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PSF
Indo- China
Printed in Foreign Relations of the United States,
1944, volume 3, PP. 778-780.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Indo. China freser fileworth
November 3, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
I have yours of November
second, enclosing memorandum on
recent developments in relation
to Indo-China. I wish you would
make it clear that:
1. We must not give American
approval to any French military
mission, as it appears we have
done in the first sentence of
the first paragraph.
2. Referring to the third
paragraph, it must be made
clear to all our people in the
Far East that they can make no
decisions on political questions
with the French mission or anyone
else.
3. We have made no final
decisions on the future of Indo-
China. This should be made
clear.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
-2-
4. In the final paragraph
it is stated the British and
Dutch have arrived at an agreement
in regard to the future of South-
east Asia and are about to bring
the French into the picture. It
should be made clear to all our
people that the United States
expects to be consulted with
regard to any future of Southeast
Asia. I have no objection to
this being made clear to the
British, the Dutch or the French.
F. D. R.
OUR
Drice
PSF: Indo-China
COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY.OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
November 2, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
INDOCHINA
In order that you may be kept fully informed on developments
in relation to Indochina, there has been prepared the memorandum
attached hereto.
FOP VICTORY
BUY
UNITED
STATES
SAVINGS
BONDS
AND
STAMPS
November 2, 1944
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN RELATION TO INDOCHINA
The following are recent developments in relation to Indochina:
Colombo has reported that:
The British staff at headquarters of SEAC has protested
to the British Chiefs of Staff in London against the inclu-
sion of Indochina in the theatre under the new United States
Army Commanding General in China, urging that Indochina be
included in the SEAC theatre.
The French Military Mission, which is large, has ar-
rived in Ceylon and has received American approval and is
now recognized openly and officially. Apparently,
General Blaizot has not yet arrived. Baron de Langlade
who parachuted into Indochina some weeks ago with a letter
of introduction from de Gaulle is also in Ceylon. He
spent twenty-four hours with French Army officers in Indo-
china, and stated, upon his return that a basis for a
French resistance movement exists there, but reportedly
declined to say more until Blaizot's arrival. Blaizot, a
Lieutenant General, was formerly Chief of Staff in Indochina.
He is a "colonial" general.
Although SEAC was advised specifically that only mili-
tary, and not political, questions might be discussed with
the French Mission, political questions are in fact under
discussion.
The British SOE which is actively engaged in undercover
operations in Indochina has recently received orders from the
Foreign Office that they should have nothing to do with any
Annamite or other native organizations in Indochina, but are
to devote their efforts to the French.
The OWI representative at New Delhi has received indication
that the British wish OWI activities directed at the native popula-
tions in Thailand and Indochina be eliminated so as not to stir up
native resistance to the Japanese and so incite the Japanese to send
more troops into those areas. Colombo states that it is apparent
SOE desires severely to restrict OSS operations in the SEAC theatre
and to give SOE preeminence or, failing that, to establish combined
SOE-OSS operations.
British
-2-
British propaganda agencies are emphasizing the recent appeal
by the French War Ministry for recruits to participate in the
campaign for liberation of Indochina on the ground that news of
any French military efforts to recover Indochina would encourage
the French in Indochina. OWI has so far refrained from mentioning
the French appeal or other phases of French preparations for mili-
tary participation fearing the adverse affect on the native popu-
lations in Indochina and elsewhere in the Far East on the restora-
tion of the status quo ante which such preparations would appear
to imply. OWI has specifically requested State Department guidance
on United States policy in this regard, and have been advised to be
silent on the subject despite the anticipated British broadcasts.
General Donovan has submitted to the Secretary of State a re-
port from the OSS representative in SEAC reading in part:
"There can be little doubt that the British and
Dutch have arrived at an agreement with regard to the
future of Southeast Asia, and now it would appear that
the French are being brought into the picture.
It
would appear that the strategy of the British, Dutch
and French is to win back and control Southeast Asia,
making the fullest use possible of American resources,
but foreclosing the Americans from any voice in policy
matters.
ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. c.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
November 15, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Developments Regarding Indochina
Supplementing my memorandum of November 2, 1944,
the Department has been informed of two further develop-
ments regarding Indochina.
Monsieur Chauvel, Secretary General of the Foreign
Office, has informed the American Ambassador in Paris
that France is anxious to participate in the recovery of
Indochina to the maximum extent its capacity will permit;
that 2,000 of the troops which have been training in North
Africa for service in the Pacific have already arrived in
India; that recruiting has been active in metropolitan
France and training there already commenced for a French
expeditionary force which eventually may amount to two
normal divisions; that the French Government is interested
not only in a French force in India but also would be
interested in having French units included in any forces
which might strike toward Indochina from the Philippines,
if such an operation is contemplated.
The American Minister at Cairo has been informed
by a usually reliable and well-informed source that at
the meeting between Lord Louis Mountbatten, Mr. Churchill
and Mr. Eden at Cairo last month, Lord Louis urged strongly
that his command should be extended to include Indochina
and Thailand; that operations in Malaya should be conducted
only by British troops, while operations in Indochina should,
with British support, be conducted by French troops.
FORVICTORY
BUY
UNITED
STATES
parents
BONDS
AND
STAMPS
RESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
November 15, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Indochina and Southeast Asia
As agreed in our conversation on November 10, I am
enclosing suggested letters for your signature to the
Secretaries of War and Navy, Admiral Leahy, General
Donovan and Mr. Davis, on the subject of Indochina and
Southeast Asia. I feel that these letters will be helpful
in coordinating American policy in this area.
