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Great Britain - MacDonald, J. Ramsey, 1933, 1937
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Great Britain - MacDonald, J. Ramsey, 1933, 1937
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Diplomatic Correspondence
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PSF
Great Britain: J. Ramsey Mac Donald
1933,1937
PSF: R.TTac Jonald
MINISTER
Pensible
10, Bowning Street,
STATE
Personal & Private.
biteball.
10th February, 1933.
Dear Mr. Roosevelt,
I am making bold to write you this letter explaining
some of our difficulties here, so that you
understand
them at first hand. It is in no sense official.
I am most anxious that we should find a way to solve
the really great difficulties which have to be surmounted
in dealing with the Debt. (You know how I put Anglo-
American good relations in the forefront of the things
absolutely essential to the regeneration of the world.)
We have a double problem with the United States on the one
hand and Europe and the world generally, on the other. How
are we to bring both together in one solution, or any
solutions? Were we dealing with you alone, the problem
would be comparatively simple and would proceed somewhat on
the lines which a friend of yours explained to us a fortnight
ago. We should consider together something which would
substantially scale down our indebtedness and leave it in a
position which both of us could accept. When we
turn
to
the /
the other side of our problem, the matter is not so easy.
At Lausanne we had to meet the European situation, the
characteristic features of which may be summarised thus:
(1) The German payments had become impossible,
especially after the Moratorium, and we were faced a year
ago with repudiation. Had that begun, nobody could foresee
the terrible disasters both in finance and in politics which
would have followed. Repudiation is a malady which spreads
like foot and mouth disease. Not only would Government
financial obligations be smashed, but commercial debts
would be involved, and a series of bankruptcies would have
followed of the gravest character.
(2) Our debtors, especially France and Italy, would
have ceased payment to us. The Moratorium had already cost
us a good many millions of pounds which we were perfectly
willing to forego had a final settlement been reached, but
no such settlement appeared to be possible and a complete
breakdown was facing us.
(3)
The virtual bankruptcy of certain mid-European
States /
PRIME
STATEMENT
10, Downing Street,
Whiteball.
States would have become operative. Whole masses of the
people of Europe would have been reduced to starvation;
international trade on this side would have been brought to
a standstill, and we should have had to face a condition of
things in finance, trade and political unsettlement, which
have not been experienced for many generations. Communism
would undoubtedly have planted its flags over the greater
part of Europe.
When I went to Lausanne, the outlook was of the most
gloomy kind. The difficulties, however, were overcome for
the time being, but, in the process of settlement, we had to
face hard realities. I have always regretted that at
Lausanne we were deprived of the benefits of American parti-
cipation or even American advice. You will remember that
Mr. Hoover's attitude was 'let Europe settle its own diffi-
culties and then approach us'; and the approach, we were
warned, would not have to be of a representative European body,
but of individual nations. We were put in a very hard corner.
During the whole of the hectic weeks of the Conference I did
my /
my best, with the loyal backing of my colleagues, to keep
in mind at every stage the American position.
The result is that whether America formally recognises
it or not, no settlement with any European nation can meet
the present situation unless it is, in fact, one which will
keep the Lausanne Agreement going and enable it to be
ratified. In other words, the American settlement must be
a European one as well, so that when it is made you and we
together will have enabled Europe and America to begin anew
a restoration of commercial transactions and trade. This
will have to be based upon confidence between the nations,
and the establishments of currencies which will have some-
thing like a stable international value, to be used for the
ordinary operations of international commerce. All this,
however, will be fully explained to you when you see our
Ambassador.
What prompted me to have this direct personal communi-
cation with you was another set of problems, namely, how
are we to conduct our negotiations? My last visit to
America was preceded by a very full exchange of views between
Washington and London. The naval positions of both
countries /
PRIME
MINISTER
10. Downing Street,
STATE
Thiteball.
countries were discussed through your Embassy here, with
myself; and all the points that were to be raised in the
course of the discussions were thoroughly explored and
differences brought down to very definite proportions.
When that was done, I went to America and finished the
business. We have found that, on this occasion, that could
not be done, so that if any Minister were to go to Washington
now, he would have to deal with a great budget of questions
upon which no exchange of opinions has taken place. After
seeing you and discovering what you wished to have discussed
and how the discussion should take place, he would require to
send very lengthy and elaborate reports to the Cabinet here
and begin with the Cabinet an exchange of views under rather
unsatisfactory conditions. Things would go, at any rate
at first, very slowly. The press in both countries would
as likely as not, be pernicious, and as our House of Commons
is sitting, Questions would be put daily on how matters were
proceeding. That is a situation which I do not like.
Moreover, we should desire to exchange views with you -
and I believe you reciprocate that desire - on some important
subjects /
THING
subjects which are really international and which, if other
European nations felt were being agreed to without their
presence, might make it impossible for either you or us to
reach the wider agreement upon them which is absolutely
necessary if they are to become part and parcel of a world
settlement. You will find again and again that it is not
always the substance of proposals which creates trouble, but
the way they are brought out. We ought, therefore, before
any Minister goes to Washington, to agree upon what we are to
discuss and how we are to discuss it. I think you will
agree with these proposals:
(i) you and I in our hearts wish to secure for the
next half century or so the closest friendship between
our two countries and the firmest confidence in each
other;
(ii) not only a settlement of Debts, but a co-operation
in world policy on such matters as peace, disarmament,
a restoration of trade, is to be our aim; and
(iii) we must secure between ourselves an exchange of
views which will, by the sheer consequence of mutual
understanding /
their
other IT
PRIME
MINISTER
10, Downing Street,
Whitebull.
understanding, give us a very great measure of co-
operation in all the international conferences now
sitting in which we are mutually interested, not only
as separate states but as states responsible for the
peace and happiness of the world.
I am afraid that as the outlook now is, we cannot get
into real touch until after the beginning of March, though
our Ambassador will see you before then and give you much
information. But I would suggest that you discuss at once
with our Ambassador your views upon the subjects about which
you would like to confer with us. We shall then give you
our opinions and by rapid exchanges of reactions, settle the
purpose of a conference between you and a British Minister,
which might be held quite soon $0 as to help you with your
public opinion.
There will be no attempt at this stage of our relations
to settle Debts but to examine various possible schemes so
that we might officially understand each other's position
and the conditions in which each of us find ourselves making
an agreement difficult. When that is done, the personal
negotiation stage would have been reached.
The objections to this way of handling is only too
apparent. It will mean time, however rapidly we may get
mean
through it. But as an offset to that, it will A - I hope -
success, for the inevitable consequence of failure to
agree is really too terrible for me to contemplate.
