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Diplomatic Correspondence
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PSF
Russia
1941
PSF; Russia
Carmody Jolder
Observations in Russia*
jile
As related to Chicago
Filed 194]
McGraw-Hill Men
By
John M. Carmody
Editor of Factory & Industrial Management
July 27, 1931.
Russia is 80 big and 80 new to us, 80 many things are going on there
which our previous training and education has not prepared us to judge, that
no two people who come out of the country are likely to tell the same story.
In some cases I found that two American engineers who worked together on the
same job and lived together in the same apartment had totally different re-
actions to the Russian situation. One could tell you why it was succeeding
and would continue to succeed; the other could tell you why it was failing
and must ultimately fail.
Very few people who come out of Russia have travelled extensively
in the country. Travel is difficult. Only those who have been there a long
time are likely to have covered much ground, particularly off the beaten path.
I talked to many tourists. I talked to engineers, American, German, Swedish,
Danish, French and English, in various parts of Russia. Almost without excep-
tion they had seen only a small part of the country. Some have spent as long
as two years in one city. Therefore, it is not surprising that we hear such
a variety of stories about Russia. Then, too, much depends on what one under-
takes to see. It was my business to study the industrial program.
If we were to lay a map of the United States on the part of Russia
that I saw, wa would find that I had covered the equivalent of a trip from
New York to San Francisco and back, stopping at Wichita and Kansas City, and
Pittsburgh, Pa.; a trip from Washington, D. C. to Florida in the south via
Birmingham, Ala.; a trip from Butte, Montana to Phoenix, Arizona, stopping at
Denver and Amarillo, Texas and Boulder Dam; with a five days' trip down the
Mississippi River from Keokuk, Iowa to Shreveport, Louisiana; a trip by boat
from Mobile to Galveston and a visit to the coal fields of Illinois. That
gives you an idea of the amount of territory covered.
A word about my first impression of Moscow. One leaves Berlin on
a good train, with Wagon Lits sleeper. Thirty-six hours later one is in
Moscow. In the meantime you have traveled over land as level as our plains,
scarcely a rise in the ground for 1,000 miles. You give up your passport on
the Polish side of the border. Your baggage is given the once-over, you get
your passport back and pass the last outpost of the Polish soldiers. Presently
you pass a barbed wire fence which divides Poland and Russia, and are on the
"Medinah Club meeting, Chicago, July 27, 1931.
2
Red side, with a red flag, with Red soldiers lined up in the log barracks
close to the border. In a few minutes you arrive in Negereole, the customs
station, a big, barren looking, log station, with long tables. Your baggage
is gone over as it is in most customhouses, except that the process seems
slower. Nobody speaks English, but you get your baggage through and pass out
the other side to the Russian train. You have left the comfortable train for
one more comfortable than ordinarily found in Russia but less comfortable
than the European trains, -- wider gage, six feet. It doesn't make quite 80
much speed. You are on your way. You land in Moscow at eight or nine or ten
o'clock in the morning in a station that is jammed full of people with all
sorts of baggage. You find yourself in the midst of a great swarm of peasants
who have come off the train, riding third class, with coarse bags of food and
clothing, bed clothing etc., under their arms and over their backs. They seem
to be moving everything but furniture. The language is strange. The thing is
all new.
You go to a hotel. You find an interpreter. At last you are able to
make yourself understood. You may or may not get a room that day. I got one
that night, after long hours of argument.
My first impression "This is a terrible place. If I had the nerve
to do it I would go back immediately." I didn't have the nerve.
Russia has reached the half-way mark in its five-year plan, a plan
which purposes to lay the foundation for the industrialization of Russia that
will make it the equal of any industrial country in the world. Nobody in
Russia believes this result will be achieved in five years. Everybody re-
alizes that it will require several five-year steps to achieve the goal. But
a great start has been made. Hundreds of millions, even billions of rubles
are being spent in Russia to build new plants of every conceivable sort. The
only comparison that came to my mind as I went about Russia was that of our
own country in the midst of the war when we were feverishly building plants,
cantonments, and 80 forth, for the prosecution of the struggle. There is a
terrific urge to get things done all over Russia. You feel yourself in a war
atmosphere.
There is not an office (and there are great numbers of them in the
principal cities like Moscow and Leningrad) that isn't jammed full of clerks
and engineers and draftsmen and tracers. Every place you go people are in con-
ference with this program or that program or this project or that project.
The business of the country is being operated by large trusts. A
trust has control over all the activities and all the functions within a spe-
cific industry. There is one steel trust. There is one trust that controls
all bus transportation. There is a trust that controls all street car trans-
portation, one that controls all railroad transportation, and another that
controls the chemical industry, the food industry, the leather industry, and
so on. Many of these trusts have subdivisions corresponding to some of our
large companies.
Then the activities of all these trusts, outside of agriculture, head
up in what is called the Supreme Economic Council, referred to in Russia as
V. 8. N. H. These are the Russian initial letters of the Supreme Council of
Economy. It was with the head of the Supreme Economic Council that I had my
most interesting conversations in Russia. Before seeing him I had, on my own,
visited several plants. After I had gotten a reasonable amount of background
3
I then went to him and discussed with him what I thought were some of the fun-
damental problems in Russia. After we had had that talk, I then met him on
one of the biggest jobs in Russia, the Magnito-gorsk steel plant in Siberia.
For the most part, however, my observations were made without assistance from
anybody except a single letter of introduction which I dictated and he signed
for me.
The question has been asked many times, "Can one see what he wants
to see in Russial" Many people told me before I went that one could 860 only
what he was shown, and since I have come out many people have told me that one
can't possibly see anything in Russia that the Russians don't want you to see.
I don't know exactly what they mean by that. Not any of those people who have
told me that have been in Russia. It is all second-hand information. But for
myself I think it is only fair to the Russians to say that I saw anything and
everything that I wanted to see. The only limitations were those of time and
physical ability to cover the job.
In no case did I call up the director of a plant and ask him if I
could come in. In no case did I even ask if it would be convenient to see the
plant. When I wanted to go to a plant I went with my interpreter, and we got
in. In many cases I went to plants that the interpreter hadn't even heard of.
I even went to plants that I only knew about myself because I saw them as we
passed along in an automobile. We went back and went into the plant.
Specifically, where did I go in Russial After a week in Moscow
visiting not only industrial plants but many of the museums that are extremely
interesting because they afford a background without which one cannot under-
stand Russia, I went to Leningrad, Nishni Novgorod where the Austin Company is
constructing the new plant to build Ford cars and trucks, to Sverdloosk, cap-
ital of the Urals, and in the very heart of the non-ferrous metal mining dis-
trict, to Chilabinsk where a new plant is being constructed to build the cater-
pillar type tractors, to Magnito-gorsk where a plant designed by Arthur McKee
& Company of Cleveland is under construction, back over part of the same route,
through Kazan and down the Volga River through Samara and Saratov and Stalingrad.
In Saratov, incidentally, I saw a large combine plant under construction that
nobody had mentioned to me anywhere in Russia. I saw it from the boat as we
came down the river. When I found the boat was to be in dock about three hours,
we got transportation and went over to the plant. From there we went to
Stalingrad where I spent two days. I will come back to that because Stalingrad
represents one of the most interesting phases of modern Russian industry.
Then I went to Rostov, north of the Black Sea, where in one single
plant manufacturing agricultural implements, a new plant opened last year,
there are 6,000 separate machines, practically all of them American machines,
twenty-two buildings, three of the finest foundries I ever saw, of gray iron,
malleable, and steel foundries, - as well as well-equipped forge shops, heat
treating plants, assembly plants for rakes, wagons and all that sort of thing,
a fine woodworking plant and the last word in the pre-treatment of wood before
it goes into the plant. They are building a. new large combine plant, with the
design of which an American engineer is assisting.
From there I went to Gigant and Verblut and Seattle Commune.
Seattle Commune is a farm of considerable acreage that was started in 1921
by Finnish-Americans from Seattle, Washington, who went to Russia -- some 300
of them -- and established this farm. They run it as a commune.
4
Gigant and Verblut, one of them an experimental farm and the other -
Gigant - a big state farm, together cover about 500,000 acres. To see those
properties I hired a car and spent from ten o'clock in the morning, having
spent two hours with the assistant director, until half past eight that night
riding through the farms. They were terrifically big enterprises. On one of
those farms there 18 an agricultural school with 1,000 students. The consult-
ing engineer there, an American from Iowa and California told me it is the
finest agricultural school he knows -- and he has been teaching for some years
in agricultural schools.
From there we went to Kislovodsk, a watering place in the Caucasus,
which in the old days was a famous resort for wealthy Russians. It is a beau-
tiful place. We haven't anything quite like it. It suggests Colorado Springs
before it got shabby. At any rate it is & beautiful spot in the mountains,
with good buildings, all built before the revolution, but now operated en-
tirely by the trade unions for workers on their vacations. People are sent
there when their health is not quite up to standard. In the hotel where I
stayed there were 425 guests, all belonging to one of the trade unions. The
business was run by a doctor.
From there I flew to Baku, on the Caspian Sea, the center of the oil
business in Russia. On the way we flew over Grosney which is one of the newer
fields, with thousands of wells, splendid looking plants for the maintenance
of equipment, for the building of pipe and that sort of thing.
Baku itself is an old city. 011 was discovered there many, many
years ago. It was being exploited in a small way by the Russians before the
revolution, but since the revolution, of course, it has been opened up on a
large scale. American oil men whom I talked to there pointed out many of the
weaknesses of operation in the field. There is, of course, a great deal of
wasteful operation there. No deep drilling has been undertaken. Wells are all
too close together. Nevertheless they are taking out a great deal of oil.
Thousands of men are at work all over that field.
From there we went to Tiflis, in the Caucasus, in the center of some
of the mining operations in that area. It is an old city, founded in the
fourth century, and looks it. I spent most of my time in the old quarter be-
cause there one still finds some of the evidences of private industry. Much
of the small work, like blacksmithing and tinsmithing, shoemaking and dyeing
of textiles, is done as it was hundreds of years ago, with small tools and
small pots.
From there we went to Batum on the Black Sea, twenty miles from the
Turkish border. It is there the pipe lines end that come out from Baku, and
it 1s there the Standard 011 Company and the other companies dealing with
Russia, get their oil, put it on ships and send it out.
From there we took a boat on the Black Sea, a boat equivalent to one
of our D & 0 boats, & good cabin ship with two six-cylinder Diesel engines,
built in 1930 in the yards at Leningrad, for Yalta in Crimea. Yalta is another
of the summer resorts made famous in the old days by the wealthy Russians,
There are beautiful places, beautiful homes, palaces, all along the northern
shore of the Black Sea, Sukhum, Sochi, Yalta, and several other places. In
Yalta the czar had a palace. All of those places were beautifully maintained,
with the exquisite Black Sea at their front door, with the mountains rising
in the back, and walled roads and walled yards. Gardens all over the hillsides,
afforded grapes, cherries and that sort of fruit.
5
Yalta, like the other resort cities, is given over to the trade
unions for rest and recreation. There again I saw what I saw in Kislovodsk,
just crowds of people, every single room occupied, the streets crowded at
night with people marching back and forth, and bathing along the shore the
next morning.
From there I went by automobile across the Crimea to Sevastopol, and
from Sevastopol to Alexandrovsk which is seven miles from Dnieperstroy, where
the so-called Cooper dam is being built. Even in Alexandrovsk, the name of
which I hadn't even heard up to the time we got off the train there, at three
o'clock in the morning, I found a combine plant in operation and working a
night shift.
At Dnieperstroy we found the dam well along toward completion. The
day I was there they let the first gate down, with a view to letting the water
in the dam. The water will rise all summer and this winter. Next year, ac-
cording to the engineer's plans, the dam will be full. When it is finished
they will generate 780,000 horsepower. They were just setting the scroll rings
that I saw at Newport News last October, when I visited the Newport News ship-
building yards.
On the other side of the dam I saw two things: first, well arranged
locks which will make that river navigable for many miles up, and then over an
area of between twelve and fifteen square miles there is this gigantie new
industrial enterprise which will be known as Combine-at, designed to manufac-
ture aluminum, iron, steel, new agricultural equipment, combines, chemical ma-
terials, brick, cement. Some of the buildings are well along. Some of them
are just being started. There, as everywhere else, taneously with the
building of these plants goes on the construction of new houses, all of which
are fairly well standardized into apartment houses for somewhere around sixty
families, A whole city has already risen on that side of the Dnieper where
three years ago, the Cooper Engineers told me, there was nothing but farm land.
From there we went to Kharkov which is the capital of the Ukraine,
one of the richest sections of Russia. Again, we had an opportunity to talk to
American engineers as well as to Russian engineers. It was in Kharkov I saw
one of the most interesting things that I came upon in Russia. Down a side
street I. encountered a clothing factory. Having spent some years in the
clothing business a few years ago, I was interested. I went in and found they
had 5,000 employees in a building that was originally used for other purposes.
