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Great Britain - Harriman, W. Averell, 1941-1942
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16618552
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Great Britain - Harriman, W. Averell, 1941-1942
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Diplomatic Correspondence
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PSF
Great Britain: Harriman
1941-42
Harriman Folder
1-41
Comginal in State folder)
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM NO. 1470 DATED APRIL 14 [1941]
FROM LONDON
RUSH - EXTREME CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM HARRIMAN.
For the purpose of evolving plans for the aggressive
defense of Libya and Egypt Churchill had an all day meet-
ing yesterday with Chief of Air Foree, First Sea Lord,
General Dill and Foreign Minister and it was decided to
inaugurate active air and naval campaign to sever Hitler's
line of supply to Tripoli even though naval losses might
result. I was told by General Dill that the Commander
in Chief of the Near East greatly needed all types of
transport vehicles, tanks, armored cars and anti-aircraft
and tank guns.
The development of Basra or Suez as base for imports
and assembly of as many of our aircraft as is possible
with as many mechanics and engineers from the United
States is urgently requested by Air Force Chief.
Shall inform Hopkins on the foregoing two matters
when I am furnished with additional data.
As strategy of combined action by Turkey, Greece and
Yugoslavia with the cooperation of British expeditionary
and Air Force had failed, military effectives sent to
Greece
-2-
Greece were a sacrifice to British honor and while this
force will courageously continue to fight, the results
are without their control.
Falder
PSF:
Heat Britain
1-41
London - May 7, 1941.
Dear Mr. President:
SECRET 11/3/22 'AD
I am taking advantage of Jim Forrestal's return to send
you this letter.
The changes in the Government appear to have been well re-
ceived by the British public.
Beaverbrook had been for some time asking to be relieved.
He is none too well, suffering from asthma and an eye affliction.
The Prime Minister speaks of his new post as being largely priorities
but I gather from conversations with both the Prime Minister and
Beaverbrook that he will end by being the number one trouble shooter.
At the moment he is getting into the tank situation.
Members of my staff have been studying this subject for several weeks.
The net is that the tank program had been pushed aside because of
priorities given to air and sea. The Libyan campaign in both direc-
tions was a rude shock to many and there will be great pressure for
increased production both in England and America. The need is for
home defense as well as the Middle East. Those in charge of tanks
tell me it is rather ironic that Beaverbrook is now to help them as
he has been the worst offender in stealing things they have needed.
Beaverbrook is not personally liked but people know he is the only
man who can really cut the red tape and he is welcomed as an ally.
The new Shipping and Transport Minister, Leathers, is a
business man. He has been manager of the Inchcape bunkering companies.
He knows world shipping intimately, port problems, etc. He is &
personal selection of the Prime Minister who knew him as a business man
in pre-war days. No one else knows him and although I understand some
of the politicians looked askance at the idea, the press has taken the
appointment well. He was elevated from a junion position in the
Ministry of Shipping (in charge of bunkering). As he has had no ex-
perience in politics he is being made a Peer, leaving the Parliamentary
work to the Parliamentary Secretary.
The Prime Minister arranged for him to lunch with me alone
the day after his appointment. I found him energetic and knowledgeful.
He will be particularly helpful in coordinating shipping, ports and
domestic transport which have been working to a considerable extent
at cross purposes in the past. I believe he will do 8 good job if his
head is not turned.
The President
- 2 -
May 7, 1941.
I will undoubtedly see a good deal of Leathers as the
Prime Minister insists that I keep in touch with all phases of the
shipping problem. I sit with a Cabinet Committee which the Prime
Minister calls together once a week on the subject.
Colonel Moore-Brabazon who takes Beaverbrook's post
as Minister of Aircraft Production is an old flyer, & man of ability
and drive but far more orderly in his approach. On the whole I
expect it will be easier for us to work with the Ministry under the
new head than under the old one man rule.
Cross, the ex Minister of Shipping, goes to Australia.
Menzies picked him.