Before leaving the thoughts which I am now trying to
express, I must point out again, and emphasize, that in
everything we do we must not isolate ourselves from the rest
of the interested nations, otherwise we on this side will
only have gone out of the frying pan to find ourselves in
the fire. This is a very difficult problem. I suppose
you find that public opinion in your country presses you
to carry out your decision that you can only deal with
nations separately. I think you will find that to be very
awkward in actual working, and the only way that I can see
through it is that in any conversations we may have you and
we will have to strive to come to understandings which can be
applied to your debtors and ours for we are both a debtor and
a creditor state.
PRIME
MINISTER
10, Bowning Street,
STATE
Thiteball.
Then the question arises, what Minister or Ministers
should go to Washington, when the stage has been set. Of
course, I should like to go myself. A sea voyage and
friendly contacts with you afterwards would be to me,
however difficult the work, a pleasant interlude, but my
hands here are so full almost beyond imagination that to
leave the country for any length of time and for such a
far away destination, is not very possible. Moreover,
if you and I met we would have to pull off some big agree-
ment. Failure in that respect would do both of us very
serious damage and would badly affect our Governments.
Therefore, good preparation would have to be made for the
visit, and we should have to find ourselves in a position
when a satisfactory agreement would be very possible.
Before I went to see your predecessor we spent some months
in preliminary negotiations through the American Embassy
here.
I believe, however, that if a British Minister went
to Washington as soon as possible the effect would be
excellent /
excellent, but even a Cabinet Minister must bring away
something.
I have been turning this over again and again in my
mind since I saw your friend here a few weeks ago. I
think you are a little bit too optimistic as to the time-
table, and if you are to meet your Congress shortly you
will not be able to go very far as regards settlements.
You might be able to go a good long way so far as under-
standings are concerned, but I come more and more definitely
to the conclusion that, if we agree that War Debts must be
set in a large programme of agreements, you will have to
face the possibility of postponing payments in June.
That will, no doubt, be a hard thing for you to do, and
you can depend upon my helping you in every way I can to
avoid it, but the more I think it over the more the doubt
in my mind of the possibility of this deepens. It would
not require to be a very long moratorium, as far as I can
see at the moment, and it could be arranged between us not
for itself and in relation merely to the specific problem
of War Debts, but in order to allow time for a full
consideration /
PRINE
MINISTER
2
10. Doivning Street,
STATE
Thiteball
consideration of the wider set of problems which we would
be reviewing. When all these preliminaries were done, I
should then be very delighted to run over to Washington for
a comparatively brief time and help to dot the 'i's and stroke
the 't's and finish the sentences, and with you do something
that would draw our two countries closer together and launch
them on a great policy of world recovery, inspired by ideals
far firmer than mere cash relationships or political documents
that are only patched up affairs. In my mind there is a
common ideal and a common outlook which I should so like to
be made effective during your term of office and my own.
I repeat that this is purely a personal communication
which I have been emboldened to make because I am so convinced
that we look upon all these problems from the same standpoint
and that we have enough influence to bring our two countries
to see them as we do. You will therefore please not use
this letter in the official communications which must pass
between our respective Governments. Our Ambassador will
meet you and tell you everything official about us, and he
will /
will have his instructions as to what to say to you about our
thoughts and intentions.
I hope most sincerely that you have entered upon a term
of office which will give you much satisfaction and bring you
great success, and in sending my kindest regards to you I make
bold to join Mrs. Roosevelt's name with your own. I have had
a good many letters during the last month or two from mutual
friends on your side, and the warmth of their references' to you
warm my own heart as regards the prospects of our relations.
Believe me to be,
Yours always sincerely,
P.S. 9 am still hondering only
the problem 1 time because I am
not give happy about it. & you
comes sel on rapidly with Linday
mm m visit 2 am willing to
The Hon. F.D. Roosevelt,
The Executive Mansion,
make might be materially hasband
Albany, New York. U.S.A.
rany
notsent tile
PSF
Pus.
Personal and Confidential
Dear Mr MacDonald:
[Fabruary 1933]
I was delighted to receive your letter of February 10th, and I hope
that you will continue to write to me unofficially until I have the
pleasure of talking with you face to face.
I regret that you feel our meeting must be long delayed. I had
hoped to see you soon. And your letter strengthens my belief that if
you should visit America we would not find it difficult to establish
a personal relationship of absolute confidence. You express my own
thoughts when you write: "You and I in our hearts wish to secure for the
next half century so the closest friendship between our two countries
and the firmest confidence in each other."
I thank you also for stating so frankly your view of the line by
which we should approach our task. I shall attempt to be equally frank,
since it is only by mutual frankness that we shall be able to achieve the
collaboration we both desire.
I was gaad to note at the outset of your letter the statement: "Were
we dealing with you alone, the problem would be comparatively simple and
would proceed somewhat on the lines which a friend of yours explained to
us a fortnight ago." From the remainder of your letter, I gather that
your difficulty in accepting that line of approach arises from an
apprehension that we desire to "isolate ourselves from the rest of the
interested nations." I can assure you that we desire no such thing.
On the contrary, I have already established contact with the French
and shall do so shortly with the other interested nations.
Your difficulty in regard to the Lausanne agreement I think I
understand. But I feel that I must add a comment to your statement:
"no settlement with any European nation can meet the present situation
unless it is, in fact, one which will keep the Lausanne Agreement going
and
and enable it to be ratified."
Is it not true that in view of recent
developments in Europe it may be most difficult, even impossible, to obtain
ratification of the Lausanne Agreement but that, ratified or not, it will
"keep going?
The possibility of payments by Germany over and above
those envisaged by the Lausanne Agreement seems to me somewhat remote.
We cannot, of course, take any official responsibility for the
maintenance of the Lausanne agreement, and obviously we cannot comment
in any way on settlements which you may or may not make with your own
each of
debtors. But we may say that we hope to reach agreement with our
debtors by way of the line of approach which you discussed with our
mutual friend some weeks ago. I am under the impression that such
settlements could in no way diminish the chance that the Lausanne
Agreement may MM "keep going." In any case, please do not forget that
so far as we are concerned the Congress of the United States has the
final word in this matter, and that I am certain Congress will not under
any conditions go beyond the line indicated. Congress may well not go
that far. Congress will certainly not go further.
That brings me to the question you raise toward the end of your
letter: the question of a possible moratorium on June 15th. It is
entirely beyond my constitutional powers to promise any such moratorium.
