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President's Secretary's File (Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration)
Departmental Correspondence
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PSF
State Dept : Cordell Hull
1943
Hull folder
2-43
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 5, 1943
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
What should we do about
this?
F.D.R.
Enclosures
Secret message to Davis and Sherwood
undated from Carroll re report in
Algiers that Giraud is considering
appt. of Lemaigre Dubreuil to high
post such as Sec. Gen. of the High
Commissariat. Protests - thinks not
good idea, etc. Memo for the P. X 2/4/
"I showed the attached cable to
Harry and he believed I should show it
to you. It is from Wallace Carroll,
Chief OWI rep. in London.' Bob Sherwoo
DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 3 1972
PSF Hull folder
fulsonal
March 23, 1943.
Dear Cordell:-
Apropos of our conversation the
other afternoon, I wish you would explore,
with the British, the question of what our
plan is to be in Germany and Italy during
the first few months after Germany's collapse.
I think you had better confer with
Stimson about it too.
My thought is if we get a substantial
meeting of the minds with the British that we
should, then, take it up with the Russians.
As ever yours,
Honorable Cordell Hull,
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
(936)
PSF Hull folder
hur
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 10, 1943
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
I suggest that a paraphrase
of Moscow - 271, April 8, 7 p.m.
be sent to Foreign Secretary
Anthony Eden.
F.D.R.
No papers accompanied the original of
this memorandum to the Secretary of State.
Hull folder2-43
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
May 12, 1943.
fillsned
Memorandum for the President
With further reference to our conversation over
the telephone last evening in regard to whether we
and the democrats in Congress should, in effect, agree
with the republicans in the House of Representatives
in an effort to prevent other amendments that they
might amend the resolution sontinuing for another three
years the Trade Agreements policy by reducing the
length of time from three to two years, I feel today
as I did last evening that it would not be in the best
interest of the cause of international cooperation,
especially in the post-war world, and especially with
respect to the economic and commercial side, for the
Executive Department and its associates in the House
of Representatives to make any concession on this point,
but to resist the proposed reduction from three to two
years, and let the responsibility rest on the opposition.
This would on its face be a hostile amendment and
definitely a backward step with respect to the general
movement in support of international cooperation,
political, economic, et al. I inferred from your
comment last evening that this likewise is your view.
Hnee
Hull folder
PSF
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
May 12, 1943
MEMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
I wish to call your atten-
tion to the attached memorandum
setting forth possible points
which Dr. Benes will most
likely discuss during his
present visit.
C.H.
NW2
THE RECHELY
fellowed
MEMORANDUM
May 11, 1943.
Eu - Mr. Atherton:
PA/D - Xr. Dunn:
U - Mr. Welles:
In his telegram no. 3, May 1, 7 p.m. (file no.
860F.001/131) Mr. Biddle reports his conversation with
Dr. Benes, setting forth the things Dr. Benes intends
to discuss during his approaching visit to Washington.
These are:
1. He expects to "clarify the juridical posi-
tion" of his Government with special reference to the
denunciation of "Munich";
2. He will disclose Moscow's attitude toward
postwar Czechoslovakia;
3. He will ask the President's support in ap-
prosching the Vatican, with a view to establishing rela-
tions between his Government and the Vatican.
On the first point, we know that Dr. Benes feels
that this Government 18 not sufficiently convinced of
the "legality" of his Government. Using precisely the
same technique as resulted in recognition during the
last war, the Czechoslovak Government has established
its status in stages. The final stage seems to have
been attained by having obtained from the British, the
U.S.S.R. and the Fighting French formal declarations re-
pudisting the Munich agreement. This means, according
to Dr. Benes' argument, that everything that transpired
at Munich or afterward, if prejudicial to Czechoslovak
interests, was accomplished under duress. (This matter
vas discussed in some detail in my memoranda of May 1
and
-2-
and May 6 concerning the status of the Sudetenland).
Dr. Benes may inquire whether this Government
would not be willing to make a declaration similar
to those issued by the British and Fighting French,
or, as in the case of the U.S.S.R., authorize him to
make a formal announcement in the matter. The follow-
ing reasons suggest that it would be better for this
Government not to accede to such a request:
1. This Government was not a party to the Munich
agreement, and 1s under no obligation to participate in
its formal repudiation;
2. The declarations of repudiation are being
used by the Czechoslovak propaganda agencies (a) to
establish clear title to all territories included with-
in Czechoslovakia before 1938 and thus move the ques-
tion of boundaries into the forefront of discussion;
(b) to complicate thereby the relations with the Po-
lish Government, in view of Poland's occupation of the
Teschen area; and (e) to retract Dr. Benes' resigna-
tion after Munich and assert his tenure of office as
"morally" uninterrupted (his term would have expired
in December 1942) and to substantiate his recent con-
tinuance in office as equivalent to & re-election for
another seven year term.
These are all questions in which this Government
need not become involved. It 1e suggested that if Dr.
Benes raises this question he could be informed that
while this Government has not considered it necessary
or appropriate to make any formal statement with re-
gard to the Munich settlement, it has taken note of the
repudiation of Munich by the Ozechoslovak Government
and other interested governments; and that the Depart-
ment has taken the necessary steps to see that any ad-
ministrative acts on the part of agencies of this Gov-
ernment which might have bearing on the Munich agree-
ment should be reviewed in a sense non-prejudicial to
the interests of Czechoslovakia.
On the second point (disdosing "Mosoow's attitude
toward postwar Czechoslovakia") we can suppose that
this means that Dr. Benes will deliver a refutation of
the popular charge that he is an "agent of Moseow".
The
-3-
The third point, that Dr. Benes will request the
President's support in approaching the Vatican, is worth
careful reflection. He speaks of the "maintenance of
equilibrium" and the "re-establishment of relations be-
tween Prague and the Vatican" since the end of the war
"would undoubtedly find Russian influences strong in
Central Europe".
Does this mean that he is now embarking on a poli-
ey of re-insurance? That having supported the Soviet
cause in all his recent diplomacy and having already
given everything that would be useful to the Soviet Union,
he now has become uneasy less the Russians treat his
Government much as they have the Poles? For him to turn
to Rome at this juncture is a dangerous policy, and our
involvement in it might give rise to awkward misunderstand-
ings.
He says that this is not a new project, --that he dis-
cussed it with Cardinal Hinsley two years ago. The Car-
dinal "did not consider the time then ripe to approach
the Vatican in the matter".
There is no indication of any subsequent conversa-
tions with the Cardinal, who died just a few weeks ago.
In this connection it may be useful to review
briefly the relations between the Czechoslovak Govern-
ment and the Vatican. They have never been cordial, and
a concordat was never negotiated.
Soon after the establishment of the Czechoslovak
Republic an anti-Papal nationalistic church was started,
which involved a sharp controversy with Rome. Neverthe-
less relations with the Vatican were established in 1921,
but there followed a period of fruitless negotiation, grow-
ing out of the Czechoslovak request that the boundaries
of dioceses be newly delimited to accord with the coun-
try's geographical frontiers, and the claim advanced by
both the Vatican and the Czechoslovak Government to the
right to nominate archbishops and bishops. Then followed
(1925) an unpleasant incident when the Nuncio left Prague
and remained absent for two years, because of the Govern-
ment's official participation in the John Huss celebration
(this was repeated in 1933).
In 1927 a modus vivendi was drawn up, at Rome's
initiation,
-4-
initiation, but eight years elapsed before an understand-
ing could be reached on some of the points in dispute,
and in fact another two years passed before a supplement
to the modus vivendi was promulgated (1937) in order to
make it really effective. By this time, of course, the
Sudeten question had become acute, and the Hungarian
agitation in Slovakia was increasing, with the result that
some of the further negotiations foreseen in the agree-
ment were never completed. This almost continuous state
of tension, throughout the history of the Republic, in-
volving property claims, political considerations (the
authority and property interests of Hungarian, German
and Polish bishops) and a nationalistic people which,
though predominantly Catholic, shows little ardor for
Rome, is then the background against which Dr. Benes would
like to persuade the President to approach the Vatican
in his behalf.
Would it not be better for him after his return to
London from Moscow, to renew his conversations with the
Catholic hierarchy at London?
Eu: CWCannon: BJS
Hull freder-43
THE WHITE HOUSE
washington
May 31, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
What would you think of
sending Bill Phillips to Canada
on the condition that if the
Indian matter is reopened in a
satisfactory way he would at
once go to India as Special
Representative? I am sure he
would be very acceptable to
Canada where he once was
stationed.
What do you think of Dick
Patterson for New Zealand?
F.D.R.
DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date
MAR 3 1972
NA n° nots
мугнислой
NOT
THE MHILE HONZE
-
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 19, 1943
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Bob Jackson phoned me this
afternoon; said he understood that there
was a possibility that you would appoint
& career man to Cahada instead of Dick
Patterson.
He wanted me to ask you -- if
that is the final decision -- could -
let him know so he can give Dick a chance
to withdraw his name and "save his face".
I told him I didn't think any
decision had been reached.
MHM
DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 3 1972
Hull foctor 2-13
Efile
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
May 31. 1943
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Reference is made to a memorandum dated May 18,
1943, from Lieutenant Colonel Chester Hammond,
Assistant to the Military Aide, transmitting, at your
direction, copies of two messages from General Hurley
regarding the Middle East, and stating that you desire
a recommendation from this Department relative thereto.
Two memoranda are transmitted herewith which con-
tain the recommendations requested.
I J
Enclosures:
Two memoranda,
May 22 and 27, 1943.
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date MAR 3 1972
Gen. Hurley 's report is filed Sen Conce H dr 3-43.
Department of State
BUREAU
NE
DIVISION
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted
ADDRESSED TO
The President
- - - - -
I
May 27, 1943
Comments on General Hurley's Telegram of
May 5, 1943 from Cairo regarding General
Conditions in the Middle East and the
Palestine Question
Part I of General Hurley's report contains a brief
statement of the high regard in which the United States
is held in the Middle East, and of the unfavorable manner
in which the countries which have been influential in that
area in the past, principally Great Britain and France,
are regarded by the native populations.
General Hurley raises no specific questions and makes
no recommendations, However, in pointing out that "con-
ditions of war require continuance at this time of certain
policies of conquest and imperialism," but that "these
must eventually be in complete conflict with the principles
of the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms,' he implicitly
raises the question of American policy in the Middle East
after the war.
The peoples of the Middle East were bitterly disap-
pointed and disillusioned at the arrangements made in their
regard after the last World War, considering them to be in
clear violation of President Wilson's principles and of
specific commitments made to them by Great Britain and
France. While some progress toward the political and eco-
nomic liberty of the Near East was made in the following
two decades, the concessions made were granted slowly and
grudgingly and for the most part were obtained through
the use or threat of force. The dominant western Powers
looked principally to their own short-term political and
economic interests; they failed to devote themselves to
the task of building sound, free nations in the Middle
East, and they did little for the common man.
Consequently, at the outbreak of war in 1939 the
Middle Eastern peoples, generally speaking, were morally
disaffected from the Allied cause, and inclined to believe
that if Nazi influence should come to prevail it could
hardly be worse than the type of domination to which they
had
-2-
had been accustomed. Thus 18 explained the unpleasant
fact that during the present war no independent Middle
Eastern country has fought against the Axis.
The Middle Eastern peoples now feel sure that the
Axis will lose the war. They believe that unless the
United States, whom they admire and respect, plays a far
larger part in determining the working relationships
between the Middle East and the West than it has done in
the past, the old policies of imperialism and exploitation
will be resumed.
The use of Middle Eastern territories, natural resources,
labor, and industries are vital in the present war; are
vital to any adequate scheme for maintaining peace; and
will be vital in any future war. We do not wish to have
to operate again among indifferent, sullen, or hostile local
people who are ill-fed, disease-ridden, and illiterate.
The following general recommendations are made in the
light of General Hurley's report and the foregoing discus-
sion:
1. No commitment or promise of any kind should be
made by us which we do not intend or cannot reasonably
expect to keep. Our existing basic commitment, the Atlantic
Charter, should of course be honored completely.
2. In political matters, it should be our policy to
assist in maintaining and, where necessary, furthering the
independence of Near Eastern peoples. We should not remain
silent when developments occur which threaten these objec-
tives.
3. In economic matters, we should seek to extend and
to strengthen American trade and economic interests on the
basis of fair give-and-take.
4. We should place ourselves in a position to give
the Middle Eastern countries all reasonable assistance in
economic and cultural matters.
5. We should assume our proper share of responsibility
in maintaining peace in the Middle East and preserving it
as against external aggression.
Part II
-3-
Part II of General Hurley's report deals with the
Palestine problem. He 1s convinced that this question is
the one which most interests the Middle East at this time.
He considers official Zionist policy to be imperialistic
in character, and produces evidence to show that the Arab
and other Moslem peoples fear the Zionists for this reason.
General Hurley also states that the opinion is widespread
that the British Government opposes the establishment of
a Jewish political state in Palestine but that the United
States Government 18 forcing the British to acquiesce in
the establishment of such & state. British propaganda along
this line is stated by General Hurley to be distinctly help-
ful to British relations with the Arabs. It 1s correspond-
ingly damaging to our own relations. The French in Syria
are using the same line of propaganda to their own advantage
and to our detriment.
General Hurley's observations are fully supported by
reports which the Department has been receiving from its
representatives in the Middle East for the past two years,
and more recently by reports which the War Department has
received from its intelligence officers on the spot.