I got to know Menzies well, which is not difficult. He is
the type of man you call by his first name almost immediately. His
nose was a bit put out of joint in London as he wanted to be made a
member of the War Cabinet. He seemed a bit soured just before he
left. He was one of the few men who talked up to the Prime Minister
and had a salutary effect in several situations. Actually the
Prime Minister was influenced by Menzies' advice even though he
would not admit it.
I feel that Menzies' presence here was valuable and hope
he comes back although I do not agree with his point of view on all
subjects. As these are outside of my assignment, I will not comment.
I have had several discussions with Menzies and the Australian High
Commissioner, Bruce, on the problems of Australia. I have urged
them to present their problems through the appropriate channels in
Washington.
I have become a general hand holder for all with problems
about which they think America might help. It seems to be useful to
listen to the stories and I usually find it possible to be of at least E
a little help in explaining how they can go about the presentation
of their problems and to whom.
The Prime Minister continues to take me with him on his
frequent trips to the devastated cities. He thinks it of value to
have an American around for the morale of the people. He also wants
me to report to you from time to time.
The President
- 3 -
May 7, 1941.
Gil Winant was with us the first trip Swansea, Bristol,
and Cardiff - and I understand he reported to you about it. Forrestal
was with us the second - Liverpool and Manchester - and will tell
you about them personally. I cabled you regarding Plymouth. This
week we go to Dover. The resction of the people of each town is
somewhat different depending upon the individual characteristics of
the area and the length of time since the last blitz.
It is very well worthwhile from my standpoint as it not
only gives me a picture of the production problems but I meet the
important local men.
The morale of the people is of such vital importance that
I am having some talks next week with the thought of recommending to
you that someone come over to help on civilian resistance. I want,
however, to know more about the problem before putting it up to you.
A most important part is the organization of mobile equipment in
sufficient quantity and well supplied to be available at a moment's
notice. I am not yet convinced that the shelters arrangements are
good enough or the best that can be done. Still it is not easy and
I don't know enough to be entitled to an opinion.
The question of man power will become more and more acute.
Women are being inducted into increasing lines of activity. But when
the air force is expanded to over a million men and other services
enlarged, there will be greater and greater requirements for trained
personnel and skilled labor. Would you consider it worthwhile to have
someone like Ed McGrady come over here for a short trip to study the
present and prospective problem?
The study I suggest is analysis of the man power needs in
every line in connection with the military and production plans.
I suggest Ed because, as you know, I worked with him in the N.R.A.
days and because, in addition to the actual needs, the man should
understand labor unions. Ed, too, has a very practical understanding
of the production and associated problems.
Dr. Conant reviewed while here the needs for technical
experts and technicians in certain lines. The whole field is one that
will become increasingly important and unless we have the facts in
advance I am afraid we may find trained man power a principal bottle-
neck next year. For example not pilots alone are needed but maintenance
crews and radio operators. It is not ships alone but the officers
and crews. When it comes to tanks, maintenance again is of vital
importance.
The President
- 4 -
May 7, 1941.
I find everyone here from the Prime Minister down
deeply appreciative of the increasing aid that you are giving.
It is natural that they hope for a belligerent status but I am
surprised how understanding all are of the psychology of the
situation at home. It is because of what they went through them-
selves. There is both greater understanding of and greater frank-
ness about their dependence on us for the final outcome.
I have never worked in a more congenial atmosphere
than at Grosvenor Square, largely due to Gil's generous person-
ality. I am impressed by the grasp and competence of Admiral
Ghormley and General Lee. We are working together as one team.
I deeply appreciate the opportunity you have given me to serve
here.
Best regards to Harry and my other friends,
Sincerely,
L.e. Harrinan
The President,
The White House.
Harriman Folder
My dear Mr. Stalin:
This note will be presented to you by my friend
Averell Harriman, whom I have asked to be head of our
delegation to Moscow.
Mr. Harriman is well aware of the stretegic
importance of your front and will, I know, do every-
thing that he can to bring the negotiations in Moscow
to a successful conclusion.