I am bound by the resolution of Congress. Furthermore, in the interest
of establishing a realI collaboration between us, I must tell you frankly
that if we were still in disagreement over questions of importance I should
not recommend such a moratorium to Congress. If on the contrary we had
reached agreement and all that was needed was in your own words, "to dot
the 'i's and stroke the 't's and finish the sentences, and if you were
about to come over for that purpose, I should in courtesy to you recommend
a slight delay.
The entire matter presents itself to me at the moment inthe following
light: There are a number of problems which must be solved if the economic
life of the world is to be revived. It is undesirable to establish an
order of priority in regard to these problems because the solution of
each and every one of them is essential for a restoration of prosperity.
lie should seek together the best solution for each problem individually
and not bargain one solution against another: but we should reach our
final solutions of all at the same time. We should, therefore, discuss
simultaneously methods to revive international commerce, tariffs, monetary
questions, the gold standard, silver, debts, etc. For example, concurrently
we should attempt to devise ways and means to enable countries, which today
have depreciated currencies, to return to the gold standard at the same
time that we adopt our other remedies for curing the present economic
illness of the world.
In these problems today it seems to me that speed bs of the essence.
Let us above all avoid a long drawn out conference like the disarmament
conference. But let us also avoid an abortive conference. I heartily
second your proposal that we should enter upon a rapid exchange of views
through the embassies in Washington and London. And I thank you for
your thoughtfulness in suggesting that a British Minister might perhaps
come over. But I must tell you frankly that such a visit, however
agreeable to me personally, would not "help me with my public opinion",
and that since Sir Ronald will have the matter at his finger tips it seems
to me that the introduction of another personality might tend to delay
father than expedite agreement.
Of course I do not refer to a visit of yourself. I remain most
anxious to talk with you at the earliest possible moment. A thought
in this connection occurs to me. Sir Ronald communicated to me your
suggestion that the Economic Conference should perhaps be held in
Washington rather than in London.
The French, I find, would also
approve of Washington. If you and I should decide that was desirable,
would you consider coming over to open the Conference? Then without
prejudice to either of us,we could establish the personal relationship
which I believe may be of the utmost importance for the future relations
of our countries. And we could give orders to our subordinates to reach
solutions in these economic questions which are, after all, but obstacles
on the road to the great collaboration we both desire.
In my opinion it is essential that we should from now on approach
our mutual problems not as traders intent on driving hard bargains but as
intimate friends attempting to help each other to find solutions for
questions which involve the welfare not only of our own countries but of
all mankind.
Every good wish to you and the hope that we may meet soon.
Yours always sincerely
16 PSF: R HT.. 2
He
74/-133
Please thank President for submitting terms
of invitation with which Prime Minister is in complete
agreement,
Terms of suggested form of acceptance are as
follows:-
I am most touched by your friendly invitation
to me to come to Washington to discuss with you the
preparations for the World Economic Conference and the
need for making further progress toward practical
disarmament. My Colleagues with whom I have discussed
the matter urge me to agree; and it is with the greatest
possible pleasure that I accept your invitation.
If it is convenient to you I will leave England
by the "Berengaria" on April 15th returning by the same
boat. I shall be very happy indeed to stay with you at
the White House.
If President concurs we suggest publication of
his invitation and of Prime Minister's reply in morning
papers of Friday, April 7th. Miss MacDonald would
accompany the Prime Minister.
file
PSF : Mo. [(orine)
CABLEGRAM.
pus onces
The White Bouse,
Mashington.
1WU MO CABLE 6:29a.m. 29
Southampton, April 15, 1933
The President,
The White House.
Thank you very much for your cable I am leaving
in wonderful weather which I take as an omen.
J. Ramsay MacDonald.
PSF:
whi
4-21-33
PRESS CONFERENCE - PRIME MINISTER RAMSAY MacDONALD
HELD IN THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE
FRIDAY, APRIL 21, 1933 - 6.35 P.M.
The
The Prime Minister: How do you do? I think
some of us have met before, have we not?
Mr. Durno: Yes. There is quite a large crowd,
Mr. Prime Minister; they will all be in in just a second.
The Prime Minister: Yes. Well, I am very glad
indeed to see you again. Will we come to an agreement
with each other? Please do not quote me verbatim because
I make it a rule that when that takes place I must always
see the copy before it is printed and that is much too
great a bother to you and, besides, I am not going to say
anything that is worth quoting. (Laughter).
Well, you understand that I have only just set
foot again in America this forenoon and it would quite
obviously be most improper for me to make any statements
whilst I am still full of innocence. (Laughter) I must
know a little more before I venture to make statements.
And I am sure that you understand quite seriously that
the importance of my meeting your President now is so
very great -- not merely for your country and for mine,
but for the whole world, -- that any one occupying my
- 2 -
position must be very, very careful that a loose word
or an ill-considered sentence is not going to make mis-
understanding and difficulty for the final success of
our meeting. My experience with the American journalists
has always been that they are faithful copywriters when
you are perfectly honest and straight with them. Some-
times, in other quarters, I have heard how difficult
the American journalist is. I always say I have never
experienced that. Some one else might have but that has
never been my experience and I am sure that an old ex-
perience of mine is going to be repeated on this
occasion. Well, now, what can I say to you?
Q. Mr. Prime Minister, is Great Britain prepared
to cooperate with the United States in restoring --
The Prime Minister: If you wouldn't mind -- just
one minute. What can I say to you? Whatever I say to
you must be prefixed by an expression of most sincere
pleasure in meeting you all again.
You know the purpose of the conversations -- the
great purpose of the conversations. It is in a sentence
to try, with the President and myself -- with others --
with other nations -- to try and find some sort of solu-
- 3 -
tion for the most extraordinary and very, very tragic
breakdown of our economic mechanism. The farmers
and some of the very best types of human beings --
and certainly some of the hardest working and most
honest of men and women. Our skilled mechanics --
I know them so well -- I can sit by their firesides
and talk to them as man to man. Their skill is great;
their thrift is magnificent; they are self-respecting
and their uprightness is beyond reproach. They have
been saving; they have been men and families of most
exemplary character, yet they with their families are
today in a state of dire distress. Theremust be
something wrong when that is true.
It is not a national problem. Of course nations
can do a good deal to elevate it within their own
boundaries, but what we have all got to get into our
heads -- you of America, we of Great Britain, is this:
That no nation can solve it of itself. We ha ve got to
lay our heads together. We have got to lay our heads
together as friendly cooperators, and that is why I have
come here and why your President has invited me to come
here and why I have come here on this occasion.
