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PSF State Dept. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. Jan.- Nov, 1944
T-200
PSF; stettennea
January 17, 1944.
PRIVATE AND
MEMORANDUM FOR HON. E. R. STETTINIUS, Jr.
Dear Ed:
I enclose a long list of promotions in the Foreign
Service. I wish you would go over these with the idea of
seeing whether any of these officers should be shelved
instead of being promoted. I have not got the list of the
Foreign Service, but I do know that in the past it has been
too much the custom to promote according to seniority and
to do no weeding out. Obviously, this 1a not a good method.
In the Navy, for example, certain officers in each
grade fail each year in promotion on a seniority basis; and
if they fail the second time, they have to 80 on the retired
list. It was based on a change that I made in 1914 or 1915
when we changed the method of "selection out" to the method
of "selection up". If an officer was not "selected up" after
two or three tries, he automatically went on the retired list
and this method did not hurt the personal feelings in the
way that "selection out" caused so many headaches.
I wish you would handle this yourself and not let
everybody in the Department know that I have asked you to
check.
F.D.R.
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble D*MAR 6 1972
January 15, 1944
My dear Mr. President:
I am sending you herewith a list of nominations of
Foreign Service officers selected for promotion as in-
dicated therein.
These promotions are in accordance with the basic
Foreign Service law and do not conflict with the regula-
tions issued by the Economic Stabilisation Director under
date of October 27, 1942. The promotions will be made
possible through savings in the appropriation for salaries
of Foreign Service Officers for 1943-1944, and constitute
in most cases a deserved recognition of services rendered
under war-time conditions.
Letters to the Chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee of the Senate and to the appropriate Senators,
notifying them of these nominations, have been prepared
and will be forwarded upon submission of the nominations
to the Senate. For your convenience in considering the
nominations, I am enclosing biographical sketches of the
officers concerned.
Faithfully yours,
Enclosures:
Nominations,
CORDELL HULL
List,
Biographical Sketches.
The President,
The White House.
FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS RECOMMENDED FOR PROMOTION
EFFECTIVE NOVEMBER 16, 1943.
From Class III to Class II
Don 0. Blins, Jr., of Mississippi
Walter J. Donnelly of District of Columbia
William R. Langdon of Massachusetts
Alfred T. Nester of New York
Albert F. Nufer of New York
From Class IV to Class III
Donald F. Bigelow of Minnesota
David Mak. Kky of Tennessee
Marcel E. Malige of Idaho
Renwick S. MoNiece of Utah
Warwick Perkins of Maryland
J. Bartlett Richards of Maryland
From Class V to Class IV
H. Merroll Benninghoff of New York
Gilson G. Blake of Maryland
Joseph F. Burt of Illinois
Reginald S. Castleman of California
Vinton Chapin of Massachusetts
Prescott Childs of Massachusetts
Charles H. Derry of Georgia
C. Paul Fletcher of Tennessee
Winthrop S. Greene of Nassachusetts
William M. Gwynn of California
Hugene M. Hinkle of New York
Clarence E. Macy of Colorado
E. Talbot Smith of Connecticut
Francis H. Styles of Virginia
From Class VI to Class V
Sidney A. Belovsky of New York
Cavendish N. Connon of Utah
Augustus S. Chase of Connecticut
"illiam P. Coohran, Jr. of Pennsylvania
D7
to
II MIND 20 1.75 III BROJO
EMERGLIAN
&ONRION EMMAICE CALICIES Madam
- 2 -
From Class VI to Class V, Continued
Gerald A. Drew of California
Monroe B. Hall of New York
Cloyce K. Huston of Iowa
Perry N. Jester of Virginia
Kenneth C. Krents of Iowa
J. Hall Paxton of Virginia
Guy W. Ray of Alabama
Walter K. Walmsley, Jr., of Maryland
Robert 8. Ward of Ohio
From Clans VII to Class VI
Walworth Barbour of Massachusetts
Jacob D. Bean of New Jersey
Barry T. Benson of Texas
Max W. Hishop of Iowa
William E. Flournoy, Jr., of Virginia
Morris N. Hughes of Illinois
Elisabeth Humes of Tennessee
C. Grant Isnnos of Tennessee
Robert Jane of Oklahoma
Charles F. Knox, Jr., of New Jersey
Henry P. Leverich of New Jersey
Raymond P. Ludden of Nassachusetts
Thomas J. Maleady of Massachusetts
Patrick Mallon of Ohio
Robert M. McClintock of California
Edward D. McLaughlin of Arkansas
Troy L. Perkins of Kentucky
Kennett F. Potter of Missouri
Joseph P. Ragland of the District of Columbia
John P. Stone of Pennsylvania
Tyler Thompson of New York
Joseph I. Touchette of Massachusetts
William C. Trimble of Maryland
Whitney Young of New York
From Class VIII to Class VII
John L. Bankhead of North Carolina
M. Williams Blake of Ohio
Carl Brouer of New York
William F. Busser of Pennsylvania
Thomas B. Campen of North Carolina
David M. Clark of Pennsylvania
Harry K. Donaldson of Pennsylvania
- 3 -
From Class VIII to Class VII, Continued
Jay Dixon Edwards of Oregon
Perry Kllis of California
James Espy of Ohio
Richard D. Gatewood of New York
John L. Goshie of New York
John D. Jernegan of California
Hartwell Johnson of South Carolina
Easton T. Kelsey of Michigan
Andrew G. Lynch of New York
Robert B. Memminger of South Carolina
Charles 5. Millet of New Hampshire
Bolard More of Ohio
Brewster H. Morris of Pennsylvania
Jack B. Neathery of Texas
Katherine E. O'Connor of Indiana
John Ordway of the District of Columbia
Charbes 0. Thompson of Alaska
S. Roger Tyler, Jr., of West Virginia
Woodruff Wallner of New York
Philip P. Williams of California
Robert E. Wilson of Arizona
From Unclassified (A) to Class VIII
Holand K. Beyer of Wisconsin
Niles W. Bond of Massachusetts
Robert P. Chalker of Florida
Wymberley deR. Coarr of Connecticut
V. Lonning Collins, Jr., of New York
Adrian B. Colquitt of Georgia
Thomas J. Cory of California
Edward A. Dow, Jr., of Nebraska
Nicholas Feld of Mississippi
William N. Fraleigh of New Jersey
John C. Fuess of Massachusetts
Boies C. Hart, Jr., of Connecticut
Richard H. Hawkins, Jr., of Pennsylvania
George D. Henderson of California
John P. Hoover of California
Donald W. Lann of the District of Columbia
Frederick J. Mann of New York
Delano McKelvey of the District of Columbia
Minedee McLean of Louisiana
Julian L. Nugent, Jr., of New Mexico
Joseph Palmer, 2d, of Massachusetts
Richard H. Post of New York
M. Robert Rutherford of Montana
Robert 0. Strong of Wisconsin
J. Kittredge Vinson of Texas
Alfred T. Wellborn of Louisiana
Charles H. Whitsker of Massachusetts
file
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
January 27, 1944
Personal and
1
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
I have studied with great care your private memo-
randum to ne of the 17th relative to foreign service
promotions. I agree with you that there is much room
for improvement and I an taking aggressive steps to
correct the situation you have in mind. Recognizing
that we have not had sufficient time to make the
thorough study that the matter requires, but, for the
reasons stated below, I think it would be best, if
you are willing, to let this old list go through to
avoid undue delay and harmful effects on morale. You
can depend upon us to bring about the improvement that
you have in mind in the next list which will be sub-
mitted to you in June.
I make this recommendation for the following rea-
sons:
First, the above suggestion will give us a chance
to correct the condition at its source.
Second, I shall recommend a change in the person-
nel handling these matters within the Department.
Third, as a result of the war, the Department is
losing Foreign Service Officers faster than they can
be obtained, We are 34 below strength at the present
time. Hence, there is ample opportunity to bring
about the improvements you desire.
Signed & q Xp. Notatta
given geb yeb
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Scheuble Date MAR 6 1972
Stettinius
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
File
WASHINGTON
PRIVATE and
IRSIN.
Good!
February 21, 1944
FOR
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Foreign Service Administration
Supplementing my memorandum of January 27th,
I am glad to inform you that a definite program
is now under way for achieving the aims and ob-
jectives which you have outlined to me on two or
three occasions. Some of the things which will
be done are as follows:
1. Approximately 30 Foreign Service Offi-
cers will be recommended for retire-
ment before another promotion list is
submitted.
2. A carefully selected list of outstand-
ing young Foreign Service Officers
will be recommended for promotion.
They will be recommended for ability
and not because of seniority.
3. The Navy system of promotion and re-
tirement is being studied with 8. view
to utilizing its best features.
4. We will commence refresher training
courses as well as In-Service training
courses at the earliest possible moment
in the "grass roots" section of our
country in such states as Kansas and
Nebraska.
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Scheuble Date MAR 6 1972
- 2 -
5. A thorough-going survey of our Foreign
Service personnel, systems and pro-
cedures is being made with a view to
adopting the newest techniques and to
assure maximum efficiency.
6. Changes have been made and further
changes are contemplated in the person-
nel handling Foreign Service matters
within the Department.
7. We are studying the idea of giving the
officers and enlisted men in the com-
bat armed services an opportunity to
apply for foreign service after the war
and at once if honorably discharged
from military service. We are consider-
ing the use of an examination which will
take into consideration the fact that
these men have been serving in the armed
forces and have not been at college for
the past few years.
