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President's Secretary's File (Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration)
Diplomatic Correspondence
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PSF Great Britain 1943
great Britein freder 1-43
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
File
January 9, 1943. Cumbid
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY.
I think this can be filed, but
the President may wish to send it to
the State Department.
HARRY L. HOPKINS
BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON,D.C.
December 31st, 1942.
and Personal
Dear Mr. President,
I enclose herein the text of
a telegram which I have just received from
the Foreign Office.
Believe me,
Dear Mr. President,
Very sincerely yours,
Halifax
The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States
of America,
DECLASSIFIED
Washington, D. C.
By Authority of British Moot
Ideqram 1/12/72
By RHP Date FEB 14 1972
By DECLASSIFIED Authority of British
Gout, Telegram 1/12/22
By RHP Date FEB 1972
Text of a telegram from Mr. Eden to
Viscount Halifax dated December 31st, 1942.
and Personal
The Prime Minister would be grateful if you
would inform the President that the following directive
was given to Mr. Macmillan before departure:-
Mr. Harold Macmillan, M.P., has been appointed
Minister Resident at Allied Headquarters in North West
Africa.
Mr. Macmillan's primary function will be to
report on the political situation and future plans for
the territory and to represent to the Commander-in-Chief
the views of His Majesty's Government on political
questions. His reports will be addressed to the Prime
Minister.
He will work in closest touch with his United
States colleague, establishing relations of confidence
and amity with him.
He is not at present accredited to any French
authority. The present French administration in North
Africa is treated by Allied Commander-in-Chief as &
temporary de facto local administration. Mr. Macmillan's
relations with French authorities will accordingly be of
an informal character.
Mr. R. M. Makins of the Foreign Office will
accompany Mr. Macmillan as his assistant and will act for
him should he at any time be absent from Algiers.
Mr. W.H.B. Mack of the Foreign Office has for
some time past held the post of British Civil Liaison
Officer on General Eisenhower's staff. He will continue
to/
-2-
to hold this appointment and will not join Mr. Macmillan's
staff though he will look to him for guidance on any
political matter affecting interest of His Majesty's
Government.
Mr. Macmillan will superintend the activities
of such British civilian experts as may be appointed to
collaborate with United States authorities in French North
Africa.
His Majesty's consular officers in French North
Africa will be instructed to repeat to Mr. Macmillan
political reports which they address to the Foreign
Secretary. Mr. Macmillan may communicate direct with
them when necessary and they with him.
PSF: Grat Britain
R
BUCKINGHAM PALACE
January 12th 1943
1
My dear President Rosevelt,
I am so glad that you
6
Mr Churchill are going to meet once
again. you will have many problems
to discuss as to our future strategy
of the War in 1943
The efforts of our two countries, already whether
soparate or combined, have shown to
the World that we are determined
to destroy the enemies of civilization.
your deliberations on this oceasion, will,
I feel sure, have the way to a meassfiel
to victorious conclusion of the war.
My only regret is, that it is not possible
for you to come here for your conversations,
when we could meet h renew the
friendships we ive made in the White House
eat Hyde Park in 1939.
The Queen to I were so delighted to
entertain Mrs Roosevelt here last October,
h have hope that she returned to you
none the worse for her strenuous visit.
Thave ashed Mc Churchill to hand you
this letter.
with my very best wishes to you
Believe me
yours very sincerely
George RI. R.I.
be
great Britain foeder
The
President of the United States of america
GRT
7DR to King George VI
Jase. 24 1943
neg. NPx 59-144
Capy
Casablemce Casa blunce
Jan 24 19413
My dear King Seorg
I wish much that you could
harr bren with Human, the past
The days - a Truly migur
metry in its hee(
in The Trai spient of Com -
Gtusson each affire
and his "ofposite number
Pr. for m, Churchill and
mysrlf I and not Till
your That ar make a
purfectly matched Trum
in harmin and vut
and invidentally we had
late offor turther in ur
a tways do - due studies
and are ère manimum apree-
ment murt mond will brom
food fruit
my with non Thrittrd by
all That she Daw and learned
in Try land A word beren
invethatiful to your and
the Antree for all 7 m did
for has -
My zerarm a yords h
year both
klways insuraly your
I I for
Br folder 1-43
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
February 15, 1943
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Ambassador Winant spoke to me this morning of the
proposed visit of Mr. Anthony Eden to this country, and
handed me your memorandum on the subject which I am
returning herewith. I would suggest, if it suits your
convenience that Eden be invited to come and the sooner
he comes the better ,as that will also suit my convenience.
This could be any time beginning next week as I understand
that Madam Chiang Kai-shek's visit will be finished by the
end of this week.
It would seem to be advisable in order to avoid any
undue significance being given to Eden's visit that an
announcement be made when the news is given out that he
1s coming over in order to be brought up to date with
regard to matters concerned with the furtherance of the
war effort, and that his visit 18 a part of a series of
contacts made between the high officials of the United
Nations in order to keep up the mutual exchange of ideas
and information which 1s undertaken with a view to keep-
ing all the interested governments informed of current
developments.
Enclosure:
The President's memorandum.
CH
T at The instation Lite
Green to talk very imformally
holding in regard Domesthalls of
United Nations conferences
Infore The and of The selar,
had where such
on subjects should
be arrangul y thi Pors It is the
thanged my Tatales
would for for Smilar
informal conventions a
fr Lital with Rusea 0
with Hime, and That
anne
invitation would Cr Dent
hat X Crill The the that
Nations
Dedminator
MY 1mg ghos 23rd 1943 /
Dear Sr I Roosewell,
James weeks ago
I had the pleasure x
meeting receive of your
lack
among thank general Keinter
Jan ! : Heddrick 4. & Col: Jass.
The accompanying photo= =
graph was There at
the time, + I seed
it to you are it
may interest you and
the President. Pm my
right is rested Field
marchal Land Birdenood
Pm. Christmas day I entar
haved two charming
Engineers Officers we your
Eapt Badley t
Escent Browth, who happened
he staying in and
asighbowshood, I are
sorry to say they left
may roan aftarwards.
2/2 office talk of your
to o hart
civit to this have you And
have hease Thousfel to
got back safely after your
have have the that
carbuty, + 2 hope that
your had a good rext.
Nith many manager to
you 4 the Inevident
Behine me
Games every sincerely
Charge 2 R
T'SF
they hand
Ge Bretan -
1943
hr F.D. Reservelt
The Nite House
Narkingtore
EL. V. a.
June
THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AMERICAN EMBASSY
London, February 23, 1943.
Dear Miss Thompson:
The Duchess of Kent has asked the Ambassador's
office if we know whether the photograph of young
Prince Michael Charles Franklin which she sent to
the President reached him safely. Our recollection
here is that the photograph was received by the Embassy
just before Mrs. Roosevelt left, and that it was taken
back to Washington with her luggage, but no one seems
to be absolutely sure. Could you let me know whether
it reached the White House safely?
If the American Outpost in Great Britain has not
sent Mrs. Roosevelt direct a copy of a recent bulletin
of theirs containing an article based on her brief
visit to University College, Oxford, it might interest
her to see it. I am enclosing a copy.
With renewed good wishes, I am,
Yours sincerely,
Miss Malvina Thompson,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
treat Britam folder
free
1-43
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 12, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR
LORD HALIFAX
Many thanks for that most
interesting report of the physical
condition of your national guest
in England!
F.D.R.
Great Britain freder 1-45
BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
MOOT
fur
June 30th, 1943.
Dear Mr. President,
In my letter of March 9th I sent
you a copy of a report by two British doctors
on the subject of Hess' health. This report
was to be handed to a representative of the
International Red Cross for transmission to
Frau Hess under cover of a letter emphasizing
that it was confidential, that it was for Frau
Hess' personal information, and that there must
be no publicity whatever.
The International Red Cross have now
informed His Majesty's Government that it is
impossible for them to convey this information
to Frau Hess without taking the German Government
into their confidence. His Majesty's Government
are not prepared to trust the German Government
to/
The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States,
DECLASSIFIED By Authority of British
Washington, D. C.
Gout, Telegram 1/12/22
By RHP Date FEB 14 1972
-2-
to refrain from undesirable publicity. The
International Red Cross have therefore been
advised that no communication should be made
to Frau Hess.
Believe me,
Dear Mr. President,
Very sincerely yours,
Halifax
BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.
March 9th, 1943.
Dear Mr. President,
You will perhaps remember that on
December 8th last I gave you a copy of a
Foreign Office memorandum on the subject of
Hess.
Since that date the Foreign Office
have been approached by the International Red
Cross with a request from Frau Hess to find out
the true state of her husband's health. Refusal
of this request might have made the task of the
International Red Cross delegates who are dealing
with prisoner-of-war questions in Germany more
difficult. It was therefore decided that while
permission could not be granted to representatives
of the International Red Cross to see Hess, a
report on his health signed by two well-known
British/
The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
By DECLASSIFIED Authority of British
President of the United States
of America,
Washington, D.C.
Dovt, Tilegram 112/72
By RHP Date FEB 1 A 1972
BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.
-2-
British doctors should be communicated to them.
This report, a copy of which is enclosed, has
now been handed to a representative of the Inter-
national Red Cross, who is passing it on through
confidential channels to the International Red
Cross Headquarters in Geneva under cover of a
letter emphasizing that it is confidential, that
it is for Frau Hess' personal information, and that
there must be no publicity whatever.
You will see that this report makes no
explicit reference to Hess' mental state as
described in the last paragraph of the memorandum
which I gave you on December 8th. This was done
deliberately to avoid the danger that the medical
certificate might be used publicly by the Germans
to expose our original propaganda that Hess was
sane, and to bear out their own original contention
that he was mentally deranged when he flew to the
United/
BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.
-3-
United Kingdom.
They might even be able,
on grounds of insanity, to claim Hess'
repatriation.
The above information has also
been brought to the notice of Mr. Stalin.
Believe me,
Dear Mr. President,
Very sincerely yours,
Halifax
I
Text of Report on Herr Hess' Health.
At the request of the Foreign Office we have
today seen and examined Herr Rudolf Hess after having
read all previous medical reports.
Herr Hess is suitably accommodated and he made
no complaint about his circumstances. The services of
an experienced physician are available, whenever required.
Since his arrival in this country Herr Hess has
experienced (1) phases of depression and emotional
instability, and (2) recurring upper abdominal discomfort.
Herr Hess told us that the latter had troubled him from
time to time in Germany in recent years, and that an X-ray
examination had proved negative. He himself attributes
this symptom to overwork and nervous strain and it seems
clear that it is a functional disturbance, without any
organic basis. More recently he has noticed a feeling of
exhaustion on walking and (quite wrongly) he has attributed
this to "weakness of the heart" and has therefore taken
less exercise.
Today Herr Hess complained of no symptoms except
slight upper abdominal discomfort and a tendency to
constipation, which he relieves by an occasional mild
purgative. He informed us that his appetite is good and
that he is sleeping well without the use of sedatives. He
occupies himself with reading and writing; he is able to
take walking exercise.
Herr Hess looks healthy, is well nourished and
shows no indication of anaemia. A complete and thorough
physical examination revealed no evidence of organic lesion
in any system and left us in no doubt that he is in
excellent physical health.
There/
-2-
There was today no evidence of depression or
anxiety and he appeared to be mentally normal but it is
clear that he is liable to fluctuations of mood.
We explained to him our conviction that his
bodily symptoms - which are slight - are purely functional
in nature - a view which appeared to please but not to
surprise him. Herr Hess has had the services of both
dental and ophthalmic surgeons. The reading glasses
prescribed by the latter are thought by Herr Hess to be
"too strong" and the ophthalmic surgeon is to see him again.