The Department, of course, will continue to carry
out the policies expressed in your memorandum of November 3,
and instructions are being sent to its appropriate missions
in the field. Because, however, the question of the French
Military Mission is primarily a military matter, the instruc-
tions in this respect will be confidential until instructions
to military officers in the Far East are issued through
military channels.
I am enclosing a memorandum on two additional
developments regarding Indochina which may be of interest
to you.
Enclosures:
1. Suggested letters to the
Secretaries of War and Navy,
Admiral Leahy, General Donovan
and Mr. Davis.
2. Memorandum regarding Indochina.
FORVICTORY
BUY
UNITED
STATES
BONDS
AND
STAMPS
3634
PSF: Indo- China folder 1-44
has
November 18, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
The President has signed the letters
addressed to the Director, Office of Strategic
Services, the Secretary of the Navy, the
Secretary of Mar, the Director of the Office
of War Information, and Admiral William D. Leahy,
in reference to Indochina, which you submitted
with your memorandum of November fifteenth.
They are herewith returned for
transmittal.
M.C. LATTA
Executive Clerk
hms
November 17, 1944
My dear General Donovent
The State Department has informed me, on the basis of a
telegram from the American Consulate hourdl at Colombo, that
a large French military mission has arrived in Ceylon and "has
received American approval and is now recognized openly and
officially" with the same status as the Dutch and Chinese Mis-
sions to the South East Asia Command. Continuing, the Con-
sulate reports that, although the South East Asia Command was
advised specifically by en "acquaint" order (from whom not indi-
oated) that only military, and not politionl, questions might
be. discussed with the French Mission, political questions are
in fact under discussion.
with regard to this matter, I wish to make it clear that
American approval must not be given to any French military
mission being accredited to the South Rest Asia Commands and
that no officer of this Government, military or civilian, may
make decisions on political questions with the French military
mission or with anyone clse.
I would like further to have it made clear that this
Government has made no final decisions on the future of Indo-
china, and that se expect to be consulted in advance with pe-
gard to any arrangements applicable to the future of Southeast
Asia.
Sincerely yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
Brigadier General William J. Donovan,
Director,
Office of Strategic Services.
November 17, 1944
My dear Mr. Secretary:
The State Department has informed me, on the basis of a
tolegram from the American Consulate
at Colombo, that
a large French military mission has arrived in Ceylon and "Has
received American approval and is now recognised openly and
officially" with the same status as the Dutch and Chinese Mis-
sions to the South East Asia Command. Continuing, the Con-
sulate reports that, although the South East Asia Command was
advised specifically by an "acquaint" order (from whom not indi-
onted) that only military, and not political, questions might
be discussed with the French Mission, political questions are
in fact under discussion.
With regard to this matter, I wish to make it clear that
American approval must not be given to any French military
mission being accredited to the South East Asia Commands and
that no officer of this Government, military or civilian, may
make decisions on political questions with the French military
mission or with anyone clse.
I would like further to have it made clear that this
Government has made no final decisions on the future of Indo-
china, and that we expect to be consulted in advance with 10"
gard to any arrangements applicable to the future of Southeast
Asia.
Sincerely yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
The Honorable
James Vs Forrestal,
Secretary of the Navy.
November 17, 1944
My dear Mr. Secretary:
The State Department has informed me, on the basis of a
telegram from the American Consulate General at Colombo, that
a large French military mission has arrived in Ceylon and "has
received American approval and is now recognized openly and
officially" with the same status as the Dutch and Chinese Mis-
sions to the South East Asie Command. Continuing, the Com-
sulate reports that, although the South East Asia Command was
advised specifically by an "soquaint" order (from whom not indi-
oated) that only military, and not political, questions night
be discussed with the French Mission, political questions are in
fact under disoussion.
With regard to this matter, I wish to nake it olear that
American approval must not be given to any French military
mission being accredited to the South East Asia Command: and
that no officer of this Government, military or civilian, may
make decisions on political questions with the French military
mission or with anyone else.
I would like further to have it made clear that this Govern-
ment has made no final decisions on the future of Indochina, and
that we expect to be consulted in advance with regard to any are
rangements applicable to the future of Southeast Asia.
Sincerely yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
The Honorable
Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of Mar.
November 17, 1944
My dear Mr. Davis:
The State Department has informed no, on the basis
of a telegram from the American Consulate at Colombo,
that a large French military mission has arrived in
Ceylon and "has received American approval and is now
recognized openly and officially" with the same status
as the Dutch and Chinese Missions to the South East Asia
Command. Continuing, the Consulate reports that, al-
though the South East Asia Command was advised
specifically by an "acquaint" order (from whom not
indicated) that only military, and not political, questions
might be discussed with the French Mission, political ques-
tions are in fact under discussion.
With regard to this matter, I wish to make it
clear that American approval must not be given to any
French military mission being accredited to the South
East Asia Command; and that no officer of this Govern-
ment, military or civilian, may make decisions on
political questions with the French military mission
or with anyone else.
I would like further to have it made clear that
this Government has made no final decisions on the
future of Indochina, and that we expect to be consulted
in advance with regard to any arrangements applicable
to the future of Southeast Asia.
Sincerely yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
Mr. Elmer Davis,
Director,
Office of War Information,
Washington, D. C.
November 17, 1944
My dear Admiral Leahys
The State Department has informed me, on the basis of a
telegram from the American Consulate General at Colombo, that
a large French military mission has arrived in Ceylon and "has
received American approval and is now recognized openly end
officially" with the same status as the Dutch and Chinese Mis-
sions to the South East Asia Command. Continuing, the Con-
sulate reports that, although the South Rast Asia Command was
advised specifically by an "acquaint" order (from whom not indi-
cated) that only military, and not political, questions might
be discussed with the French Mission, political questions are
in fact under discussion.