- 4 -
We want to discuss together the calling of this
international conference which is going to be held
and more clearly define national problems and the
situation which I have just described. We want to
consider how those problems can be solved. Why is it
that the international faith of the world is shrinking
and shrinking and shrinking? There are a great many
of us, those in particular described by Abraham Lincoln
as people for whom God must have had a special affec-
tion because he has made 80 many of them, who really
work for a living, some by muscle, some by brains,
some by imagination -- the man or woman who writes a
great poem that inspires us to good life and great
deeds is as much a producer in the world as the man
who by the exercise of his muscles takes coal from the
bowels of the earth and sends it up so that it may be
available for our grates. Why is it that the exchange
of goods, the volume of international commerce upon
which we have to live, is getting smaller -- smaller --
the stream is getting shallower and shallower? God
didn't mean that! It certainly must be a mistake on
the part of man.
- 5 -
We are going to talk about that during this week-
end. As I said, I don't know that at the moment I can
say very much more than that. I dare say there will
be other subjects -- I don't like --- you certainly are
not to quote this now, but somehow I feel very fond of
your President. I have got a sort of feeling that
there is a good colleague with great spiritual power.
And what can we do in public life without sincerity
and spiritual power? A lot of people think that
politics is a somewhat degrading occupation. Rubbish!--
rubbish! It is the most elevating of occupations. I
call it service. It is the most elevating service that
any man or woman can be called upon to perform. It all
depends an the spirit in which you do it. Some of us
come from very humble origin -- haven't forgotten and
never will forget -- and using their influence and au-
thority in order to place people where they can put
their energy to useful purpose. What better service
can we give to the community? And I believe that is the
spirit of President Roosevelt, who is now my host. I
say, "Don't quote that", for I am just talking to friends,
talking to men and women with whom I should like to come
- 6 -
into a personal understanding 80 that if you damn me,
your conscience will trouble you in doing it. (Laughter)
I know -- I know perfectly well. I whirled a pen myself
and probably, when these hectic days have gone over, I
may have to return to it and I shall do it with a great
deal of pleasure if I do. So I know the insides of
newspaper offices. I know that newspapers will oppose
and object to things, but I should like, especially on
this matter, which is not a parliamentary matter, which
is not a sectional matter, which is not an American
matter, which is not a British matter, that the critical
press should be seized with the determination to help.
Because if we could only get that -- but don't make any
mistake about it, it is going to be very difficult, but
we will. When we went through a crisis in Great
Britain a little over a year ago -- getting on to two
years ago, what did we do? We said that all those
things that are petty and small minded and partisan must
go. We have fought, but now for the time being a truce
to this pettifogging partisanism and I am glad to say that
every newspaper of any reputation in the country responded
-- I say every newspaper of any reputation.
- 7 -
My friends, it calls for a union of nationalities.
Not that we get in alliances with each other -- not that
we get tied up one to another -- not at all. But it is a
union of nationalities, appreciating the nature and im-
portance of the problems and laying their heads together
in order to find common ways to get commonly held solu-
tions. My friends, we hope so to do it.
I am not going to say any more because I am going
to speak tomorrow at the Press Club and by then I shall,
perhaps, have been able to find my bearings a little more.
This is only just a "How do you do?". This is an intro-
ductory -- a re-introductory to many of us -- shaking of
the hand. If you would like to put questions I hope you
will be discreet (laughter). If you are not discreet, I
can assure you that I shall show you a very good example.
(Laughter).
Mr. Boettiger: May we put one very discreet
question? Will you discuss war debts with the President?
The Prime Minister: The question of debts is one
of those things -- one of those features in the landscape
that we have got to survey.
Q Have you any suggestion to make to the President
in your discussion of the debts when you survey that far?
- 8 -
Q. Do you think it would be indiscreet to ask if
Great Britain is prepared to cooperate with the United
States in the restoration of the monetary standard based
on a reduced rule?
The Prime Minister: You have not put one question;
you have put a dozen. (Laughter) The United Kingdom has
been hoping for a long time for the opportunity of con-
sidering with other nations how best to establish
stability in monetary systems.
Q. Will you discuss the stabilization of Sterling --
(inaudible)
The Prime Minister: We have been trying for a long
time to give more stabilization and certainty to money.
Q. Can you tell us your idea of some things that
might be done to meet present problems?
The Prime Minister: Not at this stage. You see,
we have come to just exchange views -- especially myself.
I am your guest. You see, I am your guest and I must
behave as a guest. But I can assure you all that there
is going to be no holding back. No holding back. We
are going to pull what is in our heads, whatever it may
be and whatever value it may have.
- 9 -
Now, during the time I am here -- it is only just this
week end -- as you can imagine, there is a tremendous
amount of work that has to be done in London and it is
not convenient to be away long, so I am really only
going to spend, much to my regret, what we call at home
a "long week-end". A long week-end is from Friday to
Tuesday and I am afraid that is about all I can spend
here -- as I say, very much to my regret. But during
that time my friend, Mr. Wright -- I think probably some
of you know him, he has been in Washington before -- he
will be the liaison officer between and I am sure he will
help you with information in every possible way. I think
he would like to say something to you before we part this
afternoon.
Q. Might I ask this question? I think it is
timely. In your opinion, is there any intrinsic validity
in the criticisms -- we have cables reporting the edi-
torials in London papers as criticizing the monetary
policies of the United States -- the motive because of the
effect on the proposed conversations.
The Prime Minister: Well, I have seen nothing --
I have seen hothing. What you might call the crisis --
- 10 -
the change, took place while I was on the Berengaria and
I cannot say. I have read no newspaper. It is literally
true that I have read no newspaper. I will try to do it
tonight before I go to bed or after I get to bed.
I am quite willing to say this: All this talk about
conveying enmity -- it is not in my heart -- it is not in
the hearts of my colleagues nor the British Govern ent.
If little bits have cropped up -- well, we are all human --
but even that is not in my heard and I am sure it is not in
the hearts of my colleagues. Realize that we are going
through a very difficult crisis and do not let us begin to
say -- do not let our people say the U. S. have been work-
ing under some curious policy and do not let you say that
we have been working under some curious policy. I can
assure you -- I certainly can speak for ourselves. It is
not true -- it is not true. It does not exist.
Now I think I will leave you in charge of Mr.
Wright. I had a rather tiring day.
(Discussion about pictures)
Well, so far as I am concerning, I have no objection
to a photograph being taken in this room of my friends
and myself. (Pictures)
I was just going to say that so far as I am concerned
- 11 -
I am standing at this particular spot on the instructions
of the President who wished me to intervies sitting in his
chair and standing athis desk. So you see, we are
getting on (applause)
I am very glad to be photographed here with you and
I talked very sincerely.
Thank you. Thank you so much for coming here.
