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President's Secretary's File (Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration)
Departmental Correspondence
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PSF
State Dept. R. Walton Moore
1937-39
PSF: Moore
state
JAN 5 1937
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
IL MOORE
1-1898
FROM
5wu on 131 Collect NL Govt
San Francisco Cal Jan 4 1937
Acting Secretary of State Walton Moore
Maritime strike in my opinion completely deadlocked with considerable
agitation developing to urge Presidential intervention stop. Mayor
Rossi tomorrow evening will give national radio broadcast stating issues
involved and urging all interested parties to request president to
intervene stop. The request that he intervene will be accompanied by
an assurance that any steps he may take will be wholeheartedly
supported by the community stop. Believe it important that President
make some reference to maritime strike in his message to Congress
anticipating the pressure that will be exerted upon him for action
stop. His reference in his message to congress will no doubt have
beneficial effect on community AS well na on parties to controversy
stop. George Creel is with me and concurs in this view stop. Writing
you further details
Henry F Grady
712am Jan 5
it - ti
n
in
is
for 5 1st'
PSF: Moore
State
P.F
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
January 4, 1937.
Dear Mr. President:
Herewith is a letter just received from Caffery.
While at the moment it Beems there are not likely to
be any serious complications in Cuba, in advance of
the elections to be held in the near future, never-
theless I am asking Caffery to keep us fully informed
of developments.
Caffery speaks of Gómez having "started the whole
trouble." My understanding of the truth 1s that Gômez
did not desire to make any issue with Batista, but was
opposed to the military schools plan, and perhaps made
the mistake of not announcing his opposition in advance
of the tax bill being taken up and passed by the popular
branch of the Legislature. Gomez seems to be an honest
democrat, and there are those who are predicting that
after a while he will be returned to the office from
which he has been ousted.
Yours very sincerely,
Enclosure:
As stated.
Ruselin Mom
The President,
The White House.
EMBASSY OF THE
(AIR MAIL)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Habana, December 29, 1936.
PERSONAL AND
CONFIDENTIAL
Dear Judge Moore:
As I telegraphed yesterday, in reply to the De-
partment's telegram No. 76 of December 26, 1 P.M.,
Colonel Batista told me on Sunday that he knew of no
plans for any further changes in the Presidency.
The whole business in connection with forcing
Dr. Gomez out of office was unfortunate. He, on his
part, acted very tactlessly and as he started the
whole trouble (as set out in my telegrams No. 47 of
December 18, 6 P.M., and No. 52 of December 21, 2 P.M.)
he caused his own difficulties. On the other hand,
the impeachment charges were frivolous and the matter
of the impeachment conducted with levity and haste.
Also, there was a good deal of cowardice displayed
among the members of Congress. However, as I implied
in my reports to the Department, Army and the majority
of, the Congress were determined to force President
Gomez out of office and it would have taken direct
intervention by us to stop them. They were all very
careful in everything they did to act strictly within
existing law and the present Constitution. The Vice
President duly succeeded to office as soon as Dr. Gomez
left the Palace.
Fortunately Congress, a few days before these
events, had finally, after much discussion and argument,
voted the law for calling the Constituent Assembly.
This, to my mind, now becomes of paramount importance.
Under that law the Cuban people will be given the
opportunity of freely expressing themselves as to a
new
The Honorable
R. Walton Moore,
Acting Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
ESTATE OF anadaH
(JIAM RIA)
JANOBRE9
- 2 -
new Constitution. (Since Machado's fall in
August 1933, the Government has been operating
under provisional Constitutions.)
Yours just sincerely,
Judy in Drawn state
Jan 5, 1937.
Memorandum of the Press Conf. handled by Judge Moore
For Departmental use only
NOT FOR THE PRESS
SEE--State Dept. (S) Drawer 1--1937
THE WHITE HOUSE
PSF
WASHINGTON
January 7, moore 1937
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
state
Judge Moore seems to feel that it
would be better for Nicholas Murray Butler
or Newton Baker to nominate Hull and for
you to write a follow-up letter.
Is this satisfactory?
M. A. L.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL
Dec. 28, 1936.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE
Do you think it would be all
right for me to recommend Cordell
for the Nobel Peace Prize for 1937?
As, what they call in Europe, the
"Head of the State", I should perhaps
not do it, and also it might militate
against his getting the award if I
did do it; but, on the other hand,
no one deserves it more than Cordell
and he should have had it this year
instead of Saavedra Lama.
If you think well of the idea
of my proposing him, in accordance
with this circular, would you give
me an idea of what you think I
should say and how I should say it?
F. D. R.
FOR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
December 28, 1936.
20197
CONFIDENTIAL
wast
Dear Mr. President:
Of course we will all be delighted should the
Secretary be made the recipient of the Nobel Peace
Prize.
If you think it best for you not to nominate
him, it seems to me it might be well to have him
nominated by two or three of those who are qualified
to do 80, and at this moment I have in mind the Presi-
dent of Brazil, Newton D. Baker, a member of The Hague
Court, with whom both you and I are intimate, and some
outstanding University President, say Nicholas Murray
Butler. When something of this sort is done, our
Minister in Norway should be notified, so that in a
tactful way he can support the nomination.
Yours very sincerely,
The President,
The White House.
PSF: Moore
state
January 9, 1937.
My dear Mr. Secretary:-
As I have told you, I should
personally like to nominate Cordell Hull for the
Nobel Prise to be awarded December 10, 1937 -- but
I hesitate to do so because of my position as the
head of the Executive branch of the Government and
of the fact that Cordell serves as the number one
man in the Cabinet.
I think it would be a fine
thing if somebody not in the Government service
at this time could make the nomination, but such
a person would have to qualify under the terms of
the enclosed notice. If Nicholas Murray Butler
or Newtom Baker or Henry Stimson are members of
the Institute of International Law and would care
to make the nomination, it would be a very fitting
thing.
Perhaps you would be good
enough to take it up with one or more of them,
and I have no objection if you care to show them
this letter.
Always sincerely,
The Honorable,
The Acting Secretary of State,
Washington, D. 0.
PsF: Moore
State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
January 14, 1937
Dear Mr. President:
In compliance with your suggestion I comminicated
with Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, Mr. Newton D. Baker
and Mr. Henry L. Stimson. Attached is a letter I have
received this morning from Dr. Butler. It seems to me
that it would be well for you to write to Anthony Biddle,
indicating that when he hears that Dr. Butler has made
the nomination you desire to have your interest in the
matter manifested.
Yours very sincerely,
P.S. Since the above was dictated, a letter has come
in from Mr. Baker, which I enclose along with your letter
to me and also 8. copy of Mr. Baker's letter to the Nobel
Committee.
I am thanking Dr. Butler and Mr. Baker for their
kindness.
Runny
The President,
The White House.
NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER
BROADWAY AT 116 STREET
5
NEW YORK CITY
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STAIF
1937 JAN 14 AM 10 11
DIVISION OF
January 13, 1937
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS
The Honorable
The Acting Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.
My dear Mr. Secretary:
I have your letter of January 11 with its
enclosure, being a copy of the letter addressed to
you by the President under date of January 9.
I can think of no one to whom the award of
the Nobel Peace Prize next year could be better
justified than Secretary Rull. AS a former recipient
of that prize, I am invited to submit nominations and
I am happy indeed to write by this post to the Committee
at Oslo urging that the award be made to him.
With every good wish for the success of this
proposal, I am
Very truly yours,
kill Batter
C
X
Note
BAKER, HOSTETLER, SIDLO & PATTERSON
HOSTETLER
UNION TRUST BUILDING
CLEVELAND
MORGET
January 13, 1937
AMISTANT SE SECRETARY OF STATE
14 1937
auss
MR. MOORE
Honorable R. Walton Moore
Department of State
Washington, D. C.
My dear Mr. Secretary:
I return the private letter enclosed for my information
in your letter of January 11.
Nothing could possibly give no greater pleasure than to
take any part in nominating Mr. Hull for the award of the
Nobel Prize. His career as Secretary of State seems to ne
one of the very highest distinction not only because of the
sincerity and directness of his actions, but because of the
very modern wisdom with which he selects the economic instru-
ment as the most powerful agency for use in efforts to maintain
international peace. For your information, I enclose a copy
of the letter which I have this day addressed to the committee.
I All sorry to say that I do not know enough to feel sure that
I have complied with the technical requirements in making such
a nomination but as you will observe, I have asked the com-
mittee to let ne supplement my letter 80 6.3 to supply whatever
technical omissions there may be.
With warm regards,
Cordially yours,
murmar
1-1a
Newton D. Baker
January 13, 1937
Nobel Committee of the Norwegian Parliament
Oslo, Norway
Gentlement
As a member of the American Panel of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration at the Hague, I respectfully nomi-
nate as candidate for the Nobel Prize the Honorable
Cordell Hull, Secretary of State of the United States.
It is the general opinion of thoughtful people in
the United States that Mr. Hull has not only conducted
the ordinary diplomatic affairs of the United States
with illustrious success and wisdom during the past four
years, but that he has broadened the problem of the pre-
servation of the peace of the world beyond the ordinary
limits of conciliation, adjudication, and arbitration
which have hitherto confined the thinking of workers in
that field, by a recognition of the importance of the
economic causes of war. Pursuing this broadened view,
Secretary Hull has inaugurated a policy of economic
liberalism in international affairs which constitutes the
first serious and successful attack upon the economic
barriers to international good will which have for these
latter years increasingly menaced the peaceful relations
of nations.
The position of the United States in the group of
nations inhabiting the three Americas has, for historic
reasons, been difficult. By Mr. Hull's eminent personal
qualifications and the breadth and generosity of his
views, much of the doubt and suspicion which has hitherto
clouded those relations has been removed, end a policy of
cooperation based upon understanding has been inaugurated
in the three Americas which affords a promising basis
for the hope that international peace will find a new
and stable basic among these great peoples. The exten-
sion of this attitude and policy into international rela-
tions generally seems to me to constitute both the
greatest hope for the peace movement and the greatest
contribution to the cause of peace made by any citizen
of the world within the past three or four years.
It may be that the rules of your Committee require
that the nomination thus nade shall be fortified by
documents or other information. If 80, I beg to be
allowed to add to this nominating paper any information
or evidence which may be necessary to entitle the noni-
nation here made to your distinguished consideration.
With great respect, believe ne
Very truly yours,
1-1a
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Private
January 9, 1937.
My dear Mr. Secretary:-
As I have told you, I should
personally like to nominate Cordell Hull for the
Nobel Prize to be awarded December 10, 1937 -- but
I hesitate to do so because of my position as the
head of the Executive branch of the Government and
of the fact that Cordell serves as the number one
man in the Cabinet.
I think it would be a fine
thing if somebody not in the Government service
at this time could make the nomination, but such
a person would have to qualify under the terms of
the enclosed notice. If Nicholas Murray Butler
or Newton Baker or Henry Stimson are members of
the Institute of International Law and would care
to make the nomination, it would be B. very fitting
thing.
Perhaps you would be good
enough to take it up with one or more of them,
and I have no objection if you care to show them
this letter.
Always sincerely,
The Honorable
The Acting Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
PSF:
fie
July More State
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
January 16, 1937.
Dear Mr. President:
The enclosure, which is a report written by
one of the most intelligent men in our service,
has just come in, and I am handing it to you with
the thought that after a while you may find an
opportunity to look it over. It seems to me that
the two principal points that stand out are, first,
that it was wise in support of the cause of world
peace, to recognize the Soviet Government, and, sec-
ond, that we are compelled to proceed very slowly
in placing our relations with that Government on
an approximately satisfactory basis, because of so
many obstacles being encountered, due to the novelty
of the political system that has been set up in
Russia, and the peculiar mentality of those who are
in charge of it. Before Joe Davies left, I im-
pressed him with my view that he should do nothing
in an impulsive or spectacular way, but hold to the
festina lenti idea.
Yours very sincerely,
Enclosure:
Despatch from Moscow
dated November 16, 1937.
[not present]
The President,
The White House.
PSF: Moore
State
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
January 30, 1937.
Dear Mr. President:
Secretary Hull, Mr. Hackworth and I had a
long session with Senator Pittman at his house
last night, and came to a pretty full agreement
on neutrality legislation. With the Secretary's
approval I am mentioning several points which he
thinks should be brought to your attention:
1. Pittman is anxious to retain his pro-
vision forbidding the operation of our merchant
ships as armed vessels during a war. His argu-
ment in brief is that if the submarine of a
belligerent knows that the American vessel is un-
armed, it would have nothing to fear, and there-
120
fore would conduct a search of the cargo in the
ordinary way, without ruthlessly torpedoing the
ship on the belief that should it come to the sur-
have
face it might be fired on from the ship. We
think there is no reason why this proposal should
not be accepted.
2.
firm
ant
He argued very strongly against authority
being given the Executive to proclaim danger zones
which would be prohibited to our vessels under se-
alk settemes
vere penalties. In brief he suggested that belliger-
ents may be expected to declare certain zones danger-
ous, and that thereupon there would be an insistence
war
here
zuns
The President,
The White House.
- 2 -
here that we should make corresponding decla-
rations, and that thus soon all waters might be so
declared. It was pointed out further that the
Executive would often be without evidence on the
question of the existence of danger; that there
would have to be almost constant definition and
redefinition of the zones, and that ships might
incur the penalties prescribed without having the
opportunity to know what zones had been declared
dangerous. Furthermore, Pittman urged that to
advertise in advance that we intend to declare
zones dangerous would encourage belligerents to
extend their zones in the effort to try to create
a blockade. It seems to us that the matter
is not of sufficient importance to justify us in
taking issue with Pittman.
3. He is in favor of excepting from the
arms embargo the Latin American countries when
I
engaged in war among themselves, but thinks the
wise course is to postpone legislation on that
particular question until after the Buenos Aires
treaties are disposed of.
Should the legislation be as tentatively
prosing
agreed, it will be altogether permissive except
for the present mandatory arms embargo provision;
the flotation of loans in this country by
belligerents, and the arming of our merchant
vessels.
Since we must see Judge McReynolds today,
and perhaps start in on the hearings as early as
next Monday, may I not ask that you read this
letter at once and let me know your reactions to
what is suggested?
Yours very sincerely,
Realtarmone
MEMO FOR THE P. S.
Bring this in again when
filend, I see Judge Moore.
F.D.R.
I les TryRs
anima
RENO LOW
PSF
State:
THE WHITE HOUSE
Moore
WASHINGTON
"ebruary 2, 1937.
MEMO TO THE PRESIDENT:
Secretary Moore called me and asked ue to
give you the enclosed:
Item 1- Is a matter which he says he would
like to see you about very shortly 38 he feels
the time is getting short. I think the reason
he has come through me is that he and Mac have
had some kind of a fight, so if you want to see
him you can take it up with Mac. direct.
Item 2- Is the matter which John Mack spoke
to you about at lunch.
JR.
February 2, 1937.
File I Rhallon
more
Dear Mr. President:
The Committee created by you on International
Civil Aviation, of which I happen to be Chairman,
has frequently met in compliance with your in-
structions that it observe developments that are
taking place, but it has never further complied by
making any recommendations to you. We are now at
the point where it seems highly desirable, if our
interests are to be fully represented in the expan-
sion of aviation, to consider what should be done
in certain areas, and therefore some of us will wel-
come an opportunity to discuss some aspects of the
situation with you as early as possible.
Pan American Airways is the only agency to
which we can look to avoid the field being occupied
by foreign agencies, and if it is to go further, new
routes must be discussed, and of course any new
route will involve appropriations for the carrying
of mail.
The other day Mr. Trippe, President of Pan Ameri-
can Airways, met with the Committee and urged that
inless the Germans and Dutch are to take charge to a
large extent in South America, his company should be
put in position to establish several additional
routes. I have in hand all of the data pertaining
to
The President,
The White House.
- 2 -
to that matter, and perhaps in the very near fu-
ture, since quick action imperative, you
may be able to see me with Mr. Harllee Branch of
the Post Office Department.
Mr. Trippe has a time limited license from
the Government of New Zealand to enter that country
on a route there from Honolulu, and this is some-
thing that Mr. Branch and I are prepared to dis-
cuss.
Aside from what has just been said, Colonel
Johnson, of the Department of Commerce, and I may
wish to talk with you about a question in contro-
versy, upon the disposition of which probably de-
pends the establishment of a trans-Atlantic ser-
vice.
Yours very sincerely,
R. Walton Moore
A-M RWM : HM
21
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
February 2, 1937.
Dear Mr. President:
Colonel McIntyre has spoken to me of your de-
sire to be informed as to the consideration of the
sabotage claims by the American-German Commission,
and about that matter I have very full information.
Early last summer the Agent who represents us before
the Commission, a Mr. Bonynge, former member of Con-
grees from Colorado, who has represented us before the
Commission since 1923, acting under the authority of
this Department, went to Munich to endeavor to arrange
a. settlement of those claims, and he entered into an
agreement with persons supposed to have complete au-
thority from the German Government, whereby, speaking
generally, it was agreed that the balance of a fund in
the Treasury Department known as a German special de-
posit account, amounting to about $20,000,000, should
be devoted to the payment of those claims. As soon a.s
this was known, claimants other than the sabotage claim-
ants, who have already received awards, strongly objected
to
The President,
The White House.
- 2 -
to this agreement, and we were under heavy pressure from
both sides to state the attitude of this Department, and
I may say, parenthetically, up to this time the German
Government has not formally signified its approval of the
Munich agreement. Among others who have talked to me are
Mr. Mack of Poughkeepsie, New York, to whom I stated that
we would do nothing more than tell the Commission, through
our Agent, that it is for the Commission to pass on the
controversy, and that we cannot become identified with either
the award holders or the sabotage claimants. I then fur-
nished Mr. Mack the draft of a letter that we proposed to
write to the Agent, which, with some little change in
phraseology, was written and placed in the Agent's hands, a
copy of which is herewith. Thereafter a German named
Markau came here, who was found not to represent the German
Government, as was at first supposed to be the case, and
subsequent to his visit it seemed from statements made to me
by the German Ambassador that there were efforts made to
create the impression that you were taking some stand rela-
tive to the sabotage claims and other matters at issue be-
tween our Government and the German Government, and thereupon,
in order to clear away that impression, I wrote a letter to
the German Ambassador, a copy of which is herewith.