With regard to this matter, I wish to make it clear that
American approval must not be given to any French military
mission being accredited to the South East Asia Commands and
that no officer of this Government, military or civilian, may
make decisions on political questions with the French military
mission or with anyone else.
I would like further to have it made clear that this
Government has made no final decisions on the future of Indo-
china, and that we expect to be consulted in advance with re-
gard to any arrangements applicable to the future of Southeast
Asia.
Sincerely yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
Admiral William D. Leahy,
Chief of Staff to the Commander-
in-Chief of the Army and Havy,
The White House.
PSF: Indo-China
fale THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON OF THE NAVY
18 November 1944
My dear Mr. President:
I have your letter of November 17
referring to the French military mission to the
Southeast Asia Command.
Please be assured that the instructions
in your letter will be followed by the Navy.
Sincerely yours,
James tonestal
The President
The White House
PSF: Indochina
COPY
BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON 8, D.C.
23rd November, 1944
SECRET
3304
My dear Ed:
I send you herewith an Aide-Memoire concerning
proposals for the use of the French in pre-operational
activities in Indo-China.
This is a matter which Mountbatten and all of us
have very much at heart. Until we have the all-clear
from your side he cannot effectively carry out sabotage
etc. activities which he is satisfied should contribute
very considerably to his task.
You will see that the matter is urgent and I would
be grateful if you could let us have a very early reply.
HALIFAX
The Honourable
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.
DECLASSIFIED By Authority of British
Don't telegram, 1-12-72
By Is Date FEB 10 1972
COPY
AIDE MEMOIRE
Et
1. In August last His Majesty's Government invited
the concurrence of the United States Government in the
following proposals:
(1) The establishment of a French military mission
with the South East Asia Command. This would facilitate
the work of the Secret Operations Executive and of the
Office of Strategic Services and would serve 8.8 the
nucleus of the operational headquarters which may be
required later. The function of the mission would be
primarily to deal with matters concerning French Indo
China and it would not participate in questions of general
strategy. It would, therefore, be much on the same basis
as the Dutch and Chinese missions attached to the
South East Asia Command.
(2) The establishment in India of a "Corps Leger
d'Intervention" composed at the start of 500 men and
designed to operate exclusively in Indo China on
Japanese lines of communication. The activities of this
body would correspond to those of the American and British
Secret Operational organizations and its establishment could
be without pre judice to the wider question of from what
sources French forces participating in the Far East should
be equipped.
(3) French participation in the planning of political
warfare in the Far East. This would be a matter for arrange-
ment between the South East Asia Command and the French
Military Mission.
2. The United States Chiefs of Staff, from a mili-
tary point of view concurred with these proposals except
that they believed that French participation in the planning
of political warfare should be restricted to the area of
the South East Asia Command. No further action could be
taken by them in this matter as it was understood that
the President had expressed the desire first to discuss
the question of French Indo China orally with the Prime
Minister.
3. The United States Chiefs of Staff took occasion
to point out that in their view, French Indo China was
part, not of South East Asia Command, but of the China
By DECLASSIFIED Authority of British
Theatre
Snit tilegram 1-12-72
By Js
FEB 10 1972
Date
-2-
Theatre and was an American sphere of strategic respon-
sibility. They recognized that an oral understanding had
been come to between Admiral Mountbatten and the
Generalissimo by which both Commanders would be free to
attack Thailand and French Indo China, and boundaries
between the two Theatres would be decided at an appro-
priate time in the light of progress made by the two
forces.
4. This agreement was recognized by the Generalissimo
after Sextant as applying to pre-operational activities.
It has however never been formally confirmed by the Combined
Chiefs of Staff.
5. No further steps could be taken in obtaining the
necessary approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to
the proposals outlined in paragraph 1 of this aide memoire
until the President and the Prime Minister had had an oppor-
tunity to discuss them. It was anticipated that this
discussion would take place at the Quebec Conference, but in
fact the subject was never raised. Consequently no fur-
ther progress has been made in this matter which is becom-
ing increasingly urgent.
6. Admiral Mountbatten is strongly of the opinion
that useful and important work on irregular lines could
immediately be done in French Indo China. The French
Army and Civil Service are unquestionably anxious to take
part in the liberation of the country from the Japanese
and constitute virtually a well-organized and ready-made
Maquis. The secret organizations operating from South
East Asia Command have made contact with these elements and
are now in regular communication with them. All that is
necessary to exploit the situation is the presence in
South East Asia Command of the necessary French personnel
from whom alone the French in French Indo China will take
the direction necessary to produce the action required.
7. Admiral Mountbatten has pointed out that French
Indo China constitutes an area of vital importance to the
operation of his Command since it lies on the Japanese
land and air reinforcement route to Burma and Malaya.
Irregular activities therefore on the lines envisaged in
the proposals which are the subject of this aide memoire
are for him a matter of urgency.
8. His Majesty's Government, therefore, earnestly
hope that the United States Government will concur as
to the desirability and urgency of pushing on with the
irregular operations outlined above and will take such
action
-3-
action as will make possible the issue of a directive by
the Combined Chiefs of Staff
(a) confirming the oral understanding already
existing between the Generalissimo and
Admiral Mountbatten, and
(b) approving the program set out in the
opening paragraph of this aide memoire.
Such action would in no way prejudice the question
of the ultimate settlement of the boundary between the
China Theatre and the South East Asia Command, which, by
the agreement between Admiral Mountbatten and the
Generalissimo, is at present left open, nor the wider
question of the participation of regular French armed
forces in the Far Eastern War.
BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
22nd November, 1944
PSF: Inso-China frea 1-45
OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION
WASHINGTON
November 23, 1944
The President
The White House
Dear Mr. President:
Pursuant to the in-
structions in your letter of
November 17, we have advised
our staff in the theater of
the South East Asia Command
that they are not to undertake
discussion of political ques-
tions with the French Mission.
Very respectfully,
Elmertians
Elmer Davis
Director
SECRET
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
Franklin D. Recsevelt Library
TOP SECRET
CLASSIFIED
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON
DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
2-19-70
November 24,
1942.
Mignature- Nal
My dear Mr. President:
Your letter of November 17th advising me of the arrival of
a French Military Mission with the South East Asia Command and giving
me your wishes in regard to our policy toward Indo-China has been
received.
Upon investigating the matter, I find that the proposal for
sending & French Military Mission to the South East Asia Command
originated with the French, who submitted it to the British Chiefs of
Staff who, in turn, forwarded the proposal to our U. S. Chiefs of
Staff, leading to action by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. I am
informed that the British proposal was sent to you on August 26, 1944,
by the State Department. After some modification of the British
proposal, our Joint Chiefs of Staff gave their approval, and on the
29th of August so notified the State Department. On the following day
the Joint Chiefs of Staff notified the Combined Chiefs of Staff of
their concurrence and the Combined Chiefs thereupon approved the action
of sending a Military Mission accredited to the South East Asia Command
(a British headquarters), restricting the planning of the Mission in
regard to political warfare to the area of that Command. I also learned
that at the SEXTANT Conference matters respecting the boundaries of the
South East Asia Command and the political policy affecting French
Indo-China were discussed.
TOP_SECRET
Tanklin D. Roosevelt Library
OFFICE
DECLASSIFIED
CLUNET
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
- 2 -
Date- 2-19-70
Signature- gral
From the above facts, it is apparent that through the
Joint Chiefs of Staff American approval was given to the sending
of a French Military Mission to the South East Asia Command. Any
withdrawal of such approval at this time, I imagine, would produce
substantial repercussions, particularly since the Chinese and other
Missions are already attached to that headquarters.
In accordance with your wishes, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
to whom I have referred the contents of your letter, have instructed
General Sultan, General Wedemeyer and General Wheeler that no officer,
military or civilian, shall make any decisions on political questions
with either this French Mission or anyone else; and the same officers
have also been advised that this Government expects to be consulted
in advance in connection with any plans applicable to the future of
South East Asia.
As you will see, this matter was never before the War
Department as such for approval. It was for the purpose of avoiding
such results, as shown above, that I have always insisted that
communications to the Joint Chiefs of Staff - other than those from
the President himself on military matters, but including all those
from other departments and agencies of government - should go through
CLOREI
TOP SEORLY
- 3 -
the Secretaries of War and Navy. Otherwise I foresee that the
reasons of our ancestors for having civilian heads to our military
establishments will be eventually frustrated, with results not in
accord with our national traditions or interests.
Faithfully yours,
They L Struson
Secretary of War.
The President
The White House.
Hruna. i. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
000 UIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 2-19-70
Signature- groe
CERDET
TOT JLUINT
T 420
Indo. China frean 1-44
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 24, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.
It should be called to the
attention of our British friends that
Mr. Churchill and I did not officially
recognize the French Military Mission
at SEAC and furthermore, I have made
no agreement, definite or otherwise,
with the British, French or Dutch to
retain their Far Eastern Colonial
possessions.
F.D.R.
Transmitting original of attached memorandum
with enclosures, which are noted.
November 20, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: British, French and Dutch Colonial Policy
in the Far East
In connection with our recent conversation con-
cerning British, French and Dutch intentions in regard
to their Far Eastern colonial possessions, I think you
will be interested in the enclosed telegrams on this
subject from our Consulate in Colombo and our Embassy
in Chungking. As you will note, Colombo reports that
Mountbatten informed his staff that the French military
mission at SEAC was recognized officially on the basis
of a verbal agreement between you and Mr. Churchill.
Chungking transmits the views of General Wedemayer to
the effect that the British, French and Dutch Govern-
ments have reached a definite agreement to retain their
Far Eastern colonial possessions and even to expand
their political and economic interests in that area.
Enclosures:
1. Copy of telegram
no. 338 from Colombo,
November 18, 1944.
2. Copy of telegram
no. 1853 from Chungking,
November 17, 1944.
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date
FEB 10 1972
T-442
PSF: Shdo. China folder 1-44
,
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 27, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEAHY:
TO DO THE NECESSARY.
F.D.R.
My dear Mr. President:
Your letter of November 17th advising me of the arrival of
a French Military Mission with the South East Asia Command and giving
me your wishes in regard to our policy toward Indo-China has been
received.
Upon investigating the matter, I find that the proposal for
sending a French Military Mission to the South East Asia Command
originated with the French, who submitted it to the British Chiefs of
Staff who, in turn, forwarded the proposal to our U. S. Chiefs of
Staff, leading to action by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. I an
informed that the British proposal was sent to you on August 26, 1944,
by the State Department. After some modification of the British
proposal, our Joint Chiefs of Staff gave their approval, and on the
29th of August so notified the State Department. On the following day
the Joint Chiefs of Staff notified the Combined Chiefs of Staff of
their concurrence and the Combined Chiefs thereupon approved the action
of sending & Military Mission accredited to the South Fest Asia Coumand
(a British headquarters), restricting the planning of the Mission in
regard to political warfare to the area of that Command. I also learned
that at the SEXTANT Conference matters respecting the boundaries of the
South East Asia Command and the political policy affecting French
Indo-China were discussed.