No further treatment is necessary beyond that
which is now provided for him.
254
hm
THE WHITE HOUSE
1
WASHINGTON
March 12, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
Yes, I agree that this should
be discussed with Mr. Eden. Tell
Mr. Eden my old story of January,
1919.
The British Navy Board valued
what we should pay for rents,
damages, etc., in each of the
places occupied by American Naval
forces. The American Board did
the same thing. The two values
were somewhat apart. I want in
to see the British Secretary for
Air -- he offered to match
shillings with me in each of
the fifteen or twenty cases.
I told him we would be hanged
if the matching became public.
He then suggested that we split
the difference in each case.
I readily accepted and the whole
problem was ended in ten minutes.
F. D. R.
PS Freat Britain folder 1-43
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
March 8. 1943
My dear Mr. President:
We have not yet made payment to the British for
private property taken for use in the United States
Bases acquired under the exchange of notes of September 2,
1940, as we are required to do. Some differences have
arisen as to valuations - on the whole the values fixed
by the Colonial authorities amount to approximately
$7,500,000 while those fixed by the appraisers for the
War and Navy Departments amount to approximately $5,500,000.
These differences can undoubtedly be adjusted but some
little time will be required.
Under the procedure agreed upon between the two
Governments the British authorities are to pay the
private property owners and we, in turn, are to reimburse
the British Government. We have discussed with the War
and Navy Departments the matter of settling these claims
through reverse lend-lease and they would be glad to have
it done that way.
If
The President,
The White House.
-2-
If you agree we will discuss the matter informally
with Mr. Eden on his forthcoming visit to this country
and suggest that the British Government consider whether
it would care to propose officially to us that it under-
take the payment of these private property claims under
reverse lend-lease. We will, of course, make it clear
that we have no desire to go back on our original under-
taking, which preceded the Lend-Lease Act, but that we
feel that a gesture of this sort would have a salutary
effect on our whole cooperative program. I have in mind
the desirability of avoiding the necessity of asking
Congress for an appropriation should this eventually be
found to be necessary.
I have enclosed a memorandum outlining the plan in
detail.
A yours, Nills
Enclosure:
Memorandum.
Department of State
BUREAU
Eu
DIVISION
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted
2/22/43
ADDRESSED TO
The President.
il . - - office
1-1033
MEMORANDUM
In the exchange of notes dated September 2, 1940
with the British Government, providing for the base -
destroyers exchange, the following provision was made
in respect to payment by the Government of the United
States for private property included in the leased
areas:
"All of the bases and facilities referred
to in the preceding paragraphs will be leased to
the United States for a period of ninety-nine
years free from all rent and charges other than
such compensation to be mutually agreed on to
be paid by the United States in order to compensate
the owners of private property for loss by ex-
propriation or damage arising out of the establish-
ment of the bases and facilities in question.'
To implement this provision, it was agreed that the
local authorities would acquire the necessary privately
owned lands to be leased to the Government of the United
States for ninety-nine years and that this Government
would, after having the properties examined by its own
appraisers, reimburse the British Government if our
valuations were in accord with the amounts paid out by the
local authorities; the British Government in turn would
reimburse the local Governments in the eight areas involved.
The privately owned lands acquired in connection with
the construction of these eight Bases have now been appraised.
The total value of the United States appraisals 1s approximately
$5,500,000 United States currency. As regards a considerable
number of individual tracts of land, our appraisals accord
with the prices paid by the local authorities for the
properties. In practically everyone of the eight areas,
however, there are differences in the total value of such
private property between prices paid by local authorities
and the amounts set by the United States appraisers as
a fair market price. In Bermuda, for instance, the total
of our United States naval appraisals was £109,000 while
the awards of the Bermuda Property Board for the same
properties reached a total of £184,000. This is the most
serious discrepancy. Elsewhere the discrepancies range
from five to fifty per cent.
It
-2-
It 1s estimated that whereas our Army and Navy
appraisals for the eight properties totaled $5,500,000,
the local prices paid or awards approved would approximate
$7,500,000 to $8,000,000. These discrepancies are due to
a variety of causes. In some cases they are honest
differences of opinion. In others the local awards include
bonuses to compensate landowners for temporary loss of
earning power and extra expense of moving and resettlement.
In Newfoundland, for instance, we urged the Newfoundland
Government strongly to require the local residents to
vacate properties urgently needed for base construction.
To induce the owners to move in a hurry and in the middle
of a severe winter, the Newfoundland Government agreed to
pay each owner a special bonus of twenty per cent of the
value of his property. Under United States practice, we
do not pay such bonuses and our appraisers could not, there-
fore, include these amounts. In practically all cases the
local authorities have allowed their people to include
modest sums for legal fees. Our appraisals cannot include
such fees. Taking everything into account, the discrepancies
between our appraisals and the local awards are understandable
and probably not in excess of what was to be expected.
We can of course continue our discussions of these
discrepancies with the British authorities, and doubtless
in the course of the next few years we could reach a
reasonably satisfactory solution in respect to them.
The procedure in such matters is, as you know, slow and
tedious. Upon reaching an agreement as to amounts, we
should then have to pay these sums to the British Govern-
ment. Presumably appropriations from Congress will have
to be sought for the purpose -- possibly some of them
after the war is over. In the meantime, the people in the
Colonies will grow restive at not receiving their money.
In all these circumstances it is recommended that an
informal suggestion be made to Mr. Eden on h18 forthcoming
visit to this country that the British Government consider
whether it would not care to propose officially to us that
the British Government undertake the payment of these private
property claims under Reverse Lend-lease. Officers of
both the War Department and the Navy Department have
informally at various times suggested this procedure to
officers of the Department of State, and the Secretaries
of War and the Navy have approved this proposal.
It
-3-
It seems to us that the British Government by making
such a gesture would receive an amount of good will in this
country worth many times the comparatively small amount
of money involved. These Bases should be a lasting
tangible reminder to our people of a generous gesture
on the part of the British Government. Moreover the matter
could be finished at an early date and the people in the
Colonies could obtain prompt payment for their properties
to which they are of course entitled.
If you approve, we shall take this up personally and
informally with Mr. Eden along the following lines. We
shall make it clear to him that we recognize that the
exchange of notes of September 2, 1940 antedates the Lend-
lease policy and has no connection with it; that by that
exchange of notes the United States assumed an obligation
to pay for the private property required for the Bases and
we are, of course, prepared to carry out that obligation,
but that it has occurred to us that the British Government
might desire to consider offering to assume this obligation
under Reverse Lend-lease; that if his Government should
think well of this personal and informal suggestion, we
would be glad if it would make the proposal officially;
and that if the suggestion 1s not viewed with favor we
shall proceed with our efforts to reconcile existing
differences and in due course pay the claims in accordance
with the obligation assumed under the exchange of notes
of September 2, 1940.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 14, 1943
Memo, for Miss Tully
The President wants all this
to put in the Archives.
M.C.T.
w as
china !
Then mail aller by peach
PSF great Bortain
THE WHITE HOUSE
washington
Copy
March 14, 1943
My dear Queen Mary,
My husband and I were both so glad
to hear from you and to see the photograph.
*
You were very kind to entertain some of our
officers on Christmas Day and it must have
made them less lonely.
I think with pleasure of my visit
with you and hope that I have used all the
information I gathered there in Great Britain
to good advantage since my return.
The winter has been a busy one and
our boys are for the most part far away, but
I hope soon to go to the West Coast and visit
our hospitals and see our daughter and youngest
son, who may soon get his wish and be ordered
to sea.
My husband sends his warm regards, and
with renewed thanks,
Believe me,
Very sincerely yours,
(Eleanor Roosevelt)
CONFIDENTIAL
anthony Eden's
PSF S.B folder 1-43
file
WAR DEPARTMENT
Itenerary
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON
March 19, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF:
Proposed itinerary:
First Day
Eastern
Central
War Time
War Time
Lv. Washington
7:00 a.m.
Lunch on plane
Ar. Keesler Field, Miss. 12:40 p.m. 11:40 a.m. Inspection of basic training center
and mass review by about 25,000
trainees; inspection of shop and
other training of all types, except
radio and weather, at Technical
Training School.
Lv. Keesler Field, Miss.
3:00 p.m.
2:00 p.m.
Ar. Montgomery, Ala.
4:30 p.m.
3:30 p.m. Inspection divided between Maxwell
Field and Gunter Field. Program to
include brief view of facilities
and also inspection and air review
with 100 or more planes involved.
Some of these must be brought in
from Selma, Alabama.
Lv. Montgomery, Ala.
7:00 p.m.
6:00 p.m.
Ar. Fort Benning
7:30 p.m.
Dinner; brief presentation of
Benning activities; and spend night
Second Day
Breakfast; inspect Infantry School;
witness parachute tower jumps,
review 10th Armored Division.
Lv. Benning
Noon
Lunch on plane
Ar. Fort Bragg
2:30 p.m.
Airborne demonstration, including
parachute jumps and glider descents
by General Ridgeway's division or
other airborne troops.
Lv. Fort Bragg
6:15 p.m.
Dinner on plane if desired.
Ar. Washington
8:00 p.m.
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
funce.
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
McCarthy
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PSF Great Britain folder
hm
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 24, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. HARRY HOPKINS
W111 you read this and bring
it up when Eden comes back?
F.D.R.
Winnit
Personal and confidential ltr. 3-10 to the
President from J.G.W. re notes on Mr. Eden's
trip to Washington.
PSF Great Britain folder
March 24, 1943.
Dear Max:-
It is a long time since I have written to
you but I want you to know that you have been in
my thoughts, and I hope much that all goes well
with you and yours.
I was, of course, delighted about your
boy's decoration and very soon thereafter my boy,
Elliott, got the Distinguished Flying Cross in
the field in North Africa.
I have a hunch that you are due for
another holiday over here. I hope you may find
it possible to come over this Spring and, in-
cidentally, to talk with me about many things.
The war goes on and on -- and while I
think we are gaining, it is difficult for you
and me to curb our impatience, especially when
our military and naval friends keep saying that
this cannot be done and that cannot be done
and their time schedule seems so everyastingly
slow to us.
With affectionate personal regards and
with the hope that I shall see you soon,
Always sincerely,
His Excellency
Lord Beaverbrook,
London,
England.
PMW
PLAIN
London
Dated DECEMBER 23, 1942
Rec'd 10:45 p.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
7300, Twenty-third.
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LORD BEAVERBROOK.
Dear Mr. President: I send you the devoted good
wishes for Christmas and the new year of a British
citizen. Upon you depend the hopes of man and the
future of the world. May you have health to bear
your burdens and the brightening prospect of victory
as the new year grows older. And with affectionate
pErsonal regards, yours EVEr, Max Beaverbrook.
MATTHEWS
V/WC
Revised
HR
DRAFT STATEMENT,
143
43
During his visit to the United States of America
Mr. Eden has had a series of intimate conferences with
the President, the Secretary of State and their advisers,
at which current military and political affairs and other
questions arising out of the war have been the subject
of discussion.
These conferences have disclosed a close similarity
of outlook on the part of the two Governments and there
has been a most fruitful meeting of minds on all matters
that have come under discussion.
The conversations have touched, among other things,
when the
task
upon the problems that will face the Governments of the
mactical
problems that
U.S.A., the U.K., China and the Soviet Union and of the
will rise
other United Nations in safeguarding the world from further
num the
aggression after the defeat of the Axis Powers. Reference
sumender 3
the and every,
has been made to the problem of political decisions con-
nected with military operations and to the problems that
will arise upon the surrender of the enemy.
While it has not been the purpose of these exploratory
meetings to reach final decisions, which indeed is impossible
at this stage, a large measure of general agreement has
been reached which will be of great value in further dis-
cussions between the two Governments and with other powers.