It
- 3 -
It is not impossible that this business may be in-
vestigated by Congress, and the Department has exerted
itself to make it perfectly clear that it is not trying
to affect the action of the Commission, but only desires
that in the interest of justice, and to avoid any ground
for fair criticism, the Commission should act as a. Court
would act, by giving an opportunity for a. free discussion
of all the questions that have been raised as to the merits
or demerits of the contentions of both the sabotage claim-
ants and the award holders.
You will realize how fierce the struggle between the
competing interests has become when I tell you confidentially
that it has even been intimated that Bonynge is not straight,
but I have no evidence whatever of his being otherwise than
honest and earnest in his belief that the Munich agreement
should be made the basis of an award by the Commission, and
perhaps even though it may not have had the formal approval
of the German Government.
Yours very sincerely,
Ploaltmon
Enclosures:
As stated.
Assistant Secretary of State.
more PSF:
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
file
state
February 15, 1937.
MEMORANDUM FOR
JUDGE MOORE
I think a conversation here
with Bill Bullitt would be
helpful at this time. If
you agree with me, will you
send him the necessary order?
F. D. R.
PSF: Moore
X
File
Personal
February 15, 1937
AMEMBASSY
PARIS (FRANCE)
For the Ambassador.
The President desires you to come to Washington at your early
convenience. Telegraph date departure and name of vessel.
This assignment not made at your request nor for your
convenience.
Transportation expenses and per diem to Washington and
return and $5.00 per diem at Washington in pursuance this
instruction authorized subject Travel Regulations. Report
all pertinent dates.
original Lite 2 ov cable
the is and +
FA:MEN
FP
WE
PSF: More
state
Feb. 24, 1937
fill From R. Walton Moore
Memo saying that Pres. should see attached letter
from Atherton in re- to Quezon and the Phillipine
Islands.
SEE-State Dept. folder-Drawer 1--1937
THE WHITE HOUSE
state
WASHINGTON
April 5, 1937.
MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. R. WALTON MOORE
Will you explain this to
the Secretary in confidence? I
would entirely approve his actual
resignation September first and, of
course, if he personally wants to
leave Berlin about August first,
leaving Mrs. Dodd and his daughter
there for the extra month, I suppose
that can be arranged.
F. D. R.
Letter addressed to Judge Moore
returned to him.
PSF:Moore
/
state
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
filme (5)
Hyde Park, N. Y.
October 19, 1937.
MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. R. WALTON MOORE
Dear Walton:-
Ever 80 many thanks for that
interesting postcard with the stamp
celebrating our Constitution.
I hope to see you very soon.
As ever yours,
PSF: Moore
THE COUNSELOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
October 15, 1937.
Dear Mr. President:
Whether the most famous of all stamp
collectors will care to have the enclosure,
I do not know, but I am venturing to pass
it on to him.
Yours very sincerely,
Pewall-mone
Enclosure
The President,
The White House.
PSF: more
state
October 21, 1937.
To President
Memo from Walton Moore-State Dept.
Says British are unwilling to negotiate with respect
to their claim to Canton Island etc.
SEE--Great Britain-Drawer 2--1937
fullowe
PSF: Moore
State
November 4, 1937.
MEMORANDUM
Published records indicate that in 1806 and 1807,
the Legislatures of the following States expressed a
desire that Jefferson consent to be proposed for a third
term as President: Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, New Jersey, North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. The resolutions
of the various State Legislatures on this subject appar-
ently are not included in the published writings of
Jefferson; however, they may be among the Jefferson papers
in the Library of Congress. It appears that Jefferson's
reply in each instance was similar to the one made to the
Legislature of Vermont on December 10, 1807 (copy attached).
H. S. Randall. The Life of Thomas Jefferson. Vol. 3,
page 252.
Buttletin of the Bureau of Rolls and Library of the De-
partment of State: Calendar of the Correspondence
of Thomas Jefferson, part 2, Letters to Jefferson,
pages 18, 354.
HA:CS:AMH
TO THE LEGISLATURE OF VERMONT.
December 10, 1807.
I received in due season the address of the Legislature
of Vermont, bearing date the 5th of November 1806, in which,
with their approbation of the general course of my administra-
tion, they were so good as to express their desire that I would
consent to be proposed again, to the public voice, on the ex-
piration of my present term of office. Entertaining, as I do,
for the legislature of Vermont those sentiments of high respect
which would have prompted an immediate answer, I was certain,
nevertheless, they would approve a delay which had for its
object to avoid a premature agitation of the public mind, on a
subject 80 interesting as the election of a chief magistrate.
That I should lay down my charge at a proper period,
is as much a duty as to have borne it faithfully. If some
termination to the services of the chief megistrate be not
fixed by the constitution, or supplied by practice, his office,
nominally for years, will, in fact, become for life; and history
shows how easily that degenerates into an inheritance. Believing
that a representative government, responsible at short periods
of election, is that which produces the greatest sum of happiness
to mankind, I feel it a duty to do no act which shall essentially
impair that principle; and I should unwillingly be the person
who, disregarding the sound precedent set by an illustrious
predecessor, should furnish the first example of prolongation
beyond the second term of office.
Truth, also, requires me to add, that I am sensible of
that decline which advancing years bring on; and feeling their
physical, I ought not to doubt their mental effect. Happy if
I am the first to perceive and to obey this admonition of nature,
and to solicit a retreat from cares too great for the wearied facul-
ties of age.
For the approbation which the legislature of Vermont has
been pleased to express of the principles and measures pursued
in the management of their affairs, I am sincerely thankful; and
should I be so fortunate as to carry into retirement the equal
approbation and good will of my fellow citizens generally, it will
be the comfort of my future days, and will close a service of forty
years with the only reward it ever wished. (Washington: The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson: 121)
PSF: Moore
State
filend
THE COUNSELOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
November 12, 1937.
Dear Mr. President:
You may possibly be interested in glancing
at my two letters of yesterday to Senator
Borah, to one of which I attached at copy of the
memorandum I furnished you in October. The only
reason I mentioned Senator Nye in the second
letter to Senator Borah is that the former is
among those who believe the neutrality act should
be invoked.
Senator Thomas of Utah has just telephoned
me that he has within the last week made a speech
opposing the application of the neutrality act,
a copy of which when furnished me I will send
over to you. It happens that the other Utah
Senator, who is by no means pro-Administration,
has telephoned ne that he holds the same opinion
that is entertained by such people as Senators
Borah and Thomas.
I doubt whether there will be any serious
division of opinion on the question as to the
propriety of the course you have taken. I am
entirely against Mr. Davis' suggestion expressed
in a cable received from him yesterday, that you
should ask Congress to repeal the act, 80 far as
concerns the Far Eastern conflict. That would
simply be opening the door to a protracted debate,
which
The President,
The White House.
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which, if possible, should be avoided.
I again venture to urge that any expla-
nation you may make should be by way of an
exchange of letters between you and Senator
Pittman, instead of by your making a formal
statement to Congress.
Yours very sincerely,
Enclosures:
Copy of memorandum;
Copies of letters
to Senator Borah,
dated Nov. 11, 1937.
cur
November 11, 1937.
liy dear Senator:
I am sorry that work here that I could
not lay aside has delayed no in complying with
your request.
I am handing you herewith 6. memorandum I
prepared lost month at the President's request,
which 10 simply for your own eye, which outlines
in a very restrained way the reasons for failing
to invoke the Neutrelity Act. It night have
stated that at least there was a possibility that
the application of the Act when the hostilities
began would have caused disorderly elements in China
to engage in merciless treatment of our nationals
there. It could have set forth more strongly that
to declare the existence of a state of wer would
have given Japan a welcome opportunity to exercise
full belligerent rights and compel our neval vessels
to desist from rendering any aid to our nationals
in China, and perhaps thereby involve us in 8 clash
with the Japanese Navy. Aside from the construc-
tion of the low, it seens to se that every argument
supports the President in the course he has taken.
If there should be a debate it may be sug-
gested that the Administration is prompted by 6.
+
desire to facilitate munition makers in shipping
arms,
we
The Honorable
William 5. Borah,
United States Senate.
- 2 -
arms, ammunition and implements of war. The
reply to that is that the total of the ship-
ments for which licenses have been granted is
comparatively trifling. In the period from
July 15 to November 11,the value of license
shipments to Chine was $6,008,086.05 and to
Japan $1,470,566.24.
Should it be said that 1: invoking the
Act would have prevented the two nations from
purchasing war material here, the reply to that
is that up to this time their purchases have
been on & cash basis and according to such in-
formation as we have, it will continue at least
temporarily on that basis.
In case you think I can supply any further
information I will be very glad to do 80 either
by writing you or seeing you.
With high regard, I am
Yours very sincerely,
$ Walton Mon
Enclosure:
AS stated.
BUM:ASM
November 11, 1937.
Dear Senator Borah:
Since I wrote you this morning my
attention has been called to the fact that
in April of this year there was some dis-
cussion in the Senate on the question as to
whether the President is required when hos-
tilities occur without any declaration of
war to find the existence of "a state of
war." In the memorandum furnished me Senator
Nye is quoted as saying "It is altogether
necessary that the determination as to when
a state of war exists be left somewhere. I
do not know where else it can be left than
with the President of the United States.
That discretion is now with him. There can
be no exercise of a policy of neutrality
without his finding a state of war to exist,
and so proclaiming. I do not know how we
can escape from that degree of discretion.
I am sure it cannot be escaped." (Congressional
Record, April 29, 1937, page 5161.)
Yours very sincerely,
R. Walton Moora
The Honorable
William E. Borach,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.
\ % \ s in UNIT
October 19, 1937.
REASONS FOR NOT INVOKING THE NEUTRALITY ACT
OF MAY 1, 1937, IN CONNECTION WITH THE
FAR EASTERN SITUATION.
1. It is admitted that the so-called Neutrality
Act of May 1, 1937, is fundamentally and essentially in-
tended to keep this country out of war. That is the spirit
of the Act which leaves a wide discretion to the President.
He is not required to issue an arms embargo proclamation
under section (1) until he makes a finding that a state of
war exists and he is not compelled to make such a finding
on the basis of any specific facts or circumstances. The
language of the Act is "Whenever the President shall find
that there exists a state of war between, or among, two
or more foreign states, the President shall proclaim such
fact, and it shall thereafter be unlawful to export, ...
arms, ammunition, or implements of war from any place in
the United States", etc. This language differs from that
contained in the Act of August 31, 1935, which provides
"That upon the outbreak or during the progress of war be-
tween, or among, two or more foreign states, the President
shall proclaim such fact, and it shall thereafter be un-
lawful to export arms", etc. If, when it enacted the
present statute, Congress had intended to make it obligatory
on the President to issue a proclamation at the outbreak or
during the progress of hostilities, probably it would not
have used language which appears to leave it to his discretion
to make or not to make a finding.
2. It
PSF
=
BROBANH
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2. It would be one thing for the President, in
determining whether or not to invoke the act, to accept
some narrow, legalistic view that might be urged upon him,
based on the circumstance that there are hostilities in
progress in China. It is quite another thing for him,
in the light of his general duties and responsibilities
in the domain of foreign affairs, and the conceded interests
of this country and its nationals, and bearing in mind the
obvious purpose of the act, to proceed with caution in order
to avoid this country's being involved in war, and to pre-
vent the complications that an application of the act would
inevitably create. When he thus fairly surveys the situation,
and discovers that there has been no declaration of war by
either of the parties to the conflict, both Japan and China
being unwilling to admit that a state of war really exists,
and continuing to maintain diplomatic and consular relations
with each other; when he further discovers that no other
country has seen fit to treat the conflict as a state of war,
and when he further discovers that there are conditions very
clearly indicating sound reasons for not invoking the act,
the President believes the course he has taken will meet the
approval of Congress and the American public.
3. While it is true that the coast of China has been
blockaded as to Chinese vessels, a belligerent blockade has
not been declared, and American shipping has not been sub-
jected to the exercise of belligerent rights. Had the Pres-
ident issued 8 proclamation under the act, and the same been
accepted
redseds .2
It month De
- 3 -
accepted by the parties to the conflict as correctly
describing the situation, and had the parties thereupon
proceeded to the full exercise of belligerent rights
on land and sea, our nationals and their interests would
thereby have been subjected to very great and unjustified
annoyance and hazard. When the difficulties in the Far
East started, more than ten thousand American nationals
were in China, some engaged in business, some in religious
and charitable work, and others as visitors. The immediate
and pressing problem concerning this Government was and is
the protection of the lives and property of those people, some
six thousand of whom are still in China. Te have taken and
are now taking the measures and precuntions that seem best
calculated to promote their safety. No argument is needed
to indicate the perila to which our nationals, or many of
them, might have been subjected by the application of the
act. The difficulty of evacuating and protecting them might
have been greatly increased by clothing the contending parties
with greater freedom of action and a less degree of liability
than now obtains. In addition, it may be suggested that the
parties by exercising full belligerent rights might have
affected the status of our naval vessels in Chinese waters
and occasioned incidents leading to the sacrifice of the
great basic theory of the Act.
4. In brief, it has been the judgment of the President
that for him to find and proclaim the existence of a state of
war
accobreq på 4Pe below
- 4 -
war would have tended to defeat rather than carry out the
purpose of Congress. Nevertheless, with a view to carrying
out the spirit of the Act to the extent that seemed reason-
ably warranted, he has announced that government-owned ships
shall refrain from transporting arms, emmunition, and 1m-
plements of war to either Japan or China, and that other
American vessels will engage in such trade at their own
risk. This he considered was as far as it was prudent for
him to go.
1
-
3
RWM:AEM
PSF:Moore
COPY
state
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 21, 1937.
MEMORANDUM FOR JUDGE MOORE
I wish you would talk with the Secretary
and tell him I suggest that you proceed 1m-
mediately to the study of the possibility of
adopting a new policy relating to off-shore
fishing in Alaska. The policy would be based
on the fact that every nation has the right to
protect its own food supply in waters adjacent
to its coast in which its fish, crabs, etc.,
leave at certain times of the year on their way
to and from the actual shore-line or rivers.
I am fully aware of the old decisions in
sealing decisions and awards. Nevertheless
in the case of Alaska, we are faced with the
problem of food supplies rather than of fear,
which can hardly be classed as a necessity of
life. Therefore, if on the facts it is
necessary to protect fish which would normally
be used for food in the United States on their
migrations up to any reasonable distance from
the actual shore, we would be giving some
needed protection to one of our national food
supplies.
I make the suggestion of & study of this
kind only with the thought that Japan may seek
to delay action and that we can not go along
with much further delay. It occurs to me that
a Presidential proclamation closing the sea
area along the Alaskan coast to all fishing --
Japanese, Canadian and American -- might be a
way out -- in other words a kind of marine
refuge where one is essential to end depletion.
I do not know what Japan could well say in the
event of such a proclamation and I am reason-
ably certain that the Canadian Government
would approve and probably do the same thing
along their British Columbia coast-line.
F. D. R.
PSF: W. More
UNITED STATES
State
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
DIVISION OF TERRITORIES AND ISLAND POSSESSIONS
WASHINGTON
January 17, 1938.
MEMORANDUM for Solicitor R. Walton Moore,
Department of State.
On May 13, 1936, the President by Executive Order transferred to the
Department of the Interior the jurisdiction of the islands of Jarvis, Baker
and Howland, situated near the Equator, the first close to the Great Circle
route from Honolulu to Auckland, New Zealand, the other two not far from
the Great Circle route from Honolulu to Sydney, Australia. American cit-
izens were settled thereon, and United States sovereignty definitely ea-
tablished by this occupation which continues, a United States Coast Guard
outter from Homolulu visiting these islands four times a year to bring
water and food supplies.
The information received in the Interior Department at the time was
that these islands wore potential "first hop" stops from Honolulu to New
Zealand and to Australia respectively. (The islands are flat and could be
landed on in an emergency by a land plane. The surface of Howland was
specifically prepared for land plane landings in the Spring of 1937 in
anticipation of the landing of Amelia Earhart.)
This Fall the felands were visited for the first time by an official
from Washington, namely the writer, the Director of the Division of Terri-
tories and Island Possessions, Previous to my departure from Washington,
I conferred with Mr. Samuel W. Bogge, Geographer of the State Department,
who stated that there wore a acore or so of small islanda in the Pacific,
ownership of which was in dispute between Great Britain and the United
States. He further stated that negotiations were in progress with the
British with the idea of establishing definitely which islande belonged
to which sovereignty. He mentioned the Phoenix group specifically, to
all of which the United States had some claim, although varying in valid-
1ty among the islands of this group. The Phoenix group, lying directly
south of the Equator in approximately the same longitude as Howland and
Baker, is potentially serviceable on the Great Circle flights to Australia.
It was suggested that I visit this group in connection with my visit
to the adjacent islands of Howland and Baker and check up on the Phoenix
islanda' usefulness as commercial airplane stations, etc. I was told
that current nagotiations with Great Britain had sought to establish the
premise that neither nation do anything to disturb the status quo, and
was enjoined therefore neither to main any move to admit British sovereignty
nor to establish ours,
I left Honolulu on October 23 aboard the Coast Guard cutter Roger B.
2.
Taney. We visited and inspected a number of islands in the general region
of the "first hop" stops on the Great Circle routes to New Zoaland and Aus-
tralia respectively. In the first group (America group were Kingman's Reef,
Palmyra, Fanning, Christmas and Jarvis. In the second group (Phoenix group)
were Hull, Sydney, Phoenix, Enderbury, Canton, Baker and Howland. Ity observa-
tions as a result of these visits are as follows:
Howland, Baker and Jarvis are of relatively little use for trans-oceanic
flights for the following reasons:
A. Only land planes can alight there. It seems that among those who
planned the original occupation of these islands by the United States two
years ago, someone was convinced that future trans-oceanic flying would be
by land planes. This is not the case today, and certainly will not be do in
the near future. In any event, it would have seemed advisable to have se-
lected among the available islands some that had both sufficient land sur-
face for land plane airports and sheltered water for seaplanes.