8. Since only 17 per cent of our applicants
pass the Foreign Service examination, we
have been getting the academic type of
fellow. Hence, we are studying the idea
of shifting the emphasis to attract the
strong, tougher type of individual.
Many other opportunities for improvement will
become apparent as our survey proceeds. At any
rate, the next list which will be submitted to you
will reflect the kind of improvements you desire.
\
PSF Stathing PSF,
State
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 13, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL WATSON
Will you find out when Ed
Stettinius is leaving? I want
to have him in for lunch before
he goes.
F. D. R.
Leaving wedo 29th
Heard his group are coming
in Fridgy for conference
with resident
PSF
State March 12 2-44
30
8/17/44
Xr. Stettinius will call on the President 12.30 Fri. March
17th, with those who will accompany him abroad, in order
receive final instructions from the President.
Dn. Isaiah Bowman
mr. John L. Pratt
me. H. neeman manhews
m. Wallace murray
mr. Robert 2. Jynch
zody
fu
PSF stettinus State freser
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
March 17, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Proposed Establishment of a Free
Port in Mexico Forty Miles below
the Border
Thank you for your memorandum of March 13 on
this matter. Consideration has been given to this
problem by some members of the Department for some
time, but, in view of your memorandum, I am instruct-
ing the appropriate officers in the Department, work-
ing in conjunction with the Department of Commerce,
to make a comprehensive, searching, impartial review
of all of the economic and other factors involved in
the project. We are approaching the matter from the
point of view of the establishment of a free port
somewhere on the Mexican Pacific Coast or the Gulf
of California within accessible distance of the bor-
der where it will benefit the States of Arizona, New
Mexico, Nevada, Utah and Colorado. A copy of this
report will be made available to you as soon as it
is completed.
Stettinius foctor
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 13, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.
I have your memorandum of March
seventh in regard to the establishment
of a free port on the Gulf of lower
California below the Mexican-American
border.
I don't agree with this at all!
How does anybody in the State Department
know a free port down there would be
opposed by the Mexican Government? My
information, which comes from a better
source, is to the contrary.
I think Los Angeles might oppose
it, but I think Arizona would heartily
approve it -- also Nevada, Utah and
even New Mexico and Colorado.
Of course no one knows whether "the
project lacks economic justification".
This angle has never been studied.
I never suggested that we take this
up with the Mexican Government. This, of
course, is not the time. But I did want
to get the slant of the State Department!
F.D.R.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
March 7. 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Proposed Establishment of a Free Port
Forty Miles Below the Mexican Border
Punta Peñasco, on the Gulf of California about 55
miles south of the United States border, has in the past
been mentioned as a possible site for a port, but not as
a free port. The Legislature of Arizona has on several
occasions in recent years adopted resolutions proposing
the transfer to the United States of a strip of Mexican
territory so that the State might establish a deep-sea
port (not a free port) on the Gulf. Proposals of this
nature were strenuously opposed by the Mexican Government
and the Mexican press. It is believed that a proposal for
a free port might meet equal opposition from the Mexican
Government and press since it would be viewed as an attempt,
under a different name, to extend United States sovereignty
or administration over Mexican soil.
The establishment of a free port at the head of the
Gulf of California would be resisted by California
authorities as possibly taking business away from such
ports as those of the Los Angeles area.
Since all reports indicate that the Arizona Senators
and the Arizona interests in general are going to support
the water treaty with Mexico there 1s apparently no need
for consideration of & free port south of the border in
conjunction with these waterways developments.
Finally, the project under consideration lacks
economic justification as well as the elements for poten-
tial success, there being insufficient seaborne traffic
in the area to provide business and therefore no demand
for the facilities of a free port, and since shipping
routes are well established to the Southern California
area.
In view of all the circumstances it 1s not believed
that it would be advisable for this Government to suggest
to the Mexican Government the establishment of a free
port forty miles below the border.
file
PSF stettinies folder 2-44
State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
NOTES FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT
ON CONVERSATIONS IN LONDON,
APRIL 7th TO 29th, 1944
I
BRITISH OFFICIALS
The Prime Minister
April 9th-10th at Chequers - with Ambassador Winant; April 15th
at Chequers - with Winant, Bowman and Pratt; April 19th, two calls at
10 Downing Street; April 26th at 10 Downing Street; April 28th at 10
Downing Street - with the members of the mission.
Among the most important subjects which the Prime Minister raised
were:
1) French Directive.
The Prime Minister is thoroughly in agreement with the position
stated in Mr. Hull's speech of April 9, 1944. He feels, however, that
the proposed directive is not consistent with this position and that he
therefore cannot approve it. He proposes to leave the whole matter in
status quo now that Eisenhower has begun working informally with the
French representatives. I pointed out at our last meeting that the
Combined Chiefs of Staff had told Eisenhower that such arrangements must
be only "tentative", and that I felt the Prime Minister must take some
action on the President's draft 80 that a formal directive can be sent
to Eisenhower by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
2) Food for Occupied Countries in Europe.
The Prime Minister is strongly opposed to any action concerning
relief for the populations of occupied Europe before the coming opera-
tions, on grounds of military security. The Foreign Office, however,
plans to review the matter again.
3) Ireland.
The Prine Minister feels that the harder we push Ireland the more
we will get from her. He stated that he felt the only possibility of a.
leak, now that communications with Britain and elsewhere are out off, is
from ships sailing to the United States and that we might have to delay
turn-arounds as the critical moment approaches.
4) Spanish Wolfram.
I had several discussions on Spanish wolfram with the Prime Minister
during my several visits with him. On my last visit, he stated that he
was pleased that we and the British have reached an agreement. He was
disappointed, however, that the Japanese matter has been raised at the last
minute. He felt that the Japanese representatives in Tangier could be
isolated, and that, if necessary, we could press the point later on.
- 2 -
5) Swedish Ball-Bearings.
Regarding the Swedish ball-bearing situation, I explained to
the Prime Minister the proposal to pay SKF approximately $20,000,000
for their entire production, and to blacklist the company if they
refuse our offer. The Prime Minister stated that this appeared
satisfactory and that he would urge the British Government to join
us if blacklisting became necessary.
6) Switzerland.
The Prime Minister is anxious that we tread lightly in matters
regarding Switzerland because of the importance of her role as inter-
mediary between the United Nations and the Axis Powers, which she has
fulfilled very satisfactorily, he feels.
7) Argentina.
Both the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden assured me that Britain
will do everything possible to back up the United States in our
relations with Argentina, provided the problem of British supplies
of meat and other commodities now received from Argentina can be
solved. The British are thoroughly aware of the danger of a new
South American bloc centered around Argentina, and appreciate the
necessity for a firm united stand by Britain and the United States.
8) World Security Organization.
The Prime Minister spoke on the world security organization to
Ambassador Winant, Dr. Bowman, Mr. Pratt and me at our visit to
Chequers on April 15th. The major aspects of the problem were covered,
and the Prime Minister drew a chart to illustrate his views. His
views on the Supreme Council are not unlike those of the State Depart-
ment. Mr. Churchill believes, however, that the world security
organization should rest on three regional councils - European,
Western Hemisphere and Asiatic. The Foreign Office apparently does
not share this view, and this point will have to be thrashed out
within the British Government.
While Mr. Eden feels that early public announcement of postwar
security discussions would be desirable, the Prime Minister feels
this should be postponed until the war is further along.
9) Economic Talks.
The Prime Minister does not feel the urgency of United Nations
economic talks. He spoke of continuing the conversations within the
"next few months." He mentioned the British political situation in
this connection and also the necessity for thorough conversations
with the Dominions before discussions can be resumed.
It is clear that the Prime Minister is reluctant to place too
great an emphasis on postwar problems at this time. He recognizes,
however, that the political situation in the United States may make
it necessary to proceed at a faster pace.
- 3 -
10) Dollar Position.
The Prime Minister spoke of the necessity for viewing Britain's
total world financial position and not just her gold and dollar
position. He spoke repeatedly of Britain as "the debtor nation of
the world," and he requested that I listen to Sir John Anderson's
presentation of Britain's overseas financial position. (See note
on discussion with Sir John Anderson below.)
11) Russian-Polish Relations.
The Prime Minister seemed encouraged by the reports that the
Polish underground is cooperating with the Red Army. He discounted
Molotov's denial to Harriman that such relations existed.
12) Greece.
The Prime Minister stated that the Communistic element is
causing difficulties in Greece and that he felt it would be difficult
to restore order within that country after reoccupation. The
situation became so tense recently that Britain cut off food supplies
to the rebellious Greek forces, and three divisions in Egypt which
were ready to sail for Italy had to be disarmed. On my last visit,
however, the Prime Minister seemed more encouraged.
13) Brazilian Expeditionary Force.
The Prime Minister is strongly opposed to anything more than
a token force or "brigade" from Brazil at present, and this in the
Mediterranean theater.
In a later conversation, I explained the position of our Joint
Chiefs of Staff, our commitments to Brazil, and the present plans
for the size and sailing dates of the Brazilian forces. He seemed
satisfied with this. (See discussion with Mr. Eden on same subject.)
14) European Advisory Commission.
The Prime Minister feels that the EAC discussions of surrender
terms are moving too slowly, but he did not appear familiar with the
details of the work of the Commission.