The concensus of opinion in the Middle East of respon-
sible American and British officials is that the Zionist
program for a Jewish political state in Palestine is an
imperialistic program which 1s bitterly opposed by the
Arab peoples, including the Arab majority in Palestine it-
self. The program has no basis or justification in the
Balfour Declaration, or the Mandate, and could be carried
into effect and maintained only by force, in clear violation
of the Atlantic Charter. If this Government should have any-
thing to do with giving effect to such a program, we should
incur the enmity of the Arab peoples, whose friendship 1s
vital to us.
We believe that the issuance of a statement on the
Palestine problem along the lines of the one which the
President has recently approved for discussion with the
British and possibly other governments, will go far toward
removing the uncertainties and doubts regarding our posi-
tion which now prevail in the Middle East.
General Hurley believes that the Palestine problem is
too much for the British to handle by themselves and that
we
-4-
we should take a hand. The Department has given a great
deal of anxious and careful thought to this problem. It
18 recommended that the Arabs and Jews first endeavor to
reach a friendly settlement between themselves, by their
own efforts. If this endeavor 1s unsuccessful, our in-
fluence should be exerted toward a solution, reached after
full consultation with both Arabs and Jews, based squarely
on the Atlantic Charter.
In general, the statements ender by General Renter
regarding Eventon seonomic difficulties. New removal.
bilities therefor, the postition of American the
novisers, and the remestive attitudes of other Irenishs,
Brittah and Russians toward sech other, 678 to
strattal accord with numarous redolted
by the Department,
General Burday expresses the voinion that the
frig megirations of Great Britain and the Series Onton
in Irea TV boding the into onen conflist, Share se,
or course, no doubt that Great Britain and RODULA HAVE
intereste in Iren and that these Entereste are,
in HOME conflicting. This brea been trod for
& least the print 120 years. Yosther this state of
sifeirs will ultimately result Ln or Seation clash vauld
$1.00 to won the of the -
and London Invernments en serving at - esticfectory
over-all agreement MIDH to their respective
interests in all parts of NW world. Rowever, the to
partment feels that everything occeible moold to
to scooth the way for Moob on agreement with
to Tean and is currently coing mil that 15 CAR tx
about closer cooperation between slue Britter,
and American authorities 12 Tran.
The Department 10 curroried to 11050 the statences
an unges 9 and 30 of the agren that American Givil and
military officers 20 Iron 20 - supporting She
Seviet Union as opposed to Greet Britain. A 36 Style
that our representatives have differed with the with
on 3 number of occasione and What we have and sexor 018-
ngroomente with the Buseiens in Iran, This 08432 == -
due primerily, newever, CO the fact that proceptly
We have had less contact with the dovien authorities, who
anys held themselves aloor from the efforts unde by the
Britten
May 22, 1943
Comments on General Hurley's Telegram of
May 13, 1943 from Cairo regarding
Conditions in Iran
In general, the statements made by General Hurley
regarding Iranian economic difficulties, the responsi-
bilities therefor, the position of American troops and
advisers, and the respective attitudes of the Iranians,
British and Russians toward each other, are in sub-
stantial accord with numerous previous reports received
by the Department.
General Hurley expresses the opinion that the oppos-
ing aspirations of Great Britain and the Soviet Union
in Iran may bring them into open conflict. There 1s,
of course, no doubt that Great Britain and Russia have
special interests in Iran and that these interests are,
in some respects conflicting. This has been true for
st least the past 100 years. Whether this state of
affairs will ultimately result in a head-on clash would
seem to depend primarily upon the success of the Moscow
and London Governments in arriving at a entisfactory
over-all agreement with regard to their respective
interests in all parts of the world. However, the De-
partment feels that everything possible should be done
to smooth the way for such an agreement with respect
to Iran and 18 currently doing all that it can to bring
about closer cooperation between the British, Russian,
and American authorities in Iran.
The Department is surprised to note the statement
on pages 9 and 10 of the telegram that American civil and
military officers in Iran appear to be supporting the
Soviet Union as opposed to Great Britain. It is true
that our representatives have differed with the British
on a number of occasions and that we have had ewer dis-
agreements with the Russians in Iran. This seems to be
due primarily, however, to the fact that until recently
we have had less contact with the Soviet authorities, who
have held themselves aloof from the efforts made by the
British
-2-
British and American Governments to resolve the numerous
economic and political problems which have arisen during
the past year and a half. Despite the differences of
opinion mentioned, we have achieved reasonably satisfac-
tory cooperation and understanding with the British
authorities, and there is nothing in the numerous reports
received by the Department which indicates that our Lega-
tion is in any way favoring Russian interests as against
the British. The instructions which the Department has
sent our Minister have emphasized the importance of secur-
ing good relations with both the British and the Russians.
As regards the attitude of the American military authori-
ties, the Department of State has no information.
General Hurley suggests that the President should
take strong action to meet the existing situation in Iran,
8.8 a step toward unity among the United Nations and the
ultimate establishment of the principles of the Atlantic
Charter. This suggestion is substantially in accord with
a statement of policy prepared for its own use by the
Department of State on January 23, 1943, the salient
points of which are as follows:
"1) The past and present attitudes of Great
Britain and Russia toward Iran, together with the current
weakness of the Iranian Government and disorganization of
the country's internal structure, justify fears that Iran
may prove a danger point when we come to the post-war
settlement.
"2) The best hope of avoiding trouble in this
regard lies in strengthening Iran to a point at which she
will be able to stand on her own feet and in assuring
both of the interested Great Powers that neither one need
fear the acquisition by the other of a predominant position
in Iran.
"3) The United States is the only nation which
may be able to render effective assistance to Iran with-
out rousing the fears and opposition of Great Britain or
Russia, or of the Iranians themselves.
"4) Since we have a vital interest in the ful-
fillment of the principles of the Atlantic Charter and
the establishment of foundations for a lasting peace
throughout the world, it is to the advantage of the
United States to exert itself to see that Iran's integrity
and
-3-
and independence are maintained and that she becomes
prosperous and stable.
"5) Therefore, the United States should adopt
a policy of positive action in Iran with 8 view to facili-
tating not only the war operations of the United Nations
but also a sound post-war development of the country
which would eliminate the need or excuse for the estab-
lishment of any sort of 'protectorate'."
This statement of policy has been transmitted to
the American Legation at Tehran for its guidance, and
our Minister has expressed his entire agreement with it.
The specific measures by which this policy may be imple-
mented are, necessarily, dependent upon circumstances and,
especially, upon the success of the United States in con-
vincing not only the Iranian Government and people but also
the Soviet and British Governments of the disinterestedness
of American policy in Iran.
Finally, General Hurley makes four specific recommenda-
tions:
1. That Iran be assured that America insists that the
principles of the Atlantic Charter do apply to Iran. Such
assurance has been implicit in a number of communications
which this Government has made to the Iranian Government.
Furthermore, in the preamble of a draft agreement recently
submitted to the Iranian Government to establish the status
of American armed forces in Iran, it is stated that "Both
the Government of the United States of America and the
Imperial Iranian Government have declared their adherence
to the principles of the joint declaration made on August 14,
1941 by the President of the United States of America and
the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, known 8.8 the Atlantic Charter." It
may also be recalled that the preamble of the Anglo-Soviet-
Iranian Treaty of Alliance of January 29, 1942 refers
specifically to the principles of the Atlantic Charter.
However, if further assurance is considered necessary,
there would seem to be no objection to a specific statement
by this Government along the lines suggested by General
Hurley. It might be well to have such a statement made
jointly by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet
Union.
2. That
2. That Iran be permitted to join the United
Nations in a declaration of war against the Axis.
So far 8.8 the Department 18 aware, the Iranian Govern-
ment as such has never expressed a desire to join the
United Nations, although personal wishes of this sort
have been voiced by the Shah and one or two high officials.
By telegram no. 66 of February 5, 1943 the Department in-
formed the American Minister at Tehran that At perceived
no objection to an Iranian declaration of war, provided
the position of the Iranian Government with respect to
its own people would not thereby be weakened. The views
expressed in this telegram are still those of the
Department.
3. That the American and British Legations be raised
immediately to the status of Embassies. The Department
feels that this might be beneficial, as it would give our
representative equal standing with the Soviet Ambassador
at Tehran and indicate our positive interest in Iran.
4. That American and British Ambassadors compatible
to each other and able to understand and promote British-
American-Russian cooperation be appointed to Iran. The
Department, of course, fully appreciates the importance of
having at Tehran a chief of mission who is able to work
with the Soviet and British representatives. Our present
Minister has done an exceptional piece of work in Iran
under extraordinarily difficult circumstances and enjoye
an enviable standing among the foreign representatives at
Tehran. It is felt that his transfer to another post
should be made only after careful consideration and only
if 8. man of outstanding ability were available to replace
him. TheDepartment expects to order Mr. Dreyfus to the
United States for consultation within the next few months,
and it is believed that any action on General Hurley's
recommendation might well be postponed until there has
been an opportunity to discuss the situation with the
Minister in person.
T-108
PSF Hull folder
2-43
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 5, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEAHY:
When do you think I can use
this at a press conference?
F.D.R.
Memorandum for the President, 6-3-43,
from Cordell Hull, returning his ltr.
5-11-43, with enclosed draft statement
on poison gas together with FDR memo,
5-21-43.
Hull folder
hm
2-43
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 21, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:
I think this statement on
poison gas is excellent, but suggest
it be given out soon after the Prime
Minister leaves. Let me know when the
opportunity is ripe for good publicity.
F.D.R.
Letter to the President, 5-11-43, from
Cordell Hull, enclosing, in accordance
with the President's request, a draft
statement with respect to use of poison
gas by any of our enemies - statement is
titled, "Statement by the President on
Gas Warfare".
1173
PSF Hull folder 2-43
him
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 5, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:
Will you get me a draft of
this speech, prepared in the State
Department, and send up to me this
afternoon?
F.D.R.
Letter, 5-29-43, to the President
from Cordell Hull stating that the
United Nations Conference on Food and
Agriculture will adjourn on June 3rd; a
special train will bring delegates to
Wash. on June 4th. The delegates could
meet the Pres. on Friday evening or the
following Monday. Mr. Hull says he can
have a draft made of a short speech if the
Pres. so desires. Penned notation -"C.H.
OK FDR".
PSF Hall folder
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 9, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE. YOU MIGHT
CONSULT GENERAL MARSHALL WHO IS
JUST BACK FROM ALGIERS.
F. D. R.
Cable June 7, 1058 from Murphy, Algiers
Re invitation extended to Gen. Giraud
to proceed to the U.S.A. and recommends
that General de Gaulle also be invited.
PSF: Hull folder
THE WHITE HOUSE
washington
fullsons
June 14, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR
TEE SECRETARY OF STATE
Tell Murphy in reply to his
No. 1068, June ninth, that until
things are very much clearer in
North Africa there is no need to
discuss recognition by us in
any form. This includes en-
gagements or promises.
F. D. R.
PSF Hull folder 2-43
fulmal
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
June 14, 1943.
Memorandum for the President
Some days ago I recommended for the position of
Ambassador to Russia Mr. W. Averell Harriman.
It has been my understanding that Mr. Harry Hop-
kins is not well physically. If he should be well
enough to accept this position, he would be my first
recommendation, from the standpoint of general equip-
ment and capabilities.
CH
PSF Hull folder 2-43
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
June 24, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
The enclosed came yesterday
morning from Churchill. I do
hope that you can go this Autumn.
I honestly think it would do a
great deal of good.
Please return for my files.
F. D. R.
DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.J. Stewart Date MAR 3 1972
(1297)
hm
THE WHITE HOUSE PSF
WASHINGTON
Bill
June 24, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR
J. VAN NESS PHILIP:
FOR YOUR INFORMATION.
F.D.R.
ENCLOSURE
Transmitting copy of letter which the President
received from Hon. Sumner welles under date of
6/21/43, in re copy of report from Mr. J Van Ness
Philip in re progress on the Inter-American
Highway in Mexico. Original of letter retained for
our files.
(1186)
PSF:
0
P
Y
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 7, 1943.
My dear Mr. Secretary:
Replying to your letter of May 26th in regard
to a proposed relaxation of the existing system of quarterly
quotas of petroleum products for Sweden, I have referred the
question to the Joint Chiefs of Staff whose report is quoted
herewith:
"MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Subject: Increase in Petroleum Products Quotas to
Sweden.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the
military aspects of the letter which the Secretary of State
sent to you on 26 May 1943 with reference to the above subject.
From the best information available it appears
that in January, 1943, the Swedish reserves of petroleum
products amounted to approximately 90,000 tons. Their quarterly
FEB 1 9 1974
consumption is approximately 15,000 tons. Sweden is therefore
able to build up her reserves at the rate of 15,000 tons per
quarter provided the 30,000-ton quarterly import continues.
On this basis Sweden's reserve stocks in October should exceed
120,000 tons.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that these
amounts are adequate to meet the military needs of Sweden and
that any relaxation of the blackade of the Axis Powers in
Europe is contrary, from the military point of view, to the best
interests of the Allied Nations.
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
Unless considerations aside from military dictate
otherwise, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff recommend that negotiations
DECLASSIFIED
with Sweden should be conducted with & view to limiting the
petroleum imports to 30,000 tons per quarter."
