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Diplomatic Correspondence
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PSF
Italy! Breckinridge Long
1933-36
PSF ihong
THE UNDER SECRETARY you OF STATE
WASHINGTON
July 31, 1933.
Dear Miss LeHand:
I have read the enclosed letter
from Ambassador Long and am returning it
to you, in accordance with your request.
Sincerely William yours,
Ruleit
Miss Marguerite LeHand,
The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:
towad return
THE accured
PSF Long
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
17-33
Personal
Rome, Italy
July 7, 1933.
My dear Frank:
There is one question more in the minds of Italy today than any other
question as far as its military and naval defenses are concerned, and that
is Albania and its policy toward that small country.
Not long since Baron Aloisi, who is the Chief of Cabinet and who is
Mussolini's personal man at the Foreign Office, talked to me on the subject
of Albania and the attitude of the American Minister there. Aloisi said that
the American Minister had taken a position antagonistic to the Italian policy
in Albania and that he was very much surprised, because he understood that
the United States and Italy were very much in accord. He spoke, no doubt,
at the direction of Mussolini and expressed, not in positive language but
in a very definite way, their ideas about the attitude of the American
Minister at Tirana and the manner in which he had opposed the policies of
Italy there.
I thought it sufficiently important to telegraph the Department, which
I did. I was surprised to receive a reply to the effect that messages of
that character should be sent by mail because of the expense. I was also
more surprised to receive another despatch commenting upon and replying to
my telegram and expressing their surprise that Baron Aloisi should have
discussed the question and indicating that nis remarks seemed importinent.
While I do not care to make an issue of the manner in which the
Department has received my telegram, I do think it is probably because
this Embassy has not in the past informed the Department of Italy's point
-2-
The President
July 7, 1933.
of view and policy in Albania and has failed to properly present the importance
which Italy attaches to Albania.
As it is such an important problem for Italy today and as it is part of
her foreign policy, I think it worth while for the Department to get the
proper point of view, and I am having the situation studied and will send
on a despatch as soon ns possible which will set out the whole thing and
display Italy's interest in Albania.
But as I understand your instructions, which guide my attitude toward
have been
the Italian Government and its foreign policy, I believe I would be justified
in making a recommendation to the State Department at the same time I sent
the despatch about Albania. I did not make a recommendation, but in order
that you may understand the situation at the earliest moment I take this
opportunity to give you the important facts.
In 1925 Italy entered into a treaty with Albania by virtue of which
Albania practically abandoned some of its sovereign rights and to all intents
and purposes became a sort of protectorate of Italy. Under the terms of the
treaty as I understand them, Italy has the right even over the objection of the
King and the government of Albania to send her army into that country to
restore domestic order. She had the right to direct its military operations
and to supervise Its army. She has the right to use certain harbors on the
Adriatic. For these privileges Italy guarantees something of the independence
of Albania and was to make to her certain contributions in money. There
were various other provisions.
Of course it was objected to as a point of policy by Jugoslavia and
she was joined by the other members of the Little Entente and by France
in trying to undermine the influence of Italy at the capital, Tirana.
-3-
The President
July 7, 1933.
These diplomatic activities took the form of criticism of Italy and condemnation
of certain of her activities and condolences to the King that he was being
badly treated and all that sort of thing. It was good policy on the part
of the Little Entente and on the part of Jugoslavia. Italy probably intended
to use Albania for a military base in operations in case of war against
Jugoslavia. That that was the original purpose seems to admit of no
reasonable doubt. Militory roads were built to the frontier; forts vere
built. The Albanian army was trained and was officered and the Italian
influence permeated the country.
Since that time it has seemed e! ther inexpedient or too expensive or
impractical 08 a policy. It may be that Italy felt that the continuing
military threat on the southern border of Jugoslavia was an irritation to
France. At any rate, Italy has now changed her policy to a large extent and
as regards the military. She has relinquished her control over the army
of Albania; has withdrawn her own troops and most or her officers. King Zog
has been antagonistic to Italy and has played an opposing policy, and Italy
has for two years declined to make the monetary payments which the arrange-
ment contemplated.
But her naval policy continues. To Italy Albania is much in the position
of any important country on the Caribbean is to our policy vis. a vis.
Panama. The Italians themselves speak of Albania as being similar to
Panama in our own world. They attach great importance to the necessity of
naval bases. The Straits of Otranto are only forty miles wide. Albania
is on the eastern side. Adequate harbors are there. There are no harbors
-4-
The President
July 7, 1933.
on the Italian side. If a French fleet should pass the Straits of Otranto,
Venice and Trieste and the whole of the Adristic world would be at their
mercy. Consequently Italy insists upon holding the harbors on the coast of
Albania to use them for defensive purposes against France. She stresses the
defensive nature of her intentions. And they could be nothing but defensive.
There is not there the possibility of an offensive movement against any
nation but Albania.
Mussolini sent to Albania Aloisi himself to make the treaty. He has
since had at Albania as Minister Sorana, who is practically the under-study
of Aloisi and his colleague at the Geneva Conference.
So that when the American Minister in Tirana apparently, or in the
Italian eyes, joined forces with the Ministers of the Little Entente and with
France--or in the Italian eye at least adopted the same diplomatic policy
and criticised the Italians and the Italian policy, he gave evidence of a
policy of the United States in opposition to Italy in her foreign policy and
in the matter of what she considers to be a necessary naval defense.
Either I have wrongly construed your instructions or the Department
of State is still continuing to look upon Albania as a separate and
independent kingdon and in possession of all its sovereign rights and powers,
when as a matter of fact it has surrendered some of them to Italy.
I think that we are entirely justified in playing the game with Italy
in Albania as far as her naval policy is concerned and assuming a position in
Albania which would be colorless. There is no necessity of our backing up
Italy there, but I do not see the necessity of opposing Italy there.
Particularly is that 30 when one appreciates the importance which Italy
-5-
The President
July 7, 1933.
attaches to her special position in that little country.
I reiterate that I do not want to make an issue of the matter, but I
do want to present the Italian political situation to your thought. AS
soon as I can arrange it, a despatch will be got ready to present the
whole picture to the Department, but when it is presented to the Department I
hope the matter will be considered in the point of view of Italian policy and
not from the point of view of Albanian policy and that it will be seen that
Italy's naval control of the shore of Albania is a very helpful element in
maintaining the sense of security in Europe. For with Italy deprived of
the possibility of a naval base near her own nerve center the sense of security
in Italy cannot be as strong. And if the sense of security in Italy is
lacking, there is just that additional handicap to the success which can be
attained by Mussolini in his efforts to maintain peace on the Continent of
Europe. It is a small thing, but it is important, and I hope that I have
not troubled you with too long a letter in bringing it to your attention.
With kinlest regards and best wishes,
Most respect fully,
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
PSF Long
August 14, 1933
MENO FOR HON. NORMAN H. DAVIS: x29
I think the onclosed will be of
real interest to you. Breck Long is, of
course, at one of the good listening posts.
Please let me have it back when you have
read it.
F. D. R.
mwd
/#
at
Letter to the Pres. from Breckenridge Long, Embassy at Rome, Italy, dated
7-17-33, re his conversation with Arthur Henderson of Great Britain of the
Disarmament Conference concerning the situation in Italy, etc.
404
PSF have
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Rome, Italy
20
July 17, 1933.
7-17-33
My dear Chief:
Arthur Henderson of Great Britain of the Disarmament Conference was
here Saturday to talk to the ⁴talian Government, and I had a long talk with
him. He had seen Mussolini twice, and he was definite in his statement that
Mussolini had told him that he would go along with him on the modifications
which he is proposing to the MacDonald Plan and that he would do everything
he could to help get the Germans into line. Henderson was very pleased
over the situation which exists in Italy but somewhat discouraged about
France, though he has hopes that France will agree. He has tried to get
the French to say any one definite thing. They talk about security and
the necessity for security and the need for armament and say that they will
give the minimum of disarmament for the minimum of security and the maximum
of disarmament for the maximum of security. But when asked directly to
name the minimum of disarmament they are evasive and non-committal. And
when requested to name the maximum of disarmament they are not responsive.
However, he thinks that his plan in modification of the MacDonald Plan,
and which substitutes a period of eight years for the five of the MacDonald
Plan and which divides the eight years into two of four each, c:an be worked
out so as to obtain the adherence of France. The French call the first
of the four-year periods the trial period. He says he prefers to call it
the period of transition, because then it does not reflect upon Germany.
During the first four years no actual steps in disarmament would be made
but the process would begin and the preparations be undertaken. During the
next four years disarmament would actually commence.
-3-
The President
July 17, 1933.
he had said to Sato that he had probably made a mistake and come to the
wrong Conference that this Conference was for disarmament.
He thinks that if you and England give the final push that France can
be made to agree. Personally I do not see how you can do anything special
to induce France, because you probably would not consider a guarantee of
any kind to go to the aid of France. Of course that is what France is
angling for. But she should not expect it and could not reasonably ask for
it for the very fact of disarmament is in itself a guarantee, particularly
when it is carried out under the strict supervision of an international
authority.
Henderson said that he had heard in London that Norman Davis might not
come back to Europe, but he said that if he was to come back he hoped that
he would come in September rather than in October to the meeting because
there was a lot of preparatory work to be done.
Henderson is quite antagonistic to MacDonald, and I understood from
his remarks that the MacDonald Plan was really Henderson's plan which Mac-
Donald had stolen. Of course they are bitter political enemies.
I also saw on Saturday Dr. T. V. Soong of China. He feels that Japan
has the ambition to absorb the whole of China and the maritime provinces
of Russia and with her position solidified there that she will then embark
on what he considers to be their definite ambition to dominate the world.
There is no doubt about the fact that that is the definite conception in
the mind of Soong. But he hopes to have the world allign itself against
Japan. He feels that some day the rest of the world will be forced to take
an attitude to stop Japan and her agression. He hopes it can be done by
diplomatic means and he trusts that Manchuria will be evacuated under
-4-
The President
July 17, 1933.
diplomatic pressure as was Shantung. But failing that, he looks to see
the rest of the world lined against Japan. He said that he had been talking
to the French and to the Italians and to the English. The French assured
him that they would at the proper time take their stand. He told me
definitely that Mussolini had told him that Italy would take its stand. He
said that the British did not commit themselves and had called the Japanese
trouble "an American problem" and said that they looked to us to stop Japan
because we had a large interest in the Pacific.
The London Conference has been, as you know, very unpopular in all the
capitals of Europe and a good many criticisms have been leveled against the
"merican policy. But I think the sober reaction is setting in and that
they see that the only sensible thing for America to do is just what you
are doing. As corroborative of that change in public opinion I talked the
other day to Tevfik Bey, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey on his
way back from the Conference. He said that he thought that you were entirely
right and fully justified from any point of view and that it would have been
not only impractical but unwise for you to interrupt the process of the
"experiment," as he expressed it, on which you are engaged in America and
that you could not be expected to make a commitment which would have inter-
fered with it. Present at the same time was Von Hassell, the German
Ambassador here and several others, and I was very glad to hear that
statement definitely made in public by one other than an American and by
one who had been in London and to the representatives of governments here
who have themselves been hostile toward your point of view.
The Italians themselves have been very mild and quiet as compared to
the others.
-5-
The President
July 17, 1933.
I am glad that Dodd has got to Germany, and I wonder if it wouldn't
be well sometime, with your permission, for he and I to meet in Switzerland
quietly somewhere over the week-end, not at Geneva and not at Berne, but
say at Lausanne or Vevey or some such innocuous place. I really think it
would help us each to a more cooperative understanding. I wrote that to
him and asked him to speak to you about it, but in his answer he mentioned
the probability of our meeting but didn't say if he had discussed it with
you.
I am sorry to write you at such length again, but I do feel that you
want me to tell you fully about some of these things.
With every good wish and with expressions of affectionate and respectful
regard, I am,
Maply Yours very sincerely,
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
COPY
PSF Long
Home, August 24, 1933.
No. 153.
Subject: Trade relations between Italy and Russia.
The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.
Sir:
In response to the Department's instruction No. 39
of July 19, 1933, I have the honor to enclose herewith
a study in the form of a memorandum of the trade relations
between Russia and Italy.
- Pre-War -
The statistics are lacking in 8. large extent on the
trade relations which existed between these two countries
before the outbreak of the war in 1914, during the war,
and for the period subsequent to the war up until 1924.
Consequently no comprehensive report can be made of trade
conditions between the year 1909, as requested by the
Department, and the year 1924.
Since
20p
or
-
- 2 -
Since that time, statistics have been kept and trade
relations have had some attention on the part of the political
authorities of the two countries and in the present study
these figures are presented and an analysis of them is submitted.
Prior to the World Var, trade between Italy and Russia
was on a perfectly natural basis, there being no reciprocal
arrangemente for purchases or sales, and no efforts organized
by the political authorities of the respective countries to
instigate either purchases or sales or to supplement the res-
pective needs of the people of the two countries in the form
of commodities.
During the war there was of course 8. cessation of all
ordinary intercourse.
- Post-War -
Subsequent to the war, Russia in its Bolshevik form was
not immediately recognized by any of the Governments of the
world. Italy and England were the first of the Governments
of the world to make arrangements for recognition of Russia,
and if the announcement in the House of Commons is taken as
the date of England's recognition then it must be considered
that Great Britain was the first Government to recognize the
Soviet authorities; but if the date of the documents according
recognition is considered as the basis of recognition, then
Italy is to be considered the first country to have recognized
the post-war regime in Russia.
- Political Relations -
However, no political treaty exists between the two Govern-
ments. There is now proposed a non-aggression treaty and it
is understood that it is about to be signed. It was requested
by
RTUCE
- 3 -
by Russia. Since Italy was the first Government or one of
the first to recognize the Soviet Government of Russia,
the authorities here have felt that Italy should not long
delay the signature of a non-aggression pact. In addition
to that fact, it seems to be part of the policy of Signor
Mussolini to negotiate treaties and to create situations
looking toward the maintenance of peace.
- Communism -
While there have been no major political issues be-
tween the two countries, the Fascist Government has always
ruthlessly suppressed manifestations of Communism in Italy
and for a time Communists were sentenced to jail in groups
of ten or twenty at a time. The Soviet Ambassador in Rome
never protested these arrests unless he was in his own mind
sure that the Italian authorities had made a mistake and in
such case he would intervene in behalf of a Communist even
though the person under charges was an Italian subject. The
question of propaganda has not arisen in Italy because of
the suppression of Communism. The authorities in Russia at
one time attempted to enter into an agreement with Italy for
an exchange of political prisoners. The Soviet authorities
formed a habit of arresting the Italians in Russia on charges
of "espionage" whenever Communists were arrested in Italy.
Consequently they created political prisoners whom they
attempted to exchange for the Communists arrested in Italy,
and they attempted to negotiate a treaty which would give
them the right to exchange Italians arrested in Russia for
alleged
- 4 -
alleged political offenses and in exchange for them secure
the freedom of Communists arrested by the Italian authorities.
But the Italian Government refused this suggestion and sub-
sequent to the refusal the arrest in Russia of Italians on
the charges of espionage ceased. Germany and Poland did
enter into agreements with the Soviet Government for an ex-
change of political prisoners and have had great difficulty
in their negotiations with Russia and over the arrest in
Russia of their citizens charged by the Russian authorities
with political offenses. Every time the German or Polish
Governments arrest a Communist, there is arrested in Russia
some German or Polish engineer who is placed in prison and
who suffers there until the formalities of exchange of pri-
soners is arranged.
Except for the difficulty which existed at the time of
the original arrests of Communists in Italy and the attempted
reprisals in Russia before Italy declined to enter into treaty
relations for the exchange of prisoners, there have been few,
if any, political relations between the two Governments.
- Trade Treaties -
As indicated above, the trade relations between Italy
and Russia before the war were of little importance, the
exports to Russia being of small volume and consisting largely
of hats and olive oil. During the war there were practically
no relations. However, since the war their relations have
been on an extremely different basis and the exports of Italy
have consisted largely of machinery, automobiles and electri-
cal equipment.
Mr.
- 5 -
- Confidential -
Mr. Quaroni, of the Italian Foreign Office and now in
charge of Russian Affairs in the Foreign office, is our
authority for the confidential statement that immediately
after the war Russian purchases in Italy were for cash and
their relations were on a very agreeable basis. However, in
1924 (when Russia was reorganized and when the Treaty of
Commerce and Navigation was concluded), Russian purchases
began to be made on credit and that change introduced a
less desirable feature into the commercial relations between
the two countries.
Since the credit feature was introduced into their re-
lations, the Soviet Government has been much more difficult
to deal with and in every transaction its inspectors in
Italy and its authorities at home seize on the smallest
flaw in order to delay proceedings. Consequently every trans-
action must be executed with great care in order to avoid
difficulties and orders must be completed with the most
painstaking exactitude to accord with the specifications.
It has been almost impossible to avoid difficulties in these
respects because the Soviet Government does not buy continu-
ally the same material. First it will place orders for
articles of one kind and after a short while will begin
giving orders for the manufacture of other things. The manu-
facturers of Italy have tried to urge the Soviets to initiate
the practice of placing orders for specific materials over a
period of years, and thus secure the benefits of lower prices,
uniform material and improved methods. But the Soviets have
failed
- 6 -
failed to follow that policy and seldom purchase the same
kind of goods for a long time. They also have a great
advantage when placing orders inasmuch as the Soviet is a
monopoly purchaser, dealing with a capitalist country 80
that it can easily resort to methods resulting in strong
competition between the sellers in Italy, frequently to
the disadvantage of the Italian manufacturer. (End of
confidential).
- Business Methods -
Italian business men occasionally go to Russia on com-
mercial matters but most of the transactions are completed
by dealing with the local representatives of the Soviet
Government in Italy because no special advantage results from
personal visits to the Russian markets. Russia maintains
in Italy a corps of inspectors who are regularly stationed
at industrial centers such as Milan, Genoa and Turin. These
inspectors are generally experienced engineers, electric,
mechanical, marine, etc., depending upon their trade assign-
ments. They have something of the status of commercial
attachés or trade commiseioners and are in direct contact
with their Embassy in Rome, either the military, naval or
other attachés depending upon the nature of the work in which
they are engaged and the destination of the material on con-
tract. In addition to their work as inspectors of material,
they function as valuable informers, particularly on techni-
cal matters. In this connection it may be pertinent to note
that the present Russian naval attaché has the rank of admiral
and is a specialized material inspector with an extensive en-
gineering experience.
- Russian
balk
botter
- 7 -
- Russian Commercial Representatives -
The Russian purchasing agent in Italy is not a corpora-
tion organized under the laws of Italy, nor does it function
as such or as an artificial person subject to the corporative
or partnership laws of Italy. When it first started to
operate an attempt was made by the local Fascist representa-
tives to cause it to conform but in a short while orders were
apparently received from the central authorities in Rome and
it was permitted to function as it began and as it has since
continued, which is rather as a Committee acting under specific
instructions from the central Soviet authorities, empowered by
it to bind them in contract and acting as a Committee represen-
ting the commercial power of the Soviet State.
This Committee of the Soviet state does not deal with
the Italian state but makes contracts with individual manu-
facturers in Italy. However, it coordinates with the Russian
Embassy in Rome and reports to it and, supposedly, in many
instances is guided by it. The Italian Government has no
dealings with the Committee as such, nor does it participate
in contracts with the Russian Government, but it is naturally
interested and probably encourages contracts between its sub-
jects and Russia, or at least some of those contracts, for
the reason that they assist in supporting and developing
Italian war industries, such as torpedoes, guns and fire con-
trol instruments, airplanes, submarines and vessels susceptible
of use for war purposes.
In each of the categories mentioned above there are
rights pertaining to the Italian Government as to the plans,
designs and specifications, and the consent of the Italian
Government
- 8 -
Government must be obtained prior to their manufacture for
contract, it is understood. It is further understood that
the Russian representatives have attempted to make contracts
for certain ships and to obtain the plans and specifications
from the Italian manufacturer, but that the Italian Government
has probably interfered and declined to give its consent.
The probable objective was to obtain a few completed specimens
and the plans and specifications and to have others manufactured
in Russia, using the Italian plans.
- Character of Commercial Relations -
Beginning with the year 1924, the trade relations between
Italy and Russia assumed a political phase. On February 7th
of that year the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was signed
and it went into effect on March 23rd of the same year and
will continue in force until it shall be denounced, according
to its terms.
On the whole, the commercial relations between Russia
and Italy are reported to have been quite satisfactory during
the period which began after the World War, the credit feature
being the only element which has detracted from the wholesome
status of those relations. The trade arrangement between
Russia and Italy provides against Soviet dumping by placing
contingents on wood, wheat and other commodities, and this
precaution was taken by the Italian Government so that Russia
would not be able to demoralize Italian markets.
- Payments -
As has been already noted, the original purchases of
Russia in Italy were on a cash basis and their interchange
of commodities very satisfactory. Since the negotiation of
the
- 9 -
the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation and the allowance to
Russia of credit, Italian merchants and manufacturers have
had a great deal of difficulty, first with the inspection
by the Russian representatives of the goods under contract
and second in the long time nature of the credit. The
Italian Government has intervened on behalf of its own
citizens, parties to contract, and has guaranteed to them
75% of the purchase price under certain conditions. While
there have been considerable Russian purchases during the
life of the trade agreements, payments have been promptly
paid as they fell due but in view of the fact that original
agreements granted credits covering periods of as much as
54 months, payments have so far been on a small scale and
are only now beginning to assume substantial proportions.
As a consequence of that situation, Soviet aegotiators of
the last trade agreement made very effort to obtain even
longer term credits than in former agreements. But the
credit feature was the only obstacle to the conclusion of
these negotiations and an agreement was reached only after
negotiations had been twice suspended and then only when a
rupture in Anglo-Soviet trade relations caused the Soviets
to accept an agreement containing an average credit period
of 19-1/2 months.
- Confidential -
In this connection it is quite worth while quoting the
words of Mr. Quaroni: "They already owe Italy large sums
which must be paid beginning next year (January 1934) and
in view of these obligations I do not believe that they are
in a position to make new committments on a large scale."
while no facts can be adduced in support of the state-
ment
- 10 -
ment, it seema to be generally considered here that
Russia is not in a position to make settlement either for
cash or on short term credits and that the volume of
purchases by Russia must necessarily decrease in the future
unless she can make trade arrangements with persons other
than those with whom she has been dealing in the past or
on longer terms of credit than she has been able to obtain.
Respectfully yours,
Breckinridge Long.
Copy to Legation at Riga.
631
BL/ajl
PSF
Loral
September 11, 1933.
Dear Dreck:
Just a line to toll you that T.R. Jr.,
lunched with us at the White House on Friday
and was most cordial in every way. F.D.R. Jr.,
camo back on the steamor with hin and apparently
everything vas lovely!
I hope all (000 well. Signor Mussolini
has a wonderful chance to force through an
agreement at the Discrmment Conference. Frankly,
I feel that he can accomplish more than anyone
0100.
AB over yours,
Honorable Brockenridge Long.
Embassy of the United States,
Romo, Italy.
POR ID
PSF Long
Rome, Italy
August 2, 1933.
My dear Chief:
I have probably done the wrong thing, but I have been courteous. Your
distinguished cousin Theodore Roosevelt arrived in Rome last night. I did not
meet him at the train nor get out any particular brass bands, but he came
to the Embassy this morning and I was courteous. He said he wanted an opportunity
to talk about conditions in Italy. I afforded him that opportunity by taking
him for a swim at the beach and to lunch by the sea. Tonight I am having him
and his wife and a few other people to dinner. I an also asking in fulfillment
of his desire that he be received by Mussolini.
I think I should tell you this, however. He told me that he had resigned
the office of Governor of the Philippines voluntarily and instantly that you
assumed office in order that in the future he might be in a position to say to
his Republican colleagues that he was under no obligations whatsoever to you in
a political way, and in case he should support you in the future that they
would not be able to say that he was actuated by a desire to repay you for
political favors.
I was just a little surprised and ejaculated "But of course you have no
idea of supporting him in the future."
To which he replied, "Well, of course I am a Republican, but there are
times when one must leave their Party and become an American, and I can support
many of the things which Franklin has advocated. Of course, " he said, "I
-2-
The President
August 2, 1933.
am not oriented as to the situation in America. I have been away for five
years. But I am not going to assume the position that everything that has
been done is wrong."
I suggested that when he got home he would find that a number of his
associates had accepted you lock, stock, and barrel, but that I felt that he
might find himself in an embarrassing position in doing SO,
He said, "Of course, I may be forced to take a position in opposition to
him, because--and I say so confidentially=-it may be that I shall have to
lead the opposition against him."