15) Definition of Unconditional Surrender.
The Prime Minister discussed with me the advisability of a
definition of unconditional surrender. He leans in the direction
of no detailed definition at this time.
16) Shipping.
The Prime Minister talked about shipping and emphasised the
vital economic necessity of B. large merchant fleet to postwar
Britain. He feels that the "love of the sea" of the British and
the "love of the farm" of the Americans will be an important factor.
(or
- 4 -
17) Anglo-American Cooperation.
The Prime Minister in all our conversations mentioned the
importance of Britain and the United States remaining firaly united
after the war.
18) Other Matters.
Other matters mentioned by the Prime Minister were:
1. His suggestion that deGaulle pay a secret visit to Washington.
2. The possibility of inviting Mr. Wilkie to visit Britain
later this year.
3. The matter of the Polish Prime Minister paying a visit
to Washington.
4. The possibility of & secret surprise by the enemy in the
coming operations.
5. The necessity for rebuilding a strong France in the postwar
world.
6. His frank views on China as n. great power.
The Prime Minister spoke repeatedly of his loyalty to the
President. He inquired in a ware manner about the President,
Mr. Hull and Mr. Hopkins.
The Prime Minister was enthusiastic about Mr. Hull's speech of
April 9th. He read it aloud and discussed it paragraph by paragraph
while I was at Chequers on Easter night.
The Prime Minister mentioned with particular admiration General
Marshall. He also spoke well of the work of Mr. Philip Reed.
Mr. Anthony Eden
April 11th at Binderton, Eden's country place - with Winant
and Matthews; April 15th-16th, weekend at Binderton - with Winant;
April 24th at the Foreign Office; April 25th at the Foreign Office -
with the Russian Ambassador; April 28th at the Foreign Office - - with
the members of the mission.
Among the most important subjects that Mr. Eden and I covered
in our conversations were:
1) French Directive.
Mr. Eden feels that in the matter of the French directive we
are at a deadlock. He feels committed by a speech he made in Parliament
- 5 -
on September 22nd, in which he stated specifically that his
Government would deal with the French Committee. He feels that the
proposed directive and the position taken in Mr. Hull's speech are in-
compatible.
2) Relief to Occupied Countries.
Mr. Eden stated that he felt it was hopeless to bring the
relief question before the War Cabinet again, because they are firmly
opposed to any action for operational and security reasons. They
take the view, he said, that "the best thing for the people in the
occupied areas is to turn the occupied areas into liberated areas as
soon as possible."
Just before we left London, however, Mr. Neville Butler
informed Mr. Matthews that the Foreign Office would review the matter
again.
3) Spanish Wolfram.
Mr. Eden and I discussed several times the developments in
the Spanish wolfram situation. I impressed on him the vital inpor-
tance to American public opinion of stopping all Spanish and
Portuguese wolfram shipments. He was very pleased with the final
agreement between the United States and Great Britain.
4) Portuguese Wolfram.
After reviewing the Spanish situation thoroughly with Mr. Eden,
he stated that he was prepared to go "at least as far" with Portugal
as we succeed in going with Spain.
5) Argentina.
Mr. Eden, like the Prime Minister, expressed the determination
of his Government to back up the United States in any action we feel
necessary provided the British supply problems could be solved.
6) World Security Organization.
In the main, Mr. Eden feels that we are already very close
together in our thinking on the world security organization. He does
not feel that the regional councils proposed by the Prime Minister
are necessary.
Unlike the Prime Minister, Mr. Eden is anxious to get shead
with the security talks as quickly as possible and believes that an
early public announcement in this regard would be helpful. While
Mr. Eden is thoroughly in agreement with holding the first conferences
on world security in Washington or nearby, he suggested that attention
be gien to the possibility of holding some other conference at an
early date in Moscow.
Mr. Eden spoke of the importance of another meeting between
Mr. Hull, Molotov and himself late this summer at some convenient
location.
covernment your NY
our
- 6 -
7) United Nations Economic Discussions.
In all conversations, I pressed for the early resumption
of economic talks. The Foreign Office seems willing to proceed
promptly with the economic talks, but the Prime Minister's caution
and political sense are having great weight.
8) United Nations Economic Steering Committee.
Mr. Eden regretted that we could not settle the economic
steering committee matter while I was in London. He promised to
press the matter with the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet, and
to communicate with the State Department within the next two weeks.
9) Termination of Lend-Lease.
Mr. Eden, Mr. Law, Ambassador Winant and I discussed the
difficulties which would arise if hostilities ceased suddenly and
Lend-Lease came to a sudden halt. We discussed the possibilities
of some other mechanism, perhaps long-term credits, to permit the
continuation of the flow of food and raw materials to Britain from
the United States during the interim period until normal commercial
trade can be resumed, and thus eliminate the serious dislocations
in employment and commerce both in the United States and Britain
which might otherwise result.
10) Shipping.
A thorough discussion on shipping took place with Mr. Eden.
He is quite familiar with the President's formula and discussed it
thoroughly. Mr. Eden stressed the point that Britain's economic
future depends on a large volume of exports and that this will re-
quire a large and vigorous merchant marine.
11) Russian-Polish Relations.
Mr. Eden seems hopeful that the Russians and the Poles them-
selves will eventually work out a. mutually satisfactory solution of
their disagreements. He seemed optimistic, but not so much so as
the Prime Minister, over reports of cooperation between the Polish
underground and the Red Army.
12) Roumania.
Mr. Eden was encouraged by the fact that the Russians had at
last taken an interest in Prince Stribey's negotiations. He feels
that the Russians are showing a. genuine desire to cooperate with
Britain and the United States in the Roumanian situation.
13) Brazilian Expeditionary Force.
After I informed Mr. Eden of the proposed size and sailing
dates of the BEF, and the political considerations involved, he felt
that this would be satisfactory to his Government and promised to
take it up immediately and advise the Department.
- 7 -
14) European Advisory Commission.
Mr. Eden feels that we are not fulfilling our agreement
reached at Moscow concerning the scope of the work of EAC, and that
we are jeopardizing the success of the EAC and Russian collaboration
with the United States and Britain by whittling down EAC's scope of
authority. He emphasized the British view that the scope of EAC's
work should include agreements with the governments-in-exile and general
provisions for the government of liberated areas.
In conversations with Ambassador Winant, members of the Foreign
Office and myself, Mr. Eden emphasized with great firmness the vital
importance of reaching immediate agreement on surrender terms. He
stated that if the three governments did not reach agreement in the
near future, he would ask the EAC representatives to meet with him
in an attempt to speed matters along. Mr. Winant hoped that agree-
ment could be reached before he leaves for Washington about May 8th.
Sir Alexander Cadogan and Mr. Richard Law
April 12th
Among the most important points discussed were:
1) European Advisory Commission.
Sir Alexander Cadogan and Mr. Law were likewise discouraged
about the progress of the EAC, and agreed with me that we should
all press for immediate agreement on surrender terms.
Sir Alexander also stated that the scope of EAC's authority
was being too narrowly interpreted. He said that it was agreed at
the Moscow Conference that the French Civil Affairs matter should
be discussed in EAC and that the British are having trouble with the
Russians over the failure to consult them. I pointed out that we
had originally suggested that the October 6th draft memorandum on
France should be taken up by EAC and that the British had later
objected to this on the grounds that subsequent events had super-
ceded the draft.
2) World Security Organization.
Mr. Law informed me that Congressman Fulbright had told him
that he felt Congress is now in the mood to authorize participation
in an international organization; that the Republicans would not dare
to oppose it this summer. On theother hand, if the war were over
this summer and the Republicans were victorious in November, he said
there was a possibility that certain elements in the Republican Party
might again move toward an isolationist viewpoint.
- 8 -
3) Economic Talks.
Mr. Law urged that the economic conversations be carried
on in May, from the point where he and Lord Keynes left off last
autumn. I fully concurred in the importance of this, and the
necessity of having concrete proposals to work on.
Sir William Strang
April 12th
Dr. Bowman, Mr. Matthews and I had a general review of the
work of EAC. I emphasized to Sir William Strang the great danger
inherent in the delay in reaching agreement on surrender terms.
He thought the difficulties could be solved in one month. I told
him I felt this was too long and that quicker action was necessary
if we were not to run a serious risk of being caught unprepared by
a sudden offer of surrender.
Sir John Anderson
April 27th
Sir John Anderson discussed with me, after a luncheon at his
home, the overall financial position of Great Britain. He pointed
out that the net deterioration in their overseas financial position
would exceed fifteen billion dollars by the end of 1944, and that
their external liabilities by that time will probably be around
twelve billion dollars. Against this, the British have built up
gold and dollar balances which amounted to 1.3 billion dollars at
the end of 1943, and will probably rise to 1.6 billion dollars by
the end of this year. He emphasized that these balances were only
a small fraction of Britain's external liabilities. A memorandum
giving full details on this conversation will be prepared for the
State Department, the Treasury Department and FEA.
Discussion with King George VI
At the King's invitation, I called on him on April 17th, and
had an interesting hour's discussion, reviewing in detail the work
of our mission in London and other matters of concern to our two
Governments.
- 9 -
Informal Talk to Members of Parliament
On April 26th, at the request of the Prime Minister and Mr.