By F. J. Stewart Bate
It is my opinion that there is no serious objection to
permitting Sweden to build up its reserve stock to 120,000 tons by
October, 1943, provided that competent supervision of such petroleum
products give us reasonable assurance that they are not used for
the benefit of the Axis Powers.
(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
The Honorable,
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington. D.C.
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON
5 June 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Subject: Increase in Petroleum Products
Quotas to Sweden.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the mili-
tary aspects of the letter which the Secretary of State
sent to you on 26 May 1943 with reference to the above
subject.
From the best information available it appears
that in January, 1943, the Swedish reserves of petroleum
products amounted to approximately 90,000 tons. Their
quarterly consumption is approximately 15,000 tons. Sweden
is therefore able to build up her reserves at the rate of
15,000 tons per quarter provided the 30,000-ton quarterly
import continues. On this basis Sweden's reserve stocks in
October should exceed 120,000 tons.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that these
amounts are adequate to meet the military needs of Sweden
and that any relaxation of the blockade of the Axis Powers
in Europe is contrary, from the military point of view, to
the best interests of the Allied Nations.
Unless considerations aside from military dictate
otherwise, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff recommend that negotia-
tions with Sweden should be conducted with a view to limiting
the petroleum imports to 30,000 tons per quarter.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
inquots
WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
FORVICTORY
Chief of Staff to the
BUY
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
UNITED
STATES
WAR
BONDS
DECLASSIFIED
AND
STAMPS
JOS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 1 9 1974
/ N /
Sweedish oil
JCS
JHD
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON
5 June 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Subject: Increase in Petroleum Products
Quotas to Sweden.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the mill-
tary aspects of the letter which the Secretary of State
sent to you on 26 May 1943 with reference to the above
subject.
From the best information available it appears
that in January, 1943, the Swedish reserves of petroleum
products amounted to approximately 90,000 tons. Their
quarterly consumption is approximately 15,000 tons. Sweden
is therefore able to build up her reserves at the rate of
15,000 tons per quarter provided the 30,000-ton quarterly
import continues. On this basis Sweden's reserve stocks in
October should exceed 120,000 tons.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that these
amounts are adequate to meet the military needs of Sweden
and that any relaxation of the blockade of the Axis Powers
in Europe is contrary, from the military point of view, to
the best interests of the Allied Nations.
Unless considerations aside from military dictate
otherwise, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff recommend that negotia-
tions with Sweden should be conducted with a view to limiting
the petroleum imports to 30,000 tons per quarter.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Havy.
Distribution:
Admiral Leahy
DECLASSIFIED
JOS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 1 9 1974
mef
JOIN EF8 OF STAFF
IGTON
MEMORANDUM
Love
Date
2 June 1943
To: General DEANE
Subject: Increase in Petroleum Products
Quotas to Sweden.
1. Returned.
2. The attached 1s being circulated
to the Joint Administrative Committee for
necessary action 88 J.AD.C. 17/D.
May
Secretary,
Joint Administrative Com.
DECLASSIFIED
JOS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 1 9 1974
-
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON
&
2 June 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE:
Subject: Furnishing 011 to Sweden.
Enclosures: Letter from Sec. of State to
Admiral Leahy, dated 26 May
1943 w/encl.
Attached hereto is a letter which Admiral
Leahy received from the Secretary of State together
with & letter which the Secretary of State has
written to the President regarding furnishing of
oil to Sweden.
Admiral Leahy desires, as a matter of
urgency, that you give him your comments and recom-
mendations in so far 8.8 the military aspects of
this situation are involved. He particularly wishes
to avoid political, economic, or other aspects.
Admiral Leahy desires your reply not later than
Friday, 4 June 1943.
JOHN R. DEANE,
Secretary.
DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date
FEB 1 9 1974
FORVICTORY
BUY
UNITED
STATES
WAR
BONDS
-
STAMPS
OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. c.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
May 26. 1943
My dear Admiral Leahy:
I enclose herewith a letter dated today addressed
by me to the President in regard to Sweden.
There now seem to be good prospects for obtaining
an agreement from the Swedes looking to action by them to
stop German "leave" and war material traffic through
Sweden. In that regard the Swedes are, however, desirous
of having sufficient petroleum stocks on hand for their
armed forces before taking such action which they believe,
and I think not without reason, will result in strong
German counter action.
In my letter to the President I ask for his authority
to deal with this specific problem. In as much as the
development of Sweden-Germany relations may be rapid and
require quick action on our part I have also asked the
President for his general authority to deal with develop-
ments as I deem in our overall interest subject to your
views on matters pertaining to actual military operations,
without having to go back to him for specific directives.
I should appreciate your passing along my letter to
the President with your comments thereon.
Sincerely yours,
Enclosure:
To the President.
Admiral William D. Leahy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the
FOR VICTORY
Army and Navy.
BUY
UNITED
STATES
SAVINGS
BONDS
4ND
STAMPS
partment of State
Eu
INVOICE
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted 5-24-43
ADDRESSED TO
Admiral William D. Leahy
I : I I al
I
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
May 26. 1943
My dear Mr. President:
On November 20 and November 30, 1942 you authorized
me to inform the Swedish Government that this Government
had decided upon the policy of granting Sweden a quarterly
oil quota of 30,000 tons for the exclusive use of the
armed forces of Sweden, on the condition that the Swedish
Government would release the two Norwegian ships then in
Goteborg and would give assurances that the twenty-one
Swedish ships then the subject of negotiations in London
will be chartered to the Maritime Commission; that the
Swedish Government should in addition be informed that we
had in mind other concessions from them in exchange for
the continuation of the new oil quota and that you expected
they would agree to these concessions to the maximum extent
possible under the circumstances, the concessions being
those referred to in the resolution of the Board of
Economic Warfare adopted November 12,1942. You also asked
that
The President,
The White House.
-2-
that the Swedes be informed of your hope that Swedish
military and air stocks of oil would be built up as
rapidly as possible; and you directed me to proceed with
negotiations to obtain the concessions referred to in
collaboration with the Board of Economic Warfare and the
British Government.
The Swedish Government has already given us a number
of the concessions we desire and American representatives
are now in London negotiating, together with the British,
with Swedish representatives with respect to the remaining
concessions which we desire. Present indications are that
a satisfactory agreement will be reached in these negotiations.
With respect in particular to the desired concession
relating to transit through Sweden of German leave troops
and war materials, our negotiators have just reported
urgently that the Swedes seem inclined to agree secretly
to a formula looking to the stopping of this transit traffic
through action of the Swedish Government by a specified
date, probably this fall. The Swedes have pointed out,
however, that such action on their part would certainly
result in the Germans olosing the "Goteborg traffic" by
which Sweden imports products, including petroleum, from
the Western Hemisphere. In the Swedish view the crux of
this important matter, as far 8.8 timing of Swedish action
is
20
to
5
alazdo
8
:
fluor THOM 4tc To DOS 1 70 has 030022 9d "In ashout Das 202 and
vibigar
-3-
is concerned, is possession by Sweden of sufficient oil
to enable it to sustain for as long as possible what
could amount to a. condition of siege by Germany, and pos-
sibly even a German attack. The Swedes make the general
roservation that, if faced with the real threat of an
overwhelming German attack as a result of their action in
this matter, they might not under circumstances then pre-
vailing be able to proceed to stopping the traffic on the
agreed date, but that in such an event we would be free
to review other obligations to them undertaken by us.
I hold strongly to the view that it 1s to our interest
to relax the existing system of rigid quarterly quotas and
to permit the Swedes to import petroleum products from the
Caribbean area to the limit of their shipping capacity
(estimated at not more than 45,000 tons of petroleum a
quarter) between now and the date which we would agree
with the Swedes that they would stop the German transit
traffic. Some question has arisen, however, whether it
would be possible, under & literal interpretation of your
previous directives to me, to permit the Swedes to do so.
I should like, therefore, to have your authority to instruct
our negotiators in London that, in return for appropriate
Swedish concessions, they may agree to such measures as may
be necessary on behalf of this Government to permit the
Swedes
/ to
CODIG ETPIN CARD ORDERN 71, No man,
6 / / : : 5 / / : to 2
: / THE I = to : : Jone If
so
Swedes to import in Swedish tankers as much petroleum as
possible prior to the agreed date for Swedish action with
respect to the German transit traffic.
On the basis of past experience in handling the
problems arising from day to day in regard to this entire
matter it would be most useful also to have your general
authority, in the interests of flexibility and expedition,
to resolve any occasional differences of viewpoints on
policy - of which the foregoing is a more or less typical
example - among interested agencies of the Government,
except for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in matters dealing
with military operations, in such manner as I deem, under
developing circumstances, in our overall interests.
Faithfully yours,
Euclosure
My dear Admiral Leahy:
May 26. 1943
I enclose herewith a letter dated today addressed
by ne to the President in regard to Sweden (Appendix).
There now seen to be good prospects for obtaining
an agreement from the Swedes looking to action by them to
stop German "leave" and war material traffic through
Sweden, In that regard the Swedes are, however, desirous
of having sufficient petroleum stocks on hand for their
armed forces before taking such action which they believe,
and I think not without reason, will result in strong
German counter action.
In my letter to the President I ask for his authority
to deal with this specific problem. In as much as the
development of Sweden-Germany relations may be rapid and
require quick action on our part I have also asked the
President for his general authority to deal with develop-
ments as I deem in our overall interest subject to your
views on matters pertaining to actual military operations,
without having to go back to him for specific directives.
I should appreciate your passing along my letter to
the President with your comments thereon.
Sincerely yours,
Cordell Hull
Enclosure:
To the President.
Admiral William D. Leahy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy.
K
Emboure
Appears
I
May 26. 1943
My dear Mr. President:
On November 20 and November 30, 1942 you authorized
me to inform the Swedish Government that this Government
had decided upon the policy of granting Sweden a quarterly
oil quota of 30,000 tons for the exclusive use of the
armed forces of Sweden, on the condition that the Swedish
Government would release the two Norwegian ships then in
Göteberg and would give assurances that the twenty-one
Swedish ships then the subject of negotiations in London
will be chartered to the Maritime Commission; that the
Swedish Government should in addition be informed that we
had in mind other concessions from them in exchange for
the continuation of the new oil quota and that you expected
they would agree to these concessions to the maximum extent
possible under the circumstances, the concessions being
those referred to in the resolution of the Board of
Economic Warfare adopted November 12,1942. You also asked
The President,
The White House.
AFFEND
appending
-2-
that the Swedes be informed of your hope that Swedish
military and air stocks of oil would be built up as
rapidly as possible; and you directed me to proceed with
negotiations to obtain the concessions referred to in
collaboration with the Board of Economic Warfare and the
British Government.
The Swedish Government has already given us a number
of the concessions we desire and American representatives
are now in London negotiating, together with the British,
with Swedish representatives with respect to the remaining
concessions which we desire. Present indications are that
a satisfactory agreement will be reached in these negotiations.
With respect in particular to the desired concession
relating to transit through Sweden of German leave troops
and war materials, our negotiators have just reported
urgently that the Swedes seem inclined to agree secretly
to a formula looking to the stopping of this transit traffic
through action of the Swedish Government by a specified
date, probably this fall. The Swedes have pointed out,
however, that such action on their part would certainly
result in the Germans closing the "08teborg traffic" by
which Sweden imports products, including petroleum, from
the Western Hemisphere. In the Swedish view the crux of
this important matter, as far as timing of Swedish action
$
were
zobre
two
-3-
is concerned, is possession by Sweden of sufficient oil
to enable it to sustain for as long as possible what
could amount to a condition of siege by Germany, and pos-
sibly even a German attack. The Swedes make the general
reservation that, if faced with the real threat of an
overwhelming German attack as a result of their action in
this matter, they might not under circumstances then pre-
vailing be able to proceed to stopping the traffic on the
agreed date, but that in such an event we would be free
to review other obligations to them undertaken by us.
I hold strongly to the view that it is to our interest
to relax the existing system of rigid quarterly quotas and
to permit the Swedes to import petroleum products from the
Caribbean area to the limit of their shipping capacity
(estimated at not more than 45,000 tons of petroleum a
quarter) between now and the date which we would agree
with the Swedes that they would stop the German transit
traffic. Some question has arisen, however, whether it
would be possible, under a literal interpretation of your
previous directives to me, to permit the Swedes to do 80.
I should like, therefore, to have your authority to instruct
our negotiators in London that, in return for appropriate
Swedish concessions, they may agree to such measures as may
be necessary on behalf of this Government to permit the
Swedes-
R
of
/
z
/
Rev.
III / / a 2 / 2 toy : / : If
20 / :
-
-4-
Swedes to import in Swedish tankers as such petroleum as
possible prior to the agreed date for Swedish action with
respect to the German transit traffic.
On the basis of past experience in handling the
problems arising from day to day in regard to this entire
matter it would be most useful also to have your general
authority, in the interests of flexibility and expedition,
to resolve any occasional differences of viewpoints on
policy - of which the foregoing is a more or less typical
example - among interested agencies of the Government,
except for the Joint Chiefe of Staff in matters dealing
with military operations, in such manner as I deem, under
developing circumstances, in our overall interests.
Faithfully yours,
Cordell Holl
PSF Hull folder
2-43
THE WHITE HOUSE
washington
June 29, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
I wish you would read these
figures in regard to Swedish
shipping carrying iron ore to
Germany. In view of this, I
wish you would reconsider the
sending of fuel oil to Sweden.
Don't you think so? Please
return enclosure.