All who took part in the conversations look forward
with increased confidence to the development of harmonious
?
and effective collaboration among the United Nations,
both now and after the war,7
PSF great Britain
Bhil 6' 443
Foreign Office,
S.U.1.
by dear hr President
The Liberator carried us
safely home and / fan
Winston last night some
account of our talls. be
was ! Think, ruy pleased.
/ wally cannot Kank
you enough for all your
kindness to me, and
the gifts of fruit
and count tess other
generons presents. hou
esfecially / am froud
to has For photograph
hith its inscription.
Everybody here seems
pleased hit The work
done in America, and
/ ful immensely encomed
by all - heard and
saw which on my visit,
No doubt there are planty
of difficultin ahead,
\
but / refuse to believe
that it is beyond The
The
wit of than and
wildom of states manshife
to usolve Them
wir Unewed Tanks
and very best wishes at
all times to you and
hn Rossevelt.
ruy sincerely your
Anting Eden
Pusual
PSF greet Britam folder
I
Tab Fusident of Tan United States 4
of America
White House
By bas
Washing ton
De
AR.
PSF Great Britan
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
x
April 12, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:
To follow up on this and see
what can be done.
F.D.R.
h.Davin
Have phonesto he spoke Halifax in turn
and Catled never hand
who to authory Sundant informed Eden it who waitom is 0 said also
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 30, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
I spoke to Mr. Norman Davis
about Lady Mountbatten's visit. He
took the matter up with Lord Halifax
who cabled London to take it up with
the British Red Cross, but has had
no reply. Mr. Norman Davis also spoke
to Mr. Eden about the matter.
G.
)
Grace:
To find out from Donovan 1f 1t
is all settled about Lady Mountbatten
coming over here.
FDR
PSF theat Britain folder
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.
March 25, 1943
Miss Grace Tully,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
Dear Grace:
Would you be good enough. to bring the
attached letter to the attention of the President.
Sincerely,
Bil
William J. Donovan
Director
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.
March 25, 1943
My dear Mr. President:
Here is a copy of a letter I have received
from Lord Mountbatten.
Sincerely,
William J Donovan
Director
The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
COPY
COMBINED OPERATIONS HEADQUARTERS
la, Richmond Terrace,
Whitehall, S.W. 1
9th March, 1943.
My dear Colonel,
Please forgive my worrying you again but after
what the President told me at Casablanca and after your kind
messages it seems clear that Edwina is to receive an
invitation from the American Red Cross.
We fully appreciate that it may take some while
yet to come through but if you could give us an inkling of
the dates during which they are likely to want her in the
United States it would make the planning of her programme of
visits in the United Kingdom and Ireland much easier as she
now has such an immense job going round inspecting the
St. John's Organization in all parts of the Kingdom that it
would be very helpful to have fairly early waning of when she
will be wanted.
When are you coming over here again? I shall
look forward to seeing you.
Yours sincerely
(signed) Louis Mountbatten
PSF In Britain forder 1-43
From: Lord Beaverbrook.
File
STORNOWAY HOUSE,
CLEVELAND ROW,
STAMESS:
Res.
Cherkley,
Leatherhead,
Surrey.
12th April, 1943.
Dear Mr. President,
Thank you for your letter.
It so happens that Winston spoke to me a week
ago and made the proposal that I should go out to the
United States.
After the receipt of your letter, I
have answered him my willingness to cross over as soon as
he finds it convenient to inform me fully of events.
I wish I might say or do something that would
be of use to you in the necessary conflict with elements
too far removed from the war to understand the nature of
it.
That is where the British Government has an
easy time. British citizens have an advantage over
American citizens.
The enemy menace is always
present in England.
The enemy planes flying overhead exercise a
correcting influence. The sight of Cape Gris Nez on a
clear day always discloses the distant scene with sufficient
clarity to justify us in singing with one voice, "Lead kindly
light".
But it is possible that I can disclose to some
of my colleagues in America just a little of the devotion
we have here for the people over the sea who have sustained
and strengthened us.
To me it is indeed a pleasure to get your personal
regards, and my devotion to your cause gives me the prospect
of doing useful service once again.
With kindest regards,
Yours ever,
Mar
The President,
The White House,
Washington. D.C.
PSF can't Barlan
R
BUCKINGHAM PALACE
May 4th - 1943
My dear President Roosevelt,
I take this
opportunity of sending you
a live by my Prime Minister.
It brings my condial greeting
s hopes for some unfush talk
between you both on the
present situation 6 our future
plans.
I know how much Mr.
Churchill enjoys there
meetings, which, as he has
often told me, are on such
agreesble h friendly terms
I would like to congratulate
you on the successful issue
of your 2nd Corpo heavy
fighting in the capture of
Mateur, which I feel sure
is only is achievements. a forerumer of other
Jawait with great interest
the results of your discussions.
The Queen joins with me
in sending our hisindest regards
to you d to Mr. Roosevelt.
Believe me
yours very sincerely
GeorgeR.I.
of
oth
sure
leavy ptene of
congratulate ful issue
terms
1 ,
PSF great Britain [may 4, 1943]
The
Fresident of the United States
of america
The White House
GRI
Washington
PSF Tunt Britam folder
foreign Office,
S.
5th May, 1943.
Dear hp President
I was very distressed to learn that Bishop
Leonard, about whom you wrote to me, had been killed
in the same accident which cost General Andrews his
life. Bishop Leonard was to have come to see me on
his return from Iceland and before going off on a
visit to North Africa. I need not say how sorry I
am that his journey has ended so tragically and I
should like to send you my very sincere sympathy in
the loss of a friend.
hith kindest regards
Jun very sixcerely
The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America.
1099 him
PSF Treat Britainfolder 1-43
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 21, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL BROWN:
Will you get in touch with
Captain Tollemache and tell him that
I have a letter from Lord Mountbatten
telling me that he is sending me three
photographs by the Captain, but that
I haven't received them as yet?
F.D.R.
Letter to the President, 5-3-43, from
Lord Mountbatten, Combined Operations
Headquarters, la Richmond Terrace, White-
Hall, S.W.1, saying he is not proceeding
with remainder of the British Chiefs of
Staffs Committee. Has sent 4 members of
his Staff to take part and one of them,
Capt. Tollemache, will remain in Wash. as
his rep. in Wash. and he is sending by him
3 photos for Pres. to sign - one to go to
Town Hall of town of Romsey.
PSF
that Britden freded
5-28-43
filesonal
The Waldorf-Astoric
z
Dear m President
The memory 2 my
2tay at your home
in the forest, is
my happine bcollection
B. many joypel which
he America.
When you talked
y your predecess
at the While Home
-the just f Jener orran
judgmants of The
Princess hay a
Century ster prosed any
(mensation Theme
lun heard,
It is my help 4 this
yn his see me
again before 1so back
-h the Isluer Kingun
You denten follower
my
may 28-1943.
Returned for priservation
PSF Gl. Britam-
1943
May 28. 1943.
Dear Mr Prosident
On my relium here J was
delighted and touched to find your kind
gift of /mr photograph which shill
greatly treasure. H- was a prent
privilege to meet you and to Enjoy to
mudhospitality at / hands. J
amsure that this meeting of jourself
and le Prime Minister will he as fruitful
of my sucess and operation as other
meetings have been.
For myself, it has given me freat pleasure
andincreased confidence to meet your
naral andmilitary leaders and to Knad
personally Those of when J had heart to much.
J am very glad that Stilwell and Chennaull.
are coming England to five us further
have opportunity of discussing the Eastem problem. We
Jap but we shall do it holween
a stiff job before us to dispose of the
with very many thanks
yours very sincerely
Archie Wavell.
BRITISH MINISTRY OF WAR TRANSPORT
PSF Great Britain filewomal folder
BOWLING GREEN 9 - 5310
REPRESENTATIVE IN THE U.S.A.
25 BROADWAY
NEW YORK
May
29,
1943
My dear Mr. President,
Thank you very much for
your letter of the 28th of May, in which
you enclosed a letter addressed to the
Prime Minister, which I will hand to him
as soon as I get back.
I must, however, say one
word of gratitude at once to you and to
your advisers for the cordiality, friendli-
filed Churchell freder
ness and understanding which I have constantly
received.
I most heartily reciprocate
the kind wishes which you sent me and I look
forward to returning before very long, as you
p.2
suggest, to discuss those further subjects
which you have in mind.
Your letter was a most pleasing
finish to a very enjoyable and interesting
visit to Washington.
Thanking you once again,
Yours Learhers sincerely,
The President,
White House,
Washington, D.C.
PSF Gr. Britani -1943
30th May 1443
Dear DC President,
May I often you my very suncere thanks
to you unduen in giving we the cigned
photograble of yourself which I received
yesterday?
The inscription does we great honour
and embolders me to write personally
to tell you how much your gift is affreciated.
yours smerch
Contal.
PSF great Balain
TELEPHONE:- 3352.
Jilarsonal
CHRIST CHURCH,
OXFORD.
Hag 31nt 1943.
Dear lb President,
Ihope I
am not committing a breach
of etignette in writing to
thank you and 4m Renevelt
for all your kindness and
hospitality during my
stay in Washing ton.
The various occasions on
which I was privileged
to visit you will cver
remains red- letter days
in memorys calemdar,-
especially the less formal
ones. And I am none
the less grateful because
I realise that I owe them
to your appreciation of the
qualities of my friend
the Prime Minister rather
than to any merit of my mm.
I feel sure that the conference
will prove another, and
perhaps penu ltimate mile-
otone on the road to victory.
If the truly friendly welcome
we all of us engaged is any
measure of American public
feeling it must also encome
the hope that the Engles h
speaking peoples can continue
to work together when rictary is
won to give the world the
blessings of a lasting peace.
Once more with cormest thanks
pray believe me yours sincerely
Cherwell.
PSF
Great Britain 1-43 free
The White House
Washington
filenomal.
JUN 3 5 07 PM 1943
WB153 145 CABLE BGOVT
LONDON JUNE 3 1943 848P
THE PRESIDENT
WHITEHOUSE
PLEASE ACCEPT MR PRESIDENT MY WARMEST THANKS FOR YOUR KIND
BIRTHDAY MESSAGE STOP I HEARTILY APPRECIATE THE GOOD
WISHES WHICH YOU HAVE EXPRESSED TOWARDS ME PERSONALLY AS
WELL AS THOSE WHICH YOU HAVE SENT ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE
OF THE USA TO THE BRITISH PEOPLE NP WHAT OUR SOLDIERS
SAILORS AIRMEN AND WORKERS HAVE ACHIEVED IN AFRICA IS A
BRILLIANT AUGURY OF COMING FEATS OF ARMS IN OTHER
CONTINENTS NP AS THE TALE OF COMMON VICTORIES GROWS
so I AM SURE WILL GROW THE SENSE THAT A COMMON PURPOSE
DIRECTS AND INSPIRES THE VAST EFFORT WHICH OUR TWO PEOPLES WITH
THE PARTNERS GREAT AND SMALL ARE PUTTING FORTH IN THESE DECISIVE
YEARS NP THE MORE DEEPLY AND WIDELY THIS SENSE IS FELT THE MORE
SURELY CAN WE ALL TRUST IN VICTORY TO BRING US LASTING PEACE
GEORGE RI.
1
PSF Gl Britam -1943
9th June.
Dear & : President.
I am in deed most gratiful for
the pholograph you Ro gracinity Rent me.