Eden, I addressed an all-party committee of Parliament, numbering
about two hundred members. I had declined a request to do this
which was waiting me on my arrival, but Mr. Eden later urged on me
the importance which he and the Prime Minister attached to such &
meeting from the standpoint of good-will.
I spoke off-the-record for about half an hour on general
matters of interest to our two countries. Afterwards, I answered
a number of miscellaneous questions for fifteen minutes.
Off-the-Record Press Conference with Mr. Eden
At Mr. Eden's request, he and I held an off-the-record press
conference on April 26th with ten British diplomatic correspondents
whom Mr. Eden meets regularly. The conference lasted an hour. I
was asked to make a general statement, which I did, and then
answered questions jointly with Mr. Eden. This meeting was in
lieu of a general conference with the British press which was
requested but which I felt could best be handled in an off-the-
record, private manner.
Other Officials of the British Government
In addition to the conversations and meetings outlined above,
I had conversations with the following British officials:
Mr. Ernest Bevin, Minister of Labor
Colonel J. J. Lewellin, Minister of Food
Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, Minister of Production
Lord Catto, Governor of the Bank of England
Sir Orme Sargent, Deputy Under-Secretary of State
Sir Maurice Peterson, Deputy Under-Secretary of State
Lord Leathers, Minister of Transport
Lord Portal, Minister of Works
The Earl of Selborne, Minister of Economic Warfare
Lord Cherwell, Paymaster General, Assistant to the Prime Minister
Lord Keynes, Advisor to the Treasury
Lord Beaverbrook, Lord Privy Seal.
On April 24th, the members of the mission were entertained by
Mr. Eden and the members of the War Cabinet at a dinner where much
informal discussion took place.
- 10 -
II
AMERICAN OFFICIALS
Ambassador Winant
I had a long talk almost daily with Ambassador Winant on a wide
range of subjects. I kept him fully informed concerning the subjects
which we were taking up in our conversations. He accompanied ne on
many of the talks, and his assistance proved most helpful throughout
our stay in London.
1) European Advisory Commission.
I discussed the EAC with Ambassador Winant on numerous occasions.
It is my feeling that matters had been proceeding very slowly on the
surrender terms. Progress was beginning to be made, however, during
the latter part of our stay in London.
The misunderstanding over Ambassador Winant's authority to negoti-
ate on surrender terms seens now to have been satisfactorily clarified.
It is my view that the United States Government should review
carefully the organization, functions, and scope of authority of EAC.
It is obviously not proving to be of the importance that the British
had hoped it would be. It is clear that if the scope of EAC's
authority is enlarged, a considerably larger staff will be required.
A full report on the EAC will be submitted.
General Eisenhower
I called on General Eisenhower in April 12th, as a matter of
courtesy. Afterwards, I met with General Bedell Smith and members of
his staff.
On April 25th, Mr. Matthews and I called on General Smith and
Ambassador Phillips. We also saw General Eisenhower on this occasion.
In these discussions, General Eisenhower and his staff raised
with us 8. number of diplomatic matters involved in military operations.
The most important of these were:
1) Zones of Occupation.
General Eisenhower has a deep conviction that there should be a
combined Anglo-American zone and not two separate sones. The combined
command is now functioning very efficiently; supply and shipping matters
are being handled effectively through the combined boards. It would be
tremendously wasteful, he feels, to try to separate the forces and the
supply organization of the two nations for the purposes of occupation.
General Eisenhower took the matter up through the military a
month ago, and he has gotten nowhere. He asked ne to take it up with
Secretary Hull and the President.
- 11 - -
This problem is intimately tied up with the long-range problem
of our relations with Britain in dealing with postwar European matters.
I am taking the subject up with the Secretary and will submit to
you a memorandum on our views.
2) German Morale and Unconditional Surrender.
General Smith stated that the morale of the German Air Force is
high and that the Gestapo still has complete control. He feels that
something should be done to weaken this morale before the invasion
starts.
General Smith pressed vigorously for a memorandum on "Unconditional
Surrender" which can be used as the basis for a statement to the German
people over the heads of the Nazis, saying that the German people will
receive humane treatment. His thought is to obtain the approval of
the Soviets, the British and ourselves to a general statement of our
intentions.
This view is held by all American representatives in London,
civilian and military alike.
A detailed memorandum on this subject will be submitted.
3) Swedish Ball-Bearings.
General Smith believes that we should proceed with the plan of
paying SKF $20,000,000 to purchase their entire output and sabotage
their own plant. He greatly regretted the publicity that has been
given this subject.
Ambassador Phillips
I had several private talks with Ambassador Phillips. The most
important subjects discussed were:
1) European Advisory Commission.
Ambassador Phillips 1s very disturbed over the slow progress of
the EAC. He stated that Mr. Kennan had left discouraged.
2) French Representatives.
Ambassador Phillips stated that he hopes the French Committee
will send two or three representatives from the French Assembly to
London. I suggested that he consult Ambassador Murphy and Ambassador
Wilson on this.
Mr. Phillips stressed the need to consult the French Committee
immediately about military propaganda for use when the invasion begins.
The delay in dealing with the French Committee had seriously delayed
this.
3) Information.
Ambassador Phillips was having a. difficult time obtaining
information cables from Ambassador Winant and, as a result, SHAEF
- 12 -
had not been kept currently informed. I arranged for Ambassador
Winant to have Phillips promptly furnished with a paraphrase of
every cable that comes in concerning his work.
Other American Officials
In addition to the conversations outlined above, I had
conversations with the following American officials:
1) Mr. John McCloy and General McNarney reviewed with Ambassador
Winant and ne the purpose of their visit to Britain and discussed
with us various diplomatic aspects of the coming military operation.
2) Admiral Stark and I had many conversations. We discussed
certain matters of a secret nature on which I shall report orally.
3) General J. C. H. Lee invited Dr. Bowman, Mr. Pratt and me to
dinner, where we discussed war supply questions.
4) Congressman Fulbright discussed with me on several occasions
the work of the Educational Committee.
5) Mr. Philip Reed reviewed with me thoroughly, in a number of
talks, the work of his supply mission. I met with his staff at one
of their weekly meetings, and discussed with them various supply
problems.
6) Mr. Winfield Riefler discussed with me various aspects of
economic warfare. He feels that he could discharge his duties as
Minister and as head of the Blockade Committee with much greater
effectiveness if he were kept more fully informed. He pointed out,
for instance, that he had never seen the Anglo-American note to
Turkey of April 13th before it was presented, and that six months
had gone by before he was consulted on the Spanish wolfram matter.
7) Mr. Harvey Gibson reviewed with me and Mr. Pratt the work
of the Red Cross in Britain and took us through the Red Cross head-
quarters in London.
8) Colonel Anthony J. D. Biddle, Jr., and Mr. Rudolph Schoenfeld
reviewed with me in detail matters concerning the Governments-in-
Exile. These are discussed below in Part III.
9) Mr. Lithgow Osborne, Deputy Director General of UNRRA in
Britain, called on me at his request. He is very disturbed because
there is no agreement between UNRRA and the military as to when
UNRRA is to go into the liberated areas. He is also concerned over
the fact that the planning for inland transportation seems to be
moving slowly.
10) Mr. Herbert Pell reviewed with me the work of the War Crimes
Commission. He is very anxious to receive instructions concerning
punishment for persons guilty of Jewish persecution inside Germany.
- 13 -
11) Mr. Robert Sherwood in two discussions reviewed with me the work
of the OWI in Britain.
12) The American Press. At Ambassador Winant's suggestion, I held
an off-the-record press conference shortly after my arrival in London
to which one representative from each of the major American press
associations and newspapers was invited. I made a brief statement and
then answered questions for about an hour. I held a brief similar
conference just before leaving London.
13) American Embassies. I made a tour of the Embassy in London and
discussed with Ambassador Winant and other officials various adminis-
trative problems. I asked Mr. Robert J. Lynch to make an examination
of the administrative problems in both Embassies. A separate menorandum
will be submitted to Assistant Secretary Shaw on this subject.
Ambassador Harriman and Ambassador Murphy
I and the members of the mission not Ambassador Harriman and
Ambassador Murphy in Marrakech on April 31st. We had several long
discussions.
1) Ambassador Harriman discussed certain important military matters
on which I shall report orally. He asked permission to go to London
before proceeding to the United States in order to report these matters
to General Eisenhower immediately, and I advised him to do so.
Mr. Harriman is perturbed over the delay in arriving at an
agreement with the Soviets concerning financial arrangements for
inventories and goods under contract in the United States at the end
of the war for Lend-Lease to Russia, and for long-range industrial
equipment presently being furnished the USSR under Lend-Lease. He
feels it is very unwise to proceed with the Fourth Protocol until this
matter is settled. He asked me to take the subject up with Mr. Hull.
Mr. Harriman has a number of important topics which he wishes
to discuss with the Department, and he is coming on to Washington for
that purpose.
2) Ambessador Murphy and I had a general review of French, Italian
and Balkan matters. I described to him the developments on the French
directive in our conversations in London. He described to no the
latest developments in the Italian political situation which have been
reported in full to Mr. Hull last week.
I discussed the work of the European Advisory Commission with
Mr. Murphy, and a suggestion of Mr. Philip Reed that a civilian
economic advisor be appointed to General Eisenhower.