Of course there was no possible reply to the suggestion, but I know that
you must be terribly frightened to hear about it!
Of course the above is a repetition of an intimate conversation. Why
he should ever have confided in me is known only to him and perhaps to God.
Nevertheless, I feel justified in sending it along to you with the hope that
you will not broadcast it as coming from me.
Yours as ever,
The President
Hyde Park
New York
Sn
GNI
50
STATES CT
25
OSTE]TATIANE
POSTE ALLANE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
The President
Hyde Park
New York
Bh BY POUCH
U. 8. A.
In 555,
5.
PSF Long
60
Rome, Italy
September 14. 1933
My dear Chief:
Austria is going Fascist. Mussolini is a master political sales-
man. He is also the master of neighboring international situations.
He has sold to Dolfuss the Fascist idea as a method of escape from a
Nazi Germany. He has held out the prospect of satisfying the Nazi
psychology with the substance of Socialistic doctrine without the baneful
influence of Marxist philosophy. And with that bait he has diverted
Austrian mentality from Anschluss, and from his conception of a situation
tantamount thereto--a Nazi Austria--and directed it to a Fascist Austria,
sympathetic to Italy, politically kin to Italy and with an objective
related to that of Italy.
On the part of Dolfuss it has averted internal strife with the Nazis,
has provided an escape from the possibility of a losing fight against
Austrian Hitlerism and has afforded a political compromise whereby the
strength of effervescent Nationalistic sentiment is brought into 00-
operation with national industrial necessity and in consequence of which
the present government in Austria can continue in charge of a state to
be fashioned on economic rather than on political bases.
To understand the significance of this new development something of
the characteristics of the Italian Fascist state must be remembered.
The President
September 14, 1933.
Popular representation has been discarded. Instead of electing
representatives because they are residents of a geographical district
or because they are supposed to represent a political party in that
area, persons are selected because they represent a trade or an in-
dustry in a geographical territory. The fact is frankly acknowledged
that the State is not only an aggregation of individuals whose life,
liberty, and happiness is to be preserved, but that the State is an
aggregation of individuals who depend for their existence upon certain
specific economic, industrial, or commercial activities which, along
with the right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness of the in-
dividual are the concern of the State. Consequently the State is not
only interested in the economic, industrial and commercial activities
of its citizens, but is 80 much interested therein that it assumes to
control them for the protection of its individual citizens and in order
to promote or to preserve a regulated right to life, liberty and pursuit
of happiness of the individual citizen.
The method the Italian Fascist State employs to accomplish this is
to resolve itself, as regards its citizens, into various Corporations,
six in number, and representing:
Production
By the Agricultural Corporation
By the Industrial Corporation
Distribution
By the Commercial Corporation
By the Railroad, Steamship, and Airway Corporation.
Credit
-3-
The President
September 14. 1933.
Credit
By the Banking and Insurance Corporation
and Heterogeneous Activities
By the Authors, Professional Men and Scientific.Cor-
poration.
Grouped into one or the other of these six heads are all the
members of an ordinary society. When so grouped each Corporation is
divided into an employers corporation or an employees corporation which
have no connection nor any common bond except to contract with each other
through their specified representatives for mutual and for the State's
benefit, and to operate under the supervision of the State authorities.
The national legislative representatives of the State are chosen
from geographical districts but are nominated, in each district, to the
total number of more than 1000, by these Corporations. The list of
nominees is submitted to the Supreme Fascist Council which examines each
candidate and eliminates all but 400, who are supposed to be representative,
in the strict meaning of that word, of the moral, intellectual, scientific
and trade life of the district from which they are nominated and of Italy.
The revised list is submitted to the electorate--but without opposition.
They are Fascists. There is no other party. They are ipso facto elected.
But they represent the industrial, commercial, intellectual, and scien-
tific forces of the country. They are qualified, among their membership,
to discuss intelligently any question of public concern and to legislate
with acientific discrimination. There is no political opposition--as
such--because there is no majority nor any minority party to the leader-
ship of which falla the partisan duty of maintaining or instigating a
fight in legislative halls because the question presented was or was not
-4-
The President
September 14, 1933.
approved by a party caucus. They listen to debates carried on by experts
in the various vital activities of the country and express by their votes
the approval or disapproval of intelligent persons devoid of partisan
bias.
That the legislature is, in Italy, for the time being subordinated to
the dictates of the Supreme Fascist Council, which in its turn is composed
of members selected by Mussolini, is not only testimony adducible to
support the alleged extraordinary personality of the Head of the Govern-
ment but is a relic of those days which preceeded the effective formula-
tion of a political philosophy for the Fascist State.
Now, however, the Fascist State exists and Mussolini has been able
not only to develop it in Italy but to sell the idea to neighboring
governments distraught by political strife. Nor is that all. He has
used the idea of Fascism to wean Austria from German domination and to
inculcate the competent authorities of that government with the thought
that the Fascist doctrine of Italy is preferable to that system how
dominant in Germany and which might be characterized as the product of
an erring disciple of Fascism.
The consequences of the adoption of Mussolinism by Dolfuss are to
draw Austria from Germany, to create a closer bond between Austria and
Italy, to postpone Anschluss to the indefinite future, to insure tem-
porarily an independent Austria as a buffer state, and to strengthen the
hand of Mussolini in European political circles.
The phenomenon of the political cunning of Mussolini in bringing about
a compromise in Austria between the Dolfuss Government and the Nazia,
The President
September 14, 1933.
herebylsubstantial elements of the letter will support the existing
government in exchange for partial responsibility for that government--
is interesting--but its real significance would be lost if it were not
considered that the actual adoption outside Italy of the principles of the
Fascist State--the Corporative State--is an event of considerable im-
portance in political history. It stamps Mussolini as being not only
Europe's best political salesman, but an outstanding international
strategist and a political evangelist as well.
We are all watching your work but we are not very well informed from
here. I wish the Department could devise some method of keeping us in
touch with developments at home. They do send us Press reports through
the pouch, but they get here about two weeks late. If they could send a
weekly or semi-weekly telegram to Paris for distribution from that point
to the various important missions in Europe letting us know something of
the Government's policy and the meaning of some of its acts, it would
help us to keep in touch with things there as they are developing. As
it is, we have to depend upon a foreign and controlled press and get very
little real information. The British Embassy here for instance gets two
or three telegrams a day explaining various of the Government's acts and
the reasons for them. Since I have been here I have had one such telegram
and that was recently and concerned Cuba.
With every good wish,
Most sincerely, you fruit
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
PSF Lmg
the
National Recovery Act in the United
Stat Translated 08. Pupole of
88/8.16
The Blue Eagle, in the estimation of the
3h
POPOLO DI ROMA, is not destined to "fly toward the
sun of economic recovery." While the Blanket Code
This in
has been forced upon the country's industry, prices critical of
are industry failing is seeking to keep pace in vain with the costs, necessary and meantime credit your policy
to carry on its undertakings. One needs no gift
but is may
of prophesy, says the newspaper, to foresee that
interest you
the banks are not going to lend a dollar more,
Bh
but perhaps a dollar less, to industry because of
the new program: for a bank cannot lend more than
9/14/37
it takes in, and a bank that must grant credit
willy-nilly, because ordered to do so, is a bank
that will wait in vain for deposits from savings
investors. In other words, affirms the POPOLO DI
ROMA, President Roosevelt is attempting to solve
a crisis of confidence without building his program
upon confidence.
The present world situation, continues the
newspaper, arose because of unlimited and unjustified
credit to industry, so that bank and industry became
inextricably engangled. In Italy the day was saved
by creating special institutions to relieve the
banks of their excessive holdings of industrial shares
while new organizations were created to succor such of
the country's industries as were useful to national
economy. The United States, on the contrary, has
violated the laws of economy - but the laws of finance
will not tolerate violation, which fact is now being
experienced in that country. There 1s a flight of
capital from America toward countries having & sound
money, and this flight becomes more pronounced as
the recovery program progresses. The Americans are
-2-
alarmed because they feel that this is the real cause
for the depreciation of the dollar. Speculation feeds
it and is fed by it; the gangster element, now that
prohibition is abolished, has hurled itself into
this new game, which is less dangerous and more profit-
able than the old one. President Roosevelt, who is
working toward a system of direct economy based upon
the equilibrium of all the factors of production and
whose starting point was inflation, should have a
ready brake adequate to check the descent of the
dollar at the proper stage.
This maneuver, the POPOLO DI ROMA feels, is
extremely dangerous, and especially so for other
countries, since it amounts to a veritable attack
upon nations having sound currencies, which are
forced, therefore, to unite into a bloo. to defend
their money and consequently the confidence which
they have built up. Without confidence, concludes
the newspaper, there is no salvation, as the United
States is now demonstrating.
PSF Long Confidented tile
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Rome, October 25, 1933.
Dear Jim,
With reference to our talk about Soviet relations
and the historic part in which Italy has been connected, I
find it rather difficult to remember just what you wanted or
just what I said, which seemed to strike you as pertinent.
So I am sending you what I think is rather a good resumé of
the subject and which is a copy of the covering despatch I
sent with a memorandum on Russian-Italian trade relations.
This is a confidential document and you must treat it as such
because Italian statesmen are quoted in it and certain infor-
mation is contained in it which is of a highly confidential
nature.
That part of the enclosed paper which is contained on
page nine and which begins at the bottom of page eight I may
supplement by saying that the Soviets have bought from Italy
a grand total measured in lire in the sum of 753,000,000, and
they have paid on account only 174,000,000 lire. This is the
situation as of May 1, 1933. Their purchases began on a credit
basis in 1924, so that at the end of ten years they had made
payments from time to time in the total sum of the figure quoted
James Roosevelt, Esquire,
above
c/o American Consul General,
Naples.
- 2 -
above, and they still owe for goods purchased during a ten
year period nearly 600,000,000 lire.
Now that would not be so remarkable were it not for the
fact that they demanded last spring longer credits for addi-
tional purchases. When the longer credits were refused,
negotiations were broken off. They went at it again and nego-
tiations were again broken off. Finally, when England broke
off trade relations with Russia, Russia rushed back to Italy
and accepted the shorter term credits which had been proposed
by Italy; and the noteworthy part of that is that Italo-Russian
trade has diminished enormously in volume since that time.
It has fallen down to less than half.
Russia is now facing a situation in connection with her
relations with Italy which demands that beginning with Janu-
ary 1934 she will be expected to pay very large amounts on
her outstanding balance. She has not the money with which to
pay, so she is looking for some third person from whom she can
buy on long term and get the assets to convert into cash so
as to make good on her old obligations to Italy and other
countries.
I am concerned principally in the conversations which
are about to begin in Washington about two things: first and
foremost is that very great care be given to any political
commitments
- 3 -
commitments with Russia; she does not respect political engage-
ments, or has not in the past, and they heretofore have only
served the purpose of making it possible for Russia to exercise
very drastic treatment on citizens of the other country resident
in Russia when the efforts of Communists in the other state are
dealt with forcibly by the authorities in that state. You will
read in my covering despatch about her retaliations upon citizens
of Germany and Poland and the very salutary situation in that
respect which developed in Italy because of the lack of formal
political commitments with Russia. The second matter about which
I am concerned is that; in our effort at home to get rid of sur-
plus supplies, large quantities of raw cotton, for instance, will
be sold to Russia. She would then be in a position to do one of.
three things: a) to manufacture cotton goods and put them on the
world market in competition with our own; b) to sell raw cotton
to Italy at a price under the world market and in satisfaction of
her obligations to Italy; and c) to use it for high explosives
(in Europe). If any of these three things should transpire, it
would have been much better for us to have taken the cotton out
to the deep ocean and to have thrown it overboard.
If Russia should sell that cotton to Italy, Italy would im-
mediately make cotton goods out of it and put it into the world
market in competition with our own.
Of course the stimulus to Italy's trade with Russia was a
guarantee
- 4 -
guarantee of 75% by the Italian Government that the obligations
from Russia would be paid. Up to date they have been paid. In
case they are not paid in the future the Italian Government will
be called upon by its own citizens to compensate them for the
loss of 75% of the value of the goods. Any loan we should make
to Russia out of Government funds for the purpose of buying goods
in America would amount to the same procedure on the part of the
United States Government - up to the amount of the loan. But even
that stimulus has been unable to extract cash from Russia or to
continue the volume of trade when it is based on short-term credits
(vide the distinct falling off under the present short-term commer-
cial arrangement).
But these things are only commercial in their effect and can
mean only loss or gain in money to our citizens. They are not as
material as the political commitments which the Government might
make and I hope sincerely - most sincerely - that every precaution
will be taken against making it possible for Russia to take retali-
atory action against American citizens on the basis of some poli-
tical arrangement, and I hope the right will be reserved by the
authorities of the United States to deal summarily with Bolshevik
activities and Communistic agitations in America, particularly so
if the Soviet Embassy or any of the agencies of the Soviet Govern-
ment in the United States should be the means of inciting or ex-
tending propaganda and Communistic activities.
I
- 5 -
I am afraid this is rather a rambling letter. It
has been dictated hurriedly because I have had rather a
full day and can only look forward to the next few days
with the expectation that they will be full too.
If you should be interested in pursuing further the
subject of Russian relations you will find a very complete
report on the situation vis-a-vis Russia and Italy in the
form of my report on Russian-Italian trade relations from
1909-1933, which went forth to the Department with the des-
patch copy of which I am enclosing.
It was bully to have seen you and Betty and to have had
you at such close range for a while, and we shall hope that
you will come back again before very long.
With every expression of good will, and with many messages
of admiration and affection to Betty, and with best wishes
to your mother and father, I am always
Sincerely, long
Enclosure.
BL/ajl
PSF Long
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Rome, October 31, 1933.
Dear Jim,
Continuing the subject matter of the letter which I
sent you through the Consulate at Naples, I an taking the
liberty of sending this through the courtesy of the Consul
General at Genoa.
I would like to emphasize that I firmly believe we
ought to recognize Russia. The Soviet regime is the de jure
government there. It passed the de facto stage years ago and
has maintained its authority throughout the geographical con-
fines of Russia. There is no doubt that it exercises sovereign
authority there, nor is it questioned in any quarter that any
fraction of the population there can successfully challenge
its authority. So that its de jure character is not open to
dispute - particularly when considered in.its historic aspects.
For some years I have been of the opinion that we should
accord it formal recognition and I continue firmly of the
same opinion. However, formal recognition is one thing, and
formal political treaties are another thing.
By recognition we simply admit that that government
exists and exercises complete authority. We do not pass upon
its moral aspects, the sources of its authority, or the method
James Roosevelt, Esquire,
of
0/0 W. Roderick Dorsey,
American Consul General,
Genoa.
- 2 -
of its control.
After recognition then comes the establishment of
diplomatic relations and probably the negotiation of a
consular convention so that our consuls can operate there
and theirs be recognized by us. That permits business to
be transacted, bills of lading and invoices to be passed
and vessels to be cleared.
So far so good!
The next step is a commercial treaty. That ought to
be carefully prepared and the policy constantly kept in mind
that through the instrumentality of a commercial treaty we
can control "dumping". The Russians are great "dumpers".
Wheat, oil, wood pulp. anything they can get their hands on
they "dump" if and when they get good and ready. But if we
negotiate a commercial treaty with them and fix in that
treaty the maximum quantities of specific goods they may
import annually, and fix the quantity in tons or in dollar
values we have them under control so they can dump only
certain amounts. That policy actually controls "dumping".
Up to this point I would be willing to go if I was vested
with authority - and its concurrent responsibility. Beyond
that I would not now tread!
We ought not to be hampered in our control of Bolshevik
or Communist activities in America. If we make a political
arrangement
- 3 -
arrangement with them for extradition, or for special
protection of citizens, or for exchange of political
prisoners, they will abuse it and use their police force
to make arrests of innocent Americans on trumped up charges
to gain the liberty of Communists arrested in America.
Any other political treaty they will violate ad libitem
if they continue the line of their practise with European
governments (except Italy, which has kept the whip hand).
So I trust you will read this as a preface to the letter
I recently sent you and will lay the matter before your father
at your earliest opportunity. I see Litvinoff sails from
Le Havre today so that you and he will probably arrive at
with
about the same time, and the matter is so involved that our
future relations not only as regards our commercial activities
but as concerns our other contacts in Europe and our Far
Eastern position that with the political aspects of it. demand the
closest of attention.
I am sending a letter of introduction to you by a young
man, Count Fumasoni Biondi. He is young, very intelligent,
and resident in Washington as the representative of one of the
biggest Italian papers. He is a great admirer of America and
of your father, and I hope you will be nice to him aboard ship.
He might be very useful in Washington. He is supposed to be
the
- 4 -
the news representative there of the Fascist organization
and he warrants cultivating.
With a final "bon voyage" and every good wish,
Yours as ever,
Breckinridge Long.
Mr. phillips
to ready
Rome, Italy
December 12, 1933.
Dear Frank:
I wrote you under date of December 8 about the possibility of Italy re-
valuing the lira. That letter was based on a conversation I had with Ruggieri,
the Chase National Bank man here, and following a conversation he had with the head
of the Bank of Italia.
I now have to correct what I said then. Since I wrote that letter Asquini
has made a very important speech. Asquini is the Under-Secretary of Corporations.
Mussolini himself is the titular Secretary (one of his seven). Since Asquini's
speech I have had a long talk with him. As a result of that I am now convinced
Italy will take another course.
As a predicate, the Fascist State has issued enormous quantities of
securities which they have sold to their own people. T hey have induced them
to invest their savings in Government aecurities in the thought that the lira
was valuable and would continue to be valuable and that saving it was worth the
effort of the Italian citizen. Mussolini feels that to devalue the lira would
be to break faith with those people, for they have invested their savings in
Government securities on his assurance.
Nevertheless, Italy finds itself in this serious predicament. Its foreign
trade has fallen off enormously. The high price of the lira prevents the
manufacturers from exporting. The manufacturer cannot sell abroad because
his price is under-cut by the United States, by England, and particularly by
Japan. They want to recover their foreign trade because it means a living
The President
December 12, 1933.
wage to many millions of Italians who would otherwise be forced into the
ranks of the unemployed. It is too expensive for the Government to sub-
sidize all the manufacturers who are in the export business--so that is
out of the question. They do subsidize a few, such as a few automobile
companies who manufacture necessary transportation for Italian armies and
who cannot survive on that business alone. But as a general rule the
Government is unable to subsidize: so, according to Asquini, they have
decided to out down the cost of production at home--or at least to try it.
They have just now reduced the interest on loans to 2%. They are going to
decrease wages. They are going to decrease the cost of insurance and all
of the smaller items that run into "overhead." The decrease in the cost of
labor will decrease the cost of such raw materials as they are able to pro-
duce. The high value of the lira enables them to buy other raw materials
abroad at a cheaper rate in Italian money. So that the manufacturer with
smaller bank rates, smaller insurance rates, smaller overhead charges, smaller
wage scales, can manufacture at a smaller cost and can himself take a smaller
profit. The result will be that the lira in Italy will buy more than it
buys today. It will also mean that they can compete with other countries
the currencies of which in international exchange are worth less than the
lira. Such countries can manufacture cheaper for the world market than Italy
can at present. Under Italy's new program she will manufacture, she hopes,
at a smaller cost 80 that she can compete in the world market with the
products of the other countries.
-3-
The President
December 12, 1933.
Another phase of their plan is to engage in a series of unilateral
commercial agreements with other countries the products of which they need
or with whom they have large unfavorable trade balances.
Having led you to the belief in my recent letter that there might be
some devaluation of the lira, I now write this to offset that impression,
because I am convinced now that the authorities in control of the Italian
Government are bent upon the plan I have outlined above. I had Asquini at
dinner the other night and talked to him for three hours and went over all of
the industrial, commercial, and financial phases of the national and inter-
national aspects of the Corporative State Plan.
With kindest regards and best wishes,
Yours sincerely and respectfully,
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
PSF Long
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
tile
DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
January 6, 1934.
Private
Mr. Phillips:
The enclosed analysis of the situ-
ation from Rome is interesting, but I
think it is too much simplified. In
particular, I think it under-emphasizes
the influence and power of Great Britain
and the extent to which she can still
hold Italy in line. I likewise doubt
whether Italy could hope to succeed in
drawing Germany and Russia together,
particularly as long as Russian pre-
occupations in the Far East are not
stilled. Such information as we get
leads us to feel that Russia is playing
far more with the French bloc than with
the German. The whole scheme, if worked
out, might present a real source of peril
but it is far from worked out to date.
Already, according to Mr. Long's latest
telegram, the British have persuaded the
Italians to subordinate League reform to
progress in disarmament. But the day
when Mussolini held the key to the dis-
armament situation has passed. Ray
Atherton told me that the British Govern-
ment no longer considered Italy as a
first rate diplomatic power, though still
useful as a stalking horse if they could
flatter Mussolini into taking an initiative
for them.
If,
DIA
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
-2-
If, however, the analysis is
correct, the prime lesson to be drawn
from it is that any armaments agree-
ment on an upward basis is a purely
European adjustment in which we should
not become involved and that our old
policy of helping in disarmament but
disinteresting ourselves in rearmament
is the only sound one.
P.M.
Pierrepont Moffat.
WE:PM:VAS
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
THE UNDER SECRETARY
JAN 3 1934
January 3, 1934.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MEMORANDUM FROM
THE PRESIDENT
FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE.
Will you speak to me about this some
day?
the muc
PSF Long
Rome, Italy
December 15, 1933.
Dear Frank:
I am really sorry to trouble you so much with these letters. The subject
matters however are so important 1 see no other course. I can't talk. You
ought to know what I think. So--I have to write.
As seen from Rome, the attitude of Italy toward the current political
situation in Europe, including disarmament and the League of Nations, is as
follows:-
Disarmament:
a) Italy sincerely desires disarmament, is and has been ready to
agree to drastic reductions provided other governments do likewise. She has
even diminished appropriations for both army and navy;
b) Italy views the German attitude toward armament in a practical
way, believing it better to concede something in the way of controlled arma-
ment rather than see the alternative, a Germany stealthily but effectively
armed;
o) Italy has been engaged in efforts of reconciliation and
mediation with the hope of effecting some semblance of disarmament now and
holding out the hope of more satisfactory reductions in the next few years.
Accompanying the desire for disarmament is the question of the vitality
of the League of Nations and its continuing existence. Italy approaches the
League and the disarmament problem as a united objective. Without the
League disarmament progress will cease. Supervision, coordination and
-2-
The President
December 15, 1933.
unanimity will be lacking.
So the League becomes the most important of the two questions.
Italy views the League as: -
1) An agency under control of France and operated through alliances
with Belgium, Poland and the governments of the Little Entente:
2) An agency for the enforcement of the sanctions of the Versailles
and other post-war treaties;
3) A body composed of representatives of small countries who have
no real power but whose positions on the governing organs of the League
permit them to confound confusion and to become the objects of seductive
gestures from other powers for the purpose of using their votes:
4) A body overgrown with bureaucracy, enmeshed with detail and
encumbered by committees:
5) A body too costly for its usefulness;
6) A body ineffectual in world situations because of its pre-
occupation with European politics - vide, especially Japan, Manchukuo, China.
With valid objections to the League, as it exists and as it is operated,
Italy has determined to move for change in structure and change in objective -
to make it more practical.
Failing, Italy will withdraw.
With Italy out - with Germany, Japan, Russia and the United States out -
the League cannot survive even as a European influence. The withdrawal of
Italy would, in all probability, be followed by those of Austria, Hungary,
Turkey, possibly Bulgaria and Greece.
The consequence would be a return to the old system of alliances.
-3-
The President
December 15, 1933.
Visualizing the possibility, Italy is proceeding to lay the ground-
work for possible alliances. She has maintained close relations with
Germany. She has augmented cordial relations with Turkey, Russia and
Greece and has been instrumental in assisting them to closer cooperation,
between each other and with them individually and Bulgaria. She has strength-
ened her ties with Austria and Hungary, both politically and economically.
The result is that Italy is in a position to surround the Little
Entente. Germany, Austria, Hungary and Italy on the west: Greece, Albania
and Turkey on the south; Bulgaria and the Black Sea on the east; and Russia
on the north, provided they were coordinating, would effectually surround
the Little Entente and Poland and might render it more advisable for them,
in circumstances short of war, to cooperate with the "Eastern Bloc" - east
of the Rhine - rather than with France. In case of war they could be
The same alliance would cut France away from her Little Entente by
drawing a straight line north and south - Germany, Austria, Italy.