Even had it only had you signature it
would have been a most prized possession, but
having anto go aphed it a you did u. becomes
doubly Ro.
he all returned from hashington feeling very pt
and thanks b everyones Kendness have enjoyed on
visit to much.
hours your please Coursey my respects WM? Rosevelt
and accept mysine an good wishin for all Queen
in the shipenders work you are doing
Sencerely
your
In Iranklin I. Rosevelt.
President offine llmbis States
While House
Washington
n
U.S.A.
PSF quat Britain
6-14-43
The Waldorf-Astoria:
my dear m Rindul
1 Lune always been curious
about The lives 7the Presidents
y the United states. And
have read much m that
object.
But never had , imagine
that I should myself see are
here The President who has
the biggest tash of all, who
has performed his any will
The greater genium, and in
the same time disferengs such
Charm in his private life if
such gentlemen and kindliness
of mames w these around him
The oppertunity which you
have allowed the y entering
and staying the days r days
in you own circle, has been
to the a moving and inspiring
experience.
4m divoled friend
may
June 14th
1943.
feleisonal PSF Is B. folder
June 17, 1943.
Dear Max:-
That was another grand weekend and I
got the kind of real relaxation and fun which
comes too rarely these days.
I have not let those marvelous Kiplings
out of my sight -- in fact, I have already re-
read three of them and I am taking them to
Hyde Park to go into the locked bookcase beside
my desk. I am ever SO grateful for them and
I am confirmed in my thought that they are
excellent material for movies. After this show
is over I have visions of a visit to Hollywood
by Beaverbrook and Roosevelt, joint producers
of Mrs. Hawksby, Mrs. Gadsby and the Brushwood
Boy. We might then catch a live Viceroy to
that that part. Perhaps Winston will select
one!
Give the latter my love when you see
him.
Have a good trip with Averell and do
be sure to come back soon.
As ever yours,
Right Honorable
Lord Beaverbrook,
Waldorf Towers,
301 Park Avenue,
New York, N. Y.
SECRET
PSF great Britan & fredu
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON
Hold then file
July 6, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:
Some time ago you asked me to arrange for the
transportation of Sir William and Lady Beveridge to
London on or after July 10, in order to arrive at their
destination by July 15.
I have just received a telephone call from the
Air Transport Command to the effect that the plane, on
which reservations have been made for the Beveridge party,
is scheduled to leave on July 10. Of course, this depart-
ure date is contingent on weather conditions. Pan American
is notifying the Beveridges directly and asking them to be
ready to depart from New York on the above date.
B.W.Davergat B. W. DAVENPORT
Major, General Staff,
Asst. Secretary, General Staff.
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 3-16-59
Signature- Call L. Spicer
SECRET
In Bs folder,
1-43
From Lord Beaverbrook
CHERKLEY,
LEATHERHEAD,
ah
SURREY.
7th July 1943.
Dear Mr. President,
On my return I see a marked decline in the
fortunes of the Labour Party. It finds itself debarred,
by its participation in the Government, from wide
criticism of the war effort, while the praise of
victories goes not to its leaders, but to Churchill.
It is a body in a vacuum.
That decline is emphasised by the position of
Herbert Morrison. The Party at its Annual Conference
tried to humble him, and succeeded in exalting him.
His defeat by Arthur Greenwood for the Party
Treasurership has raised his prestige, so that he
stands now in the public esteem second only to
Churchill. He is in fact the actual leader, even
though Attlee is the titular leader of the Labour Party.
Churchill is safe and well in the political arena.
He will remain in high authority, provided he does'nt
get too certain. But that is unlikely. He had too
many years of opposition and unpopularity to make that
mistake.
Acland, the leader of the new Common Wealth Party,
is not making headway. The Christian Communism which
he preaches has its attractions in wartime. The Bishop
of Bradford is the Chairman. And though His Grace has
never shown himself a maker of Party leaders, he has
the glory of launching the movement which made a King into
a Duke.
I have seen Gilbert Winant. They say that he looks
like Lincoln. But I think he looks like Nancy Hanks.
How very much I liked the weekends you allowed me to
spend in your company. They are the lasting memory of
my visit to America. And I am frankly looking for another
invitation another day.
Your dutiful follower resident abroad,
The President,
Max
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
PSF: Dreat Britainflds -Y3
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 14, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. HARRY HOPKINS:
TO READ AND RETURN FOR
MY PERSONAL FILES.
F.D.R.
Letter, 7-5-43, from Mr. Averell Harriman,
London, re his talk with Mr. Churchill in
regard to three-cornered meeting; re Stalin
; and re sending him to Moscow.
file Personal Great Britain
forder
THE WHITE HOUSE
N.L.H. 1-43
WASHINGTON
July 14, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. HARRY HOPKINS:
TO READ AND RETURN FOR
MY PERSONAL FILES.
F.D.R.
London - July 5, 1943.
Dear Mr. President:
In order that you may understand the Prime
Minister's reaction to the number one matter you asked me to
discuss with him, I think I should explain in more detail
his reactions and the circumstances under which I discussed
it with him.
Max and I arrived late Wednesday afternoon
after two nights on the plane with little sleep to find an
invitation to dine with the Prime Minister that evening. Max
was tired and would have preferred to go to bed. He was not,
therefore, in too good a mood. The dinner, which included
Mrs. Churchill and Kathleen, was argumentative and some of the
fundamental disagreements between the two men came out. This
type of argument with Max always upsets the Prime Minister.
Max left at midnight. I stayed to give the
Prime Minister alone your several messages. The talk, which
started with the proposed meeting, developed into a two hour
discussion on every subject - from de Gaulle to China to India
to Poland, etc., coming back throughout the talk to Russia and
the question of the meeting.
The President
- 2 -
July 5, 1943.
I have never had a better opportunity to be
direct and frank and, as he has since been more friendly than
ever, it 18 obvious that he accepted the sincerity of my
statements even though he did not always agree with them.
He firmly believes a three-cornered meeting
is in the interests of the war but he admitted that his
viewpoint is colored by considerations of the reaction in
Great Britain. My main argument was based on the long view
as against the immediate - (1) the value of the intimate
understanding that in all probability would result from a
tete-a-tete, impossible with three persons, and (2) the great
importance of the favorable reaction of the American people to it
and to your participation. I explained the difference in the
public reaction in the United States to a personal meeting of
two as compared with a three cornered meeting on British soil
in which it would appear that he, Churchill, had been the
broker in the transaction.
There is no doubt in my mind as to his sincere
desire and determination to back you up in anything that you
finally decide to do and, although I must emphasize his disap-
pointment if he is not present, I am satisfied he would accept
it in good part and that it would in the long run improve rather
than adversely affect your relations with him.
The President
- 3 -
July 5, 1943
If a meeting of three were held reasonably soon
after your first meeting alone, he recognizes, I believe, the
logic of the historic sequence of the two tete-a-tete meetings
culminating in the third with three present.
Should Germany not attack this summer, there is
much in the Prime Minister's argument of the need for a
closer military understanding between the Chiefs of Staff of
the three countries. The question is whether much would come
of a large meeting of the Staffs now unless you had first
created a foundation of understanding which I am satisfied
would come from the type of meeting you have in mind. In fact
I am not all sure that you would not be able personally to
accomplish more toward an immediate military understanding
in the meeting you propose than would be accomplished by the
larger meeting he proposes.
I explained to the Prime Minister the first night
that there was no need for hurry in his reply, but he prepared
a cable to you the next day, discussed it with Eden, and
called me over to Number 10 (Annex) at one o'clock the following
evening. I think he expected another argument from me and he
seemed relieved when my only comment was that I thought his
cable, although I did not agree with his reasoning, fairly
The President
- 4 -
July 5, 1943.
expressed his views. On my way out I had a few words with
Eden and got the impression from Eden that he personally
was not unsympathetic to your position and was quite
satisfied to let the decision rest with you.
I spent the week end at Chequers. The de Gaulle
question came up a number of times and I can say with great
assurance that the Prime Minister is ready to seize any
opportunity that opens up in directing British Government
policy or in public statements in the House in which he would
take full responsibility for any moves to control de Gaulle's
ambitions to the point of his elimination if it comes to that.
The Prime Minister was full of his speech which
he has since delivered on his receiving the freedom of the
City of London. He considered this a historic occasion and
he put a great deal into it. We had some arguments about what
he should say about China. I hope you are not too disappointed
by the brevity of his reference to China. He will always
refuse to picture the world reconstructed on four great columns
of which China is one, but he is becoming a bit more unbending
and realistic.
The President
- 5 -
July 5, 1943
He showed me his rough cable from Stalin
and his latest reply. I regret that he sent it without
consultation with you. I told him that I thought his recent
interchange of cables with Stalin had shown no profit.
He referred to the subject several times later and agreed
that this type of interchange should not be pursued and
that perhaps he had made a mistake in answering Stalin's
first cable. He defended, however, the need for his
answering the last one because of the implications of bad
faith in the last paragraph.
I am puzzled by the Stalin cables. Churchill's
only explanation 18 that Stalin wants us to become involved
in Western Europe to avoid our entry in the Balkans. This
may be true. On the other hand your reaction that he is
drafting cables for the satisfaction of his military advisors
18, I feel, a better guess. We must always realize, too,
that Stalin's expressions are crude. I have heard him say
things in a way which would be unforgivable between Anglo-Saxons.
The President
- 6 -
July 5, 1943
I called on Maisky last week before his
departure for Moscow. The subject of the Stalin-Churchill
cables came up. The interchange had not disturbed him.
He said, laughing "You know that Stalin speaks his mind
bluntly." He also indicated no concern over the possibility
of our increased military influence in the Balkans.
As you know, I am a confirmed optimist in our
relations with Russia because of my conviction that Stalin
wants, if obtainable, a firm understanding with you and
America more than anything else - after the destruction of
Hitler. He sees Russia's reconstruction and security more
soundly based on it than on any alternative. He is a man
of simple purposes and, although he may use devious means in
attempting to accomplish them, he does not deviate from his
long run objectives.
The situation is today in the making and we
have much at stake. If you don't get a follow up on the
Davies letter, you may want to consider sending me to Moscow
soon (assuming that you think I am the man to 80).
The President
- 7 -
July 5, 1943.
I have thought a good deal about it since you
talked with me and have some definite views as to how the
situation might be handled. If you consider sending me, I
would respectfully suggest that you recall me to Washington
and give me an opportunity to put my ideas before you. You
could then decide whether I should go. Real accomplishment by
an Ambassador in Moscow is a gamble with the odds against
success but the stakes are great both for the war in Europe
and in the Pacific - and after.
I would know within a couple of months in Moscow
whether I could be of value and would ask that, if I have not
been able to do a job, I could then return or be fired.
I am so keen about the work you have given me in
London, which I feel is of increasing value as the time for the
offensive approaches, that I would like to go back to it if
I cannot do a real job in Moscow. I am sure I can be of more
use to you and the war in London than to remain in Moscow as a
glorified communications officer.
Respectfully yours,
Rowell
The President,
The White House.
PSF Great Britain freder 1-43
TELEGRAM
The White House
Mashington
July 30, 1943.
Admiral of the Fleet,
Sir Dudley Pound,
(THROUGH MAP ROOM
c/o The American Embassy,
WHITE HOUSE)
London, England.
I have only just heard the sad news of
Lady Pound's passing and do want you to know
that I am deeply sorry and am thinking of you.
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.
TELEGRAM
The White House
WHITE ONE
Mashington
JULY 24 1943
WORD WAS RECEIVED HERE TODAY THAT LADY POUND HAS DIED X
ADMIRAL LEAHY HAS SENT A MESSAGE OF SYMPATHY IN HIS OWN
BEHALF X
SIGNED HAMMOND
PSF Mr Mr folder 1-45
THE WHITE HOUSE
fill
WASHINGTON
September 3, 1943
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Lady Dill's plane was grounded in Baltimore for about an
hour this evening. It has now taken off and will arive in
Washington at approximately eleven o'clock this evening.