I think I had a little more difficulty convincing those fellows that I ought
to see the plant than I did with anybody else. Four or five comparatively
young, shrewd men, in their early thirties, sat around the desk and talked and
argued with the interpreter. As soon as they were convinced we might see the
plant, they brought out their figures on costs, standards of production etc.
They amazed me by saying they had their plant laid out in such a way as to
take forty-seven seconds for every operation in the manufacture of a coat.
Well, that didn't seem very reasonable. They also told me they had the plant
conveyorized. I couldn't quite understand that. We went into the plant; we
went in late in the afternoon, an hour before the day shift quit and stayed an
hour after the night shift came on. I found that what they told me was true,
that they had so organized and standardized the garment, that each operation
took exactly forty-seven seconds. If anybody was a little slow, somebody had
to wait. If anybody was faster, he might rest. There wasn't very much varia-
tion. I observed the operations carefully. It enabled them to manufacture
coats, not quite as good as our own, not quite 80 well tailored, but good
6
enough for people who do not have enough clothing anyway, for less than we
manufacture them, with less time, and with practically no work in process,
because every operation, as it was finished, was passed to the next person.
Instead of having physically conveyorized the plant, they conveyorized it as
to method. In other words, every garment passed from one person to the next
without any delay and without any extra handling.
We found a somewhat similar thing in a shoe factory in Rostov where
6,000 people were turning out 20,000 pairs of shoes a day. Our guide in that
particular plant was the head of what they called the norm department, that is,
the department that sets the production standards -- a very capable girl who,
when she found I had some experience in that field, wanted us to meet some of
the other officials of the company. She was especially interested to know how
to apply motion study methods.
From Kharkov we went into the Dunbas where some of our American
mining engineers are assisting with the rationalization of Russian coal mining.
Allen and Garcia of Chicago have a corps of engineers there, and Stuart of
Stuart, James and Cook of New York, have a group. One or two other American
engineering firms are in or have been in the Dunbaz. There I had an oppor-
tunity not only to 888 the top works but to go underground in the mines. They
have a long way to go in Russia to put their mining on as modern a basis as it
is in America. They know that, but they are making considerable progress.
From this little mining town we went to Stalina and to Meekvka.
Stalina is one of the oldest steel towns in Russia. Perhaps fifty years ago
a man named Hughes, a Welsh-American, got British capital and organized this
steel plant in Stalina and developed the mines around there. In fact, the
town, until the revolution, was called Hughesovka. It is an old mill, a good
deal like our mills were thirty or forty years ago, but it is being modernized.
A new pig-casting machine was being put into operation while I was there. They
have increased the power plant. They have modernized two of the blast fur-
naces, and altogether there are evidences about the place that in a few years
it will be quite as modern as any of our old plants that we would undertake to
rationalize.
I learned, as I did in many other places, that they had almost twice
as many employees as they had before the revolution. I was prepared for that,
because it is a fact that the Russians at present do not produce as much per
man per day as we do in this country. I should say offhand it may take any-
where from three to six Russians to do the same work that would be done in
this country by one man. I don't think that will always be true, but that is
the situation today.
From Stalina we went to Meekvka, another plant, the same sort, opened
by the French at about the same time. There again we found a modernization
program in effect. A new pig-casting machine had already been installed under
the supervision of an American blast furnace man. Fourteen new open hearths
were being erected, to be ready next year.
Bill Harris, an American blast furnace man who had spent four years
in India and more or less knocked around the world, a hard-boiled sort of
fellow, told me he pointed out to the Russians after he had been there a short
time, that the force report showing the number of men at work on the blast fur-
nace showed sixteen men, whereas in America, on a furnace of similar capacity,
they would have only three men, Bill looked at the force report the next day
7
and it showed "three men and thirteen students." That is characteristic of
many things in Russia, Nobody wants to be caught in a position of inferiority
to the best practice that he knows about any place else, if he can get out of
it.
Then, too, practically every job in Russia is actually overloaded
today because they are preparing for this rapid expansion, which leads me to
their plan of education as I observed it in many places. They realize that
they have got a huge task to change from an agricultural country to an indus-
trial country, a terrific job to remold the thinking of millions of peasants
accustomed to the slow work of small strip farming, either to collective farm-
ing, which calls for a high degree of mechanization, or to work in industrial
plants. Therefore, all over the Union they have industrial schools. They are
putting their emphasis, of course, on the youth in Russia. Starting out with
what they call the Central Labor Bureau in Moscow, where they have a training
school that is theoretically fine but practically not very valuable, except
that it does stimulate thinking and gives some degree of training on machines,
they build into every factory that they erect, a school, and this school is
more important in Russia today than the old schools for regular curricula.
They take it more seriously.
Curiously enough, these schools built into these plants are operated
jointly by the Supreme Economic Council and the Commissar of Education. They
work together on the curricula. They work together in the administration of
these schools. These schools are designed to give boys and girls half-time in-
struction in the classroom and half-time on the job. They speak of it over
there as the Henry Ford idea, carrying out more or less the theory that Ford
has expounded in this country, that much of our education is wasted because
boys and girls come out of our schools without knowing anything about industry.
That will not be true of Russia because they hear, see and think almost nothing
but industry and work. All over Russia there is propaganda for work, propa-
ganda for the development of specialists. You will find it everywhere, in
stores, on the streets, in the plants, on the walls, on the cars, in the
stations.
In some plants I saw excursions of school children from seven years
to ten years of age. In one place, out at Adtostroy, I noticed a group of
school girls, about twelve to fifteen years, dressed about like our school
girls would be, handling brick. I inquired first from the Russian engineer
with whom I was spending a couple of hours and later from the American engi-
neers who had been there for a year and one-half, who they were. They were
school girls out on their rest day, giving their rest day to the plant. They
were carrying brick for the bricklayers -- all girls, no boys in that party.
I have driven through the streets of Moscow when you would pass per-
haps thirty or forty boys and girls with transits and instructors, groups of
three or four or five with a transit, making their studies. They are cre-
ating engineers. Obviously they are not going to be as good engineers as the
old engineers were under the old Russian system, 80 far as theory is concerned,
but they will at least have an acquaintance with industry, and they will enter
industry with an eagerness that we are more or less unaccustomed to. So much
for education.
Transportation. What is the situation with regard to transportation
in Russia? One hears all sorts of things. In the first place, practically
every mile of Russian railroad is single track. Practically all of it was
8
laid at the time there were no heavy engines or heavy cars, and there is
little ballast. Cars are small and light; engines are small and light, much
smaller than ours. The speed of trains is not at all equal to ours, and the
delay at stations is much greater than our own. But I did find that almost
universally they are building long side tracks, miles and miles of long side
tracks. It is an intelligent way to go about the double tracking of a rail-
road. It won't take much to double track a great many of the railroads in
Russia. They are also building many, many miles of new railroad. I rode for
some thirty hours on one of these new roads, built about twelve months ago.
But there are miles and miles and miles of new roads going back into chemical
plants, back into plants for the preparation of timber and so forth. Every
place we went we found the side tracks loaded with cars that themselves were
loaded with merchandise. They had lumber and logs. They had machinery coming
from the ports. They had wheat; they had seed. They had what not. In many
cases they had army supplies, carloads of portable kitchens and small guns and
that sort of thing. But everywhere the trains are jammed.
Airplanes -- some, yes. I flew twice, once 1900 kilometers, and
another time about 1,000 kilometers. In both cases the planes were off on
time and arrived on time, just as the trains started on time and arrived on
time. I dare say neither one starts on time or arrives on time in the winter.
I was there in favorable weather, arrived in April and left just before the
beginning of July.
Boats -- plenty of boats, good boats on the Volga River and on the
Black Sea, and they operate, and operate on schedule. We were late going down
the Volga because the river was way out of her course, as a result of the heavy
snows of the previous winter just melting. Incidentally, it was interesting
to note going down the Volga that we passed scores and scores of log rafts
anywhere from one-quarter mile to a half mile long. The food was not 80 good
on the Volga boat. Fortunately we had taken our own,
Street cars -- in the cities, crowded everywhere, all the time. It
is almost impossible to get on, much less get a seat. An interesting thing:
They have no difficulty collecting fares on the street cars. An inspector may
get on the car anywhere and if the rider cannot show a receipt, he may be fined
up to 100 rubles. In those crowded cars people are jammed together, and I have
seen the fare passed from the front clear back to the conductor and the receipt
passed back from hand to hand. Nobody in Russia will ride on a street car
without a receipt. The cars are operated by women. I never saw our conductors
handle a crowd as efficiently as those women handle these jamming throngs. I
rode on a lot of street cars in different places, as far as 2,000 miles apart.
Buses -- they are getting them. Roads aren't good. But there are
buses in all of the large cities, and as these new industrial plants develop
within seven and eight and ten miles of the cities, as they are doing at Rostov,
Kharkov, Stalingrad and many other places, they must expand their bue service.
Italian and German buses seemed to me to predominate. I saw only one comfort-
able bus, an Italian bus that I rode in outside Stalingrad, which was the
equal of the best buses we have here.
Taxis -- practically none anywhere. Sometimes you go into a city
and there is only one car in the city, which accounts for the fact that I
walked more than I have in twenty years. Droshkies -- yes, It takes two hours
to bargain with a fellow who knows he is going to charge half what he asks, and
he knows you are going to walk away and he will follow you. It is the most
9
annoying thing in the world. Some of them are 80 old that they carried the
czar around when he was a small child. Some of the uniforms are the uniforms
that they used when the czar was & boy, with this old bustle business. They
must have been gorgeous things in their day like the czar's own uniforms.
Living conditions -- there isn't anywhere near enough housing in
Russia to take care of modern Russia's requirements. In spite of all the
houses and apartments that have been built in the past two years, and thousands
of them have been built, there is a terrific housing shortage everywhere. Even
in these new centers I have seen as many as five and six and seven people liv-
ing in one small room. It will take a long time for Russia to catch up with
her housing needs.
Of course, almost everywhere I went the job was only in the process
of building. Therefore, the barracks were still in existence. For instance,
in Magnito-gorsk, I have it on good authority from the records as well as from
the American engineers who went in there early, that fifteen months ago it was
only grazing land. It happens to represent somewhat of a saucer in the hills,
approximately five miles in diameter. It was grazing land. The Don Cessacks
had special privileges there. Today there are 72,000 people living in that
community, almost all, of course, in barracks, most of them in wooden barracks,
some in tents. The Socialist housing program is going slowly. Nobody is living
in the apartments yet, But 72,000 people had to be taken care of in that short
time. In fact, they had to be taken care of in a very few months. Forty
thousand of those people, men and women, are working on the job.
Excavation alone on that job represented 5,500,000 cubic meters.
That is the total excavation on that job alone. When they have finished they
will have a plant designed to produce 2,500,000 tons of steel. They are be-
ginning by building blast furnaces and coke ovens. By the way, Koppers has a
group of men out there who are getting along better with the Russians than
almost anybody I met.
Labor -- everybody in Russia tells you there is a shortage of labor.
On the basis of their present efficiency, there is. I was quite frank in my
talk with Russian officials everywhere, in saying that in a country where it
took from three to six or seven men to do one man's work, quite naturally they
had a shortage of labor. They really have a shortage of efficiency and manage-
ment. When they learn more about management, when individuals and groups are
more efficient, they are not likely to have a shortage of labor.
Men and women do the same work for the same pay. There are almost as
many women found on construction jobs as anywhere else. About thirty-five per
cent of the workers on the Kharkov tractor plant, for instance, scheduled to
open in October, were women, right in the midst of construction, digging
ditches, mixing cement, sifting gravel, sand, everything. They drive tractors;
they do anything that men will do. Not all but a great deal of the mainte-
nance-of-way work on the railroad is done by women. I saw them running steam
hammers in plants as old as the Putiluv plant, and, of course, in the machine
shops they are just as numerous as they are in our own shops here in America.
On the whole, I found that the American instructors say they learn quicker;
they really think they are more efficient than the men.
10
I said a word a little while ago about Gigant and Verblut, these
two very large farms. There is a closer relationship between industry and
agriculture in Russia than we recognize in this country. In the first place,
the revolution can't be a success unless the peasants are as satisfied as the
city workers are. This was recognized very early, in spite of the fact that
the earliest revolts in Russia were organized by the peasants. In fact, the
backbone of the revolution for 200 years was among the peasants in Russia who
were serfs. The war and perhaps the orientation given by the revolutionary
philosophy, by Lenin himself, took the play away from the peasants, as it
were, and put the power, at least the early power, into the hands of the
workers in Leningrad and Moscow and old Ekaterinburg, and in Baku. The work-
ers really gave the big push to the 1917 revolution, but, as I say, it was
recognized by all the leaders that without the support of the peasants, the
revolution itself could not be an ultimate success. That accounted, of course,
for Lenin's New Economic Policy, just before he died, which gave the right and
privilege of trading to various groups in Russia, It was meant to allay
peasants' dissatisfaction. The story is a long one. You are familiar with it.