In diplomatic moves it might leave France alone, to face world opinion
if she blocked disarmament and reconstruction of the League.
In war it would cause France to face Germany and Italy with the strong
probability of air assistance from Russia.
The maneuvers centering in Rome lead me unmistakably to the opinion
that italy is -
1) Trying, sincerely, to reform the League for peaceful purposes;
2) Laying the basis for extensive, encircling alliances for
possible development in case France blocks either disarmament or reform of
the League - and they are inseparable.
-4-
The President
December 15, 1933.
The position of England is enigmatic. Her position in case the
League fails is unknown here but her power is discounted in Italian
circles. They feel the British Empire is losing cohesion; that cen-
trifugal forces are at work: that the growing independence of the dominions
detracts from the centralized power of England: that England would
probably take sides with the group opposed, fundamentally and in the long
run, to excessive armament in Europe.
Of course Italy does not forget who controls the Mediterranean and
her dependence on free ingress and egress. But her opinion of England as
a military power on the continent is decreasing.
The German proposals: - 300,000 men, adequate armor, no offensive
weapons, no gas warfare or bombing planes, gradual allied reduction,
inspection of factories, and non-agression pacts with each contiguous
neighbor - with sanctions - will appeal to Italy, England, Italy's
"allies." France will oppose - and her allies.
It has the color of increasing armament instead of decreasing. It
will take a lot of explaining to convince the man on the street it is
"reduction."
Nevertheless - Germany has a sine qua non. Some armament is necessary
to satisfy her national self-respect. The non-agression pacts will lend
substance to her professions of peaceful intent. And the program offers
a practical solution of the impasse in Europe.
The English think a French government with Paul-Boncour, Daladier,
and Herriot could hold the country in line for acceptance.
If she does accept. 0. K.
If France and her allies continue opposition - the show is over.
-5-
The President
December 15, 1933.
Germany will arm anyway. There will be no supervision and no agreement
of any kind. France cannot attack. It is too late. Germany is a
tough nut today - and France knows it. Chemical warfare would be the
result of invasion. It would be a difficult task indeed to penetrate
Germany, even on the pretext of preventing armament.
So, while the German proposals may look like a program for armament,
it is the best European produce today. It seema the only practical step
to get somewhere on the road to armament reduction during the next ten
years.
And if it fails - disarmament and the Lengue may both be memories
of the past.
If you can lead the way out - consider it. But, the political
penalties of failure, even of partial success, are severe - as we have
learned.
with kindest regards and best wishes,
The President
Parkly Sincerely and respectfully,
The White House
Washington, D. C.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 28, 1934.
PRIVATE AND C
MEMORANDUM FROM
THE PRESIDENT
FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
This is for your eyes only. I
do not think that anyone else should see
it. It is interesting even though there
may not be anything in it.
LETTER FROM BRECK LONG ABOUT SITUATION
IN FRANCE. FEB. 7, 1934.
Ca Given
da
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
50700920
Rome, February 7, 1934.
Dear Frank,
I would like to talk to you a few minutes about a
situation developing in Europe which may not amount to
anything but which has such possibilities that it is well
worth keeping in mind and watching. I am not sending a
despatch to the Department because there are no facts.
So I take this means of bringing directly to your atten-
tion a situation which may develop and have wide-spread
consequences.
There is a well defined movement to restore the
monarchy in France. Strikes and rioting in Paris, which
have now spread to various of the outlying cities, are
being carried on under the direction of the ACTION
FRANCAISE with communist support. The ACTION FRANCAISE
is the royalist organ. There are possibilities of a
Bonapartist restoration - which I discount. The other
possibility is the restoration of the house of Orléans-
Bourbon, now united in the person of the Duke de Guise.
He is the Pretender to the throne of France.
His
The President,
The White House,
Huutic
Washington.
- 2 -
His daughter is Françoise of France. She is married to
Prince Christopher of Greece whose nephew is the Pretender
to the throne of Greece. Françoise is a very clever young
woman. She is in Rome and from Rome is intimately in touch
with developments in France.
I know her very well and have talked to her about this
matter very guardedly on several occasions. Her brother is
the Count de Paris and as such is the heir apparent to the
Pretender to the French throne. However, he is well known
to be an illegitimate son and therefore is not considered by
circles which are backing the royalist cause, to be eligible.
He has his headquarters in Brussels. Françoise has a sister
who married the Duke d'Aosta. He is the second in line to the
throne of Italy. The Crown Prince in Italy is not at all well
liked and has made remarks critical of the Duce. He is pre-
sumably not in favor with the Fascist chiefs and certainly is
not popular with the people of Italy. On the other hand, the
Duke d'Aosta is on intimately cordial relations with the
Fascist officials and is the most popular of all the figures
in connection with the royal family.
Because of the stigma attached to the brother of Françoise
and naturally the odium in which her mother would be held by
the legitimists, it is quite possible that she might figure
in the picture rather than her brother and rather than her
father
- 3 -
father, who is himself the actual Pretender. She is
shrewd, careful, well educated, intelligent and politically-
minded. She has conducted herself very well in Rome where
she has been given the royal rank.
The situation in which France finds itself today is
lending itself to the furtherance of the royalist schemes.
There is intense dissatisfaction with the Government there.
In fact it goes farther. There is wide-spread discontent
with the parliamentary system. This is fostered of course
by the royalists and also by the communists, but it is being
helped by the idea of Fascism, which has some ardent suppor-
ters in France. The theory of a monarchy is not far removed
from the dictatorial principle of government so prevalent in
Europe. In both systems power is concentrated and almost
absolute. In one, it is transmitted by heredity. The other.
lacks that element. But both represent a high concentration
of power in the hands of an individual. The continent of
Europe is pretty well committed to that idea for the time
being. Vide Russia, the Balkan states, Germany, Austria
and Italy.
When people attain a nervous pitch, somewhat more ex-
aggerated than actually exists in France today, and labor
under
- 4 -
under the impression that they are against a principle of
government or against a set of men who symbolize in their
minds a principle of government, they are apt to run off
at any tangent. The French are notoriously and historically
that way. There was the Revolution of 1789, the Triumvirate,
Napoleon, the Republic, the Restoration, another Republic,
another revolution, and now the Third Republic. They are
not committed to any form of government. They are excitable,
emotional and possessed of great power under the influence
of mass psychology. If they increase their nervous tension
there might easily be an opposition to the present government
carried on by various elements which in themselves are in-
compatible except in their opposition but which would result
in the adoption of one or the other of the ideas held by
those temporarily in opposition to the existing government.
It might more easily be, and much more easily, a restoration
of the monarchy than the revival of the Bonapartists or an
accession to power of communism.
But there are several other elements, which indicate that
some persons in the government itself are parties to the possi-
bilities of a restoration. Chiappe has just been dismissed
as Chief of Police. His name has been associated with the
restoration
- 5 -
restoration movement. His dismissal no doubt was partly
responsible for the increased manifestations of rioting.
Last night they were worse than at any other time. He
has declined to go to the colonies and continues in France,
where in spite of his dismissal he has many political and
official connections.
Our friend Tardieu has lost some of his political
power and is not now considered to be one of the leaders
of French political thought but the fact is that he lost
it because he declined to cooperate with his successors
in office and has been considered to be something of an
opportunist and playing with the royalists.
Our friend Charles de Chambrun is the French Ambassador
in Rome. He is leaving tonight for Paris. He is a member
of the Cincinnati. He even wears his Cincinnati medal on
his uniform when they wear medals. The Cincinnati are con-
sidered to be part of the royalist group, at least amongst
the anti-parliamentary elements, in Paris. They are dis-
tinctly of the right - of the extreme right. - and have
given reason to be suspected of being sympathetic to a
restoration. Whether de Chambrun partakes of the political
theories of his colleagues in Paris, I do not know. How-
ever, he has now as a house guest for whom he gave a big
dinner
- 6 -
dinner the other night, Marquis de la Ferronnays, who is &
royalist member of the Chamber of Deputies. Françoise was
at the Embassy that night and something must have transpired
there because to one or two of her intimates she manifested
great excitement and perturbation and left the Embassy under
a considerable emotional strain as soon as she could politely
and courteously do so, though not as soon as she wanted to
do SO.
I bring de Chambrun into this picture only on suspicion.
But if he is in it, no doubt his two brothers are in it; the
Marquis is a member of the French Senate and one of its in-
fluential members; the other brother, as you know, is a general
in the army.
The Princess Françoise and the royalists generally lack
money. It is hard to see how they could finance a coup. I
have strong reasons to suspect - though this is all a fabri-
cation of conjecture and thin filament - that a man by the
name of Fummi, who is the representative in Rome of J.P.
Morgan and who has access to all the financial circles in
Europe, is acting with Françoise and within her entire con-
fidence. I am morally certain of the last statement. What
his function is - I can only assume that it is as a financial
agent in addition to being a close personal friend. That
Morgan could be brought into such a movement, I seriously
doubt,
- 7 -
doubt, but his French banking connections might find it to
their political advantage to be on the inside of a movement
if they had any idea that it was going to succeed.
Fummi has access to the Italian authorities. The
Italian authorities have been very courteous, to say the
least, to Françoise. Italy looks with grave apprehension
upon the continuance of an unsettled situation in France.
France can make no commitments. Nobody can speak for her.
With France in the shadow of a political revolution, the
hand of Germany is strengthened and the delicate situation
in Austria becomes more acute because Italy cannot rely
upon French aid. in preventing Anschluss or even a Nazi
coup with some German assistance. So that the lack of res-
ponsibility in the French Government - or what goes by that
name - is upsetting the picture and the balance in Europe
and it is a matter of serious concern to Italy. Consequently
Italy would be glad to see something happen in France which
would put the government in control of a definite group who
could speak for France and could re-enter European politics
on the side of Italy. There is also the well-known thought
that Mussolini would like to see dictatorial governments
throughout Europe.
Given
- 8 -
Given these elements, you have this possibility - that
Italy, under cover and without showing her hand, would give
some clandestine support to the cause of Françoise whose own
sister might easily soon become the Queen of Italy. Fran-
çoise and her crowd would be willing to make any concession.
They want the throne. They would accept a dictator under
them and themselves retain the nominal function of sovereignty.
If Mussolini could find in France a satisfactory person to
cooperate with him and Françoise would accept - and no doubt
she would. Italy might be very glad to help in such ways as
she could, even financially Particularly in view of the
fact that the Fascist Grand Council has authority under the
Italian system of government to pass upon the succession to
the throne and to veto the accession of the Heir Apparent.
The Fascist Grand Council is Mussolini's mouth-piece. Since
they do not like the Prince of Piedmont, the Crown Prince,
and do like the next in line, his cousin the Duke of Aosta,
they might easily exercise their power and declare him king
when this one dies. Then Françoise's sister would be on
the throne of Italy and if Françoise or her father or even
her brother were on the throne of France, each of them render-
ing authority to a dictator to exercise functions of state
in their name, it would be a development which would be very
pleasing
- 9 -
pleasing to Italy no doubt.
How much of this you will hear from other places
I don't know. I have no way to find out. I cannot write
about it, nor can I talk to anybody here - except possibly
to Françoise herself. It is not a matter one could talk
about with the members of the Fascist Government or with
any other element in Rome. There are very few people in
Washington who ought to know that I have written such a
letter. But the political possibilities of the situation
are so interesting, and the movements in France are so
corroborative of my syspicions that I feel there is some
substance to my intuitive sense. It all may come to noth-
ing. However, while the elements are before our eyes
and some of them working, I think it is the part of wisdom
to watch it, and I bring it to your attention just so that
it will be somewhere in the back of your head. You have
enough things to worry you at home but this won't worry.
Apologies again for the length of this, but it didn't
seem possible to make it much shorter.
With every good wish and expressions of affectionate
and respectful regard, I am
Yours as ever, Long
PSF Long
May 28, 1934.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:
Referring to #102, May 23, from
Long in Rome, what would you think of my
asking Colonel Frank Knox to come to see
me when he comes back to this country
and try to draw him out about his trip?
F.D.R.
Colonel Frank Knox of Chicago Daily News and
North American Newspaper Synidicate has recently
been to Rome. Learns that objective of his visit
was to gather ammunition from the alleged failure
of Fascist regime to use in newspaper editorials
and press articles as arguments against the NRA.
5466
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
June 9, 1934.
Memorandum:
Returned to the Presi-
dent by the Secretary of State.
Private
Private Drp
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 8, 1934.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
The Secretary of State
Please read enclosed and return to me.
F.D.R.
Interesting
Hull
PSF Long
Rome
May 23, 1934.
My dear Chief:
I cabled you today about Colonel Frank Knox's activities in Rome.
I was advised in deep confidence by one of my friends who is in the
Press here that he had had several long talks with Colonel Knox and
that he had had also several long talks with Richard Washburn Child.
Of course I write you in all the confidence which in your descretion
you see fit to respect. I do not like to write the name of my
informant, because it might react against him.
Knox is definitely opposed to your administration and is seeking
material to provide arguments which will undermine public confidence
in the N. R. A. Whether his former connections and personal contacts
with Mr. Hearst have any bearing upon his present inclination was the
subject of speculation here. The significant part of it, however, is
that he had several talks with Child, and my informant tells me he
offered Child $1000 each for articles to be written for the North
American Newspaper Union carrying out Knox's ideas. It is also
understood that Child has accepted the assignment. I did not like
to name Child in my telegram, and I have a hesitancy in writing even
to you on this subject, but I know that you will not misunderstand
me and will appreciate the peculiar position in which I find myself,
-2-
The President
May 23, 1934.
but as usual in a matter like this my loyalty and allegiance
knows only one direction. You are not only the head of my
Government, but you are the chief of my Party, and my devotion
to ench is life-long and of the utmost sincerity. Under those
circumstances I feel that I should tell you that Child apparently
is using the visit he made to Italy to get material which will
bring him some pecuniary profit and which will be directed,
probably not openly, against the operations of the N. R. A.
Child was perfectly friendly to you in his conversations
with me. My information may be entirely wrong. My informant
may be wrong. But he is such a careful person and is so well
trained in matters of this kind and the circumstances of his
conversations with them were on such an informal basis, for my
informant knows each of these gentlemen well, that the matter
must rest in my mind in the status that the burden is on the
other side to disprove the correctness of the information.
From your point of view it may be just another one of
those developments with which you are constantly faced. However,
from this point of view it is the only real sign of opposition
to you or to your administration which has come to my attention.
-3-
The President
May 23, 1934.
At any rate I feel that I should lay the matter before you
for the attention of such of your entourage as you think should
know it but with the expressed hope that you will be able to
preserve the confidential nature of the communication.
With every good wish and with respectful regards,
As always,
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
PSF Long
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
October 24, 1934. Paula
sil
My dear Mr. President:
In accordance with Ambassador Long's
request, I am bringing this confidential
cable from him to your personal attention.
I have also sent a copy of it to
Secretary Wallace.
Faithfully yours,
Enclosure.
The President,
The White House.
PSF Long
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM
FROM:
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AT ROME.
DATED:
October 22, 1 p.m.
No.
235
This message is confidential for the President,
the Secretary of State and Mr. Sayre.
I am using this means to bring directly to your at-
tention a situation which seriously threatens the export of
cotton from the United States to Italy. A substitute has
been discovered which they believe to be, and which at the
present time seems to me to have all the evidences of being,
serviceable as a substitute. A process has been discovered
by them and they have built a machine which interrupts the pro-
cess of the manufacture of cellulose into rayon at a certain
point and transfers the substance to the new machine and con-
tinues a new secret process which will give a substance which
is being used by them as a substitute for cotton. Two million
seven hundred thousand kilos of this substance per month are
being made by them today. and in this way they are permitted
to sell it at six lire per kilo. The cost of cotton to
them, laid down in Milan, is four lire a kilo. They are
selling this substance at a price which permits them to
amortize their investment in the machine, in spite of the
fact that it can be produced today at a cost cheaper than cotton.
LEO
2
After the next six months with quantity production they
expect to be able to sell it cheaper than cotton in Milan.
Through the Commercial Attache I have obtained
samples of the finished product of the cotton substitute
and samples of the cloth they make from it, mixed with
cotton or with wool or with other materials and am sending
them by the next pouch to you.
In view of this situation it is very probable that
Italy can reduce her cotton purchases from the United
States by 50% within two years.
I have been informed
that a decree will probably be issued about January lst
by the authorities which will require the use of 10% of
this new material in the manufacture of cotton goods;
thereafter within a few months it will be increased to 20%;
and within a few months thereafter to 30%.
Plans are being made by them to enter upon a large
scale production and have inquiries from Czechoslovakia,
Poland, Sweden, Spain, Belgium, Holland and Switzerland
for the establishment of plants in those countries to be
equipped with the Italian machine for the manufacture of
this substance there. An enormous inroad upon the cotton
export trade of the United States would be the result of this.
The cost of changing the equipment of cotton mills
would be eliminated as this material is 80 produced that it
3
can be used in any cotton textile machine without change of
machinery.
The following is a brief review of the history of Italy
as a purchaser: Italy imports more from the United States
than from any other country; 60% of those imports, by value,
are cotton; 153,000 metric tons of cotton are bought by Italy
from the United States annually; she has a huge adverse trade
balance with the United States, running about two to one
against her. Her objective at the present time is to cut
down imports and save the necessity of exporting gold.
She has directed naturally her attention for some time to
the largest item of her purchases. The political authorities
and the manufacturers of Italy are now satisfied that they
can eliminate a very large part of their purchases of cotton.
I draw your attention, as a predicate for this, to their
monetary policy and the fact that Italy is definitely committed
to the gold standard and firm in the belief that the countries
which have an adequate supply of gold will be in the strongest
positions after the world crisis has passed. It is believed
by its officers that such countries will then have a more
stable monetary system at home, better credit abroad and a
larger share of world trade and that they will consequently
surpass the other countries in prosperity and security.
Therefore, they are not only definitely committed to the
gold standard, but also to the conservation at all cost of
the gold they have and to policies which will increase their
4
supply.
Their gold reserve, according to recent history,
has in the last nine months decreased eleven billion sixty-
nine million lire, is now about 43% of coverage for circu-
lation and sight obligations combined and is approaching
the legal minimum requirement of forty per cent.
Italy has in her major imports for some years fol-
lowed the policy of restricting imports.
In this con-
nection I refer you to the statistics recently submitted
in my report on proposed reciprocal trade agreement with
Italy to show to what extent she has decreased her pur-
chases in the United States of coal, wheat, oil and autome-
biles. Because of the fact that it is the largest item
of their enormous trade deficit on their balance with the
United States they are more determined in the matter of
cotton than they were in other primary requirements.
Very heavy purchases of cotton in the American market
is the cause of part of the loss by Italy of gold in the
last six weeks.
I have received this information from a
highly confidential and authentic source.
Supplies of
cotton in the United States are being laid up by them, for
which they are expending gold with the idea of establishing
a large reserve in cotton to last them through a period of
transition.
They will soon, in my opinion, cease their
purchases of cotton and will probably put a quota or some
other restrictive trade device upon the importation of it
and will issue permits to themselves only for the cotton
5
which they have already bought. This brings to the fore-
front a matter of extreme importance, not only for our
ordinary export trade, but for the effect it may have upon
the cotton growing states and upon our general recovery
program. This threat applies to other European states
which can be equipped with the new Italian machine and can
in this way produce the substitute for cotton at a price far
cheaper than they can buy the real article from the United
States, as well as to the importation by Italy from America.
This situation is causing me serius concern and
I refer you, as a background for this telegram, to page three
of despatch No. 728 of September 27; to the article on cotton
in section three of despatch No. 737 of October 2d; to the
enclosure to my despatch No. 741 of October 4th; and also,
with the President's permission, to a personal letter to him
on the same subject under date of October 12, which should
be received by him about now.
Because of the fact that this process has developed
here to the extent to which it has, the suggestions made in
that letter are probably not now applicable.
The process
has been very carefully guarded and kept in the nature of a
state secret and, although there have been rumors concerning
it, until the present time there has been no definite informa-
tion.
Nevertheless, I am still of the opinion that the
suggestions made therein might have some ameliorating effect
upon the hard and fast economic policy which they are putting
6
into effect concerning the United States.
The trade balance may very easily run against the United
States if Italy can succeed in eliminating fifty per cent
of her cotton imports in the next two years.
They have
told our Commercial Attache with perfect confidence that they
can use as much as 90% of the substitute with 10% of cotton
and make a suitable material.
The materials which I am
sending to you in the pouch are 50% cotton and 50% substitute.
LONG.
PSF Long
Fill
European (s) (2)
Long
Rome
February 8, 1935.
My dear Chief:
I will try to give you a picture of the appearance of European
politics today - since the Rome conference, the Saar plebiscite,
and the London conference.
While I doubt if it is reduced to writing, I get the impression
that the Italo-Prench accord amounts practically to an alliance.
This is subject to revision and rectification in my thought, depending
upon later developments. But the attitude of the Italians toward
the French and the confidence with which they look toward unified
action in case of German aggression leads me definitely to the
belief that the principal business - as yet undisclosed - of the
Mussolini-Laval conversations was to align France and Italy against
what they probably expect in the form of German aggression.
They all feel that the Saar plebiscite has acted as a big
drink of Schnape to the Germans and that Hitler will be emboldened
now to pursue his Pan Germanic ideas into the fields of former
German territories and Austria. They are convinced that Germany
is very well equipped for war but not yet prepared to take the
offensive or to commit an act which might lead immediately to
open warfare. Nevertheless, they seem more confident of their
-2-
The President
February 8, 1935.
efforts and seem to place great reliance upon the accord with France.
The London conversations seem to have laid the basis for common
action against Germany in which England would participate, though
it has not been - as far as I can ascertain - in any sense reduced
to writing or into the exactness of a definite understanding. How-
ever, the growth of air forces in Europe has brought England to the
realization that the Channel no longer separates her from the
Continent, and as Sir Eric Drummond said to me, and as reported in
my recent telegram on the subject, he could not see that a Government
could distinguish between one kind of warfare and another and that
engugement to participate in one was tantamount to being involved
in a general struggle. So that on that basis England seems to be
now expected to participate on the side of Italy and France and
against a possible aggressive move on the part of Germany. And the
Germans are always so "dumb" in their maneuvers that it would be
comparatively easy to construe any incident as having been brought
about by Germany.
What is striking in the whole thing is that Mussolini appears
for the time being to have abandoned his role as mediator. The
change of heart probably dates, if it actually exists, to the
reaction following the Hitler-Mussolini conversations last summer
immediately after which Hitler committed his barbarous activities
in Germany and offended the Italian sense of propriety. At any
rate, for the time being Mussolini seems to have lined himself
-3-
The President
February 8, 1935.
definitely against Germany and to have made what amounts to an
alliance with France with the probable annexation of military
support from England.
But the most remarkable part of it from my point of view is
that it is simply a continuation of French Continental policy.
Ever since the War France has tried to encircle Germany. She got
Poland; she got the Little Entente: she got Russia: and she had
the sympathetic activity from time to time of Italy and Austria,
but the circle was not closed. However, the object of France was
to encircle Germany. The present situation seems to encircle Germany -
absolutely. So that it seems to be not a diplomatic victory for
Italy but to reflect considerable credit upon the dexterous
management by France of both Italy and England.
Now it is all up to Germany. The morning press indicates that
Germany's demands will contemplate 3000 airplanes as forming a
basis of an air equality. This would simply be indicative of the
other demands to be made in the form of other equipment. There
is neither hope nor dismay over the prospect of the answer which
will eventually come from Germany. They seem to be satisfied that
whichever way Germany answers the result will be the same, except
that it will insure peace without a war if Germany should honestly
join the entente of the three western powers. I doubt, however, if
anyone will place any great confidence in Germany's declaration to
the effect that she would like to continue on friendly and peaceful
-4-
The President
February 8, 1935.
terms with her neighbors. She is suspected like a wolf, and her
intentions are considered to be about as peaceful as were the acts
which history records of Attila.
The important elements, as I see it now, are first, what
amounts practically to an Italo-Prench alliance: second, the
signified willingness of England to join; third, the delay attending
Germany's announcement of a willingness to consider cooperation:
and fourth, the ring that has been drawn around Germany.
The failure of Germany to agree will result in a race for
armament, and it is my real belief that the Italians will not
start from behind scratch. My information is that their steel
factories are working over-time.