Colonel McCarthy, from General Marshall's Staff, is
going to meet her when she comes in.
The above information was passed to you as General
Marshall knew you were interested.
Very respectfully,
F.H.Shaham
F. H. GRAHAM,
1st Lt, AGD,
Watch Officer.
Dameranth Bit alty From
d Bildle -
cen limiting
PSFGMAT
copy mude at FDR Library 1-24-56
Brital
September 4, 1943.
From:
Opnav
To :
Alusna London
Personal
to Winant for the King from the
President.
The visit of the Churchill family at the White House
not only affords me a great deal of pleasure but gives
us an opportunity to evaluate the work of the conference
at Quebec. I know that you will be well pleased with the
results when you receive a full report from your Prime
Minister. Quebec, Ottawa, and all of Canada could not have
been more hospitable. You could not have found more helpful
and agreeable representatives to receive us than the Governor-
General and Princess Alice. I send you my personal thanks
for providing such delightful quarters at the Citadel.
ROOSEVELT.
Sgd. FDR
PSF Dr. Br. folder,,43
fermal
10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.
9-13-43
Somewhere in Maine
13. ix. 43
Dear M, President,
A coeat many children must have
been Grought up in the White House
nursery, but 1 am Sure name of
them enjoyed it more than (
did. These visits to the White
House and your extrame kindness
The children are a brivilege /
shall be hound to them em bes lother
end of my days. Please accept my
respect ful thanks,
Town sincerely
plan or. Markin
PSF Es. Bi. folder
Returned for preservation
PRIME MINISTER
filsme
10, Downing Street,
dhitehall.
on the Train
13. Septimber.
Dear Mr Prodent
May & stad 20n my
warm thanks for all form Rindness
and hospitality tome, and specially
for asking me a H20s Park and showing
we would. It really is a wish
selightful 5/5/- and the library and
High Schools ans most into siting and
improsior.
? han has 162 chance tin
time to Ser here that R ow last
time of your country and country men
and valined how much ? has
Jines
learn.
May ? send for my
instruct ful good arites to m in
you qual was Goth how and in
the future.
with my knews Hanks
yours sincerel
Thonas have Rowan
PSF 21% Br. Ret.
14 Sept 1843.
10, Downing Street,
Whiteball.
1
her dear me President,
may I after 15 you my
must finces thanks, as nak,fn
lt. heat pleasure it has k stay
at the While House d Hyde Park,
as, In the honorn which 1n han
nce hine done me by atanding
tome your feverous hospitality.
I am mideca must
ful imate and certainly am
hist gratepul.
may 1 Send my best
hishes for A comportable wafe
Khun for his Roosevilt from
her fred advance.
Now sniar with
her duty
CRiumpsin
2
PSF GreatBaJain
BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
September 21st, 1943.
Dear Mr. President,
You may recollect that on December
8th, 1942 Lord Halifax gave you a memorandum
on the subject of Rudolph Hess.
Interest in Hess has revived as a
result of Mr. Brendan Bracken's recent remarks
in New York, and the Cabinet have decided that
the time has come when a statement should be
made regarding the circumstances of Hess'
arrival in Great Britain and the purpose for
which he came. Mr. Eden proposes to reply to
a question on the subject in the House of
Commons on September 22nd, approximately on
the lines of Lord Halifax's memorandum but
with certain important omissions and additions.
No reference will be made to Hess' mental
state for the reasons set out in the third
The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
paragraph of Lord Halifax's letter to you of
March 9th, 1943, that is to avoid the danger that
the medical certificate might be used publicly by
the Germans to expose our original propaganda that
Hess was sane and to bear out their own original
contention that he was mentally deranged when he
flew to the United Kingdom. They might even be able,
on grounds of insanity, to claim Hess' repatriation.
The Soviet Government are being informed
of the action which is being taken.
Believe me,
My dear Mr. President,
Very respectfully and sincerely yours,
R.d. Compbell
IMMEDIATE.
23205
ble
in D. Roosevelt,
resident of the United States of America,
The White House.
ourable
klin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America.
PSF = Mr Br. folder 1-43
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION,
MALET ST., W.C.1.
September 23.1943.
Dear Mr President
A word of thanks to you
for all your hospitality.
I shall not lightly forget
the happy times I've spent at the
White House d Hyde Park.
There was but one lively
hour in Our Atlantic crossing. Just
after Winston had drafted the part
of his speech which dealt with the
punishment given to German submanines,
we got news that a couple of 4. Boab
had sunk a ship within a hundred
miles of the Renown. How the Huns miss
their opportunities!
your sincerely
Brendan Bracken
Priority nn Bas
The President of the United Statesof America
SAFE HAND
Ministry of Information
B.B.
PSF
that Partain folder 1-43
file
(filer moq,
BRITISH INFORMATION SERVICES further report that:
[9-29-43]
Berlin.
The Berlin Press radio to Europe (in German) said that
German troops in Italy are adequately guarded against all
surprises and are prepared for treachery. They compared the
situation to that in Yugoslavia in March 1941.
Tokio.
Domer, the Japanese official radio, said that
Japan's war policy remained unaffected; the war in South-East
Asia would be carried on to a victorious conclusion. The
Japanese people (they said) remained calm and composed.
Stockholm.
It is reported that ships of the Italian fleet have
left Spezia to surrender themselves at Sicily.
PSF the Br
PRIVATE AND
November 8, 1943.
Dear Dickie:-
It is good to get your letter via Brehon
Somervell and he confirms all that you say about
the success of the Chungking meeting. I trust you
are giving a full account to Edwina of all that
happened! Be a good boy.
I am really thrilled over the fact that
for the first time in two years I have confidence
in the personality problems in the China and Burma
fields -- and you personally are largely responsible
for this.
As you probably know, we succeeded in
Russia in having China included in the Four Power
Declaration toward saving the world from aggression
during the immediate and post-war periods. I really
feel that it is a triumph to have got the four
hundred and twenty-five million Chinese in on the
Allied side. This will be very useful twenty-five
or fifty years hence, even though China cannot
moment. contribute much military or naval support for the
As you will know by the time this reaches
you, I an "on my way" with full confidence that the
cessors. joint meeting will be as successful as its prede-
I much wish you could be there.
Take care of yourself and keep up the good
work.
As ever yours,
Acting Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, G.C.V.O., D.S.O.
23rd October, 1943
Dear Mr. President,
You wished me to let you know how my visit to the
Generalissimo passed off, I am therefore sending this letter by
hand of General Somervell who will be able to confirm to you that
it was an unqualified success.
I was invited to stay at the Hyde Park of China, Huang
Shan, and was so able to meet them in very pleasant circumstances.
My preliminary meeting was alone with the Generalissimo
and Madame Ch'iang Kai-shek. I began by telling the Generalissimo
that I had come to Chungking at the earliest possible moment even
before my own staff had formed up at Delhi, as I was so anxious to
make his acquaintance and to discuss matters with him. I pointed
out what a young and relatively inexperienced officer I was for such
a high appointment but if I could feel that I could lean on his
vast wisdom and experience for help and advice that it would be of
the greatest help to me. This line went over very well with him
and he promised me his support, advice and friendship.
I went privately with him through the various points
that were to be raised in the Conference to be quite sure what
his reactions would be in each case.
The interview closed after two hours and I then had one
hour alone with Madame. I told her that I fully realised that the
success or failure of my Mission depended upon the degree of support
and help which I could count on from her. She told me that she was
used to sizing up men quickly and that she had decided to become my
firm friend and that I could rely on her for the utmost help and
support. During subsequent interviews she amply proved that she meant
what she said and was indeed of the greatest help both at the meetings
and with advice between meetings.
She helped me in formulating the correct line of approach
on some of the more ticklish problems and there is no doubt that
her help enabled the informal conferences to pass off more smoothly,
I am told, than any Conference within the memory of those who took part.
Page Two
The Generalissimo and Madame gave Edwina and me the
most charming carved Chinese jade seals and fortunately I had
brought out a present from Edwina consisting of a little Cartier
vanity case made after the Chinese style.
When we parted I felt I had made two real friends and
they were good enough to express the same views to me.
The only difficulty still to be settled is the question
of the Assam lines of communication and the air.lift into China.
Somervell was present at all the discussions in Chungking and at
Delhi and thoroughly understands the position and will be able to
explain it to you in person.
Although we held out an optimistic picture of being able
to build up the lines of communication to a sufficient extent to
enable the campaign to be carried out without interfering with the
air lift into China, I had it recorded at the meeting that I
could not undertake the campaign if I were tied in any way and that
the British forecasts were by no means so optimistic and that I
might well have to encroach on the supply to China to enable the
campaign to take place at all. He accepted this and said that he
would trust me to do the right thing and would have every sympathy
with me in my endeavours to increase the lines of communication.
I thought you would be glad to know that during my visit to the
Burma front I found the British and American troops and airmen in
very good heart and burning with a real desire to get at the
enemy.
If only we can get our logistics to come out right, I
look forward to the future with every confidence.
Yours very sincerely,
Dickie Mounthatter
By Hand
The President
The White House
Washing ton D. e
Tfile
file
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
S.H.1.
PRIME MINISTER
Gold and Dollar Balances
Thanks to gold from South Africa and pay to American troops in the
U.K. and the Empire, our gold and dollar balances have increased to & 1200
million and may rise to & 2000 million by the end of the war. much of the
increase is not really ours at all but represents profits of Empire countries
who choose to use us as their banker. Actually our reserves are far out-
weighed by our liabilities, especially in India and the Middle East, which
are rising about five times as fast as our reserves and may amount to
$10,000 million by the end of the war. Thus our net overseas position is
deteriorating rapidly and our reserve when the war ends is likely to be
only one fifth of our liabilities.
Certain Americans, ignoring these liabilities, claim that supplies
on Lend/Lease should now be reduced and that we should be made to pay with
our gold and dollars for goods supplied. Why they should pick on us for
such treatment is not clear; it is never suggested that Russia and France
with their enormous gold balances should pay for goods supplied to them.
The Lend/Lease administration who, with the State Department, are
favourable to us, are reluctantly proposing to cut supplies since the
United States Treasury maintain that the President issued a directive limit-
ing British reserves to & 1000 million.
The President has appointed & Committee to examine the matter, whose
report may be already in his hands. It is vital to us that he should make
the right decision. If our Lease/Lend supplies are cut off and our balances
reduced to $1000 million, it will be almost impossible for us to tide over
the difficult post-war period while we are building up our export trade.
(signed) Cherwell
12th November, 1943.
DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of State Dept.
hetter 1/20/72
By
RHP
Duto
FEB 1972
Prime Minister
There is a matter affecting our financial relations with the United
States of America which I think I must bring prominently to your notice at this
particular juncture. We have reason to believe that the President is about to give
& decision which is of absolutely vital importance to our financial capacity to get
through the transitional period and, indeed, to our diplomatic independence during
that time.
lie are all concerned by the mounting accumulations of sterling balances
in he hands of other countries. These represent a post-war liability upon us to
convert the sterling into gold or other foreign exchange which the holders of the
balances may need.
It looks indeed as though we may come to the end of the war with
external liabilities of not less than £2,500,000,000 (ten billion dollars).
On the other side, after being almost cleaned out by the middle of
1941, we have been gradually building up & modest reserve. Our free balances of
gold and dollars have now reached £300,000,000, and there is & reasonable hope of
their reaching £500,000,000 (two billion dollars) by the end of the war, or about
one-fifth of our assumed liabilities at the same date. These balances represent
our only quick assets against the liabilities and constitute in fact the central
reserve of the whole Commonwealth, since they include dollars turned over to us
under the sterling area arrangements by the Dominions and other countries in the
sterling area.