Harry Hopkins has told me in great detail of his
encouraging and satisfactory visits with you. I can't
tell you how thrilled all of us are because of the
gallant defense of the Soviet armies.
I am very sure that Hitler made & profound
strategic mistake when he attacked your country. I
am confident that ways will be found to provide the
material and supplies necessary to fight him on all
fronts, including your own.
I want particularly to take this occasion to
express my great confidence that your armies will
ultimately prevail over Hitler and to assure you of
our great determination to be of every possible
material assistance.
Yours very sincerely,
His Excellency
Joseph Stalin,
President of the Soviet of
People's Commissars of
the U.S.S.R.
HLH/lmb 9/17/41
Harriman Folder
put
1941
Harrium
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
PARAPHRASE
Telegram No: 4855
Dated: October 11 5 p.m.
From: London
Rec'd: October 11 12:30 p.m.
SECRET FROM MR. HARRIMAN FOR MR. HOPKINS
As a supplement to our cables Nos. 3028 and 2616 there
follow figures in hundred thousand dollars giving the losses at
sea which have taken place in respect to goodsof United States
origin, and the percentage lost in relation to "shipments":
Item
June
July
Losses
Percent
Losses
Percent
Raw Materials
9
3.1
15
5.4
Food and Feed
7
10.5
nil
nil
Aircraft
nil
nil
13
3.5
Navel equipment
and munitions
4
1.3
5
2.2
Total
20
2.2
33
3.2
January
January
through June
through July
Losses
Percent
Losses
Percent
Raw Materials
144
6.7
159
6.6
Food and feed
12
5.1
12
3.2
Aircraft
99
6.5
111
5.9
Naval equipment
and munitions
65
5.9
71
5.2
Total
320
6.4
333
5.8
10/11/41
Copies to:
S:BCC/bec
Mr. Hopkins (4)
SA/E (1)
S
(1)
DCR
(1)
PERSONAL AND
March 16, 1942.
Dear Averell:-
It is mighty good to get yours of
March seventh. I enclose very confidential
copy of a letter I want you to hand to Winston.
Read the copy but don't let anyone know you
know what is in it.
As ever yours,
Honorable W. Averell Harriman,
c/o American Embassy,
London,
England.
(Enclosure)
DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
DateEB 9 1972
Personal and
London - March 7, 1942.
Dear Mr. President:
I have been worried about the Prime
Minister - both his political status and his own spirits.
He did not take well the criticism he found on his return
from Washington. The criticism was not directed at him
personally but against certain policies and against
various individuals. Unfortunately he bared his chest
and assumed the blame for everything and everybody -
politicians and soldiers alike. The natural effect of
this was to turn the criticism against himself.
He was forced, obviously reluctantly, to
make changes, thus failing to get full credit. He has,
however, quieted things for the present. His opponents
have found that he has an Achilles Heel and will undoubtedly
attack again. It is curious how, when criticism starts, a
coalition government suffers from lack of party loyalty and
support.
Although the British are keeping a stiff
upper lip, the surrender of their troops at Singapore has
shattered confidence to the core - even in themselves but
more particularly in their leaders. They don't intend to
take it lying down and I am satisfied we will see the re-
birth of greater determination. At the moment, however,
they can't see the end to defeats.
Unfortunately Singapore shook the Prime
Minister himself to such an extent that he has not been
able to stand up in this adversity with his old vigor.
A number of astute people, both friends and
opponents, feel it is only a question of a few months
before his Government falls. I cannot accept this view.
He has been very tired but is better in the last day or two.
I believe he will come back with renewed strength, particularly
when the tone of the war improves.
DECLASSIFIED State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By RHP Date FEB a 1972
The President
- 2 -
March 7, 1942.
There is no other man in sight to
give the British the leadership Churchill does.
Cripps wears the hair shirt and wants
everyone else to do the same. The British are pre-
pared to make any sacrifice to get on with the war but
are not interested in sacrifice for its own sake. It
has been proved that workmen need good food and enter-
tainment to keep up production over long periods. In
his present position, however, I believe Cripps will
do a lot of good in stiffening things up.