F. D. R.
Memo from Admiral to the
President, dated June 26, 1943,
re "Axis Shipping in Northern
European Waters.
(1320)
Hull focar 2-43
o P him
Y
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 29, 1945
My dear Mr. Secretary:
There has just come to my attention a BOC Airgram No. 60
of June 15, 1943, from the Combined Committee for French North and
west African Civil Affairs, relative to "Property Changes under German
Rule - Tunisis".
The conditions described in this airgram are additional
evidences of the extremes to which the Axis powers have gone to wreck
their vengeance upon innocent inhabitants of occupied torritories.
I should appreciate It if you would notify the representa-
tives of the United States Government in North Africa that the
conditions described in BOC Airgram 60 come within the accepted and
announced policy stated by the United Nations last December not to
recognize property transfers nade by inhabitants of occupied tor-
ritories under the duress of the Axis powers.
Our representatives should also be instructed to notify the
French authorities in North Africa that this Government looks with
disfavor upon any attempt at foreclosure or collection of interest
on mortgages incurred as a result of levies made by the Axis powers.
T should appreciate your keeping ne informed of such AC-
tions as are taken by our representatives and of any changes in the
situation that may occur.
sincerely,
(Signed)
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
The Honorable
The Secretary of State
616
U.S.
DECLASSIFIED By Authority of State Dept letter 1-12-72
the
BRITISH
and British Dovt. telegram 1-13-72
By
Jd
Date MAR 3 1972
COMBINED COMMITTEE FOR PRENCH NORTH AND VEST APRICAN CIVIL AFFAIRS
m Authorizery
m
cowler
The following communication was received 19 June, 1943. me.
CC: Mr. Orchard
Mr. 310mon
BOC Airgram 60, 15 June, 1943
Mr. Traver
Mr. Mitanell (4)
Mr. 0'Boyle (3)
From:
NAEB, Finance and Control Division
Mr. Bacgolain
"THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING TIEL NATIONAL DEPENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING
Mr. Rendler
OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT, U.S.C. 50; 31 and 32. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY
To:
CCNA and Secretary of Treasury
Mr. Sundelam
Subject:
Property Changes under German Rule - Tunisia
m. ent Bundik
m m. van Ragon
1.
Junis, as the first sizeable city recaptured from Nazi
occupation, offers a realistic indication of the problems which will
ariso in the return of property and the indemnification of discriminated
groups who have suffered at Nazi hands. Our proliminary study of this
matter, presented horewith, is based primarily on the treatment
accorded to Jowish people in Tunis and was gleaned from conferences
with the heads of Jewish groups and other persons in Tunis. Exact
figures are not available at present.
2.
There are about 90,000 Jews in Tunisia as & whole. About
80,000 are descendants of people who have been in the country 2,000
years. They are not subjects of the French, but of the Boy, There
are about 5,000 - 6,000 Italian Jows, sent to Tunisia as colonists
about 150 - 200 years &C°, who have remained subjects of Italy.
MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PIRSON IS PROHIBITED BY 1AW."
Lastly, there are about 5,000 Jows who are French subjects.
3.
Shortly after the arrival of the Germans in Tunisia on
about a November, 1942, the Nazis commenced to requisition buildings
of the Jews for use 68 offices and dwelling houses. A typical case
is the following: A middle class Jewish family in Tunis was notified
one evening in early December that they would have to evacuate their
apartment the next morning, since it was to be taken over by Italian
officers AS a residence. The family, more fortunate than many,
packed up most of Its belongings during the night and moved out the
next morning. After 8 May with the departure of the Italians, the
family raturned, In many cases in which houses were requisitioned
for use by the Germans or Italians, damage was done to fixtures and
furniture. Rugs, hangings, furniture, etc. were taken. The Lasts also
requisitioned the vehicles owned by Jewish people and obliged them to
turn in their radios, refrigerators, firearms, etc. Many of these
requisitioned vehicles were damaged and some were sent to Burope.
Most of the radios, refrigerators, etc. were sent to Europe. The total
cost of this phase of Nasi oppression was estimated at about 30,000,000
francs. Thile some of the requisitioned vehicles have been found and
returned, there is, na yet, no program developed for componsation for
losses incurred as the result of this type of activity.
Page one
*6-22-419
U.S.
DECLASSIFIED By Authority of State Sept. letter 1-12-72
BRITISH
and Butish Hait. telepasu1-13-72
By I
Date MAR 3 1972
4.
On 6 December, 1942, the Council of the Jewish community
in Tunis received an order from the German authorities to produce
2,000 workers, under an arrangement whereby food, clothing, wages,
etc. wore to be paid for by the Jews. At the cost of an additional
1,000 leborers A 24-hour extension was obtained. On 9 December, 1942,
the request not having been complied with, a reign of terror commenced,
in which synagogues and schools were broken into, Jews beaten and
threatened, and obliged to march long distances, At this point the
Jewish Community organized itself and set up services for drafting
laborers, feeding, clothing and paying them, BE well as supplying them
with transportation and medical aid. About 4,000 workers were obtained,
and put at work at the airport and harbor in Tunis, at Biserta, Mateur,
Enfidaville, and Cheylus, all points of nearly constant Allied air
attacks. The Jews also had to not as policemen, to insure that the
workers remained at their jobs despite heavy bombings and maltroatment.
5.
The Jewish Community was obliged also to shoulder the
financial burden of caring for Jewish refugees who came to Tunis
from Disorta and similarly destroyed cities as well as those who
lost their homes by other means.
6.
The funds to meet the expenses referred to above including
the costs of feeding and care for the labor ganga were obtained by
the Jowish Community by imposing a capital levy of 10-15% upon the
property of ite members. Mortgages, sales, etc. were resorted to to
raise these funds, which were estimated at 60,000,000 francs. At the
present time, these mortgages are still outstanding, and in the hands
of banks principally.
7.
On 22 December 1942, the Germans imposed a levy of 20,000,000
france on the Jewish Community to "pay" for the Anglo-American bombings
of non-Jewish property, for which the Jows were said to be responsible
because they were friends of the Allies, The head of the Jewish Community
endoavored, without success, to raise these funds at the private banks
in Tunis, and was obliged to appeal to the Government for aid. The
latter authorized the Caisse Fonciere, a semi-public institution, to
advance these funds in the form of a loan at 8% interest, with commissions
and carrying charges running it up to about 12% The loan was secured
by mortgages on Jewish estates, those in the country being insisted
upon because there was loss danger from bombing, The Caisse Fonciere
received the funds from the Bank of Algeria, Tunis Branch, and we have
been advised that payment was made in Bank of France notes. It was said
that these Bank of France notes were subsequently distributed among the
Arab and Italian followers of the Nasis. The former head of the Jewish
Community has recently approached the Government in Tunisia with a view
toward adjusting or deferring the payment of this loan which the Jows
are not in a position to meet at present. The Caisse Fonciere threatoned
Page two
U.S.
DECLASSIFIED By Authority of State Dept letter 1-12-72
BRITISH
and British Mort. aligram 1-13-72
By Is
Date MAR 3 1972
foreclosure and a six months interest payment of 1,500,000 france in
due. At first the Government was and to have advised the head of
.J
the Jewish Community to repay the loan, with interest. and to place
& claim against the Germans after the war, The latest indications
were that the French authorities had not yet reached a definite
decision of the question but were thinking in terms of & moratorium.
8.
On 15 February, 1943, the Germans, because many of the
forced Jewish laborers were leaving the work camps, imposed a fine
of 3,000,000 france on the Community. This fine was paid without
resort to the banks, by the sale of jewels, etc. belonging to
individual members of the Community.
6"
On the basis of present estimates, the measures taken by
the Germans and Italians against the Jows in the Tunis area, from
8 November, 1942 to 8 May, 1943 cost the latter about 100,000,000
france, No indemmification or relief measures have yet been taken
by the French, and, insofar as the bulk of the problem is concerned,
none appears to be contemplated.
10.
From the fact that this memorandum is confined largely
to the Jews, it should not be inferred that this class stood alone
in regard to discrimination. The case of the Jews is probably the
most glaring, because the great majority of them could not be
considered enemies of the Nazia or Italians in the technical senso,
Furthermore, there appears to have been more physical hardships, and
the imposition of fines seems to be an additional neasure of oppression.
Howover, vehicles, houses, factories, etc. were requisitioned from the
French in Tunis. Machinery was taken away, and forced labor was at
least threatened, if not in fact realized. To are canvassing this
side of the picture more fully at the present.
11.
Likewise, a counterpart of this story which we will canvass
if the matter of increments to Italians and Arabs as the result of
this discrimination. Rumors as to these matters have reached us, but
it is, of course, more difficult to develop this side of the problem.
12.
Tie are also studying the question of real property transfers
made during the occipations and endeavoring to obtain as much information
as possible on this score.
13.
Ce should appreciate your views on the problems. In this
connection, reference might be made to the United Nations Declaration
on property transfers.
ACTION: Treasury, State
DISTRIBUTION "A"
Page three
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 26, 1943
Grace - -
will you please see that
the President gets this?
Lube
THE MAILE HONRE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 26, 1943
MEMORANDUM
TO:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
MR. LUBIN
The attached cable from Algiers describes one of the most
damnable situations I have ever heard of. It is worthy of very
careful reading.
Would it be possible to have the State Department bring
pressure upon the French Committee immediately in order to relieve
what appears to be an unbearable situation?
The State Department might notify the French Committee
that the United Nations refuse to recognize as valid any sale or
mortgage incurred by the Jewish residents of North Africa to meet
levies made by the Germans and Italians.
The State Department should also be asked to notify the
French that we do not countenance the pressure now being exercised
by the French banks upon those Jews who were forced to mortgage
their properties at high interest rates in order to meet levies
imposed by the Axis. It is certainly beyond reason to believe that
these banks would be permitted to foreclose on loans made under
the conditions described in the attached cable.
I an attaching herewith a draft of a letter that might be
sent to the Secretary of State in the event that you can see your
way clear to taking some action in this matter.
Have a copy made
of this for file Y then
send out -gST
file
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
August 6. 1943
My dear Mr. President:
I appreciate the expression of approval in your
letter of July 30, 1943 with reference to the cables
sent by the Department to the Consulate at Algiers
and by the CCNA to the NAEB, regarding steps that may
be taken to relieve the hardships caused by acts of
dispossession by the enemy in Tunisia.
Regarding your request for information as to what
has been done under cable COB 769, I attach for your
information a copy of the paraphrase of BOC 927, a
cable from the Field Headquarters of the North African
Economic Board, received on July 26. This is the only
information thus far received, and I shall see to it
that you are promptly informed of any further reports.
Faithfully yours,
Enclosure:
Greether
Paraphrase copy of
BOC 927, July 24, 1943.
The President,
The White House.
By Authority of Statespet letter 1-12-72
U. 8.
BRITISH
and British Mout telegram 143-72
By &
Date MAR 3 1972
COMBINED COMMITTEE FOR FRENCE NORTH AND WEST AFRICAN CIVIL AFFAIRS
The following communication vas received 26 July 1943.
PARAPHRASE
"THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE ESPIONACE ACT, U.S.C. 50; 31 AND 32. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS
BOC 927, W-5615/3901, 24 July 1943 (Treasury A-55)
From:
FEAEB
To:
CCNA
Subject:
United Nations Declaration - Property Loanes in Tunisia
Ref:
COB 767; State 1275
Given below in the French position on Tunioian property louses
CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO ATT UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY
and on application of United Nations declaration.
1.
We have been advised by the French authorities that the
necomsity for approval of United Nations declaration by the Comite
Francais De La Liberation Nationale still erista. However, they feel
It vill be done rapidly.
2.
Arrangements for provisional moratorium on mortgage loans
to Jewish communition in Tunisia will be made by French authorities,
after such approval and as first application of declaration. This will
be done until a program for the disposition of those claima to worked
out.
3.
At present & plan for administering and financing & var
damage compensation program la being studind by the French authorities.
Cases arising under the United Nations declaration vill be included in
this. This is felt by the French to be a matter of extreme delicacy
and one which must be nonsidered carefully.
4.
The dgnificance of this program for economic variare purposes
1a acknowledged by the French authorities.
ACTION: Treasury
DIVIRIBUTION: "A"
7-26-521
PSF.Hull folder
(1386)
July 3, 1943.
My dear Mr. Secretary:
Replying to your letter of 16 June 1943 in
regard to the construction of a port in Liberia, I have consulted
the Secretary of the Navy 60 this question. Me recommends that
construction of the port be proceeded with 18 practicable, and
that as so initial step a survey be ende, under direction of the
Navy Department, to determine its loostion.
the part for establishment of an outlying base for submarines. and paties
The Secretary of the May desires that provision be made in
It is suggested that you communioste directly with him in regard
to further procedure with the project.
The intorest of the Navy Department is associated with the
security of South America, particularly Brazil, but the value of
a port in Liboria is largely dependent upon continued use by the
United States of Assension Island and Dekar and the air fields at
those places. Please be guided by the above considerations in
future conversations by the Department of State with interested
countries.
Very sincerely yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
The Secretary of State
(drig. corres filed - Xwz folder 2-13)
(SC/L11-7/EF-39
3 July 1943
Ky dear Mr. President:
I have referred your confidential DOEO-
randus dated 23 June 1943 to the General Board for a reconsiders-
tion of the subject of & port in Liberia. The General Board
has reconsidered this matter and has recommended that a survey
be made, under direction of the Navy Department, to determine
the best sito, that plans for & port be prepared, and that the
work be proceeded with as practicable.