Connected with this thought and the probability of preparation
for war on a considerable scale is the fact that when the bond
(lin 2 billion)
issue in Italy was proposed for subscription at the end of
^
November last, it was stated to be one of the objectives to retire
five hundred million from circulation and to use the other billion
and a half to pay the budgetory deficit. They did pay the
budgetory deficit, as appears from the statements of the Bank of
Italy, but they did not retire five hundred million from
circulation nor any amount from circulation. A8 a matter of
fact, circulation has risen just a little. They explained this
by saying that there were certain unforeseen items which had to be
cleared up. The net result is that the Treasury got five hundred
million lire for some purpose now undisclosed.
-5-
The President
February 8, 1935.
It may be that part of it is used for equipment, and it may
be part of it is being used to advance the Abyssinian movement.
Randolph Harrison, our Third Secretary, has a man servant who is
a member of the militia. This man advised him this morning that
300 men and three officers from his own contingent had been
drafted to go to Abyssinia and would be paid 25 lire a day instead
of the ordinary 10 lire. Enormous supplies of barbed wire, trucks,
and all that sort of thing continue to be sent, one big ship load
having sailed just recently from Naples, as I was advised by the
Consul General there this morning. Of course this will be expen-
sive, and it may be that it will consume the five hundred million
lire in question without leaving any for preparation for Germany.
And if Mussolini foresees war in Europe, I don't know what he is
thinking of in spending 30 much money in Abyssinia and preparing
to engage in warfare there, unless he thinks it would be good
training for his men. Novertheless, the Abyssinian campaign
proceeds and the thought of eventual conflict with Germany continues.
In connection with our conversation about a communication to
Mussolini on the subject of Abyasinia, may I suggest that the
situation seems to have changed a little bit since the time you
spoke. Since then there have been Ethopian aggressions against the
Franch which have been well advertised in the European press and
-6-
The President
February 8, 1935.
in which it is stated that members of the regular army were
mingled with the Nomad tribesmen. And also since then the Italian
papers state that the American Minister - or Charge d'Affaires-
has been subjected to some mistreatment and indignity. In
addition to that, the League of Nations is apparently not to take
up the subject but has referred it back for settlement between
Italy and Abyasinia. So that our absence from membership in the
League would not serve as a predicate. There would remain only
our interest in universal peace - but it does seem a long way
outside our bailiwick. However, you will know what you want to do
and whatever you decide in the premises, I will be happy to carry
out.
Things have been awfully hectic here since my return. I have
hardly had an opportunity to leave my desk, but I hope within the
next week I will be able to get a respite.
Affectionately and respectfully,
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
PSF - Breck Long
plate
Europeany (0) (2) fill
Long
Rome
February 15, 1935
My dear Chief:
The Abyasinian campaign is uppermost in Italian thought for the
moment. I have telegraphed rather fully and assume that you have
seen my reports of developments from here, but it is the larger
aspects of the thing which are not so apparent and which I am not
willing to reduce to writing in official despatch but which intrigue
the imagination and lead to long-time deductions and which I will
attempt to lay before you - always with the thought that they are
tentative conclusions.
It begins to be somewhat clear in my mind that the conversations
in Rome at the time of the visit of Laval laid the basis for a very
close cooperation between France and Italy, as I suggested in my
last letter under date of February 8, and which proceeded to an
extent which, in my mind, practically amounts to an alliance against
Germany. But to get Italy on the side of France in direct opposition
to Germany Italy had to be bought. The price was the subject of the
discussion in Rome. For years - since the War - Italy had been
clamoring for additional territory in Africa, and France had taken
the position that she would give her some. In Rome she made out
a deed to some, but it was only a worthless little strip of sand
to the south of the southern boundary of Tripoli. It really amounted
The President
February 15, 1935
to nothing. It is of no practical value, but it did serve to straighten
out the line of the Italian frontier and to define it exactly and to
serve as an actual (even if worthless) concession on the part of
France to the demands of Italy.
But in addition to that, France has undoubtedly given her consent
to Italian penetration and occupation of Ethiopia. England has, in my
opinion, not agreed but is cognizant of the situation and has served
notice that the district around Lake Tana must not be interfered with.
Lake Tana is the source of the Blue Nile, and the English have large
ideas about control of the flow of the Nile (J. G. White and Company
had some kind of a contract with the Abyssinian Government which has
never been executed to build a dam there). But the English apparently
are making it easy for the Abyssinians there and are preparing public
opinion in England and bolstering the Italian hand by the nature
of the Press articles which are published in Great Britain. The
French are doing the same thing with the Press and are making it
easier for the Italians. In addition to that they have agreed to
send some troops to French Somaliland to reinforce their garrisons
there. This is additional justification for the Italians. It has
been reported, but not confirmed, that two train loads of French
troops passed through Florence this week moving south. The morning
Press states officially that France is reinforcing her garrison
there. My landlord, Count Borromeo, who is an industrialist
The President
February 15, 1935
and lives in Milan, told me yesterday that it was well understood
in important circles in Milan that the French were paying the bills
for the Italian military activity. It is probable that rather than
give up any territory in Africa the French have decided to make a
financial contribution to permit Italy to carve it out for herself.
I think the French Ambassador has intentionally tried to mislead
me by sending me a special message to the effect that no movement was
contemplated in Africa but that Italy's maneuver was for the benefit
of Germany. I discount this statement.
I also believe that the British Ambassador is less than frank with
me. I had a conversation with him last night in which he minimized the
whole movement in Abyssinia and said that in his opinion all that was
necessary was for the Ethiopians to withdraw twenty miles and establish
a neutral zone; that the Italians had no intention of joining Eritrea
with Somaliland around back of British and French Somaliland: and
that he felt that 20,000 to 25,000 troops would be all that Italy
would send.
We happen to know that the Italian Government has been busily
engaged in their map making department preparing detailed maps of all
of Ethiopia. This has been going on since last May. We know that
pith helmets and tropical equipment have been manufactured in great
quantities and are being furnished troops as they depart. We know that
the factories in Milan have been working for months day and night
making all kinds of ammunition and equipment as well as tanks,
-4-
The President
February 15, 1935
airplanes, bombs, trucks, and machine guns. We know that from the
ports of Trieste, Venice, Genoa, Leghorn, Naples, and Ancona (We
think also from Bari and from Brindisi) there have been continuing
shipments of material and supplies. We know that at least 30,000
men have been sent away from Italy. We know that there have been
drafts from the military classes as far back as 1893 (one as far back
as 1884 - making him 51 years old), of specialists in mechanics,
motors, air, and medicine. We know that the large sections of the
classes of 1909, 1910, 1912, and 1913 have been drafted and practically
all of the class of 1911. Some have been given notices calling
them within twenty-four hours. I talked yesterday to a man of the
class of 1893 who was in the militia and has been drafted and is
now a Captain in the regular army. His orders are to sail on the 18th.
He wanted me to have him relieved from duty on the grounds that he
was an employee of the American Consulate - which I couldn't.
My Military Attache is unwilling to risk an estimate as to the
number of men which would be justified as an expeditionary force
based on the supplies which have been sent. He feels there is not
enough specific information. However, I am conscious of the fact that
we know only a very small part of what has actually been shipped.
However, six months ago I learned that horses had been bought
in Canada and mules in Oklahoma and had arrived in Italy and had
-5-
The President
February 15, 1935.
been shipped to Italian East Africa. Mules are still being imported.
The American S.S. QUISTCONCK landed fifty mules from Huston, Texas,
and the Captain of the ship states that all the ships of that line
are engaged in transporting mules from Gulf ports to Italy, and it
is reported that 10,000 mules are involved in the purchase and
transfer.
Now there is only one use for mules in an army. They are no
good on the flat costal plains, which are practically desert. They
are no doubt intended for mountain work and to carry mountain artillery.
If the operation involves as many as 5,000 mules, it means rather a
large-scale venture into the mountains. And I am satisfied that the
British Ambassador and the French Ambassador are playing the game and
trying to leave the impression that the Italian Government is not
doing any extraordinary thing and are trying to justify the action of
their 0180 Governments in the light of public opinion.
NOW briefly I see this picture - that the rainy season will
begin in Ethiopia about the time you receive this letter - about March 1.
NO extensive military operations will take place then. In May and
June the rains will be leas, but the ground will still be soft.
However, airplane activities and light movements across the desert
can be successfully undertaken. In July and August there will be
some heavier rains. But beginning in September the weather will
permit any operation. They will send out airplanes and bomb any
paso
The President
February 15, 1935
concentration of Abyssinian troops. They will scatter the tribes.
They will then move up machine gun units and occupy the territory.
The will move up heavier units, including the mules, and will
penetrate the mountains, following always in the wake of the machine
guns and the lighter movements and will attempt to reach Addis Abeba,
which is 500 miles by railroad from the port of Gibuti. It is
probable that the objective can be attained during November and December
and a subjugation of part of the territory can by that time be made
sufficient to satisfy Italian desires for the time being and to join
the two colonies of Eritrea and Somaliland. The French will pay
the bills; italy's African claims will be washed out - and by that
time Italy will have - if successful - a well-trained body of
veterans numbering in the neighborhood of 200,000 men which can be
used as a very fine unit around which to build a big army.
The scene may then be transferred to Europe. If Germany does
not play ball and if it is necessary to operate against her, Italy
and France, with the Little Entente and Russia, will be in a position
to make sure that Germany is defeated - with the help of England,
and at least her air force.
Because there is one phase of this that cannot be overlooked.
Mussolini will have a large army south of the Sues Canal. It will
be absolutely at the mercy of England. The Italian colonial veterans
in
&
The President
February 15, 1935
will be no use in a European war unless they can be returned to
the German front. And with those troops south of Suez, Italy will
be in the hand of England and must play ball with France and
England, or on whatever side England should desire. Else the
troops would probably not get back through the Suez Canal.
This Abyssinian movement is not popular in Italy. I hear from
all sides that the sober and thoughtful people are far from
enthusiastic. The wealthy class is still wondering about how it is
going to be paid for. They have heard that France is going to do
it, but they are not quite sure. If France does not do it, they
will have to. The poor people that have to go in the ranks are
objecting strenuously. Of course there is always that enthusiastic
age of youth which accepts any military activity as a venture. But
by and large, as I hear it from all over Italy, it is not a popular
movement. Whether the British and French Press can "educate" their
public to approval of Italy's intended activities remains to be
seen, but it is certain that the French control of the League of
Nations suffices to exclude Ethiopia from the benefits which might
be attained by the mediation of the League. Incidentally I hear -
and it might be worth inquiring from Geneva - that all the old maps
of Abyssinia which were the property of the League and which showed
definite boundaries of the country have been removed and are now
-8-
The President
February 15, 1935
absent. All of the maps I have seen recently in the Italian, French,
and British papers show no boundary between Abyssinia and Eritrea
or between Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland, though the boundaries
between the British, French, and Italian Somalilands are definitely
fixed and between the French and British Somalilands and Abyasinia.
The map attached is an example.
Liarsan
STATE
D reo 200 you
Chilometri
One
Cassale Agordaf
Asmárá
so
Migrat
2
Socala
Assis
Usine
Lego no
ADEN Golfo di Aden
Apcila
Geneni
(Nones
Name
Manterer
Dirgine
SOMALIA
Burde
ADDIS ASEBA
Harrar
Ini BRITANNICA
A
o
P
Sessebeneh
Sahodle
Uarandab
Name
false
Turil
Granti
Burgi
Bedie
Salele
Date
⑈
BeletDen
given
Lage
Rodelife
APRICA
Conadiscio
ORIENTALE
BRITANNICA
Clisimate
This is a long rambling screan and I apologize, but I think it
is worth considering in view of the possibility of a European
-9-
The President
February 15, 1935
struggle - which no observer in Europe can yet discount.
Affect ionately and respectfully,
Breckinridge 10mg
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
PSF Long
7ᵗʰ
Italy
@
March 9, 1935.
Dear Breck:-
Those letters of yours are extra-
ordinarily interesting even though they are
pessimistic in tone. I fear I must agree with
you about the general situation. We, too, are
going through a bad case of Huey Long and Father
Coughlin influenza - the whole country aching
in every bone. It 1s an internal disease, not
external as it seems to be in Europe.
These are without doubt the most
hair-trigger times the world has gone through
in your life time or mine. I do not even
exclude June and July, 1914, because at that
time there was economic and social stability,
with only the loom of a war by Governments
in accordance with preconceived ideas and
prognostications. Today there is not one
element alone but three or more.
Keep on writing to me.
Always sincerely,
Honorable Breckinridge Long,
American Embassy,
Home,
Italy.
PSF Long
wis
Rome
February 21, 1935
My dear Chief:
I seem to be writing you very frequently these days, but I am
confident in the belief that if you could sit here as I do and could
come in such close contact with the rumors of war and with the
actual preparations to engage in war, that you would feel disposed
to write as I do.
There is no doubt in my mind that Europe is headed straight
for war. Italy is practically on a war basis today. While it cannot
be proven, I am morally certain that the whole of the class of 1911
has been mobilized. That means in the neighborhood of 250,000 men.
In addition to that, there have been specialists in motors, air,
and engineering called back to the colors from many classes. In
addition to that, it is inferred from the Press account that as
many as 70,000 of the Black Shirt Militia is to be added to the
rolls. That will mean a total of somewhere between 350,000 and
400,000 men under arms.
A great deal of noise and publicity is attending the embarkation
of small quantities of troops from Naples. Nothing is being said
of the vast mobilization in Sicily. It is estimated there are
100,000 men mobilized in that part of Sicily from Messina down to
Siracusa.
-2-
The President
February 21, 1935.
In addition to that, the Supreme Council of the Defense has
been in session and has broken all precedent by having made a public
announcement in the form of a communique giving a summary of the
decisions of the Council. It is published on the front page of the
morning papers under stream-line headers which read "How the Regime
has liberated Fascist Italy from the bands interfering with war"-
"The Supreme Council of the Defense has decided the steps indis-
pensable to the Nation because an eventual war-like force has been
developed for conditions to insure victory" - etc. etc. It is all
accompanied by an editorial headed "Ready for any eventuality."
In continuation of the thought expressed in my last letter to
you under date of February 15. I am more and more convinced that these
people expect war in Europe during 1936 - if not sooner - and that
they are ready for it. Their embargo on all imports, which has been
announced since I last wrote to you but which I have feared and
predicted for six months - just puts into the hands of the Govern-
ment entire control over all imports. It is a war measure pure and
simple. They foresee German objections to the arrangements proposed
by England. They foresee the continuation of Germany's preparedness
for war. They believe that Germany is not yet ready. They look
with some trepidation at the unstable political conditions of France
and fear that Flandin may not last another six months. They
foresee the possibility of internal conflict in France and that
Germany will be free to pursue her aims in Austria, Hungary, Czecho-
slovakia, and elsewhere with the possible reservation that the
-3-
The President
February 21, 1935.
waving of a German flag on the French frontier would solidify the
nation. They see England committed to air warfare with the
inevitable consequence of participation in other forms of military
activity against Germany, provided France is attacked and
provided France, if it should blow up internally, will give Germany
the free hand to the southward and eastward, which would deny
the probability of British participation, because it would not be
directed against France.
The Italians do not like the air arrangement which England has
proposed, because it does not commit England to help Italy in case
the latter country has difficulty with Germany. The arrangement
only contemplates mutual assistance between France, England, and
Germany, or France, Italy, and Germany. So that if France should
blow up and Germany started into Austria, Italy would be faced with
the problem of stopping her single-handed.
In any event, Italy is preparing for what she thinks is a
certain eventuality. Thile no responsible statesman in Italy will
admit it, I am just as certain of it as I am that I am sitting in
this chair.
If this develops in Europe within the next twenty months, Japan
will start to over-run the East. Russia may have all her attention
occupied with Japan, or she may simply throw a sufficient cordon
along the mountains east of Baikal in the neighborhood of Chita
to hold the Japanese there while she participates in the European
-4-
The President
February 21, 1935.
show with the expectation that she will later attend to Japan.
That leaves the two Americas out, and I hope with every fervent
wish that we can stay out of the devastating show and fulfill our
real destiny as trustee X the future of the civilization which we
have in America and with which we can subsequently revive the world.
But I think we must contemplate that Europe will be at war within
two years. I believe we must take into almost definite consideration
that fact in making our plans for the future. Personally I cannot
see how it can be escaped. The national traditions, the religious
prejudices, the local animosities of all these peoples and the strict
discipline of each of the Continental States (except France) over the
persons under their respective jurisdictions, render unnecessary the
creation of a public spirit. The only alternative is that the people
will refuse to fight through some manifestation of social disorder
amounting in the last analysis to Bolshevism. It is hard to contemplate
the recrudescence of disorder in Italy and in Germany under the
present regimes. Nevertheless it is possible. It may not take the
form of the theoretical Communism. It may, if it should develop,
simply assume the form of opposition to established government
and manifest itself in a tense terrorism and anarchy.
So the people may refuse to fight. But unless they do, and unless
armies refuse to move to the front, I see no escape from a real
cataclysm. While the Italian movement. in Abyssinia is not popular
with the people, and while there is a lack of enthusiasm and some
-5-
The President
February 21, 1935.
some grumbling and a great deal of criticism - yet the troops go. If
they should fail in Abyssinia and have a debacle which would affect
the preatige of Mussolini and bring about a change of government in
Italy, the general picture would not be changed, except to the
extent of Italy's participation on the grand scale.
I am not an optimist about the future of Europe. From where I
sit there are only visible preparations for the conflict, which all
recognize as being indicative of the future of Europe. All agree that
if it should come it would be epoch-marking. The only difference
in the opinions which are permitted to be expressed is to the
proximity or imminence of the movement.
Very respectfully,
Ricklay Breckinridge Long.
P. S. Since dictating the above I have had
at luncheon at my residence and have had a
long talk with Margherita Sarfatti, whom
The President
you saw in Washington last year and whom you
will recognize as a former associate of
The White House
Mussolini and who still is probably conscious
of his mental processes. She agrees in
Washington, D. C.
substance with B.W everything I have written above.
PSFiLong
PM
Rome
April 5. 1935.
My dear Chief:
The European political situation is marking time until the meeting
at Stresa on the 11th. That meeting does not promise to produce anything
conclusive. It will probably develop into a larger subsequent meeting
either with or without Germany. That subsequent meeting will probably
consider some limitation of armament and/or some kind of a general non-
aggression pact.
The limitation of armament question will start badly if each of them
send back to the conference their old-time representatives. These men have
known each other for years - and sat across the table from each other -
have each committed themselves to definite proposals - have each declined
to accede to the point of view of the other - have each explained their
respective positions - and have each 30 definitely assumed positions from
which they cannot recede without losing face that it will be very difficult
for them to get anywhere. What they need in any future discussion of
armament amongst European Powers is a New Deal in conferees. If they would
each send fresh men, there would be a much better chance for them to get
together. As it is now, each of them knows each of the other ones and knows
their position - and they are at an impasse.
I do not look for any blow-up, though one can never tell what will
happen in case someone should get excited and make a mistake - at least
-2-
The President
April 5. 1935.
under the circumstances that exist here with a lot of French troops on
the border and nearly a million men in Italy under arms and military
activity all over the Continent of Europe. Nevertheless, it looks
quiet for the time being.
Notwithstanding this weakness, there are some rumblings of a preventive
war. It is not heard from the tops of the Government but in the second and
third strata of Government officials and from at least one careful and
responsible source recently in high position (De Francisci, who has just
finished a long service as Minister of Justice). The members of my
Embassy have heard them speak furtively and hold out the possibility of
an attack on Germany before Germany gets better armed. I discount the
probability, but my ears are always close to the ground, and I report
for possible reference in the next three or four weeks.
These are truly ticklish days. It is the aftermath of another show
which is 30 appalling. with the social unrest widespread as it is, and
with the certain exaggeration of it as the sequel to another war, I can
only shudder to think of our social situation a year after another
conflict.
Affectionately and respectfully
Breckinridge Long
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
P.SF:
esfiting
May 8, 1935.
Dear Breck:-
I hope you are not right but I
fear you are.
I am looking forward to seeing
you the end of June or the first part of July,
and it looks as though Congress will still be
here.
Always sincerely,
Honorable Breckinridge Long,
American Embassy,
Rome,
Italy.
troin
Rome
April 19, 1935.
My dear Chief:
The Stresa Conference has cleared up the situation to a con-
siderable extent. Prior to that there was a great deal of
anxiety. I think it was more intense in Italy than in any of the
other European countries as far as I can judge. Here there was
every indication of preparation for and expectancy of military
activities. The authorities at Rome even were preparing the
civilian population for airplane activities and getting them
acustomed to such activity by keeping continually in the air all
day and well into the night airplanes which flew low over the
city. This went on for about ten days. In Milan and Naples
they held gas attack drills, and in every possible way the
Administration brought to the attention of the people the
possibility of impending military activities.
That has all changed since the Stresa Conference adjourned
and not a single airplane has appeared in the sky. Everything has
quieted down, and the whole tempo has been altered.
I am sending by this pouch a despatch of comment. It is
my No. 1053, and consists of an analysis of the agreements reached
at Stresa. There is also another one going, giving a history of
-2-
The President
April 19, 1935.
it, but that is all history and just for record purposes.
As I see it, they have put a military ring around Germany.
In my last conversation with Suvich he indicated the policy of
his Government for the present and the future by saying that
Germany would not listen to reason and had to be met by a manifesta-
tion of force. Suvich is convinced that Germany has been
stopped and bottled up and her aggressive disease cured. I am
sorry that I do not share that belief. You think I am a
pessimist. As a matter of fact I am a realist. I see the
situation in Europe as it exists. They are all prepared for
war, and they have got to have it. War is the only cure for
the malady with which Europe is affected. There are three and a
half million men under arms here today. The Assistant Military
Attache has just returned from Milan on a tour of inspection.
He was allowed to inspect very little. The factories were
closed to him. However, he discovered that the airplane factories
were being enlarged so that their production would be ten planes
a day instead of one. The automobile manufacturers are en-
gaged in turning out machine guns. The whole manufacturing show
is working day and night making military equipment and supplies.
The national hatreds, jealousies, ambitions, and their racial,
religious, and language differences, with the super-structure
now of trade barriers, have got Europe cut up to such an extent
that there is no way for them to stay together. Once the
-3-
The President
April 19, 1935.
psychology of this moment has passed they will revert to the same
situation as existed a few months ago, and it will gradually work
up again to another high pitch.
Germany is not going to change her characteristics or her
nature. She is not going to throw her ambitions to the winds. The
ring which has now been put around her will yield in spots in the
east and south east to German diplomacy and will weaken under the
strain of fear of Germany, which will lead them to accept something
of German leadership rather than French leadership. The French
domination is of military and political alliances. The German
infusion is of blood and race. It runs all through Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Jugoslavia, and Austria.
The only cure for it is a war, from which there will emerge
a real victor. There are only two Governments in Europe capable of
being a real victor. One is Germany, and the other is Russia.
I doubt if Russian education and technique is sufficient to
establish itself in a dominant position throughout western and
central Europe. I believe the German technique, determination,
and character is such that it can. I shudder to think of a
Russian domination of Europe. While a German domination would
be hard and cruel - at least in the beginning - it would be an
intensification of a culture which is more akin to ours than would
be that of Russia. Further than that, if Germany should be
dominant throughout the greater part of Europe, she would act
as a bulwark against the westward progress of Russia, and that
-4-
The President
April 19, 1935.
Government would be confined to Ruasia and Siberia and would
not have its strength tapped in the European struggle and would
be a stronger resistance against Japan. With a Russia
successful in Europe and spreading westward, her attention
would be taken from Japan, and that country would be even
more arrogant in the Far East.
Nevertheless, Stresa has calmed the waters for the time
being and postponed the evil day.
Incidentally, the Assistant Military Attache here has
been ordered home. His relief will soon arrive, but the new
man will not have contacts and will not speak the language. I
am writing Bill Phillips and asking if they can possibly
postpone Brady's departure for four or five months so that he
can break in this new man. I think it almost necessary to
have a flying officer here who is actually in touch with the
men from whom he can get information, and a new man cannot
do it within the space of, conservatively speaking, six months.
For the good of the Government's information here I think it
ought to be done if it is possible under the War Department
regulations, and both Brady and his chief, the Military Attache,
are agreeable.
I am expecting to leave here the latter part of June to
pay a visit to Dr. Cary Grayson and will hope to see you the
first part of July - provided they don't get near the boiling
-5-
The President
April 19, 1935.
point here before that.
Affect ionately and Respectfully,
May Breckiny Idea Long
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
PSF Long
jue
Rome
May 10, 1935.