(End)
PSF R. ITTacTionald
[April ? 1933]
Today was occupied in a
though survey of the business
of the Divarmament Conference
at geneva Substantial
hargooss was mak, it was
felt by both the President +
the Prime Minister that the
usults of the tay's conversation
would considerably advance brth the
prospect of the Success of the
Diarm Conference 90/ the internal Eam Confee
The President will continue the
Discussion of Jijarmament problems
with M. Herriot. an hisarrival
PSF R. The Bound &
mistetland
IMMEDIATE RELEASE
April 26, 1933
FOR THE PRESS
JOI" STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME
MIN STER MACDONALD
As stated yesterday, our discussions on the questions
facing the World Conference were not designed to result in defini-
tive agreements, which must be left to the Conference itself.
But they showed that our two Governments were looking with a like
purpose and a close similarity of method at the main
objectives of the Conference, and were impressed by the vital
necessity of assuring international agreements for their realiza-
tion in the interests of the peoples of all countries.
The
practical measures which are required for their realization were
analysed and explored. The necessity for an increase in the
general level of commodity prices was recognised as primary and
fundamental. To this end simultaneous action needs to be taken
both in the economic and in the monetary field. Commercial policies
have to be set to a new orientation. There should be a constructive
effort to moderate the network of restrictions of all sorts by
which commerce is at present hampered, such as excessive tariffs,
quotas, exchange restrictions, etc. Contral Banks should by
concerted action provide an adequate expansion of credit and
every means should be used to get the credit thus created into
circulation. Enterprise must be stimulated by creating conditions
favorable to business recovery and Governments can contribute by
the development of appropriate programs of capital expenditure.
The ultimate re-establishment of equilibrium in the international
exchanges should also be contomplated. No must when circumstances
permit re-estrilish an international monetary standard which will
operate successfully without depressing prices and avoid the
repetition of the mistakes which have produced such disastrous
results in the past. I' this connection the question of silver,
which is of such importance in trade with the Orient, was dis-
cussed and proposals were tentatively suggested for the improvement
of its status.
These questions are all inter-related and cannot be
settled by any individual country acting by itself. The -
achievement of sound and lasting world recovery depends on
co-ordinating domestic remedies and supplementing them by con-
current and simultaneous action in the international field. The
proposals examined will be discussed with the representatives of
the other nations who have been invited to Washington with a view
to securing the fullest possible measure of common understanding
before the Conference meets. It is the hope of both Governments
that it may be possible to convene the Conference for June.
The have in these talks found a reassurance of unity of
purpose and method. They have given a fresh impetus to the
solution of the problems that weigh so heavily upon the most
stable, industrious and deserving men and women of the world -
the human foundation of our civilization whose hard lot it is our
common object to alleviate.
PSF: missLettend R. Mechald
FOR THE PRESS
INDIATE RILEASE
April 26, 1933.
PRESS CONFERENCE - PRIME LINISTER MACDONALD
The President's Office, April 25, 1933 - 10.10 A.M.
THE PRIME MINISTER: Good morning. Well, I brought good
weather and I have left good weather. I think that ought to be
reckoned in whatover settlement is going to be made between us.
How much value do you place upon a good day? You had better credit
me with that.
Well, I am very sorry to leave you again. It seems
only an hour or two since I said "Hot do you do" to you just after
I arrived in Washington. I think you have been 80 admirably served
by our press men behind us that it the unnecessary for you to see me,
and I should 11:00 to thank you for the fine help you have been to
us. I would like to thank our press experts -- and I think you per-
haps will join DD in this -- for the way they have placed themselves to
unreservedly at our disposal. The success of our conversations has
depended very largely upon that admirable body of experts who, with great
patience and groot !nowledge and unlimited good will for each other --
both sides -- have worked away to advise possible ways of coming to
agreements when the time arrives.
You will remember I told you that I was not calling to come
to agreements -- to draft papers and sign them so that the last word had
been said. I have kept my promise, my friends, we have not done that --
we have never tried to do it. This has been preliminary conversation --
just like when you cro going out on some big expedition you send scouts
ahoad to see that is the best trail for you to take and to see how far
the ground will enable you to carry out your purposes.
Well, that is what tre have been doing the last two or three
days and I think -- though I have had many experiences that between the
cup and the lip there are many slips -- I think that I can say to you,
without any reservation at all, either in my heart or on my lips, that
these two or three days of friendly, pleasant conversations have been
fruitful in a way that I hardly imagined would be possible when I came.
But still -- and I repeat it -- no agreements, no settlements.
I leave your President as free as he vas when I found him
and he lets ne go home to see my own colloagursin the British Empire as
free as I was the day I left them -- that is the day before I sailed for
New York.
But, nevertheless, it has been real good business we have
done -- real good business. I am very glad that I have had the pleasure
also of meeting Dr. Bennett down here.
It was absolutely impossible for De to get to Canada at this
time. You saw this morning that yesterday vas our budget day, and the
Prime Minister's supreme duty is to be at home whilst the budget is being
discussed and settled in the House of Commons, BO I an hurrying back. I
must hurry back in order to be there with as little delay as possible.
33 I couldn't go to Canada and I hope the Canadian journalists
who are present will convey to their readers my profound regret that.
fate has been against DO on this occasion but that I still remember my
pledge to go to Canada on a holiday. In the meantime, I am very glad
indeed that I an having the opportunity of talking with Mr. Bennott.
- 2 -
How, I would like to put it to you this way: I came
here 0.8 -- apparently as a Minister of Great Britain and as the
destined perhaps for my sins, because it is going to be no easy
job -- Chairman of the International Economic Conference. The
burdens and the vorries of both offices were lying in a most terrible
way on my back when I saw you last.
I an going away as a friend, for I an taking away with no
a memory of a most genial mn, who is your President, and a really
friendly crowd representing I hope -- I flatter nyself by hoping --
representing the spirit of the American people.
I have learned more clearly than I knew before of the
difficulties of the American Government -- the American nation -- and
I hope that in return for that you folks and your Government appre-
ciates perhaps a little bit more vividly the great troubles and the
great difficulties that I have to face as Prino Ministor and my
collongues have to face as responsible cabinot ministers.
To are going away leaving behind us and taking away with
us & closer understanding than before. le understood each other at a
little distance off. We now understand each other, as it wore, elbow
to elbow. You know the human difference in that and, believe me my
friends, the very highest diplomacy and the most accurate and search-
ing diplomncy always take into account the value of personal and human
understandings between both sidos. I think the have got that as the
result of the conversations.
It therefore has come to this: That we have got above and
beyond more market haggling end foggling. The are not going to co-
operate in finding solutions of the great troubles of the world if we
maintain ourselves in the position of mere bargainers. "I will give
you six ponce in silver if I an perfectly certain that you are going
to give de six coppers." Bahl That is not the way of going to work
together. That is not a way tre are going to live together. That is
not the way we are going to aspire and achieve together. Te have got
above that.