I enclose herewith a 00/y of the General Board's memorandum
on this subject, and & suggested letter to the Secretary of State.
Sincerely yours,
/a/ James Forrestal,
Acting.
The President,
The White House.
DECLASSIFIED Franklin D. Receivelt Library
DOB DML 5200.9 (9/27/59)
Date- 9-6-70
Signature- WDays
-11.1/02)
CONFIDENTIAL
(SC)L11-7/EF39
June 21, 1943.
Serial 021800A
My dear Mr. President:
I as returning herevith the letter,
dated June 16, 1943, from the Secretary of State, together
with a suggested reply thereto, and & copy of a memorandus
from the General Board.
Sincerely yours,
Frank Enen
The President,
The White House.
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DGO DIR 5200.9 (9/27/68)
Date- 7-6-70
Signature-
June 21, 1943.
ky dear Hr. Secretary:
Replying to your letter of June 16, 1943,
in regard to the construction of a port La Liberia, I have 000->
sulted the Secretary of the Savy on this question and he has
advised that the site for such & port and the construction thereof
should be determined primarily with regard to commercial con-
siderations. The interests of the Havy in this connection are
general in nature and not such as to require special considers-
tion as regards the particular site selected.
The Secretary of the Havy agrees as to the practicability
and the advisability of furnishing nave: ongineers to be asso-
clated with the survey as to the best location for such & port
and in its subsequent development. A primary interest of the
Navy is that vessels of the Havy and silitary aircraft should
have free accoss to the port and to Liberian territory for sili-
tary purposes M occasion pay ariss.
I suggest that any further communication with respect to the
detail of engineers for the purpose of making & survey be taken
up directly with the Secretary of the Navy.
Very sincerely yours,
The Secretary of State.
(c o P r)
Franklin D. Receivelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
G.B.No. 439
DOB DAR. 5200.9 (8/27/58)
(Serial No. 244)
ATD
Date- 7-6-76
21 June 1943 Signature- JVDey
BORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.
SUBJECT: Development of a Port in Liberia.
Reference: (a) SecNav Confidential Memo (SC)L11-7/EF39 Serial 021400A
of 19 June 1943.
1. The General Board has held a meeting and discussed this project
and has also examined the files of various offices of the Navy Department
which have hitherto considered the matter.
2. So far as the present war is concerned, there appears to be no
important need of a port in Liberia for naval purposes. There are enough
other ports on the African Coast to which the Navy has free access.
3. Under normal peacetime conditions the Navy's interest in a port
in Liberia would be of a general nature, 1.e., first, in having free access
to a port on the African Coast, without ordinary special diplomatic require-
ments, and second, in the improvement of any facilities for the export of
important strategic raw materials produced in Liberia.
4. Of all possible sites for a port in Liberia there is none which
offers outstanding advantages, so far as location is concerned, for purely
naval purposes.
5. In the opinion of the Board, therefore, it appears that the de-
velopment of a Liberian port should be undertaken with primary regard for
commercial interests, - i.e., the location of Liberia's principal raw re-
sources, transportation facilities within the country, and the costs in-
volved in the construction of & suitable port. The Board does not foresee
the need for construction of any special naval facilities in connection
with the proposed development.
6. The Bureau of Yards and Docks is prepared to assign naval engi-
neers to assist in the selection and development of this project and the
Board is of the opinion that it would be wise from the naval point of view
to have naval engineers associated with it.
7. The Board transmits herewith a proposed letter to the Secretary
of State for the President's signature involving the foregoing considera-
tions.
(Signed) A.J. HEPBURN
Chairman General Board
(gextey 20.
.00.8.0
June 16, 1943
My dear Mr. President:
In view of your recently expressed interest in the
construction of a port in Liberia, particularly for naval
purposes, and the apparent absence of adequate data upon
which to base a decision as to where the port should be
located, engineering and other technical factors con-
sidered, we are of the opinion that it would be advis-
able to have an official survey made as the first step
in determining the site which would best serve our naval
purposes and the economic needs of Liberia. Naval con-
siderations would seem to require that the survey should
be conducted by the Navy Department, and under these
circumstances we would like to recommend that the Navy
Department, which has already expressed an interest in
seeing a port constructed in Liberia, be directed to
conduct the survey.
While
The President,
The White House.
-2-
While the above suggestion might eventually involve
the sending of two or three naval engineers to Liberia
for a study on the spot, it is not anticipated that the
undertaking would represent any serious burden on the Navy
Department. A certain amount of material is already avail-
able both in the Navy Department and in this Department
which might assist the Navy in reaching a decision. In
any case, this Department does not feel qualified to
select the site and would find it difficult to proceed
with discussions with the agencies of the Government which
might finance the project until this point, as well as the
cost factor, 1s satisfactorily settled.
The Office of Lend-Lease Administration included a
provisional estimate in its budget for the fiscal year
1944 of $6,000,000 for allocation to Liberia for the pos-
sible construction of & port and for other purposes, and
a lump sum appropriation embracing this amount along with
funds for certain other uses has been approved by the
Congress. The amount estimated for & port and access
roads is $5,000,000 and was based on data obtained by
this Department from both official and private sources,
but this information is inconclusive, and the actual cost
might be expected to vary upward or downward, depending
upon
rys
-3-
upon the location and the size of the port works, as
determined upon.
If the amount needed should not be considerably in
excess of the figure indicated, it is anticipated that
port revenues would cover amortization within a reason-
able period of time, provided the economic development
program envisaged by the Department should also be carried
forward. This program would involve 8. loan by the Export-
Import Bank to private American interests of from two to
three million dollars, to be repaid, of course, during a
specified time. It is our opinion that both projects
should go forward simultaneously if the objectives which
the Department has in mind are to be successfully achieved.
Thus managed, and unless unforeseen factors arise, there
should be no ultimate cost to this Government, as both
projects should pay for themselves, and meanwhile many
advantages, commercial, strategic, and political, would
accrue to this country as well as to Liberia. Up to the
present, Liberia has remained a backward country, not
because of the lack of natural resources but because of
the laok of a port and American capital, other foreign
capital having been largely excluded by the policies of
this and the Liberian Governments.
May
bfuoda bebeen ZAUONA add 11
DEPARTUNG about
20 only ed# 5ne nolJaool add noqu
-4-
May we receive an indication whether you wish action
to be taken along the above lines? President Barclay is
planning to return to Liberia about June 18 and has
expressed a desire to be informed of the attitude of
this Government toward the port project before he leaves
this country.
Faithfully yours,
Cordell Hull
/ FORWER 4 5 : : / 2 2 or PELOLE of PTOTE / E & 4 / SPORE : /
! Through To : : E i t tom :
THE
APT# CONUELA. donse'
THE WHITE HOUSE
476
WASHINGTON
June 18, 1943
MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. CORDELL HULL
I have referred your letter
in regard to a port in Liberia to
the Navy Department. I agree with
you that they should make a survey.
You can tell this to the President
of Liberia.
#
F. D. R.
No papers accompanied the original of this
memorandum to the Secretary of State.
1602
Admiral Leady
said this is ok
ee
&
Hull folder
boy
for
original 8/11/43 returned to State
zight
August 10, 1943
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
There is submitted herewith a draft of a telegram
which it is proposed to send to London in connection with
the secret negotiations now in progress between the British
Government and the Prime Minister of Portugal. The conditions
set forth in London's telegram no. 4285 of June 29, 1943 are
as follows:
(1) That at the close of hostilities British
troops would be withdrawn from Bracken, and
(2) That Portuguese sovereignty will be main-
tained over all Portuguese colonies.
In lieu of the assurances concerning "the maintenance
of Portuguese sovereignty over all Portuguese colonies", it
will be observed that in the attached draft telegram a
phraseology has been substituted to indicate the under-
taking of this Government to respect Portuguese sovereignty
over all Portuguese colonies.
There is attached a copy of a communication addressed
to
State DECLASSIFIED Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date MAR 3 1972
I an
wears
st f
$
-2-
to the Department by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 9,
1943, upon which the second paragraph of the draft telegram
is based.
C.N
Enclosures:
1. Draft telegram.
2. From Joint Chiefs of
Staff, August 9, 1943.
O.K.
K.
F.D.R.
,Eses
of 5
original 8/11/43 Releaved to state
mgH
August 10, 1943
AMEMBASSY,
LONDON.
U. S. URGENT.
FOR THE AMBASSADOR.
Your 5051, August 4, 4 p.m. and 4285, June 29, 10 p.m.
with regard to the British assurances, this Government
is ready to communicate to the Portuguese Government (1) its
concurrence in the undertaking to withdraw troops upon the
termination of hostilities and (2) its agreement to respect
Portuguese sovereignty in all Portuguese colonies.
With regard to the other conditions laid down by
Dr. Salazar, our Chiefs of Staff, with the President's ap-
proval, have indicated to the British Chiefs of Staff that
while appreciative of the delioncy of conversations now in
progress between the British and the Portuguese, nevertheless
any agreement restricting facilities in Bracken to British
aircraft is unacceptable to this country and would not be
in harmony with the Trident Agreement. They have further
indicated the vital importance that Bracken facilities be
accorded air ferry, transport and military operations for
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date MAR 3 1972
-2-
this country. Obviously this would necessitate adequate
protective and ground maintenance personnel.
Hull.
F.DR.
EutWPGtIED
1666
COPY
original, initialed an indicated
returned to see of state 4/31/43 will PSF
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Hill
THE SECRETARY
August 30, 1943
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
The War Department and General Barker, Deputy Chief
of Staff of COSSAC in London, have requested the temporary
assignment for a few months of Mr. William Phillips to
assist with respect to political and civilian aspects of
the planning now being undertaken for Allied military
operations against the continent.
As you know, the British Government has already
appointed Charles Peake, who has been the Foreign Office
official dealing with the French Committee situation, to
assist from the British viewpoint.
While it would not seem advisable to have Mr. Phillips
give up his present assignment to New Delhi at this time,
I see no reason why, if it meets with your approval, he
should not be given leave of absence from his New Delhi
appointment and asked to proceed to London for a few months
work in connection with this operational planning.
CH
OK
/S/ F.D.R.
+
PSF Mull - predee 2-43
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
fee Russol
August 30, 1943
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
As a sample of what I told
you today, I am sending you
excerpts from one of Drew Pear-
son's broadcasts.
CH
EXCERPTS FROM DREW PEARSON'S BROADCAST SUNDAY,
AUGUST 29, 1943.
STATE DEPARTMENT
Allied relations with Russia, already at the brink
of the precipice, have been made worse as a result of
Sumner Welles' forced resignation. This leaves the State
Department with no important executive friendly to Russia.
Mr. Hull and his chief assistants, Adolf Berle, Jimmie
Dunn, Breckinridge Long, would really like to see Russia
bled white and the Russians know it. That 1s why Stalin
is 80 suspicious. He blames the anti-Russian clique with
the fact that he was not consulted when the Allies drew up
the surrender terms for Italy. He also blames this anti-
Russian clique for keeping his ambassador to the exiled
governments cooling his heels for two solid months in
London and not permitting him even to speak to the French
exiled government in North Africa. This is why the
Russians are going ahead with their own peace plans for
Europe, thumbing their nose at us and setting up their
own governments in Italy and Germany.
WHITE HOUSE
President Roosevelt when he returns to Washington
from Quebec will go into the vitally important Russian
situation immediately. He plans to ask Sumner Welles to
go
Name
-2-
go to Russia to lay the ground work for a long desired
conference of the B1g Three -- Stalin, Churchill and
Roosevelt. London reports that Stalin has finally agreed
to that conference. The thing that brought him around
probably was a definite guarantee at Quebec of the second
front in Western Europe. But before the conference takes
place, Roosevelt wants the man he trusts most on foreign
affairs to lay the ground work very carefully and work
out all the details of what they are going to talk about.
Foreign Minister Eden is ready to fly there immediately.
This may be the most important conference for post-war
peace in all history.
Hall folder
PSF
THE WHITE HOUSE
followed
WASHINGTON
August 31, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
You might send word to
Murphy to tell Catroux and
others that it is silly and
unfair of them to make false
interpretations.
F. D. R.
Original ofthe letter, together with original
(1672)
of tetegram, a copy of which No attenhed PSF
Ams
returned to the Secr state, 9/2/43
Hell folder
2-Y8
"C.H.
hmo
"C
September 1 1943
My dear Mr. President:
Ve have had before us en indication of the desire
of His Royal Highness, Prince Abdul Ilsh, the Regent
of Iraq, to visit the United States. Other things being
equal, I feel sure that his visit would be welcome. Ireq
has declared war against the Axis Powers, is a member of
the United Nations, and important American economic and
cultural interests exist in Iraq. Relations between the
two countries are very friendly.
However, for the reasons set forth in the nccompany-
ing draft telegram to the American Minister Resident at
Baghdad, I believe that a visit of the Traqi Regent would
be insdvisable at thistime. As you know, the Zionists
have already reacted against the forthooming visit of
two Soudi Arabian princes, and I feel sure that If their
arrival of the
visit vere closely followed by the head of another Arab
royal family, a strong outery would occur. Moreover,
King Its Send would doubtless be displeased If the visit
of
The President,
The White House.
-2-
of two of his sons were almost immediately followed by
a visit from the head of the Hashemite House in Iraq,
which Ibn Saud regards with great suspicion.
