, September 21, 1938, 4.29 p.m.\n1\nMy telegram No. 349.\nIt is unlikely that I shall be able to see President again in the near\n1 Document (v) in this Appendix.\nfuture but I think it would be useful if you would send me a friendly\nexpression of appreciation of his message which I could convey to him\nthrough his Private Secretary. I should be grateful for instructions.\n(vii)\nViscount Halifax to Sir R. Lindsay (Washington)\nNo. 640 Telegraphic [A 7504/64/45]\nForeign Office, September 23, 1938, 4.20 p.m.\nYour telegram No. 351.¹\nYou may certainly convey to President my great appreciation of his hav-\ning taken you so far into his confidence, and my assurance that I will\nobserve complete secrecy in the matter.\nAt the present moment it is extremely difficult to forecast events. We\nhave gone as far as we can in an effort to remove what might be consider-\ned a German grievance. If our effort fails, there will no longer be any\ndoubt as to Herr Hitler's real intentions.\nShould His Majesty's Government be drawn into any conflict, their major\nrole would probably be enforcement of blockade, as President foresees.\nBut situation is very obscure: position of Italy in event of conflict\nmay yet be doubtful: a neutral Italy might be more valuable to Germany,\nas an avenue of supply, than an Italy as an ally in arms. Blockade of\nGermany would be rendered to a great degree ineffective unless Italy were\nalso blockaded or rationed, but even the latter would probably turn the\nscale and bring Italy into action against France. It might be necessary\nto choose between a neutral Italy with an ineffective blockade and a\nhostile Italy with an effective blockade.\nIt is of great encouragement to know that the President has been giving\nthought to these questions and I am most grateful to him for his confi-\ndence. We are doing our best to keep United States Ambassador fully in-\nformed.\n1 Document (vi) in this Appendix.\nPSF\nTile\nSr. Baitam 1939\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\n3\nOctober 25, 1939.\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nTHE SECRETARY OF STATE\nTO READ AND RETURN\nF. D. R.\nInteresting -\n+ U\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nOctober 25, 1939.\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nTHE SECRETARY OF STATE\nTO READ AND RETURN\nF. D. R.\nNote from Ambassador Kennedy\ntransmitting reply from Neville\nChamberlain to the President's\nletter of September 11th, 1939.\nPSF igant Britan\nLondon, October 6, 1939.\nDear Mr. President:\nI enclose a letter addressed to you by\nthe Prime Minister which was handed to me yester-\nday.\nYours sincerely,\nEnclosure: as stated.\nThe President,\nThe White House,\nWASHINGTON.\nPRIME\n10, Downing Street,\nWhiteball.\n4th October, 1939.\nmy dear In Roosenle\nYour letter of the 11th of last month\nhas just reached me and I am very grateful to\nyou for your sympathetic and encouraging words.\nThese are indeed difficult days and there\nare many more before us, but I retain full\nconfidence that we shall come out successfully\nin the end.\nMy own belief is that we shall win, not\nby a complete and spectacular military victory,\nwhich is unlikely under modern conditions, but\nby convincing the Germans that they cannot win.\nOnce they have arrived at that conclusion, I do\nnot believe they can stand our relentless\npressure, for they have not started this war with\nthe enthusiasm or the confidence of 1914.\nI\nPRIME\n10, Downing Street,\nWhitehall.\nI believe they are already half way to this\nconviction and I cannot doubt that the attitude of\nthe United States of America, due to your personal\nefforts, has had a notable influence in this\ndirection. If the embargo is repealed this month,\nI am convinced that the effect on German morale\nwill be devastating.\nI hope so much that one day I may have the\ngreat pleasure of meeting you personally and\ndiscussing with you the happy results of the\nactions of our two countries in this testing\ntime for democracy.\nwith kind legands\nEruss sincerely\nGeville Chamberhin\nThe President of the\nUnited States of America.\nPSF\nPRIME\nBritain\n10, Downing Street,\nbiteball.\nPRIVATE & PERSONAL.\n8th November, 1939.\nMy dran In Rooselt\nIn your letter of the 11th September you\ninvited me to write to you personally whenever there\nwere any problems on which I wished to consult you.\nYou may be sure that I shall do so.\nAt the moment,\nI have no question to raise with you, but I cannot\nforbear from sending you a private line of thanks\nand congratulation on the great development of the\nlast week-end.\nThe repeal of the arms embargo, which has been\nso anxiously awaited in this country, is not only an\nassurance that we and our French Allies may draw on\nthe great reservoir of American resources; it is\nalso a profound moral encouragement to us in the\nstruggle upon which we are engaged.\nAs I said in\nmy letter of the 4th October, I am convinced that\nit will have a devastating effect on German morale;\nit\nPRIME\nEXPIRATE\n10, Downing Street,\nWiteball.