Te have got to an understanding now. There is to be a real
humn understanding and the bargains tre want and the exchanges we want
are the bargains and exchanges which will make us both both separately
and cooporatively -- more efficient in removing the burdens that are
oppressing the world at the present moment.
Te are also -- and this is the last I want to say -- we are
also going away not only convinced of the fact that we hope to come to
an agreement -- we are going away with a greater thought than that -
we are going away with a determination 170 are going to come to an agree-
ment because it is our moral duty to come to an agreement; that if we
don't come to agreements, --- I an only telling you what I have been
trying to do.
But can you inagine what is going to happen if America and
Great Britain cannot devise a means of marching side by sido? No
alliances. Don't you have any fear of that. No entanglements! We
are not going to be brought into the melstron of Europe. You are go-
ing to remain where you are, but no man lives to himself alone.
The man who is strongest and most independent is the one
who has stretched out his hand to somebody else and grusped it. That
is the idea that is in my mind and I think -- I think tre have got. I
think we have got it.
And you have been avfully good in helping us to get it, and
with all the gratitudes that I take away with be -- I believe in about
an hour and a half. I an sorry but it is true but amongst all the
things I an going to take away with ne -- not in my luggage but in my
heart -- one of the strongest of them will be my gratitude to the
American Press, whom you represent here today.
- 3 -
Well, I hope ve will meet again. I cannot bear to
think that this contact is not going to be a continuing one. I
hope that your President will be spared may years of life to
give us opportunities for these meetings and I can assure -- I can
assure his through you that every opportunity that comos to me to
go out in your woods, to go dorm your river, I will fly to take
then.
So, my friends, goodbye for the time being.
P5F R. The Donald
TELEGRAM
The White House
NA 1061
42
Mashington
WA New York 628 PM April 26th-1933.
The President:
The White House.
I cannot leave these shores without sending you a message of
heartfelt thanks for the cordial and generous hospitality which
you Mr. President and Mrs. Roosevelt have extended to Ishbel
and myself and for the friendly welcome which we have everywhere
received.
J. Ramsay MacDonald.
710 PM
PSP: R. THE Iorald
30 Pdovia Rea
Radio apl 27th1933
RT Non I Ramsay Macdound -
My wife and I wich much you both
V.S. Berngaria - newyukRedio
were still with us - Happy vayage and
beat of back always -
Franklin M Prosever
[F.D.R] to [s. Ramsay Mac Donald], I [may 22,1933]
Great Britain's copy published in
Documents on British Foreign Policy,
1919-1939, Second Series, Vol. V, 1933
pages 810-811.
PSF: R. The Jorwal
[ may 22, 1933]
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
I have read with great care your gracious letter
and also the personal message handed to me by the
Ambassador. You may be assured that I fully sympathize
with your expression of views as to the desirability
of avoiding difficulties concerning the debts at the
opening of the Economic Conference. I note with appre-
ciation what you say of your understanding of the views
held by our Congress and by the American people.
As I told you when you were here, I am most
anxious that the Conference begin in an atmosphere
of mutual good-will. To that end I am discussing the
subject informally and privately with leaders of the
Congress. No doubt we shall find some way of meeting
the situation in ample time before the opening of the
Conference. I am finding a good deal of sentiment to
the effect that if your Government is unable to pay the
entire
- 2 -
entire amount, it might find it possible to pay a part,
perhaps in silver, as has been authorized by Congress.
This feeling is based on the thought that it would make
it clear in both countries that there had not been a
default. It avoids a debate on terminology. This is
a mere suggestion, however, and is not intended to be
a definitive request.
Another question, however, concerns me much more.
I am disturbed lest the deliberations of the Conference
be unduly affected by the desire of the debtor governments
to bring about a new settlement of the debt question,
even though this question does not form a part of the
Agenda. While we all recognize certain economic relation-
ships between the debts and a few of the subjects at issue,
the major questions to be discussed at the Economic Con-
ference, in my opinion, can be brought to a satisfactory
and mutually advantageous determination at the Conference,
without reference to the debts at all, and without their
settlement being made in any way contingent upon a debt
settlement. Hence, I am deeply pleased to note that you
do
- 3 -
do not place a new debt settlement as a necessary prere-
quisite to a successful conclusion of the Conference.
I hold to my policy of free debt discussion when-
ever the debtor governments desire them. It is obvious
of course that such discussions must be held here in
Washington with whatever representaives the British
Government designates for that purpose.
As to procedure, I note that your letter suggests
an exchange of notes, but your personal message sent sub-
sequent to the letter, suggests that in your opinion it
would be best not to wait for a formal request from you.
I am inclined to the point of view that we can consider
that the communications and conferences which I have had
amount to a representation of your views. I will have a
clearer picture of the Congressional situation by the end
of this week and will cable you then.
I am delighted that the disarmament conference is
moving forward on the lines on which you and I are in
such full accord. If things again get in a jam, be sure
to let me know if you advise any action by me.
Tell
- 4 -
Tell the Lady Ishbel that Howe ate that halibut
for breakfast. My warm regards to you both.
PSF R ITTe Jonald
PRIME
EXPIRATE
10, Downing Street,
Thiteball.
Personnel h mossicial
8 may 1933.
my Dear President,
The weather on my why home was as fair and
kind as my stay at the white house, and 9 rached Sarthampton
much Denefitted s my in days at dea. Whatever may be the
kanth 7 unr conversations as regards national understanding
they have given the memories 7 great (mindship and an interesting
companionship which 2 shall always be swift to try and renew.
During the neal Week of two, as we anticipated him great advantage
to both our commines which our meeting could bring, they
are given a chance to mature, will have to hudergo cirticisms
and attacks both in housting lon 1 London, disigned to render them
7 no avail. According to on press, you seem to be going to have
a specially trouble homs time. you know how well 9 minstand
your difficulties and how much 9 sympathise with you in
meeting them. 9 have tried to keep you and your tack in mind
in swaything I have said ince my klurn, and 9 hope that
I have not smbarrassed you by anything 9 have done.