The argument that it would be unvise to subject the
Regent to the dangers of a trensatlantic crossing in
wartime 1s also valid. It is true that the Regent 1s
going to travel by air to visit England. However, the
Journey across the Atlantic presents special hazards,
particularly since the circuitous winter route would have
to be followed. Since the decease of King Feisal and the
tragic death of the young King Ghazi, the Royal Family of
Iraq, which is the chief stabilizing influence in that
young and inexperienced country, has been seriously weak-
ened. Should anything happen to the Regent, serious results
could be expected.
I should be glad to know whether you approve the
dispatch of the attached telegram.
Faithfully yours,
Gerdell Hall
Enclosure:
Draft of telegram to
Baghdad.
August 31, 1943
AMERICAN LEGATION
BAGHDAD
Your A-11, February 17; A-14, February 14; and
378, August 30, 5 p.m.
We have given much thought to the advisability of a
visit by the Regent to the United States at this juncture.
For your strictly confidential information we have come to
the conclusion that his visit to this country in the near
future would be inadvisable because: (1) two Saudi Arabian
princes are expected to come here for a visit early in
October, and certain susceptibilities would be aroused by
a close-following visit by this additional Arab royalty;
(2) a transatlantic air Journey has its dangers and from
the point of view of the war effort and the internal situation
in Iraq it would be most unfortunate should anything happen to
the Regent.
Accordingly, you should inform the Prime Minister that
in any but the most unusual circumstances the President would
be delighted to receive a visit from the Regent. After most
careful consideration, however, it is felt that it would be
-2-
unwise to risk a transatlantic crossing in time of war
by the Regent. This consideration has particular force
since the long, circuitous winter route from England
involving a considerable number of landings would have to
be followed for some months to come. The President 1s,
of course, thoroughly aware of the high and heavy responsi-
bilities of the head of the Ruling House of Iraq. Should
the Regent still have a desire to visit this country when
conditions become more settled, the President would be very
glad indeed to know of it.
NE:GPM:BLS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
file
September 4, 1943
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
I attach translation of a
letter dated August fifth from
the Argentine Foreign Minister
and a copy of my reply of August
thirtieth. It is proposed to
release this exchange of letters
to the press on September eighth
or ninth upon the delivery of my
reply to the Argentine Foreign
Minister by our Chargé in Buenos
Aires.
CH
Hull folder 2-45
RSF
TRANSLATION
Buenos Aires, August 5, 1943
Mr. Secretary of State:
Coinciding with Ambassador Armour's trip to the
United States, I have thought it desirable to place
myself in direct contact with you, in order to set forth
confidentially to your friendly Government the situation
of the new Argentine Government established as the result
of the military movement of June 4, particularly with ref-
erence to the international position of this country. I
do so with the full approval of the President of the Nation
and in the hope that, by this means, his views may also
be made known to President Roosevelt.
The military movement which has just overthrown the
Government of Señor Castillo assumed power as an inevita-
ble consequence of the atmosphere of corruption that un-
fortunately had penetrated the political and administra-
tive life of the country. The unanimous approval with
which the renovating work of the new Government is being
followed, is the best justification of the movement. The
Government has complete control of the situation, supported
by
To the Secretary of State
Mr. Cordell Hull,
WASHINGTON.
-2-
by all sound opinion in the country and fully upheld by
the armed forces. But there is one factor which carries
decisive weight in the work that it is doing: I refer
to the international situation and to the problems of
foreign policy with which the Republic is confronted.
Due to lack of adequate information, or to other
causes the origin of which I do not know, there has been
created with respect to the situation of neutrality of
the Argentine Republic an atmosphere which is prejudicial
to good relations with the countries of America and es-
pecially with that great friendly nation (the United
States). Thus the rumor has spread that General Ramírez,
the armed forces and the men who form this new Government
profess a markedly totalitarian ideology or, at the least,
that we look upon the Axis powers with great sympathy.
I can affirm, and I beg that you, Mr. Secretary, accept
this affirmation as the word of a man of honor, that such
assumptions are absolutely false. The Argentine nation,
its armed forces and the men in its Government, base their
acts on the firmest democratic convictions. We are men
of America: Our historic tradition is very olear and it
will not be modified now or in the future by the adoption
of dictatorial systems of government that are repugnant
to our consciences as free men, as men who, today as in
the past, feel indissolubly linked with the other inhabi-
tants of this continent, of profoundly democratic origins.
The
sing LOLOGS.
P2 "II BOADS objuter
-3-
The situation of neutrality that the Argentine Republic
has had to observe up to now, has not been understood.
Moreover, it has given rise to suspicious comments. In
judging that neutrality it has been forgotten, against
all the evidence, that Argentine ships are operating ex-
clusively in the service of the allied nations and par-
ticularly of the American countries, extending, by the
decision of this new Government, to the very zone of
operations proclaimed by Germany. There have also been
forgotten the Argentine deorees granting the status of
"non belligerency" exclusively to one of the belligerent
parties. There have likewise been disregarded the protests
made by Germany, Italy and Japan after the secreoy of
their official communications with their Embassies here
was prohibited, while the other countries continue to
have the free use of their cables.
It is difficult to ignore the collaboration that
the Argentine Republic is giving to the cause of the
allied nations, under the conditions of a neutrality which,
more than tolerant, is of an evidently benevolent charac-
ter. This current of collaboration is even more effective
in the field of our exports, placed at the almost exclusive
service of the Allied cause and of the American countries,
in BO doing many times depriving our country of articles
necessary for its own defense.
The
-4-
The effort that Argentina is making should be under-
stood. It is not fair to forget that this new Government
has sprung from a revolutionary movement which was planned
and carried out in order to overthrow a Government that
did not understand the reality of internel and foreign
policy. But the change, particularly with reference to
foreign policy, could not be effected in 8. violent manner
because our country was not ready for it. In this conneo-
tion, it should not be forgotten that the Argentine Repub-
lie has been living and is still living in an atmosphere
of peace, work and comparative abundance, - that our people
are influenced by the ties of kinship of numerous foreign
colonies, - that there exists fear of the communist danger,
the propagation of which in our country has corrupted even
the most genuinely democratic institutions such as Acción
Argentina and the Junta de la Victoria. It should be re-
called that, on the other hand, the Government that was
overthrown maintained its neutrality even during the most
oritical period of our relations with the Axis countries,
as undoubtedly was the case with the repeated torpedoing
of Argentine ships and the Japanese attack against Pearl
Herbor.
This situation, Mr. Secretary, cannot be abruptly
changed by a revolutionary Government that must reconstruct
the country, which is corrupted in its administration and
in
-5-
in its educational and social institutions. The changes
oan be brought about only as rapidly as the internal situa-
tion may permit. The spirit in which they have been begun
in the international position of the country is clear and
evident, and deserves to be noted in & friendly way and
without bias by your Government.
Argentine sentiment, eminently American, firmly op-
posed to totalitarian régimes, is on the side of the United
Nations in its material and spiritual action. But you,
Mr. Secretary, citizen of a country that venerates freedom
of consoience, will acknowledge that it is not possible,
without preliminary preparation, to force the Argentine
conscience with a view to leading it coldly and without
any immediate motive to the breaking of relations with
the Axis. The war having reached its present stage, when
defeat is inexorably drawing closer to the countries of
the Axis, this unexpected rupture would furthermore put
Argentine ohivalry to a hard test. Let it suffice to re-
call the judgment which Italy merited when, in a similar
situation, it took its position against defected France.
I cannot fail to point out to you, Mr. Secretary,
the concern with which I view future possibilities if,
because of the persistence in the present lact of com-
prehension, Argentine should continue to be denied the
materials
: De
E The
-6-
materials that it needs in order to increase its produc-
tion and to arm itself in order to fulfill, should the
case arise, its obligations for continental defense. It
is of particular interest to recall that some time ago
the Argentine Republic offered to increase shipments of
fuels and heavy oils to American countries, for which pur-
pose it sought from the United States the shipment of the
machinery essential in order to increase its productive
capacity. Unfortunately, thus far, this request has not
been heeded, no recognition being made of the secrifice
at which our country is extending its assistance to friend-
ly countries in order to supply them so far 68 possible with
the much coveted fuel. Petroleum production has decreased
because of the deterioration of the equipment, and our re-
serves have diminished considerably. Today, in order to
compensate for this shortage, we find it necessary to burn
in the boilers of factories and plants millions of
quintals of corn, wheat and linseed. with the aid of the
United States, Argentina could burn its own petroleum,
keeping that wealth of grain to supply the allied nations
and to form a reserve stock that would make it possible to
feed the European peoples threatened with hunger.
The Government of General Ramirez will spare no effort
to fulfill the obligations contracted. But, as I have
already
-7-
already said, it will not be able to do so without 8. cause
to justify it. To act otherwise would afford grounds to
believe action is being taken under the pressure or threat
of foreign agents, and this would not be tolerated by either
the people or the armed forces of the country.
I believe that in this long letter I have explained
to you, Mr. Secretary, the real situation of the Argentine
Republic with respect to its sentiments of deep friend-
ship and solidarity with the American countries. I do
not doubt that in contemplating the situation from the
high position that the Government of President Roosevelt
occupies in the world, it will be appreciated that it is
not just to maintain the attitude of suspicion assumed
towards e country such as ours, which has shown unmis-
takebly its feelings of friendship and frank support for
the countries that are fighting for freedom. I cannot
believe that it is desired to eliminate the action of
Argentina within the concert of American nations, on the
basis that our neutrality - which is only theoretical -
places us in an equivocal position with respect to the
rest of the countries of this continent.
I can affirm to you, Mr. Secretary, that the Axis
countries have nothing to hope for from our Government
and that public opinion is daily more unfevorable to them.
But this evolution would be more rapid and effective for
the
#
: : ₹
:
-8-
the American cause if President Roosevelt should make a
gesture of genuine friendship toward our people; such a
gesture might be the urgent provision of airplanes, spare
parts, armaments and machinery to restore Argentina to the
position of equilibrium to which it is entitled with re-
spect to other South American countries.
This general and sincere picture of the Argentine
situation will explain to you, Mr. Secretary of State,
the obstacles - up to now insurmountable - encountered
by this Government in fulfilling the last part of its
original objectives. On the basis of the loyal under-
standing that we reciprocally owe to each other, I wish
to rely on the spirit of good will with which we shall
be heard, which would be a concrete proof of the friend-
ship that this Government is seeking in its present dif-
ficult initial period. Moreover, Ambassador Armour, who
has penetrated with intelligent and friendly understanding
into all the aspects of our complicated internal situation,
and who was the confidential recipient of these thoughts,
personally expressed by His Excellency the President of the
Nation, will be able to convey to you, Mr. Secretary, a more
complete personal impression, obtained directly from the
present reality of the life of our country.
I an very happy on this occasion to renew to you,
Mr. Secretary, the assurance of my cordial and friendly
consideration.
(Signed) SEGUNDO R. STORNI
August 30, 1943
My dear Mr. Minister:
I have received your letter of August 5, in which
you were good enough to inform me regarding the
situation of the new Argentine Government established
as the result of the military movement of June 4,
particularly with reference to the international posi-
tion of Argentina. I note that your letter has the
full approval of the President of Argentina and I have
been pleased to make the views expressed therein known
to President Roosevelt.
It is profoundly satisfactory to note your state-
ment that the people of your country feel themselves in-
dissolubly linked with the other inhabitants of this
continent of profoundly democratic origins. This state-
ment will be most welcome to the citizens of the United
States actively engaged at the cost of tremendous sacri-
fices in lives and materials in a var for the survival
of the principles so eloquently described by you. I
feel sure that in the same spirit it will be varmly
greeted by the peoples of all of the other republics of
the Hemisphere which have taken measures essential to
the defense of our continent against B. menace now happily
being overcome by the joint efforts of the friends of
freedom everywhere.
However, it 1a with regret that my Government and
the people of the United States have been forced to the
conclusion that the undoubted sentiments of the Argentine
people have not been implemented by action called for by
the commitments freely entered into by their Government
in common
His Excellency
Vice Admiral Segundo Storni,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina,
Buenos Aires.
-2-
in common with the governments of the other twenty
American republics.
Your Excellency is, of course, fully familiar with
those commitments. As they particularly affect the
present world conflict, they are based upon Resolution XV
adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics
at Habana in July of 1940. That Resolution provides that
any attempt on the part of & non-American state against the
integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sover-
eignty or the political independence of an American state
shall be considered as an act of aggression against the
states which signed this declaration. The act of aggression
contemplated in this Declaration took place on December 7,
1941. In January of 1942 the Foreign Ministers of the
American Republics met at Rio de Janeiro to consider the
measures which they should adopt for common defense. A
Resolution recommending the break of diplomatic relations
with Japan, Germany and Italy was adopted. The wording of
that Resolution vas the subject of prolonged discussion and
the text finally agreed upon vas fully responsive to the
views expressed by the Argentine Government. I believe it
desirable to quote the Resolution in full:
"BREAKING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
"I
The American Republics reaffirm their
declaration to consider any act of aggression
on the part of a non-American State against one
of them as an act of aggression against all of
them, constituting as it does an immediate
threat to the liberty and independence of
America.
"II The American Republics reaffirm their
complete solidarity and their determination to
cooperate jointly for their mutual protection
until the effects of the present aggression
against the Continent have disappeared.