B. Howland, Baker and Jarvis are all small, the largest being Howland,
less than two miles long and about two-thirds of e. mile wide. Both Jarvis
and Baker are somewhat smaller.
0. Landing has to be done in small bonts across the reef. No anchorage
exists around any of those islands, the reef shelving off abruptly to great
depths. The transportation of heavy materials onto these islands is next to
impossible. Therefore anything like a permanent establishment here is out of
the question.
PHONNIX ISLANDS
In the Phoenix group, however, there is another island--Canton--which
possesses just the qualifications required. At the time Howland, Baker and
Jarvis were settled early in 1936, Canton was unoccupied. The United States
claim to it was approximately as good as to Howland, Baker and Jarvis. It
is therefore difficult to understand why Canton was not selected for settle-
ment, certainly in preference to both Howland and Baker and even more in
preference to the second of these two islands, since these two, situated
close together and wholly similar, duplicate each other without additional
advantage.
Canton is 6 coral atoll, situated between the 171st and 172nd parallels
of longitude west and approximately two degrees four minutes south. It is a
somewhat irregular rectangle with an opening in the reef on the west about
100 yards wide and a channel eight to ten feet in depth at high tide. This
channel therefore permits the passage of small boats into the lagoon. The
lagoon is about nine miles long and four miles wide. While it contains some
coral patches and undoubtedly some blasting would have to be done, it is now
possible for seaplanes to land there. Moreover, there is ample surface for
land planes, particularly on the north side of the island where there is al-
most a straight runway for some three to four miles with a width varying be-
tween 200 and 300 yards. This runway is in the direction of the prevailing
winds, and there are other areas available on the west side below the open-
ing in the reef, on the south side and on the west, In addition to having
both land plane and sea plane potentialities, it has an anchorage. The open-
3.
ing in the reef could without difficulty be deepened to admit vessels of
desired size.
Canton 1a the most desirable island and perhaps the only one in the
Phoenix group worth acquiring for aviation purposes.
The British have established two white men, one of them a radio opera-
tor, on Canton, with one native (Union Islander) servant. They are established
on the west coast just south of the entrance to the lagoon, and their shacks
are adjacent to those established by the American eclipse expedition of
June, 1937. This expedition's marker, of concrete, with an American flag
enameled on both sides and bolted through the concrete, still remains. When
we visited the island, the British radio operator declined our invitation to
come aboard for dinner on the ground that he could not leave his radio and
that his associate was over on the other side of the island with the native
servant. To gathered that these two were surveying.
It seems a great pity that we did not take possession of Canton at the
time we occupied Baker, Howland and Jarvis, as Canton would have been ample
for commercial flying needs in this region and would likewise have been use-
ful for naval purposes.
Hull, the next best island in the Phoenix group, has an ample lagoon
about four miles long by three miles wide, but the land surface is inadequate
except on the northeast rim. Landing there would be difficult in case of a
southeast or northwest wind.
Enderbury is an island of the Howland, Baker and Jarvis type, although
considerably larger, being three miles long and approximately at mile wide.
Within the last year the British have taken definite stops to occupy
these islands, formerly unoccupied. Natives are apparently established on
Hull, and this and the other islands have been formally ennexed to the
Gilbert and Ellice colony. Within the past year, some Union Islands natives
have been settled on Sydney, Phoenix and Endorbury are still uninhabited,
but the British flag has been hoisted and is apparently renewed every few
months on a flag pole beneath which are the two following wooden markers,
of which I have photographs:
This Island belongs to His Brittanic Majesty
King George II, was visited by H.M.S. LEITH
January 1937. (Signed) J.C.P. Judway
Captain, R.N.
Gilbert and Ellice Islands colony.
Administrative visit to Phoenix Island
H.M.C.S. "Nimanca" October 1937
(Sgd) M.L.Singleton
H.E.Maude
Master H.M.C.S.Nimanoa
Administrativo Officer
C.E.J.C.
4.
The British who visited the islands in October, 1937, erected similar
signs on all the Phoenix islands. The indication would therefore be that
definitive possession was not proclaimed until last October, just a few
weeks, if not days, before my visit,
AMERICA ISLANDS
In the islands lying due south from Onlin, the so-called America group
near the Great Circle route to New Zealand, far and away the best island for
commercial land and sea plane stops as well as for naval purposes is Christ-
mas, Christmas is a large island, some 30 miles long, 17 to 18 miles wide,
and contains a large magnificent lagoon as well as several smaller lagoons.
The large lagoon 18 about 12 miles long and eight miles wide. The island is
flat and there is enough flat land for all the land planes and son planes of
the United States to alight there. I inspected several regions of flat hard
ground two or three miles square,
Christmas is sparmely settled. Its present occupants consist of five
white persons and nome 30 Tahitian natives. The whites are the British ad-
ministrator, Cowie; a Ozecho-Slovak named Jarabeck who is the manager of
the copra concession which has been leased to 6. French resident of Tahiti;
his wife, his eight-year-old son; and one assistant. Were it possible for
the United States to secure possession of Christmas, we should have in this
one island everything that we need in the Great Circle route to New Zealand.
The other possibilities in this group are negligible.
Fanning seens to be indisputably British.
Washington is too small.
Kingman's Reef, which we already have, is wholly unsatisfactory. There
is no land surface. Even at low tide only a small portion of the reef is
visible. When winds blow from the south, 6. ship anchored within to supply
fuel would not be safe; and it is entirely safe to say that with 8. rough son,
even though the weather may be good for flying, it would be impossible for a
plane to land there. With n. southwest wind, the waves come in through the
opening and would make it extremely difficult to land there even in good
weather. I have confirmed with Mr. Juan Trippe, President of the Pan American
Airways, that Kingman's Reef is considered unsatisfactory and even potentially
dangerous.
I understand that the Navy is planning to spend several hundred thousand
dollars in blasting en opening through the reef in Palmyra and further blast-
ing the coral to connect the three lagoons and make this island available for
an airplane station. This in my judgment will prove a total waste of funds.
The coral reef extends for four miles west of the place where the lagoon
would have to be entered. For fully a mile, it has at varying depth of only
two or three feet, Blasting there would be extremely expensive. The longest
length of the largestlagoon 18 less than a mile; the other two lagoons which
are separated from it by considerable coral are respectively half a mile and
two-thirds of a mile in length in the name direction. Boyond that 10 the
fact that there is inadequate land surface on Palmyre and only the sketchiest
5.
kind of an establishment could be created there. I em convinced that a vast
expenditure of money there would produce nothing satisfactory.
Instead of expending large sums of money on Palmyra, I warmly recommend
that every prior effort be made to secure Christmas, which is not only in the
seme group but is better situated because further away from Honolulu and
nearer Pago Pago, which would be the second stop in the flight to New Zealand.
If all efforts fail in securing sovereignty over Christmas, it is possible
that a. joint occupancy with the British could be worked out. (A similar
joint occupancy between the Dutch and the French exists on a vory much small-
or island in the Caribbean, St. Martin.)
As long no this whole issue of sovereignty is still moot for numerous
Pacific islands, and questions of earlier occupancy and use are involved,
and in view of the necessities of the situation, I would recommend the set-
tling on Christmas Island of Hawaiian boys as was done on Howland, Baker and
Jarvis. The British claim has of course been greatly strengthened by recent
occupation, but the United States had a long occupation prior to that and
occupation now would tend to blur and lessen the force of the British claim
based on present occupancy. There 18 ample room on the island for a settle-
ment of Hewaiian boys without any conflict with the British who are grouped
close to the north entrance to the lagoon.
Based on my observations, I would recommend a similar settlement on
Canton Island. British occupancy in a matter of only a few months. It ap-
pears to have been in violation of our understanding at least, and settlement
established by both the United States and Great Britain would greatly strengthen
our claim. Settlement could very easily be effected either adjacent to the
present British housing on the same side of the opening of the lagoon, or the
other side. I would recomend the same side where the eclipse expedition has
left considerable material and where the American marker is located.
For trading purposes _in negotiations with Great Britain, I would like-
wise recomend settling on Enderbury and possibly Phoenix, which are now un-
occupied.
I did not visit some of the other islands included in the list of those
Pacific Islands to which the United States has a claim, particularly those
in the Gilbert group. If these are desirable for other purposes, then the
strengthening of our claim on the previously mentioned islands in the Phoenix
and America groups (Canton, Enderbury, Christmas) might be useful for trading
purposes. In the case of Canton, there is a valid reason for prompt action.
The British occupancy--the settlement of the two white men and a native--is
less than six months old. It will be completely mullified by our occupancy.
But if we delay, it seens entirely probable that the British may land further
settlers, may start deepening the channel into the lagoon, may blast in the
lagoon and may lay out a flying field on the land surface. This has not yet
taken place, but conceivably may begin at any moment. Such expenditure of
funds on the island by the British would greatly impair any efforts we might
make to secure this island.
It would seem that at this critical point in the effort to secure Pacific
Islands we should not make the mistake of taking possession too late. We are
V
labi
6.
presumably entering a period when these claims are losing their fluidity.
In a very short time it will be much more difficult to achieve what can now
be achieved. I believe that the present world situation, the unpaid British
debt to us, etc. should make it easier for us to secure concessions now from
the British than at some future time,
Emisthurning ERNEST GREENING,
Director.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
January 27, 1938.
My dear Mr. President:
Soon, a year will have elapsed since the attention
of this Government was drawn to the status of Canton Is-
land and certain other islands in mid-Pacific.
In the interval, there has been much activity, but
the status of the islands is no nearer settlement than
it was a year ago. On August 9, 1937, we proposed to
the British a standstill during discussions between our
two governments as to the title to the Island of Canton
and to certain other islands which 18 the subject of con-
flicting claims. The British, despite promises made by
Embassy officials, at various times, to press the matter,
have exhibited a definite tendency to engage in dilatory
tactics. It is true that in a note of October 20, 1937,
they accepted in principle the method proposed by this
Government for settling the issue, but they nullified
the effect of their acceptance by excepting from the
discussion the Island of Canton and the other islands
of the Phoenix Group. Moreover, some time after they
had
The President,
The White House.
-2-
had received our note proposing a standstill, they took
steps to land settlers and equipment on Canton Island
and on the other islands of the Phoenix Group, thus dis-
regarding the proposed standstill.
Clearly, then, the time has come to bring this
matter to a head. This Department is of the opinion
that further delay not only would serve no useful purpose
but would be harmful to our interests involved. The
Navy and Interior Departments wish to act at once.
In the circumstances, you might wish to consider
the following alternative courses:
(1) You might wish personally to summon Lindsay to
discuss the matter further in the hope of persuading the
British to engage in & settlement in negotiation with us.
It is apparent, however, from past experience with Sir
Ronald in this case that either he himself does not at-
tribute great importance to it or his efforts make little
or no headway at the Foreign Office. He would, doubtless,
repeat, as he has on every previous occasion, that the
British Government can do nothing without the approval
of the New Zealand Government--and the approval of the
New Zealand Government does not appear to be forthcoming.
Nevertheless, it would do no harm to attempt to convince
Lindsay of the manifold advantages of following the pro-
cedure of settlement of the controversy in discussion
between
-3-
between the two governments during a standstill, and, in
order to give added weight to our contention that this
would constitute the wisest course and the least prone
to lead to unfortunate publicity, you might be disposed
to convey 8. warning to him that unless his Government can
see its way to accept our proposal with regard to method
of settlement in a month's time, you will feel obliged (a)
to transfer by Executive Order to the Department of the
Interior the administration of the islands in m1d-Pacific
to which we make claim and (b) to land settlers on those
islands.
(2) In case you feel that this course entails too
much delay, you might--this course 1s apparently favored
by the Navy and Interior Departments--transfer by Execu-
tive Order to the administration of the Department of the
Interior (a) the islands of the Phoenix Group, to which
we make claim, particularly Canton, Enderbury, Phoenix
and McKean Islands, or (b) a more extensive list cover-
ing all islands in mid-Pacific to which we may make claim,
even though we might abandon many such claims at a later
date by virtue of an agreement with the British. On this
list might even be included Christmas Island, which the
Navy and Interior Departments are particularly desirous
of occupying, at least in part, but as to which our posi-
tion 1s weak. At the same time, you might authorize the
despatch
-4-
despatch of the revenue cutter Itasca with settlers and
equipment for Canton, Enderbury, Phoenix and Christmas
Islands. We would then be in the situation of having, on
some of the islands, both American and British settlers
side by side-while awaiting a diplomatic settlement of
the issue.
If you favor this second alternative, I am of the
opinion that we should communicate the enclosed note to
the British, giving them notice that we regard, among
others, Canton, Enderbury, McKean and Phoenix Islands as
American soil, pointing out that we regard the British 00-
cupying party on Canton Island as being on American terri-
tory without authorization, and regretting that they have
not seen their way to accept our proposal of settlement of
title to the islands in joint discussion.
I should very much appreciate your instructions, and
shall hold myself in readiness to discuss the matter with
you further if you desire. Meanwhile I enclose copy of
Mr. Gruening's memorandum following his visit to some of
the islands, and the draft note to Sir Ronald Lindsay above
referred to designed to recover our freedom of action.
Faithfully yours,
Enclosures:
1. Memorandum of
Mr. Gruening.
2. Draft of a note to
the British Embassy.
3. Map.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
Excellency:
Reference is made to this Government's note of
August 9, 1937, suggesting a method of settling by a
standstill during discussions between the American and
British Governments as to the title to the Island of
Canton and certain other islands in the Pacific which
is the subject of conflicting claims.
More than five months have now elapsed since the
American Government proposed to the British Government
the discussion of the conflicting claims of ownership
of Canton and certain other Pacific islands. In its
note of October 20, 1937, the British Government, it
is true, accepted in principle the proposed method of
settlement with this Government, but nullified the ef-
fect of this acceptance when it specifically excepted
from
His Excellency
The Right Honorable
Sir Ronald Lindsay, P.C.,
G.C.M.G., K.C.B., C.V.O.,
British Ambassador.
-2-
from the proposed discussion the Island of Canton and
the Phoenix Group of islands and, at a time when the
American Government considered itself bound by the
standstill agreement it had proposed in its note of
August 9, 1937, the British Government sent settlers
and equipment to Canton Island. Moreover, despite
several conversations between officials of the Depart-
ment of State and Your Excellency, the proviso except-
ing the islands of the Phoenix Group from the discussion
has never been withdrawn.
The American Government, therefore, 1s reluctantly
obliged to conclude that the British Government is not
willing to accept the method of settlement by means of
a standstill during discussions as to the title to Canton
Island and certain other islands in the Pacific, and is
compelled to reiterate that it does not accept 8.8 bind-
ing upon it the British Order-in-Council of March 18,
1937, incorporating in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands
Colony the Phoenix Group of islands. Further, it can
not accept as a valid basis for a claim to any one 18-
land possession established by occupation subsequent to
its
-3-
its note of August 9, 1937.
The American Government, on this occasion must,
moreover, without prejudice to its claims to other 18-
lands in the Pacific not included in the Phoenix Group,
inform the British Government that it regards Canton Is-
land, Enderbury Island, McKean Island and Phoenix Island
in the Phoenix Group of islands 8.8 American territory by
virtue of discovery, occupation at various times and pro-
clamation. The American Government, accordingly, feels
free to exercise in these islands all the rights and
privileges accruing to possession.
The American Government had hoped that the procedure
which it suggested in its note of August 9, 1937, might
be followed. In the circumstances, however, it 1s con-
strained to point out that it considers the British 00-
cupying party on Canton Island as established, without
authorization, on American soil.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my
highest consideration.
APAIRMS - CHARLOTTE ISLAND
If
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FALMYRA
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MAILIN IF EARLTARI ISLANDS
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CANTON ISLAND
-
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MILL ISLAND
ENDERSURY
Promo used
[Moses 4)
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20.000
ISLANDS IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN
SCALE 1400.000
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SEE ALSO-Navy and Interior
folder$for other correspondence
on Canton Island etc.
-
sym confidential
THE COUNSELOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
fale
PSF
January 27, 1938
statmore
Dear Mr. President:
W.
The attached papers pertain to the effort we
have been making to bring about a negotiation with
the British Government relative to the islands of
the Pacific. Included is my letter to you of this
date, and also the draft of a letter you may wish
to approve our sending to the British Ambassador.
The matter has been very carefully considered
by several of the Department officials, and should
you wish to discuss it personally with any of us,
Mr. Moffat, Chief of the European Division, and I
will be at your service for that purpose.
It is perhaps proper that I should emphasize the
point that we all agree that our Government cannot
maintain a claim of ownership of Christmas Island,
the evidence showing that it was not only discovered,
but for a long time has been occupied by the British.
Accordingly, if there is an executive order, you will
wish to consider whether the order should name Christ-
mas along with the other islands. It is also proper
to mention that if action is to be taken by executive
order, the order should be issued in advance of the
sailing of the Coast Guard Cutter Itasca, which expects
to sail from Honolulu to the South Pacific within the
next week or ten days.
Yours very sincerely,
Enclosures:
As stated.
Browltone
The President,
The White House.
PSF: Moore
1state
THE
COUNSELOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
February 26, 1938.
Dear Mr. President:
This refers to the salmon fishing matter,
which I believe you will think ought to be
handled without much delay, in view of the con-
cern felt on the Pacific Coast about further
Japanese activities.
The paper I left you last week is what has
been thought out here as a statement the Japa-
nese Government might concur in being published
as a temporary disposition of the problem. The
idea is that if you approve the statement, it
should be sent to Mr. Grew. Of course it may
not be acceptable to the Japanese, but if accept-
able, our belief is that we will certainly have
no further trouble this year.
When the statement was being put in final
form, Senator Schwellenbach and Mr. Dimond came
to my office, and some suggestions made by the
Senator were adopted. A little later I had a
telephone conversation with Senator Bone, inform-
ing him of what is proposed. While Senator
Schwellenbach seems to be doubtful about the
possibility of effective legislation, Mr. Dimond
is naturally anxious that his bill, which is
pretty drastic, should be enacted, but my belief
is that all of the gentlemen mentioned are willing
to experiment in taking the course now being
proposed.