"Humanity Uprooted" by Hindus is one of the best stories in that general field.
But the fact remains that there must be close coordination between the peasants
and the industrial workers if the revolution is to continue to be successful.
That is recognized throughout Russia.
What did the city workers promise the peasants for giving up their
land, for giving up their old method of farming and of individual trading?
They offered to give them machines to produce large quantities of grain with
small amounts of labor. That accounts for the fact that the biggest emphasis
in Russia today is placed on the development of agricultural machinery. All
over the land you find these agricultural machinery and tractor plants start-
ing up. They are situated in places that are strategic from the political
point of view rather than from the industrial point of view. Rostof is right
at the very base of the Ukraine, the richest wheat land in Russia. There they
have built one of their largest agricultural implement factories. At Kharkof,
the capital of Ukraine, again, another big plant to make tractors -- Stalingrad,
along the Volga, Cheliabinsk, out in Siberia, in the very heart of Siberian
farming area. So it goes all over. These are spotted so that the peasants
can see the tractors come out or can be told by local people and local papers
that they are coming out and are coming into their area.
So we find a very much greater effort to coordinate the activities
of industry and agriculture in Russia than we are likely to find even here at
home.
Quality and quantity production. It is a little early to say def-
initely just what Russia will mean in the world of commerce ten or fifteen or
twenty years hence. This whole plan was conceived by dreamers, by men whose
whole life had been devoted to a study of revolutionary philosophy. It was
conceived by what they call in Russia, party men, theoreticians. Therefore,
party men and theoreticians had the top places in the early days of this five-
year program, but as they began to spend money, send money outside for ma-
chinery, and as they began to put this machinery into place, as they began to
compare accomplishment with the plan, it dawned on a good many people in
Russia that while theory is a fine thing, and while philosophy is important to
the revolution, the realities of economics meant that somebody with practical
industrial experience must have something to say in the guiding of this work.
That is really at the base of this so-called new statement of Stalin's about
recognizing individual efficiency and listening to the advice of outside
11
engineers, and so forth. But what brought this to a head? It seems to me
that this situation is responsible. The Stalingrad plant was the first of
the tractor plants to be put into operation. The building was erected by an
American. A Russian commission came to the United States, looked over plants
here, went out to Ford's and saw what had been done at Dearborn. They said,
"We want for Stalingrad the architect who designed and the erector who put up
that building." They hired John Calder, the erector. He went to Russia,
Without having another English-speaking person on the job, he erected the
steel three months in advance of schedule.
Before the job was done he went to Ivanoff who was the director and
a very competent executive and said, "You had better get your machinery here."
Ivanoff said, "It is no use, you won't have the building done."
"Yes, we will. We are going to have it done in such-and-such time."
Finally, the building was completed and it laid idle some three or
four months before they got the machinery and put it into operation. That went
through Russia like an electric spark. Throughout the whole country people
were told, "Ah! See what we can do. Bee what we did in Stalingrad. We built
the plant three months ahead of schedule. We will finish the plan in two
years." They brought in machinery, and they brought in peasants and brought
in some 437 men from Detroit, some foremen, assistant foremen, job setters,
die-makers, and mixed them with the Russian peasants. The first thing they
knew, there was a great mess. The plant was designed for 154 tractors every
day, one every eleven minutes. It limply and lamely began to turn out a lot
of junk. The machines got loose and some were abused and some were out of or-
der, and they were short this material and that. They were taking from one
job to put on another.
Presently they were getting six, seven or eight tractors a day, just
groping along. It went for some months before they got up to fifteen or six-
teen, with the result that a newspaper in Moscow, Pravda, sent a commission
down there, also sent reporters who could sit on the job and get all the facts.
They began to burn them up. Before I went to Stalingrad, I began to see this
in the paper. I didn't need any translator to tell me what the problem was,
because big charts showed what they had produced yesterday and the day before
that and a month ago, and compared this with schedule. That, plus a little
translation, gave me the whole story. I was able to say to the director when
I talked to him, when he said, "Oh, yes, you got your criticism of Stalingrad
in America," "No, I didn't. I got it from Pravda which is your own party
mouthpiece."
The result was a shake-up. Some of the Americans were sent home
because they weren't efficient, and others went because they didn't want to
stay. They began to take better care of the machines and began to organize
the maintenance department under the direction of a competent American. Many
things happened, with the result that within three months the production went
up first to forty and then to approximately fifty tractors. Even so, all
those tractors are not entirely satisfactory.
It was the best lesson that Russia could possibly have had. If that
plant had started out as they thought it would because they had the last word
in American machinery; if it had started out producing anywhere near the
schedule for which it was planned, they would have been ruined. They would
12
have gotten the mistaken notion that you can press a button, and that peasant
boys could operate these highly complicated machines. But now they realize
that this is not possible. Hundreds and hundreds, even thousands of Russian
engineers have been sent to Stalingrad to study that situation, and the ex-
perience of Stalingrad is beginning to penetrate throughout Russian industry.
The Russians have learned mare in Stalingrad than they could possibly
have learned in ten years without that experience. They couldn't blame the
machinery. They still say it isn't designed right. That is characteristic of
these Russian engineers, all of whom know a great deal more about design than
even the combined engineering talent of nations that have been at it for hun-
dreds of years. But they couldn't very well blame the machinery because sim-
ilar machinery in other countries, even in Europe, was turning out a great deal
more production.
Some other time we will talk about "Russian engineers versus American
engineers." Perhaps I ought to say this now, no two American engineers have
quite the same experience in Russia. I talked to many of them in different
parts of Russia. I saw them when they were going in to start their jobs. I
saw others who were going out after five months and getting their contract can-
celled. I saw others who had been there four years. I saw others who were
going back on their second contract, after having come out for a two week's
vacation. I spent many hours with them. I was on the job with them. I saw
them everywhere except on the trains. On the trains I encountered Americans
only once except from Berlin to Moscow and return.
Many American engineers ought not to go to Russia. They are not
equipped either technically or psychologically to go. Some of the men who were
getting on best in Russia were not good engineers. One or two who are termed
engineers but who are not engineers at all, are darn smart fellows, good exec-
utives, good business men. They have knocked around. They know how to get
along with people. Others who are among the best technical men anywhere don't
get along. They either want to come out or ought to come out. You get into
all kinds of situations. One of the things I hope we can do is probably pre-
pare some sort of an article for our journals that will say a word about that
situation, because there are BO many fellows, under our economic depression
here, who think they would like to go to Russia. It is a nice trip, a trip to
Europe, and a lot of romance about it, and so forth. It is not so hot. The
food isn't very good, and it is certainly different from anything we have here.
Recreation: There is very little recreation in Russia for anybody.
There are parks, of course, and people go to the parks. You see them in the
parks in the evening. There are practically no games. They are talking about
a golf course down in Magnito-gorsk for the foreign engineers, and they may get
one. They have plenty of land.
There is horse racing in Moscow, the only thing in Moscow I missed
that I am sorry about. They race from five o'clock in the evening until ten
o'clock. It is daylight until ten o'clock. The place is crowded. They have
pari-mutuel. I never did get there, although my friends went and I go clear
out to Arlington here and take hours to do it. There I could have gone in a
few minutes.
13
Everybody in Russia is either studying something or teaching some-
thing. I think that is pretty generally true. They certainly go to school a
lot. Everybody has a brief-case under his arm, every boy and girl and engineer.
I met a Russian engineer on the train. In his Russian and my English he ex-
plained to me that he was designing & new excavator to be a better excavator
than one of our fifty-ton machines. He showed me the drawing which was copied.
He was complaining because some of the drawings he got, some of the catalogs
didn't have all the details, and they had to tear a machine down and measure
it. Quite naive. He pulled down his brief-case and I thought, "Here is where
I am going to see some more drawings, perhaps of the plant, but all he had in
it was a loaf of bread and some bologna.
Workers' clubs: Along with the building of plants and houses and
schools go what they call workers' clubs or cultural clubs. I found them
everywhere in Russia. You have seen pictures of them, large buildings, the 80-
called new German modernistic architecture, not very handsome from the outside
but efficient, with a theater, that will hold from 1,000 to 2,000 people, de-
pending on the size of the plant and the size of the town, a great many school
rooms full of exhibits and charts. If any child in Russia doesn't know exactly
how many more acres of wheat can be raised on an Ukrainian field than on a
field in Illinois, it is not the fault of the Russian government. They have
every conceivable bit of information about every phase of our life, health,
agriculture, dairying, industry, the difference between the strength of mater-
ials, and everything you can think of, on charts in all these places. There
are thousands of boys and girls and men and women in these places at night.
You don't 868 many peasants. I say again that the peasants don't participate.
These are for city and town people.
Theaters -- yes, in the cities. I went to the Ballet twice in
Moscow. It is almost the equivalent of the old Russian Ballet with which some
of you are familiar. It is crowded from top to bottom. Who goes? Who gets
the tickets? The tickets are passed out in workshops. Perhaps some plant ex-
ceeded its schedule or did something else, and 600 tickets go there, and 400
here and 300 there. It is just an ordinary working crowd. Half of the men
have their boots on, and few take their caps off. The women are dressed a
little bit better than the men, usually, but they come in from all over the
town. I went to the opera "Eugene Onegin." The opera house was crowded. There
was a long wait between acts, and the people would go out and drink tea and
wander around. There were two revolutionary plays at the Meyerhold and Art
Theaters. Mayerhold is recognized as one of the outstanding artists in all
Europe. These are old theaters modernized and simplified. Upstairs there was
a model of the stage setting for every play produced recently and those that
were planned to be played for the next year or so. This was in charge of an
actor too old to act but enthusiastic about his new responsibility. The rev-
olutionary plays like "The Last Fight" and "Bread" have a political significance.
"The Last Fight" has to do with the military situation and "Bread," for in-
stance, is a propaganda play for the collectivization of farms and the technic
that should be used in the development of collectives. Interesting plays.
The finest combination of motion picture effects and the ordinary stage drama
that I ever saw. When they want mass action they throw on the screen the
motion picture and then it fades out and you are back in the play again. The
orchestras are very good. These are in the larger cities. The smaller places
don't have so many theaters, although they have traveling troupes such as we
have here, stock companies, that go up and down the Volga and elsewhere.
14
Reading. Everybody in Russia is reading. Newspapers circulate the
same as they do here. You find them on all corners. Books are rather crudely
put together, but all have a technical slant. You find in them all kinds of
drawings of gas engines and tractors and what not as part of the whole scheme.
Museums are well maintained. I talked to several authorities on
museums, Germans and Americans who had been asked by the Russian Government to
look at Russian museums. One archaeologist, a Harvard man, well known, was
just coming out after having made an appraisement of some of the art work in
Russia. The old palaces have been turned into museums, and, of course, util-
ized to the fullest extent for propaganda for the new life.
Religion is out. There is no Sunday. You almost never see anybody
in church. Occasionally one or two people drift in and out, but there is no
such church-going as we have in this country.
A word about two other things. One is the May Day parade. The ac-
tivities in Moscow on May Day began between half past seven and eight o'clock
in the morning on Red Square. I got there early. I stayed through until about
twelve o'clock. During that time it was a military spectacle. The Red Army
was in. They had all the various divisions of the army, the functions of the
army, with airplanes overhead, the cavalry and artillery, and what not, and a
lot of drilling and the taking of the oath by the new men, and 80 forth. Then
started the parade, that is, the parade of the proletariat, the parade of the
workers, men, women and children, a parade that started through the Square at
about twelve o'clock and finished about ten minutes to six at night. I didn't
stand up, although I had a ticket, and my ticket entitled me to stand up all
day, not to sit down, because nobody sits down. They stand up straight between
twelve and six. At half past twelve I went back to my hotel. I had a window
overlooking the entrance to the Square and could see the thirty-two lines, the
eight lines of four each, that went through. Bronx-like I lay on my stomach
in the window sill from one o'clock until ten minutes to six and counted
people. That just gives you some idea of how they turn out on a day like that.
Of course, it is true that everybody was expected to parade. Word went down
the line in these factories that they were supposed to be in the parade, and
they were in the parade.
I made up my mind before I came out that I would see Lenin's mauso-
leum. Lenin is buried in Red Square, immediately in front of the Kremlin, the
Kremlin itself being the old czar's headquarters, before they moved to Leningrad.
Ivan lived in the Kremlin and so did many other czars of Russia. Just outside
Kremlin Wall is this gorgeous mausoleum of black and brown marble, very simple
in design. Lenin lies in a glass case downstairs, with a soldier standing at
attention at his head and one at his feet. He looks perfectly natural; as you
probably gathered from what George Bernard Shaw or Lady Astor said, he looks
like a. man who had just died or perhaps wasn't quite dead. He has & fine, in-
tellectual head.