My dear Chief:
The war clouds have all brushed away, and the troubled waters
have flattened out. The proposed Danubian Conference, which is one
of the things to come out of the Stresa Conference, is the object
of their present activities. Each of the Governments is being
consulted - except Germany. The present effort is to arrange a
program and draft resolutions to be adopted. Germany is not being
consulted. She will be invited to the Conference like the others
are, but Von Hassell, the German Ambassador, tells me that Germany
would resent being presented with a fait accompli, as she feels
she would be presented in case they should all consult with one
another and come to an agreement about program and resolutions
and then ask her to come down formally and approve the program
which has more or less ostensibly been warm up against her. There
is some nerit in the German position. I discussed the situation
yesterday afternoon with Sir Eric Drunmond. He feels that these
other Governments have had 30 much more experience with Germany
than England has had that they may be right in their present
policy. He feels that England started out as a mediating friend
but found that she would have to align herself more or less with
the other Governments.
-2-
The President
May 10, 1935.
It seems to me there is a half-way course - which would be more
or less the Anglo-Saxon point of view and which would represent
a moderate attitude toward Germany and one not calculated to
antagonize her further and at the same time would be a broard
statesmanlike view of the situation which actually exists in
Europe. Whether we like it or not the facts are that Germany has
been rather harshly treated since 1918.
The Governments of the countries surrounding Germany are having
their difficulties in getting together, even on such a matter as
the resolutions to be adopted by the Danubian Conference. It is
bringing into pointed relief the differences between Jugoslavia
and Italy, and Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and France and Poland -
differences which have many evidences of insolubility.
In the meantime I am going off to Tripoli, sailing tomorrow
and returning Sunday, the 26th of May. I will try to get a general
idea of the agricultural, economic, and political developments in
Tripoli and expect to go down into the desert. I want to go to
an oasis called Gadames. It is pronounced as if we were swearing
at ourselves! It lies two days by motor south of Tripoli on
the Tunisian border, quite peaceful and serene, the seat of a
white camel cavalry regiment. I also will look at Leptis
Magna, which has been dug out of the sand and continues as
the most perfect architectural example of "Greek" art extant, though
it was actually done by the Romans in the reign, I believe of
The President
May 10, 1935.
Septimius Severus. It was gradually swallowed up by the desert
and drifting sand and has been preserved in all of its details,
and since its careful excavation they say it is a magnificent
white marble city right on the shores of the blue Mediterranean.
Incidentally I am going to present your medal to Balbo and will stay with
him at his palace during part of my visit, though it is quite well
understood that I am not going on a visit of state and that I
am just going in the ordinary course as an Ambassador and as
a friend of Balbo.
I sympathize with you in the difficulties you are having,
and you have been handling them in a masterful way. I will be
over there the latter part of June till about the tenth of July,
and I hope during that time you will have an opportunity to
let me see you.
Affectionately and respectfully,
Brecking Idge Long
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
PSF F Lorg
Park The Avenue Vanderbilt at Thirty Fourth Botel Street
New York 5/21/35-
Dear Mid and
Will you are that
the Passident psts Their
note ?
Many thouse - and
au never
his
hug
PSF Long
or
THE BON-AIR-VANDERBILT
VANDERBILT Fotel
AUGUSTA, GEORGIA
Thirty Fourth Street EAST at Park Avenue
6/21/35
they dear chief
you message an Informationce Tensa is O.K.
you hor taken The issues from The "afts"
Now Twout to the you do the sevel thing
with the "rights" They are standing on the
Constitution and weing the flag. He prople
like their condition and it can & made
an senu Essay issue. 4th 1 July is
coming. you can talls about the qualitation
and on tradition -ad take that essued
away from them. you Know how to do
I - and 9 hope you will.
Gan sailing along an her Honnandis
-Cary - Bruis both roly Ed.
Can nin -
leg 10mg
PSF
Long
file
Long
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
September 11, 1935
My dear Mr. President:
I desire to call your attention to the enclosed
telegram No. 567 from Mr. Long in Rome, as this may be
regarded as the result of his considered study of con-
ditions observed since his return to his post about a
week ago.
The developments in Geneva, the high lights of
which you have been kept in touch with through copies
of the more important telegrams we have received from
Geneva and our missions abroad, are not very different
from the picture as presented in the press despatches.
There appears to be a very cynical attitude toward the
possibilities of preventing the war and at present it
would appear that the more important countries in Geneva
are proceeding on the theory that Italy must make some
demonstration of force in Ethiopia before she will come
to a sensible arrangement and settlement of the whole
affair
The President,
The White House.
- 2 -
affair. I shall keep you closely informed of any 1m-
portant developments that come to our attention here.
Faithfully yours,
Enclosure:
Telegram 567, September 10, 6 p.m.,
From Rome.
MJP
This telegram must be
Rome
closely paraphrased
before being communi-
Dated September 10, 1935.
cated to anyone. (B)
Rec'd 4:15 p.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
567, September 10, 6 p. m.
CONT
I
There remains no vestige of doubt in my mind that the
determination of Italy to proceed in Africa is irrevocable
nor that any opposition will be met by subjected mass
attack from whatever quarter opposition is offered. My
contacts with the people, reports of the attitude of the
man on the street and my observation of the antipathy to
England on the part of the civilian and the soldier
convince me that the entire population, both civil and
military, are in entire accord with the policies of
Mussolini as developed up to this point and as prospected
for the future. Each issue of the press gives additional
expression to the national determination to proceed to
war and to brook interference from no source.
Step by step over a period of many months the Italian
plans have developed. They now find themselves with more
than two hundred thousand men south of the Suez Canal and
at
REP
2-#567, From Rome, Sept. 10, 6 p.m.
at least three more divisions preparing to go. To
withdraw those troops would be a defeat. The effect
upon the regime here would be disastrous. Hastened
on by the gradual approach of an economic crisis at
home I have the distinct impression that they would
welcome opposition from England as an opportunity
to demonstrate their imaginary and even possible
superiority of strength in the Eastern Mediterranean.
From their posts in Sicily, Malta is only a few
minutes by air and the coast of Libya are only an
hour removed from Cairo, Alexandria and Port Said.
Their press heaps abuse upon those who have the
temerity to stand up at Geneva and express thoughts
in opposition to the Italian objectives, castigates
the Socialists of France and of England who dare to
spea!: of sanctions and inveighs against the opposition
of Bolshevism united with the "piracy of plutocracy",
as they choose to designate the Rickett affair, and
alleges that these are all combined in a worthless
effort to block the progress of Italy.
My impression is that they are quite willing to
accept the delay occasioned by the meetings at Geneva
as
REP
3-,/567, From Rome, Sept. 10,,6p.m
as it affords them additional time for preparation
and to hurry to completion a number of newly bought
ships for transport purposes now being transformed
in the harbor of Genoa. I am equally impressed with
the position in which they find themselves and from
which it is now impossible to withdraw without
suffering the effect of a defeat. Every indication
points to a well calculated, well prepared, cold,
hard and cruel prosecution of their preconceived plans
using the instrumentality of an army and navy almost
fanatic in its devotion to, and idolatry of, one man
and worked up to an emotional pitch which is unique
in modern history.
I wish I could send some word to encourage the
thought that there might be some compromise arrived at at
Geneva or elsewhere but I am led to the firm belief
that no compromise is possible except on Mussolini's
own terms and that unless they are accepted he will
proceed to his objectives in spite of world opinion
and in opposition to any force that may be raised
against him. The only alternative is military capitula-
tion.
At
REP
4-#567, From Rome, Sept.10,6p.m.
At the same time I should invite your attention to
the lasting effect that this situation necessitates on
European international situations and in changing
political alignments. The settled friendship between
Italy and England is gone, not to reappear for
generations. Today the press is featuring the friendly
exchange of expressions between Hitler and the new
Italian Ambassador at Berlin presumably as a political
warning to France that she must adhere to her Italian
alliance. But irrespective of the future arrangements
Italy may be able to make with Germany, and it would
seem impossible their clashing interests could be
reconciled, the changed situation between Italy and
England has brought an entirely new element into the
already complicated European situation. Italy's
action in the Eastern Mediterranean is a direct threat
to the British Empire, and, if successful in establishing
itself in Ethiopia, the Suez Canal will have a political
importance to Italy equal almost to that of England.
If with 200,000 soldiers south of the canal it assumes
its present importance to Italy it will have a greater
one when they achieve their ambition to have ten million
colonists
REP
5-#567, From Rome, Sept.10,6p.m.
colonists there. And the necessity for an alternative
route of communication from Ethiopia to Italy through
Lybia and across the Sudan will not be long in
developing and will be part of the efforts to solidify
their position in Ethiopia if their objective is
accomplished there. So that from many angles the present
situation is fraught with danger not only for the present
but for the future and I fear that we shall have the
reverbations of it in the international relations of the
world during the life of the present generation at
least -- unless a decisive military defeat is suffered.
No other missions informed.
LONG
CIB
SMS
PSF Long
Hyde Park, N. Y.
September 19, 1935.
Dear Breck:-
That is an extraordinarily interesting
letter of yours of September sixth. An I dictate
this, the situation at Geneva still drags. You are
right about the British feeling of the threat to the
Empire.
What a commentary this whole situation
is on what we like to think of as a modern and
excellent civilization!
You and Dodd have been fard more accurate
in your pessimism for the past two years thanany of
my other friends in Europe. In any event, I think
our American position is unassailable - so much so
that I really believe that even if hostilities start,
I can still make my cruise -- leaving the twenty-sixth
and getting back to Washington inside of four weeks.
I am delighted to know that your health
is so much better. Watch out for that tummy!
As ever yours,
Honorable Breokinridge Long,
American Embassy,
Rome,
Italy.
PSF Long
Rome
September 6, 1935.
My dear Chief:
This may be entirely impertinent by the time it reaches you,
but the Geneva aession may be a long and drawn-out affair. The
Italians now expect that the matter will not be decided by the
Council and will be thrown over to the Assembly meeting, and it
lasts for several weeks.
While the tone of the Italian diplomatic branch is moderate,
their intentions are definite, and some of their other declarations
more accurately express their purposes than do their expressions
to diplomatic officers. They have worked themselves into a fury
here. Every man, woman, and child in Italy today hates England.
Even if this affair should be settled amicably, I am afraid it
will leave its permanent impress upon international relations.
It will take years, if they should start today, to change public
sentiment in favor of England and to resstablish the cordial and
almost historic relations between the two countries which existed
up to four or five months ago. They have worked themselves into
a state of self-adoration and self-consciousness which leads them
to believe that they can meet any Power in battle with success.
The President
September 6, 1935.
The Italian propaganda in Egypt has been rather intense.
They have a propaganda organisation there and a large colony of citi-
sens which are organized according to Fascist groups. with
their air fleet they could make an enormous amount of trouble
for England there, and I think could have some marked temporary
success if they should come to the point of hostilities. Italy
has a large air fleet, and it is all concentrated, or capable
of being concentrated, around the Eastern Mediterranean. It is
only two and a half hours by air from the bases in Sicily to
the coast of Lybia. Lybia flanks Egypt and the Sudan on the
weat. Eritrea flanks the Sudan on the east, and when they will
have arrived in Ethiopia they will flank the Sudan on the south.
The Sues Canal assumes a particular political importance for
Italy today just as it has for England. with a large body of
men in East Africa it will be necessary for Italy to have some
communication between them and the home country. That communi-
cation can be established through Lybia and across the Sudan.
It can be also established through the Sues Canal. The Canal
route is more important than the other because of the transport
of supplies. If they are brought to the point of hostility
with England, they will attempt to take control of the Canal.
Of course this is a direct threat to the British Empire.
Without the Canal England loses her route to India, Ceylon,
-3-
The President
September 6, 1935
Burma, the Straits Settlements, Australia, and New Zealand. with
air bases on the west boundary of Egypt and the Sudan and with
air bases on the eastern and southern borders of the Sudan and
all communicating directly with supplies from Italy only two and
a half hours from the coast of Lybia, it can be understood that
their position is rather strategic.
Of course I do not believe they are going to have trouble
with England, but the situation is such that England must feel
the threat to her empire, and it is also such that Italy feels
her power in connection with it. Consequently they are emboldened
to rashness, and the high state of fanaticism to which they have
been worked renders them a very dangerous people, particularly
in view of the excellent organization which they support.
They are now in a state of excitement which might lead them
to any rash act in case of hostility, and if they found that they
could not take and use the Canal, they might, after the manner of
Sampson, attempt to destroy the temple and themselves amongst the
rest.
Provided, however, that they do not come to open hostilities
with England, and provided also that they do proceed in Ethiopia
to establish a military and political control over the country,
it will not mean that their objective has been reached. I am
conscious that I am walking on delicate ground, but it is my
firm belief that the success which probably awaits them in their
first venture from home will only lead them on to other fields.
-4-
The President
September 6. 1935.
They will be trouble-makers in Africa and will attempt to connect
Lybia and Ethiopia. Across the Red Sea they will try to re-
inforce their friendly relations with the Imam of Yemen and fortify
him in his opposition to Ibn Saud, the King of Arabia with the
object of controling that at present unoccupied and independent
country. This will not happen in the immediate future. They
will entrench themselves in Ethiopia before they venture to other
fields. But I have not the slightest doubt in my mind that they
have intentions on the eastern side of the Red Sea.
Their declarations to the effect that they had no hostile
intentions toward any British province are hardly to be taken
at their face value considering their present and recent activities
in Egypt and their incitement in the Italian press to Egypt to
assume its independence.
So that whatever the outcome of the present difficulties
being thrashed out at Geneva we are going to be confronted with
a continuing source of trouble in the future - and that on several
accounts. First, the threat to the British Empire in the east;
second, the failure of the League of Nations to be useful for
anything outside of Europe with the possible dropping of the League
as an instrument of policy by England: third, a reversion to the
pre-League theory of practical politics and alliances: and fourth,
the distrust which will exist in the future between Italy and
England and will serve to disrupt the solidarity of the three
-5-
The President
September 6, 1935.
western Powers. The result of this last will be an aggrandizement
of the power and importance of Germany and an extension, perhaps
stealthily, of her influence southerly and easterly.
There is a report in circulation that Mussolini is mad -
that he has lost his reason. He has not. He is just as cool and
calm and deliberate and has prepared for this present situation
through the last year and a half in a stealthy but deliberate
manner. Each economic and financial move, attributed at the
time to the pressure of economic necessity, is now revealed as
a part of his military preparations. It is quite possible that
they have been hurried because of the economic conditions that
existed, by its need for expansion and the necessity to show that
they are a world power and their fanatical belief in the power
of their own organization and in the efficacy of that thing they
call Fascism which has led them on and which is today driving
them. They are not mad. They are deliberate, determined, obdurate,
ruthless, and almost vicious. The whole organization is as one
man. The efficiency of the army has been increased enormously
till it is not recognizable as the same military organization,
and the whole civil and military elements of the population are
moving as pieces of a single organism, spurred on by the thought
that failure means utter collapse and that they must succeed.
So whichever way Geneva goes there is trouble on our hands
in Europe for years to come. A new order is in the making, and
-6-
The President
September 6, 1935.
the results of it cannot yet be foreseen.
I hurry this off to catch you before you leave on your
western trip. I am talking to the British Ambassador this
evening, but it will be after the pouch closes, and I want to
put this in this pouch, because I am not sure that it will reach
you before you get away.
You may be interested to know that my health is much better
and that after several weeks in hospitals that I am looking forward
to a real return to health. The ulcer has gone, but my stomach
is still suffering from some of its effects.
I hope you are well and that you will have a wonderful trip
and get some rest and recreation, which you 80 fully deserve and
need.
with every good wish and expressions of affectionate regard
I am
Yours as ever,
Breckinridge Long
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
PS7
piemel
(5)/2)
Rome
October 30, 1935.
My dear Chief:
I expect I am a good deal of a cynic. Whether I am or not, I am
unable to see any moral element in this whole war. To me, it is not a
holy war.
Certainly Italy has not a leg to stand on, either moral or legal, in
her invasion of Ethiopia. She has been condemned, and properly condemned,
by the League of Nations and by practically every Government in the world.
But in my opinion the League action would not have taken place without
the driving force of England.
While Italy has no moral justification, I doubt very much whether
England has. The Italians believe, and I expect there is a good deal of
truth in it, that England was preparing a commercial penetration of
Abyssinia which would have enveloped the country and given her a political
control which would have been peacefully consumated within a period of
about three years. The Italians had been trying for many years by peaceful
means to come to some understanding with the Negus 80 that they could
extend their commercial activities, but they were not as smart as the
British (who are past masters in that game), and they were met by the able
and influential opposition to their schemes on the part of the British
Minister at Adis Ababa, who had established a considerable influence with
the Negus, reinforced by various British official and private activities
throughout the country.
The President
October 30, 1935.
The Italians believe, and I expect with some foundation, that the
Ual Ual incident was brought on through the activities of a Colonel Clifford.
It is certain that he was there with a band of Ethiopian warriors and by
his presence and actions on the spot created a situation from which neither
side would withdraw. He was supposed to be defining the boundary between
British Somaliland and Ethiopia, but Ual Ual is many many miles to the
south of British Somaliland, and he does not seem to have had any reasonable
explanation for his presence or for his activities there. The Italians
think that the Ual Ual incident precipitated a situation which they had
hoped would not develop. Of course I doubt that statement, and I have
reason to believe, as I reported to the Department long before the Ual Ual
incident, that they were bound on a military venture against Abyssinia.
Nevertheless, the Ual Ual incident did happen, and Colonel Clifford was
there and seems to have been instrumental in creating a situation which
brought it about. It is now rumored that Colonel Clifford is again -
or still - active in Ethiopia in connection with Chertov, who has
organized a British syndicate to finance the explorative operations
under the concession he received through the Abyasinian Minister in
London and also in connection with Ricketts, who has reappeared on the
scene and who still maintains that the concession he received in favor
of the Vacujim Standard 011 Company is valid but is to be operated now
in favor of a British syndicate, probably the same one which Chertov
represents.
We remember the British opposition to the J. G. White Company at
-3-
The President
October 30, 1935.
the time it received its concession to build the dam near Lake Tsana. We
have always known that the British have viewed with great jealousy any
activity by anybody else in Ethiopia. Also we have for many years been
witnessing British commercial and industrial penetration of the backward
countries and have wondered at the pink spots on the world map.
Viewing it all and discounting the allegations on both sides and
deruding the whole thing of frills, I think it stands out very fairly that
the British and the Italians were having a rivalry for the economic
penetration and subsequent political control over Ethiopia; that British
interests were winning out; and that the Italians got desperate and decided to
do something about it; and the whole thing got precipitated by either the
reckless or the purposeful act of Colonel Clifford at Ual Ual.
So that I can't get very excited about the moral standing of either
contestant.
I will say this about it, however, that while the Italians have been
crude and bisarre, yet they have been honest and have not tried to hide
from the world their plans or their ultimate intentions. It may be bad
diplomacy, but it was fair honesty.
The situation which I have reviewed existed up to the time the affair
was brought before the League of Nations. At Geneva Great Britain certainly
assumed the lead and was the dominating force. Had it not been for her
activity and probably her original encouragement to Ethiopia to bring it
before the League, nothing would have happened. But the Governments of
the world rose to what they consider to be a moral issue. It was painted
-4-
The President
October 30, 1935.
to them that Italy intended to violate Ethiopian territory, and subsequently
they were confronted with the fact that Italy had actually been the
aggressor and they so declared it.
However, long before the League met to sit on the actual question of
aggression; long before the League considered any measure of sanctions; and
long before there was a jeopardy to any national interest except that of
Ethiopia, the British fleet appeared in the Mediterranean in an enormous
demonstration of force. It was not there to carry out any mandate of
the League, for none had been given. It was not there to protect the
interests of the League of Nations or of any group or Committee of the
League. The British Ambassador here told the Italian Government it was
there to protect British interests against a possible Italian attack, and
this statement itself is sufficient to divest the presence of the British
fleet of any holy motive such as is now being proclaimed for it in the
electoral speeches in England by Mr. Hoare and Mr. Baldwin. The plain
truth is it had no authority from anybody but the British Government and
no purpose but to intimidate the Italians from prosecuting their threat
to British ambitions in Ethiopia and the threat that their presence in
Ethiopia would be to British Empire interests - including the Sues Canal.
The Sues Canal was not at that time threatened, but it was in the cards
that it would be threatened in years to come if the Italians attained a
big colony at the southern end of the Red Sea and on the flank of the
Sudar. Nevertheless the activity of the British navy was one of pure
selfishness and had no moral justification, though they have been good
publicists and propagandists and have associated themselves with the moral
side of the question.
The British fleet moved about the 25th of August. Immediately the
Italian fleet began to assemble in southern waters. The next thing,
beginning September 11th, the Italians answered the British threat by
surreptitiously dropping down three divisions to Libya and planting them
on the Egyptian border. These divisions consisted of mechanized units
and had somewhere between 200 and 500 airplanes. It was all under the
direction of Balbo. There is a fairly good road runs along the
Mediterranean littoral of Egypt. From a place called Solum on the border
it is passable to a place called Matruh, which is about one-third of
the distance to Alexandria. From Matruh there is a rather good road
to Alexandria. The distance from the border to Alexandria is about
300 miles. These mechanized units could have made the run in four or
five days. It was a distinct threat - and still is - to the Sues
Canal, and the British have been landing reinforcements from India
in Egypt in order to protect themselves there.
However, this phase worked itself out of the picture of the League
of Nations and became a separate Anglo-Italian conflict - England trying
to protect her Empire: Italy trying to expand her colonial domain. The
cross-roads is Sues. It is a fight on the part of Italy to gain
something and on the part of England to lose nothing. One is on the
aggressive; the other on the defensive. But neither of them deserves
any sympathy from the world on moral grounds. Each of them is operating
from purely selfish motives.
-6-
The President
October 30. 1935.
I expect the fight to actually begin whether England is authorized by
the League or not. I am satisfied Italy is not going to stop her activity
in Africa unless forced to do 80 by a military defeat or as a consequence
of economic necessity. And I think England will try to prevent it sooner
or later. And if she doesn't do it now, she will have to do it ten years
from now. But first and last it will be a British fight against Italy and
not a League of Nations fight or a moral fight.
Conversations to settle the whole thing and to liquidate the whole
military program still continue. Laval, undiscouraged, is making another
proposal. But for the life of me I cannot see how any of them can be
accepted. The League has already gone on record as denouncing Italy as
an aggressor. It cannot morally now approve a settlement which would be
a partition of the territory of one of its members in favor of that
aggressor. To do so would put a premium upon aggression and would reward
Italy for having violated its most solemn obligation. If the League
should de that it would cease to be a world force or a moral organisation.
About that there is no doubt in my mind.
So that the League has either got to back down; Italy got to back
downs or England got to back down - or be whipped.
So that as I see it one of three things must happen. Either the
League goes out of business as a world force; or Italy gets ruined: or
England gets a dent put in her Empire. One of those three things has
got to happen unless - and I expect there is a good deal of truth in
-7-
The President
October 30, 1935.
this observation - your American Ambassador in Rome is just a simple little
American student with moral and legal ideas and perfectly ignorant of the
wiles of diplomacy. I am probably just a simple little fellow that ought
not to be an Ambassador because I can't see how diplomatists can deny their
solemn declarations in public without compromising their honor or the
dignity of their Government and flaunt dishonesty in the face of world
opinion. If they are honest, they can't settle it without a fight. If
they are dishonest, we ought to wash our hands of them anyhow.
The diplomatic program is to come to a settlement which will save the
face of Mussolini, the prestige of Great Britain, and the dignity of the
League of Nations. But I notice they leave the Negus out of this! I
suppose he is to be saved either by the shot and shell of the Italians or
by the moralising economic activities of England.
If we save the League and preserve the English Empire, the old world
will roll along under the gentle guidance of Great Britain for some few
years to come. But if Italy is implanted with a big colony and a persisting
ambition south of the Suez Canal, the political line-up of the world is
going to be different, and it may be very interesting.
The unthinking man is liable to look at England as a fine example of a
democracy. As far as England is concerned, she is a very nice democracy.