- 14 -
III
REPRESENTATIVES OF ALLIED GOVERNMENTS
The Soviet Ambassador
1) Ambassador Winant and I called on Ambassador Gousev on April 12th.
I explained to him that it was not convenient for Secretary Hull to
go to London at this time, and that I had been asked to do so. I
stated that we would keep him informed as to our conversations.
I stressed the need for speeding up agreement on the surrender
terms in the EAC, and Ambassador Gousev agreed.
The Soviet Ambassador emphasized that the one item they were
having difficulty in agreeing on was the Russian suggestion for
making the entire German Army prisoners of war. He felt this was
the only way in which the United Nations could have adequate control
over the demobilized Army.
2) On April 25th, Mr. Eden and I reviewed our conversations with the
Soviet Ambassador in Foreign Secretary Eden's office. Ambassador
Winant, Sir Alexander Cadogan and Neville Butler were also present.
The Soviet Ambassador seemed thoroughly satisfied.
Mr. Eden again stressed the need of pressing for an agreement on
surrender terms.
I urged economic collaboration in Iran on the part of all three
governments. It was agreed that their diplomatic representatives
there should be instructed to meet in Tehran.
3) On April 28th, I called on the Soviet Ambassador to make certain
that he was satisfied with our information to him. He inquired whether
we had had any specific discussions on geographic matters in Europe,
such as the partitioning of Germany, the treatment of the French, etc.
I advised him that Dr. Bowman had & preliminary exchange of views with
the British, but that our thinking on these subjects had not yet
crystallized.
The Chinese Ambassador
On April 18th, Ambassador Winant, Howard Bucknell, and I called
on Ambassador Koo to explain the purpose of By visit to London. We
had & most interesting exchange of views on a wide range of general
topics.
- 15 - -
On April 25th, the Chinese Ambassador called on me for a
general conversation as to the progress of our talks in London.
He inquired as to whether we had taken any position on Indian affairs,
and whether or not we had raised with the British any territorial
questions in the Far East. I informed the Ambassador that nothing of
significance had occurred on these subjects.
I inquired of Ambassador Koo as to the status of Dr. T. V. Soong.
The Ambassador informed ne confidentially that Dr. Soong has had a
bad quarrel with the Generalissimo. However, his family prevailed
upon him not to resign his positions. He resigned only 8.8 Chairman
of the Bank of China, and will remain as Foreign Minister. He is very
popular with the people, but not with the political party.
Conversations with Representatives of the Governments-in-Exile
Ambassador Winant felt it advisable for ne to take the
initiative in seeing the Foreign Ministers of the exiled governments,
by asking them all for tea. This we did on April 12th.
In addition, the following representatives of the exiled
governments called on no and our Charge d'Affairs, Mr. Rudolph E.
Schoenfeld, or received us at their request:
1) Belgium.
Mr. Camille Gutt, the Belgian Minister of Finance, called on
me on April 27th, and we discussed the following matters:
1. The costs of the army of liberation and the
Belgian feeling it is unfair to ask them to
pay the wages of United States forces;
2. The conclusion of a Civil Affairs Agreement.
2) Czechoslovakia.
On April 25th, I saw President Benes of Czechoslovakia at his
residence at his request. He asked me to report to Secretary Hull
and the President that he had made no new commitments or agreements
when he was in Moscow.
Mr. Benes is confident that our invasion operations and the
Russian operations this summer will bring about the collapse of the
German Army this year. He spoke of the possibility of returning to
his country by September. He felt there was a distinct chance that
Germany would give up and ask for & United States-British army of
occupation before the Russians could reach the German boundary.
-16 - -
President Benes asked me to report that in about three weeks'
time he would submit what he terms "The Armistice Terms of Czecho-
slovakia," in which they would ask for nothing - - territorial or
otherwise. He desires to move the German population out of Czecho-
slovakia gradually. He has a reparations scheme for paying these
Germans in script for their property, the script to be redeemed by
the new German government. It is his ambition only to have the
Czechoslovakian nation re-established as it was before Munich.
3) Greece.
On April 7th, the King of Greece called on me at his request.
The King is very disturbed about Communistic activity in Greece.
He thinks when the Germans withdraw their forces, a small army of
re-occupation will have to be sent by the United Nations to restore
order and make it possible to hold an election to determine the will
of the people of Greece.
4) The Netherlands.
April 27th, Dr. E. N. van Kleffens, Netherlands Minister for
Foreign Affairs, and Mr. J. van den Broek, Minister of Finance for the
Netherlands, called on me. They discussed the following subjects:
1. The redemption of Netherlands currency put at the
disposal of the American military authorities.
2. The possible inclusion of the cost of repairs of Dutch
ships in United States parts under Lend-Lease.
3. The desire of the Netherlands Government to secure a loan
from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
4. The European Advisory Commission.
5) Norway.
I called on the King of Norway on April 27th, at his invitation.
The King discussed many subjects with me and raised the following three
questions:
1. The absence of sufficient consultation by the great
powers with the lesser Allies.
2. The question of diplomatic representation.
3. The British ban on cipher, code and uncensored correspondence
other than British, American and Russian.
I called on the Crown Prince of Norway on April 27th, at his
invitation, and our conversation revolved around sconomic and financial
subjects.
- 17 -
Mr. Trygve Lie, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs,
called on me on April 27th. He stated that the Norwegian Government
was pleased with its arrangements with the United States and that
they were grateful for our war aid. The Norwegians were concerned,
however, over the question of American diplomatic representation and
the Civil Affairs arrangement.
On April 19th I saw Ambassador Morgenstierne. He expressed
great concern because we have not appointed a full Ambassador to
Norway. Also, he is stranded in England and cannot get back to the
United States because of the recent ban on diplomatic travel. He
asked my assistance in arranging for his return to Washington. I
have taken no action in this regard.
6) Poland.
I met Mr. Mikolajczyk, Polish Prime Minister, at Chequers,
on April 9th.
On April 27th, Mr. Mikolajozyk and Mr. Romer, Polish Foreign
Minister, called on ne and raised the subject of the Polish under-
ground and its relations with the Red Army, and the Polish boundary
question. I was favorably impressed with the Polish Prime Minister,
who is a man of strength and intelligence.
7) Yugoslavia.
The Yugoslavian Prime Minister called on me on April 26th.
He emphasized that his people are behind Mikailovich and not Tito,
and that Mikailovich has not aided the Germans. The day before we
left, he called on me again to inquire whether there had been any
new developments since his previous visit. I was non-committal.
8) Luxemburg.
I called upon the Grand Duchess of Luxemburg at her invitation.
A general conversation took place at which her husband, Prince Felix,
was present.
9) General.
In a talk on April 24th, Colonel Anthony Biddle stated that
he feels the proper time to appoint individual American Ambassadors
to exiled governments is when the military withdraws and the exiled
governments return to their countries. He recommends appointing
Mr. Schoenfeld to Holland at that time.
- 18 -
IV
CONVERSATIONS OF DR. ISAIAH BOWMAN
1) World Organization.
In the field of world organization, there were frank and
detailed comments by British officials including the Prime Minister,
Foreign Secretary Eden, Sir Alexander Cadogan and others. They
covered the following subjects:
1. Composition of the Executive Council conceived with
larger representation of small states than we envisage.
2. A possible "Defense Committee" of the Executive Council
(including some representation of small states) to deal
more directly and swiftly with security.
3. Military bases under international authority.
4. Mandated territories of 1919, legal position
and desirability of waiting final action until
France can participate as a restored power.
5. Organization and use of military contingents
for international security.
2) World Court.
The World Court, said Sir William Malkin, will increase the co-
operative habit and not merely the machinery of peace. While nations
do not make wars because of cases like those which have come before
the Court, international law, which the Court represents (as well 8.8
other bases for the settlement of disputes, such as conciliation and
arbitration), is one way of bringing the different legal systems
of the world into a working relation. The British emphasized that
our presence is essential on the Court, and therefore they express
readiness to accept any reasonable modifications of their proposal
that the United States finds politically feasible.
3) Colonial Policies.
After 8. hands-off attitude at first, a change occurred in the
British position. Four propositions were developed for further dis-
cussions at Washington, with a new proposal to London in view. They
are designed:
1. To open the question with Great Britain on a practical
and realistic basis;
2. To provide the United States with a policy with respect
to the future of the Japanese mandated islands in the
Pacific;
3. To enable us to enter the French colonial question;
4. To draw in also the Netherlands, Belgium and possibly
Portugal.
- 19 -
V
CONVERSATIONS OF MR. JOHN L. PRATT
Mr. Pratt had a number of talks with various British dficials
on problems of war supply, postwar international connerce, and post-
war internal reconstruction in Britain and the United States. Some of
the most important of these talks were:
1) Shipping.
The proposed interim United Nations shipping board was dis-
cussed with Lord Leathers, as well as the general postwar picture.
Lord Leathers stated that the President had agreed to discuss the
matter further with him before definite proposals are made.
2) Lend-Lease Inventories.
Mr. Pratt reviewed the British inventories of all goods supplied
to Britain under Lend-Lease and goods of a similar character. He
concluded that, in the light of shipping needs for coming operations,
the stockpiles are not too large.
3) Reconversion.
Mr. Pratt exchanged views with Lord Woolton, Mr. Lyttelton,
Mr. Maud and Mr. Franks on postwar reconversion, demobilization, and
disposal of surplus stocks. He concluded that due to Britain's nearness
to the war, this problem has had very little attention at the Ministerial
level, and that in general we are a good deal further ahead in the
United States in our planning on such matters. Copper and wool will
be in great surplus and need attention from the British standpoint.