Eden you know all about. Anderson is an
uninspired, competent technician. Bevin has never
really risen above labor union politics. And then we
have Max! There is no one else on the horizon.
Now that the political storm has blown
over, the Ministers can give their full time to the war.
There is no doubt the new team will on balance be a
big improvement over the old.
I find on my return even greater opportunity
for usefulness and deeply appreciate this opportunity you
are giving me.
Sincerely,
avenue
The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
PSF: Gt. tain: Harriman
TELEGRAM
But The White House
Mashington August 14 1942
0329 ZM
FROM TEHERAN TO AGWAR
NUMBER 106 August 13 1942
Personal for the Eyes of the President only from Harriman
PRUMY, traveling companion, asks me to describe to you his
inspection of four armored brigades training for the US tanks
soon to arrive. One brigade is to have Grants and the other
three Shermans.
In speaking to a number of selected group of officers and
enlisted men he explained your personal interest in arranging
for the dispatch of the Shermans and in his vivid way he has
brought you personally to these men over with the tanks.
I was much impressed with the keeness of the men in their
training on the few battle scarred tanks at their disposal
by the confidence expressed in our equipment and by the
determination they showed in the reaction to my companions
remarks.
They are fit tough men and with effective leadership will
use the equipment you are sending to good advantage.
New subject: Smuts expressed to me his complete approval of
the changes in command and confidence in the offensive potential-
ities here, also enthusiasm for our other operational plans.
However he emphasized the need for determination and particularly
speed.
ONDRICK
755pm/d
Harriman 1942
State DECLASSIFIED Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 9 1972
DECRET-
CR 4364
FROM HARRIMAN; PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT.
I HAVE BEEN PRESENT AT FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON BURMA WITH THE PRIME-
MINISTER AND WITH THE WAR OFFICE. AS EVERY ONE IS so BEWILDERED BY THE
TURN OF EVENTS IN SINGAPORE THEY ARE NO LONGER READY TO EXPRESS OPTIMISM
IN ANY OTHER THEATRE IN WHICH BRITISH FORCES ARE INVOLVED. ON THE OTHER
HAND IT IS QUITE CLEAR THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE WAR OFFICE HAVE BEEN
CONFIDENT THAT REINFORCEMENTS BEING SENT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO WITH-
STAND JAPANESE ATTACK IN BURMS IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. THIS OPTIMISM HAS
BEEN BASED ON THEIR ESTIMATE OF THE STRENGTH OF THE ATTACKING FORCES
WHICH CAN BE TRANSPORTED AND MAINTAINED. THE JAPANESE WITH LOCAL LABOR
ARE WORKING FAST TO IMPROVE ROADS BUT IT IS NOT BELIEVED THAT THIS WORK
CAN MAKE A MARKED CHANGE BEFORE THE RAINY SEASON BEGINS IN JUNE WHICH IS
EXPECTED TO FURTHER IMPEDE THE ADVANCE. ALTHOUGH THE PUBLIC GENERALLY
HAD LOOKED FOR BAD NEWS FROM SINGAPORE, THE SPEED WITH WHICH THE JAPS
HAVE BEEN ABLE TO TAKE POSITIONS AND GAIN GROUND ON THE ISLAND WAS NOT
ANTICIPATED AND IT IS CAUSING REAL DISMAY. YOU CAN WELL UNDERSTAND HOW
KEENLY THE PRIME MINISTER FEELS THIS, COMING AS IT DOES ON TOP OF THE -
(CONTINUED ON PAGE 2)
C.R. 4364, PAGE 2.
OF THE -
REVERSES IN LYBIA. THE CABINET CHANGES ARE STILL GIVING HIM DIFFICULTY.
ALL IN ALL, IT IS A DARK MOMENT FOR HIM.
I GATHER THAT YOUR CABLE OF YESTERDAY WAS MUCH APPRECIATED.
ACTIONs PRESUS
PRESONAL FILE
H.
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Scheuble Date FEB 9 1972
PSF: Harriman
[1942]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Harriman -
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