The mausoleum is open two hours a day, every day in the week, usually
from seven to nine. I never hit it without running into a big crowd. I was
told I could get a special pass that would allow me to go in without waiting in
line but I didn't want to do that. The night before I left, I went out to the
Square at eight o'clock. People had been going in for an hour, and the line
then was almost a mile long, not in one place because they worked a snake-line
up and down the Square. I joined the line. At two minutes to nine I got in.
The crowd entertained itself by watching the clock on Kremlin wall and checking
15
progress of the line against time. In fact, I learned again to count in
Russian by listening to people discuss the possibility of being left outside.
There were 1,000 people back of me when I went in.
That has been going on for some two or three years. It is always
that way. How long it will continue, I don't know. There were all kinds of
people in that line. Nobody asked them to go; you don't have to do that.
People say, "How long is it going to last?" and all that business. Of course,
nobody knows. Nobody knows, I suppose, the inner recesses of the Russian's
mind. But I came away with the impression that we know entirely too little
about Russia, that we have been quite completely misled, most of us, by the
ordinary reports that we read about Russia. The ordinary observer, even the
newspaper correspondent, frequently misleads us because he puts too much em-
phasis on non-essentials.
But looking at it from our point of view, that is our interest in
industry, I have a feeling that American business men ought to give much more
serious consideration to Russia than they have been giving. I think they ought
to shake out of their minds the ordinary rubbish that is handed to them many
times by people who have more to gain by keeping them disturbed about Russia,
or misled by Russia than they have by giving them anywhere near the truth.
People say, "Should we be in business in Russia" I say, "We are in business
in Russia." There are hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of American equip-
ment all over Russia. We are already in Russia. It is too late to ask the
question whether we will do business with Russia. We have got a lot of money
invested in Russia. There are many ramifications to the problem that I haven't
even touched upon,
Russia is determined to create for the people some means of life.
They have made headway. They have made headway along the lines of consolidating
the interests of a hundred separate races found in European Russia in the Cau-
casus, the Urals and Siberia. A lot of people who really weren't Russians in
the beginning are closer together than ever before.
Talking again about our approach to it, I am not saying people should
give them credit. I am not saying that. That isn't the thing. That is for
each concern to work out for itself, but I do think that business men ought to
realize that we are now in business in Russia. We have extended a terrific
amount of credit. The Russians want more credit, they want longer credit. They
play one nation against another; they can do it. They know how to take advan-
tage of our economic depression as well as that of Germany and England and
Italy; they know how to do it. They are much keener psychologists. They are
much keener bargainers, on the whole, than are our business men.
They have another advantage. Business, politics, industry and educa-
tion are all together in Russia. The whole thing is all welded into one single
knot, not scattered all over. A small group of men in Russia can talk to you
about any particular situation. They have to have a meeting of only thirty or
forty to have a meeting of the responsible executives of all industry and agri-
culture in Russia. They don't have to get 10,000 men together and have them
appoint committees down, down, down, down until the committees are so far re-
moved from the original plan that they themselves don't know what they are nego-
tiating about. It is not BO in Russia. Thirty or forty men in one room can
talk to you about all the problems that Russia has with regard to the rest of
the world, That is a lot to think about.
X
PSF. insia
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary
of State, Noscow, March 24, 1941. For the President, Secretary,
and Under Secretary.
Relates his disuossions with roving Japanese ambassador,
Matsuoka and discusses his impressions of Hitler, Ribbentrop,
and Japanese aims and policies in China.
SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV,
The Far Last, pages 921-922.
RJ
12/13/56
X
PSF - Russia
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary
of State, Moscow, April 3, 1941. For the President, Secretary,
and Under Secretary.
Describes & meeting which took place between Matsuoka,
Stalin, Molotov, and the Japanese Ambassador, and states that
no "business" of any kind wes discussed.
SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV,
The Far Last, page 929.
RS 12/13/56
PSF- Ruesia
X
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary
of State, Moscow, April 8, 1941. For the President, the Secretary
and Under Secretary.
Relates A. conversation with Matsuoka in which he, Matsuoka,
described an interview tih Hitler and Ribbentrop. In this interview
the Germans discussed at length their relations with Japan,
Italy, and Russia.
SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV,
the Far East, pages 932-934.
RS 12/13/56
X
PSF - Russia
The Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary
of State, Moscow, April 9, 1941. For the President, the Secretary,
and the Under Secretary.
Transmite a letter from Matsuoka to himself (Steinhardt) asking
for 8. paraphrased abstract of Steinhardt's cable to Washington
discussing Matsuoka's views. Also discusses his views on Japan-
China relations.
SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV,
The Far East, pages 934-935.
RJ 12/13/56
X
PSF- Russia
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary
of State, Moscow, April 11, 1941. For the President, the
Secretary, and the Under Secretary.
Reports that he has read, orally, to Matsuoka excerpts from
his previous report to Washington, that Matsuoka has categorically
approved each of the sixteen statements and amplified a few.
SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV,
The Far Lest, pages 936-937.
RS 12/13/56
PSF- Kasin
x
The Ambassador in the Sowiet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary
of State, Moscow, April 12, 1941. For the President [and] the
Secretary. [Transmitted at 5 p.m.]
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary
of State, Mossow, April 12, 1941. For the President, the
Secretary, and the Under Secretary. [Transmitted at 8 p.m.]
Discusses arrangements by which Ambassador Cripps (British)
was enabled to meeti with Matsuoka "by accident" at the Moscow
Art Theatre. Other discussion of the British position.
SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV,
The Far East, pages 938-940.
RJ 12/14/56
PSF- Russia
X
The Embassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary
of State, Moscow, April 13, 1941 - 4 p.m. For the President,
the Secretary and Under Secretary.
Relates the incident of the meeting between Matsuoka
and Cripps at the Moscow Art Theatre during which Cripps
transmitted a message from Churchill which Matsuoka "Surreptitiously"
slipped into his pocket.
SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV,
The Far East, pages 940-941.
RJ 12/14/56
X
PSF. Russia
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the "ecretary of
State, Moscow, April 13, 1941, 10 p.m. For the President, the
Secretary and the Under Secretary.
Announces the signing of & treaty of neutrality between the
Soviet Union and Japan and states his interpretations of the
reasons underlying the negotiations. Includes the text of 8.
confidential letter written in longhand by Matsuoka to Steinhardt.
SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV,
The Far East, pages 942-944.
RS 12/17/56
PSF- Russia
X
The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew),
Washington, July ", 1941. (Approved by President Hoosevelt on
July 3, 1941)
Delivers 8. message from the Secretary of State for the
Prime Minister of Japan indicating alarm concerning reports
that Japan plans to attack the Soviet Union and requesting an
assurance from the Prime Minister that such is not the case.
SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV,
The Far East, pages 994-995.
RS 12/19/56
PSI Russia
Folder
Doral
1-41
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 7, 1941. 84
MEMORANDUM FOR
S. T. E.
Tell him I'm sorry I cannot
see him -- -- wish I could.-- but do the
best he can and be sure to come in to
see me when he gets back.
F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 5, 1941
MEMORANDUM FOR GRACE TULLY:
Mr. Early asks if you will
show this to the President and ask
him what he wants to do and then send
a telegram to Ingersoll.
RR
COPY SENT TO GENERAL WATSON
PSF Russia
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 5, 1941
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Ingersoll of PM is going to Russia.
He is leaving Wednesday for the West Coast,
en route to Russia.
Ingersoll would like to know what
he can do for you, in addition to the work he
will do for PM. He asks five or ten minutes,
either Monday or Tuesday.
Ingersoll can be reached at
PM Publications, 27 Sixth Avenue, Brooklyn,
New York.
S.T.E.
PSF Russia Fold
1-4
July 8, 1941
Dear Larry:
This letter will be brought to you
by Ralph Ingersoll who is carrying a message
to you from no.
Good luck to you.
As ever,
Franklin D Roosevelt
Honorable Laurence A. Steinhardt,
The American Ambassador,
American Embassy,
Moseow, U.S.S.R.
wdh-mw
Russia Flder
August 2, 1941.
PERSONAL AND
MEMORANDUM FOR WAYNE COY:
I raised the point in Cabinet on Friday that nearly
six weeks have elapsed since the Russian War began and that
we have done practically nothing to get any of the materials
they asked for on their actual way to delivery in Siberia.
Frankly, if I were a Russian I would feel that I
had been given the run-around in the United States.
Please get out the list and please, with my full
authority, use a heavy hand -- act as a burr under the saddle
and get things moving!
The enclosed comes in just before I leave. In regard
to bombers, we should make and the British should make small
token deliveries. In regard to P-forties, it is ridiculous
to bring any back here from England by steamer through the
submarine zone and we should expedite 200 of them via Fairbanks
from the total number now in this country.
I have told the Russians that I am dividing things
into two categories -- first, material which can be delivered
on the Russian western front in time to take part in battle
between September first and October first -- and secondly,
those materials which physically could not get there before
October first. I have chosen that date because after October
first, we all doubt if there will be very active operations
in view of rain, snow, frost, etc. and that if Germany can be
held until then, Russia is safe until the Spring.
Step on it!
F.D.R.
Memo from Gen. Marshall to the Pres. 8/2 subject: Transfer of
air material to Russia.
OFFICE FOR
WAR DEPARTMENT
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
RECEIVED
WASHINGTON
AUG 4 1941
WAYNE COY
August 2, 1941.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Subject: Transfer of Air Materiel to Russia.
The following steps have been taken toward the transfer
to the Russian Government of aviation materiel:
It has been proposed to the Russian Embassy, and
accepted by them - subject to the confirmation of their
government - - to utilize our aviation set-up at Fairbanks,
Alaska, as the point of transfer of equipment, including
the transition training of pilots and mechanics. The
Russian Embassy has been requested to have fifty single-
engine pilots, 25 mechanics and ten two-engine bomber
pilots and ten mechanics flown to Fairbanks, Alaska via
Nome. The Russian Embassy says that these men can be in
Fairbanks by August 11.
The War Department is assembling the pilots and
mechanics necessary for the ferrying of planes to Fair-
banks and the training of pilots and mechanics at Fair-
banks.
There are 59 modern P-forties (Tomahawks) on
British order now in this country. 28 of these are at
the Curtiss Plant, and the remainder have been delivered
on the docks on the Atlantic seaboard. We have the Curtiss
plant now uncrating the 28 at Buffalo and have directed
the return from the seaboard to Buffalo of the remaining
planes. As these planes all lack radio and their wiring
will not permit the installation of our radio, we have
cabled London to send the British radioes by B-24 transport
planes as quickly as possible. Meanwhile we will under-
take to fly these planes into Alaska, convoying them with
our planes to provide the radio control. There is some
hazard in this on account of the bad weather in passing
out of the North Temperate zone, but this will have to be
accepted.
Our principal complication at the moment is that the
British authorities in this country, with whom our Air officers
have been in contact, state that they have no definite instructions
to release any planes. We have committed ourselves to the extent
of having their planes uncrated and others ordered to Buffalo
from the seaboard. We are endeavoring to get some authorization
to go ahead with the matter.
As to the bomber types, we are preparing five B-twenty-fives
for flight to Fairbanks with the necessery officers to give pilot
and mechanic instruction. There is a sight complication here, as
the Norden and the AFCE (automatic control) has to be removed. How-
ever, we will install a substitute sight.
The only bomber, approximately medium type, that the British
have under order in this country is the Lockheed-Hudson. We are
discussing with them the possibility of five of these being matched
with five of our B-twenty-fives. The difficulty here would be that
while this British plane has its radio installed in this country,
the turret is installed in England. Possibly it would be simpler
for the British to fly their bomber contribution directly from Great
Britain into Russia.
4,000,000 rounds of 30 caliber ammunition have been allotted,
and will have to be shipped to some agreed-upon point in Eastern
Siberia, possibly Vladivostok. A portion of this will be placed in
the planes at Fairbanks as flight equipment during their transit
flight to Siberia.
The 50 caliber ammunition required for these planes will
have to be supplied by the British, who up to the present time have
indicated an unwillingness to do so. Our Army reserves have been so
depleted in building up to the Navy's requirements that we should
not release any of this ammunition. We are arranging to provide
bombs on the same basis of "missions" as the 30 caliber ammunition.
P-forties in England:
Approximately 140 P-40mof the British 200 are in England.
Just what their degree of readiness for service is I do not know,
but there is a probability that spare part shortage will affect the
availability of a number of these planes. I understand from Saccer
Burns and Colonel Faymonville that you wish us to make available
from our Air forces the necessary P-forties to off-set planes of
this type now in England, if we could not obtain them elsewhere -
presumably from British orders in this country. At the present time
we have 149 P-tens in service in continental United States. The
-2-
remaining 138 which have been delivered lack wing tips, or complete
wings or propellers, due to the tendency to ground-loop and a shortage
of spare parts.