Franklin D. Roceevelt Library
TOD GEODET
CLASSIFIED
for OLONET
vili. 5200.9 (9/27/59)
- 2 -
Date- 21-19-70
Signature- ND
From the above facts, it is apparent that through the
Joint Chiefs of Staff American approval was given to the sending
of a French Military Mission to the South East Asie Command. Any
withdrawal of such approval at this time, I imagine, would produce
substantial repercussions, particularly since the Chinese and other
Missions are already attached to that headquarters.
In accordance with your wishes, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
to whom I have referred the contents of your letter, have instructed
General Sultan, General Wedemeyer and General Wheeler that no officer,
military or civilian, shall make any decisions on political questions
with either this French Mission or anyone else; and the same officers
have also been advised that this Government expects to be consulted
in advance in connection with any plans applicable to the future of
South East Asia.
As you will see, this matter was never before the War
Department as such for approval. It was for the purpose of avoiding
such results, as shown above, that I have always insisted that
communications to the Joint Chiefs of Staff - - other than those from
the President himself on military matters, but including all those
from other departments and agencies of government - should go through
for SLORET
TAB SECRET
TOT OLUNET
- 3 -
the Secretaries of War and Navy. Otherwise I foresee that the
reasons of our ancestors for having civilian heads to our military
establishments will be eventually frustrated, with results not in
accord with our national traditions or interests.
Faithfully yours,
5/Henry L.Stimen
Secretary of Ear.
The President
The White House.
Irans Roosevelt Library
OPCLASSIFIED
if DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/59)
-to- 2-19-70
signature- MD
TAB SECRET
TOI SEORLY
Indo. China folder 1.44
GEOREI
filen
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
December 1, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Future of Southeast Asia
I believe you will be interested, in the light
of reports we have previously received alleging an
Anglo-Dutch-French understanding on the future of
colonial possessions in Southeast Asia, in the en-
closed telegram from Schoenfeld describing a con-
versation with the Netherlands Foreign Minister who
denies categorically that any such understanding
exists.
Enclosure:
Copy of telegram from London,
Neter series no. 39,
November 27, 1944.
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
FEB 10 1972
By J. Schauble Date
DÉPARTMENT
INCOMING
DIVISION OF
OF
COMMUNICATIONS
STATE
TELEGRAM
AND RECORDS
FMH-1094
London
This telegram must bE
clostly paraphrased bE-
Dated November 27, 1944
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SECHEP)
Rec'd 10:12 p.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
NETER 39, November 27, 8 p.m.
FROM SCHOENFELD
In course of a conversation on November 24, I
mentioned to Dr. Val Kleffens the reports reaching
washington indicating that the British and the Dutch
might have reached a common understanding regarding
Economic, political and security aspects of the
future of south East Asia and that the French might
also bE included (your 12, November 21). HE said
there was no truth in these reports.
Van Kleffens then digressed to say that the
Belgians and the French had sought before Dumbarton
Oaks to have talks with him about a regional security
arrangement in western Europe. HE had told them hE
would not enter upon such discussions without first
talking with the British. Eden had taken the position
that the British could not Enter upon such talks before
the washington
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 10 1972
-2-
#NETER 39, November 27, 8 p.m. from London
the Washington talks on a world security organization.
Van Kleffens went on to say that just as hE would
not talk about a regiohal security arrangement in
western Europe with the Belgians and the French with-
out the British or for that matter with the British
and the French without the Belgians so hE would not
talk with the British and the French about the security
aspects of south east Asia without talking to United
States nor talk to United States without also talking
to the British and the French. There were, hE said,
no political or security or Economic understandings
between the Dutch and the British and the French
regarding south Asia.
HE could tell mE, however, that a French general
some time ago had approsched a Dutch military person
with such an idea. The latter had brought the matter
to the attention of Dr. Van Kleffens who had requested
M. DE Jean the French Minister to call and had asked
him how a French general could take up a matter which
was so essentially political. HE had added that if
the French Government wanted to discuss such a matter
presumably it would not take it up in that way. HE
thereupon turned over to M DE Jean the French General's
"paper" and had since heard no more about the matter.
Repeated to Paris.
WINANT
MJF
PSF: Indo China focaer,-44
files
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
Becember
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: British Proposals Involving French
Plans with Regard to Indo-China.
I am enclosing for your information a copy of an
aide memoire from the British Embassy dated November 22
again seeking the concurrence of this Government in a
number of proposals involving French participation in
certain military plans and operations in the Far East
looking toward the liberation of Indo-China.
I am also enclosing a suggested reply which has
been prepared in the light of your memorandum of Novem-
ber 3, 1944 and previous instructions on the subject.
With regard to the British request for confirma-
tion of the reported oral understanding between
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Lord Mountbatten
concerning the boundaries between their two theatres,
we propose to inform the British that this is a matter
on which decision should be left to the appropriate
military authorities.
Copies of the British aide memoire and of my pro-
posed reply are being transmitted to the Secretary of
War and the Secretary of the Navy with the suggestion
that they make known observations which they
may have on the proposed
Enclosures:
1. From British
November 22,
Date
2. Proposed reply.
By
PSFi Indo-China China
AIDE MEMOIRE
The British Embassy's aide memoire of November 22,
1944 has been referred to the President. The State
Department is authorized to make the following reply.
In the aide memoire left by Lord Halifax with the Department
of State on August 26, reference was made to a French request
for British approval of:
(a) Sending B. French military mission to be attached
to S.E.A.C. headquarters;
(b) Sending to India 8. light intervention force
for later use in Indo-China;
(c) Sending, later on, a French expeditionary force
to participate in the liberation of Indo-China;
(d) Participation by the French in planning the
war against Japan;
(e) Participation by the French in planning
political warfare in the Far East.