To an mines Committee y In (abinet 1 to the (abinet
itsalf in man general and less specific terms, 9 have knowled
what things we reviewed. 9 can assure you that my colleagues
are as annions as sver to find ways 9 resoneiling your
difficulthes with am own 20 that both your Government & ours
may deal with one problems & the International Sconomic
Conference work determined to find 20mhins 2 secure agreements
Our good-will, however, cannot blind no to the realities 9 the
Speedingly treacherous country we have to cross before we reach
Ensier times. 9 shall refer to two points specifically:
1. The Dariff truce: you know how much 9 favour the idea and
how much , wish to cooperate in making is possible. you will
remember when our Superts biral Grought up the subject , had to
warn you 7 the position in which , found myself owing to
hegotialions which we had begun, and to objectives E.g. land
ressement and agricultural protection, which had been smbodied
in legislation giving instructions from him House Houmons to
him Cabrier to proced immediately to apply the law. What had
actually been begun and amounced we could not suspend
on the chance that, in or uven months from now, the
International Conference would be a complete success. su that
we an now doing will be reported at the Conference When the Jubjects
knowled
2.
PRIME MINISTER
10, Downing Street,
bitsball.
arise. On an inamination 9 our actions, we have come to the
conclusion that is an work in hand were completed, we should
still be in a better hosition than other States whose agreement is
Essential to accept proposals which would make a real success
q m Conference. moreover, is must be knumbered that AR were forced
to begin this Johny when one European competitors were hard as work
setting np new barriers to damage one trade, and when svery attempt we
had made to fin him date for the meeting q two International Conference
had fried. for instance, him Argentine Agreement (Regarding which in
norman Dairs culled upon me on triday to say he had been instructs
to protest & to indicate the hossibility 9 some hostile action in Congress)
was virtually concluded before 9 left for houshington. 9 told you 7 the
unfortunate effect on our minds 7 in behaviour 9 some European
Governments when we ourselves tried to get a Jariff buce at Geneva
a few years ago, and nothing coned persuade no to so through the
same superiences. Before s got home, In hoution which , had
Emplained to you was worsened owning to a heavy propagonada by
Lome newspapers, and the House Hommons had become
auspicions that the proposal was another attempt to take
advantage y one sisting weak homes 2 that is would mean a
sacrifice 9 one interests alone 1 all an computitors. you will reading
understand how difficuls is is, When lack 9 confidence is about; to
meet the plausible argument that, if there is to be a truce, it should
not
be Lonly a stablisation qtm status the which snposes us all the
time to samaging attacks, but should be when a Handard of
molection and modition as low as our own. I made some
suggestions as to how tm truce resonition should be worded, but , do
not know what was the result of your conversations with two bench
on the subject and Whether they were helpful or otherwise. no doubt
Sw Leith Russ will be able to tall us.
2: War Debb: I am 20mg to rec in the leress that new
troubles appear to have gathered round ani question, and the quiet
and stendy working out 1 the negotiations which we had Wanned
has been interfered with by newspaper head. lines. & the quicker ways
cannot befollowed failure threatens the other good work we did, the
on will ready
w mean a
take
3.
PRIME
MINISTER
10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.
friendly cooperation between our two countries and two
International Economic [onference itsalf. All these misfortunes
I shall strive to the and to prevent. is we are the warted - will!
the world will reques it as is kaps in consiquences. Since my return,
I find that the position I suplained to you regarding a June payment
still holds good and that there is increasing responsioness lest from
good. will we should ask in country to do what is believes it
cannot & onght not to do. you seem to be beset by messure to Snact
all huymonts, I am baset by dependations demanding that 9 thould
make none. At the same time, the Envernment is still ansions to
find 20ml means 9 final settlement though sconomic conditions
continue to narrow the margin within which we can turn. This
final settlement is to be difficult snough in all conscience, but if
during Debs negolishions and the sittings 7 the Sconomic Conference
something happens which is to create confusion in Europe and an
upset in commercial as will as Government debti all were m world,
9 cannot insurance in what state we are all to be left. To
reach a final debt settlement within three or four weeks is
impossible for it antails not only an agreement between no two,
one between m separately and all our debton and creditors. The
negoliations between us will have, pom stage to stage, to be snamined
in rention to this wider complexity because, is not results may
wenk down in their application to misting facts. 9 can du no
way one 1 this disasks other than one we considered vis. a
suspension of his June hayment on the ground that is would
seriously interrupt the negotiations for a final settlement and
isopardise the conference, and on the definete and amounted
industanding that you were in no way committed to anything
beyond the specific act 7 temporary enspension The latest news from
Washing ton is rather oninous as to this rossiblity and parkly, is
depresses me. 21 rus camel be arranged, then z fear much that
nothing can be done, is it am be arranged an agreement though is
be difficult is within his bounds 7 hossility.
Supposing that the shock 9 disagreement on hw 15th June could
be avvided in the way 9 have indicated the question 9 procedure is
important 2t would mean an Smehange 1 notes and I am anxions
on
To
S.
4.
PRIME
MINISTER
10, Downing Street,
Whitehnll.
that they shoned be helpful to both 9 no. We cannot supect
you to take the initiative by informing us that in view 9 the
gral work in which he are both sugaged you do not sapect us to
make a haryment on sm 19th June 4 we addressed you first any
nok would have to be on m lines that owing to the negotiations
for a reftlement which are begun and the importance 1 the
work 1 the Firkermational forgerence we ask that we may
how up our payment on tm time bing without prijudice to withes
9 us and you might respond Emphasism your views on two
importance 1 the negotiations and the Conference and agring not
to regard a failure in June as a default but making it plain
that such a gesture on your hart must not be taken to commit
you to this, that and the other thing. 4 your leading representations
at him Economic Conference could come to London a day or two
before him opening these arrangements could be made surily -
provided 7 conse that we know you can accept them. L1 would
be most desirable that tm terms 1 our letters be selled beforehand
Inturn to those Michand days we spent together ricussing
how we could get are on Groubles, is there were no one but
ourselves changed with overoming them. There is am open
green hank in front 1 my window (I am writing at
cheques) & thrushes singing in the garden and I wish
that you and mm Roosevelt - and may , add the gay
and in faithful How trailing a doubtfully pragrant halibut
in his wake :- were here now haying me your refurn visit
you will all come one day, I hope howaver, to Lossemouth before
he set to regions more sublime, and not more attracher. h
through on tobacco smoke - Even is yours comes from
minable Chesterfulds or Lucky strikes - durvey a
ramshackle world which we strove together to help.
with my knowst regards A best wishes to both 1 you,
I am
yours very shicerely
PSF
I have read with great care your gracious letter and
also the personal message handed to me by the Ambassador.