"III The American Republics, in accordance
with the procedures established by their own
laws and in conformity with the position and
circumstances obtaining in each country in the
existing continental conflict, recommend the
breaking
ER
-3-
breaking of their diplomatic relations with
Japan, Germany and Italy, since the first-
mentioned State attacked and the other two
declared war on an American country.
"IV Finally, the American Republics declare
that, prior to the reestablishment of the
relations referred to in the preceding para-
graph, they vill consult among themselves in
order that their action may have a solidary
character."
With the exception of Argentina, all of the Ameri-
can Republics have severed diplomatic relations with
Japan, Germany and Italy and of these twenty republics
thirteen are at war with the Axis powers.
Resolution V, adopted by the Consultative Meeting
of Foreign Ministers at Rio de Janeiro, stipulated by
unanimous agreement the immediate adoption of any add1-
tional measures necessary to out off for the duration of
the present Hemispheric emergency all commercial and
financial intercourse, direct or indirect, between the
Western Hemisphere and the nations signatory to the
Tri-Partite Pact and the territories dominated by them.
The Argentine representative at the Meeting adhered to
this Resolution with the following reservation:
"The Argentine Delegation requests that
it be recorded in the minutes, as well as at
the end of this draft resolution, that the
Argentine Republic agrees with the necessity
of adopting economic and financial control
measures with regard to all foreign and
domestic activities of firms or enterprises
which may, in one way or another, affect the
welfare of the republics of America or the
solidarity or defense of the Continent. It
has adopted and is prepared to adopt further
measures in this respect, in accordance with
the present resolution, extending them,
however, to firms or enterprises managed or
controlled by aliens or from foreign belligerent
countries not in the American Continent.'
The Argentine
OF THE Z of 400
OF 5 SEAL 8 B # 5
In
-4-
The Argentine Government has failed to effect the sev-
erance of financial and commercial relations called for by
Resolution V. Moreover, financial transactions of direct
benefit to the enemies of the United Nations have been
authorized by agencies of the Argentine Government.
Resolution XVII adopted at Rio provided for &
concerted effort to discover and combat subversive activ-
ities. It is notorious that Axis agents in Argentina
have been and are engaging in systematic espionage which
has cost the United Nations ships and lives. Vicious
propaganda aimed at the United Nations appears in publi-
cations which are supported by subsidies from Axis
sources. These publications have benefited by a Govern-
ment decree which enables them to receive supplies of
newsprint at favorable prices through the intervention of
the Argentine Ministry of Agriculture.
Resolution XL adopted at the Rio de Janeiro Meeting
recommended that each American republic adopt the necessary
and immediate measures to close all radiotelephone and
radiotelegraph communications between the American Republics
and the aggressor States and all territories subservient
to them, except in so far as official communications of
the American Governments are concerned. Argentina is the
only one of the twenty-one American Republics now permitting
radiotelephone and radiotelegraph communications with
Japan, Germany and Italy.
The above summary of certain of the inter-American
commitments freely entered into by Argentina, together with
the twenty other American republics, furnishes a convincing
expression of the reason why the situation of neutrality
which Your Excellency states the Argentine Republic has
had to observe up to now has not been understood.
It 1s, of course, & matter solely within the competence
of the Argentine Government to judge the degree to which
Argentine public opinion which you state is firmly opposed
to totalitarian regimes vill support a foreign policy
designed at the very least to reduce the assistance which
Argentina's present position has rendered and is continuing
to render those regimes. Nor can I pass upon the question
of the nature of the motive which you believe would be
necessary to enable the Argentine Government to fulfill
the obligations it has contracted. I must, however, express
my astonishment at your statement that for the Argentine
Government to fulfill those obligations would afford grounds
to believe
STATE
pene
Heao
-5-
to believe that such action was taken under the pressure or
threat of foreign agents. The obligations in question were
freely entered into by all the American Republics, and have
been carried out by all except Argentina.
In concluding the discussion of this subject, I believe
it fitting to recall that the public and private statements
made by the President of the Nation and by Your Excellency
during the first few weeks of the tenure of office of the
new Argentine Government gave my Government positive ground
for the belief that Argentine sentiments of continental soli-
darity and of adherence to inter-American commitments would be
translated into effective action within a specific and brief
period.
It is no doubt true as indicated by Your Excellency that
the products of Argentine agriculture and mining have been of
the greatest value to the cause of the United Nations. Those
products, however, have found markets at equitable prices in
the determination of which the United Nations have consis-
tently refused to take advantage of the fact that they are,
thanks to the efficiency of their military and naval operations,
the only major markets open to Argentina. A glance at
Argentine economic statistics will show that Argentina's
economic transactions with the United Nations have been highly
beneficial to Argentina. I am, of course, not fully informed
regarding the degree to which these transactions may have
resulted in the sacrifice of materials essential to the de-
fense of Argentina as mentioned in Your Excellency's letter.
In this connection, however, it may be noted that neither the
present Argentine Government nor its predecessor has at any
time evidenced a disposition to strengthen the security of
Argentina by having Argentine military and naval forces take
part in measures designed for the defense of the hemisphere.
With respect to Your Excellency's statement to the
effect that Argentina is being denied materials which she
requires to increase her production of commodities essential
to the United Nations, you are, of course, aware that the
conditions of the war have imposed upon the United States
and the other United Nations the necessity for a very
careful allocation of available materials of a critical and
strategic nature in order that these materials may be used
to the best advantage in furtherance of the war effort.
Notwithstanding these circumstances, Argentine essential
civilian requirements, particularly those related to public
health and the maintenance of essential services, have
received fair treatment.
With
-6-
With regard to the petroleum negotiations, it may be
pointed out that Argentina, thanks to its natural resources,
the production of which has increased during the war period,
and to its ability to import, has enjoyed during the past
year and a half far greater oil supplies for the consump-
tion of its civilian population than have the neighboring
republics. Those republics have received extremely limited
supplies made possible through cooperative action in which
the Government of the United States and of the producing
republics other than Argentina have participated. Consider-
able hardship and sacrifice has resulted owing to the
serious shortage of ocean-going tankers. Thus, while the
Argentine people were enjoying gasoline supplies equivalent
to about seventy per cent of their normal civilian require-
ments, the peoples of Uruguay, Brazil, Paraguay, Chile and,
in general, other republics were receiving only approximately
forty per cent of normal civilian requirements. Argentine
assistance would have been of great value during this very
difficult period.
The negotiations to which your letter refers have
been concerned with the provision of materials and supplies
to enable the future production of the Argentine oil fields
to be maintained and even to be increased. The lack of
these materials has not in any way affected the ability of
Argentina to cooperate with the neighboring republics
during the past eighteen months if Argentina had desired
to cooperate.
With regard to the matter of arms and munitions, your
letter states that the evolution of Argentine public opinion
would be more rapid and effective in favor of the American
countries if President Roosevelt were to make an open and
friendly gesture toward the Argentine people such as would
be the immediate supply of airplanes, replacement parts,
armaments and machinery, in order to restore Argentina to
the position of equilibrium which corresponds to her with
respect to other South American countries. In reply, I
must point out emphatically that questions of military and
naval equilibrium as between American republics are surely
inconsistent with the inter-American doctrine of the peace-
ful settlement of international disputes to which so many
practical contributions have been made by Argentine
statesmen. In fact, one of the most specific expressions
of that doctrine, known as the Treaty of Non-Aggression and
Conciliation, was the work of & distinguished Argentine
Minister
-7-
Minister for Foreign Affairs. To furnish arms and
munitions for the purpose indicated by Your Excellency
would appear to this Government to be clearly incon-
sistent with the juridical and moral foundations upon
which existing inter-American understanding and agree-
ments are based.
I must also recall that it has been frequently
indicated to representatives of your Government,
including the military and naval officers who visited
Washington more than a year ago, that the supply of
arms and munitions by the United States to the other
American republics 1s exclusively for the purpose of
contributing to the defense of the Hemisphere against
possible aggression. In the determination of the con-
tribution which the Government of the United States
could make to the preparations for defense of the other
nineteen American Republics which jointly determined
upon the need for such defense, the Government of the
United States has been guided exclusively by consider-
ations of hemispheric security. Since Argentina, both
by its words and its actions, has indicated clearly
that the Argentine armed forces will not under present
conditions be used in a manner designed to forward
the cause of the security of the New World, and,
thereby, the vital war interests of the United States,
it would be impossible for the President of the United
States to enter into an agreement to furnish arms and
munitions to Argentina under the Lend-Lease Act.
I have written Your Excellency in this detail since
I am sure from the frank and friendly terms in which your
letter to me 1s couched, that you would desire an equally
frank and friendly exposition of the views of this
Government. I feel that I should be lacking in such
frankness, however, were I to leave you under the
impression that the Government and the people of the
United States have not viewed with deep regret the course
followed by the Argentine Government in 80 far as concerns
hemispheric defense since the Conference of Foreign Ministers
in Rio de Janeiro. I am in entire agreement with your
statement that defeat 1s inexorably drawing closer to the
countries of the Axis. In recognition of that fact the
United Nations and those associated with them are devoting
their attention in a wide variety of practical and cons-
tructive ways to the problems of post-war organization.
Thus the failure of the Argentine Government to comply
with
-8-
with its inter-American commitments has not only resulted
in the non-participation of Argentina in the defense of
the continent in a most critical period, it is also
depriving Argentina of participation in the studies, dis-
cussions, meetings and arrangements designed to solve
the post-war problems mentioned above.
I am pleased to take this opportunity of extending
to Your Excellency the renewed assurances of my high
consideration.
Cordell Holl
A true copy of
the signed or(g).
nai, HIS
FSF: Hull folder 2.43
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON
RESTRICTED
14 September 1943
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT:
Subject: Location of Proposed Port in Liberia.
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the recommendation
of the Secretary of State that the construction of a port in
Liberia be undertaken now with Lend-Lease funds, as outlined
in his letter to you of 4 September 1943.
2. As explained in the letter of the Secretary of State,
it is contemplated that the port will be located in the
estuary at St. Paul River, about five miles north of Monrovia,
provided final field surveys verify the preliminary conclusions
as to feasibility and costs, now estimated at $8,665,000
total. Mamba Point, also near Monrovia, is the second choice
for the port site. All work should be performed by private
contractors since military-navel personnel cannot be assigned
without detriment to the war effort.
3. Draft of recommended reply to the letter from the
Secretary of State is enclosed.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
1 incl.
RESTRICTE
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
FORVICTORY
BUY
BOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
UNITED
STATES
WAR
BONDS
AND
Date- 5-22-62
STAMPS
Signature- CLS.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
14 September 1943
RESTRICTED
The Honorable
Cordell Hull
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
The recommendation in your letter of 4 September
1943 for the construction of a port in Liberia, meets with
my approval. In concluding your negotiations in this matter
with the Liberian Government provision should be made for
protection of United States military, air and naval interests
in the port with particular reference to our future operational
rights there.
Allocation of Lend-Lease funds for this project
within the general limitation outlined in your letter is
authorized. It is to be understood, however, that the work
shall be performed by private contractors since military and
naval personnel cannot be assigned without detriment to the
war effort.
Very sincerely yours,
s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
JCB
JRD
RESTRICTED
14 September 1943
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT:
Subject: Location of Proposed Port in Liberia.
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consur in the recommendation
of the Secretary of State that the construction of a port in
Liberia be undertaken nov with Lend-Lease funds, as outlined
in his letter to you of 4 September 1943.
2. As explained in the letter of the Secretary of State,
it is contemplated that the pert will be lecated in the
estuary at st. Paul River, about five miles north of Monrovia,
provided final field surveys verify the preliminary somelusions
as to feasibility and costs, nov estimated at $8,665,000
total. Membe Point, also near Nearovia, is the second choice
for the port site. All work should be performed by private
contractors since military-nevel personnel cammot be assigned
without detriment to the var effort.
3. Draft of recommended reply to the letter from the
Secretary of State is enclosed.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
WILLIAM D. LEANY,
Admiral, U.S. Havy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Havy.
pil
RESTRICTED
Franklin D. Receivelt Library
DEGLASSIFIED
BOD 5200.9 (9/27/68)
Date- 5-22-63
Signature- cLs.
RESTRICTED
14 September 1943
The Nonerable
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. c.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
The recommendation in your letter of 4 September
1943 for the construction of a part in Liberia, meets with
my approval. In concluding your negotiations in this mat-
ter with the Liberian Government provision should be made
for protection of United States military, air and naval
interests in the part with particular reference to our
future operational rights there.
Allocation of Lend-Lease funds for this project
within the general limitation outlined in your letter is
authorised. It is to be understood, however, that the work
shall be performed by private contractors since military and
naval personnel cannot be assigned without detriment to the
var effort.
Very sincerely yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
Pronklin n. Receivers Library
0.00 ADDITION
DOB que 5200.0 (9/27/58)
Date- 5-22-62
Signature- cls
RESTRICTED
T-139
Hull folder
2-40 2
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 7, 1945.
MEMORANDUM FOR
HON, CORDELL HULL:
Please speak to no about
our publishing the notes of the con-
versations between Wilson, Lloyd
George and Clemenoeau in Paris in
1919.
I have a distinot hestita-
tion (a) because Lloyd George is still
alive and (b) because notes of these
conversations ought not to have been
taken down any way,
F.D.R.