\nit will also, I am confident, have a great\ninfluence on world opinion.\nWe here have\nderived all the greater satisfaction from it\nbecause we realise to what an extent we owe it\nto your personal efforts and goodwill.\nMay I send you my sincere thanks, not\nonly for the measure itself, but for your great\nsympathy to which it is so largely due?\nwith Kind upand\nEma incents\nKsmila Chambulain\nThe President of the\nUnited States of America.\ngp\nPrivate Personal.\nThe President of the\nUnited States of America,\nThe White House,\nWashington,\nU.S.A.\nDecember 8, 1939.\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM CAPT. CALLAGHAN\nAttaches two letters containing information which may\nprove to be of interest to the President. One letter is from\nAllan Kirk-London and the other from Hayne Ellis-Naval Operating Base-\nNorfolk, Va.\nSee: Capt Callaghan memo of Dec 8, 1939-Navy folder-Drawer 1-1939\nDecember 8, 1939.\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM CAPTAIN CALLAGHAN\nAttaches tabulation of British naval losses to Nov. 29, 1939.\nSee: Navy folder-Drawer 1-1939\nDecember 11, 1939.\nMemorandum for the President from Capt. Callaghan\nAttaches sheets containing compilations in tabular\nform of the graphic data presented in the attached books of\ngraphs from Ambassador Kennedy.\nRe-Merchant Marine Losses\nBRITISH--ALLIED--NEUTRAL\nThese are compiled from official British Graphs\nand prepared by the ONI\nSee:Joe Kennedy folder-Drawer 1-1939\nThe Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary\nof State, London, December 25, 1939\n\"Personal for the President from Naval Person [Chuchill]\n=\n[Concerning British naval action off the River Plate]\nPublihsed in: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1939,\nVol. V, The American Republics, pages 121-122.\nPINK 15,16,17\nU.S.S. HOUSTON\nCONFIDENTIAL\nFROM MR EARLY, SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT\nTO THE PRESIDENT\n0020 FROM HULL THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR WHO HAS JUST RETURNED FROM\nENGLAND GAVE ME THIS MORNING THE TEXT OF A PERSONAL AND SECRET\nMESSAGE SENT TO YOU FOR YOUR INFORMATION BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT\nAND RECEIVED BY TELEGRAM TODAY. AFTER REFERRING TO PREVIOUS\nMEMORANDA SENT BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT\nTHE MESSAGE STATES THAT THE BRITESH GOVERNMENT HAS INFORMED THE\nFRENCH GOVERNMENT AS REGARDS SWITZERLAND THAT IF GERMANY INVADED\nSWITZERLAND AND FRANCE THEREUPON DECLARED WAR UPON GERMANY THE\nUNITED KINGDOM WOULD GO TO THE ASSISTANCE OF FRANCE IN THE SAME\nWAY THAT THEY UNDERSTOOD FRANCE WOULD BE WILLING TO SUPPORT GREAT\nBRITAIN IF GERMANY INVADED HOLLAND AND GREAT BRITAIN THEREUPON\nDECLARED WAR ON GERMANY. THE REMAINDER OF THE MESSAGE READS TEXT\nUALLY AS FOLLOWS QUOTE IN REPLY TO THE FRENCH ARGUMENTS REGARDING\nANGLO-FRENCH SOLIDARITY IN FACE OF AN UNPROVOKED ATTACK BY GERMANY\nOR ITALY HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM STATED\nTHAT JOINT ACTION BY GERMANY AND ITALY AGAINST THE TWO WESTERN\nGREAT POWERS OR AGAINST ANY one OF THEM WOULD CLEARLY HAVE TO BE\nRESISTED IN COMMON BE THE TWO POWERS WITH THE WHOLE OF THEIR\nRESOURCES; INDEED THE OBLIGATIONS WHICH HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT\nIN THE UNITED KINGDOM HAD ASSUMED TOWARDS THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT\nCONFIDENTIAL\nU.S.S. HOUSTON\nFROM MR EARLY, SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT\nTO THE PRESIDENT\nBY TREATY ALREADY COVER THE CASE OF AN UNPROVOKED ATTACK DELIVERED\nUPON FRANCE BY GERMANY WHETHER ACTING ALONE OR IN SUPPORT OF ITALY.\nWHILE IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK ON FRANCE BY\nITALY ALONE FRANCE MIGHT FEEL THAT IT WAS NOT NECESSARILY IN HER IN-\nTERESTS THAT GREAT BRITAIN SHOULD INTERVENE IF THE EFFECT OF SUCH\nINTERNENTION WERE TO BRING GERMANY INTO WHAT MIGHT OTHERWISE BE A\nLOCALIZED CONFLICT, HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM\nWERE FULLY CONSCIOUS THAT THE RISKS TO WHICH THE TWO POWERS WERE\nSEVERALLY EXPOSED COULD NOT BE DISASSOCIATED THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT\nWOULD HAVE NOTED THE PRIME MINISTERS STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE OF\nCOMMONS ON FEBRUARY SIXTH.IT WAS IN THE LIGHT OF THIS SITUATION\nTHAT HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM HAD PROPOSED\nTO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT THE EXTENSION OF STAFF CONVERSATIONS AS\nINDICATED IN PARAGRAPH TWO OF LORD HALIFAX'S SHORT MESSAGE OF\nFEBRUARY SEVENTH\nTHE TERMS OF THIS REPLY TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT ARE BEING\nCOMMUNICATED TO THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT FOR THEIR SECRET INFORM-\nATION END QUOTE 2320\nADM. REAR ADM. MIL. NAVAL ADM. FLAG COPIES TO\nPRESIDENT LEAHY MeINTIRE AIDE AIDE AIDE OFFICE"
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