Yours very sincerely,
The President,
The White House.
Information
m
PSF: she
State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
March 10, 1938.
My dear Mr. President:
You may be interested in knowing that the British
Ambassador sent a note late Tuesday afternoon very
much regretting that we had taken action in regard
to Canton Island and Enderbury Island "without await-
ing their proposals which it is their hope will serve
8.8 a basis for ending an unfortunate controversy in a
manner designed to preserve intact the real interests
of all parties concerned, while rendering of less
importance the vexed question of conflicting claims
to the various islands in the Southern Pacific". (No
indication had ever been received before last Saturday
that such proposals were contemplated or would be forth-
coming.)
The note then continues in reserving British
rights, and concludes with the hope "that no further
difficulties
The President,
The White House.
-2-
difficulties will arise pending the receipt of their
proposals".
As you probably know, Ambassador Kennedy has an
appointment with Lord Halifax this afternoon when he
plans to discuss the general question.
Faithfully yours,
Reselta Mone
Counselor
1/30 appt.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TX
April 13, 1938.
MEMO FOR S. T. E.
I want to see Judge Moore
and Dr. Gruening next Monday.
F.D.R.
friends
/ / SEAL & / / YOU / is 1
1828
TO
// HOTTER 18 4998
SEAL
PSF more
THE COUNSELOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
state
WASHINGTON
April 7, 1938
Dear Colonel Roosevelt:
Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum written
by Mr. Pierrepont Moffat after he and I had talked
with the British Ambassador yesterday. Following
the talk we furnished the Ambassador an Interior
Department press release stating the substance
of the Canton Island permit granted the Pan
American and also informed him that the permit is
revocable at any time without notice. We thought
it was very desirable to indicate to the Ambassador
that perhaps his Government has in mind obtaining
the right to enjoy aviation facilities in Hawaii,
our purpose being to head him away from that possi-
bility.
I am in touch not only with Mr. Moffat but with
Dr. Gruening and as before stated we can see the
President at any time he may appoint.
Yours very sincerely,
Enclosure:
Rewallamon
Memorandum.
Colonel James Roosevelt,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
-
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Date: April 6, 1938
SUBJECT: Canton Island
Participants: The British Ambassador
The Counselor of the State Department
Mr. Pierrepont Moffat
Copies to: C
Interior
U
London
S
Wellington
IC
Sydney
PA/H
Sir Ronald Lindsay called this morning much perturbed
over press reports that the Secretary of the Interior had
given a license to the Pan American Airways to use Canton
Island as a base. He said that he was very much afraid
that this would complicate a final agreement between the
two Governments as to the Islands and wondered whether it
might not have been issued as a means of pressure to ex-
pedite a reply from the British Government to the President's
proposal that the Islands be held as a joint trust. The
Ambassador was assured that the permit had not been issued
as a means of exerting pressure, but had been issued in order
to enable Pan American to make use of the Island. He was
also assured that the permit was revocable on 30 days' notice.
We saw ourselves confronted by two possible alternatives,
either not to use the Island in any way during such period
as discussions were in progress or for both to feel free to
use it, without prejudice to any ultimate agreement to be
reached. Of the two alternatives we very much preferred the
latter. The Ambassador asked for a copy of the permit which
Judge Moore agreed to send him.
Sir Ronald then said that speaking without instructions
but according himself the luxury of thinking aloud, he felt
he should tell us that he had many preoccupations as to the
future. The British Government had been dealing with the
Dominions
-2-
Dominions for months and was just on the point of sending
us a. proposition,- he had even seen a first draft prepared
in the Foreign Office,- when we had taken precipitate action
by sending an expedition to the Island and had shortly there-
after made a proposition in the name of the President that
the Islands be held by the two countries as a. joint trust for
from 25 to 50 years. He asked himself in whose favor the
trust was being held, and the answer was inescapable that
it was for the sole benefit of the two trustees. In other
words, whether we liked it or not we were faced with the
idea of a condominium. He thought that working out the
details of a condominium would be exceedingly difficult
and that carrying out any form of joint administration
would be bound to produce trouble. Mr. Moffat inquired
whether the Ambassador was suggesting a division of the
Island, profiting by its curious geographic formation, 80
that the British, Australians and New Zealanders would ad-
minister one side and the Americans the other. Sir Ronald
replied that he doubted whether such a solution would be
practicable, instancing as a possible difficulty, a situa-
tion where one side of the Island would be wet and the
other side dry. His mind had toyed with the idea of one of
the four interested Powers accepting an administrative mandate
from the others, possibly for a limited period with a system
of rotation, but he was frank to admit that he saw difficulties
even with this plan. He did not know how it would work out
even in the matter of planting palms and eventually of
settling the Island with natives. Perhaps he might be
"seeing spooks" but having successfully passed the hurdle
of differences of principle, he was anxious to avoid practical
difficulties.
Judge Moore told the Ambassador that he had not yet
had an opportunity of discussing the problem with the
President. He was inclined to think that the difficulties
might be solved by exchange of notes whereby the two Govern-
ments would agree that certain administrative measures should
be observed and leave the application of these measures to the
men on the spot, whom both countries would have the interest
in keeping of a high caliber. The bigger question seemed to
him to determine just how many Islands this principle of a
joint trust should apply to. Sir Ronald indicated that the
British Government was making an exceedingly generous offer
in granting full reciprocal use of Pacific Islands for avia-
tion purposes. Judge Moore pointed out that the British note
was ambiguous but that we had been concerned lest they were
ask ing for landing rights in Hawaii. This would raise all
sorts of difficult problems bearing on our defense and on our
relations with other Powers who might feel that we were
discriminating
DOWID
-3-
discriminating against them. Sir Ronald replied that he
was not quite sure what was the intention of his Government
with regard to Hawaii; that he thought the spirit of the
note dealt only with Islands enroute between New Zealand and
Hawaii rather than with the terminals. On the other hand he
admitted that the following sentence in the British note
might be construed in the other sense:
"It is still desired to maintain this offer
which the Governments concerned trust will commend
itself to the United States Government, providing as
it does for a concerted scheme for establishing equal
air facilities on & route where conditions must indef-
initely preclude the existence of competition between
two services using different intermediate stopping
places especially as they must in any case possess
joint terminal facilities".
Pierrepont Moffat
COUNSELOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE. $300
WASHINGTON
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
Secretary to Colonel Roosevelt
department OF STATE
THE COUNSELOR
April 7, 1938.
Attention of Secretary to Colonel
Roosevelt:
This morning Mr. R. Walton
Moore in the State Department sent
a letter to Colonel Roosevelt re-
garding Canton Island and attached
a `memorandum. Will you please be
kind enough to make a correction
in the 19th line of the memo --
the word "former" should be changed
to "latter". Thank you.
Miss Mullen
Br. 324
BSF: Moore
State
THE COUNSELOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
February 8, 1939.
Dear Mr. President:
Your letter to Judge Roberts is fine and
ought to have an excellent effect, particularly
in Virginia.
While the Virginia Senators claim to be
Jeffersonian Democrats, they apparently are not
in accord with the view expressed by Jefferson
in a letter to Gallatin relative to Senate action
on appointments, as see the enclosure herewith.
You will notice from the other enclosure Alexander
Hamilton agreed with Jefferson.
I have been intimate with Senator Glass for
many years; was his deskmate in the Constitutional
Convention of Virginia; and subsequently served
with him in Congress after he was appointed to
the Senate, and deeply regret that he becomes
more autocratic and bitter with the advance of
years as evidenced by the fierce and heartless
spirit he has shown in the present case. To
him might be applied the lines which John Quincy
Adams when 8 member of the House used in a debate
with another Virginian, John Randolph of Roanoke.
Randolph having made some vituperative observations,
Adams pointing his finger at him quoted from Ovid:
"Pallid is his face,
Gaunt is his body,
His breast is green with gall,
His tongue drips poison.'
The President
The White House.
- 2 -
I am reliably informed that the public
interests will not be affected by any delay
in appointing a successor to Roberts, and
venture to suggest that great care should be
taken in selecting a high class lawyer of
irreproachable character who is friendly to
the Administration.
Yours very sincerely,
Pinnettin Morn
(Enclosure to letter from R. Walton Moore to The President)
Alexander Hamilton wrote on March 11, 1788:
"It will be the office of the President to nomin-
ate, and, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to
appoint. There will, of course, be no exertion of
choice on the part of the Senate. They may defeat one
choice of the Executive, and oblige him to make another;
but they cannot themselves choose - they can only
ratify or reject the choice of the President. They
might even entertain a preference to some other person,
at the very moment they were assenting to the one pro-
posed, because there might be no positive ground of
opposition to him; and they could not be sure, if they
withheld their assent, that the subsequent nomination
would fall upon their own favorite, or upon any other
person in their estimation more meritorious than the
one rejected. Thus it could hardly happen, that the
majority of the Senate would feel any other complacency
towards the object of an appointment than such as the
appearances of merit might inspire, and the proofs of
the want of it destroy. (Federalist: Lodge, The
Works of Alexander Hamilton, XII, 167)
(Enclosure to letter from R. Walton Moore to The President)
President Jefferson wrote to the Secretary of the
Treasury, Albert Gallatin, on February 10, 1803:
"I have always considered the controul of the
Senate as meant to prevent any bias or favoritism in
the President towards his own relations, his own re-
ligion, towards particular states &c. and perhaps to
keep very abnoxious persons out of offices of the
first grade. But in all subordinate cases I have ever
thought that the selection made by the President ought
to inspire a general confidence that it has been made
on due inquiry and investigation of character, and
that the Senate should interpose their negative only in
those particular cases where something happens to be
within their knowlege, against the character of the
person and unfitting him for the appointment."
(Ford, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, VIII, 211)
45F, merre
TSF,
State
moore
Washington, D. C.
February 14, 1939.
Since there has been considerable discussion of
the question of rotation in the office of President,
I have had a careful investigation made with the result
of the attached memorandum being prepared, which I believe
sets forth more fully than any previous compilation
what has been done and said relative to that question.
As appears from his statement cited on page 11 of
the memorandum it is not true, as often assumed, that
General Washington was opposed to the President filling
more than two terms. It is altogether probable that, ex-
cept for realizing the failure of his physical and mental
strength, he would have consented to remain in office for
more than two terms.
It seems very clear that the custom which has been
observed had its genesis with Jefferson, who was influenced
by his fear that a monarchy might be substituted for our
system of government. This view is supported by several
statements of his cited in the memorandum. Even so, I do
not feel certain that Jefferson would have declined to
accede to the strong desire that he should serve for B.
80
third term, but for being/greatly worn by his long political
service he felt unequal to the task of carrying on. It is
interesting
- 2 -
interesting to note that in initiating what became a
custom he had to combat the views of many strong statesmen.
In recent times no one has more convincingly argued
against rigid and blind adhorence to the custom than
Senator Borah, who is quoted on pages 25 and 29 of the
memorandum.
The logic of the contention that an individual
should not serve for more than two terms might actually
lead to the overthrow of our institutions, the very thing
feared by Jefferson. It is at least conceivable, though
not likely, that there would in some given case be an
irrestibile necessity for the service of a man who had
already been in office two terms.
This little summary has exclusive reference to the
historical aspect of the question and not to the manner
in which it may be dealt with in any particular case.
THE THIRD TERM QUESTION, 1787-1928
Page
1. Statements by Delegates to the Constitutional Con-
vention of 1787
James Wilson
1,2
James Madison
1,3
Roger Sherman
1,3
George Mason
1,3,8
Gouverneur Morris
1,3
Rufus King
2
Hugh Williamson
2
Oliver Ellsworth
2
Charles Pinckney
3
Luther Martin
4
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney
4
Alexander Hamilton
5
Edmund Randolph
9
William R. Davie
9
Benjamin Franklin
9,10
2. Constitutional Amendments Proposed by State Ratify-
ing Conventions, 1788
10
3. George Washington's Attitude
11
4. Thomas Jefferson's Attitude
15
5. Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 1824
19
6. Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 1826
19
7. James Buchanan, February 6, 1829
20
8. Andrew Jackson, December 6, 1830
20
9. John Quincy Adams, April 30, 1839
21
10. William Henry Harrison, March 4, 1841
21
11. Ulyases S. Grant, 1875
22
12. Resolution of the House of Representatives,
December 15, 1875
22
13. Rutherford B. Hayes, March 5, 1877
22
14. Ulysses S. Grant, March 25, 1880
22
15. Resolution of the Republican Anti-Third Term Con-
vention, St. Louis, Missouri, May 6, 1880
23
16. Grover Cleveland, August 18, 1884
24
17. Platform of the Democratic Party, 1896
24
18. Benjamin Harrison, 1897
24
19. William McKinley, June 10, 1901
25
20. Theodore Roosevelt, November 1904
25
-2-
Page
21. Platform of the Democratic Party, 1912
25
22. William E. Borah, August 20, 1912
25
23. Proposed Constitutional Amendment, February 1, 1913
27
24. Woodrow Wilson, February 5, 1913
27
25. Theodore Roosevelt, 1913
28
26. William Howard Taft, 1915
29
27. William E. Borah, February 7, 9, 10, 1928
29
28. Joseph T. Robinson, February 10, 1928
31
29. Resolution of the Senate, February 10, 1928
31
THE THIRD TERM QUESTION, 1787-1928
1. STATEMENTS BY DELEGATES TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF 1787
JAMES WILSON, June 1, 1787.
Rendering the executive ineligible [18] an infringement of
the right of election. (Hamilton's notes, House Document 398,
69th Congress, 1st session, 914)
JAMES MADISON, June 1, 1787.
Mr. Maddison observed that to prevent & Man from holding
an Office longer than he ought, he may for mal-practice be im-
peached and removed; - he is not for any ineligibility.
(Pierce's notes, ibid., 91)
ROGER SHERMAN, June 1, 1787.
Mr. Sherman was for three years, and agst. the doctrine
of rotation as throwing out of office the men best qualifyed
to execute its duties. (Madison's notes, ibid., 135)
GEORGE MASON, June 1, 1787.
Mr. Mason was ... for prohibiting a re-eligibility as the
best expedient both for preventing the effect of a false com-
plaisance on the side of the Legislature towards unfit charac-
ters; and a temptation on the side of the Executive to intrigue
with the Legislature for a re-appointment. (Madison's notes,
ibid., 135)
GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, July 17, 1787.
Mr. Govr. Morris espoused the motion. The ineligibility
proposed by the clause as it stood tended to destroy the great
motive to good behavior, the hope of being rewarded by a re-
appointment. It was saying to him, make hay while the sun
shines. (Madison's notes, ibid., 396)
GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, July 19, 1787.
He finds too that the Executive is not to be re-eligible.
What effect will this have? 1. it will destroy the great in-
citement to merit public esteem by taking away the hope of
being rewarded with a reappointment. It may give a dangerous
turn to one of the strongest passions in the human breast.
The love of fame is the great spring to noble & illustrious
actions. Shut the Civil road to Glory & he may be compelled
to seek it by the sword. 2. It will tempt him to make the
most of the short space of time allotted him, to accumulate
wealth and provide for his friends. 3. It will produce viola-
tions of the very constitution it is meant to secure. In
moments of pressing danger the tried abilities and established
character of 8. favorite Magistrate will prevail over respect
for the forms of the Constitution. (Madison's notes, ibid.,
409)
RUFUS KING
-2-
RUFUS KING, July 19, 1787.
Mr. King did not like the ineligibility. He thought
there was great force in the remark of Mr. Sherman, that he
who has proved himself to be most fit for an Office, ought
not to be excluded by the constitution from holding it. He
would therefore prefer any other reasonable plan that could
be substituted. He was much disposed to think that in such
cases the people at large would chuse wisely. (Madison's
notes, ibid., 412)
HUGH WILLIAMSON, July 24, 1787.
Mr. Williamson was for going back to the original ground;
to elect the Executive for 7 years and render him ineligible
a 2d. time. He will spare no pains to keep himself in for
life, and will then lay a train for the succession of his
children. It was pretty certain he thought that we should at
some time or other have a King; but he wished no precaution to
be omitted that might postpone the event as long as possible. -
Ineligibility a 2d. time appeared to him to be the best pre-
caution. With this precaution he had no objection to a longer
term than 7 years. He would go as far as to 10 or 12 years.
(Madison's notes, 1b1d., 442-443)
OLIVER ELLSWORTH, July 24, 1787.
The Executive he thought should be reelected if his con-
duct proved him worthy of it. And he will be more likely to
render himself, worthy of it if he be rewardable with it. The
most eminent characters also will be more willing to accept
the trust under this condition, than if they foresee a neces-
sary degradation at a fixt period. (Madison's notes, ibid.,
444)
JAMES WILSON, July 24, 1787.
It seemed to be supposed that at a certain advance in
life, a continuance in office would cease to be agreeable to
the officer, as well as desirable to the public. Experience
had shewn in a variety of instances that both a capacity & in-
clination for public service existed - in very advanced stages.
He mentioned the instance of a Doge of Venice who was elected
after he was 80 years of age. The popes have generally been
elected at very advanced periods, and yet in no case had a
more steady or a better concerted policy been pursued than in
the Court of Rome. If the Executive should come into office
at 35. years of age, which he presumes may happen & his con-
tinuance should be fixt at 15 years. at the age of 50. in the
very prime of life, and with all the aid of experience, he
must be cast aside like a useless hulk. What an irreparable
loss would the British Jurisprudence have sustained, had the
age of 50. been fixt there as the ultimate limit of capacity
or readiness to serve the public. The great luminary [L.
Manafield] held his seat for thirty years after his arrival
at that age. (Madison's notes, ibid., 444-445)
GOUVERNEUR MORRIS
-3-
GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, July 24, 1787.
In order to get rid of the dependence of the Executive on
the Legislature, the expedient of making him ineligible a 2d.
time had been devised. This was as much as to say we shd.
give him the benefit of experience, and then deprive ourselves
of the use of it. But make him ineligible a 2d. time - and
prolong his duration even to 15-years, will he by any wonder-
ful interposition of providence at that period cease to be a
man? No he will be unwilling to quit his exaltation, the road
to his object thro' the Constitution will be shut; he will be
in possession of the sword, a civil war will ensue, and the
Commander of the victorious army on which ever side, will be
the despot of America. (Madison's notes, ibid., 446-447)
GEORGE MASON, July 26, 1787.