The matter of the delivery of planes beyond the 59 first
referred to can be adjusted a little bit later, as the first problem
is to establish our contact at Fairbanks and get the instruction of
pilots and mechanics under way.
The unadjusted difficulties of the moment in this matter
are (1) the lack of authorization in this country for the British
to turn over planes to us, and (2) whatever delay is involved in
hearing from the Russian Government.
Chief of Staff.
full ml
Russia Folder
1-41
OFFICE OF
TREASURY DEPARTMENT
THE
WASHINGTON
SECRETARY
August 16, 1941.
The President,
The White House.
My dear Mr. President:
Secretary Morgenthau has asked me to write to you to tell
you of a transaction which he entered into on Friday with the
Soviet Ambassador.
Mr. Oumansky came to the Treasury shortly before noon on
Friday and told Secretary Morgenthau that he was in great diffi-
culty because of urgent need for funds. He said he had been nego-
tiating with Jesse Jones for a $500,000,000 loan, but that the
negotiations had reached a difficult stage and could not be termi-
nated quickly and his buying representatives had obligations
immediately due beyond their capacity to meet. He asked if some
way could not be found to arrange an advance of ten million dollars
from the Treasury.
After exploring various possibilities Secretary Morgenthau
agreed with the Ambassador to advance him ten million dollars for
a period of ninety days against anticipated shipments of gold. A
letter embodying the agreement was drafted during the afternoon
and was signed by the Ambassador and by me as Acting Secretary.
I am enclosing a carbon copy of it.
Instructions were sent to the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York to effect the transfer.
Sincerely,
William herbert E. Gaston
Acting Secretary of the Treasury.
August 15, 1941.
My dear Mr. Ambassador:
Pursuant to and in confirmation of the conversa-
tions had between you and the Secretary of the Treasury
it is agreed as follows:
(1) The Government of the United States hereby
purchases from the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics 301,000 fine troy ounces of gold which
301,000 fine troy ounces of gold the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics hereby agrees to
deliver to the United States Mint at San Francisco or to
the United States Assay Office at New York within ninety
days from the date hereof for the account of the Secretary
of the Treasury of the United States.
(2) The purchase price of such gold will be at
the rate of $35 per fine troy ounce less 1/4 of 1% and
less usual mint charges. Ten million dollars, constitut-
ing an advance payment, shall be paid by August 16, 1941
to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics by credit to the account of the State Bank of the
U.S.S.R., Moscow, U.S.S.R., on the books of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York. Final adjustment will be made
after the gold is melted, weighed and tested at the mint
or assay office.
(3) The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics agrees to reimburse and indemnify the Government
of the United States and the Secretary of the Treasury for
any advance payments and expenses in the event that the
gold herein purchased is not delivered as herein provided
within ninety days from the date hereof or in the event
that the gold is under weight. All risk of loss remains
with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics until delivery of the gold at the United States Mint
- 2 -
at San Francisco or the United States Assay Office at
New York, and all expenses incurred in connection with
the delivery of the gold to such mint or assay office
shall be for the account of the Government of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Very sincerely yours,
(Signed) Herbert E. Gaston
Acting Secretary of the Treasury.
His Excellency
Constantine A. Oumansky,
Ambassador of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics.
The foregoing is agreed to on behalf
of the Government of the Union of
Seviet Socialist Republics.
(Signed) C. Oumansky
Ambassador of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics.
BB:HMC:1ap-8/15/41
X
PSF Russin Folder
1-41
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 5, 1941
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
At your conference with Oumansky this morning
it seems to me the following points need to be made:
1. The political problems in reference to
Russian aid.
2. Divide the financial problem into two parts.
a) Between now and January 1 Russians pay in gold as
much as possible.
b) We agree to buy manganese and other raw materials
at once for which the Export-Import Bank, under
the law, can make advance payments.
These two methods should provide all the actual
cash that the Russians should require up until the
first of the year or, at any rate, the first of December.
3. That the much larger problem of finance be
handled by you at a later date. That our Government
will take the responsibility for working out those
details.
4. That there should be no holding up of supply
orders.
5. Oumansky should be impressed by the fact that
tanks and airplanes are matters that have got to be
settled at the Moscow conference and that he can not
get large quantities of these until that conference is
held.
HLA.
H.L.H.
Published in
Foreign Relations of the United States
1941 Vol. 1
General
The Soviet Union
Pages 832-834
CLS
7-14-66
Part
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
feledented Russia Folder
1-41
Memorandum of Conversation
DATE:
SEPTEMBER 11, 1941
SUBJECT: U. S. CREDITS FOR RUSSIA
PARTICIPANTS: THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, MR. HARRY
HOPKINS AND THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR, MR. CONSTANTINE A.
OUMAN SKY
COPIES TO:
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE
1-148
The Soviet Ambassador called on the President at
the former's request. The Secretary of State and
Mr. Harry Hopkins were also present.
The Ambassador brought up the matter of Soviet re-
quests for credit, war materials, and supplies, which
included a request to apply our lease-lend policy to
Russia. The President explained in some detail to the
Ambassador the extreme difficulty of getting the neces-
sary authority from Congress on account of the prejudice
or hostility to Russia and the unpopularity of Russia
among large groups in this country who exercise great
political power in Congress. The President also referred
to
-2-
to the fact that Russia does have churches and does
permit religious worship under the Constitution of
1936. He suggested that if Mossow could get some pub-
licity back to this country regarding the freedom of
religion during the next few days without waiting for
the Harriman mission to reach Mossow, it might have a
very fine educational effect before the next lease-lend
bill comes up in Congress. The Ambassador agreed that
he would attend to this matter.
The President then said that to get a lease-lend
proposal for Russia through Congress, we should have an
official statement showing Russian assets, the amount of
gold and also barter that could be carried on between the
two countries both now and after the war. The President
also stated that maximum quantities of manganese,
chromium and other commodities of use to the United
States could be purchased and paid for now, with the
understanding that production and delivery would not
necessarily take place until after the war.
The Ambassador said that his Government would still
prefer to effect adequate arrangements to secure the
maximum of military supplies within the minimum of time,
which might involve the financial cooperation of the
Reconstruction
-3-
Reconstruction Finance Corporation under Jesse Jones, or
an advance from the stabilization fund of the Treasury
Department, but if it were impossible now to make such
arrangements as were necessary, then the Soviet Govern-
ment very earnestly would ask for lease-lend aid.
Mr. Hopkins referred to possible aid to the extent of
fifty million dollars in the form of a credit from the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and the Ambassador
replied that he had not been able to work out any barter
arrangements or perfect other plans that provided for
post-war payments and that no agreements with Mr. Jones
had been thus far reached. He referred to the fact that
his Government had borrowed ten million dollars from the
Treasury Department by putting up gold as collateral.
The Ambassador, adopting a most serious tone, said
that Moscow today 1a bitter about the credit situation.
The Soviet Government needs one hundred and forty million
dollars, whereas the Amtorg Trading Corporation has only
one hundred and sixty thousand dollars. He said that he
and Jesse Jones could work the barter plan up only to
seventy-five million dollars by stretching it in every
possible way with respect to the kind and quantity of
commodities that might be used by the United States and he
again
-4-
again referred to the fact that he had been able to se-
cure only ten million dollars from Mr. Morgenthau with
gold as security.
It was remarked that there might be a possibility
of getting Congressional approval for some method of ad-
vancing credits to the Soviet Union but there was no
probability just now of & lease-lend provision for Soviet
Russia on account of political difficulties. The Am-
bassador urged that Russia be granted a credit out of
the two billion dollar Treasury stabilization fund and
said that its use in this way was permissible.
The upshot of the conversation was that this Govern-
ment would undertake to perfect credit and barter arrange-
ments to the amount of seventy-five million dollars through
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and other sources,
80 that the matter would be taken care of for a few months
during which time full and adequate arrangements for Rus-
sian military supplies might be worked out.
C.H.
S CH:MA
PSF. Russie
X
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary
of State, Moscow, September 22, 1941. For the President, the
Secretary and Under Secretary.
Steinhardt reports on his discussion with the Japanese
Ambassador in Moscow regarding those matters which are the
subject of negociation between Japan and the Soviet Union.
SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV,
The Far East, page 1019.
as 12/12/16
Kussin Folder
Published in Stalin's correspondonce with Churchill,
1-41
Attlee, Roosevelt, and Truman, volume 2, pages 12-13.
SEPTEMBER 29, 1941
TO: AMEMBASSY
MOSCOW
TO HARRIMAN FROM THE PRESIDENT
MY LETTER SEPTEMBER 17 DELAYED IN TRANSIT, LATER
DESTROYED.
WILL YOU PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE
FROM ME TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SOVIET OF
PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OF THE U.S.S.R.:
"MY DEAR MR. STALIN: THIS NOTE WILL BE PRESENTED TO
YOU BY MY FRIEND AVERELL HARRIMAN, WHOM I HAVE ASKED TO
BE HEAD OF OUR DELEGATION TO MOSCOW.
MR. HARRIMAN IS WELL AWARE OF THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE
OF YOUR FRONT AND WILL, I KNOW, DO EVERYTHING THAT HE CAN
TO BRING THE NEGOTIATIONS IN MOSCOW TO A SUCCESSFUL
CONCLUSION.
HARRY HOPKINS HAS TOLD ME IN GREAT DETAIL OF HIS
ENCOURAGING AND SATISFACTORY VISITS WITH YOU. I CAN'T
TELL YOU HOW THRILLED ALL OF US ARE BECAUSE OF THE GALLANT
DEFENSE OF THE SOVIET ARMIES.
I AM VERY SURE THAT HITLER MADE A PROFOUND STRATEGIC
MISTAKE WHEN HE ATTACKED YOUR COUNTRY. I AM CONFIDENT
THAT WAYS WILL BE FOUND TO PROVIDE THE MATERIAL AND
SUPPLIES NECESSARY TO FIGHT HIM ON ALL FRONTS?,
- 2 -
INCLUDING YOUR OWN.
I WANT PARTICULARLY TO TAKE THIS OCCESION TO
EXPRESS MY GREAT CONFIDENCE THAT YOUR ARMIES WILL
ULTIMATELY PREVAIL OVER HITLER AND TO ASSURE YOU OF
OUR GREAT DETERMINATION TO BE OF EVERY POSSIBLE MATERIAL
ASSISTANCE.
YOURS VERY SINCERELY,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT."
ROOSEVELT
September 17, 1941
My dear Mr. Stalin:
This note will be presented to you by my friend
Averell Harriman, whom I have asked to be head of our
delegation to Moscow.
Mr. Harriman 18 well aware of the strategic
importance of your front and will, I know, do every-
thing that he can to bring the negotiations in Moscow
to & successful conclusion.
Harry Hopkins has told me in great detail of his
encouraging and satisfactory visits with you. I can't
tell you how thrilled all of us are because of the
gallant defense of the Soviet armies.
I am very sure that Hitler made a profound
strategic mistake when he attacked your country. I am
confident that ways will be found to provide the material
and supplies necessary to fight him on all fronts, including
your own.
I want particularly to take this occasion to
express my great confidence that your armies will
ultimately prevail over Hitler and to assure you of our
great determination to be of every possible material
assistance.
Yours very sincerely,
Funchlen DRoosevelt
His Excellency
Joseph Stalin,
President of the Soviet of
People's Commissars of
the U.S.S.R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 8, 1941
MEMORANDUM FOR GRACE TULLY:
Dear Crace:
Here is the press release
I have just issued.
Also attached you will find
hereto very secret and confidential
copies of the letter and cablegram.
I assume these may be filed
now.
S.T.E.
FCR THE PRESS
EMEDIATE RELEASE
FOR THE PRESS
OCTOBER 8, 1941
Careful comparison of the language of the German
announcement, made today by DNB in Perlin, and that actually
contained in the President's letter of introduction of Mr.
Harriman to Mr. Stalin, is invited. "Then such a comparison is
made, the propaganda objectives of the Nazi action become very
clear.
The Prosident's letter reads as follows:
"My Dear Mr. Stalin:
"This note will be presented to you by my
friend Averell Harriman, whom I have asked to be head
of our delegation to Moscow.
"I'r. Harriman is well aware of the strategic
importance of your front and will, I know, do everything
that he can to bring the negotiations in Moscow to a suc-
cessful conclusion.
"Harry Hopkins has told me in great detail of
his encouraging and satisfactory visits with you. I can't
tell you how thrilled all of us are because of the gellant
defense of the Soviet armies.
"I am confident that ways will be found to pro-
vide the material and supplies necessary to fight Hitler
on all fronts, including your own.
"I want particularly to take this occasion to
express my great confidence that your armies will ulti-
mately prevail over Hitler and to assure you of our great
determination to be of every possible material assistance.