4) Cartels, with Mr. Law, Mr. Ronald, Dr. Robbins and Sir Andrew Duncan.
It is clear that the British did not recognize cartels as a
vital problem until we raised the issue in the 1943 talks. Even
though some of them may admit some of the evils connected with cartels,
they emphasize that the unscrambling process would be very long and
difficult. Sir Andrew Duncan at 8. later meeting stated that be believed
6. certain number of cartels to be inevitable and that the United States
would be forced to accept them as our economy ceased expanding.
5) Manpower Problem.
In the transition period between the end of the European war
and the end of the Japanese War, there will not be sufficient release
of people from the war effort to permit the British to resume exporting
in any considerable volume. Dr. Dennison estimates that three million
people will be released but those will just about offset two million
women and five hundred thousand old men who will stop working. Hence,
they feel the need for some form of Lend-Lease assistance or other form
of credit for some time to come.
-20-
VI
CONVERSATIONS OF MR. WALLACE MURRAY
Mr. Murray held a number of conversations with officials
of the Foreign Office, headed by Sir Maurice Peterson. The talks
covered all the countries of the Near and Middle East. Among the
most important points covered were:
1) Palestine.
British views on Palestine are closely similar to those
discussed and formulated by the Department of State: Continued
immigration until the quota of the White Paper is filled; no
territorial division; possible acceptability of local government of
separate Arab and Jewish communities by Arab and Jewish officials
respectively; government of the four principal cities of mixed
population on an Advisory Commission principle, under United Nations
authority, but with undivided executive power to be exercised by the
trustee, presumably Britain; Palestine not a part of an Arab
Confederation; future unrestricted immigration of Jews a source of
certain trouble. The British do not favor a joint declaration by
the United States and Great Britain on Palestine at this time.
2) Bahrein.
The British agreed to permit American consular services in
Bahrein.
3) Iran.
Mr. Murray proposed economic discussions between the American,
British and Soviet diplomatic representatives in Iran to implement
the Tehran declaration on Iran. This proposal was agreed to by the
Foreign Office, and after Secretary Hull's approval, was communicated
to the Soviet Ambassador by Mr. Eden and myself.
4) Saudi Arabia.
The American oil interests in Saudi Arabia and the proposed
British financial and military missions to that country were discussed.
5) Middle East Supply Center.
The MESC was discussed with the assistance of experts on both
sides. It was agreed that every effort should be made to continue
operations on a joint basis with full participation by both American
and British officials.
It was also agreed that the MESC would probably have to
continue to solve supply dislocations after the war, and that the
governments of the Middle Eastern countries should gradually be drawn
into participation.
- 21 -
VII
CONVERSATIONS OF MR. H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS
Mr. Matthews accompanied me on many of my conversations with
officials of the Foreign Office noted above. In addition, he discussed
in detail the situation regarding all European countries with the
appropriate officials of the Foreign Office. Some of the most
important of these talks were:
1) France, with Mr. Harvey and Mr. Mack. The British officials
are far more optimistic than we that the National Committee will be
welcomed wholeheartedly in France. They stated, however, that they
had no intention of recognizing the Committee as the provisional
government before it goes into France, but the impression was that they
would do so at an early date if it has a semblance of general popular
support.
2) Yugoslavia, with Sir Orme Sargent. The British have taken 8.
strong stand against the Pouritch Government. They are doing every-
thing possible to persuade King Peter to form a new Government and to
make & conciliatory declaration with the hope of reducing Tito's
opposition. They admit, however, that there is small possibility of
a reconciliation between Tito and the King.
3) Russia. Mr. Matthews had B. general exchange of views on Russia
with Mr. Warner. They discussed particularly the relations of the
USSR with Great Britain and the United States. He endeavored to
allay unfounded British anxiety lest we be less patient with the
Russians than the long broad view warrants.
4) Poland, with Mr. Harvey and Mr. Roberts. The British officials
are convinced that the Polish Government in London does in fact
represent the substantial majority of Poles. They can see no steps,
however, which could be taken at the present time to improve Polish-
Russian relations.
filesap THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
May 26, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Attached you will find a copy of my
report to Mr. Hull, covering our recent
London conversations, certain sections of
which I believe you would wish to have
available Chart for reference purposes.
This report has been published in Foreign Relations, 1944,
Volume 3, pp. 1 - 30.
Stettinius' memorandum for the President (5-26-44) and
the "List of Conversations" at the end of the report
were not published.
1
Statinius
SECRET
REPORT
to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE HONORABLE CORDELL HULL
in
Submitted by
The Under Secretary of State
E. R. STETTINIUS, Jr.
On Conversations in London
April 7th to April 29th, 1944
THE PRESIDENT
2
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
REPORT
to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE HONORABLE CORDELL HULL
Submitted by
The Under Secretary of State
E. R. STETTINIUS, Jr.
On Conversations in London
April 7th to April 29th, 1944
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
May 22, 1944
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
My dear Mr. Secretary:
It gives me pleasure to transmit to you herewith
a report on the conversations carried on in London on
your behalf from April 7th to April 29th, 1944.
As directed by you and the President, the objec-
tive of our Mission was to exchange views with members
of the British Government on any subjects of current
mutual interest which the British desired to discuss
with us. We sought also to establish with British of-
ficials relationships of frankness and mutual confi-
dence, having in mind the vital importance of such re-
lationships in the solution of our common problems both
during the war and in the post-war era. In the carry-
ing out of these objectives I was given most loyal and
capable support by all the members of the Mission and
by Ambassador Winant and other American officials in
Britain.
We were accorded a most warm and hospitable recep-
tion by the British. They displayed throughout our
talks the same spirit of frankness and cooperation
which motivated our approach to them.
In the course of the conversations, the British
raised with us a large number of topics of both imme-
diate and long-range importance. I explored a large
number of these topics with senior British officials
The Honorable
Cordell Hull
Secretary of State
discussing in particular detail a number of currently
pressing matters such as the European Advisory Com-
mission, the French directive, shipment of war sup-
plies to the Ax1s from the neutral countries, the
Brazilian Expeditionary Force, and the forthcoming
economic talks. I met also on several occasions with
the Soviet Ambassador and with the Chinese Ambassador
in order to keep them informed of the course of our
discussions. In addition, I met with representatives
of all the Governments-in-Exile at their request and
with numerous American diplomatic, military and civil-
ian officials.
Dr. Isaiah Bowman gave the greatest part of his
attention in London to post-war matters, particularly
the world security organization, the world court, and
colonial problems. Mr. John L. Pratt concentrated on
problems of war supply and British planning for post-
war reconstruction and reconversion. Mr. Wallace Murray
discussed with members of the Foreign Office a large num-
ber of current Near Eastern and African topics. Mr. H.
Freeman Matthews, who accompanied me on many of my talks
with senior members of the British Government, carried
on conversations also with members of the Foreign Office
on European matters. Mr. Robert Lynch discussed admin-
istrative affairs, both at the Foreign Office and at our
two Embassies in London.
As the result of our conversations in London, we
are more deeply convinced than ever that the United
States must play an aggressive role in the creation of
the international machinery necessary to ensure world
security and economic stability. It is clear that the
British attach great importance to the active participa-
tion of the United States in the world problems of the
post-war era. We feel that in order to ensure our par-
ticipation they will go far toward meeting our wishes
on the form and character of the machinery for interna-
tional cooperation. In the field of international secu-
rity, British thinking is already very similar to our
own, and we are convinced that when formal negotiations
begin, we and the British will find ourselves in sub-
stantial agreement.
In the meanwhile, we urge that the most careful at-
tention be given to the workings of the inter-allied
bodies already functioning and to the preparation for
those which it may be necessary to create in the near
future. Much of our attention in London was devoted
to the European Advisory Commission, to the civil af-
fairs planning of SHAEF and to European control ma-
chinery which it may be necessary to set up as surren-
der becomes imminent, to the President's proposal for
& United Nations economic "steering committee", to the
proposed interim shipping commission, and to other
United Nations bodies. It is vital that these United
Nations groups work as efficiently and as fruitfully
as possible, for it is there that the spirit of coop-
eration and mutual confidence is being formed which
will be indispensable to successful international coop-
eration in the post-war era.
In conclusion, may I take this means of expressing
again the deep appreciation of myself and the other mem-
bers for the privilege of having been able to undertake
this Mission for you and for the splendid support and
cooperation which you and the other officials of the
State Department gave us at all times.
EQuard Sincerely yours,
THE MISSION TO LONDON
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Under Secretary of State
Dr. Isaiah Bowman, Vice Chairman, Advisory Council on
Post-War Foreign Policy, Department of State
John L. Pratt, Consultant on Commercial Affairs, De-
partment of State
Wallace Murray, Director of the Office of Near East-
ern and African Affairs, Department of State
H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Director of the Office of
European Affairs.
Robert J. Lynch, Special Assistant to the Under Sec-
retary and Executive Secretary to the Mission
Louis J. Hector, Assistant to the Under Secretary
****
The members of the Mission left the United States
on March 30th, 1944 and arrived in London on April 7th.