He conceived at the same time that a second election
ought to be absolutely prohibited. Having for his primary
object, for the pole-star of his political conduct, the pres-
ervation of the rights of the people, he held it as an essen-
tial point, as the very palladium of Civil liberty, that the
great officers of State, and particularly the Executive should
at fixed periods return to that mass from which they were at
first taken, in order that they may feel & respect those rights
& interests, which are again to be personally valuable to them.
(Madison's notes, 1b1d., 457)
[On September 4 and 5, 1787 the Convention discussed a committee
proposal, which later became a part of the Constitution, for
election of the Executive by electors, with no prohibition of
reelection.]
ROGER SHERMAN, September 4, 1787.
Mr. Sherman said the object of this clause of the report
of the Committee was to get rid of the ineligibility, which
was attached to the mode of election by the Legislature, & to
render the Executive independent of the Legislature.
(Madison's notes, ibid., 662)
GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, September 4, 1787.
Mr. Govr. Morris said he would give the reasons of the
Committee and his own. The lst. was the danger of intrigue &
faction if the appointmt. should be made by the Legislature.
2. the inconveniency of an ineligibility required by that mode
in order to lessen its evils. (Madison's notes, 1b1d., 662)
CHARLES PINCKNEY, September 5, 1787.
Mr. Pinkney renewed his opposition to the mode, arguing
This change in the mode of election was meant to get rid
of the ineligibility of the President a second time, whereby
he will become fixed for life under the auspices of the Senate.
(Madison's notes, 1b1d., 668)
JAMES MADISON, in a letter to Thomas Jefferson, October 24, 1787.
As to the duration in office, a few would have preferred
& tenure during good behaviour - a considerable number would
have done so in case an easy & effectual removal by impeachment
could be settled. It was much agitated whether a long term,
seven years for example, with & subsequent & perpetual ineli-
gibility, or a short term with a capacity to be re-elected,
should
-4-
should be fixed. In favor of the first opinion were urged the
danger of a gradual degeneracy of re-elections from time to
time, into first & life and then a hereditary tenure, and the
favorable effect of an incapacity to be reappointed on the
independent exercise of the Executive authority. On the other
side it was contended that the prospect of necessary degrada-
tion would discourage the most dignified characters from aspir-
ing to the office, would take away the principal motive to ye.
faithful discharge of its duties - the hope of being rewarded
with a reappointment would stimulate ambition to violent efforts
for holding over the Constitutional term - and instead of pro-
duoing an independent administration, and a firmer defence of
the constitutional rights of the department, would render the
officer more indifferent to the importance of a place which he
would soon be obliged to quit forever, and more ready to yield
to the encroachmts. of the Legislature of which he might again
be a member. (Hunt, The Writings of James Madison, V, 21)
LUTHER MARTIN, in the Maryland House of Delegates,
November 29, 1787.
There was a party who attempted to have the President ap-
pointed during good behaviour, without any limitation as to
time; and, not being able to succeed in that attempt, they then
endeavoured to have him re8ligible without any restraint. It
was objected, that the choice of a President to continue in
office during good behaviour, would be at once rendering our
system an elective monarchy; and, that if the President was to
be reëligible without any interval of disqualification, it
would amount nearly to the same thing; since with the powers
that the President is to enjoy, and the interests and influ-
ence with which they will be attended, he will be almost
absolutely certain of being reelected, from time to time, as
long as he lives. As the propositions were reported by the
committee of the whole House, the President was to be chosen
for seven years, and not to be eligible, at any time after. In
the same manner the proposition was agreed to in convention,
and so it was reported by the committee of detail, although a
variety of attempts were made to alter that part of the system,
by those who were of a contrary opinion, in which they re-
peatedly failed; but, Sir, by never losing sight of their
object, and choosing a proper time for their purpose, they
succeeded at length in obtaining the alteration, which was not
made until within the last twelve days before the convention
adjourned. (Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of
1787, III, 216)
CHARLES COTESWORTH PINCKNEY, in the South Carolina Convention,
January 18, 1788.
He said, that the time for which the President should hold
his office, and whether he should be reëligible, had been fully
discussed in the Convention. It had been once agreed to by a
majority, that he should hold his office for the term of seven
years, but should not be re8lected a second time. But upon
reconsidering that article, it was thought that to out off all
hopes from a man of serving again in that elevated station,
might render him dangerous, or perhaps indifferent to the
faithful discharge of his duty. His term of service might
expire during the raging of war, when he might, perhaps, be
the most capable man in America to conduct it; and would it be
wise
-5-
wise and prudent to declare in our Constitution that such a
man should not again direct our military operations, though
our success might be owing to his abilities? The mode of
electing the President rendered undue influence almost impos-
sible; and it would have been imprudent in us to have put it
out of our power to reëlect a man whose talents, abilities, and
integrity, were such as to render him the object of the general
choice of his country. (Elliot, The Debates in the Several
State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution,
IV, 315)
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, in the New York Packet, March 21, 1788.
With a positive duration of considerable extent, I con-
nect the circumstance of reëligibility. The first is necessary
to give to the officer himself the inclination and the resolu-
tion to act his part well, and to the community time and leisure
to observe the tendency of his measures, and thence to form an
experimental estimate of their merits. The last is necessary
to enable the people, when they see reason to approve of his
conduct, to continue him in his station, in order to prolong
the utility of his talents and virtues, and to secure to the
government the advantage of permanency in a wise system of ad-
ministration.
Nothing appears more plausible at first sight, nor more
ill-founded upon close inspection, than a scheme which in rela-
tion to the present point has had some respectable advocates, -
I mean that of continuing the chief magistrate in office for a
certain time, and then excluding him from it, either for a
limited period or forever after. This exclusion, whether tem-
porary or perpetual, would have nearly the same effects, and
these effects would be for the most part rather pernicious than
salutary.
One 111 effect of the exclusion would be a diminution of
the inducements to good behavior. There are few men who would
not feel much less zeal in the discharge of a duty, when they
were conscious that the advantages of the station with which
it was connected must be relinquished at a determinate period,
than when they were permitted to entertain a hope of obtaining,
by meriting, a continuance of them. This position will not be
disputed so long 0.8 it is admitted that the desire of reward
is one of the strongest incentives of human conduct; or that
the best security for the fidelity of mankind is to make their
interest coincide with their duty. Even the love of fame, the
ruling passion of the noblest minds, which would prompt a man
to plan and undertake extensive and arduous enterprises for the
public benefit, requiring considerable time to mature and per-
fect them, if he could flatter himself with the prospect of
being allowed to finish what he had begun, would, on the con-
trary, deter him from the undertaking, when he foresaw that he
must quit the scene before he could accomplish the work, and
must commit that, together with his own reputation, to hands
which might be unequal or unfriendly to the task. The most to
be expected from the generality of men, in such a. situation,
is the negative merit of not doing harm, instead of the posi-
tive merit of doing good.
Another
-6-
Another 111 effect of the exclusion would be the tempta-
tion to sordid views, to peculation, and, in some instances,
to usurpation. An avaricious man, who might happen to fill the
office, looking forward to a time when he must at all events
yield up the emoluments he enjoyed, would feel a. propensity,
not easy to be resisted by such a man, to make the best use of
the opportunity he enjoyed while it lasted, and might not
scruple to have recourse to the most corrupt expedients to make
the harvest as abundant as it was transitory; though the same
man, probably, with a different prospect before him, might con-
tent himself with the regular perquisites of his situation, and
might even be unwilling to risk the consequences of an abuse
of his opportunities. His avarice might be a guard upon his
avarice. Add to this that the same man might be vain or ambi-
tious, as well as avaricious. And if he could expect to pro-
long his honors by his good conduct, he might hesitate to
sacrifice his appetite for them to his appetite for gain. But
with the prospect before him of approaching an inevitable anni-
hilation, his avarice would be likely to get the victory over
his caution, his vanity, or his ambition.
An ambitious man, too, when he found himself seated on
the summit of his country's honors, when he looked forward to
the time at which he must descend from the exalted eminence
for ever, and reflected that no exertion of merit on his part
could save him from the unwelcome reverse; such a man, in such
a situation, would be much more violently tempted to embrace a
favorable conjuncture for attempting the prolongation of his
power, at every personal hazard, than if he had the probability
of answering the same end by doing his duty.
Would it promote the peace of the community, or the sta-
bility of the government to have half a dozen men who had had
credit enough to be raised to the seat of the supreme magis-
tracy, wandering among the people like discontented ghosts, and
sighing for a place which they were destined never more to
possess?
A third 111 effect of the exclusion would be, the depriv-
ing the community of the advantage of the experience gained by
the chief magistrate in the exercise of his office. That
experience 1s the parent of wisdom, is an adage the truth of
which 1a recognized by the wisest as well as the simplest of
mankind. What more desirable or more essential than this
quality in the governors of nations? Where more desirable or
more essential than in the first magistrate of B. nation? Can
it be wise to put this desirable and essential quality under
the ban of the Constitution, and to declare that the moment it
is acquired, its possessor shall be compelled to abandon the
station in which it was acquired, and to which it is adapted?
This, nevertheless, 1s the precise import of all those regula-
tions which exclude men from serving their country, by the
choice of their fellow-citizens, after they have by a course
of service fitted themselves for doing it with 8. greater degree
of utility.
A fourth 111 effect of the exclusion would be the banish-
ing men from stations in which, in certain emergencies of the
state, their presence might be of the greatest moment to the
public interest or safety. There is no nation which has not,
at one period or another, experienced an absolute necessity
of
-7-
of the services of particular men in particular situations;
perhaps it would not be too strong to say, to the preservation
of its political existence. How unwise, therefore, must be
every such self-denying ordinance as serves to prohibit a nation
from making use of its own citizens in the manner best suited
to its exigencies and circumstances: Without supposing the per-
sonal essentiality of the man, it is evident that a change of
the chief magistrate, at the breaking out of a war, or at any
similar crisis, for another, even of equal merit, would at all
times be detrimental to the community, inasmuch as it would
substitute inexperience to experience, and would tend to un-
hinge and set afloat the already settled train of the adminis-
tration.
A fifth 111 effect of the exclusion would be, that it would
operate as a constitutional interdiction of stability in the
administration. By necessitating a change of men, in the first
office of the nation, it would necessitate a mutability of
measures. It is not generally to be expected, that men will
vary and measures remain uniform. The contrary is the usual
course of things. And we need not be apprehensive that there
will be too much stability, while there is even the option of
changing; nor need we desire to prohibit the people from con-
tinuing their confidence where they think it may be safely
placed, and where, by constancy on their part, they may obviate
the fatal inconveniences of fluctuating councils and a variable
policy.
These are some of the disadvantages which would flow from
the principle of exclusion. They apply most foroibly to the
scheme of a perpetual exclusion; but when we consider that
even a partial exclusion would always render the readmission
of the person a remote and precarious object, the observations
which have been made will apply nearly as fully to one case as
to the other.
What are the advantages promised to counterbalance these
disadvantages? They are represented to be: 1st, greater in-
dependence in the magistrate; 2d, greater security to the
people. Unless the exclusion be perpetual, there will be no
pretence to infer the first advantage. But even in that case,
may he have no object beyond his present station, to which he
may sacrifice his independence? May he have no connections,
no friends, for whom he may sacrifice it? May he not be less
willing, by a firm conduct, to make personal enemies, when he
acts under the impression that a time 1a fast approaching, on
the arrival of which he not only MAY, but MUST, be exposed to
their resentments, upon an equal, perhaps upon an inferior,
footing? It is not an easy point to determine whether his
independence would be most promoted or impaired by such an
arrangement.
As to the second supposed advantage, there is still
greater reason to entertain doubts concerning it. If the ex-
clusion were to be perpetual, a man of irregular ambition, of
whom alone there could be reason in any case to entertain
apprehension, would, with infinite reluctance, yield to the
necessity of taking his leave forever of a post in which his
passion for power and predminence had acquired the force of
habit. And if he had been fortunate or adroit enough to
conciliate the good-will of the people, he might induce them
to
-8-
to consider as & very odious and unjustifiable restraint upon
themselves, a provision which was calculated to debar them of
the right of giving & fresh proof of their attachment to a
favorite. There may be conceived circumstances in which this
disgust of the people, seconding the thwarted ambition of such
a favorite, might occasion greater danger to liberty, than
could ever reasonably be dreaded from the possibility of a per-
petuation in office, by the voluntary suffrages of the commun-
ity, exercising a constitutional privilege.
There is an excess of refinement in the idea of disabling
the people to continue in office men who had entitled them-
selves, in their opinion, to approbation and confidence; the
advantages of which are at best speculative and equivocal, and
are overbalanced by disadvantages far more certain and decisive.
(Lodge, The Federalist, No. LXXII, 451-455)
GEORGE MASON, in the Virginia Convention, June 17, 1788.
The President is elected without rotation. It may be said
that a new election may remove him, and place another in his
stead. If we judge from the experience of all other countries,
and even our own, we may conclude that, as the President of the
United States may be re8lected, so he will. How 18 it in every
government where rotation is not required? Is there & single
instance of a great man not being reelected? Our governor is
obliged to return, after a given period, to a private station.
It is so in most of the states. This President will be elected
time after time: he will be continued in office for life. If
we wish to change him, the great powers in Europe will not
allow us.
Will not the great powers of Europe, as France and Great
Britain, be interested in having a friend in the President of
the United States? and will they not be more interested in his
election than in that of the king of Poland? The people of
Poland have a right to displace their king. But do they ever
do it? No. Prussia and Russia, and other European powers,
would not suffer it. This clause will open & door to the
dangers and misfortunes which the people of Poland undergo.
The powers of Europe will interpose, and we shall have 8. civil
war in the bowels of our country, and be subject to all the
horrors and calamities of an elective monarchy. This very
executive officer may, by consent of Congress, receive a stated
pension from European potentates. This is not an idea alto-
gether new in America. It is not many years ago - since the
revolution - that a foreign power offered emoluments to persons
holding offices under our government. It will, moreover, be
difficult to know whether he receives emoluments from foreign
powers or not. The electors, who are to meet in each state to
vote for him, may be easily influenced. To prevent the cer-
tain evils of attempting to elect a new President, it will be
necessary to continue the old one. The only way to alter this
would be to render him ineligible after a certain number of
years, and then no foreign nation would interfere to keep in a
man who was utterly ineligible. Nothing 18 so essential to
the preservation of & republican government as a periodical
rotation. Nothing so strongly impels a man to regard the inter-
est of his constituents as the certainty of returning to the
general mass of the people, from whence he was taken, where he
must participate their burdens. It is a great defect in the
Senate
-9-
Senate that they are not ineligible at the end of six years.
The biennial exclusion of one third of them will have no ef-
fect, as they can be redlected. Some stated time ought to be
fixed when the President ought to be reduced to a private sta-
tion. I should be contented that he might be elected for eight
years; but I would wish him to be capable of holding the office
only eight years out of twelve or sixteen years. But, 0.5 it
now stands, he may continue in office for life; or, in other
words, it will be an elective monarchy. (Elliot, op. cit., III,
484-485)
EDMUND RANDOLPH, in the Virginia Convention, June 17, 1788.
I will acknowledge that, at one stage of this business,
I had embraced the idea of the honorable gentleman, that the
reëligibility of the President was improper. But I will
acknowledge that, on a further consideration of the subject,
and attention to the lights which were thrown upon it by others,
I altered my opinion of the limitation of his eligibility.
When we consider the advantages arising to us from it, we can-
not object to it. That which has produced my opinion against
the limitation of his eligibility is this - that it renders him
more independent in his place, and more solicitous of promoting
the interest of his constituents; for, unless you put it in his
power to be reelected, instead of being attentive to their
interests, he will lean to the augmentation of his private
emoluments. (Ib1d., 485-486)
WILLIAM R. DAVIE, in the North Carolina Convention, July 26,
1788.
A dispute arose in the Convention concerning the re8ligi-
bility of the President. It was the opinion of the deputation
from this state, that he should be elected for five or seven
years, and be afterwards ineligible.
A large and very
respectable majority were of the contrary opinion. It was said
that such an exclusion would be improper for many reasons; that
if an enlightened, upright man had discharged the duties of
the office ably and faithfully, it would be depriving the people
of the benefit of his ability and experience, though they highly
approved of him; that it would render the President less ardent
in his endeavors to acquire the esteem and approbation of his
country, if he knew that he would be absolutely excluded after
a given period; and that it would be depriving a man of singu-
lar merit even of the rights of citizenship. It was also said,
that the day might come, when the confidence of America would
be put in one man, and that it might be dangerous to exclude
such a man from the service of his country. (Ibid., IV, 103-104)
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, letter to the Due de la Rochefoucauld,
October 22, 1788.
Many, if I remember right, were for making the President
incapable of being chosen after the first four Years; but &
Majority were for leaving the Election free to chuse whom they
pleas'd; and it was alledged that such Incapability might tend
to make the President less attentive to the duties of his
Office, and to the Interests of the People, than he would be
if & second Choice depended on their good Opinion of them.
(Smyth, The Writings of Benjamin Franklin, IX, 666)
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN
-10-
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, letter to M. Le Veillard, October 24, 1788.
You seem to me to be so apprehensive about our President's
being perpetual. Neither he nor we have any such intention.
What danger there may be of such an event we are all aware of,
and shall take care effectually to prevent it. The choice is
from four years to four years; the appointments will be small;
thus we may change our President if we don't like his conduct,
and he will have less inducement to struggle for a new elec-
tion. (Ibid., 674)
[Several members of the convention were willing that the
president should hold office during good behavior, and Hamil-
ton expressed a preference for life tenure, subject to removal
by impeachment. The prevailing sentiment, however, favored a
fixed term, and the question narrowed down to a seven-year term
without the privilege of re-election or a four-year term with
no restriction in the latter respect. At one stage of the dis-
cussion the seven-year plan was adopted. But when it became
clear that the president was not to be chosen by Congress, the
main objection to re-eligibility was removed; and the four-
year term was substituted, with no restriction on the number
of times that a man might be chosen to the office.