"Yours very sincerely,
"FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT"
-
-
-
-
-
for the Pross
Get 8 -41
batober
Gareful comparison of the language of the German
announcement, made today by DNB in Berlin, and that actually con-
tained in the President's letter of introduction of Mr. Harriman
to Mr. Stalin, is invited. When such a comparison is made, the
propaganda objectives of the Nazi action become very clear.
The President's letter readsas follows:
"
therough
A
tigation to find out how the
the contents of the President's letter do-in progress.
11
actual Cabligram
as sent by the state Dept.
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
September 29, 1941
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)
10 a.m.
AMERICAN EMBASSY
MOSCOW, U.S.S.R.
TRIPLE PRIORITY
1093
Your 1718, September 28, 4 p.m.
T FOR HARRIMAN FROM THE PRESIDENT
My letter September 17 delayed in transit, later des-
troyed.
Will you please deliver following personal message
from me to His Excellency the President of the Soviet of
People's Commissers of the U.S.S.R.:
QUOTE My Dear Mr. Stalin: This note will be pre-
sented to you by my friend Averell Harriman, whom I have
asked to be head of our delegation to Moseow.
11 Mr. Harriman is well aware of the strategic impor-
tance of your front and will, I know, do everything that
he can to bring the negotiations in Moscow to a success-
ful conclusion.
11 Harry Hopkins has told no in great detail of his en-
couraging and satisfactory visits with you. I can't tell
you how thrilled all of us are because of the gallent
defense of the Soviet armies.
I am
- 2 -
11
I am confident that ways will be found to provide the
material and supplies necessary to fight Hitler on all fronts,
including your own.
11 I want particularly to take this occasion to express
my great confidence that your armies will ultimately prevail
over Hitler and to assure you of our great determination to
be of every possible material assistance.
" Yours very sincerely,
11 FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT. UNQUOTE
HULL
S: ASB:AR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
Sept. 28, 1941.
Telegraph Room,
The White House.
Please transmit the following urgent message to the
President:
Ambassador Steinhardt's telegram no. 1718, dated
September 28, 4 p.m., contains the following message for
the President from Mr. Harriman: It is important for the
objectives toward which we are all working that I should re-
ceive from you a personal message that I may deliver to
Stalin. I understood that I would receive a message from
you for Stalin before I left London, but it did not arrive.
Lord Beaverbrook has come to Moscow with such a message
for Stalin from Churchill. I shall be happy to deliver
your message if you wish to cable it to me here.
to
C
S:ASB
Telegraph room
file mal file mal
White House to Hyde Park
September 28, 1941.
Please transmit following urgent message to the
President:
Ambassador Steinhardt's telegram #1718 dated
September 28, 4 PM, contains the following message
for the President from Mr. Harriman:
It is important for the objectives toward which
we are all working that I should receive from you
a personal message that I may deliver to Stalin. I
understood that I would receive a message from you
for Stalin before I left London, but 1t did not
arrive. Lord Beaverbrook has come to Moscow with
such a message for Stalin from Churchill. I shall
be happy to deliver your message if you wish to
Cable it to me here.
Bechox The President asked me to telephone to
Harry Hopkins suggesting that he get out the copy of
letter which was sent to Mr. Harriman about ten days
ago and have it cabled to Mr. Harriman in Moscow.
This was done.
BER
Moscow, Kremlin,
Translation
October 3d,1941.
My dear Mr. Roosevelt,
Your letter has been presented to me by Mr.Harri-
man. I avail myself of the opportunity to express to you
the deep gratitude of the Soviet Government for having
put at the head of the American Delegation such an autho-
rity, as Mr.Harriman, whose participation in the proceed-
ings of the Moscow conference of the three powers has
been so effective.
I have no doubt, that you will do everything ne-
cessary to ensure the carrying out of the decisions of
the Moscow conference 88 speedily and as completely as
possible particularly in view of the fact that the Hit-
lerites will certainly try to take advantage of prewin-
ter months to exert every possible pressure on the front
against the USSR.
Like you I have no doubt that final victory over
Hitler will be won by those countries, which are uniting
now their efforts in order to speed up the annihilation
of bloody Hitlerism - a task, for the sake of which the
Soviet Union now makes so great and so heavy sacrifices.
Sincerely yours
(signed)
J.Stalin
PSF Pussin
союз
СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ
РЕСПУБЛИК
-
COBET НАРОДНЫХ КОМИССАРОВ
3. октября 19412
MOCKBA, КРЕМЛЬ
Увакаемый г-я Рузвельт,
Bame письмо MHe передано г.Гарриманом.
Пользуюсь случаем, чтобы выразить BaM глубокую
благодарность CoBeTcKoΓo Правительства 38 To, что BH
поручили руководство американской делегацией столь
авторитетному лицу, KaK г.Гарриман, участие KoTopoΓo
B работах московской конференции Tpex держав было TaK
эффективно.
Я He сомневаюсь, что нами будет сделано Bce необ-
ходимое для ToΓo, чтобы обеспечить реализацию решений
МОСКОВСКОЙ конференции возможно cKopo И полно, OCO-
бенно ввиду ToΓo, что предзимние месяцы гитлеровцы
наверняка постараются использовать для всяческого Ha-
жима Ha фронте против COCP.
KaK и Bu, я He сомневаюсь B конечной победе над
Гитлером cTpaH, которые теперь о0'единяют свои усилия
для ToΓo, чтобы ускорить ликвидацию KpoBaBoΓo гитле-
ризма, для чего Советский CODE приносит теперь столь
большие и тяжелне жертвы.
C искренчим уважением H. Gaunn
The October 3, 1941 letter of Marshal Stalin
to President Roosevelt has been printed in
Stalin's Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee,
Roosevelt and Truman [1941-45], Vol. II P. 13.
E. P. Dutton & Co.: Nev York, 1958.
fund
P5Russia Folder
1-41
[10-25-41?]
My dear Mr. Stalin:
Mr. Harriman has handed no your kind note dated
October 3, 1941. I appreciate very such hearing from
you.
A cable has already gone to you advising you
that we can include the Soviet Union under our Lend-
Lease arrangements.
I want to take this opportunity to assure you
again that we are going to bend every possible effort
to move these supplies to your battle lines.
The determination of your armies and people to
defeat Ritlerism is an inspiration to the free people
of all the world.
Very sincerely yours,
His Excellency
Joseph Stalin,
President of the Soviet of People's
Commissars of the U.S.S.R.
PSF Russia Folder 1-41
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 25, 1941.
MEMORANDUM FOR HARRY HOPKINS:
Do you think this should be
replied to, especially in view of the
apparent pleasure of Stalin when
Harriman said I would be delighted to
hear from him directly?
F.D.R.
Ltr. to the President and translation signed
J. Stalin, Moscow, Kremlin, 10/3/41; express-
ing gratitude for having put Mr. Harriman at
the head of the American Delegation, and that
he has no doubt everything necessary will be
done to ensure the carrying out of the deci-
sions of the Moscow conference as speedily
and as completely as possible.
BERLIN.--DNB PUBLISHED WHAT IT ASSERTED WAS THE TEXT OF A LETTER
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO JOSEF STALIN EXPRESSING "MY GREAT CONFIDENCE
THAT YOUR ARMIES FINALLY WILL BE VICTORIOUS OVER NITLER."
THE LETTER, DNB SAID, PROMISED THE U. s. WOULD FIND MEANS OF
SUPPLYING THE SOVIET UNION WITH ALL EQUIPMENT NECESSARY TO DEFEAT THE
GERMANS.
DNB SAID THE LETTER, OBTAINED "FROM n RELIABLE SOURCE," CARRIED
THE SALUTATION "MY DEAR FRIEND STALIN." IT ALLEGEDLY WAS DELIVERED
TO STALIN BY w. AVERELL HARRIMAN, HEAD OF THE U. s. DELEGATION TO
MOSCOW.
DNB SAID THE TEXT OF THE LETTER WAS AS FOLLOWS:
"MY DEAR FRIEND STALIN:
"THIS LETTER WILL BE HANDED TO YOU BY MY FRIEND HARRIMAN, WHOM I
HAVE INSTRUCTED TO BE LEADER OF OUR MOSCOW DELEGATION.
"I WISH TO TAKE OPPORTUNITY OF EXPRESSING NY GREAT CONFIDENCE
THAT YOUR ARMIES FINALLY WILL BE VICTORIOUS OVER NITLER.
"NR. HARRIMAN 1$ WELL ACQUAINTED WITH YOUR PROBLEMS AND WILL, I
KNOW, DO EVERYTHING ME CAN TO BRING THE MOSCOW NEGOTIATIONS TO A
SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.
"HARRY NOPKINS REPORTED EXTENSIVELY ABOUT HIS SUCCESSFUL AND
SATISFACTORY VISIT IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. I CANNOT SAY NOW DEEPLY
WE ALL WERE IMPRESSED BY THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE BRAVE SOVIET ARMIES.
"WE SHALL FIND SUITABLE WAYS OF OBTAINING MATERIALS AND THE
EQUIPMENT NECESSARY TO FIGHT HITLER ON ALL FRONTS, INCLUDING THE
SOVIET FRONT.
"I ASSURE YOU OF OUR GREATEST DETERMINATION TO PROVIDE THE
NECESSARY MATERIAL SUPPORT.
"IN CORDIAL FRIENDSHIP (INR IN FREUNDSCHAFT ERGEBENER)
"FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT."
(THE ABOVE TRANSLATION IS FROM THE GERMAN VERSION AS DISSEMINATED
BY DNB.)
10/8--RS1029A
PSF Russia Folder
file
ml
pus
9-17-41
My dear Mr. Stalin:
This note will be presented to you by my friend
Averell Harriman, whom I have asked to be head of our
delegation to Moscow.
Mr. Harriman is well aware of the stretegic
importance of your front and will, I know, do every-
thing that he can to bring the negotiations in Moscow
to a successful conclusion.
Harry Hopkins has told me in great detail of his
encouraging and satisfactory visits with you. I can't
tell you how thrilled all of us are because of the
gallant defense of the Soviet armies.
I am very sure that Hitler made a profound
strategic mistake when he attacked your country. I
am confident that ways will be found to provide the
material and supplies necessary to fight him on all
fronts, including your own.
I want particularly to take this occasion to
express my great confidence that your armies will
ultimately prevail over Hitler and to assure you of
our great determination to be of every possible
material assistance.
Yours very sincerely,
His Excellency
Joseph Stalin,
President of the Soviet of
People's Commissars of
the U.S.S.R.
HLH/lmb 9/17/41
PSF Russia
Moscow, Kremlin,
Translation
October 3d,1941.
My dear Mr. Roosevelt,
Your letter has been presented to me by Mr.Harri-
man. I avail myself of the opportunity to express to you
the deep gratitude of the Soviet Government for having
put at the head of the American Delegation such an autho-
rity, as Mr.Harriman, whose participation in the proceed-
ings of the Moscow conference of the three powers has
been so effective.
I have no doubt, that you will do everything ne-
cessary to ensure the carrying out of the decisions of
the Moscow conference as speedily and as completely as
possible particularly in view of the fact that the Hit-
lerites will certainly try to take advantage of prewin-
ter months to exert every possible pressure on the front
against the USSR.
Like you I have no doubt that final victory over
Hitler will be won by those countries, which are uniting
now their efforts in order to speed up the annihilation
of bloody Hitlerism - a task, for the sake of which the
Soviet Union now makes so great and so heavy sacrifices.
Sincerely yours
(signed)
J.Stalin
PSF Russin
союз
СОВЕТСКИХ
РЕСПУБЛИК
-
COBET НАРОДНЫХ КОМИССАРОВ
3. октября 194 1941 1 2.
MOCKBA, КРЕМЛЬ
Уважаемый r-H Рузвельт,
Ваше писъмо MHe передано Γ. гарриманом.
Пользуюсь случаем, чтобы выразить BaM глубокую
благодарность CoBeTcKoΓo Правительства 3a TO, что BH
поручили руководство американской делегацией столь
авторитетному лицу, KaK ..Гарриман, участие KoTopoΓo
B работах московской конференции Tpex держав было TaK
эффективно.
Я He сомневаюсь, что Вами будет сделано Bce необ-
ходимое для ToΓo, чтобы обеспечить реализацию решений
МОСКОВСКОЙ конференции возможно cKopo и полно, OCO-
бенно ввиду ToΓo, что предзимние месяцы гитлеровцы
наверняка постараются использовать для всяческого Ha-
жима Ha фронте против COCP.
KaK и Вы, я He сомневаюсь B конечной победе над
Гитлером cTpaH, которые теперь об'единяют свои усилия
для ToΓo, чтобы ускорить ликвидацию KpoBaBoΓo гитле-
ризма, для чего Советский C0103 приносит теперь столь
большие И тяжелне жертвы.
C искренним уважением H. Gaunn
The origin al of th is documen is on display in the South Section
of the Main Gallery of the Museum as of 3/71.
Господину ФРАНКЛИНУ ДЕЛАНО РУЗ ВЕЛЬТУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ штатов
АМЕРИКИ.