Conversations were carried on until April 29th with
members of the British Government, with officials of
other Allied Governments, and with United States diplo-
matic, military and civilian officials. The members of
the Mission left London on April 29th and reached Wash-
ington on May 4th, spending two days en route in confer-
ences with Ambassador Averell Harriman and Ambassador
Robert Murphy at Marrakech, French Morocco.
CONTENTS
A complete list of the conversations carried on in London
by the Mission will be found at the end of the Report. The
most important topics discussed in these conversations are
summarized under the following headings:
Page
I. Current Political Topics
1. European Advisory Commission
1
2. Occupation of Germany--Long
term implications
4
3. Food Relief for Occupied Europe
5
4. France
6
5. Russia
9
6. Portuguese Wolfram
12
7. Argentina
13
8. Brazilian Expeditionary Force
14
9. The Governments-in-Exile
15
II. Post War Topics
1. World Organization
17
2. World Court
21
3. Colonial Policy
23
4. Arctic and Anarctic
26
III. Economic Topics
1. Economic Advisers to SHAEF
27
2. United Nations Economic Discus-
sions
28
3. Cartels
29
4. Shipping
30
5. British Post War Reconstruction
31
6. British Reconversion and Disposal
of Surplus War Materials
33
IV. Middle East Topics
1.
Palestine
34
2. Bahrein
35
3. Iran
36
4. Saudi Arabia
37
5. Middle East Supply Center
38
V. List of Conversations
39
I
CURRENT POLITICAL TOPICS
-1-
EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION
British officials and Mr. Eden in particular, were most
eager to raise with the Mission various questions concerning
the European Advisory Commission.
Scope of Reference of the E.A.C.
As the Department is aware, the British, since the Com-
mission's inception, have ascribed to it a much broader
field of endeavor than we have. They stated to us that
under its terms of reference the E.A.C. should concern it-
self with the whole short-term clearing up of Europe after
cessation of hostilities, 1.e., as distinguished from long-
term peace and security arrangements which should be left to
the world security organization.
The British admitted that under their conception the
E.A.C. might grow into the instrument for governing the con-
trol machinery of Europe. They envisage it, indeed, as be-
coming the focus for Tri-Partite forward planning in both
the pre-surrender and post-hostilities periods, particularly
the latter.
The British laid great store on their interpretation of
the Moscow Conference decision to refer to the E.A.C. the
British paper on policy toward liberated areas. Mr. Eden in-
sisted it was not merely this specific document--which the
British no longer wish to present--that was referred to the
E.A.C., but rather that all questions affecting liberated
areas were to come before the E.A.C. We stated that this in-
terpretation differed materially from ours, and further,
that our military authorities are definitely opposed to hav-
ing matters come before the Commission which concern mili-
tary planning and operations because of the possible delays
involved. We said that the Anglo-Norwegian Agreement, cover-
ing primarily the pre-surrender period, fell in this cate-
gory.
As one of the principal British arguments in support of
their conception of the E.A.C., the British dwelt on the im-
portance of obtaining Russia's wholehearted support of coop-
erative action in the solution of European problems. They
insisted that the only existing machinery for consulting
Russia is the E.A.C. and, in support of this, cited Russian
requests to the British that the Anglo-Norwegian Agreement
and the French Civil Affairs directive should be considered
by the E.A.C. We pointed out to the British that the
-2-
Russians had declined so far to consider any other questions
until agreement is reached on the proposed surrender terms
for Germany. The British seemed to feel that since the Rus-
sians themselves had now proposed several other questions for
clearance through the E.A.C., they would probably not insist
upon this position.
While we were still in London, the Russians presented
their Civil Affairs Agreement with Czechoslovakia to the
British Foreign Office and to the Department for comment with-
out suggesting reference to the E.A.C. This had a moderating
effect upon the British position and they dropped their in-
sistence that such documents should be cleared through the
E.A.C.
We endeavored in all conversations to correct the Brit-
ish feeling that there is a desire on the Department's part
to belittle the Commission or to underestimate the value of
its functions. We emphasized the complexity, size and im-
portance of the problems affecting the future treatment of
Germany and the satellite countries and said that we doubted
whether the Commission could, as a practical matter, handle
other problems at the present time. Sir William Strang in
private conversation admitted that the E.A.C. would have its
hands full for some time to come with the problems affecting
enemy countries already scheduled for consideration.
Progress on Surrender Terms
We and the British were equally insistent that time did
not permit of further delays in reaching agreement on surren-
der terms for Germany and beginning consideration of the
other questions concerning the subsequent treatment and con-
trol of Germany.
As to the lack of progress thus far in disposing of the
surrender terms, various causes emerged. The original delay
was caused by the failure for some weeks of the Russian Am-
bassador to receive instructions on surrender terms. The
subsequent delay resulted from confusion in Ambassador
Winant's mind as to the degree of latitude he had to nego-
tiate agreements not strictly in accord with the letter of
the documents furnished him. As a result of our visit and
that of General Wickersham, his Military Advisor, to Washing-
ton, we believe that Mr. Winant now realizes the importance
attached to expediting the Commission's work and understands
that we expect him to negotiate, on the general basis of the
documents furnished, the best agreements possible for submis-
sion to the three governments.
-3-
During our stay Mr. Winant informally submitted a new
draft of the surrender terms to his British and Russian col-
leagues. In substance it is apparently acceptable to the
British, and it goes a long way to meet the Russian point of
view. When we left, Ambassador Gousev was daily expecting
Moscow's comment on this draft and all seemed hopeful that
agreement could soon be reached.
As the E.A.C. passes from surrender terms to directives
and proclamations for the Allied commanders and then to con-
trol machinery for Germany, Ambassador Winant will need an
increase in his Commission staff. This is particularly true
in the economic field. Sir William Strang can and does call
upon the whole British Government for technical assistance.
If Mr. Winant is to have the technical assistance he will re-
quire in presenting the American view, he must have on his
staff persons capable of advising him on the economic prob-
lems which will come before the Commission.
Recommendations
1) We recommend that careful attention be given
Mr. Winant's personnel requirements. The Department should
begin at once to consider personnel choices for the expanded
staff Mr. Winant will need as soon as the detailed control
machinery and occupation arrangements come under discussion.
2) In order that Mr. Winant may have the full benefit
of this Government's current views on problems under consid-
eration by the E.A.C., it would seem desirable that officers
in the Department who have participated in the formulation
of these views make brief visits to London from time to time
in order to assist the American representative on E.A.C. in
understanding our Government's approach and the factors be-
hind it,
3) The Department should give careful consideration to
the possible scope of the work of the E.A.C. during the in-
terim period between the surrender of Germany and the final
settlements, and to the relations between the E.A.C. and the
military during that period. If the E.A.C. does, in fact,
become the control machinery for Europe during this interim
period, we must be prepared with the necessary personnel and
machinery for American participation. If it is decided by
the State Department that the E.A.C. should not assume these
post-surrender control functions, immediate consideration
should be given to alternative machinery since this may have
to be set up with considerable speed.
- 4 -
OCCUPATION OF GERMANY -- LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS
General Eisenhower and General Bedell Smith stated to
members of the Mission their conviction that there should
be a single Anglo-American zone of occupation in Germany in-
stead of two separate zones. The issue had been raised by
them through military channels but no reply had been re-
ceived. They asked that the matter be discussed with the
President and with the Secretary.
It is General Eisenhower's belief that it would be a
very difficult task to separate the combined Anglo-American
invasion force so as to create two distinct occupation forces.
Moreover, he pointed out that the supply for the combined
force is based on an intricate system of Combined Boards and
pooled supplies which would be very difficult to disentangle
in order to create two different supply systems for two sepa-
rate zones of occupation.
The character of the zones of occupation in Germany must
be considered, however, from the long-range political view-
point as well as the immediate military viewpoint. Great
Britain, because of her geographical position, will inevita-
bly desire to play a more active role than will the United
States in continental affairs, particularly French affairs.
If the American occupation forces are integrated with the
British forces in a single Anglo-American zone, we may be put
in the position of seeming to back up all of Britain's post-
war European policies. On the other hand, the creation of
two separate zones will give the Germans wider scope for
playing off one occupying power against another. These are
only two examples of the various long-range aspects of the
problem which must be given careful consideration.
Recommendation
We suggest that this is a problem of great urgency,
since military planning for the zones of occupation must get
under way immediately. We recommend that the Secretary call
a meeting in the very near future, to include the Under Sec-
retary, Dr. Bowman, Mr. Dunn, Mr. Matthews and such other of-
ficers of the Department as may seem appropriate, and that
the views of the Department be promptly embodied in a memo-
randum to the President.
-5-
FOOD RELIEF FOR OCCUPIED EUROPE
The Prime Minister stated that he objected strongly to
any relief shipments of food to the occupied countries of
Europe because of the danger of security leaks concerning
the coming operations. He said that he is interested in the
providing of relief, but that he feels we must take no
chances whatsoever of jeopardizing the success of our mili-
tary operations.
Mr. Eden stated that it was hopeless to raise the food
relief question again with the War Cabinet. He said that
they had taken a firm position that the best thing for the
people in the occupied areas is to turn those areas into lib-
erated areas as soon as possible and that any food relief
plans must be turned down for operational and security rea-
sons. This whole question is tied up, of course, with Brit-
ain's historical dependence on blockade as a principal weapon
of war.