(Frederic A. 0gg and P. Orman Ray, Introduction to American
Government, 1925 ed., 199)
It is a usage of American government, again, that no
one shall serve more than two terms in the White House, but
whether this usage has become so strong as to be unbreakable,
the future alone can determine. At any rate it is far from
what the framers of the constitution intended. (William B.
Munro, The Government of the United States, National, State,
and Local, 1925 ed., 81)]
2. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS PROPOSED BY STATE
RATIFYING CONVENTIONS, 1788
VIRGINIA, June 27, 1788.
That no person shall be capable of being President of the
United States for more than eight years in any term of sixteen
years. (House Document 398, 69th Congress, 1st session, 1032)
NEW YORK, July 26, 1788.
That no Person shall be eligible to the Office of Presi-
dent of the United States a third time. (Ibid., 1042)
NORTH CAROLINA, August 1, 1788.
That no person shall be capable of being president of the
United States for more than eight years in any term of sixteen
years. (Ib1d., 1049)
3.
-11-
3.
GEORGE WASHINGTON'S ATTITUDE
WASHINGTON, Letter to Lafayette, April 28, 1788.
There are other points in which opinions would be more
likely to vary. As for instance, on the ineligibility of the
same person for president, after he should have served a cer-
tain course of years. Guarded so effectually as the proposed
constitution 1s, in respect to the prevention of bribery and
undue influence in the choice of president, I confess I differ
widely myself from Mr. Jefferson and you, as to the necessity
or expediency of rotation in that appointment. The matter was
fairly discussed in the convention, and to my full conviction,
though I cannot have time or room to sum up the argument in
this letter. There cannot in my judgment be the least danger,
that the president will by any practicable intrigue ever be
able to continue himself one moment in office, much less per-
petuate himself in it, but in the last stage of corrupted
morals and political depravity; and even then, there is as
much danger that any other species of domination would prevail.
Though, when a people shall have become incapable of governing
themselves, and fit for a master, it is of little consequence
from what quarter he comes. Under an extended view of this
part of the subject, I can see no propriety in precluding our-
selves from the services of any man, who on some great emer-
gency shall be deemed universally most capable of serving the
public. (Ford, The Writings of Washington, XI, 257)
WASHINGTON, Memorandum by Jefferson of a Conversation,
February 29, 1792.
He [Washington] ... said in an affectionate tone, that he
had felt much concern at an expression which dropped from me
yesterday, and which marked my intention of retiring when he
should. That as to himself, many motives obliged him to it.
He had, through the whole course of the war, and most particu-
larly at the close of it, uniformly declared his resolution to
retire from public affairs, and never to act in any public
office; that he had retired under that firm resolution: that
the government, however, which had been formed, being found
evidently too inefficacious, and it being supposed that his aid
was of some consequence towards bringing the people to consent
to one of sufficient efficacy for their own good, he consented
to come into the convention, and on the same motive, after much
pressing, to take a part in the new government, and get it
under way. That were he to continue longer, it might give room
to say, that having tasted the sweets of office, he could not
do without them: that he really felt himself growing old, his
bodily health less firm, his memory, always bad, becoming worse,
and perhaps the other faculties of his mind showing a decay to
others of which he WB.S insensible himself; that this apprehen-
sion particularly oppressed him: that he found, moreover, his
activity lessened, business therefore more irksome, and tran-
quility and retirement become an irresistible passion.
(Washington, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, IX, 102)
WASHINGTON,
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WASHINGTON, Letter to Madison, May 20, 1792.
I have not been unmindful of the sentiments expressed by
you in the conversations just alluded to:--on the contrary I
have again, and again revolved them with thoughtful anxiety;
but without being able to dispose my mind to a longer continua-
tion in the office I now have the honor to hold. therefore
still look forward to the fulfilment of my fondest and most
ardent wishes to spend the remainder of my days (which I can-
not expect will be many) in ease and tranquillity.
Nothing short of conviction that my deriliction of the
Chair of Government (if it should be the desire of the people
to continue me in 1t) would involve the Country in serious dis-
putes respecting the chief Magestrate, and the disagreeable
consequences which might result there from in the floating and
divided opinions which seem to prevail at present, could, in
any wise, induce me to relinquish the determination I have
formed: and of this I do not see how any evidence can be ob-
tained previous to the Election. My vanity, I am sure is not
of that cast to allow me to view the subject in this light.
Under these impressions then, permit me to reiterate the
request I made to you at our last meeting--namely, to think of
the proper time, and the best mode of announcing the intention;
and that you would prepare the latter In revolving this sub-
ject myself, my judgment has always been embarrassed.- the
one hand, a previous declaration to retire, not only carries
with it the appearance of vanity and self-importance, but it
may be construed into a manoeuvre to be invited to remain.--
And on the other hand, to say nothing, implys consent; or, at
any rate, would leave the matter in doubt; and to decline after-
wards might be deemed as bad, and uncandid. ...
I will, without apology, desire (if the measure in itself
should strike you as proper, and likely to produce public good,
or private honor) that you would turn your thoughts to a vale-
dictory address from me to the public, expressing in plain and
modest terms, that having been honored with the Presidential
chair, and to the best of my abilities contributed to the or-
ganization and administration of the government--that having
arrived at a period of life when the private walks of it, in
the shade of retirement, becomes necessary and will be most
pleasing to me;--and the spirit of the government may render &
rotation in the elective officers of it more congenial with
their ideas of liberty and safety, that I take my leave of them
as a public man. (Ford, The Writings of Washington, XII,
123-126)
WASHINGTON, Farewell Address, September 17, 1796.
The period for a new election of a citizen to administer
the Executive Government of the United States being not far
distant, and the time actually arrived when your thoughts must
be employed in designating the person who is to be clothed
with that important trust, it appears to me proper, especially
as it may conduce to & more distinct expression of the public
voice, that I should not apprise you of the resolution I have
formed to decline being considered among the number of those
out of whom & choice is to be made.
The
-13-
The acceptance of and continuance hitherto in the office
to which your suffrages have twice called me have been a uni-
form sacrifice of inclination to the opinion of duty and to a
deference for what appeared to be your desire. I constantly
hoped that it would have been much earlier in my power, consis-
tently with motives which I was not at liberty to disregard,
to return to that retirement from which I had been reluctantly
drawn. The strength of my inclination to do this previous to
the last election had even led to the preparation of an address
to declare it to you; but mature reflection on the then per-
plexed and critical posture of our affairs with foreign nations
and the unanimous advice of persons entitled to my confidence
impelled me to abandon the idea. I rejoice that the state of
your concerns, external as well as internal, no longer renders
the pursuit of inclination incompatible with the sentiment of
duty or propriety, and am persuaded, whatever partiality may
be retained for my services, that in the present circumstances
of our country you will not disapprove my determination to
retire.
The impressions with which I first undertook the arduous
trust were explained on the proper occasion. In the discharge
of this trust I will only say that I have, with good intentions,
contributed toward the organization and administration of the
Government the best exertions of which a very fallible judgment
was capable. Not unconscious in the outset of the inferiority
of my qualifications, experience in my own eyes, perhaps still
more in the eyes of others, has strengthened the motives to
diffidence of myself; and every day the increasing weight of
years admonished me more and more that the shade of retirement
is 6.8 necessary to me as it will be welcome. Satisfied that if
any circumstances have given peculiar value to my services they
were temporary, I have the consolation to believe that, while
choice and prudence invite me to quit the political scene, patri-
otism does not forbid it. (Richardson, Messages and Papers of
the Presidents, I, 213-214)
WASHINGTON, Letter to Jonathan Trumbull, July 21, 1799.
It would be matter of sore regret to me, if I could believe
that a serious thought was turned towards me as his [Adams]
successor, not only as it respects my ardent wishes to pass
through the vale of life in retirement, undisturbed in the
remnant of the days I have to sojourn here, unless called upon
to defend my country (which every citizen is bound to do), but
on public ground also; for, although I have abundant cause to
be thankful for the good health with which I am blessed, yet I
an not insensible to my declination in other respects. It
would be criminal, therefore, in me, although it would be the
wish of my countrymen, and I could be elected, to accept an
office under this conviction, which another would discharge
with more ability; and this, too, at a time when I am thoroughly
convinced I should not draw a single vote from the anti-Federal
side, and, of course, should stand upon no other ground than
any other Federal character well supported; and, when I should
become a mark for the shafts of envenomed malice and the basest
calumny to fire at, - when I should be charged not only with
irresolution, but with concealed ambition, which waits only an
occasion to blaze out, - and, in short, with dotage and im-
becility.
All
-14-
All this, I grant, ought to be like dust in the balance,
when put in competition with a great public good, when the
accomplishment of it is apparent. But, as no problem is better
defined in my mind than that principle, not men, is now, and
will be, the object of contention; and that I could not obtain
B. solitary vote from that party; that any other respectable
Federal character would receive the same suffrages that I
should; that at my time of life (verging towards threescore and
ten) I should expose myself, without rendering any essential
service to my country, or answering the end contemplated; pru-
dence on my part must arrest any attempt of the well-meant but
mistaken views of my friends to introduce mo again into the
chair of government. (Ford, The Writings of George Washington,
XIV, 191-192)
[This "third term doctrine," as it is called, is supposed
to rest upon the example set by Washington in declining re-
Election at the expiration of eight years' service. Tradition
has it that Washington acted on principle, but this seems to
have slight historical foundation. He did not share Jeffer-
son's decided ideas on rotation in office, and there is appar-
ently no reason for believing that he objected to a President's
serving three terms or more. In fact, his farewell address is
filled with reasonable excuses why he in particular ought not
to be charged with lack of patriotism or neglect of duty in
refusing to serve for another term. Jefferson originally be-
lieved that the President should have been given a seven years'
term, and then made ineligible for re8lection. Later, however,
he came to the conclusion that service for eight years with the
possibility of removal at the end of four years was nearer the
ideal arrangement. He, accordingly, followed the example set
by Washington, and thus the third term doctrine early received
such high sanction that it became a political dogma almost as
inviolable as an express provision of the Constitution.
(Beard, American Government and Politics, 1914 ed., page 184)
-15-
4.
THOMAS JEFFERSON'S ATTITUDE
JEFFERSON, Letter to Madison, December 20, 1787.
The second feature [of the proposed constitution] I dis-
like, and strongly dislike, is the abandonment, in every in-
stance of the principle of rotation in office, and most particu-
larly in the case of the President. Reason and experience tell
us, that the first magistrate will always be reelected if he
may be re-elected. He is then an officer for life. This once
observed, it becomes of so much consequence to certain nations,
to have a friend or & foe at the head of our affairs, that they
will interfere with money and with arms. A Galloman, or an
Angloman, will be supported by the nation he befriends. If
once elected, and at a second or third election out-voted by
one or two votes, he will pretend false votes, foul play, hold
possession of the reigns of government, be supported by the
States voting for him, especially if they be the central ones,
lying in a compact body themselves, and separating their oppo-
nents; and they will be aided by one nation in Europe, while
the majority are aided by another. The election of a President
of America, some years hence, will be much more interesting to
certain nations of Europe, than ever the election of a King of
Poland was. Reflect on all the instances in history, ancient
and modern, of elective monarchies, and say if they do not give
foundation for my fears; the Roman Emperors, the Popes while
they were of any importance, the German Emperors till they be-
came hereditary in practice, the Kings of Poland, the Deys of
the Ottoman dependencies. It may be said, that if elections
are to be attended with these disorders, the less frequently
they are repeated the better. But experience says, that to free
them from disorder, they must be rendered less interesting by a
necessity of change. No foreign power, nor domestic party,
will waste their blood and money to elect a person, who must go
out at the end of a short period. The power of removing every
fourth year by the vote of the people, 1s a power which they
will not exercise, and if they were disposed to exercise it,
they would not be permitted. The King of Poland is removable
every day by the diet. But they never remove him. Nor would
Russia, the Emperor, &c., permit them to do it. (Washington,
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, II, 330-331)
JEFFERSON, Letter to A. Donald, February 7, 1788.
There 1a another strong feature in the new constitution,
which I as strongly dislike. That is, the perpetual re-eligi-
bility of the President. of this I expect no amendment at
present, because I do not see that anybody has objected to it
on your side the water. But it will be productive of cruel
distress to our country, even in your day and mine. The impor-
tance to France and England, to have our government in the
hands of a friend or a foe, will occasion their interference
by money, and even by arms. Our President will be of much
more consequence to them than a King of Poland. We must take
care, however, that neither this, nor any other objection to
the new form, produces a schism in our Union. (Ibid., 355-356)
JEFFERSON,
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JEFFERSON, Letter to George Washington, May 2, 1788.
There are two things however which I dislike strongly. 1.
The want of a declaration of rights. I an in hopes the opposi-
tion of Virginia will remedy this, & produce such a declaration.
2. The perpetual re-eligibility of the President. This I fear
will make an office for life first, & then hereditary. I was
much an enemy to monarchy before I came to Europe. I am ten
thousand times more so since I have seen what they are. There
1a scarcely an evil known in these countries which may not be
traced to their king as it's source, nor a good which is not
derived from the small fibres of republicanism existing among
them. I can further say with safety there is not a drowned head
in Europe whose talents or merit would entitle him to be elected
a vestryman by the people of any parish in America. However I
shall hope that before there 1a danger of this change taking
place in the office of President, the good sense & free spirit
of our countrymen will make the changes necessary to prevent
it. (Ford, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, V, 8)
JEFFERSON, Letter to Edward Carrington, May 27, 1788.
The 2d amendment which appears to me essential is the re-
storing the principle of necessary rotation particularly to
the Senate & Presidency: but most of all to the last. Re-
eligibility makes him an officer for life, and the disastors
inseparable from an elective monarchy, render it preferable,
if we cannot tread back that step, that we should go forward &
take refuge in an hereditary one. Of the correction of this
Article however I entertain no present hope, because I find it
has scarcely excited an objection in America. And if it does
not take place are long, it assuredly never will. The natural
progress of things is for liberty to yield, & government to
gain ground. As yet our spirits are free. Our jealousy is
only put to sleep by the unlimited confidence we all repose in
the person to whom we all look as our president. After him
inferior characters may perhaps succeed and awaken us to the
danger which his merit has led us into. (Ibid., 20-21)
JEFFERSON, Letter to Edward Rutledge, July 18, 1788.
I apprehend too that the total abandonment of the principle
of rotation in the offices of President & Senator will end in
abuse. But my confidence 1a that there will for a long time be
virtue & good sense enough in our countrymen. to correct abuses.
(Ibid., 42)
JEFFERSON, Letter to Francis Hopkinson, March 13, 1789.
With respect to the re-eligibility of the president, I
find myself differing from the majority of my countrymen, for
I think there are but three states out of the 11. which have
desired an alteration of this. And indeed, since the thing
1a established, I would wish it not to be altered during the
life of our great leader, whose executive talents are superior
to those I believe of any man in the world, and who alone by
the authority of his name and the confidence reposed in his
perfect integrity, is fully qualified to put the new govern-
ment so under way as to secure it against the efforts of
opposition. But having derived from our error all the good
there was in it I hope we shall correct it the moment we can
no longer have the same name at the helm. (Ibid., 77-78)
JEFFERSON
-17-
JEFFERSON, Letter to David Humphreys, March 18, 1789.
The general voice
has not however authorized me to
consider as & real defect what I thought and still think one,
the perpetual re-eligibility of the president. But three
states out of 11. having declared against this, we must suppose
we are wrong according to the fundamental law of every society,
the lex majoris partis, to which we are bound to submit. And
should the majority change their opinion, & become sensible
that this trait in their constitution 18 wrong, I would wish
it to remain uncorrected, as long as we can avail ourselves of
the services of our great leader, whose talents and whose
weight of character I consider as peculiarly necessary to get
the government so under way as that it may afterwards be car-
ried on by subordinate characters. (Ibid., 90-91)
[On December 12, 1803, the Senate of the United States
rejected by a vote of four to twenty-five the following pro-
posed amendment to the Constitution: "No person who has been
twice successively elected President of the United States
shall be eligible as President until four years shall have
elapsed: but any citizen who has been President of the United
States may, after such intervention, be eligible to the office
of President for four years and no longer." (Annals of Con-
gress, 8th Congress, lst session, 214)]
JEFFERSON, Letter to John Taylor, January 6, 1805.
My opinion originally was that the President of the United
States should have been elected for seven years, and forever
ineligible afterwards. I have since become sensible that seven
years is too long to be irremovable, and that there should be a
peaceable way of withdrawing a man in midway who is doing wrong.
The service for eight years, with a power to remove at the end
of the first four, comes nearly to my principle as corrected by
experience; and it is in adherence to that, that I determine to
withdraw at the end of my second term. The danger is that the
indulgence and attachments of the people will keep a man in the
chair after he becomes a dotard, that re-election through life
shall become habitual, and election for life follow that.
General Washington set the example of voluntary retirement after
eight years. I shall follow it. And a few more precedents
will oppose the obstacle of habit to any one after awhile who
shall endeavor to extend his term. Perhaps it may beget a dis-
position to establish it by an amendment of the Constitution.
I believe I am doing right therefore in pursuing my principle.
I had determined to declare my intention, but I have consented
to be silent on the opinion of friends, who think it best not
to put a continuance out of my power in defiance of all circum-
stances. There is, however, but one circumstance which could
engage my acquiescence in another election; to wit, such a
division about a successor, as might bring in a monarchist.
But that circumstance 1a impossible. While, therefore, I shall
make no formal declaration to the public of my purpose, I have
freely let it be understood in private conversation.
(Washington, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, IV, 565)
JEFFERSON
-18-
JEFFERSON, Letter to the Legislature of Vermont, December 10,
1807.
I received in due season the address of the Legislature of
Vermont, bearing date the 5th of November 1806, in which, with
their approbation of the general course of my administration,
they were so good as to express their desire that I would con-
sent to be proposed again, to the public voice, on the expira-
tion of my present term of office.