T-146
PSF Hull folder
2-43
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 16, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:
In regard to the publication of the
meetings with the Big Four in Paris in
1919, I am still not satisfied that it
is advisable at this time. Their pub-
lication now would probably result in
wholly unwarranted sensational articles.
Such articles would, without doubt,
come from hostile sources. They would
seek to draw untrue conclusions and
parallels between 1919 and 1943. I am
especially anxious that this wholly
preventable result should not occur.
I would suggest that if the
Congress asks about the matter that
they be told that the President has
requested that they be not published
until after the war, in order to avoid
at this time the reopening of inter-
national controversy. They cannot go
behind that with any success.
Incidentally, in those meetings of
the Big Four in Paris no notes should
have been kept. Four people cannot be
conversationally frank with each other
if somebody is taking down notes for
future publication.
I feel very strongly about this and
incidentally it is not going to do any-
body any harm if we defer publication for
a year or two.
F.D.R.
(over)
Memorandum for the President, 9-9-43, from
Cordell Hull, in answer to Pres.' memo, 9-7
re publication of notes of conversations
between Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau
at Paris in
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19.0.9
Hull folder 2-13
file
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
September 22. 1943
My dear Mr. President:
In your letter of June 29, 1943 you requested me to keep
you informed of developments with respect to the fines imposed
by the German occupation authorities on the Jewish Community of
Tunisia. There is attached a copy of the paraphrase of telegram
no. 1513 from Algiers which indicates the ourrent proposals of the
French authorities for dealing with the problem. You will observe
that the proposed measures would prevent any foreclosure or col-
lection of interest on mortgages incurred as a result of levies
made by the occupying authorities, but, on the other hand, would
not at this time make an unqualified indemnification for the losses
incurred.
Faithfully yours,
Enclosure:
Paraphrase of telegram no. 1513
from Algiers, September 1, 1943.
The President,
The White House.
COPY
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED
FROM:
AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL, Algiers
TO:
Secretary of State, Washington
DATED:
September 1, 1943
NUMBER:
1513
Murphy and Glasser send the following for the Secretary
and Morgenthau.
Reference is made herewith to the Department's telegrams
nos. 1289 and 1276.
The following is the proposal made by the Commissariat of
Finance for settling the problem of levies, fines, mortgages, et
cetera, which the enemy imposed on Jews in Tunisia: loans will be
made by the banks to organized Jewish Communities who will give
formal acknowledgment of the debt and distribute funds but no pro-
perty will be pledged by them. The loans are to be of indefinite
maturity and the Tunisian Treasury is to guarantee them. The pro-
posal is that the advance will last until such time as it is possible
to settle the whole question of levies and fines imposed in both
France and Tunisia by the enemy. All charges, including interests,
will be paid by the Tunisian Treasury. These advances will be large
enough to repay bank loans made previously and to reimburse fully
the members of the Jewish Communities who advanced funds to meet
the levies imposed by the enemy.
This proposal is to be submitted to Comite. It was stated by
us that the conditions were a great improvement over suggestions
made previously but we felt it was important that the obligation
be assumed in the first instance by the French authorities. There
are two objections to this on the part of the French. In the first
place they do not wish to commit the French Treasury at this time
to an unknown and possibly huge financial burden once France is free.
In the second place they fear that, in view of the delicate Arab-
Jewish political problem in Tunisia, direct payment of Jewish fines
will lead to resentment and demands by the Arabs for financial aid.
It has been requested by us that pending your reactions the matter
not be referred to the Comite. It is felt by us that we still have
a good possibility of achieving unqualified indemnification by the
French authorities by continuing to point out advantages to Economic
Warfare of our position. An urgent reply is requested.
MCBRIDE
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date MAR 3 1972
PSF: Hull freder
2-43
October 14, 1943.
Dear Frances:-
Everybody has orders to let me know,
and to let you know, just as soon as we get news
of the arrival. From then on it will be the air
people and they, too, have instructions.
I do hope you will get a bit of quiet
at Hot Springs. We have all had a hectic time.
I an all in favor of chloroforming
for certain newspaper men - not Drew Pearson
alone -- but some of the more subtle murderers,
like Arthur Krock.
Affectionately,
Mrs. Hull,
The Homestead,
Hot Springs,
Virginia.
WARDMAN PARK
they dear mr. Provident:
Cor due told
Me you said you would keep
nw wformed - about his trip
from time to time.
I am going to Hat Springs
Should you has any thing to
to-mourrow, nednes day, and
report for will find The
:
I am just too miser able here
what worried-
without him, rd naturally some-
I believe -a change Triee he
the best thing for Me.
that - a and hard Dum mel
I have had
Mr. Prisident cant you do
Last my lt he started on
John thing - about Srew Pealson-
Jde is-a real traitor qd-a -
only new under Secretaly- -
dunger to our country- -
Cant the Cuttoring Leneral, m. Biddle
and Edgar Hoores do some thing
about it.
with appretionate regards-
Frances
Tial Leace-
mont you kindly
ed?
give to
Limit
The President
teamings toll
.ninigalV
PSF: sept fords
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
STATE
% 1 for
October 18, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The Under Secretary of State called
up to say that the United Nations business
is getting in quite a mess. Very confi-
dentially, he said that Governor Lehman
was suspicious of everyone in the State
Department and that Lehman was setting
up a huge organization with a big corps
of publicity people, etc. and Stettinius
thinks that someone should talk to him
about the whole matter.
Ed Stettinius suggests that he
talk to Sam Rosenman and give him the
entire background and then have Sam take
it up with Governor Lehman. Is this
arrangement all right with you?
G.G.T.
personal
Hull freder 2-43
We
PSF
THE HOMESTEAD
HOT SPRINGS
VIRGINIA
Get. 30th 30
My dear Mr. President-
I cant tell you how
happy I am this morn ing to read
you and pleased with the success
of the Moscow Can fereuce.
I know X actly how Cordill must feel
for I have heard him say over and
over, my greatest disire and
pleasure is to - always please the
President. that w and has been
my objection throughout my
service W der his direc tion.
one, an and be knew it, but be went
This indertaking was an insertain
with every fibre in his body ready
for the pull.
and isn't it won der ful that all of
the lis tinguished New of the group
thought.
Forked in perfect harmony ,and
I hope it opens the way for the
final seal by you.
I am returnin g to Washing ton
to hashing ton the middle of nept
heak to be hearer the "codes"- "
weat
meertain
tain
THE HOMESTEAD
HOT SPRINGS
VIRGINIA
I visited the wonderful Leneral Golford
Hospital- at White Sulphur and they
aho so amt ions to han Mrs. Rosselt
Come and E them - I hope she can go,
Wilson Leveral Hospital at Stam tow.
and stop over and fee my noodrow
She radiates such Con fidence and
cheen that is most help fal to our
for shallered boys- -
Please take Cake of yourself for you
are unded above every thing eke-
in the would t. day-
with lone and best mishes-
ОАЛТОЗМОН
3HT
TOH
your deroted Frances friend
termonal most J (Mis. Cordell s Hall) who
la
of your will 47 arta be
us
wing
A chand white He
X tart
my
water
-wo first "In ZND
with ** Will
PSF.Hull folder
2-43
S. C. Form No. =
Signal Corps, United States Army
Received at
3-9501
WASHINGTON DC
NOVEMBER 30
43
19
WHITE SIX FOUR.
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HULLY:
THERE IS A DANGER THAT UNLESS WE MOVE HAEAD IN OUR STUDY OF
POSTWAR INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION PROBLEMS, WE MAY FIND THAT THE
PRESENT SITUATION WILL BECOME JELLED IN THE MINDS OF SOME OF OUR ALLIES
ALONG LINES THAT MAY NOT PARALLEL YOUR OWN THOUGHTS. I FEEL THEREFORE
THAT IT IS URGENT AND IMPORTANT FOR US TO MOVE AHEAD IN PREPARING THE
GROUNDWORK WHICH IS AN ESSENTIAL PRELIMINARY TO ANY DISCUSSIONS WITH
OTHER COUNTRIES. AS A PRACTICAL AND FEASIBLE WAY TO PROCEED WHAT WOULD
YOU THINK OF A COMMITTEE CONSISTING OF SECRETARY STIMSON, KNOX AND
MYSELF MEETING TO CONSIDER THE COMPLICATED PROBLEMS INVOLVED. FURTHER
THAT WE THREE BE AUTHORIZED TO SECURE AN ABLE AND DISINTERESTED MAN SUCH
AS OWEN D YOUNG OR SOMEONE ELSE OF EQUAL STATURE THAT YOU MAY SUGGEST,
TO GIVE HIS THOUGHT TO THIS QUESTION AND TO DRAW UP A REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS TO SUBMIT FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION.
AW
MHILE 21X tony
16
No. =
LOB THE
Signal Corps, United States Army
Received at
3-9501
WASHINGTON DC
NOVEMBER 30
1943
WHITE SIX SEVEN (B)
FROM HULL FOR THE PRESIDENT:
WINANT WOULD CERTAINLY BE A FINE CHOICE. OUR REPRESENTATIVE ON
THE COMMISSION WILL HAVE A FULL TIME JOB AND MUCH DETAILED DRAFTING AND
DISCUSSION WILL BE ESSENTIAL. I DONT SEE THEREFORE HOW ONE MAN CAN
COMBINE THE EXACTING DUTIES OF AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO GREAT BRITAIN
WITH THOSE OF OUR REPRESENTATIVE ON THE COMMISSION IF THESE TWO
IMPORTANT JOBS ARE TO BE EFFECTIVELY DONE. HAVE YOU ANY FURTHER COMMENT
OR SUGGESTIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, IN OTHER WORDS DO YOU
STILL DESIRE HIM TO HOLD BOTH POSITIONS QUERY.
PSF three factor 2-43
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
file fills mal mal /
December 23, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
This I think should be taken
up by Winant with Prime Minister
Churchill as soon as the latter
gets back. It was not brought
up in any way at Teheran in my
presence.
F. D. R.
ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
December 22, 1943
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
I have been informed by the British Embassy that
at Tehran, when the question of a joint declaration to
the German people on the basis of unconditional sur-
render arose, Marshal Stalin stated that he thought
this would be bad tactics as far as Germany was con-
cerned, and he suggested that the three Governments
should work out terms together and make them known
generally to the German people. Mr. Eden suggests
that this matter should be dealt with as soon as
possible by the European Advisory Commission.
As I have no information on this question of a
joint declaration, and as I have not been under the 1m-
pression that the European Advisory Commission would
undertake political discussions of this character, I
would be glad to have your direction as to whether this
matter should be taken up by the London Commission. I
would also be glad to know what your views are with re-
gard to avoiding the use of the term "unconditional
surrender".
CH
PSF: And Folder
2-44
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Private
December 31, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
I am sending you herewith a
copy of a memorandum I sent to
Churchill. Thank the Lord I
don't have the same trouble with
the State Department that he
has with his Foreign Office!
F. D. R.
(copy of cores filed. chuschill folder. 1-43)
PSF: Hull
December 31, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN
I have received the enclosed memorandum from the
Secretary of State.
When you and I look back eleven months we realize
that de Gaulle and his Committee have most decidedly moved
forward by "the process of infiltration" -- in other words,
here a little, there a little.
This 18 another example. This puts France on to
the Allied Commission for Italy, even though the memo-
randum says that the French representative will not have
anything to say about it. However, he will still be a
member of the Commission.
For the life of me I cannot see why France is
entitled to anybody on the Allied Control Commission for
Italy. His presence there will, as we know from ex-
perience, cause controversy and more trouble with the
French Committee.
I know what problems you have with your own
Foreign Office -- and I wish you and I could run this
Italian business. We would not need any help or advice.
I am holding up cabling until I hear from you.
F. D. R.
DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stowart Date NOV 1 1971
ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS -
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, B.C.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
December 30, 1943
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
The United States member of the Advisory Council for
Italy has strongly recommended that a French as well as a
Soviet representative be attached to the Allied Control
Commission for Italy. The "British formula" which is ac-
ceptable to the Soviets and French provides only for token
representation by accepting a representative of the U.S.S.R.
and France on the staff of the Deputy President of the
Control Commission and avoids placing Soviet and French
representatives throughout the entire structure of the
Control Commission; in other words it provides for a kind
of superior "liaison officer".
Our representative further reports that the British
and the Soviet members of the Advisory Council have already
committed themselves to recommending the acceptance of a
French representative on the Control Commission.
Consequently if, after consideration, you perceive
no objection, I shall instruct our representative on the
Advisory Council to concur in the British formula recom-
mending the acceptance of Soviet and French representatives
on the staff of the Deputy President of the Control Commission.
FORVICTORY
BUY
ENITED
STATES
person
BONDS
AND
STAMPS
CH
PSF Hull folder
2-43
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
fele frusmel. mal
you may design to
Consider Twagly ^ requesting The
British not to to dramatize
De saulle two much re
Darlan, just now
with Battle critical in africa.
CH
PSF Hull folder
2-43
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
pelsonal
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
With reference to the report that General de Bois
Boiselle has been appointed Governor General of French
West Africa the following data has been obtained from
a source deemed reliable.
General de Bois Boiselle is a little over middle
age and is an infantry officer. He left France and arrived
in Algiers last October in the general entourage of
General Giraud. After November 8 of last year as soon
as possible General Giraud appointed him to succeed
General Koeltz as Commander of the Nineteenth Region
which includes Algiers, Constintin and Oran.
General de Bois Boiselle's son 1s an aviator who
is due to arrive shortly in this country for training.
CH