You may be assured that I fully sympathize with your expression
of views as to the desirability of avoiding difficulties as unpleasent
concerning the debts at the opening of the Economic
Conference. I note with appreciation what you say of your
our
understanding of the views held by ymux Congress and by the
American people.
most
As I told you when you were hre, I am anxious that
the Conference begin in an atmosphere of mutual good-will.
that + am willing to attempt to bring about the deferment
of the June 15th payment by your Government If practicable
means can be found. To that end I am discussing the subject
informally and privately with leaders of the Congress. No
doubt we shall find some way of meeting the situation in ample
both countrin that there had not to a default. reads
time before the opening of the Conference I am finding a
it clobate Terminalagy.
good deal of sentiment to the effect that if your Government
is unable to pay the entire amount, it might find it possible
to pay & part, perhaps in silver, as has been authorized by
This is basrd an The thought That it Would make italem on
Congress This is 8. mere suggestion, however, and is not in-
tended to be adefinitive request.
Another question, however, concerns me much more. I am
disturbed lest the deliberations of the Conference be un-
duly affected by the desire of the debtor governments to bring
about a new settlement of the debt question, even though this
question does not form a part of the Agenda. While we all
recognize certain economic relationships between the debts and
-2-
a few of the subjects at issue, the major questions to be dis-
cussed at the Economic Conference, in my opinion, can be brought
to a satisfactory and mutually advantageous determination at
the Conference, without reference to the debts at all, and
without their settlement being made in any way contingent upon
a debt settlement. Hence, I am deeply pleased to note that you
do not place a new debt settlement as a necessary prerequisite
to a successful conclusion of the Conference.
I hold to my policy of free debt discussion whenever the
debtor governments desire them. During the period of the
stis is abvious Minure that
Conference, however, I toshage such discussions must
Be held here in Washington with whatever representatives the British
Government designates for that purpose.
As to procedure, I note that your letter suggests an ex-
change of notes, but your personal message sent subsequent to
the letter, suggests that in your opinion it would be best
not
to wait for 8. formal request from you, but to announce that
because of the danger of distrubing the atmosphere in which
the Economic Conference will meet, we are not pressing for the
The
immediate payment on June 15th. I am inclined to blade point of
view, and will, if 1t is decided to express agreement to e.
that hr c/m
deforment, consider that the communications and conferences which
virws.
I have had amount to & representation of your case, and make such
announcement as I deem necessary on my own initiative. I will
has a claimer picture of the sitnation by
the and of This wish and will cable you them
I am deligated that the
PRIME
confirmed is kiving
forward on the lines an which yung
and I are in 2nch full accord If
things again get in a 1 am , to anre
to tat me know ifquire Advise
Any action by ms.
Till the Larly Island that Huar
maren anyards Agan bath
ats that truckfast. My
20
Plane
PSF Rittle Dorald
ON HIS MAJESTY'S SERVICE.
By bag
Personal 2 unofficial
The President
me while House
Washington
PRIME MINISTER.
wing
PSF R. TTOC Jonald
PRIME
MINISTRY
2
10, Downing Street,
Feb
hiteball.
September 27th 1933.
PURELY PERSONAL AND UNOFFICIAL :
My dear President,
I was very glad to have your letter
delivered to me by Mr. Norman Davis. I watch from
day to day, so far as newspapers and reports will
allow me, the valiant struggle you are putting up to
straighten things out in the United States, and I
pray that you will secure a great success. You have
opportunities for experiment which we do not have here.
Our margins are very narrow; the equipoise of our
economic life is very delicate; to pull out a brick,
to see what is behind or to get at some rotten bit of
structure, is as dangerous in the State as I have just
found out it is in my own delightful old house which is
beginning to show signs of its two centuries of years.
But with care, exercisedin carrying out a very clearly
defined policy aimed at increasing both prices and
consumption, we are steadily effecting improvements.
-2-
STATE
Every day, however, I come across decisive proofs
that, unless we get the world in a healthier condition,
we are going to be able to do very little that is to be
permanent and is to remove the awful poverty of our day.
Every stream of international commerce is as parched as
our Scotch rivers have been this summer on account of the
drought. No fish have been able to get up and the reservirs
of water- supply upon which hundreds of villages depend,
are
their
almost down to mud bottom. To spend a quiet half-
hour musing over the unity of things is very profitable;
but how few such half-hours have you or I got ?
I saw the Dutch Prime Minister this week and had
a patient survey with him over the field. You know, we
really must try and get some means of imparting some degree
of certainty to international exchanges. You can help us
enormously and we can help you, if our exchanges were a
bit more steady. I do not dream of anything that is
permanent. I do not think that you can settle rock
foundations or anything of the kind; but if we could
just patch something up to keep going from day to day, I
Aroof 9ATST09
-3-
39
am sure that both your general aim and mine would be
enormously facilitated. Please do not imagine I am
butting in on your province. I am just venturing
and
to impose upon our mutual relationships to mention
to you one of my biggest troubles in getting things
going on this side of the world.
I saw Leith Ross before he left and told him
that, apart from his official work of discussing Debts,
if you show any disposition to have a general talk
with him on how matters stand; he must withhold nothing
from you but tell you exactly what is passing through
than
my mind; and nobody knows what that is better/he does.
The Disarmament situation is becoming increas-
ingly difficult. On this side here there can be no
doubt at all but that the conduct, the pose and the
spirit of the German Government have raised fear and
unsettlement where, largely owing to us, calmness and
confidence had begun to operate. And, in addition to
that, the same unfortunate hesitations arise from the
more remote country, Japan. I cannot honestly say to
you that we can get such a good agreement to-day as
-4-
we could have got twelve months ago. This letter has
been interrupted by a telephone communication from Sir
John Simon at Geneva. He reports no great achievement
as yet by reason of the private negotiations, but he does
say that our efforts are getting the more troublesome
powers a little closer together. I am seeing him here
in a few days and he says he will give me a more complete
report.
Now, I must not take up any more of your
very crowded moments. I just send you all my best wishes
and, with kindest regards to Mrs. Roosevelt and yourself,
believe me to be
Yours always sincerely,
The Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt.
os. I hope trul your
White House.
Washington.
indishusition 7 which 9
daw hns now completely
gone. 26.m
PSF R. Moetonald,
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 10, 1937.
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
Because Ramsay MacDonald
labored long and successfully
for the good of his fellowmen
he will be mourned by those
throughout the world who call
themselves liberals. I am
glad to have known him as a
friend and I deeply regret
his death.
TANDARD FORM No. 14A
PSF R. TTTere Donald
APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT
FROM
MARCH 10, 1926
The White House
Mashington
TELEGRAM
OFFICIAL BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RATES
CABLE
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
131254
November 10, 1937.
MISS ISHBEL MacDONALD
LONDON
ENGLAND
MRS. ROOSEVELT AND I ARE DEEPLY SORRY END SEND YOU AND THE
FAMILY OUR HEARTFELT SYMPATHY
ROOSEVELT