That I should lay down my charge at a proper period, is
as much a duty as to have borne it faithfully. If some ter-
mination to the services of the chief magistrate be not fixed
by the constitution, or supplied by practice, his office, nomi-
nally for years, will, in fact, become for life; and history
shows how easily that degenerates into an inheritance. Believ-
ing that a representative government, responsible at short
periods of election, is that which produces the greatest sum
of happiness to mankind, I feel it a duty to do no act which
shall essentially impair that principle; and I should unwill-
ingly be the person who, disregarding the sound precedent set
by an illustrious predecessor, should furnish the first example
of prolongation beyond the second term of office.
Truth, also, requires me to add, that I am sensible of
that decline which advancing years bring on; and feeling their
physical, I ought not to doubt their mental effect. Happy if
I an the first to perceive and to obey this admonition of
nature, and to solicit a retreat from cares too great for the
wearied faculties of age. (Ibid., VIII, 121)
JEFFERSON, Letter to Henry Guest, January 4, 1809.
I am sensible of the kindness of your rebuke on my deter-
mination to retire from office at a time when our country is
laboring under difficulties truly great. But if the principle
of rotation be a sound one, as I conscientiously believe it to
be with respect to this office, no pretext should ever be per-
mitted to dispense with it, because there never will be & time
when real difficulties will not exist, and furnish a plausible
pretext for dispensation. you suppose I am "in the prime of
life for rule." am sensible I am not; and before I am so
far declined as to become insensible of it, I think it right
to put it out of my own power. I have the comfort too of know-
ing that the person whom the public choice has designated to
receive the charge from me, is eminently qualified 8.8 & safe
depository by the endowments of integrity, understanding, and
experience. (Lipscomb and Bergh, The Writings of Thomas
Jefferson, XII, 224)
JEFFERSON, Letter to James Martin, September 20, 1813.
Your quotation from the former paper alludes, as I presume,
to the term of office to our Senate; a term, like that of the
judges, too long for my approbation. I am for responsibilities
at short periods, seeing neither reason nor safety in making
public functionaries independent of the nation for life, or
even for long terms of years. On this principle I prefer the
Presidential term of four years, to that of seven years, which
I myself had at first suggested, annexing to it, however, in-
eligibility forever after; and I wish it were now annexed to
the 2d quadrennial election of President. (Washington, VI, 213)
JEFFERSON
-19-
JEFFERSON, Autobiography.
... the re-eligibility of the President for life, I quite
disapproved. ... My fears of that feature were founded on the
importance of the office, on the fierce contentions it might
excite among ourselves, if continuable for life, and the dan-
gers of interference either with money or arms, by foreign
nations, to whom the choice of an American President might
become interesting. Examples of this abounded in history; in
the case of the Roman emperors for instance, of the Popes while
of any significance, of the German emperors, the Kings of
Poland, & the Deys of Barbary. I had observed too in the feudal
History, and in the recent instance particularly of the Stadt-
holder of Holland, how easily offices or tenures for life slide
into inheritances. My wish therefore was that the President
should be elected for 7. years & be ineligible afterwards.
This term I thought sufficient to enable him, with the con-
currence of the legislature, to carry thro' & establish any
system of improvement he should propose for the general good.
But the practice adopted I think is better allowing his continu-
ance for 8. years with a liability to be dropped at half way
of the term, making that a period of probation. That his con-
tinuance should be restrained to 7. years was the opinion of
the Convention at an early stage of it's session, when it
voted that term by a majority of 8. against 2. and by a simple
majority that he should be ineligible B. second time. This
opinion &c. was confirmed by the house so late as July 26,
referred to the committee of detail, reported favorably by
them, and changed to the present form by final vote on the
last day but one only of their session. of this change three
states expressed their disapprobation, N. York by recommending
an amendment that the President should not be eligible e. third
time, and Virginia and N. Carolina that he should not be
capable of serving more than 8. in any term of 16. years. And
altho's this amendment has not been made in form, yet practice
seems to have established it. The example of 4 Presidents
voluntarily retiring at the end of their 8th year, & the pro-
gress of public opinion that the principle is salutary, have
given it in practice the force of precedent & usage; insomuch
that should & President consent to be a candidate for a 3d.
election, I trust he would be rejected on this demonstration
of ambitious views. (Ford, I, 109-111)
5.
PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, 1824
No person, having been twice elected to the office of
President, shall again be eligible to that office. (Passed by
the Senate, 36 to 3, January 30, 1824. Annals of Congress,
18th Congress, 1st session, 160)
6.
PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, 1826
No person who shall have been elected President of the
United States a second time, shall again be eligible to that
office. (Passed by the Senate, 32 to 7, April 3, 1826.
Register of Debates in Congress, 19th Congress, 1st session, part 1,
19, 407)
7.
-20-
7.
JAMES BUCHANAN, February 6, 1829
The example of Washington, which has been followed by
Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe, has forever determined that no
President shall be more than once re-elected. This principle
18 now become as sacred as if it were written in the constitu-
tion. I would incline to leave to the people of the United
States, without incorporating it in the constitution, to de-
cide whether a President should serve longer than one term.
The day may come, when dangers shall lower over us, and when
we may have a President at the helm of State who possesses the
confidence of the country, and is better able to weather the
storm than any other pilot; shall we, then, under such circum-
stances, deprive the people of the United States of the power
of obtaining his services for a second term? Shall we pass a
decree, as fixed as fate, to bind the American people, and pre-
vent them from ever re-electing such a man? I am not afraid
to trust them with this power. (Register of Debates in
Congress, 20th Congress, 2d session, House of Representatives,
321)
8.
ANDREW JACKSON, December 6, 1830
It was a leading object with the framers of the Constitu-
tion to keep as separate as possible the action of the legisla-
tive and executive branches of the Government. To secure this
object nothing 1a more essential than to preserve the former
from all temptations of private interest, and therefore so to
direct the patronage of the latter 8.8 not to permit such tempta-
tions to be offered. Experience abundantly demonstrates that
every precaution in this respect 1a a valuable safeguard of
liberty, and one which my reflections upon the tendencies of our
system incline me to think should be made still stronger. It
was for this reason that, in connection with an amendment of the
Constitution removing all intermediate agency in the choice of
the President, I recommended some restrictions upon the reeligi-
bility of that officer and upon the tenure of offices generally.
The reason still exists, and I renew the recommendation with an
increased confidence that its adoption will strengthen those
checks by which the Constitution designed to secure the indepen-
dence of each department of the Government and promote the
healthful and equitable administration of all the trusts which
it has created. The agent most likely to contravene this de-
sign of the Constitution is the Chief Magistrate. In order,
particularly, that his appointment may as far as possible be
placed beyond the reach of any improper influences; in order
that he may approach the solemn responsibilities of the highest
office in the gift of a free people uncommitted to any other
course than the strict line of constitutional duty, and that
the securities for this independence may be rendered a.8 strong
as the nature of power and the weakness of its possessor will
admit, I can not too earnestly invite your attention to the pro-
priety of promoting such an amendment of the Constitution as
will render him ineligible after one term of service. (Second
Annual Message to Congress, Richardson, Messages and Papers of
the Presidents, II, 519. Similar recommendations were made by
President Jackson in his first, third, fourth, fifth and sixth
annual messages to Congress.)
9.
-21-
9.
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, April 30, 1839
The example of Washington, of retiring from the Presidency
after a double term of four years, was followed by Mr. Jeffer-
son, against the urgent solicitations of several state Legisla-
tures. This second example of voluntary self-chastened ambition
by the decided approbation of public opinion, has been held
obligatory upon their successors, and has become a tacit subsi-
diary Constitutional law. If not entirely satisfactory to the
nation, it is rather by its admitting one re-election, than by
its interdicting a second. (Adams, The Jubilee of the Consti-
tution, 115)
10. WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON, March 4, 1841
Of the former [defects of the Constitution] is the eligi-
bility of the same individual to & second term of the Presidency.
The sagacious mind of Mr. Jefferson early saw and lamented this
error, and attempts have been made, hitherto without success,
to apply the amendatory power of the States to its correction.
As, however, one mode of correction is in the power of every
President, and consequently in mine, it would be useless, and
perhaps invidious, to enumerate the evils of which, in the
opinion of many of our fellow-citizens, this error of the sages
who framed the Constitution may have been the source and the
bitter fruits which we are still to gather from it if it con-
tinues to disfigure our system. It may be observed, however,
as a general remark, that republics can commit no greater error
than to adopt or continue any feature in their systems of
government which may be calculated to create or increase the
love of power in the bosoms of those to whom necessity obliges
them to commit the management of their affairs; and surely
nothing 1s more likely to produce such a state of mind than the
long continuance of an office of high trust. Nothing can be
more corrupting, nothing more destructive of all those noble
feelings which belong to the character of a devoted republican
patriot. When this corrupting passion once takes possession of
the human mind, like the love of gold it becomes insatiable.
It is the never-dying worm in his bosom, grows with his growth
and strengthens with the declining years of its victim. If
this is true, it is the part of wisdom for a republic to limit
the service of that officer at least to whom she has intrusted
the management of her foreign relations, the execution of her
laws, and the command of her armies and navies to a period so
short as to prevent his forgetting that he is the accountable
agent, not the principal; the servant, not the master. Until
an amendment of the Constitution can be effected public opinion
may secure the desired object. I give my aid to it by renewing
the pledge heretofore given that under no circumstances will I
consent to serve a second term. (Richardson, Messages and
Papers of the Presidents, IV, 8)
11.
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11.
ULYSSES S. GRANT, 1875
I am not nor have I ever been a candidate for renomination.
I would not accept a nomination if it were tendered, unless it
should come under such circumstances as to make it an imperative
duty - circumstances not likely to arise. (Coolidge, Ulysses 8.
Grant, 497)
12. RESOLUTION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
December 15, 1875
In the opinion of this House, the precedent established
by Washington and other Presidents of the United States, in
retiring from the presidential office after their second term,
has become, by universal concurrence, a part of our republican
system of government, and that any departure from this time-
honored custom would be unwise, unpatriotic, and fraught with
peril to our free institutions. (Adopted 233 to 18, Congres-
sional Record, 44th Congress, lst session, part 1, 228)
13.
RUTHERFORD B. HAYES, March 5, 1877
I recommend an amendment to the Constitution prescribing
a term of six years for the Presidential office and forbidding
a reelection. (Inaugural Address, Richardson, Messages and
Papers of the Presidents, VII, 445)
14.
ULYSSES S. GRANT, March 25, 1880
It is a matter of supreme indifference to me whether I am
[nominated] or not. There are many persons I would prefer
should have the office to myself. I owe so much to the Union
men of the country that if they think my chances are better
for election than for other probable candidates in case I
should decline, I cannot decline if the nomination is tendered
without seeking on my part. (Letter to Elihu B. Washburne,
Coolidge, Ulysses S. Grant, 541)
15.
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15. RESOLUTION OF THE REPUBLICAN ANTI-THIRD
TERM CONVENTION, ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI,
May 6, 1880
In pursuance of the demand, and representing the convic-
tions of what we believe to be a majority of the Republican
party throughout the Union, this Convention of Republicans
has assembled for the purpose of declaring those convictions
with reference to the present aspect of political affairs.
This action is necessary in view of the determined efforts to
force upon the party the nomination of a candidate for the
Presidency for a third term, in defiance not only of the tradi-
tions of the Government, but also of the solemn declarations
of the Republican party through its conventions in the largest
and controlling Republican States, reaffirmed by its represen-
tatives in the popular branch of Congress, and adopted by the
entire party in the declarations of its latest Presidential
candidate.
We reaffirm our adhesion to the principles of the Repub-
lican party as heretofore set forth by its authorized represen-
tatives, especially the declarations of the State Republican
Convention of New York in 1875, opposing a third term for the
President; of Pennsylvania in 1875, and reaffirmed in 1876, to
the same effect; of Ohio in 1875; Massachusetts the same year;
and of Minnesota and other Republican States, all to the same
effect; also by the House of Representatives, in December,
1875, by an overwhelming majority.
We declare that the nomination of 8. third-term candidate
will put the party on the defensive by reviving the memory of
the public scandals and official corruptions which brought
the party to the verge of ruin. We believe the questions now
at issue - finance, tariff, etc. - require a trained states-
man for President; and we find additional objection to a third-
term candidate in that it would substitute a dangerous tendency
to personal government for an unwearied effort for the true
reform of civil service, which is vital to the welfare and
safety of the republic.
As Republicans, we can not be hero-worshipers, and we
demand from a party without & master the nomination of a can-
didate without a stain.
Resolved, That a National Committee of One Hundred be
appointed and instructed, in the event of the nomination of
General Grant, to meet in the city of New York, at the call
of the chairman of this committee, and there to act in such &
manner as they shall then deem best to carry out the spirit
and purpose of these resolutions, the said committee to be
selected by a committee of thirteen, and published at its
earliest convenience. (Appletons' Annual Cyclopaedia, 1880,
New Series, Vol. V, 694)
16.
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16.
GROVER CLEVELAND, August 18, 1884.
When an election to office shall be the selection by the
voters of one of their number to assume for a time a public
trust, instead of his dedication to the profession of politics;
when the holders of the ballot, quickened by a sense of duty,
shall avenge truth betrayed and pledges broken, and when the
suffrage shall be altogether free and uncorrupted, the full
realization of a government by the people will be at hand. And
of the means to this end not one would, in my judgment, be more
effective than an amendment to the Constitution disqualifying
the President from re-election. When we consider the patronage
of this great office, the allurements of power, the temptations
to retain public place once gained, and, more than all, the
availability a party finds in an incumbent whom a horde of
office-holders, with a zeal born of benefits received and
fostered by the hope of favors yet to come, stand ready to aid
with money and trained political service, we recognize in the
eligibility of the President for re-election a most serious
danger to that calm, deliberate, and intelligent political
action which must characterize a government by the people.
(Letter accepting the Democratic presidential nomination,
Parker, The Writings and Speeches of Grover Cleveland, 10-11)
17. PLATFORM OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1896
We declare it to be the unwritten law of this Republic,
established by custom and usage of one hundred years, and
sanctioned by the examples of the greatest and wisest of those
who founded and have maintained our Government, that no man
should be eligible for a third term of the Presidential office.
(Hopkins, Political Parties in the United States, 433)
18.
BENJAMIN HARRISON, 1897
The fears of those who said that the power of the office
was such as to enable an ambitious incumbent to secure an in-
definite succession of terms have not been realized. In prac-
tice the popular opinion has limited the eligibility of the
President to one re-election. But some of our leading and most
thoughtful public men have challenged the wisdom of the four-
year term, and have advocated six years, usually accompanied
with a prohibition of a second term. And unless some method
can be devised by which & less considerable part of the four-
year term must be given to hearing applicants for office and to
making appointments, it would be wise to give the President, by
extending the term, a better chance to show what he can do for
the country. It must be admitted, also, that ineligibility to
a second term will give to the executive action greater inde-
pendence. It seems unlikely, however, that any change in the
Presidential term will be made unless some unexpected event
should stir into action a thought that is now of a theoretical
rather than a practical cast. Our people are wisely conserva-
tive in the matter of amending the Constitution. (Harrison,
This Country of Ours, 72-73)
19.
-25-
19.
WILLIAM MoKINLEY, June 10, 1901
I regret that the suggestion of & third term has been made.
I doubt whether I am called upon to give to it notice, but there
are new questions of the gravest importance before the adminis-
tration and the country, and their just consideration should
not be prejudiced in the public mind by even the suspicion of
the thought of a third term.
In view, therefore, of the reiteration of the suggestion
of it I will now say, once for all, expressing a long-settled
conviction, that I not only am not and will not be a candidate
for a third term, but I would not accept a nomination for it if
it were tendered to me.
My only ambition is to serve through my second term to the
acceptance of my countrymen, whose generous confidence I so
deeply appreciate, and then with them to do my duty in the
ranks of private citizenship. (House Report 885, 62d Congress,
2d session, 7)
20.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT, November 1904
The wise custom which limits the President to two terms
regards the substance and not the form, and under no circum-
stances will I be a candidate for or accept another nomination.
(Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography, 387)
21. PLATFORM OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1912
We favor a single presidential term, and to that end we
urge the adoption of an amendment to the constitution making
the president of the United States ineligible for re-election
and we pledge the candidate of this convention to this principle.
(The Democratic Text-Book, 1912, 14)
22.
WILLIAM E. BORAH, August 20, 1912
The people who could be trusted to determine whether or
not they desire a President for the second term may also be
trusted to determine whether or not they desire a President
for a third term. I think they can be trusted to settle both
questions in a way to best conserve the interest of the people
and the Republic. If we believe that the people have the
capacity to judge of a man's worth, of his intelligence, of his
integrity, of his ability, we will not be uneasy when they come
to pass judgment. If we have a lingering belief that the
people
-26-
people are unfit to perform this service, we will naturally be
vigilant to guard against their performing it. Ineligibility,
in my judgment, has its real foundation in the fear that the
people may not act wisely and may not have the ability and
courage to reject bad men.
At the time that this matter was under discussion in the
convention and when they had agreed upon the proposition that
the Presidency should not be a reeligible office, they had
agreed, I say, upon the proposition of selecting the President
through the Congress. It was believed that a combined intrigue
between the legislative department and the Presidency might
lead to the continuation of that office to an undue length of
time, and without an opportunity for the intervening power of
the people in regard to it. The matter went to the committee
that was to give final form to the Constitution. This committee
conceived the plan of selecting the President through the elec-
toral college, taking it away from the Congress and leaving it
indirectly to selection by the people, at least separating the
legislative and the executive department with reference to the
election.
I think I am perfectly safe in saying that, after the plan
of the selection of the President was determined upon as we
finally found it in the Constitution - through electors - the
proposition of limiting it to a single term no longer received
any considerable support in the convention; that after they had
eliminated the possibility of intrigue between the two depart-
ments it was not urged, and with the exception of two individuals
in the convention, I have never been able to find that it was
even discussed or mentioned thereafter. I believe that we must
come to the conclusion from the convention proceedings that they
never contemplated limiting it to a single term after the elec-
toral college was planned. We find, therefore, from the pro-
ceedings of the convention that this question was thoroughly
discussed, and that, after a full discussion and the electoral
college was conceived of, it was finally rejected.