These balances will be absolutely essential to see us through the
difficult transition period after Lend/Lease has ceased, and before the measures
we
we shall have to take to restore the balance of our external trade have had time
to bear fruit.
Early in the year we heard, almost accidentally, that the President
had authorised a directive to the effect that the British reserves were not to be
allowed to rise beyond a billion dollars (250,000,000). It is not clear that this
directive was ever issued in such explicit terms, and we were certainly not consulted
about it. But the U.S. Treasury maintain that this alleged directive puts the
Departments under orders to cut off Lend-Lease as soon as our total reserves exceed
the limit of a billion dollars.
In course of time, this figure has been passed. Our reserves are now
more than $1,200 million. From now on they are likely to increase, owing to our
receiving the dollar equivalent of the pay of the American troops in the sterling
area. According to present estimates of the numbers of American troops who will
be drawing their pay in those areas, our reserves may increase by as much as $600
million in the next year.
This does not mean, however, that we are getting richer. Our liabil-
ities are increasing five or six times as rapidly as our reserves, and we are con-
stantly getting deeper into the pit of net indebtedness. Indeed, I doubt if we can
maintain our external financial fabric on its present basis, unless some moderate
proportion of our increased liabilities is covered by reserves against them.
All this has been explained in great detail to the American Adminis-
tration. The late Chancellor of the Exchequer wrote a long letter to Ar. Morgenthau,
rather more than two months ago, which the latter acknowledged and promised to answer.
No reply has been received. When our Delegation was recently in Washington in
connection with the currency and commercial talks, Lord Keynes and his colleagues
submitted
per
2
no
submitted & memorandum to the State Department, the Lend-Lease Administration and the
American Treasury on our balances and on our liabilities, asking the American Govern-
ment to recognise that, in view of our growing external liabilities which arose
directly from the war, the position of our balances should not be regarded as open
to criticism. This view received strong support in some of the American Departments,
though not in all. Mr. Stettinius and the State Department are wholly convinced
that, in the circumstances, there should be no reduction of Lend-Lease, and that
this small mitigation of our growing indeptedness should be allowed to accrue to us.
The Lend-Lease Administration (at any rate before they were merged in the new body)
were of the same opinion. The U.S. Treasury, on the other hand, has been taking up
a sticky line, for reasons which have never been explained to us. They have shown
& disinclination to discuss the matter with any of our representatives or to give
any reasons.
Some elements in the Administration maintain that Congress was given
to understand that Lend-Lease was only to apply to the extent to which the recipient
countries were utterly unable to pay for imports, whether of food or military equip-
ment. In other words, however great our liabilities, we are not entitled to Lend-
Lease as long as we have & dollar in the till. This view might have been sustainable
in some quarters before Pearl Harbour. But it is, of course, utterly contrary to the
principle of the pooling of resources between Allies, and also to the principle that
the most convenient supplier shall provide the materials, irrespective of financial
liability.
Moreover, it is & doctrine apparently to be applied to us only, for
no such suggestion has been made to Russia. Nor, of course, do we apply it in giving
reciprocal aid to the Americans or to any other country.
To
To resolve the difference of opinion between his OW] advisers, the
President set up, several months ago, an interdepartmental, ministerial Committee,
to report to him. Owing to the difference of opinion on this Committee, no report
emerged, and sundry meetings of the Committee were adjourned when the time came to
call them. This position has gradually become intolerable from our point of view.
As the U.S. Treasury takes the line that the existing Presidential directive must
be followed until it is superseded, the Lend-Lease Administration is reluctantly
and half-heartedly falling in with this by proposing to cut off various items of
Lend-Lease, though on nothing like a large enough scale to keep our balances down
to the prescribed figure. lie have been urging, therefore, on the American Depart-
ments concerned that the matter should be brought to & head. During Lord Keynes's
recent visit, the State Department and the Lend-Lease Administration both agreed
that this was the right course. Colonel Llewellin and Sir Ronald Campbell urged
Mr. Harry Hopkins to bring it to a head. As a result, the President has instructed
Mr. Morgenthau to expedite the Committee's report.
It may be that this report is already in the President's hands. In
any case, it is absolutely vital to us that he should make the right decision when
it reaches him.
There are several reasons for hoping that he will :-
(1) The force of our case, to anyone who takes the trouble to under-
stand it, is overwhelming.
(2) Russia's gold and dollar reserves are nearly twice ours, and
they have no liabilities against them. The Americans are not proposing to tackle
the Russians with 8. similar proposal. We, however, are thought to be easier game.
(3) A change of policy sufficient to keep our balances down to one
billion
2 Loboa
billion dollars would have to be & very drastic one. The Americans will either have
to ask us to meet the pay of their troops throughout the world (at 8. rate approxi-
mately double ours); or they will have to cut off Lend*Lease from some major item,
such as food. At the very same time that the President has been emphasising the
importance of our mutual aid, and when we have only just offered them raw materials,
it would be a bit stiff to take either of these measures.
A favourable decision could take various forms. In no circumstances,
of course, should we agree, on our side, to allow the amount of this country's
reserves to be settled by the Congress of the United States. But that is no reason
why the President should not give instructions to his own Departments to the effect
that they need not begin to worry about our reserves until they exceed & certain
figure.
The most satisfactory revised directive would be one that fixes no
limites, but asks that we should keep in consultation with the Administration about
liabilities and balances. Failing that, if there is to be & ceiling, it should be
raised to something not less than $2,000 million.
Apart from our post-war liabilities, which, 8.8 I have said, are
likely to approach five times that amount, our adverse balance of trade in the first
two or three years after the war will by itself exceed it. It is about the same
amount as the Russian reserves, and they, as I have said, have no corresponding
liabilities.
I attach a brief version of our case in a form which may have reached
the President. This was prepared by Lord Keynes for Mr. Dean Acheson and Mr. Harry
Hopkins, so that they could have something brief in their hands for use at an
appropriate opportunity.
I
I again emphasise that an adverse decision would have the gravest
consequences to our financial independence; whilst E. favourable decision would
remove & constant source of anxiety and friction.
11th November, 1943.
THE QUESTION OF THE BRITTSH GOLD AND DOLLAR BALANCES
1.
Some time back, in different circumstances from the present, the
President approved & line of policy which would permit the British gold and dollar
reserves to reach some figure between $600 million and $1,000 million. There was
no agreement by the British to limit their reserves to this figure.
2.
For some little time past the British reserves have exceeded $1,000
million, and may be increasing at a rate of some 6600 million a year. This includes
gold and represents their total resources against growing liabilities in all parts
of the world, which amount to six or seven times these reserves.
3.
This increase in the British reserves does not reflect an improvement
in their financial position. Their quick liabilities, largely caused by heavy cash
outgoings in the Middle East, are increasing at four or five times the rate at
which the reserves against them have increased. Their net overseas position, in
fact, is deteriorating at a rate of about 83 billions a year.
4.
The increase in their gold holdings is due to certain receipts from
South Africa and Russia. The increase in their dollar balances is due to their
receiving the dollar equivalent of the local currency provided to meet the pay of
American troops within the sterling area. Indeed, if it were not for the pay of
the American troops the British dollar balances would be going down.
5.
Apart from certain raw materials, the British are already giving
reciprocal aid to the fullest extent of American Government requirements. They
have now offered raw materials purchased by the U.S. Government in Great Britain
and the Colonies on reciprocal aid terms. This would retard the growth of their
balances
balances by about $100 million & year, and by $200 million if India and Australia
join in.
6.
The British argue that some growth of their reserves is indispensable
to the delicate system they are operating by which they finance the war on credit
throughout a large part of the world, and that the retention of some part of the
above receipts, as & support to this credit system and an offset to a much larger
increase of liabilities, is not open to legitimate criticism. They point out that
the Russians are believed to hold gold reserves nearly double the total reserves
of the British and have no significant liabilities against them. But, in the case
of Russia, it is not at present proposed to require them to surrender any part of
their reserves as E. condition of further Lend-Lease assistance.
7.
The British feel that they ought not to be asked to agree to E. ceiling
to their balances, since their reserve position must be their own concern. Never-
theless, if the British argument is accepted as valid, the position could be regularised
by a new Directive, which would set up a. revised formula for the guidance of American
Departments. If the figure given by the new formula was being approached, then the
whole question could be re-opened.
8.
The new formula might provide that an increase in British reserves
is not unreasonable if the increase does not exceed, say, 30 per cent, of the in-
crease of British liabilities.
9.
Figures furnished to Congress hitherto have not disclosed the full
burden of British overseas liabilities, or their rate of growth. It might be
necessary to justify the new arrangement to provide that the information given to
Congress in future should be fuller, and should show in some fashion, which would not
be dangerous to British credit, the growth of liabilities as well as the growth of
reserves.
26th October, 1943.
PSF; Great Britain focher 1-45
SECRET-
differenture
From: London
To:
President of the United States
Unnumbered,
15th December 1943
From Winant to the President.
I am forwarding to you in my immediately following
message the complete text of Eden's address to the House of
Commons on the conferences as reported in Hansard. You will
note that Eden's reference to France is in effect an answer
to Marshal Smut's address of some ten days ago. I did what
you asked me to do the morning you left Cairo on the Greek
situation.
Thank you for a great trip. I got a lot out of it
which will be most useful to me as a member of the European
Advisory Commission.
No Sig
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET
From: London
To: The President of the United States
Unnumbered,
14 December 1943
To the President. Following is complete text of Eden's
speech
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Eden):
"My first sentence must be to express my warmest thanks
to this House for their generous treatment of me in 80 kindly
re-arranging business as to enable this debate to take place in
the last week before the Christmas recess. I understand, of
course, that that re-arrangement must have been inconvenient
to many of my Hon. Friends in all parts of the House, and I am
the more grateful to them. The fact is that it would not have
been possible for me to take part in these recent Turkish con-
versations in Cairo and get back, despite the best efforts of the
Royal Air Force, in time for a debate last Thursday. Again I
express my thanks. Let me say also that I only too well under-
stand the disappointment that Hon. Members must be feeling that
the Prime Minister is not able to be here himself to give a first-
hand account of these three conferences in which he has played
80 leading a part. My right Hon. Friend asked me to express his
regret to the House, but there is still important work for him to
do in the sphere where he now is, and he is sure the House would
wish him to see that work through to the end. So this poor
substitute "strute and frets his hour upon the stage."
We have spent three very strenuous weeks. Into that short
time have been compressed three conferences of world significance
any one of which in the ordinary leisured times of diplomacy would
have taken & full month. But, with the rapid development of
air communication, methods of consultation have been transformed,
80 it was possible within only a month of the meeting of the
Foreign Secretaries in Moscow to open the yet more authoritative
conferences of the heads of Governments in Teheran. These
meetings between the three men who bear the chief responsibility
in their respective countries must be a rare event. Their value
can hardly be exaggerated. They impose a considerable additional
burden on those who travel or take part in them. It is not 80
-2-
much the intensity of the work that has to be done as the wide
range of subjects through which the mind has to move from one to
the other which adds 80 heavily to the burden. I do not believe
even my Right Hon. Friend the Prime Minister, ardent as we know
him to be for work, has ever devoted more hours of the day, and
alas, of the night to unremitting labour than during these
conferences. I am glad to be able to report to the House that,
in spite of that, I left my Right Hon. Friend, though perhaps
& little tired, in good health, stout of heart and most
confident in spirit.