Published in
Foreign Relations of the United States
1941 Vol. * The Felt Act
I
General, Soviet Union
page
PSF Russia Folder 1-41
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
STATE
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL MISSION
TO THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
October 29, 1941
The President
The White House
Dear Mr. President:
I am transmitting herewith the report of
your Mission to Moscow with covering letter describing
the conclusions.
I wish to record my appreciation of the
valuable services rendered by the members of the Mission
and the members of the staff as well. The satisfactory
conclusion of the conference is due largely to the intel-
ligent teamwork displayed by all of the delegation. It
has been a high privilege for me to work with them.
I wish to record, also, our appreciation of
the cooperative and energetic spirit with which our
recommendations have been accepted and acted upon by
all departments of the Government.
Faithfully L.C.Harrin yours,
P5F Russia
OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
DIVISION OF DEFENSE AID REPORTS
WASHINGTON, D.C.
10-29-41
The President
The White House
Dear Mr. President:
As Chairman of your Special Mission to the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, I am pleased to submit the follow-
ing report.
In general, the Mission followed the procedure out-
lined in your letter of August 30, 1941, to the Secretary of
War and the cablegram of September 9, 1941, to the Prime
Minister of Great Britain.
Discussions were held in London during the period
September 15 - 20, 1941, in order to determine the possibili-
ties of British and American aid to Russia. These discussions
were held with the Prime Minister, with Lord Beaverbrook and
other British officials through joint committees. As a result
of such discussions and your cabled decisions, the Mission was
able to proceed to Russia with a well formulated program.
The American and British Missions arrived in Moscow on
September 28th and after a number of conferences with Mr. Stalin
and other Russian officials through committees the attached
protocol was signed as of October 1, 1941.
Joint Committee discussions were held in London on the
Victory Program of overall production required for the defeat of
enemies and potential enemies. It was agreed that the studies
should continue in Washington and that requirements for the
maintenance of Russian resistance should be added after the return
of the Missions from Moscow. In the discussions in Moscow it was
not practicable to obtain, at that time, the long-range American
productive capacity that would be needed by Russia.
The aid to be furnished by the United States under the
protocol during the period October 1, 1941 to July 1, 1942 is de-
tailed in the attached subsidiary reports which are summarized as
follows:
Army:
Aviation. The United States to furnish 200
planes per month - 100 fighters and 100 bombers.
The total of 1800 planes to consist of 900 - P-40,
828 - A-20 and 72 - B-25 type airplanes, together
with armament, ammunition and bombs.
Ground Weapons. United States to furnish an
average of 250 tanks per month, part light and part
medium, together with armament and ammunition; also,
152 - 90 mm anti-aircraft guns with ammunition and
756 - 37 mm anti-tank guns with ammunition.
Navy:
The naval program was entirely changed as a
result of the Moscow Conference and studies are still
under way to determine the amount of help that can be
given. Practically all items conflict with American
and British commitments.
Raw Materials:
The requests included some sixty items, with a
total value of $340,000,000 for the items and quantities
to come from the United States. A study that has been
made since the return of the Mission indicates that
material to the value of $270,000,000 can be furnished.
On the whole, the quantities requested are considered
to be modest in view of the extent of the Russian effort
and Russian losses. It is believed to be of major
importance to furnish all the material possible in order
to make full use of and balance the Russian productive
capacity.
Medical Supplies:
The total value of the supplies requested is about
$15,000,000. About one fourth of these supplies can be
delivered in sixty days and the remainder within a period
of one year. The American Red Cross, with the aid of the
British Red Cross, is prepared to provide that part
presumably intended for civilian relief. This approximates
$5,000,000 in value.
-2-
Food:
The protocol lists 200,000 tons of wheat and
70,000 tons of sugar per month. It was contemplated
that the wheat would come from Canada and the sugar
from the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines. It
is understood that negotiations are now under way
between the British and American representatives as
to the best sources for these materials.
Transportation:
This is a vital part of the aid program. The
Russians desire to import some 500,000 tons per month,
of which 270,000 tons represent food; 20,000 tons, oil;
and the remainder, raw materials and war supplies.
This will require 1,500,000 tons of shipping, of which
the Soviet will provide 117,000 tons. They estimate
that an average of some 270,000 tons of cargo per month
can be received through the Port of Archangel, 224,000
tons though the Vladisvostok region and 6,000 tons
through the Persian Gulf. Archangel is vulnerable for
two reasons: one, it is ordinarily frozen from December
to June, although it is hoped to keep it sufficiently
open this winter by icebreakers to permit the receipt of
a large part of its capacity, and, two; the only exit is
over one railroad which is not too distant from the front.
The difficulties with Vladisvostok are the danger of
interruption by Japan and the long freight haul of one
hundred days duration to the Moscow region. The Persian
route passes through extensive and difficult mountain
terrain and requires considerable development before it
can be of importance. It is expected that steps will be
taken to increase the capacity of this route to 60,000 tons
per month. It is obvious that difficult shipping problems
are involved and they must be solved jointly by the Russian,
British and American shipping authorities.
The aid programs outlined above will cost approximately
$1,000,000,000 prior to next July. While the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, with the aid of Reconstruction Finance
Corporation and Treasury loans, has financed the October shipments,
it is impossible for Russia to continue to finance the full program.
In addition, there are practical reasons of procedure making the
use of lend-lease mechanism most desirable. It is recommended that
the use of lend-lease funds be authorized at the earliest moment
possible.
-3-
In conclusion, it is the conviction of the Mission
that Russia can make very effective use of the latest types
of American equipment and that Russia will continue to fight
even in retreat. It is believed that her continuation as an
active belligerent is of paramount importance and that every
effort should be made to assist her and assist her promptly.
It is recommended that the aid proposed herein and in the
attached reports of the various committees be approved by you.
Respectfully yours,
Wh.Hamin Harrin
Chairman,
Special Mission to the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics.
-4-
Russia Folder
11/4/81
ublished in Stalin's correspondence with Churchill
ttlee, Roosevelt, and Truman, Volume 2, page 15.
EMBASSY OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
WASHINGTON, D.C.
точный TEKCT OTBETA И. СТАЛИНА ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ
США ГОСПОДИНУ РУЗВЕЛЬТУ
Подписано 4 Ноября 1941 r
Господин Президент, хотя TeKcT Вашего послания R еще
He получил, Посол Соединенных Штатов Америки Господин
Штейнгардт передал MHe через Господина Вышинского 2-Γo нояб-
ря ceΓo года памятную записку C изложением содержания Вашего
послания Ha Moe имя.
B связи C этим позвольте MHe, прежде BceΓo, выразить пол-
Hoe согласие C Вашей оценкой работы конференции Tpex держав B
MocKBe, что следует отнести B наибольшей Mepe K заслугам Госпо - -
дина Гарримана, a также Господина Бивербрука, сделавших Bce
возможное для успешного завершения работы конференции B KpaT-
чайший cpoK. 3a. Ваше залвление 0 ToM, что постановления конфе-
ренции будут максимально выполнены, CoBeTcKoe Правительство вы=
ражает свою глубокую приэнательность.
Ваше решение, Господин Президент, o ToM, чтобы предоста-
вить CoBeTcKoMy Союзу беспроцентный 3aeM Ha cyMMy B 1 миллиард
долларов Ha оплату поставок вооружения и сырьевых материалов
Советским Союзом, CoBeTcKoe Правительство принимает C искренней
благодарностью, KaK исключительно серьезную поддержку CoBeT-
cKoΓo Союза B eΓo громадной и трудной борьбе C нашим общим Bpa-
ΓoM, C кровавым гитлеризмом.
2.
По поручению Правительства CCCP R выражаю полное согла-
сие C изложенными Вами условиями предоставления CoBeTcKoMy
Copsy этого займа, платежи по KoTopoMy должны начаться спу-
стя 5 лет после окончания войны и будут производиться B Te-
чение 10 лет после истечения этого пятилетнего периода.
Правительство CCCP ΓoToBo сделать Bce возможное, чтобы
поставлять Соединенным Штатам Америки Te товары и сырье, Ko-
торые имеются B ero распоряжении и B которых MoΓyT нуждаться
Соединенные Штаты.
Что касается выраженного Вами, Господин Президент, поло-
жения, чтобы между Вами и мною был бы незамедлительно ycTaHoB-
лен личный непосредственный KoHTaKT, и если этого потребуют
обстоятельства, TO A C удовольствием присоединяюсь K этому Ba-
шему пожеланию и ΓoToB 00 своей стороны сделать Bce возможное
ДЛЯ осуществления этого.
C искренним уважением - И.СТАЛИН
1
November 8, 1941
Dear General Watson:
I am enclosing herewith the note
which Mr. Gromyko, Counselor of the
Soviet Embassy, left with the President
yesterday together with a translation
thereof which has been prepared in the
Department.
Sincerely yours,
Edward Page
Major General Edwin M. Watson,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.
TRANSLATION
THE EXACT TEXT OF THE ANSWER OF
I. STALIN TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE U.S.A., MR. ROOSEVELT.
Signed, November 4, 1941.
Mr. President:
Although I have not yet received the text of
your message, Mr. Steinhardt, the Ambassador of the
United States of America, on November 2, 1941 trans-
mitted to me, through Mr. Vyshinski, an aide-mémoire
setting forth the contents of your message to me.
In this connection permit me first of all to
express complete agreement with your evaluation of
the work of the conference of the three powers in
Moscow which 18 to be attributed in the greatest
degree to the services of Mr. Harriman and also
Mr. Beaverbrook who did everything possible for the
successful conclusion of the work of the conference
in the shortest time. The Soviet Government expresses
its deep gratitude for your statement that the
decisions of the conference will be carried out
to the maximum extent.
Mr. President, the Soviet Government accepts with
sincere gratitude your decision to grant to the Soviet
Union a non-interest bearing loan in the sum of
one
-2-
one billion dollars to pay for supplies of armaments
and raw materials for the Soviet Union, as exceptionally
substantial assistance to the Soviet Union in its
great and difficult struggle with our common enemy,
blood-thirsty Hitlerism. On behalf of the Government
of the U.S.S.R., I express complete agreement with the
conditions set forth by you concerning the granting of
this loan to the Soviet Union payments on which shall
commence five years after the termination of the war
and be made during the ten years after the expiration
of this five year period.
The Government of the U.S.S.R. is prepared to do
everything possible in order to furnish the United
States of America those goode and raw materials which
are at its disposal and which the United States may
need.
With respect to your proposal, Mr. President, that
personal direct contact should be immediately establ-
ished between you and me, should circumstances require
this, I share your desire with satisfaction and am
prepared to do everything necessary to make this possi-
ble.
With sincere respects,
I. STALIN
Eu:EP:RIC
Cipy is being sent
to roman Davis
Dors it require an
answerto no 1:30pm
PSF Russia Folder
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
November 21, 1941
My dear Mr. President:
The Soviet Chargé d'Affaires called upon me
this morning and requested me to give you a per-
sonal message addressed to you by Stalin, in reply
to your recent message to him regarding the ques-
tion of Red Cross supplies.
I am enclosing the message handed to me by
the Chargé d'Affaires.
Believe me
L Faithfully yours,
Nulls
Enc.
The President,
The White House.
Ps F Russia
EMBASSY OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
WASHINGTON, D.C.
[11-21-41?]
Text of Personal Message of J.V. Stalin to
Mr. F.D. Roosevelt.
Your message informing me of the favorable
solution of the question in regard to deliveries
of medical supplies by the American Red Cross was
received by me on November 11, 1941. The Soviet
Government has no objections to the establishment
of organizational forms of cooperation between the
Red Cross Societies of our both countries. It is
understood that this cooperation will be organized
in accordance with the exchange of letters, the
contents of which was agreed upon by representatives
of both countries in the beginning of November in
Kuibyshev.
Signed --- Stalin.
EMBASSY OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
WASHINGTON, D.C.
TEKCT личного ПОСЛАНИЯ И .СТАЛИНА
ГОСПОДИНУ РУЗВЕЛЬТУ
Ваше послание C сообщением 0 благоприятном pa3-
решении вопроса o поставках медицинских материалов
американским Красным KpecToM получено мною 11 ноября.
По вопросу об установлении организационных форм co-
трудничества между обществами KpacHoΓo KpecTa обеих
наших cTpaH y CoBeTcKoΓo правительства HeT возраже-
ний, при этом имеется ввиду, что это сотрудничество
будет организовано B соответствии C обменом письма-
ми, тексты которых были согласованы B начале ноября
между представителями KpacHoΓo KpecTa обеих cTpaH B
городе Куйбышеве -
И.СТАЛИН
PSF: Russia tolder
fee
MEMORANDUM
At the present time various cargoes which are to be
shipped to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from
the United States in accordance with the October program
of deliveries and requiring 15-17 vessels are lying in
United States ports. These cargoes consist of armaments
and items of military importance.