But as far as Great Britain and the Empire are concerned, she is just about
as great a concentration of political power as existed in Prussia prior to
1918. The British Parliament and its government speak for the Empire, but
neither Canada, nor South Africa, nor India, nor Australia, nor New
Zealand, nor any of its smaller parts has a seat in Parliament. They each
&
The President
October 30, 1935.
have their own little aggregation of legislative bodies like our states
do, but they have no representation in the policy-making body as our states
have. Parliament and its leaders speak for the Empire and act in the
name of the Empire. They have a little trouble occasionally with their
dominions and colonies on matters of internal policy, but when the Empire
speaks the dominions and colonies all vote "Aye". It is the most centralised
Government on earth today with the possible exception of Italy and Japan -
but its greater extent makes it more centralised than either - but I am
unable to think of it in the light of a democracy or as typifying the
principles of Government which we have developed in America, except in so
far as they apply to the British Isles themselves, where they are delightful
gentlemen, good traders, smart financiers, and breeders of good horses.
Yours with affection and respect,
Breckinridge Long
En other and -
The President
The White House
"a plasue a boets your houses".
Washington, D. C.
file
PSF Long
freesmal
Rome
November 8, 1935.
My dear Chief:
Since my letter to you of October 30 the situation has not changed
in any material aspect. Everybody seems to be waiting for one reason
or another. The Italians are talking about negotiation but proceeding
with their plans in Abyasinia. The British are talking about negotiation
and can do nothing until they have had their elections. The French are
talking about negotiation but trying to come to some definite understand-
ing with either Great Britain or Italy or both to help them against Germany.
The League of Nations is plodding on its weary way through committees
and sub-committees and sub=sub-committees arranging for the sanctions
program, having postponed the application of sanctions until after the
British elections.
The people here speak in future terms. The Government talks as if
it might hope for some change to come after the British elections, but
I am morally satisfied that in the bottom of their hearts they have
not the slightest hope for arriving at a settlement. My last conversation
with Mr. Suvich, which I had yesterday and which has already been
telegraphed, left me with the rather solemn understanding that they
were looking forward with rather a grim determination to eventual
trouble with England.
The President
November 8, 1935.
is I wrote you in my last letter, I think the struggle is really one
between England and Italy. The road to British empire has crossed with
the road of Italian empirical ambitions or colonial aspirations, whichever
one cares to call it. The crossroads is Sues. A clash is a definite
certainty as I see it.
I know you have thought I was a good deal of a pessimist, and I have
parried the thrust by claiming to be a realist. In whichever way you may
view me today I can only see trouble in the future. To pursue the
thought that England and Italy could have a battle, even of a comparatively
short duration and with England victorious, without involving other
countries of Europe would be to delude oneself with the thought that
there was a universal tranquility except in these two areas.
While Italian armament is a palpable and throbbing thing, the armaments
of Germany are fast in the making and of France ready made but carried
like a sword in its scabard concealed from the inquiring eyes of the
public. We even saw a year or more ago in Vienna that there was a real
army in a country which was supposed to have been disarmed, and there
are military establishments all oiled and greased in Poland, Jugoslavia,
and Russia. The conflicting interests of some of these Governments will
bring them in, and their presence will bring others in. I cannot see
just how far it will go or just which ones will become involved first,
but I am sure that if the English-Italian show starts and lasts any
considerable length of time that first one and then another will get in.
And the poor French people may blow up internally before any of it
The President
November 8, 1935.
happens. That is the only thing which seems not to be dependent upon the
first shot in another war, and there is such a great deal of unrest in
France and such a large and well organized left element that it seems
almost necessary to expect some radical change in the form of the French
Government before very long.
The truth of it is that the Italian challenge to England in the
Mediterranean has raised the specter of another military power along the
central nerve of empire. It seems to be a conflict in which Ethiopia
is a side-show and which would have come to a head somehow or other even
if there had not been an Ethiopia. The mere fact that it is Ethiopia
which brings it to a head is because there was no other place for Italy
to go. Up until fifty years ago the Continent of Africa was a dark and
unknown waste even though on its borders for thousands and thousands of
years had existed the world's only civilization. What is a stones throw
from Rome today would have required endless toil and years of work to
reach. During the fifty years in which Africa has been absorbed, the
Governments of Europe, except Italy, have had their big elices. Even
little Portugal and Belgium, countries inconsequential in size and power
to Italy, have very extensive colonies. Though Italy awoice too late, or
was hampered earlier by the incompetence of her statesmen, it remains
that Ethiopia was the place in Africa which was not already occupied by
some other European power. It also happened that the particular spot
in the hands of a European power would raise cain with various of the
British possessions scattered through Africa and Asia. And the result
-4-
The President
November 8, 1935.
is that the Italian outbreak, while it is pointed at Ethiopia, is really
aimed at the British Empire.
I think we cannot afford to look at the world as static, either
as to its philosophies, its political theories, its political jurisdictions,
or as to its geographical aspects. It was only a hundred years ago that
the Turkish Empire started at Vienna and encompassed all the Balkan
states, Turkey proper, Asia Minor, Arabia, and as far east as the
Himalaya Mountains and westward along the south side of the Mediterranean.
It exists today in a very restricted area in Asia Minor. Two hundred
years ago the Spanish Empire encompassed most of the Americas, including
most of the United States, and ruled the seas. Today it is hardly self-
supporting and practically confined to a peninsula in Europe. Such
has been the history of the world. Unless we deny the theory of change
and accept the point of view that things will always remain as they
are we cannot expect the British Empire to continue as it is. This
may not be the time for it to suffer a set-back. But whether this is
the time or not, some such ambition is sure to start the change at some
future time. Personally I do not discount the power of the Italian
military machine concentrated as it is in the eastern part of the
Mediterranean. Whether they can pay the bills to keep it going is
another thing, but in my opinion they can keep it going for nearly two
years. The start may be delayed, because I think both the British and
the Italians have a lurking idea that the other's navy has some
mysterious quality of which they are a bit afraid. But whether it is
The President
November 8, 1935.
delayed for that reason or for some other reason, sooner or later - and
my impression is sooner - this thing is going to break out into actual
open warfare and involve other nations of Europe with the chances that
it may develop into a European conflagration.
I hope you are going to keep us out. If they are going to destroy
themselves, it is because their civilization is built on those lines.
When people say to me that it would be a shame to destroy such a pure
civilization, I cannot help but remark that it is that same civilization
which has developed and produced the thing which is about to destroy it
and that consequently the strongest part of the civilization and the
most virile element of it is its power for destruction. To my mind that
is a truism, and if the cataclysm breaks and we get drawn into it, we
will not be able to relight the fires of a decent civilization. So I
fervently hope you are going to keep us out, and when I say "out" I
mean entirely out - without any possibility of being involved.
While I believe you are not entirely satisfied with the neutrality
legislation, yet to my mind it offers a very good solution, and I am
afraid you are going to have a lot of trouble with the Congress to get
it changed, except to write into the law a demand for a more strict
neutrality. The way it stands today the American people can trade at
their own risk. Any of them who are selfish enough to take the chance
are at liberty to do so without in any way involving the Government of
the United States or making it necessary for the Government to protect
them. And if the theater of war should become enlarged, the same thing
The President
November 8, 1935.
could continue without in any way involving us.
For purposes of peace I believe in international cooperation. For
purposes of war I believe in keeping out. And if we start to take sides
in order to make peace, our position is immediately compromised with
every chance that we will be drawn into the war.
If I know my "Middle West" and if I have any proper appreciation of
the sentiment of the American people lyging west of the Allegheny Mountains
and south of the Mason and Dixon Line, they want "out". And if they saw
this thing as closely as I see it and had the veil of mysticism lifted
from the picture 80 that they could see it in all of its naked reality,
I am sure they would think so all the more. Because all of these nations,
including Great Britain, have policies based on force and put their faith
in big military and naval establishments - which none of them can afford.
The Italians have tightened their belts for the sanction period and
are all set and waiting for what they fear and expect to be the opening
gun of the fight with England. I can't see any escape from it - but
just as soon as I see the slightest ray of hope, I will be the first to
admit it and will send a joyous telegram.
with every good wish and respectful and affectionate regards,
Sincerely,
Breckinridge Long
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
PSF Long
FS
This telegram must be
Rome
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
Dated November 12, 1935
to anyone. (B)
Rec'd 1:15 p. m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
822, November 12, 3 p. m.
The present seems to be an opportune moment to make
a resume of the European political crisis. It may be
opportune for the reason that the present solstice marks
the end of one period and the beginning of another. Any
account of the complicated situation is lacking in clarity
and baffling to the understanding which fails to recognize
that there are two academic struggles in Europe, sometimes
fused, sometimes seeming to be amalgamated but fundamentally
different and distinct. One is the Italo-Abyssinian conflict
of which the political focus is Geneva. The other is the
Anglo-Italian conflict which has its epi center in the
eastern Mediterranean.
ITALO-ETHIOPIAN.
Considering these separately and in that order Italy
vis a vis Geneva stands today indicted as an aggressor,
stigmatized as an international outlaw, subjected to
sanctions of industrial, economic and financial character.
At the
FS
2-No. 822, November 12, 3 p. m. from Rome
At the moment she has an army of nearly 300,000 men
in Ethiopia, is shipping additional supplies and per-
sonnel reinforcements at the rate of 12,000 a week; has
50,000 troops in Lybia, 1,000,000 soldiers in Italy. A
recent survey of industrial activity in Italy discloses
present generally speaking (for it is impossible to
check up every individual manufacturing plant and their
respective products) the entire productive machinery
of the country is working day and night on military
supplies. Production is not being increased for the
simple reason all the plants have been working at capacity
for many months turning out military motors, airplanes,
rifles, guns, ammunition, equipment, et cetera. They are
still working at capacity. There is no dimunition of
output. In a constant stream ships carry men, arms,
equipment, munitions and supplies to Africa.
Under these circumstances and with a sound appreciation
of the character of the men directing Italian policy today
I have no hesitancy in saying that there 1s not the very
slightest indication of modification of their course in
this respect in the near future. Reaffirming my repeated
statements to you during the whole course of this difficulty
I say that they have no present idea of altering their
course but on the contrary that they are determined to
supply
FS
3-No. 822, November 12, 3 P. m. from Rome
supply as many more men and materials as may be
necessary to a successful prosecution of their venture
in Ethiopia.
The Italians believe rightly or wrongly that their
former possession of the Tigre was terminated by the
incompetence of the then Italian Government and that
Adowa stood as a disgrace to their national reputation
and 8.9 a testimony to their own improper equipment; that
the present delayed punitive expedition must be so manned
and equipped as to deny the possibility of repetition.
Their policy is to induce the local chiefs (End Section
One).
CSB
LONG
REP
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
ROME
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)
Dated November 12,1935
Rec'd 12:15 P. m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
822, November 12, 3 p. m. (SECTION TWO)
to accept without a fight the protection of Italy in
preference to that of the Negus but to confront them
with a force bewilderingly superior as an added induce-
ment to submission.
THEIR MILITARY AIMS.
They plan to occupy as much of the country outside
the old Kingdom of Ethiopia as may be practicable but
certainly sufficient to join territorially their two
colonies including substantial parts of the uplands
-- and to retain control of the territory occupied.
Simultaneously they plan to build roads, dig wells,
build towns, establish tolegraphic and telephonic
communications and to render the country habitable for
persons of readable oducation and experience, all with
the idea of colonization and exploitation.
POLITICAL
REP
2-#822, From Rome, Nov.12,3p.m.
(Sec. Two)
POLITICAL POLICY.
Their policy has been and still is to delay a
negotiated settlement until they have occupied such a
substantial part of the country that their claims to
possession or control cannot be successfully denied.
During that period of time -- until there may be found
a settlement -- they are bending every effort in Africa
to advance slowly but surely, then consolidate their
positions and to pour in men in the rear for protective
purposes. At the same time they are playing a delaying
diplomatic game.
SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE.
The hope of negotiators is to save the face of
Mussolini; the dignity of England and the honor of the
League of Nations. The three seem to me incompatible.
As I see it each has gone so far there is no retreat
without loss of face or dignity or honor. It can be
settled on a basis favorable to Italy. That would
require the League to accept a decision which would
engulf it in the bad estimation of the public for it
would require a partition of a member state in favor
of an aggressor and incidentially put premium on
aggression.
REP
3-#822, From Rome, Nov.12,30.m.
(Sec. Two)
aggression.
As I see it one of three presumptions must happen
-- (1) a negotiated settlement which will ruin the
character of the League; (2) an humiliated Italy; or
(3) an England partially defeated at sea.
SANCTIONS.
I divide this into its effect on (a) Italy and
(b) European sanctioning countries and governments.
(a) Italy. The incredible happened when there
was practical unanimity in the vote for sanctions.
The Government was disillusioned and distressed
particularly at the attitude of France but in a true
combative mood immediately took steps (a) to apply
the arrangements already made to minimize the effect on
Italian economy and (b) to retaliate on the countries
of those governments which will actually apply them.
In respect to the former activity the government has
already directed curtailmont (one) in the use of meat
by abstaining
(END SECTION TWO)
LONG
CSB
REP
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
ROME
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)
Dated November 12, 1935
Rec'd 2:50 P. m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
822, November 12, 3 p. m. (SECTION THREE)
Tuesdays and Wednesdays (except chicken may be eaten
Wednesdays), (two) in the use of gasoline by raising
the price to almost prohibitive figures, (three) in
the use of electric power by rearranging the hours
of business and offices by arranging for closing at
4:30 thereby eliminating electric consumption at night
and continuing work through the lunch hour.
A perfect phenomenon is the attitude of the Italian
people. They have accepted the vote of sanctions with
stoic placidity and await application with grim calmness
not usually associated with Italian temperament but
which is both a reflection of the attitude of their
leaders and a testimony to their entire devotion to
the cause at stake. They anticipate privations of a
drastic nature and are prepared to suffer them with
perfect
REP
2-#822, From Rome, Nov. 12, 3 P. m.
(Sec. Three)
perfect equanimity. They are a grim, determined
nation today practically totalitarian in abnegation
and support.
(b) Retaliations on other countries. They are
already (#) from buying articles of French and British
manufacture. Such articles as may have been in shops
-- perfumes, brandies, et cetera -- are already removed
from (?) and stored away. That is just spontaneous
action by the people. The Government, however, plans
definite steps. What they are I do not know but I
think they will include withholding balances due,
refusal at the ports of cargoes under delivery, owners
to pay return costs, dumping foreign securities on
their local bourses, possibly impounding credits and
even possibly confiscation of property owned in Italy.
But this is pure conjecture as no one is in the con-
fidence of the Government. In other words, they look
upon sanctions as economic war waged against the
individual and collective personality of Italy and
are prepared to meet it on that basis by waging
economic war against the personality of foreigners
citizens of offending governments who have property
real
REP
3-#822, From Rome, Nov. 12,3f.m.
real or personal subject to the jurisdiction of Italy.
It is a new kind of warfare but logical in view of
sanctions and not without some precedent.
IS APPLICATION PRACTICAL?
The hope of ameliorating their prospective con-
dition lies in a negative answer. It seems there will
be bootlegging on a large scale with some governments
acting as bootleggers or conniving at the practice
but in spite of government supervision there is
certain to be a lot of illicit trade in evasion of
sanctions regulations. The future alone can disclose
the extent of it. But even with a strict application
of the provisions as they stand I think Italy can last
two years with the proviso that before the end of that
period the inevitable will be apparent and have its
depressing psychological effect.
(b) EFFECT ON EUROPEAN SANCTIONING COUNTRIES AND
GOVERNMENTS.
There will be political repercussions in the
internal affairs of some in consequence of
LONG
CSB
(#) Apparent omission
M3P
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
ROME
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)
Dated November 12, 1935
Rec'd 2:10 P. m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
822, November 12, 3 P. m.
(SECTION FOUR)
of these I count France as important. My information
here from non Italian sources is that there is wide-
spread sympathy for Ita ly throughout France, a
recrudescence of opposition to England, and a growing
potential opposition to the Laval Government which if
his strong hand is shaken may assume the proportions
of real disorder. Yugoslavia sould apply sanctions
strictly but to do so would have to send her army to
the border and the unfortunate consequences of that
move would be enormous. Rumania will still sell her
oil and will suffer internal difficulties if she fails
to continue her foreign credits through that medium.
Czechoslovakia intends to enforce sanctions. The road
for Poland to effectuate her exceptions recorded at
Geneva lies through Germany and Austria. If an effort
were not made to exercise force against Austria to
compel her compliance with the Geneva program Italy
would
MJP -2- No. 822, Novomber 12, 3 P. m. from Rome
would consider it an unwarranted interference in the
internal affairs of that country and would react to
it as quickly and as effectively as she would if
Germany should attempt an interference there. Germany
is watching the whole proceeding with the understanding
that the machine which has been fashioned to operate
against herself is being given a thorough trial and
a sharpening up so as to have it all greased and
primed for future use and she is not very sympathetic
in her efforts to perfect the mechanism. While I
can't imagine Germany will suffer any internal compli-
cations from the effect of the present movement -
except to solidify Hitler's strength out of fear of
France and the League - her foreign policy is liable
to be modified to look more to England for a better
understanding there. It is also true she sees her
pan-German ambitions closer to realization with a
prospect of a weakened Italy and the end of the old
allied powers. And in my mind the one thing that
stands out as definite is the long time estrangement
of Italy and England frustrating the old alliance and
necessitating a new European set of alliance. These
have come into vogue in spite of the League of Nations,
(?) France and her Little Entente-- and France and
Russia
MJP -3- No. 822, November 12, 3 P. m. from Rome
Russia. The encirclement policy of France was practical
as long as Italy stayed with her and England but with
Italy and England antagonized the encirclement policy
seems of doubtful longevity. And that leads to my
second subdivision the Anglo Italian struggle. But
before I venture on it and in closing this part of
the review I desire to emphasize the calm undemonstra-
tive quiet well ordered deep seated unanimous determination
of the Italian people to seo this whole think through
under the orders of the Duce and at the same time to
remind you again of the bold fearless virile, almost,
it seems, reckless, determination of their leaders.
ANGLO-ITALIAN DISPUTE.
This developed gradually to a point where it has
assumed the greatest importance and in the course of
its development became separate and
CSB
LONG
FS
This telegram must be
Rome
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
Dated November 12, 1935
to anyone. (B)
Rec'd 3:15 p. m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
822, November 12, 3 p. m. (SECTION FIVE)
distinct from the Italo-Abyssinian dispute focused
in Geneva. The Italian press became critical of England
in early May, 1935. Suvich stated to me then it was
retaliatory of articles in the English press critical of
papers.
Italy. There were some such articles in British/ The
Italian press though soon outstripped them in malediction
and I now believe it was a studied policy of the Italian
Government either because Mussolini foresaw that England
must in the very nature of geography and British imperial
plans sooner or later take steps to oppose Italy or be-
cause the Italian Government had some definite knowledge
of British activity in and plans for a penetration of
Abyssinia which would, if successful, have precluded the
realization of Italian ambitions there--or some of both.
Nevertheless, the Italian press grew vicious. In August
Great Britain ordered her home fleet to the Mediterranean
and her China fleet to the Red Sea. The movement actually
started
FS
2-No. 822, November 12 SECTION FIVE from Rome
started August 25th. This was before the League met
September 4th to consider the question of aggression and
was without any authority of the League. It was an uni-
lateral action of Great Britain in defense of her own
interests as the British Ambassador in Rome later told
Mussolini. In my mind the movement never needed explana-
tion. Its nature was patent on its face. After the whole
fleet was in the Mediterranean the League met. Also after
that beginning September 11 and ending September 16 the
Italian Government moved two mechanized divisions and
some hundreds of airplanes to Libya and placed them on
the Egyptian border. It was their answer to the British
fleet. After that a third division was sent. Prior to
this there were in Libya some seven thousand colonial
colored troops all the rest having been withdrawn and sent
to the Ogaden front in Somali.
In spite of the electoral statements of distinguished
British statesmen that the fleet 1s in the Meditermanean
to lend support to the councils at Geneva the fleet was
there before there were any decisions taken at Geneva which
might need support.
The Italians as a nation were electrified and were
immediately solidified. The war became not only justified
of which
FS
3-No. 822, November 12, 3 p. m. from Rome Section 5.
of which there had been some doubt but sanctified. Italy
resented the presence of the fleet as an intimidation.
The British suddenly discovered three divisions on
the frontier of Egypt and resented that as a threat. And
it was.
As a gesture to relieve tension and to entice some
warships away from his path Mussolini withdrew one divi-
sion (but not a mechanized unit). The British thought
one division not equal to a battleship and failed to with-
draw a single unit unless the French would throw open their
bases, supplement any British withdrawals.
Conversations in Paris, London and Rome and professions
of deep friendship have eased the tension a little but the
fundamental difference
WWC:CSB
LONG
MJP
This telegram must be
Romo
closely paraphrased
before being communicated
Dated November 12, 1935
to anyone. (B)
Rec'd 5 p. m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
822, November 12, 3 P. m.
(SECTION SIX)
remains and out shadows in importance any of the
Geneva deliberations. Until the British elections
are passed, and the date of application of sanc-
tions has arrived, the tension will be relieved
and the situation continue unchanged barring any
unfortunate accident which might precipitate an
armed clash.
Danger of war between Italy and England
is a realty, not because of or for the account
of the League of Nations, but because of the
clash of two ambitions for empire, the paths to
each of which cross at Suez. If actual hostilities
do not break out soon, that danger will continue
a long time - - and until either Italy is forced
to abandon Ethiopia for financial reasons or is
whipped in a fight, or until England becomes
reconciled
MJP -2- No. 822, November 12, 3 P. m. from Rome
reconciled to a big Italian civilization implanted
in juxtaposition to her colonial treasurers and
on her path to India.
This fact alone ends the entente cordiale
with its consequences in Europe. But it also
portends more armaments with more political unrest
than it has already created and brings closer an
European conflagaration. The consequence of that
European situation, and the certainty that the
governments inconsonant will be preoccupied at
home gives Japan a free hand to pursue her way
unmolested in the Far East. And Japan will be
sure to constitute such a continuing threat to
Russia that the latter can be counted on for
little military activity in the European field.
Whether that is a blessing or not is debatable.
So that the Anglo-Italian conflict is liable
to have far reaching consequences.
While Italy was entiroly wrong in her pene-
tration of Abyssinia from the point of view of
the Loague Covenant, the Kellogg Pact, and her
honorable commitments, there is quite a different
aspect in regard to her difficulty with England.
In
MJP -3- No. 822, November 12, 3 P. m. from Rome
In my opinion Great Britain's naval threat against
Italy was also a violation of the Covenant of the
League (it was a threat of war) and fairly good
evidence that she was, and is, ready to disregard
her renunciation of "war as a national policy"
taken under the Kellogg Pact. And that possibly
will continue unless, and until she receives an
authorization from the League to make war against
Italy.
ATTITUDE TOWARD AMERICA.
The efforts of the American Government to
prevent hostilities in Ethiopia have been uni-
versally received and appreciated as to the
wholesome and honest expression of a great power
of its desire to preserve peace.
The neutrality proclamation was viewed by
Italy at first with some suspicion in that its
application was practically one-sided. Now they
have adjusted their minds to look upon it as a
real neutrality in a conflict we tried to prevent.
However, the Italian officials place their own
interpretations upon such extracts as appear
here in the press for public
KLP:SMS
LONG
JS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
ROME
fore being communicated
to anyone (B)
Dated November 12, 1935
Rec'd 8:05 p.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
822, November 12, 3 p.m. (SECTION SEVEN)
Statements made by the responsible heads of
the American Government read in connection with other
interpretations of those statements sent out from
England are likely to convey the impression that any
remarks favorable to, or which might be construed
as an encouragement to the League as lining America
up with British policy. Considering the peculiar
situation of Italy vis a vis England, they naturally
reason that if these expressions indicate the poss-
ibility of a modification of policy which would be
in support of the League's position or that of
England ipso facto it would be antagonistic to Italy.
While there is some querulousness in their scrutiny
of American policy, they are on the whole generous
in their interpretations of it as it affects them
and they very generally consider America in a very
friendly way. Their attitude to America is in
marked contrast to their bitter antagonism toward
all the sanctionist governments. They hope it will
not
-2-
From Rome, November 12, #822.
not involve the friendship of America not only
because of the selfish advantage it is to them
in this fight but also because the thought is
traditional with them.
CONCLUSION.
The 18th of November will mark the beginning
of a new era in this really very considerable
political disturbance. It is quite possible that
even economic sanctions may lead directly to war.
This is not only because of the sanctions per se
but because of the retaliatroy measures which may
be taken by Italy.
The potentiality of the whole situation is
sinister. Every government in Europe is armed to
the teeth. Any little incident might mistakenly
lead to trouble or even afford the pretext any one
of three or four governments might seek. Open hos-
tilities are definitely a distinct possibility. If
they should begin, the base of the conflict is almost
certain to be broadened.