If a President has proved himself peculiarly capable of
discharging the duties of this high office, has disclosed the
judgment, the poise, and the patriotism which we are always
anxious to note in the discharge of these duties, it would
seem that there would be no necessity for making it impossible
for him to continue in the service for such time as the judg-
ment of the great mass of the people thought proper. It is
not often that fitness and efficiency are condemned by laws
and constitutions. It would seem that unless there be a fear
that the people may be unable to determine the question of
fitness and efficiency there could be no occasion for this
amendment. (Congressional Record, 62d Congress, 2d session,
part 11, Senate, 11355-11356)
23.
-27-
23.
PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT,
February 1, 1913
The term of the office of President shall be six years;
and no person who has held the office by election, or discharged
its powers or duties, or acted 8.8 President under the Constitu-
tion and laws made in pursuance thereof shall be eligible to
hold again the office by election. (Passed by the Senate, 47
to 23, Congressional Record, 62d Congress, 3d session, part 3,
2419-2420)
24.
WOODROW WILSON, February 5, 1913
The argument 18 not that it is clearly known now just how
long each President should remain in office. Four years is too
long a term for a President who is not the true spokesman of
the people, who is imposed upon and does not lead. It is too
short a term for a President who is doing, or attempting a
great work of reform, and who has not had time to finish it.
To change the term to six years would increase the likeli-
hood of its being too long, without any assurance that it would,
in happy cases, be long enough. A fixed constitutional limita-
tion to a single term of office is highly arbitrary and unsatis-
factory from every point of view.
Put the present customary limitation of two terms into the
Constitution, if you do not trust the people to take care of
themselves, but make it two terms (not one, because four years
is often too long), and give the President a chance to win the
full service by proving himself fit for it.
If you wish to learn the result of constitutional ineligi-
bility to re-election, ask any former governor of New Jersey,
for example, what the effect 18 in actual experience. He will
tell you how cynically and with what complacence the politi-
cians banded against him waited for the inevitable end of his
term to take their chances with his successor. ...
As things stand now the people might more likely be cheated
than served by further limitations of the President's eligi-
bility. His fighting power in their behalf would be immensely
weakened. No one will fear a President except those whom he
can make fear the elections.
We singularly belie our own principles by seeking to deter-
mine by fixed constitutional provision what the people shall
determine for themselves and are perfectly competent to deter-
mine for themselves. We cast a doubt upon the whole theory of
popular government.
I believe that we should fatally embarrass ourselves if
we made the constitutional change proposed. If we want our
Presidents to fight our battles for us, we should give them the
means, the legitimate means, the means their opponents will
always
-28-
always have. Strip them of everything else but the right to
appeal to the people, but leave them that; suffer them to be
leaders; absolutely prevent them from being bosses.
We would otherwise appear to be going in two opposite di-
rections. We are seeking in every way to extend the power of
the people, but in the matter of the Presidency we fear and
distrust the people and seek to bind them hand and foot by
rigid constitutional provision. (Baker and Dodd, The Public
Papers of Woodrow Wilson, The New Democracy, I, 21-26)
[In 1885 Woodrow Wilson wrote in his Congressional
Government, page 255: "Efficiency is the only just foundation
for confidence in a public officer, under republican institu-
tions no less than under monarchs; and short terms which cut
off the efficient as surely and inexorably as the inefficient
are quite as repugnant to republican as to monarchical rules
of wisdom. Unhappily, however, this is not American doctrine.
A President is dismissed almost as soon as he has learned the
duties of his office."]
25.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT, 1913
The Presidency is a great office, and the power of the
President can be effectively used to secure a renomination,
especially if the President has the support of certain great
political and financial interests. It is for this reason, and
this reason alone, that the wholesome principle of continuing
in office, so long as he is willing to serve, an incumbent who
has proved capable, is not applicable to the Presidency.
Therefore, the American people have wisely established a cus-
tom against allowing any man to hold that office for more than
two consecutive terms.
I believe that it is well to have a
custom of this kind, to be generally observed, but that it
would be very unwise to have it definitely hardened into a
Constitutional prohibition. It is not desirable ordinarily
that a man should stay in office twelve consecutive years as
President; but most certainly the American people are fit to
take care of themselves, and stand in no need of an irrevocable
self-denying ordinance. They should not bind themselves never
to take action which under some quite conceivable circumstances
it might be to their great interest to take. It is obviously
of the last importance to the safety of & democracy that in
time of real peril it should be able to command the service of
every one among its citizens in the precise position where the
service rendered will be most valuable. It would be a benighted
policy in such event to disqualify absolutely from the highest
office a man who while holding it had actually shown the high-
est capacity to exercise its powers with the utmost effect for
the public defense. If, for instance, a tremendous crisis
occurred at the end of the second term of a man like Lincoln,
as such a crisis occurred at the end of his first term, it
would be a veritable calamity if the American people were for-
bidden to continue to use the services of the one man whom they
knew
-29-
knew, and did not merely guess, could carry them through the
crisis. The third term tradition has no value whatever except
as it applies to a third consecutive term. While it is well
to keep it as a custom, it would be a mark both of weakness
and unwisdom for the American people to embody it into a Con-
stitutional provision which could not do them good and on some
given occasion might work real harm. (Theodore Roosevelt,
An Autobiography, 388-390)
26.
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, 1915
I am strongly inclined to the view that it would have
been a wiser provision, as it was at one time voted in the
convention, to make the term of the President seven years and
render him ineligible thereafter. Such a change would give to
the executive greater courage and independence in the discharge
of his duties. (Taft, The Presidency, 4)
27. WILLIAM E. BORAH, February 7, 9, 10, 1928
February 7, 1928
It is a fact, though, that Washington never at any time,
so far as I have been able to ascertain, referred to the accep-
tance of a third term as being inimical to the liberties or
sound political principles of our Government. He based his re-
tirement entirely upon the proposition, so far as I can recall,
that political conditions at the end of his second term were
such that he thought he could retire without failing in his
public duty; and, secondly, on account of his personal desire
to be out of public life.
I have always felt that the third-term proposition as a
principle was established by Jefferson. Jefferson was from
the beginning opposed to a third term on principle. ... and
he was the first President to state, on his retirement, that
it was on account of principle that he refused to accept a
third term.
Jefferson, it is true, cited the fact that Washington had
retired 8.8 a proper precedent to be followed; but Washington
did not base his retirement on the ground that he thought a
third term was wrong in principle. He said in effect, that
had the political conditions been the same at the end of his
first term that they were at the end of his second term he
would have consulted his own personal pleasure and retired
then.
February 9, 1928
Das
20
know
-30-
February 9, 1928
I want to say that I think the anti-third-term principle
is sound, but I do not think it is sacred. I have said many
times that while I think in ordinary exigencies of political
conditions in the country the third-term principle ought to be
observed, I am perfectly willing, however, to also leave it to
the judgment of the people or the electorate. I would not
write it in the Constitution of the United States. There may
be times and terms and conditions in which the people would
judge it better to have the President for the third time than
to change under the circumstances.
I think that condition would have arisen, as I said yes-
terday, had Lincoln's first term been his second term; that is
to say, had the exigencies of the Civil War situation arisen
at the close of his second term as they did at the close of
his first term, the American people would have insisted on
his being President again, and he would have been President.
When we take into consideration the stupendous effort which
was made by the leaders in the Republican Party to confine him
to one term, when he was advised over and over again by the
leaders that he could not be elected, but that, the people
being heard from, he was renominated and reelected, in my
judgment that same thing would have happened at the close of
his second term under similar conditions. That exigency might
be justified. I believe, too, that had Washington had upon
his hands at the close of his second term the situation that
he had at the close of his first term, he would have consented
to be a candidate for the third time, and he would have been
reelected for the third time.
But those are extraordinary and exceptional conditions,
which are to be appealed to when the judgment of the people
think the facts justify it. In all ordinary conditions I
think the third-term principle ought to apply.
February 10, 1928
[My] personal view is that under all ordinary circum-
stances the tradition ought to prevail.
I would not write it into the Constitution. I would
leave it where it 1s. But, generally speaking, I believe it
a wise tradition. If I had been writing the resolution before
us, I should not have expressed it as strongly as did the
Senator who wrote it, because, while I regard it as sound, I
can very well understand how conditions might arise in which
it would be wise and patriotic to disregard the tradition.
(Congressional Record, 70th Congress, 1st session, part 3,
Senate, 2615-2616, 2784, 2832)
28.
-31-
28. JOSEPH T. ROBINSON, February 10, 1928
Nevertheless, Mr. President, when urged to become a can-
didate for a third term, when the Nation seemed to demand his
services, when many great influences were being brought to
bear upon him to make the sacrifice, he [Washington] declined
to do so, and his action in declining under those conditions
forms the basis of a policy which has become well established
in the conscience and judgment of the great majority of the
American people, in my opinion, namely, that no Chief Execu-
tive should succeed himself after having served a second term.
There is this consideration, too, which applies with some
force to a second term, but not with equal force, namely, that
a President who desires to do so can force his own renomina-
tion, for the simple reason that in nearly every convention
that assembles a large number of the delegates consist of
Federal officeholders, and a larger number, perhaps, consist
of the relatives and friends of Federal officeholders; and
within the last few years we have seen an illustration of a
President seeking to be nominated for a second term, whose
nomination was encompassed, when he was able to carry only
two very small States. So that there is a power and an influ-
ence which accrues to one in a high office, particularly a
high executive office, which enables that individual, if he
chooses to exercise his power, to encompass his own preferment
in spite of the will of the public. (Congressional Record,
70th Congress, 1st session, part 3, Senate, 2827)
29. RESOLUTION OF THE SENATE, February 10, 1928
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the pre-
cedent established by Washington and other Presidents of the
United States in retiring from the presidential office after
their second term has become, by universal concurrence, a part
of our republican system of government, and that any departure
from this time-honored custom would be unwise, unpatriotic, and
fraught with peril to our free institutions. (Adopted, 56 to 26)
YEAS: Ashurst, Barkley, Bayard, Black, Blaine, Borah,
Bratton, Brookhart, Broussard, Bruce, Capper, Copeland, Couzens,
Curtis, Cutting, Dill, Edwards, Fletcher, Frazier, Gerry,
Gillett, Glass, Goodling, Harris, Harrison, Hawes, Hayden,
Heflin, Howell, Johnson, Kendrick, King, LA Follette, McKellar,
McMaster, Mayfield, Neely, Norris, Nye, Overman, Pittman,
Robinson (Ark.), Sackett, Schall, Sheppard, Shipstead, Simmons,
Smith, Steck, Stephens, Thomas, Trammell, Tydings, Wagner,
Walsh (Mont.), Wheeler
NAYS: Bingham, Blease, Dale, Edge, Ferris, Fess, Gould,
Greene, Jones, McLean, McNary, Moses, Norbeck, Oddie, Pine,
Ransdell, Reed (Pa.), Robinson (Ind.), Shortridge, Smoot,
Steiwer, Walsh (Mass.), Warren, Waterman, Watson, Willis
NOT VOTING: Caraway, Deneen, du Pont, George, Goff, Hale,
Keyes, Metcalf, Phipps, Reed (Mo.), Swanson, Tyson
(Congressional Record, 70th Congress, lst session, part 3,
2842)
PSF: Moore
State
THE COUNSELOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Fill
WASHINGTON
Product
June 8, 1939
Dear Mr. President:
One further word about George Creel. In a
note to me dated May 29th he says "I expect to be
in Washington sometime in July and will make a
point to see you at once. What you suggest meets
my own views absolutely, and I would love to do
the article." That note was an acknowledgment
of my letter to Creel of May 22nd from which the
following is an extract:
"Of course, I realize the practice that
has grown up of limiting a president to two
terms but I think, as General Washington
thought, that there is a great deal of twaddle
in holding that a man who is desirable and
necessary should not be elected for a third
term. The story of the evolution of the
practice is very interesting but I shall not
now attempt to elaborate.
"It seems to me that whatever view anyone
may take, a well-balanced story in such a
publication as Colliers would serve to stimu-
late reasonable thinking on the subject."
After
The President,
The White House.
After having been with the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs three days in considering neutrality
legislation, I feel confident that next Monday an
entirely satisfactory bill will be reported.
Yours very sincerely,
full
mul
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE COUNSELOR
States - (in 1808):
Connecticut;
Delaware;
Georgia;
Kentucky;
Maryland;
Massachusetts;
New Hampshire;
New Jersey;
New York;
North Carolina;
Pennsylvania;
Rhode Island;
South Carolina;
Tennessee;
Vermont;
Viginia.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
state more
THE COUNSELOR
August 5, 1939.
Authoritative Life of Thomas Jefferson, by Henry 8.
Randall, published in 1858. At page 352, of Volume 3,
there is the following statement:
"The Legislatures of Massachusetts, Vermont,
Rhode Island, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
New Jersey, and North Carolina -- all perhaps that
acted in 1808, before Mr. Jefferson's final re-
fusal to serve a. third term had been made public --
solicited his continuance in office.'
In 1808 there were sixteen states, and thus it seems
that one-half of the number desired Jefferson to continue
in office.
0 RWM:MHM
refirmore
OFFICE OF
COUNSELOR
fullowed
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
state
WASHINGTON
August 16, 1939.
Dear Mr. President:
It is proper to say that owing to the Secretary's
absence I have not had the opportunity of discussing
with him the matters to which this note refers.
There have just returned from Ottawa officials of
this Department who participated in an aviation confer-
ence at which Mr. Roper presided, and they tell me that
he indicated that he is leaving Ottawa in a very few days.
As I took the liberty of saying to you the other day,
I strongly hope that John Cudahy will be appointed to re-
place him. You know Cudahy's fine qualities, and I can
tell you that his record in Warsaw and Dublin has been al-
together satisfactory. When I mentioned him for the Ottawa
appointment, you spoke of desiring to consider some suitable
man to go to Dublin in the event Cudahy goes to Ottawa, and
I have thought that perhaps you might regard it as desirable
to consider Wayne Taylor. I am saying this without having
had a word on the subject with Taylor, but because I know him
well
The President,
The White House.
DEVELLMEN
- 2 -
well as an unusually able man, who I believe would be of value
to the Administration not only in Dublin but otherwise.
You are fortunate in being away from Washington in this
time of excessive heat, and I hope that you will be greatly
refreshed by your sea trip and visit to a. cooler place.
Yours very sincerely,
H PSFice m
State
Letter to the President
From R. Walton Moore-State Dept
September 23, 1939
Encloses copy of a report of a conversation with the Minister
of Rumania, Mr. Radu Irinescu, and Mr. Dunn.
In re-Rumanian Gov acts in detaining the Polish officials.
Refers to assination of Prime Minister Calinescu.
See:State Dept folder-Drawer 1-1939
gadge PSF; more
state
Letter to Judge Moore
From John Cudahy
Dated--November 29, 1939
Subject: War in general abroad-
See:Ireland folder-Drawer 1-1939
(Walton PSF Box more 1933-37, 1939)
flere pus gudy
psFimine PSF:
state
December 26, 1939.
Dear Mr. President:
I know how the pressure of work at this time makes
it difficult for you to arrange for personal interviews and,
therefore, I have thought best to write you.
You will remember that several months ago I talked
with George Creel about preparing an article for COLLIERS.
Two weeks ago I received from him a note dated December 13
which is herewith enclosed along with his draft of an
article for which he is seeking a publisher. I do not
attach much importance to the disinclination of magazines
to deal with the question in the manner desired by Creel.
The result of the election next year will in my judgment
very slightly depend on the attitude of the magazines and
newspapers.
The Creel draft seems to me pretty satisfactory, but
perhaps there is a lack of emphasis on a few points. to which
I think great significance should be attached as showing
how artifical and unwarranted is the anti-third term fetish:
(1) There are 8. great many people who believe that
what has become a tradition was established by the first
president, while the fact is that as soon as General Wash-
ington heard of the opposition to the eligibility of a
president for re-election he stated that the framers of
the Constitution after much discussion deliberately
resolved to let the people themselves determine who should
be selected for the office and how long he should be con-
tinued in office. Before he was inaugurated he expressed
that view in a letter to Lafayette who had advised him
of the contrary view entertained by Mr. Jeffersoh. It is
very clear that, as Washington indicated, it would be
contrary
- 2 -
contrary to our constitutional system to take a course
that might disable the people from retaining in office
a president whose retention would be altogether desirable.
(2) Jefferson would probably never have been
opposed to the re-election of a president except for his
extreme fear that Hamilton and his adherents might make
a successful effort to substitute a monarchial system for
the system devised at Philadelphia. Thus even before he
returned from France to this country he became a very
strong advocate of that theory with respect to the office
of president and with respect to the senatorial and
judicial offices. Had be become United States senator
we would perhaps now be facing a Jefferson tradition with
reference to re-election to the Senate.
(3) It is very interesting to find that in the early
part of the last century the people accepted the Washington
view as against that of Jefferson, this being apparent from
the fact that eight of the sixteen states petititioned
Jefferson to stand for a third term and that except for his
emphatic declination the other eight states would have
followed suit.
(4) One premise on which Jefferson built his theory
was that the occupant of the presidential office has so
much much power that he can bring about his re-election
conception at will. That com eption fades away when it
is condisered that only a minority of the presidents have
been able to secure their re-election for a second term.
For many months I have thought and still think that
unless you are retained in office your successor will be
a Republican with the result that domestic policies will
become
- 3 -
become largely reactionary. But even worse would be the
disappearance of the only leadership which at the end of
the war could be exerted with tremendous influence to
make fair adjustments and find some method of insuring a
more peaceful world. I am in complete agreement with
Senator Norris that, whatever your personal inclination,
you would render 8. disservice to the country and the world
by announcing in advance of the convention that you will
not accept a renomination. You will, of course, understand
that this frank expression is not dictated by any personal
ambition. In the nature of things I can not hope to hold on
much longer, realizing to quote the words of Mr. Coolidge
that "my future lies in the past".
Yours very merely,
PSF
(tlate
Memo from Walton Moore
to M. A. Le Hand
Attaches letter from J.P. Moffitt on
Roosevelt ancestry.
See-Genealogy folder-Drawer 3-1939