Now let me describe our work. It fell into three main,
easily defined chapters. First, the first Cairo conference for
the prosecution of the war against Japan, next the Teheran
conference for the prosecution of the war against Germany, and
then the second Cairo conference for discussions with the
President and the Foreign Secretary of Turkey. I propose to say
something about each, and also about a number of subsidiary and
important matters which were discussed and dealt with in both
Cairo and Teheran. The greater part of the time of the first two
conferences in Cairo about the Far East, and in Teheran about the
war against Germany, were taken up with military matters. It was
possible for us to bring these matters to a state of complete and
collective preparation far exceeding anything that had hitherto
been realised in this war. The thought is, I think, quite well
expressed in two sentences of the Teheran communique, to which
I draw the attention of the House because they are, I think, the
most important of all. It states:,
"Our Military Staffs have joined in our round table dis-
cussions and we have concerted our plans for the destruction of
the German forces. We have reached complete agreement as to the
scope and timing of the operations which will be undertaken from
the east, west and south."
That is a message which it has never, as yet, been possible
to give to the Allied peoples in this war. The words must ring
ominously in German ears and in those of Germany's unhappy
satellites. They could be applied textually to the earlier con-
ference at Cairo in respect of the Far East. That conference had
certain special features. It gave the Prime Minister, forinstance,
his first opportunity of meeting the Generalissimo and Madame
-3-
Chiang Kai-Shek. I think it was also the first time the
President had met the Generalissimo. By the luck of good
weather I arrived in Cairo on the evening when the Prime
Minister was entertaining the Generalissimo and Madame
Chiang Kai-Shek, this leader of indestructible China and his
most gifted wife. It was a most memorable experience when
the Prime Minister took his guests and Admiral Mountbatten,
who is Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia Command, and
who, of course, also came to Cairo for the conference into his
map room, where for some hours we dived deep into war plans
and projects.
If I may just strike one personal note, I would say that
it is difficult not to be deeply impressed by the Generalissimo,
even at a first meeting. Some of my Hon. Friends have already
met him. I had never met him before, and that impression
deepeñs as t ime goes on. Under the outward gentleness and
gracefulness of this remarkable personality there is & core of
supple steel. His is a strength, you feel, that cannot be
broken; it can only be bent and then strike back with even
greater force. From what I have said, the House will understand
how readily the Generalissimo and our Prime Minister understood
each other. They speak just the same language of determination.
And all through that evening and many subsequent discussions and
meetings Madame Chiang Kai-Shek was always there to help us with
her sagacious counsel, her unrivalled experience of east and west,
and her brilliant gifts as an interpreter. I am sure the House
will not wish me to apologise for giving just this personal
impression of meeting these very remarkable personalities. As
I have said, our military mission agreed in Cairo upon future
military operations against Japan, but we also thought it well to
take this opportunity to set out the political principles for
which we are fighting, and we did 80 in these words:
"The three great powers are fighting this war to resist
and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for them-
selves and have no thought of territorial expansion."
Such being our purpose, it is our determined intention that
Japan shall be deprived of opportunities for further mischief; that
she shall be expelled from all the territories, to whomsoever they
belong, which she has taken and that reparation shall be made to
China for the wrongs which have been done to her. We thought
it well, too, to take this opportunity to tell the people of
Korea that we had not-forgotten them and that their country
would, in due course become free and independent again. The
House may say and it is true, that there is, in all this, no
new declaration of British policy. The House will remember
that even before Pearl Harbour, the Prime Minister warned
Japan that if she attacked the United States we would declare
war within the hour. From that moment we have been committed
to the objectives which are set out now, for the first time,
internationally, in the Cairo agreement. We are committed to
them because we understand that to destroy Germany and then
make a compromise peace with Japan, would only BOW the seeds
of a Third World War.
Let me emphasise. The war with Japan 1s not one in which
we in this country are playing the part of benevolent assistants.
Even if we are compelled, for the time being, to devote the
greater part of our human and material resources to the task of
defeating Germany. We are still principals in the Far Eastern
war. Japan is just as great a menace to the security of the
British Commonwealth as she is to the security of either the
United States or China. Ask any one of the splendid fighting men
from Canada, Australia or New Zealand who are in this country,
whether they have any doubts on this score or whether they could
contemplate any future for their countries unless the power of
Japan were broken. They and thousands of their fellows came here
in 1939 to help us in our defense here. Many of them are still
here, in spite of the dangers to their own countries and we should
be utterly unworthy of our heritage and traditions, if we did not,
at the earliest possible moment, deploy all our resources for the
purpose of establishing their security on a firm basis. For that
we have to fight Japan to the bitter end whatever the cost and
however long it takes.
I have no doubt that this meeting between the leaders of
the three great powers, upon whom rests the heaviest share in the
conduct of the war against Japan, has been of the greatest service
to our cause in the political as well as in the military sphere.
I was able during these conversations to have some discussion
with our Chinese friends on another matter in which I know the
House takes an interest -- post-war collaboration between our two
-5-
countries both in policy and in commerce. I told our Chinese
friends that it was the desire of this country that that
collaboration should be as close and as cordial as possible.
I found that to be their attitude also, and I hope, in fact I
feet sure that we are going to be able to make steady progress
in both those spheres.
Now, I invite the House to leave Cairo and the Far
Eastern conference and, if they will, to take their places with
me again upon the magic carpet --- in this instance the good
aircraft "York" --- and fly across the Dead Sea over Iraq and
the Persian hills to Teheran. This long journey which many,
like my noble friend opposite, have performed in the past, we
performed in the incredible space of five-and-half hours. The
Teheran conference lasted four full working days and they were
crowded days. We had, every afternoon, a plenary session of
the heads of the Governments and their principal diplomatic
and military advisers. All the mornings were devoted to pre-
paration and to those numerous consultations which have to take
place between delegations in the course of any successful con-
ference. There was a welcome absence of formality about all
our meetings. Both lunches and dinners served for the further
prosecution of business. Except, perhaps for the Prime Minister's
birthday celebrations, the party at these meals never totalled
more than eight, with the necessary addition of interpreters.
In this way, it is fair to say that all the waking hours and many
hours normally devoted to sleep, were, during these four days and
nights, devoted to discussions on any and every topic between
the leaders of these three countries.
When I came back to this House from Moscow I ventured to
give the House a message that I was confident that the foundation
had been laid for enduring collaboration between this country,
the United States and the Soviet Union. I am many time more
confident of this today. The work of Teheran began just where the
work of Moscow left off, but the Teheran conference, being a
conference of leaders, carries a still more stirring message to
the world. I would like to quote just an extract about the con-
ference from the Soviet newspaper "Pravda," and I quote it because
it expresses exactly my own feelings at the end of this conference.
They say this:
-6-
"Only a short time separates us from the Moscow conference
of the three Foreign Ministers of the Allied powers, the
decisions of which not only demonstrated the strengthening
of friendly co-operation between Great Britain, the U.S.S.R.
and the U.S.A. in the war period, but laid the basis for
fruitful work together after the war. But what & tremendous
step forward has now been taken along this path?"
I am convinced that that is true. Let me try to sum up
the results of the Teheran meeting. The first result is that
the war will be shortened. The close co-ordination of all our
military plans which was reached at the conference will ensure
it. Clearly, we can do better when there is a close interplay
at every move, which we have not had until now. The Teheran
conference laid the plans to this end. All is now agreed.
Every plan is now agreed, and the timing is now agreed, and, in
due course, the decisions of the Teheran conference will be
unrolled on the fields of battle.
Even this is not all, because victory is a means to an
end, and the end is a peace that will last. More than once
before Allies have stood together in war and fallen apart in
peace. In the last year or 80 many Hon. Members in all parts of
the House must have said to themselves, "Is this going to be our
experience once again?" Well, that will certainly be Germany's
game. Let the House not doubt that. She will play it with all
she knows from the moment the last shot is fired --- to BOW
confusion, to sow doubt and division. That will be Germany's
game, and thus to prepare for the next war. This recurrent threat
of war can only be met if there is an international order firmer
in strength and unity than any enemy that can seek to challenge
it. Is there or is there not the possibility of creating such an
order? Do the foundations exist?
Six months ago I could not have given any certain answer.
It might have been 80; it might not have been SO. But today I
can give the answer. It is an emphatic "yes". The foundations
do exist, and I an truly confident that there is a possibility,
and more than a possibility, a desire, among the three powers for
continued co-operation not only during the war, not only in
reshaping Europe when the armistice comes, but also, thereafter,
in maintaining in the world an orderly progress and continuing
peace. The foundations of that understanding were laid by us in
-7-
Moscow. They have been strengthened and confirmed in Teheran.
We three worked together. We have set our hands to the task,
and heavy is our responsibility to ensure that we do not fail.
I would like to give two illustrations of the beginning
that has been made. When I came back from Moscow & month ago I
told the House that we had set up there an advisory council for
Italy, on which there would be representatives of our country,
the United States, Soviet Russia and France. That committee --
that council -- has begun its work. Its members have had 8.
number of meetings. They have been to Italy and surveyed the
position there. I had the opportunity when I was away to nee
the representatives of all four of the countries, and each and
all told me that the work was proceeding smoothly and well. That
is the first step. And then there is the advisory commission for
Europe, the commission agreed on in Moscow, which is to sit here
in London. That has now been completed by the nomination by the
United States of the American Ambassador in London, Mr. John
Winant, a most admirable choice. I understand I am not telling
secrets about another body which is to have its first preliminary
informal meeting tomorrow. That is the beginning. These two
bodies were planned in Moscow, but the scope of their work was
greatly increased by the decisions taken at Teheran.
I will now pass to another matter - Turkey. It was
decided in Teheran to invite the president of the Turkish
Republic to attend a conference with the representatives of the
three powers - The United States, Soviet Russia and ourselves
in Cairo, on what was our homeward journey. The Turkish
President accepted, and he was accompanied by his Foreign
Secretary and the Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Office.
The British, the American and the Soviet Ambassadors in Ankara
accompanied him. Unfortunately, Mr. Vyshinsky, who was to have
been the Russian representative to join us in that capacity, was
away at the front in Italy, and he could not reach us until after
the close of the talks, but I was able to see him before I left
Cairo, and I gave him a full account of all that had passed, and
discussed with him the outcome of our work. These conversations
were in the nature of a fuller and more complete development of the
earlier meeting which I had had with the Turkish Foreign Secretary
in Cairo five weeks ago. I clearly cannot at this stage give
details of these confidential discussions - too many people might
be listening . - but I can say that I have good hopes that they will
-8-
be found to have established a sound basis for future cooperation
between the four countries -- ourselves, Soviet Russia, America
and Turkey.
Since his return to Ankara, the Turkish Foreign Minister
himself has made & statement which the House, perhaps, may not
have noticed in which he said that the conversations in Cairo
were BO intimate and far-reaching that he could now say that
Turkey's relations with the United States and the Soviet Union
were almost as cordial and as strong as with Great Britain. Those
who know the past history of this business will realize what an
important statement that is. It augurs well, I think, for the
progressive development of future relations between us four, and
were it on account of this development alone I should feel
justified in telling the House that we regard the Cairo conference
No. 2 as encouraging. Further than that I cannot go to-day.
While we were in Cairo my Right Hon. Friend the member for
Stockton (Mr. Harold MacMillan and with my Hon. and Gallant friend
the member for Carlisle (Major-General Sir Edward Spears), who is
our minister at Beirut, as well as with the Minister of State in
the Middle East. The House has already been informed of the
development and of the conclusion of that crisis, but, if the
House will allow me, I want to take this, my first opportunity,
to say something about it. We have sympathy, deep sympathy, with
the national aspirations of the Arab world.