I think there is nothing the American Government
can do or say which would alter the situation in
any material respect. These governments have got
themselves into this position with their eyes all
open. Some of them mean business. They have all
got their guns and some of them mean to use them.
The
-3-
From Rome, Nov. 12, #822.
The application of sanctions by America would not
alter the situation. Brazil, Germany, and Japan
are not applying sanctions. Bootlegging prohibited
materials in Europe will be very profitable. Con-
sequently American goods are not essential. Besides
many of them can be furnished by the other big non-
conformist governments. I emphasize this point.
Furthermore, even if it were consonant with
American policy to conform to the Geneva regulations
or to shut off all supplies from Italy because of the
Abyssinian difficulty, there would remain the Anglo-
Italian trouble and the adoption of a policy to
punish Italy would be tantamount to aligning America
with England and to become immediately involved in
what may become a general European war. The trouble
with taking sides in one conflict is that if it is
enlarged we are involved before we know the list of
contestants or the American interests concerned.
Neutrality is a definite status. If a neutral
government attempts to end a war quicker by aiding
one belligerent that government is no longer a neutral.
If it attempts to coerce a belligerent it is no longer
a neautral.
I strongly recommend the American Government be
neutral and keep out of this war. If we are not
neutral we will be into it when it breaks. We will
then
-4-
From Rome, Nov. 12, #822.
then be inextricably involved for the duration of the
warunless we should be willing to make a separate
peace. Pending the time when this unfortunate affair
will be either settled to their own satisfaction by
the interested powers and the League, or until it
broaks in open conflict, I recommend that we pursue
& course of studied aloofness. And I mako the rec-
commodnation, solemly arrived at after months of
study of complicated situations and after careful
consideration of all the facts at my disposal, as
the only course I seo to sufoguard the interests of
America.
Code copy handed Grow. Not repoated anywhoro.
End of mossago.
LONG
SMS NPL
JR
CORRECTION
In telegram from Rome 822, November 12, 3 plm.
(section 4) re Italy-Ethiopia, page 2, last line, (?)
should be "England." "
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
PSF Long
MJP
GRAY
Rome
Dated November 12, 1935
Rec'd 2:30 P. m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
823, November 12, 6 p. m.
FOR COMMERCE FROM COMMERCIAL ATTACHE.
21. Hooper arrived,
LONG
CSB
REP
GRAY
Rome
Dated November 12, 1935
Rec'd 4:20 P. m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
824, November 12, 7 P. m.
Afternoon papers publish text of Italian note on
sanctions which was delivered yesterday to the
governments represented on the Committee of Coordina-
tion at Geneva and which was brought to the attention
of other governments including, I understand, the
American Government.
LONG
KLP
SMS
PSF: Long
MJP
GRAY
Rome
Dated November 12, 1935
Rec'd 7 p. m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
825, November 12, 8 p. m.
Official Gazette of November 11 publishes
decreo law No. 1891 dated November 3, effective
on seventh day after publication which places
entire Italian import trade under the control
of the office of the Suporintendent of Exchange
with the exception of gold, silver, and copper
coins, and manuscripts, the importation of which
is not restricted. There is a long list of
additions to the list of commodities for which
import licenses, issued by the Ministry of
Finance on instructions from the Superintendent
of Exchange, are required. The importation of
all other products will not be subject to quotas
based on customs receipts of previous years,
the percentages to be fixed by the Ministry of
Finance on instructions from the Superintendent
of Exchange "with particular regard to the
country's
MJP -2- No. 825, November 12, 8 p. m. from Rome
country's requirements and to the availability of
means of payment derived from Italian exports"
An official of the Ministry of Finance
stated that in this phrase lies the instrument
of reprisals against sanctions inasmuch as the
percentages approved on goods coming from countries
applying sanctions "may be zero".
It is obvious also that the Superintendent
of Exchange is able to grant 02' withhold import
licenses as expediency dictates.
The decree law further provides that the
import quotas on products handled by Government
monopoly or by special boards, commissions,
institutes, et cetera, shall be fixed by the
Superintendent of Exchange.
Shipments of goods affected by the new rulings
will be admitted on the basis of the former regu-
lations where it can be shown that such goods
were shipped direct to Italy up to and including
the date on which the decree becomes effective,
provided they are declared at the Italian customs
within stated periods according to their origin,
which in the case of the United States is one month
from November 18.
Inform Commerce.
LONG
SMS:KLP
PSF Long
JR
This tologram must bo
Romo
closoly paraphrasod be-
fore boing communicated
Dated November 13, 1935
to anyono. (B)
Roc'd. 9:15 a.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
826, November 13, 10 a.m.
My 819, November 11, 4 p.m.
Mr. Suvich was present again at the conversation
yesterday betwoon Mussolini and Drummond. He told me last
night that the conversation concerned British naval
tonnage in the Mediterranean and that there was now a P.
possibility that the British would remove their two big
ships, the HOOD and the RENOWN under a sort of gentlemen's
agreement in the spirit of conciliation and with the
understanding that the Italians would subsequently remove
another division from the Egyptian frontier in Libya with
no time set for the withdrawal of the ships or the removal
of the division but with the understanding that if the one
should be done the other would follow within a reasonably
short time. He said that no understanding had been arrived
at but that the conversations proceeded along that line
and that while there was some hope for 2. future agroement
thore had been nothing substantial to indicate a chango in
the situation.
PEG:CSB
LONG
PSF Long
MG
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
Rome
to anyone. B
Dated November 13, 1935.
Rec'd 8:04 a.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
827, November 13, 11 a.m.
My 824 November 12, 7 p.m.
I discussed with Mr. Suvich last
night the communication which had been addressed to
the governments employing sanctions against them and
with particular reference to the seventh paragraph
concerning Italy's continuing membership in the League
of Nations. I asked him whether that was intended
to convey the thought that Italy might leave the
League of Nations or even to lay the basis for some
future communication in that regard and whether it
might indicate that that step was being comtemplated
by Italy.
His answer was in the negative. He said that
Italy was not considering withdrawal from the League
and that the note was not intended to lay the basis
for any such development but that it was simply in
line
IIG
Page 2, #827 from Rome.
line with the other provisions of the note, all being
based on the thought that Italy as a member of the
League had certain ideas as to the correctness and
logality of the acts of certain of the governments
in pursuance of the decisions of the Coordinating
Committee and that those governments had certain
obligations 0.3 members of the League which they might
be noglecting by adopting recommondation s of a body
which was not C. constitutional organ of the Leaguo
and might thereby be incurring liabilities in respoct
of which Italy might have some valid claim against
thom.
I was unable to substantiate the thought that
Italy might have been preparing to withdraw from the
League. Mr. Suvich's manner as woll as his words
failod to pormit that deduction.
LONG
HPD
JR
GRAY
Rome
Dated November 13, 1935
Rec'd. 9:30 a.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
828, November 13 noon.
My 824, November 12, 7 p.m.
Press comment on the Italian note emphasizes the
idea that the various governments must assume individual
responsibility rather than hiding behind the fictitious
collectivity of the Coordination Committee which is
declared an arbitrary and artificial instrument for
evasion of responsibilities and in no way a League organ.
The "economic siege" is termed an unequivocal act of
consequoncos
hostility and Italy must call due attention to the/ thereof
on her trade relations with individual countries,
hitherto governed by commercial treaties which sanctions
will render invalid.
It is insisted that at British instance the League
has never tried to settle the Ethiopian dispute, that the
spirit of the Covenant has been broken, that the letter of
the Covenant in so far as those of its provisions actually
applicable to the present case are concerned has never
been applied, that the League's procedure has been illegal
and
JR -2- 828, November 13, noon, from Rome.
and immoral and that all efforts have been concentrated
only upon an economic war against Italy overlooking the
justice of the latter's accusation and doliberately
ondorsing tho falso satements of the Ethiopian Government.
The pitiful conditions provailing among the native
populations under Amharic rule and the benefits which are
being brought them by Italian administration are described
as proving the orronoous promises of League action and
it is also pointed out that the spontaneous submission of
the populations is an act of autodocision which cannot
bo overlookod.
Newspapers received to date contain no reference to
the possibility of Italy's abandoning the League except
for the statement that each country must state its
position with regard to sanctions and that upon this basis
Italian policy both toward oach country and toward the
Leaguo will be establishod. It is insisted that Italy
fully rocognizes hor obligations under the Covenant but
that the Covenant in this instance has boon falsoly
interproted in the service of the imperial interosts of
othor countries rather than in the service of tho League's
fundamental purpose.
LONG
HPD
PSF Long
MG
GRAY
Rome
Dated November 13, 1935
Rec'd 8:40 a.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
829, November 13, 1 p.m.
According to communique No. 43, the territory
beyond the Doghea Pass and the Dandera River ahead
of the Makalle front is being cleared of enemy groups;
the second army corps has garrisoned Adnevrid in the
Adiabo region while four columns are advancing to-
ward the Tacazze; the Dankali column is advancing
toward Dessa wh ile one unit proceeding clong the
edge of the plateau has reached the vicinity of
Azbi; the districts north of Gorrahei are being
cleared; and the air force has explored the uplands
and the Dankali region.
LONG
T7C
HPD
PsF Long
JR
This telegram must be
Rome
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
Dated November 13, 1935
to anyone. (B)
Rec'd. 11:20 a.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
830, November 13, 2 p.m.
CONT IDENTIAL
I learned yesterday from an authoritative
source that secret orders have been given each harbormaster
in Italy to see personally the captain of every departing
Italian merchant vessel and advise him that if his ship is
stopped for search by an English man-of-war he is to stop
and submit to search.
Apropos of the foregoing, last night in a conversation
with Mr. Suvich I posed the following hypothetical question:
Suppose a particular Italian merchant ship were proceeding
to Italy with raw materials not included in the list
prohibited by Geneva and should be stopped for search by a
British man-of-war in the Eastern Mediterranean. What would
be the reaction of Italy?
He replied that England had announced that she was
acting as a neutral under The Hague Convention of 1907, and
that as a neutral under that Convention she had no right to
stop an Italian ship. If she should stop an Italian ship
the
JR -2- 830, November 13, 2 p.m., from Rome.
the Italian Government could appeal to the International
Court at The Hague for redress. However, as soon as a
British warship should commit such an not it would mark a
definite departure of Great Britain from a state of
neutrality to one of belligerency for only belligerents
had the right to stop vessels for search. He was inclined
to think that an attempt would first be made to place the
matter before the World Court but that Italy would
necessarily be confronted with the assumption of a change
of character in the relationship of England vis a vis Italy
in the present circumstances.
LONG
HPD
JR
GRAY
Rome
Dated November 13, 1935
Rec'd. 11:55 a.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
831, November 13, 3 p.m.
COMMUNICATION OFFICER NAVY DEPARTMENT.
Washington 19 18 1100 October speed of transmission
bulletins continuos at 17 words per minute. Request if
practicable the increase to 22 or 25 words per minute
to facilitate early finish and mailing of bulletins and
to allow time for commercial press items. Reception
continued good.
LONG
HPD
REP
GRAY
Rome
Dated November 13, 1935
Rec'd 12:30 p. m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
832, November 13, 4 P. m.
FROM COMMERCIAL ATTACHE FOR COMMERCE:
22. Your 9. Imports according to Italian statistical
classification 18 follows in hundreds of metric tons:
July total crude petroleum 256, gasoline 358, kerosene
150, lubricating oils 68, all other mineral oils 3,
residual oils 835, benzol 10; from the United States
gasoline 14, kerosene 3, lubricating oils 40, crude, all
other and residual 40, benzol 2. August total crude 207,
gasoline 401, kerosene 2021, lubricating 64, other 4,
residual 927, benzol 11; from the United States gasoline
15, kerosene 2, lubricating 50, crude other and residual
35, benzol 5. September total crude 1, gasoline 432,
kerosene 209, lubricating 133, other 10 residual 919,
benzol 18; from the United States gasoline 12, kerosene
3, lubricating 74, crude, other and residual 50, benzol 5.
LONG
HPD
PsF
Long
REP
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
ROME
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)
Dated November 13, 1935
Rec'd 12:55 p. m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
833, November 13, 5 P. m.
Italian press carries without comment notices of
German export embargo list published yesterday. In
German Embassy circles here the measure is declared to
have no anti-Italian spirit behind it and to have as its
sole purpose the protection of German economy against
possible scarcity of necessary commodities and local
speculation. The proximity of the date of publication
of the list to that of the beginning of sanctions is
explained by the fear that increased demands from
Germany by Italy as a result of sanctions would tend to
bring about the above mentioned scarcity and speculation.
LONG
CSB
REP
GRAY
Rome
Dated November 13, 1935
Rec'd 12:45 p. m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
834, November 13, 6 P. m.
In preparation for the application of sanotions the
Official Gazette of November 12 publishes ministerial
decree effective same date containing list of essential
commodities of which the export from Italy is prohibited.
This is the second list of export prohibitions to become
effective within the last ten days.
THE
With regard to Franco-Italian commercial relations
the Superintendent of Finance decided yesterday that
beginning November 18th no Italian goods can be exported
to France unless already paid for by confirmed letter of
credit opened in Italy or in cash duly transferred. Con-
cerning imports State from France ministerial decree published
November 12 and effective that date provides that the
proceeds of such imports must be deposited with the Foreign
Exchange Institute in a non-interest bearing blocked
the
account in the name of the creditor
Inform Commerce.
commodities
LONG
RR-CSB
This
in
REP
GRAY
Rome
Dated November 13, 1935
Rec'd 3:15 p. m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
835, November 13, 7 P. m.
According to communique No. 44 the first army corps
has occupied the Dessa district and established contact
with the Dankali column. The native corps is completing
occupation of the Gheralta region defeating strong enemy
groups. The second army corps has reached the Tacazze
forming a front at Addi Rassi and Addi Encato. Operations
on the southern front continue. The air force which has
reconnoitred as far as Lake Ashanghi and northern Ogaden
is keeping tab on enemy movements.
LONG
KLP
HPD
PSF Long
REP
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
ROME
fore being communicated
to anyone. (c)
Dated November 13, 1935
Rec'd 3:40 P. m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
836, November 13, 8 P. m.
From a secret source, which I consider entirely
reliable, I have learned that some days ago instructions
to the following effect were sent to the Italian Ambassadors
as indicated below:
One. To Grandi at London to advise the British
Government that (a) the Italian Government will not
recede or withdraw from any of the territories it has
occupied or may occupy in Ethiopia; (b) that the Italian
Government will maintain by all of its power the position
of its military forces in the occupied areas and protect
them and the Italian rights and interests concerned;
(c) that the Italian Government is proceeding to build
and will continue to maintain airplanes and submarines
in numbers always to be superior to the British.
As supplemental to these instructions Grandi has
been
REP
2-#836, From Rome, Nov. 13, 8 p. m.
been directed several times in the last few days to be
strong and forceful in his presentation of these matters
to the British Government and to carry to them the con-
viction that Italy is not only earnest in these expressions
but is determined to use whatever force may be necessary
to prevent and overcome any interference with the attain-
ment or preservation of her national interests.
Two. Cerruti in Paris has been instructed to make
himself the "guardian angel" of Laval; to show sympathy
and appreciation for his support to Italy; and to support
in such way as he may be able the position of Laval and
to present to Laval the positive picture that if France
allies herself definitely and finally with England that
Italy will offer no opposition to the German occupation
of Austria and will not interfere with German ambitions
in Yugoslavia and will withdraw entirely her support,
military and otherwise, from the side of France.
Three, Attolica in Berlin has absolutely no in-
structions on these matters.
Not repeated anywhere.
LONG
KLP
PSF Long
1
AU
GRAY
Love
Rome
Dated November 14, 1935
Rec'd 8:55 a.m.
Secretary of State
Washington
837, November 14, 1 p.m.
Your 202, November 13, 8 p.m.
I am very sorry if my 822, November 12, 3 p.m.
was too expensive to be considered by you justified.
I used my judgment and discretion in sending it by
cable so as to present to you a full picture of a
matter I consider of great importance to the American
Government before an entirely new phase will present
itself on November 18th. It would not have been
possible to present it to you by mail till ten days
after that date for the next pouch will not arrive in
Washington until about November 26. If I have been
guilty of extravagance from your point of view naturally
I regret it. If it is only a matter of cost it is
easily remedied and may be dismissed for I have paid
for the message out of my personal funds. But as
long as I am Ambassador I will continue to use my
judgment and discretion as to what should be sent to
you and how it should be sent. If you consider the
cost
AU -2- #837, November 14, 1 p.m. from Rome
cost too heavy I will always be glad to assume it.
If, however, the use of my discretion is denied me
or my judgment be considered at fault an entirely
different condition would exist.
LONG
HPD
TELEGRAM SENT
RB
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)
November 13,1935
8 p.m.
AMEMBASSY
ROME (ITALY)
202.
We estimate that your telegram 822, November 12, 3
p. m. cost approximately $400 net. We appreciate your
study and comments on the situation, but would suggest
that for reports of this character brief summaries be
telegraphed and complete text sent by mail.
HULL
WE
COST OF MESSAGES FROM ROME NOVEMBER 12 AND 13, 1935
No. of
No.
Cost of
Message
Date
Words
Message
822
11/12/35
2,827
$ 409.92
823
11
12
1.74
824
11
32
4.64
825
#
238
34.51
826
11/13/35
122
17.69
827
If
184
26.68
828
ff
268
38.86
829
If
97
14.07
830
If
192
27.84
831
11
53
7.69
832
If
140
20.30
833
If
76
11.02
834
If
109
15.81
835
If
87
12.62
836
If
232
33.64
TOTAL COST
$ 677.03
PSFLong
(2)
file
(s)
Rome
November 15, 1935.
My dear Chief:
Joe Grew has been here two or three days and is leaving tomorrow.
We have had several good talks. It is very helpful to have contacts
with my colleagues from other pos ts. I hope they too find it helpful.
Joe is a very able fellow and has had a long and valuable experience.
He sails Monday on a German boat for his post, but it will take him a
month to get there. He had a good talk with Suvich at my house one
night when I had several people to dinner, and he has also talked to
others in the Government and to de Chambrun and Drummond, though I am
afraid he found, the latter as uncommunicative as I find him. However,
I think it has been very helpful to have him here, and I hope it has
been helpful to him. I wish you would suggest to some of the others to
do the same thing as they move around.
With affectionate regards,
Very respectfully,
The President
The White House
pay Breckinridge
Washington, D. C.
PSF Long
FS
GRAY
Rome
Dated November 20, 1935
Rec'd 2:50 p. m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
847, November 20, 7 p. m.
Royal decree law published in the Official Gazette
of November 19th and effective that date establishes a
state monopoly for the purchase abroad of raw gold and
subjects the importation of semi-worked and worked gold
objects to the license system. The Foreign Exchange
Institute furthermore is authorized to purchase within
the Kingdom for the account of the Treasury gold in all
forms at a price to be fixed each week by the Institute
on the basis of the average price of gold on the interna-
tional markets, applying the average official exchange
rate of the respective currencies on the Milan Stock
Exchange on the day preceding the purchase, and with
the addition of premiums which shall be established
periodically by the Institute. Private persons are
forbidden to buy gold within the Kingdom at a price
higher than that fixed by the Institute. The Institute
is authorized to receive gold in all forms on deposit
and
FS
2 No. 847, November 20, 7 p. m. from Rome
and interest at the rate of 5% per annum will be paid
on the sum equivalent to the gold deposited. The
Institute undertakes to return not later than one year
from the date of deposit a quantity of fine gold equal
to the amount of gold deposited.
Inform Treasury and Commerce.
HPD
LONG
purlicy
Rome
November 29, 1935.
Dear Chief:
We are in another crisis here, and this time we are involved in it.
It arises over the proposed embargo on oil. Mussolini has adopted the
position that an embargo on oil will be tantamount to a military sanction.
He is justified from his point of view in taking the position, because
Italy has no resources of oil and limited storage capacity. The
effect of it would be to immobilize his navy. Consequently he con-
strues it the same as a military sanction and will react to it just
the same as if military sanctions were applied. That means war, and
war soon, if the actual decision is made. Anybody that thinks he
is bluffing is mistaken. There are only two alternatives, one is
for him to quit and the other is for him to fight his way through
the circle. He has already served notice to this effect upon France,
and I have no doubt in the world that he means to do it if the
embargo is undertaken. That will mean the European war. He cannot
be crushed in a few weeks, and the longer it goes the more countries
will be involved. If there is any doubt in your mind that he would
quit, please dismiss those doubts. On the contrary, he will use
every force at his command.
Now we get involved in it through the possibility of an embargo
The President
November 29, 1935.
on oil shipments from the United States to Italy. To my mind that
is not a neutral act. It may be neutral from the American point of
view, but it is not consonant with the status of neutrality as
fixed in the principles of international law. Our act will be
judged by other nations not as we see it but as viewed in connection
with international law as the other nations understand it. That
embargo would violate our treaty of commerce with Italy. The argument
that Mussolini has violated other treaties is to my mind no
justification for a violation of a treaty on the part of the United
States. He will consider an embargo on oils by the United States
as an unfriendly act. His reasons are three-fold: first, it is a
violation of the treaty; second, it is a breach of what he considers
neutrality; third, it will make possible the action at Geneva which
a quid
Great Britain desires to effectuate by emplacing that embargo, and
A
he views our action in that connection as being in coordination with
(if not in collaboration with) the powers opposing him. As a
consequence of his reasoning the United States will be placed in
the same position that the other principal Governments at Geneva
will be in, and he will treat us accordingly.
I am motivated entirely by the desire to see the United States
out of this war. I believe that an emplacement of an embargo on
oil will get us involved in it. We are not members of the League
and have no obligation in that respect, but if we take the action
The President
November 29, 1935.
which serves as a predicate for League action, then we will be morally
responsible for precipitating the European war, and we will suffer the
consequences of it.
If I thought that Mussolini could be stopped and that a war could
be averted by a violation of our neutrality, I might be persuaded
to agree to it. But if I feel that the very act which we commit will
precipitate a crisis of untold consequences, will bring on a European
war, and will involve the United States, then I must continue to
advocate that we follow a course which will be justified in the light
of international law as the course of a neutral. Believing as I do
in the latter theory, I implore you to direct the policy of the
American Government along the lines of strict neutrality.
There has been made a suggestion in the press in the form of a
despatch from New York to the effect that we would limit our exports
of all commodities to the quantities bought by Italy in normal times.
To my mind that is the solution of the problem, but I have not been
advised by the Department of State that we have adopted that policy.
The Foreign Office here has information to that effect, and the
British Embasay understands it to be the case. The press has that
information. But I have no confirmation of it. To my mind it is
the solution. If we refuse to sell Italy any oil, we would be taking
sides against Italy. If we agree to sell Italy more oil than she had
been in the habit of buying in normal times, it would under the
present circumatances be taking sides against Ethiopia - or against
England, whichever you choose. To continue to sell her the same
-4-
The President
November 29, 1935.
quantities of commodities which she has been in the habit of buying
will be contributing to neither side, will be the continuance of a
state of neutrality, and will be substantial compliance with our treaty
commitments.
We have not been selling Italy great quantities of oil. She cannot
prolong the war by buying from us the quantities she has been in the
habit of buying. It will not be a material factor in any sense of the
word, so that if the other Governments when they assemble at Geneva
vote to apply the oil embargo against Italy, the little quantity of
oil that we sell will not in any material way effect the efficacy of
their decision. But we will be out of it. It will not be on our
responsibility that Geneva has acted. We will not be responsible
for closing the circle. And if they want to take the decision, it
will be on their responsibility and not on ours. If they want to
precipitate a European war - that's their business. Personally and
officially I do not want us to precipitate a European war or to be
a party to its precipitation. I do not want us to have any responsibility
in connection with the beginning of a circumstance that may engulf
all Europe.
Mussolini is wrong and has been wrong from the start. But his
wrongful conduct can be limited in its consequences to a small part
of Africa. If he is driven to the wall, he will break out and with
such force that you cannot conceive from America. If he is allowed to
-5-
The President
November 29, 1935.
wander his own way, he will either go broke or be forced by the trend
of circumstances to limit his activities in the course of time. But
if he is goaded under the mistaken impression that he will be stopped,
the development will occur which I shudder to think about but which
has been in the cards for a year and a half and which you have thought
I was a pessimist in anticipating.
Another situation will arise if you have legislative authority
for neutrality. If there had been no Neutrality Resolution, your
hands would have been freer and there would have been no presumption
of law which Italy and other Governments in Europe might invoke as
indicating that you are exceeding the authority granted by the Congress.