In this aide memoire there was expressed on behalf
of the British Government: disapproval 88 to proposal
(d), approval of proposal (c), but only "in the later
stages of the war and on the understanding that they are
made up of good and experienced fighting men"; approval
of
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-71
FEB 10 1972
By J. Schauble Date
-2-
of proposal (e) "in areas in which the French are interested",
this to "be a matter for arrangement between the SEAC and
the French Military Mission"; and approval of proposals
(a) and (b). American concurrence on these last two was
requested if possible in time to advise Monsieur Massigli
before he should leave London on August 29.
As indicated in the Embassy's aide memoire of
November 22, no formal reply was made to this request as
it was expected that the entire matter would be discussed
and a decision reached by the President and the Prime
Minister at the Quebec conference. No such decision, how-
ever, was made.
This Government, meanwhile, has given serious consi-
deration to the French requests referred to in the Embassy's
aide memoire of August 25, and again in the Embassy's
aide memoire of November 22. It concurs fully with the
British Government that the French should not participate
in planning the war against Japan; it feels that no plans
should now be made for a French expeditionary force to
participate in the liberation of Indo-China; and it has
reached
6
-3-
reached the conclusion that American approval cannot
be given at this time to the accrediting of a French
Military Mission to the S.E.A.C.
In particular, it does not believe that pending final
decisions on the future of Indo-China, such a Mission
should participate in the planning of political warfare in
the Far East where French interests center primarily in
Indo-China.
Reports, which would appear reliable, have recently
been received by this Government that a French Military
Mission under General Blaizot has arrived in Kandy, that
such Mission has been accorded by Admiral Mountbatten
official recognition and approval and the same status as
the Chinese and Dutch Missions accredited to the South
East Asia Command, and that discussions are proceeding be-
tween officers of the South East Asia Command and the
French Mission. Reports have also been received that two
thousand French troops have arrived in India and the French
are recruiting and training personnel in metropolitan
France with the hope of increasing this group ultimately
to
-4-
to about two divisions.
This Government is surprised by these reports,
which would imply that the British Government has already
given approval to the French Military Mission without the
concurrent approval of this Government.
Finally, the British aide memoire of November 22
expresses the earnest hope that this Government will con-
cur in taking such action as will make possible the issue
of a directive by the Combined Chiefs of Staff confirm-
ing that the oral understanding said to exist between
Admiral Mountbatten and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek
concerning the boundaries between their two theaters
should be applicable to preoperational activities. It
is felt that in view of the military considerations
involved decision in regard to this question should be
left to the appropriate military authorities.
Department of State,
Washington,
740.0011 P.W./8-2544
Indo Indo.Cherea China folder 1-44
file CEODE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
December 26, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: United States Policy toward Indochina
The enclosed cable from London describes an
informal inquiry from the British Foreign Office
in regard to our policy toward Indochina.
Enclosure:
Copy of telegram
no. 11368 from London,
December 22, 1944.
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 10 19/2
DEPARTMENT
INCOMING
DIVISION OF
OF
COMMUNICATIONS
STATE
TELEGRAM
AND RECORDS
n
DCG-547
London
This tologram must be
closcly paraphrased bo-
Dated Docember 22, 1944
foro being communicated
to anyone. (
Roc'd 5:30 p.m.
Socrotary of State,
Washington.
11368, December 22, 3 p.m.
During the course of conversation on December 21
with an officer of the Embassy, the head of the Far
Eastern Department of the FOROF referred
to the request made by the British in August for American
approval of a French Hilitary Mission to be despatched
to tho Southenst Asia Command and expressed some concern
at the fact that the Unitod States Government policy on
Indo China had apparently not yet been determined.
Bonnett stated that it was folt that the French
Provisional Government was constantly strengthoning its
position in world affairs and that it would be difficult
to dony them participation in the reconquest of Indo
China. He expressed the fear that ns events wore
progressing in the For East, circumstancos might at any
timo arise in connection with Indo China which would
place the United States and United Kingdom Governments
in an
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
FEB 10 1972
By J. Schooble Date
-2-311368, December 22, 3 p.m. from London.
in an awkward predicament if the policy to be pursued
toward Indo China had not been previously agreed upon.
Bennott WAS not talking officially but was only
expressing his personal vicws. However, it is bolieved
that the views expressed by him are thos e generally held
in the FOROF.
WINANT
WTD
Stettinius memorandum printed in Foreign Relations
of the United States, 1944, volume 3, pp. 783-784.
Indo- China folder
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 1, 1945.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
I still do not want to get
mixed up in any Indóchina decision.
It is a matter for post-war.
By the same token, I do not
want to get mixed up in any military
effort toward the liberation of
Indochina from the Japanese.
You can tell Halifax that I
made this very clear to Mr.
Churchill. From both the military
and civil point of view, action
at this time is premature.
F. D. R.
PSF: Indo China
fat
SECREE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
December 27, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Indochina
With reference to the British aide-memoire of
November 22, requesting approval of the French Military
Mission to the Southeast Asia Command and French mili-
tary participation in the liberation of Indochina, a
proposed reply to which was sent to you with a memo-
randum on December 11, the British are obviously per-
turbed about the situation.
On December 8 Lord Halifax called at his re-
quest and stressed to me the importance of a prompt
reply.
Ambassador Winant has now reported that Mr. Bennett,
head of the Far Eastern Department in the British Foreign
Office, has expressed his concern that the United States
apparently has not yet determined upon its policy
towards Indochina. Mr. Bennett stated that it would
be difficult to deny French participation in the libera-
tion of Indochina in light of the increasing strength
of the French Government in world affairs, and that
unless a policy to be followed toward Indochina is
mutually agreed between our two Governments, circum-
stances may arise at any moment which will place our
two Governments in a very awkward situation. Although
Mr. Bennett was expressing his personal views only,
Mr. Winant stated his belief that the Foreign Office
generally share those views.