We are the only country that has ever concluded a treaty
with and withdrawn from an independent Arab state. Yet at the same
time the preservation of order and tranquility in the Lebanon is
an allied interest, for it closely affects the whole of our war
effort in the Middle East. I understand that General Catroux is
going back to Beirut on behalf of the French Committee of National
Liberation, and he is to conduct negotiations to try and bring
about a modus vivendi in the Levant states. No happier choice of
representative, I think, could have been made by our French friends,
and I am sure the House will share the earnest hope, which we have
expressed already through diplomatic channels to the authorities
concerned, that these negotiations will be conducted in a concil-
iatory spirit on both sides and that they will lead to early agreement.
I am confident that all our Allies, all the members of the United
*Our interest in this matter is twofold.
-9-
Nations, share that view.
It so happened that on my return journey one of the
engines of our four-engined aircraft became tired of operating.
Luckily when we were getting near the aerodrome of Algiers,
and 80 we were landed and delayed there. As a consequence I
had opportunities of meeting both M, Massigli and General
Catroux himself and of conversations with them about this
situation. Here let me say just one word - which I hope the
House will endorse --- to the people of France. We are at the
heart of the fifth winter of this war. The suffering of the
French people has been harsh and cruel. She has spent a long
ordeal, which perhaps, but for he hazard of geography, the
British people might have had to share. We believe that this
great people, 40,000,000 strong, enriched by the moral and
intellectual qualities that have been theirs throughout history,
will find the spirit to lift them up again from the heavy blows
which have been dealt them during the last four years. We
believe that in the Colonial and French forces in Tunisia and in
Libya, of which I have heard from our own officers who served
with them, and in the heroic and ever increasing resistance
movement in France, some of whose representatives I have met
within the last few days --- we believe that in those people we
have the real soul of France. So I say at this time that
despite all the difficulties we extend to France our sympathy
and our confidence.
What I have said, and said deliberately, applies not only
to France but to all those nations now under German occupation.
What we are seeking, what we are working for, when we approach
these matters in harmony with the United States and Russia is
not to impose a three-power will upon Europe. We are seeking to
liberate those countries 80 that each and all can take their place
in the European family again. There could not be anything
exclusive in the arrangements between the three powers. We want
to restore the liberty of these nations of Europe, great and small,
so that they can play their part in Europe. I am one who believes
that Europe has still perhaps the greatest contribution of all to
make to the future of mankind.
Having said that, I must come to one or two of our troubles,
for it would not be fair to ignore our troubles. There are two
-10-
countries in the Balkans about which I must say a word or two ---
Yugoslavia and Greece. It is, perhaps, inevitable that after
three years of enemy occupation and guerilla fighting there is
not a little internal confusion and chaos. It must be remembered
that German propaganda, day and night, is trying to increase that
confusion, trying to spread false reports of our intentions,
trying to divide us from our Allies and play one off against the
other. So I hope I may say to the House that in approaching
these matters in public discussion we should use all possible
restraint and above all, if I may add it, resist the temptation
of fighting our own elections in all these Balkan lands. I
laid down some time ago, with the assent of the cabinet, of
course, three rules to try to guide us in this state of affairs,
and I will give them to the House. First, to give all the
practical help in our power to those elements in these countries
which are actively resisting the enemy. Second, to make clear
that BO far as we can exert any authority it shall be used to
ensure that these countries shall be ree to choose their own
governments when they are liberated. Third, to work in the
closest possible concert with our Allies.
Having said 80 much, may we, on the basis of these rules,
look at Yugoslavia? For many months past the head and front of
resistance to he enemy in Yugoslavia have been the Partisans
under their Commander-in-Chief, General Tito. From all the
reports which we have received it is clear that these Pertisans
are containing and engaging a large number of German divisions.
We are doing all we can to supply them with munitions and to support
them in every possible way. Our action in this respect has, of
course, been endorsed by our Allies.
Mr. Bellenger (Bassetlaw): By whom has it been endorsed?
Mr. Eden: By the Soviet Government and the United States
Government several times over, at various conferences. Now if I
may I would like to go back a little into past history. I want to
show the House the development in this matter. As a result of
information which we had, we decided as long ago as the spring of
this year that we should ask General Tito to receive a British
military mission. He replied, "Yes", and British officers have
been with him ever since. Our mission has been and, as it happens,
is under the leadership of a member of this House, my Hon. and
Gallant Friend the member for Lancaster (Brigadier Fitzroy MacLean)
-11-
who has established most excellent relations with General Tito.
As the House will have seen from the newspapers today, the
Soviet government have decided also to send & military mission
to the Partisan Commander-in-Chief. I want to make it quite
plain where we stand in this. Mr. Molotov was good enough to
discuss this project with me, both when I was in Moscow and more
recently in Teheran. He said, "You have a mission with them,
and we think of sending a mission, too." We, of course,
endorsed this proposal --- the Prime Minister and I --- Mr.
Molotov and I agreed that our two missions shall work together
in the closest collaboration when the Soviet mission reaches
the country. That is the position.
Now for another development since I left Teheran. As the
House is aware, a supreme legislative committee and an executive
national committee of liberation have recently been set up under
the auspices of the Commander-in-Chief of he Partisan forces.
So far as I am aware, this national committee does not claim
authority outside the borders of the area in which it operates.
It has certainly not claimed any form of recognition from His
Majesty's government. As I understand the position and as it has
been reported to me by our officers, the Partisans emphasise the
provisional nature of this administration, and they hold that it is
for the Yugoslav people, as soon as their country is liberated,
freely to choose the form of government they prefer. If that
is the position, this, too, 1s the view of His Majesty's govern-
ment. It is also, as I know, because he has told us 80, the
desire of King Peter himself and the policy of His government.
(Hon. Members: "Oh.") They have publicly declared it 8.8 their
policy. We must be fair in all this. A public statement was made
by the government that the moment the war was over they would lay
down their portfolios and the country would choose what govern-
ment they preferred.
Mr. A. Bevan (Ebbw Vale): Do the radio pronouncements of
the Yugoslav government from Cairo confirm that statement?
Mr. Eden: Certainly, Sir. I am not trying to say that the
government in Cairo agree on all points with the Partisans. Clearly
that is not 80. I am trying to make a fair approach to this very
difficult question and what I am saying is that all, including the
government in Cairo, have declared that the moment their country is
-12-
liberated they will lay down their offices and it will be for
the country to choose its government. That is a point on which
all are agreed -- the King, General Tito and the Yugoslav
government. (Interruption.) I feel myself the greatest sympathy
for this young king. He came to his responsibilities at & most
critical hour in his country's history. He did his best to rally
his country to the Allied cause, and he is now faced with the
most difficult problems that any young monarch could be faced
with. I repeat that we must try to be fair, and, if I may use
the word, not too, partisan in our actions in the literal and
not the military sense of the word. Finally on that subject,
let me tell the House this. We are in consulation with other
Allied governments on this policy, and the Prime Minister and I
devoted no little time to it while we were in Cairo. We are now
at work in conjunction with our Allies to bring all those
in Yugoslavia or out of it together who want to fight the common
German enemy. I hope that the contributions of this House will
be made to that end.
One word about Greece. The position there is not on all
fours with the position in Yugoslavia. There are warring bands,
all of them in different degrees hostile to the Germans. There
are also political controversies which cut right across the matter.
It is our aim there to try and unite all these bands, or almost
all of them, in common action against the enemy. We have some
hope that we may have a measure of success in that. The recently
published letter of the King of the Hellenes which he had written
last November to his cabinet, shows clearly that the king is
anxious to make his contribution 80 that his position shall not be
a matter of controversy or get in the way of unity. I am not
without hope that we may see some progress in the near future,
though I do not pretend that the task is particularly easy.
I want to say something about the progress of the fighting
in Italy, because it is wrong that we should adjourn for Christmas
without the House being informed of the latest information that
the government has. We must admit, first of all, that the advance
of the Allied Armies in Italy during the third and fourth months
of the campaign has not covered quite the spectacular distances we
achieved in the first two months. That, of course, is not due to
lack of initiative on the part of our armies. The truth is that
we have now reached what is the narrowest part of the Italian
penisula. The Apennines stretch almost from coast to coast, and
where the Apennines stop the swollen rivers take over. That is the
position which confronts us. These natural facilities afford
-13-
exceptional opportunities for skillful defense, and the Germans,
as they are forced relentlessly back, are making good use of
these advantages. Add to this heavy persistent rains which
swell every river and turn every approach into a sea of mud,
and we have a fair picture of the background against which the
Italian events should be reviewed. On 8th November, after a
surprise sea borne attack on Termoli, the Eighth Army pressed
on and secured a bridge head over the river Trigno while inland
their left flank was moving up through the Apennines. Meanwhile,
on the west General Clark's Anglo-American Fifth Army crossed the
Volturno and fought their way to the next river obstacle. By
the 8th, by a lightening thrust most characteristic of him, General
Montgomery swept the Germans back across the Sangro River. The
whole of the rest of his line moved forward at the same time while
the Fifth Army kept pace in the western Apennines. It was then
when, as I know, our commanders felt the campaign to be developing
as they wished that we had another deluge and steadily worsening
weather conditions which called & halt along the whole group of
armies. That time was spent building up stocks, preparing rivers
and roads and getting ready for the next offensive, General
Montgomery waiting for & spell of fine weather.
At last it came and on the night of 27th November the
Eighth Army, further strengthened by the arrival of the Second
New Zealand Division, that most gallant veteran division, was able
to launch its main assault. It was preceded, as has become almost
the custom now, by & familiar and shattering bombardment and the
full support of the Royal Air Force. The 78th and the 18th Divisions,
both of them also veterans in fighting, advanced and secured Fossa
Cesia Ridge. Down came the rain again and still our troops fought
grimly on, as they are doing now to the line of the Moro and beyond.
Far on the left Canadians have now relieved the 78th Division and
they are pressing on towards Ortona. Inland the New Zealand Division
is trying to gain the high ground which will help the Canadians
further in their advance. Meanwhile, on the west of the Anglo-
American Fifth Army began the battle for the Mignano Gap. There
was a struggle to secure this mountain feature and the enemy had
plenty of time to prepare formidable defenses. But thanks to the
gallantry of the Allied infantry all the more important of the hill
features are now in our hands and it seems that the Germans may be
forced to withdraw further. It would be unjust to make these
references to the fighting in Italy without paying tribute to the
-14-
Royal Engineers and the administrative services. Theirs has
been an immense task to keep communications open and to recon-
struct them where they are destroyed, and yet throughout this
fighting the army has never lacked for a moment a shell or food
or supplies of any kind. It is my duty to give the House the
casualties from the moment of the landing on the mainland to
23rd November. The British casualties were 3,212 killed, 9,709
wounded and 3,153 missing. Total 16,074. The American
casualties were to 25th November: 1,603 killed, 6,361 wounded,
2,685 missing. Total 10,649. Up to the most recent counting
the German prisoners taken by the Allies total just over 6,000.
Let me sum up my impressions of these three weeks. My
Right Hon. Friend and I were greatly encouraged by the outcome of
our three conference. So I believe were all our Allied colleagues.
To that extent I bring the House a message of good cheer. These
events, of course, give no cause for easy optimism--far from it.
If I were to do that I would give my message falsely. The truth,
on the contrary, is that the very magnitude of the plans to which
we have set our hands, to which the heads of other governments
have given their approval, will call for an immense effort in the
coming months from each and all of the United Nations. Plans,
however good, can only yield results if the force of the citizens
in all the lands is behind them. We have set ourselves a. hard task
in our determination to achieve victory at the earliest possible
date. Great battles are impending. For this effort we shall need
all our strength, all our courage, all our unity in greater measure
perhaps than ever before. I ask this House to give the pledge that
for our part that effort will be forthcoming."
Signed Winant