But under the circumstances there is the law which they well know and
which they interpret in a narrow way after the custom of such of us
as are lawyers. But with that law and with that interpretation, they -
will feel that the Administration is actuated by motives of hostility
to Italy in exceeding the limits of legislative authority. However if
the law were changed, it would also amend the treaty, and the activities
of the executive branch of the Government under your direction would
be viewed entirely differently by Italy and by other Governments which
might some day be critical of your act. So let me implore you again to
continue the policy of allowing Italy - and Ethiopia - to buy the
same quantities of the same goods they have bought in normal times in
the recent past and to pursue that policy until the Congress meets.
At that time have the law repealed so as to give you a free hand
or have another law passed which will relieve you of the responsibility
-6-
The President
November 29, 1935.
as understand in international
of commiting acts which will be interpreted as violating neutrality
Daw.
I would like to telegraph this to you. I have telegraphed to
the Department of State until I am blue in the face. I feel that they
have resented some of my telegrams because they contained recommendations
which seemed to be at variance with a policy which they had already
adopted but which I had not been sufficiently advised about to under-
stand properly. It is all very easy for them to sit in Washington with
all the background and understanding and interpret public statements.
But it is quite another matter when one is isolated over here and
lacks the background and lacks the reasons that underlie public
statements to give a proper interpretation to a statement or to pick
out one paragraph from it and realize that it was supposed to indicate
the direction of Government policy which I was supposed to follow.
I should receive supplemental explanatory telegrams giving me a better
interpretation of public statements and specific instructions under
the circumstances. But lacking practically any such explanatory
messages, I have had to flounder along as best I could, and I assure
you it has been most difficult. But this oil business has given me
the greatest of concern, because I do not want to see America involved
in any of the complications that come out of this thing, and I am sure
it will be involved if it follows the course of an embargo without
authority and in violation of our treaty. Because even an ordinary
commercial treaty is a solemn and binding obligation. If you will
get that treaty and read Articles VI and XV, you will understand that
they were drawn specifically to meet just such circumstances.
-7-
The President
November 29, 1935.
As I have written, I would like to telegraph you this. Letters
take so long, and the times are so urgent. But some of the responses
to my telegrams have led me to believe that somebody in the Department
resented their receipt. I think you know me well enough and have known
me long enough and have known enough about me to realize that I am actuated
purely and simply by the best interests of the United States as I see it.
If you have any other impression, then you ought to recall me. And if
others
I felt that you had any such impression, I would ask you to relieve me
of my responsibility. Because you need here at this time a person in
whom you have entire confidence not only as to his patriotic impulse but
as to his judgment and discretion. The Department has made me feel that
they resented the receipt of certain telegrama and that they were displeased
with advice which I feel it my right and duty to give, and I am sure that
from my point of view I would be quite derelict in my duty if I did
not send them every bit of information I got and interpret it as
best I could and give such advice as seems to me proper under the
circumstances. And when I have done it to the very best of my ability
it seems just a little inappropriate to receive a message complaining
that I have spent $400 on a telegram when as it turned out it was that
telegram which forecast the situat ion which has arisen and which
could not have been delivered by mail until after the development had
taken place, because it would not have arrived in Washington until
the 26th of November.
-8-
The President
November 29, 1935.
I don't mean to bother you about details of that character, but I
do think that your Ambassadors ought to be treated with due consideration
by the Department. But it makes no difference with me. I have continued
to send telegrams and to advise them to the best of my ability, and I
shall continue to do so as long as I am here.
I know, my dear Chief, that you have a thousand worries and I have
only one. I do not want to exaggerate the importance of the one with
which I happen to be concersed, but from my point of view it is most
enormously important at the present time that we do not overstep the
limits of strict propriety as regards our international conduct as it
will be viewed in the light of international law. And I implore you
again to 30 direct our policy that until the Congress meets we will
follow a course of neutrality as I have indicated above in order that
we may not be held responsible for precipitating this awful conflict
and will not be held to have gone out of our way to commit a hostile act
against Italy - or any other country - under these circumstances.
Affectionately and respectfully,
Breckinridge Long
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
fill personal and
PSF Long
Rome
December 6, 1935.
My dear Chief:
This may be known in history as the "oil war" - or "no oil war" -
depending on which side you are on or what the future historian may
think about it all. It certainly to my mind is demonstrating one thing -
that under the conditions in the world as now organized and mechanized
nobody can make war unless he has an oil well. On that thesis there
are only three Governments in the world that can successfully wage
war - the United States, England, and Russia. And even England is
dependent upon the carriage of oil and the protection of the seas in
order to insure that she will have oil. Other places, such as Mexico,
Venezuela, and Rumania, have oil wells, but that is about all they have
got in the way of war industry.
On that predicate, I think it would be a very wise thing for you
to set up some unannounced and confidential committee - if one does not
already exist - to consider the very great power which the United
States has over and above that of any other Government in the world
in these circumstances and to consider how that power might be further
developed and how it might be exercised for the best interests of the
United States. Such an inquiry might develop that it would be wise
to encourage American oil production outside of the United States and
companies
that the Government itself might be interested in having American 611
1
-2-
The President
December 6, 1935.
exercising exclusive rights in such countries as Mexico, Venezuela,
Columbia, and Bolivia.
I hope the policy to prevent war will not react in favor of
British oil companies by permitting them to extend their influence and
become more widely and securely entrenched. There is no doubt that
English companies are preparing to sell oil to Italy through Germany.
I telegraphed that to the Department as having been obtained from
official sources in connection with the activities in Rome of an
American who was selling oil to Italy. He had in his pockets con-
tracts with British companies for future delivery to be imported
into Italy through Germany. It is of course known to you that the
British oil companies at Suez are selling oil and loading it directly
into the bunkers of Italian ships on their way to and from Italian
East Africa. The British do not miss one chance to "earn an
honest penny".
But there are several possibilities, not only through the ownership,
but through the well-directed control of oil in the Caribbean area
and in the United States, to exercise an enormous influence in the
world. I don't see how Japan is going to get very far in a war with-
out oil. She must confine herself to neighboring lands in China
and eastern Siberia. If all flow of oil could be stopped toward
Japan, she would find herself in the same position that France would
find herself if an embargo were placed on oil to France.
The practical lessons involved in this small war may be very
-3-
The President
December 6, 1935.
far-reaching, and I am only wondering whether the possibility that the
Congress might place oil on the embargo list might not interfere
with the use of the power of the United States in some future situation
which might be much more important to us than the present.
Affectionately
and
respectfully,
Multik by
The President
The White House
Washington, Do C.
Quando dal cielo vien giù la pioggia voi prende-
te l'ombrello e siete tranquillo.
Se domani dal cielo venisse giù dell'altro, per esem-
pio dei gas, prendete la maschera e sarete altret-
tanto tranquillo.
Con l'ombrello non vi fa più paura la pioggia.
Con la maschera non vi faranno più paurai gas
PSF: Italy:Long 12/13/35
In caso di attacchi con gas astis-
sianti soltanto la maschera anti-
gas può salvare la vita
La fabbricazione delle maschere
richiede una org anizzazione
scientifica e tecnica quale soltanto
una Azienda Industriale di pri-
missimo ordine può avere.
Le maschere antigas TIRELLI
approvate dal Ministero della
Guerra, offrono oggi le migliori
garanzie di assoluta sicurezza.
RIPRODUZIONE VIETATA
ARTIGRAF NAVARRA SAMILARO
Translated
When from the heavens comes rain
use an umbrella and be happy.
When from the heavens come other
things, like gas, use a gas-
mask and be supremely happy.
With the umbrella you have no
fear of rain.
with the gas-mask you have no
fear of gasses.
The Pirelli gas-mask approved by
the Minister of War offers today
the best guarantee of absolute
security.
plesse
Rome
December 13, 1935.
My dear Chief:
Without a sense of humor this whole business - as well as the
rest of life - would be pretty drab. Attached is a serious
advertisement, but it can be read with humor. These things come
in cigarette boxes, and I pass it along to you for a laugh.
The situation is so confused here I cannot write about it. It
will take a few days to judge whether England is playing on the
level in her peace offer: what the astonished assemblage at Geneva
will do about it; and what the effects of it will be on the League,
on Italy, on British prestige, and on the peace of Europe.
One thing seems certain - that we are well out of it.
With every good wish for a Merry Christmas and a Happy New
Year - and all that the New Year may hold for you in the satisfaction
of additional accomplishments, I am
Breckinridge Affectionately Long and respectfully
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
PSF: staly
Long folder
Rome
January 31, 1936
My dear Chief:
There are two things of a constructive nature I would like to do
here before I leave - and I hope you are not going to leave me here
long after the present difficulties smooth out.
First, I would like to induce the Italians to pay their war debt
and to break the solid front in Europe which exists against the
United States in that matter. And
Second, I would like to buy the house I now live in as a residence
for the string of American Ambassadors who will follow me.
These two things are susceptible of combination.
One reason the Italians have not paid their debt is because of
the transfer problem. As you know, they have had a very limited supply
of gold, and it would have been at any time very difficult for them
to have made payments in gold. They now owe us about $2,000,000. If
we could buy this house - and it really makes the best Embassy in
Rome, except the Farnese Palace, which is the French Embassy - at a
cost of $800,000 or $1,000,000, we could deduct that from the sum which
the Italians owe us. They could then pay us the balance and continue
their other payments pending the possibility of some adjustment to be
made of the whole question at some subsequent date.
The President
January 31, 1936
I particularly would like to break the solid front in Europe. If
the Italians cash in, it is possible that the French might be induced
to do so or to make some agreement with us in that connection under the
leadership of Herriot, who, as you know, has always been favorably
inclined toward paying the American debt and who seems to be the coming
Premier of France - after their elections. All of my information is
to the effect that the country will go strongly radical. If we could
induce Italy to desert the other European Governments on this question,
it might be a leverage that would help Herriot in France, and it might
leave England in a position where she would rather reconsider the
situation.
As to the house - it is such a delightful place with such large
grounds and such commodious space and 80 well furnished that I know
if you could see it you would approve of the movement. And if we
could get it without the expenditure of any money, it seems to me that
it would be quite worth while doing. As a matter of fact I even have
advocated the expenditure of that much money to acquire it. It is
dignified and appropriate for an Ambassadorial residence, and the up-
keep is not a major question. It has been there for 350 years, and
it will probably be there for another 350 years with an occasional new
roof and once in a while a bit of interior paint.
I really would like to do both of these things, but I will not
move until I am authorized. will you not consider it very carefully and
either write me or have me telegraphed that I can try my hand on it.
-3-
The President
January 31, 1936
The political consequences of Italy's payment of her debt might be
considerable, and even the acceptance by the Government of the United
States as part payment of a piece of territory (only eight acres in
extent) might be the precedent for acquiring a few West Indies islands
from one source or another.
I think it is worth considering carefully, and if you decide in
the affirmative, I hope you will let me know as soon as possible, because
the Italian Government will have to make some kind of arrangements
before its June 15th payment.
I think Al Smith's speech helped you. And I think Joe Robinson's
helped some more.
my Affectionately and respectfully,
Breckinridge Long
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
PSF Long
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 15, 1936.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
F
will you let me have a
memorandum on which I can base a
reply?
F.D.R.
Let. from BRECKINRIDGE LONG, Rome, 1/31/36, outling
2 things he wants to do while in Italy - and expres-
ing hope he won't be left there long after the pre-
sent difficulties smooth out:
1. Would like to induce Italians to pay their
war debt and to break the solid front in Europe
which exists against the U. S. in the matter.
2. Would like to buy the house in which he lives
as residence for future Ambassadors.
PSF Long
February 22, 1936.
Dear Breok:-
I have not written to you for ages but
I am very glad to have had your most interesting
letters. I quoted your letter about the Embassy to
Bill Phillips and enclose the memorandum from Carr.
You will doubtless hear from Phillips.
We all watch the daily news from Europe
with, I think, the feeling each day that the next
will bring a major explosion. On the other hand,
day succeeds day without anything happening 80 some
people are rather definitely concluding that each
recurring orisis will iron itself out and that
nothing really serious will happen. I cannot wholly
share this optimism.
Here at home things are going extremely
well from the point of view of business, though
the papers are against us from the political angle
as well.
That leads me to the question of your
return. AS you know, I want you here during the
whole of the campaign. I hope, too, that Bowers
and Bullitt and probably Cudahy among the
Ambassadore and two or three among the Ministers
will do likewise. This involves resigning because
all of us here are agreed that it is not wise to
retain the titles and be active in campaign work.
You know, and the others too, that after November
I shall want you again to be part of the Adminis-
tration! I hope, therefore, that you will make
your plans to come back at such time as suits you
this spring.
We are facing a very formidable opposition
on the part of a very powerful group among the
extremely wealthy and the centralized industries.
Ours must be a truth-telling and falsehood exposing
campaign that will get into every home. You can be
extremely useful in this.
I hope your "tummy" is all well again
and that you are ready for one-night-stands and
ham and eggs and coffee.
AB over yours,
Honorable Breckinridge Long,
American Embassy,
Rome,
Italy.
(Enclosure)
PSF: Italy: Long
file
See platol 3L
Rome
March 13, 1936
My dear Chief:
I have your letter of February 22 and gladly follow your
suggestion. My "tumny" is gladder. I am planning to leave in
May and by that time hope to have the war debts question definitely
settled one way or the other.
Since the date of your letter the situation in Europe has assumed
an entirely different phase. Germany's action in the Rhineland has
produced a crisis which may not be so easily settled. By the time
you receive this you will know whether you want me to come home now -
even under the circumstances of an upheaval here - or would rather I
postpone my departure a while. In case you think I ought to stay
longer, of course I can do it. I cannot be of much practical assistance
to you before or during the Convention, because nomination is only
a formal matter and the Campaign will not really begin until August.
One other thing I think you ought to consider is the possible
political effect upon you of letting a number of men from key posts
in Europe return to participate in political activities during a period
which is more dangerous than any since 1918.
However - I am not arguing the question. I am simply expressing
things which are in my mind and which you may want to consider before I
leave here and which are not susceptible of determination today.
The President
March 13, 1936
There are certain formalities which will have to be complied with here
and which you will want me to comply with before I leave, and I think the
courtesies involved prior to my departure would be much easier if you
would have me telegraphed to proceed to Washington for consultation via
Paris. The "via Paris" will eliminate the question of traveling on an
Italian ship and the order to return for consultation will afford the
basis to do the proper things before I leave, and which I would not do
if just going on leave.
Can we not leave it this way? - I will plan to proceed to the United
States in May on receipt of orders, unless you want me earlier. If
you see any reason to change your mind so that I should postpone my
return, you could telegraph and simply mention the date of this letter
which I will understand to mean that I will postpone my return until
I receive further orders. If I hear nothing I will return in May.
I will be very glad to be back in the States and do what I can to see
that the things you have been fighting for are confirmed in November. This
being Friday, the thirteenth, the omen is good. I am always lucky on that
coincidence. The last one - last December - I got $2,000 refund
unexpectedly.
Affectionately and respectfully,
Breckinridge Long
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
State
(Long)
June 18, 1936.
Dear Breck:-
I have followed your progress at the Mayobs,
first with alarm and later with deep satisfaction that
the operation was wholly successful and that they found
no permanent trouble. Everyone says that you will be
better than ever after you have regained your strength.
You must be sure to devote plenty of time
to the period of recuperation, and you are fortunate
in being able to go to Nantucket.
I do not need to tell you how proud I an
of the splendid record you made in Rome, in the midst
of trying and difficult situations -- and I cannot
blame you for not wanting to go back to a place where
you had 80 much physical suffering.
If it is all right with you, I will con-
sider that you resign and that it is accepted a short
time after the adjournment of the Congress. As you
probably know, I have asked Bill Phillips to go to
Rome as Ambassador, and I am hoping that we can
straighten out the problem-of the King's title by
using a series of "eto.'s."
You are right about the campaign. I am
telling all our friends that they have & serious
task. When you feel wholly wèll again it will help,
I know, for you to go Into a number of places and,
in the meantime, perhaps you can write some articles
that would be useful. Try your hand at it.
You are a grand fellow -- and you know my
devotion to you.
As ever yours,
Honorable Breckinridge Long,
e/o Mayo Brothers Clinic,
Rochester,
Minnesota.
HOTEL KAHLER
THE KAHLER CORPORATION
OWNING AND OPERATING
THE MAHLER
WORRALL HOSPITAL
THE COLLEGE APARTMENTS
HOTEL ZUMBRO
THE DAMON HOTEL
ZUMBRO CAFETERIA
COLONIAL HOSPITAL CURIE HOSPITAL
MODEL LAUNDRY
ROCHESTER CALORIE KITCHEN
"THE KAHLER'
ROCHESTER,MINN
Rochester. Minn
Dictated from bed in Columbia Hospital
June 15, 1936
My dear Chief:
I expect I have let you down for a while. My
presence at Philadelphia is now impossible, and active
participation in the Campaign will not be possible until
after Labor Day. They took most of my stomach away from
me, but all the trouble has been eliminated. It was just
an old ulcer that had been irritating the whole stomach
and that whole nervous area for years. Now it is gone,
and I will be in better health and in stronger physical
condition.
I am sorry that it will lessen my activities on your
behalf for the time being, but the old head will still
work, and there will be no reason why I cannot appear
from time to time at Headquarters and do what may be
possible in the way of consultation after the next two
or three weeks.
There was one phase of the consequence of my resigna-
tion which I wanted to present to you along with several
-2-
HOTEL KAHLER
THE KAHLER CORPORATION
OWNING AND OPERATING
THE MAHLER
WORRALL HOSPITAL
THE COLLEGE APARTMENTS
HOTEL ZUMBRO
THE DAMON HOTEL
ZUMBRO CAFETERIA
COLONIAL HOSPITAL
CURIE HOSPITAL
MODEL LAUNDRY
ROCHESTER CALORIE KITCHEN
THE KAHLER
ROCHESTER,MINA
Rochester, Minn
The President
June 15, 1936
other things before I came to the hospital. My belief
is that the appointment of a successor will be authentic
recognition of the Government of Italy by its new title
including "Emperor of Ethiopia" with the consequent
recognition of that status. Personally I see no reason
why it should not be done - from the practical point of
view. It will have to be done some day unless there is
a bigger war about it. However, that is a matter of
policy for you to decide. You will have my resignation
whenever you want to use it. The only thing is that I
hope never to see Italy again and hope you will not ask
me to go back there. I had so much physical suffering
on that scene that I really hope I never set foot in the
land again.
In my one conversation with you I neglected to give
you a message from Jessie Straus and hoped to do so before
I got sick. Jessie said that he expected to continue in
Europe this summer and to take a cruise to the North Capes;
-3-
Hoter KAHLER
THE KAHLER CORPORATION
OWNING AND OPERATING
THE MAHLER
WORRALL HOSPITAL
THE COLLEGE APARTMENTS
HOTEL ZUMBRO
THE DAMON HOTEL
ZUMBRO CAFETERIA
COLONIAL HOSPITAL CURIE HOSPITAL
MODEL LAUNDRY
THE KAHLER
ROCHESTER CALORIE KITCHEN
ROCHESTER,MINN
Rochester. Minn
The President
June 15, 1936
that he had not considered coming home and helping in
the Campaign because he did not feel he could be of any
great assistance but he wanted me to tell you that
he was sure that you knew him well enough to feel that
all you had to do was to make a suggestion and he would
gladly do anything that you wanted him to do. He hesitated
to write to you on the subject and asked me to convey
it orally. I am sorry I forgot, but my conversation with
you was quite short and there seemed so many things to
talk about that I didn't have time for that and several
other things.
As to the Campaign - Please do not let our fellows
get over-confident and take chances. I am perfectly
confident of your reelection, but I like to see an
organization working as if the candidate was "running
scared". I mean no betrayal OF a lack of confidence
but simply a thorough intensity that will not overlook
a single bet.
-4-
Hoter KAHLER
THE KAHLER CORPORATION
OWNING AND OPERATING
THE KAHLER
WORRALL HOSPITAL THE COLLEGE APARTMENTS
HOTEL ZUMBRO
THE DAMON HOTEL
ZUMBRO CAFETERIA
COLONIAL HOSPITAL CURIE HOSPITAL
MODEL LAUNDRY
"THE KAHLER'
ROCHESTER CALORIE KITCHEN
ROCHESTER,MINN
Rochester. Minn.
The President
June 15, 1936
In about three weeks they let me get away from here,
and I hope to go to Nantucket to my summer home. From
there I shall get to Headquarters occasionally, but it
may be a long time before I see you. Whenever you accept
my resignation you may take back the commission which I
have been honored to hold and under the authority of which
I have faithfully tried to serve you.
and
Affectionately Breckinridge Long of respectfubly,
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
PSF Long
July 2, 1936.
Dear Breck:-
Many thanks for yours of June twenty-
third. I do hope that you will soon be able to
move to Nantucket.
That is an awfully nice letter from
the Cardinal.
I an telling Bill that when the
/
agrement goes through with Rome your resignation
and his appointment can be announced.
Take it easy for a month or six weeks
and then when you are feeling wholly fit come
down here and we will work on plans for the
campaign.
As ever yours,
Honorable Breckinridge Long,
Hotel Kahler,
Rochester,
Minnesota.
PFS Lmg
BRECKINRIDGE LONG
LAUREL MARYLAND
Hotel Kahler
Rochester, Minnesota
June 23, 1936
My dear Chief:
It is with real pleasure I receive your letter of June 18.
You are a good friend as well as being a great Chief.
As this is probably the last communication I shall make to
you in my capacity as your Ambassador to Italy, I will devote it
to a two-fold purpose; first, I am glad you are sending Billie
Phillips. I am sure he will do well there. In doing so I hope
you will not quibble about the credentials that he will carry. It
can be a quiet and innocuous way to effect recognition. Personally
I advocate recognition. If we do not do it, England and the
Governments of Europe will do so, and England will try to use her
benevolent act as a lever with which to pry open again the door
of Italian trade. They talk a lot about principles, but these
European statesmen are very practical gentlemen. What they want
is trade and extension of business. We are now in a position to
obtain a great deal of the trade that formerly went to England,
and I trust that you will not consider in too generous a light the
attitude which the British will profess they will take. It will
only be a matter of a short time one way or another until they
recognize the status in Ethiopia. We might 8.8 well do it first,
and I am very glad to see that you have already revoked the
Neutrality Proclamation. So I strongly urge that you send Billie
with regular credentials and not enter into any fine-spun arguments
on the theory of recognition, which themselves, as a matter of fact,
will indicate our desire not to recognize.
Secondly, I want you to be advised of a letter I have received.
I think it is quite personal, and I think you probably will desire
to keep it confidential. It is such an unusual letter that I
wanted to show it to you but had not an opportunity, for it was
received just shortly before I had to leave Washington to come
here. It is from Cardinal Pacelli, the Papal Secretary of State,
and came through the open mail. I enclose you a copy. It is
quite unique in that it was written by the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of one State to an Ambassador accredited to another Govern-
ment. However, the purpose in showing it to you is to reveal to
you something of the character of the relationship which your
Ambassador in Rome established with the Vatican authorities.
Through this and several other contacts most intimate in the
Vatican circle and amongst the most highly placed in the world
there existed a relationship "off the record" which might have been
placed to practical advantage in case the European war became a
reality.
-2-
The President
June 23, 1936
And so I close my official relationship - with a recommendation
which I consider to be to our own practical advantage - and with
a revelation of an unofficial relationship with the authorities
of the Vatican which is not of record anywhere but of which I
think you should be advised.
With every good wish and expressions of affectionate regard,
I am
Most sincerely, your friend and servant,
Breckinridge Long Rong
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Enclosure: Copy of letter from Cardinal Pacelli
SEAL
Segreteria di Stato
Di Sua Santita
May 12, 1936.
Your Excellency:
I have learned that at the time of your
departure on leave for the United States you
were not feeling as well as might have been
desired. The news was a source of deep per-
sonal distress to me and I know that you will
permit me to express to you my heartfelt good
wishes, which I shall not fail to confirm
with my prayers, for your early restoration
to good health so that you may continue with
renewed vigor your career of distinguished
service to your beloved country.
It is my confident hope that some weeks
of rest in the mild and beneficent airs of
Maryland will act as a tonic and recruit anew
the forces which you have spent so generously
for the public weal.
I can never forget your kindness at the
time of the death of my dear brother.
With cordial regards and the renewed
assurance of my prayerful interest in your
health, happiness and well-being, I am, my
dear Mr. Ambassador,
Very sincerely yours,
(Signed) E. CARD. PACELLI