Among these cargoes are:
120 pursuit planes P-40
100 light bombers DB-7
8 medium tanks
2,456 trucks
176 scout cars (Jeeps)
12 tons of chemicals
14 tons of army shoes
165 tons of brass
815 tons of aluminum
26 tons telephone wire
119 tons Ethyl (liquid)
459 tons presses, hammers and different machines
1,110 tons Isopentane
and other very important goods, the total weight of
which is 21,000 tons and which occupies & space of
4,180,056 cubic feet.
In addition to the aforementioned cargoes, there is
some merchandise which 1s ready to be delivered to ports,
but which has not been delivered due to lack of trans-
portation facilities.
In
A.G.
- 2 -
In connection with this absence of means of trans-
portation much cargo is now distributed at various rail-
road stations. The condition of the freight has been
adversely affected by weather conditions, etc. This ap-
plies particularly to that freight now lying in the rail-
road yards twelve miles from Boston. No adequate provision
has been made for the protection of this freight not only
against the elements, but also against any harmful acts
such as theft, malicious mischief or other acts of damage.
The United States Maritime Commission promised us ten
vessels for shipment of cargo in October. Actually only
five ships were granted to us. Of these five ships, the
S/S "Friar Rock" was not in seaworthy condition, as borne
out by the fact that within two or three days after sailing
it was necessary for this vessel to return to port due to
the bad condition of this ship, resulting in the unloading
of the cargo in port.
For delivery of cargo to the Soviet Union in November
the United States Maritime Commission had planned 31 ships.
Actually, by November 24th only 7 ships had been placed at
our disposal.
Thus for October and up to November 24th, there had been
granted to us a total of only twelve vessels instead of
forty-one as promised. It is understood that twelve ships
could not fulfill the requirements for delivery of cargo
from the United States to the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics in accordance with the October program.
We cite below an example to illustrate the serious situa-
tion which exists with reference to deliveries of material and
other cargo from the United States to the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics.
By November 24th only the following part of the quantity
planned
- 3 -
planned for delivery in October had been actually shipped:
Trucks
37.63%
Airplanes
30.07%
Tanks
43.04%
Scout cars
27.02%
As to the November program for delivery of goods from
the United States to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
it 1s necessary to state that delivery has not commenced as yet.
In order to facilitate the shipments of military supplies
and other cargoes which are urgently required by the U.S.S.R.
we are ready to deliver monthly some of the cargoes through the
Persian Gulf, such as airplanes DB7, 2,000 military trucks,
leather, shoes, part of sugar shipments, and other cargoes. We
are providing for shipment to Archangel of all kinds of arma-
ments and other cargo of military importance, raw materials,
chemicals, toluol, TNT, and so forth.
In order to ship all the cargo which is in ports now and
which is to be transported to ports in accordance with the
October, November, and December schedules we need 98 ships by
January 1, 1942. 63 of these ships will go to Archangel, 21 to
the Persian Gulf, and 14 to Vladivostok. To relieve the tense
situation in shipping no less than 30 ships are needed by
December 1, 1941.
As can be observed from the foregoing, the situation
pertaining to shipments from the United States to the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics is most critical. Therefore every-
thing possible should be done to remedy this situation, so that
to ensure the fulfilment of the established program of monthly
deliveries of vital war materials and armament from the United
States to the Soviet Union.
Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
November 25, 1941
Washington, D.C.
state Dept. copy of J.E.D. Conference w/LiTvinor
Published in
Foreign Relations of the United States
1941 Vol. IV The Far East
pp. 730-731.
P3F Russie
JOSEPH E. DAVIES
BOWEN BUILDING
WASHINGTON,D
file
December 8, 1941.
Dear Mr. President:
I have been trying in a small way
to sustain your marvelous effort.
Here is a confidential memo which
might possibly help you assess the Soviet
situation and psychology.
Thank God your great sagacity and
wisdom saw through Japan's cloak of infamous
deceit in time.
Faithfully yours,
Joseph Jew E. Davies
The President,
The White House.
Enclosure
PSF Russia Folder
MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE HAD WITH
AMBASSADOR LITVINOV UPON HIS ARRIVAL
DECEMBER 7, 1941
When Ambassador and Mrs. Litvinov were lunching with
me alone, word came of the Japanese attack. Litvinov asked me
how I felt about it. I replied that it was a terrible thing,
but it was providential. It assured unity in this country. It
also assured a united battle front of the non-aggressor great
nations. It was now "all for one and one for all."
I asked him how he felt about it. He said that had the
United States come into the war earlier it would have undoubtedly
thwarted Hitler. He was not so sure that it was advantageous now.
I gathered that what was in the back of his mind was that this
development would prevent the delivery of vital war materials to
Britain and Russia.
I asked him if that was what he thought would be the re-
action of his government. He said that he could not say. He
had been out of touch with his government for three or four weeks.
He intimated that his government had been handling Japan gingerly,
under the non-aggression pact, to avoid war on two fronts.
Madame Litvinov expressed great concern over Moscow. In
reply to my question she said that 1f Moscow fell it would have a
bad effect on the morale of the Soviet people. I did not press
the discussion further.
The matter of air bases in Siberia and Kamchatka and
the question of Soviet bombing of Japan from Vladivostok is vital.
Hitler will decide it. If by his direction the Jap forces in
Manchukuo attack Russia the problem becomes academic.
If on the other hand, Japan may have been able to pre-
vail upon Hitler not to require such a pincer movement against the
Soviets because of the bombing danger, then the problem will be
vital. The question of policy will then arise as to whether it
is better to try to get the Soviets to attack and aid us or not.
We might win the battle, but hazard the war.
If the Soviet should be defeated by an attack on two
fronts; or if they should lose heart, it might affect the ultimate
issue.
The Soviets, if attacked by Japan and Germany, might be
in a desperate plight, or think that they were. Particularly is
this true if the Germans cut the Murmansk rail line of supply.
Shipments by way of the Persian Gulf in the Caspian seaare also
dubious. The limited rail facilities are accentuated because of
lack of harbor equipment on the south shore of the Caspian.
J.E.D.
PSF- - Kussia
Mr. Owen Lattimore to Mr. Laughlin Currie, Administrative Assistant
to President Roosevelt, Chungking, December 9, 1941.
Transmits information from Generalissimo that he is urging
simultaneous Soviet-Chinese deddaration of war on Japan following
American dealaration.
SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV,
The Far East, pages 738-739.
RLJ 12/7/56
State Dept. copy
Published in
Foreign Relations of the United States
1941
Vol. IV
The Far East
pp. 742-744.
FOLGY
BARITE
34012
THE PRESIDENT
toldn
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PSFR
1-41
Memorandum of Conversation
DATE: DECMEBER 11, 1941
SUBJECT: SOVIET POLICY IN UNITED STATES-JAPANESE WAR
PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY HULL AND THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR, MAXIM LITVINOV
COPIES TO:
170 1-1403
The Ambassador of Soviet Russia called at my request.
He stated that earlier today he had conferred with Harry
Hopkins in regard to our policy of carrying out fully our
Lease-Lend allocations to Russia for war purposes. He
then said that he came in contact with the President dur-
ing this visit to Hopkins and that they talked over the
situation in regard to cooperation between the United
States and Russia and other countries opposing Germany,
Japan and Italy in the world war. Without going into
detail concerning the conversation between himself and
the President, he proceeded to say that he had received
the final decision of his Government today and that it
was not in a position to cooperate with us at present
in
-2-
in the Japanese Far Eastern area; that his Government is
fighting on a huge scale against Germany and that to take
part with us in the Far East would mean a prompt attack
by Japan, which would result in serious fighting on two
fronts by Russia. In those circumstances his Government
felt that it should obtain better and more secure control
of the situation over Germany in Europe and the west.
This was the substance of his contention, which was rather
positively stated.
I replied that, of course, if his Government has its
mind made up about the matter, there is not much more to
be said at this time. I stated that during last January
information that I considered absolutely reliable came to
me to the effect that Hitler would attack Ruesia sometime
around May of this year. I had requested Mr. Welles to
convey that fact to the Soviet Government - a fact, how-
ever, that they did not accredit at the time. I added
that I now have information I deem equally reliable to the
effect that Japan, notwithstanding the terms of the Russo-
Japanese neutrality agreement, is now under the strictest
commitment to Germany to attack Russia and any other
country fighting against Germany, whenever Hitler demands
that Japan do so, and that this arrangement contemplated
that Japan would first attack the United States and
Germany and Italy would join, and that at a given time
later --
-3-
later -- at any time demanded by Germany, in fact - Japan
would carry out this agreement to attack Russia.
The Ambassador seemed very much interested in this
but still did not seriously attempt to discuss 1t, al-
though indicating that he did not doubt the truth of it.
I said that, of course, this is a world movement in its
practical effects and that these international despera-
does, operating together in all mutually desirable
respects, will not cease their movements of conquest volun-
tarily; that somebody must stop them; that they will not
be stopped by merely slowing down one phase of this world
movement and world combination of invaders; that, there-
fore, if this world movement and method of resisting and
suppressing it is to be dealt with effectively, it must
be considered as a whole and the fact must be realized
that the movement of resistance must be carried on in
each part of the world at the same time. He did not dis-
agree with this.
I then said that if this Government could get two
air bases, one on the Kamchatka Peninsula and one around
Vladivostok, our heavy bombers could get over Japanese
home naval bases and the home fleet, as well as over the
cities. The Ambassador did not argue the former but
suggested that bombing of cities did not necessarily
settle
settle the matter in view of experiences in Mossow, London
and other cities.
I emphasized the extreme importance right now and
each day hereafter of obtaining these two bases for the
purpose of permitting our aircraft to operate over all
portions of Japan from the air. I said that we could
scarcely do so without them, and that, therefore, it is
a matter of very great importance to the present resistance
to Japan by us - that, in fact, there is no substitute
for effective attacks just now when compared with the
injury that we could and would inflict from the air.
The Ambassador then inquired whether Singapore could
defend itself successfully in the present circumstances,
to which I replied that forces from all of the other
countries, from Australia across to Singapore and to the
Philippines were unifying themselves and coming to the
aid of Singapore and that probably they would be able to
hold out successfully. The Ambassador inquired if they
had a unified command over there, to which I replied that
there was the fullest confidence among staff officers and
others in each of the countries interested, which was the
next thing to unified command but, of course, is not that
in some respects.
I again brought up quite a number of circumstances
and
-5-
and conditions illustrating the world nature of this
movement of conquest and the extreme dangers of more and
more cooperation between Japan and Germany, such as the
possibility of the Japanese fleet going across the Indian
Ocean to the Persian Gulf oil fields, to the mouth of the
Canal, to the Cape of Good Hope, and, if Germany should
be successful in her contemplated African invasion, Japan
on the sea would meet her on the African Coast, extending
up towards French Africa, and that the effect of this on
the whole British European situation would be terrific,
with the result that Hitler and Japan would have a new
lease on life, the effects of which would be terrible on
all of us, including Russia. The Ambassador nodded his
head and spoke in the affirmative but did not discuss
these views.
Throughout the conversation I constantly came back
to the point that if Russia should refrain from coopera-
tion with us in the East while we continue to aid her,
there will be a constant flow of oriticism about why we
are aiding Russia in a world movement involving all alike
and Russia in turn is not cooperating with us in the Far
East. I said I issued a statement today in an effort to
allay some of this very kind of rising criticism and that
it will become an increasingly serious matter for both
governments.
After
-6-
After bringing this up several times, the Ambassador
always agreeing, I finally remarked that it is highly
important for some kind of formula to be worked out in
regard to what each government is doing and should do
and that at present I an unable to formulate a statement
on this subject, which is a most difficult thing to do.
The Ambassador inquired if I had any suggestions or
propositions to offer on this or in a general way. I
replied that since he informed me that the President and
he have gone over these phases I need not go into them
now. I then added that, having just arrived here on
Sunday, there has been no time before today for him to
get settled and find out something about the general
situation from his Government preliminary to a conversa-
tion between us touching such matters as cooperation in
the war against the Tripartite group, and since his Gov-
ernment has made up its mind on the governing question,
there is not much, as far as I can see, for me to take
up with him just now. I then invited him to keep this
question of cooperation in the East, as well as in the
West, especially in mind and lend his cooperation to
improve the situation in these respects because it will
call for every possible attention as we go along here-
after.
C.H.
S:CH:AR
PSF. Russia
The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union
(Stalin) to the President of the Chinese Executive Yuan (Chiang),
[Moseow, December 12, 1941].
Explains that Bussia 1a carrying the principal burden of
the war against Germany and urges Chiangnot to insist that Russia
at once declare war against Japan.
SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV,
The Far East, page 747.
[Translation received in the Dept. of State from Dr. T.V. Soong,
o/a Dec. 16. Forwarded by Welles to FDR on Dec. 17 after Welles
had first read the message to FDR on the telephone.]
RLJ 12/7/56