In a conversation yesterday Lord Halifax again re-
ferred to the importance which his Government attaches
to a prompt decision on the questions raised in his
DECLASSIFEDAide-memoire.
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 10 1972
Indo. China CERTET folder 1-45
file
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
January 10, 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: American Participation in
Southeast Asia Command
The enclosed telegram from Bishop, our Political
Representative with the SEAC, sets forth some of the
political and strategic considerations which he believes
should be taken into account in reaching a decision as
to whether to increase, to decrease, or to maintain at
its present level United States participation in the
Southeast Asia Command.
Enclosure:
Copy of telegram
no. 9 from Colombo,
January 9, 1945.
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
FEB 10 1972
By J. Schauble Date
DEPARTMENT
INCOMING
DIVISION OF
OF
COMMUNICATIONS
STATE
TELEGRAM
AND RECORDS
GEM-1026
Colombo
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be
Dated January 9, 1945
fore being communicated
to anyone.
Ree'd 11:42 a.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
U.S. URGENT
9, January 9, 5 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO )
FOR SECRETARY AND
SECRET FOR
UNDERSECRET.RY
With accomplishment of recapture of Burma Road
and securing of its defence which may be reasonably
expected within one month, question of American
participation in Southeast Asia Command will require
consideration and decision, perhaps at highest level.
Militarily it will be necessary to decide upon mission
to be assigned to United States forces in this theatre.
It is possible that that mission may be limited to
operation of Burma Road and all necessary functions
for movement of supplies to our forces in China. In
that event all forces and equipment not needed to per-
form supply mission would be available for transfor
elsewhere, prosumably China, and primary military
interest of United States would be directed to areas
north and
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Scheuble Date
FEB 10 1972
-2-#9, January 9, 5 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from
Colombo.
north and east of a line running roughly from
Philippines to Burma Road.
(If situation in China wore to detoriorate to
point where evacuation of Amorican forces from China
were required, our forces in this aroa would also be
called upon as part of their mission to facilitato
withdrawal from China).
If shortage of such stratogic materials as rubbor
becomes sufficiontly ncute, it might be necessary to
direct Unitod States military offort toward areas south
of above line.
War Department is actively considering those
questions and perhaps has alroady approached the Depart-
ment for decisions on political aspects of problems
invclved. Political considerations will shortly out-
weigh strategic factors in American participation in
this theatro under a supreme allied command.
Apparently British desire to incroase American
participation in SEAC (my tologram No. 1, January 3)
and to augment American personnel. An Amorican Colonel
from SEAC has recontly returned homo reportedly on a
mission to obtain additional Amorican personnel for
SEAC staff.
BISHOP
WFS
EPARTMENT
INCOMING
DIVISION OF
OF
COMMUNICATIONS
STATE
TELEGRAM
AND RECORDS
CC-1315
Columbo
This telegram must bE
clostly paraphrased be-
Dated January 9, 1945
fore being communicated
to anyone.
REc'd 6:36 a.m. 10th
Secretary of State,
Washington.
IMPORTANT
9, January 9, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO)
At least three courses would SEEM to bE open to United
States: (1) to limit activities of United States forces
in this theater toca supply mission in India Burma and
to present activities of United States side of SEAC.
(2) To withdraw from participation in SEAC and to
leave Southeast Asia to British and other Allies but to
continue supply functions of India-Burma.
(3) To increase American participation in SEAC and to
acquiesce in apparant British desire for a fully intergrate
Allied command in all its phases.
It seems most likely that British land and air Effort
against Japan will bE concentrated under SEAC. To assure
(1) that British effort renders maximum assistance to our
own Efforts in the Pacific and China (2) that our policies
toward Thailand, Indochina and Southeast Asia are not
prejudiced and (3) that whatever American assistance is
DECLASSIFIED
given SEAC,
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 10 1972
-2-49, January 9, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Columbo
given SEAC, whether material or personnel, is utilized
in C. manner to promote American national interests, it
would SEEM highly desirable to maintain at SEAC a strong
American military staff fully conversant with American
high policy EVEN though all American combat forces are
transferred from SEAC.
Decisions which will bE reached on these questions
are of Extreme importance, and I hope that I may bE
kept fully informed of Department's views as they are
formulated to enable ME to carry out my duties C.S
political adviser to General Sultan.
END OF MESSAGE
BISHOP
WSB
Indo China fran
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
January 16, 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Reports of Angle-Franco-Dutch
Understanding Concerning Southeast Asia
The head of the Far Eastern Department of the
British Foreign Office recently gave our Embassy in
London informal assurances that there is no basis for
the reports which have been widely circulated to the
effect that the British, Dutch and French have reached
some common understanding regarding the future of
Southeast Asia. The Foreign Office stated that there
are no conversations on this subject going on at present
and that none have taken place in the past of which the
United States Government has not been kept fully informed.
The Foreign Office pointed out that as the war in the
Far East progresses it may be necessary from time to
time for the British to make special agreements with
the Dutch or the French on civil affairs or economic
matters but that any such agreements would only be
made with the full knowledge of the United States Govern-
ment.
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. etter, 1-11-72
By J. Scheuble Date
EEB 10 1972
Indo. China freder 1-45
supple
file
confidential
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
January 19, 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Indochina
The Department has received the following estimate
of the present British point of view about Indochina,
sent from Kandy on January 4, 1945. As the source of
this estimate was Mr. Dening, the Foreign Office offi-
cial who is Chief Political Adviser under SEAC, I feel
that it is of sufficient importance to transmit to you
for your information.
In this estimate it is stated that:
"As a result of his verbal agreement with
the Generalissimo at Cairo the Supreme Com-
mander still considers that the status of Indo-
china is as it was in the days of the ABCD
Agreement, namely that Indochina and Thailand
are free-for-all areas open to whichever allied
military force gets there first. The reason
for this is that when it was proposed to the
Generalissimo that French Indochina be included
in the SEAC theater he objected because of the
loss of face involved and the alternative sug-
gested by SAC Supreme Allied Commander7, and
agreed to by the Generalissimo, was that the
decision of the Combined Chiefs that Thailand
was in SEAC theater should not be released to
the public and that both countries would be
considered on a free-for-all basis."
Mr. Dening also expressed the view that, as in Thai-
land, in Indochina the domestic dislocation resulting
from
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
FEB 10 1972
By J. Scheuble Date
SECRET
-2-
from the occupation would presumably be at a minimum and
that there would be little need for military government
and again, as with Thailand, Indochina should be governed
by an Allied Control Commission.
The report states also that the only recent considera-
tion of French activity in the SEAC theater has arisen
from a French request to set up a radio broadcasting
propaganda station at Pondichery. The SEAC division of
information and civil affairs is apparently reluctant to
give this permission because of American non-recognition
and has suggested that the propaganda campaign be put on
from Radio Paris. A joint SEAC-French leaflet campaign
for Indochina is, however, at present under consideration.
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72 FEB 10 1972
By J. Schauble Date
leave
Indo. Chica freder
yes- FDIC.
SECRET
copy j Reld intialeste to
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
January 29, 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Air Transport Agreement with France-
Indochina
Reference is made to the Department's memorandum
of January 3, 1945 and to your reply of January 17,
regarding the air transport agreement with France,
photostatic copies of which are attached hereto for
convenience.
The Department is not sure whether your
January 17 memorandum refers to the air transport agree-
ment as a whole or merely to the route proposed through
Indochina. Will it be satisfactory to proceed now with
negotiations for the air transport agreement with France,
but without any reference to Indochina at this time?
Enclosures:
Acting Secretary
1. Memorandum for the
president, January 3, 1945.
2. Memorandum from the
President, January 17, 1945.
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
FEB 10 1972
By J. Scheuble Date
Indo. China folder
1-45
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 17, 1945.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
I think on this air transport
agreement it is not necessary to
take any stand until a little
later on.
F. D. R.
file
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
January 3, 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Air Transport Agreement with France - Indochina
An air transport agreement with France is being
drafted for presentation to the French authorities for
their consideration. It follows the standard form of
bilateral agreement adopted at the Chicago air confer-
ence, and includes an Annex stipulating that American
airlines are to be accorded rights of transit and non-
traffic stop in French territory, as well as the right
to take on and discharge international traffic at speci-
fic points.
The routes and ports of call specified in this
Annex are based on the U. S. international route pattern
as proposed by the Civil Aeronautics Board, in so far
as it applies to French territory. Included is a stop
at Hanoi in French Indochina in connection with the
proposed route across the Pacific to Hong Kong, and
thence across Indochina to India. There is also a
proposed trans-Pacific route with a segment connecting
Manila with Singapore and Batavia via Tarakan (Borneo).
It has been suggested that this route might go by -
Saigon instead of Tarakan, in which case Indochina again
would be involved.
Various agencies of the Government are anxious for
the Department to begin negotiations for an air transport
agreement with France as soon as practicable. Will you
inform me whether, in view of your memorandum of Novem-
ber 3 and previous instructions relating to Indochina,
you wish the proposed draft of this agreement to include
or to omit reference to any route which would include 8
stop in Indochina?
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
FEB 10 1972
By J. Scheuble Date
Indo- China folder 1-44"
4241
Carbon initialed "OK F.D.R." and returned to
SECRET
Acting Secretary Joseph C. Grew, 3/24/45, elb.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
March 22, 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Netherlands Participation in Planning
and Operations of the South East Asia
Command.
The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff have
referred to the Department of State the desire of the
Netherlands Government to train Netherlands staff
officers for future operations in Netherlands Indian
territory by having them study and take part in planning
and operations in all parts of the South East Asia
Command (SEAC). The Department of State preceives no
political objection to Netherlands participation in
SEAC except in so far as it may have a bearing on French
participation. Unless you have objection, we propose
to inform the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff that
there is no objection to their agreeing to the request
of the Netherlands Government.
Acting Secretary
DECLASSIFTED
State-
etter, 1-11-72
By J. Schemble Date FEB 10 1972
Indo-China fredn
1-45
DEPARTMENT
INCOMING
DIVISION OF
OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
STATE
TELEGRAM
TELEGRAPH SECTION
AMT-1821
file Colombo
This telegram must bE
clostly paraphrased bE-
Dated March 22, 1945
fore bEing communicated
to anyone. (SECRET)
Rec'd 12:11 p.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
74, March 22, 4 p.m.
SECRET FOR SECRETARY AND undersecretary
FROM BISHOP
"British Chiefs of Staff have wired Mountbatten that
General dE Saint Didier has requested Combined Chiefs of
Staff that Blaizot bE formally appointed as "the accredited
agent of the French Provisional Government to you."
Mountbatten also requested by British Chief of Staff to
increase "your present scale of air supply" of French
Indochina Especially to French at Moncay.
Mountbatten has replied offering to accept formal
accreditation of Blaizot to SEAC and requesting additional
facilities to increase air supply to Indochina.
Ranking American officers SEAC feel, and I concur,
that formal appointment Blaizot to SEAC will bE only first
step toward full French integration and participation in
SEAC."
GATEWOOD
DECLASSIFIED
RD
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
FEB 10 1972
By J. Schauble Date