The Under-Secretary told Mr. Eden that it is very im-
portant from the American political point of view to open
negotiations promptly with Germany, through Switzerland or
Sweden, on the subject of food relief. Mr. Eden felt that
his Government would never agree to such action.
-6-
FRANCE
Status of Directive to General Eisenhower
Upon arrival in England we found that the President's
proposed directive of March 3rd, 1944 to General Eisenhower
on the administration of civil affairs in France was still
on the Prime Minister's desk. The Prime Minister took the
position that he did not want to "bother the President" at
this time, and he was apparently unwilling to authorize ac-
ceptance of the directive or even its discussion in the Com-
bined Civil Affairs Committee.
Following our arrival, we made every effort with the
Prime Minister, Mr. Eden, Mr. Cadogan and other Foreign Of-
fice officials to have action on the directive expedited.
We explained at length that in practice General Eisenhower
would deal with the French Committee in all his pre-invasion
planning and to the extent that it proved possible after
landing in France. We made it clear that neither the Depart-
ment nor General Eisenhower has any intention of encouraging
any rival group which may emerge in France, but that we did
feel General Eisenhower's hands should not be tied to the
extent of forcing him to maintain the Committee with
American bayonets should it prove unacceptable to the
French people.
The British were delighted with the Secretary's speech
of April 9th and particularly his references to France. They
felt, however, that there were elements in the speech incom-
patible with the President's directive. We consistently ex-
plained that there was no divergence and pointed out that
the Secretary's speech had received the President's prior
approval.
Mr. Eden insisted that his statement in Parliament on
September 22nd last made it "embarrassing" for him to accept
the President's directive unless it were amended so as to
make General Eisenhower's dealings with the Committee manda-
tory, i.e. "may" changed to "should" in Article II, para-
graph 3 of the directive. Subsequent reading of Mr. Eden's
statement, however, does not reveal to us any real basis
for such embarrassment.
During our stay in England, it developed that as action
on the President's directive was not to be immediately forth-
coming, the time element compelled General Eisenhower to
initiate informal discussions with the French Military Mission
-7-
in London under General Koenig, with a view to reaching work-
ing agreements. General Eisenhower at the same time re-
quested approval of this procedure from the Combined Chiefs
of Staff. He feels, however, that, while this arrangement is
a satisfactory stop-gap, he must eventually have some formal
directive.
Mr. Churchill stated in his last visit with the Under-
Secretary that he had devised a "formula" on the French di-
rective. He would say in the House of Commons that the
British Government's position was identical with that out-
lined in the Secretary's speech and that General Eisenhower
and his staff were already in informal conversations with
"a French general". If asked about the directive, Mr. Chur-
chill would say that it was a private matter between the
two Governments concerning the prosecution of the war and
not the concern of Parliament or the Press. He thought this
formula would meet the situation in England, and he did not
propose to communicate further with the President on the di-
rective. (This is apparently the basis of Mr. Eden's state-
ment of May 2.)
The Under-Secretary made it clear to the Prime Minister
that while the present informal conversations provided a
satisfactory "tentative" basis for working agreements with
the French Committee, but that General Eisenhower must have
some definite directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff on
which to base his policies.
Basis of British Policy Toward French Directive
We believe that the British reluctance to accept the
President's proposed directive stems from three causes:
1) The policy of the British Government has always
been to give the French Committee the fullest possible sup-
port, and we believe that it is prepared to continue this
support to the utmost once the invasion starts. It does not
therefore wish to place on record with its stamp of approval
any document which might, some time in the future, be taken
to imply that the British contemplated dealing under any
circumstances with some group or element other than the Com-
mittee.
2) It is contrary to the conception of the British
system of government to permit important political decisions
to be taken by a military commander. Such decisions are the
functions of the Foreign Office with the prior approval, in
important cases, of the War Cabinet. The British consider
that relations with the French authorities of a non-
operational character are primarily political in nature,
-8-
particularly the decision as to the authority with whom to
deal. They would be unwilling to grant discretion to &
British supreme commander in such a matter, and they are
naturally far less willing to grant this authority to an
American supreme commander, however much confidence they
may have in him.
3) There is much suspicion on the part of the British
that after we get into France a "deal" may be made similar
to the arrangements which were entered into with Admiral
Darlan at the time of our landing in North Africa, the mem-
ory of which is still vivid in England. The British have
never more than grudgingly admitted that however unfortunate
the Darlan arrangements may have been from the political
point of view, they nonetheless saved many lives and helped
materially to shorten the African campaign. They fear that
for strictly military reasons General Eisenhower may again
take some action under the President's flexible directive
which might run counter to their determination to give full
and undivided support to the French Committee of National
Liberation.
The difference in British and American thinking with
regard to the immediate situation we will find in France
was brought out clearly during our stay. Whereas we con-
sider that as France is liberated a period of some confusion,
disorders and even a limited blood bath are possible, the
British attitude is one of convinced optimism. They not
only hope, but believe, that the entire country will rally
to the support of General de Gaulle and the Committee, and
will accept their dictates without question. They state
that they do not plan to recognize de Gaulle and the Commit-
tee as a provisional government until they are reestablished
in Metropolitan France. It is clear, however, that the
British will do everything possible to encourage support of
the Committee and discourage opposition to it and that full
recognition will probably not be long delayed once the Com-
mittee or certain members thereof have arrived on the main-
land of France.
-9-
RUSSIA
British and American Policy Toward Russia
The British are determined to work in all ways for con-
tinued Russian cooperation with the Western Allies after the
conclusion of hostilities. This is one of the cornerstones
of present British policy. Given the background of Russian
isolation and suspicion over the past quarter century -- not
to mention traditional Anglo-Russian rivalry -- the British
believe that the road will be long, slow and painful. But
they feel -- with occasional doubts -- that the chances of
ultimate success are favorable. They believe that the maxi-
mum of patience will be called for in the face of the inevit-
able setbacks and sudden incomprehensible Russian moves.
The British seemed curiously unaware of the fact that
American relations with Russia are at present enjoying less
friction than their own. They even seem to fear that we will
exercise less patience with Russia than they. We assured the
British that the Secretary is well aware of all the pitfalls
that may confront us and of the patience which will be re-
quired if the habit of Russian consultation and cooperation
with the Western world is to be gradually evolved. We em-
phasized that the outlook for a post-war world without such
prospect of Russian partnership would indeed be grim.
On this fundamental objective of Russian cooperation
there seems to be no difference in British or American view-
point; on the means of bringing the policy to fruition there
may, of course, be differences in approach. We explained to
the British the greater difficulties which we face with pub-
lic opinion in this country and mentioned the disillusionment
on the part of some Americans which followed the Polish af-
fair, the Pravda peace feeler story, and the Badoglio recog-
nition incident. We pointed out that the Secretary has
taken every opportunity both in Washington and through our
Ambassador at Moscow to emphasize how American public opinion
fails to understand any unilateral course of action on
Russia's part and the need for working through mutual con-
sultation and agreement. The British expressed full agree-
ment with the wisdom of this policy and felt that it is al-
ready having results, notably in the "moderate" Russian Terms
to Finland and more recently in the Russian consultation with
the British and ourselves on surrender terms for Rumania and
the Czech civil affairs agreement.
-10-
Russian Treatment of Germany
The British are convinced that the Russians will be de-
cidedly "tough" with Germany after the termination of hos-
tilities. They believe that the cornerstone of future Rus-
sian policy is to prevent Germany ever being again in a posi-
tion to threaten the peace. They feel that any argument
that a stable peaceful Europe requires a prosperous stable
Germany will fall on decidedly deaf Russian ears. In fact,
the British Foreign Office thought that one element in
Russia's offer of German territory up to the Oder to a
friendly Poland is the belief that in thus giving the Poles
a sizeable Germany minority problem, any possibility of a
German-Polish alliance will be prevented. The British be-
lieve that Russia will maintain its determination to keep
Germany weak long after the British and ourselves have fallen
into forgiveness and forgetfulness.
Russian-Polish Relations
The British feel that there is nothing that can usefully
be done at the moment with regard to Russian-Polish relations.
They were encouraged in varying degrees by Polish reports --
which they appeared to accept at face value -- that the Pol-
ish underground has working arrangements with Russian military
commanders on the spot. The British believe that the Rus-
sians have discovered that the Polish underground has some
real military value, that it is loyal to the Polish Govern-
ment in London and that failure to obtain its cooperation
might hamper Russian military operations. The British seem
to feel that if cooperation on the spot between the Polish
underground and the Russian armies works well, a Polish Gov-
ernment with substantial popular support may gradually arise
in Poland.
In spite of reiterated Russian hostility to the Polish
Government-in-Exile, the British have not abandoned hope
that perhaps Mikolajczyk and one or two others might be
brought into an administration set up locally in Poland.
They admitted that this for the moment is pure speculation,
but they are not inclined to accept Russian denials of coop-
eration with the Polish underground at face value.
Post-War Relations with Russia
We endeavored to learn whether there is any substantial
body of opinion in England which believes that at some future
time a stronger Germany may be necessary as a bulwark against
the East and whether thinking in this direction has affected
British policy. It was admitted that there exists and always
has existed a minority fringe of people on the extreme Right
-11-
who believe that Bolshevism is the real menace to Europe and
that such people might argue for a strong Germany after the
war. The vast majority of the British, however, so far as
we could ascertain, are not thinking along these lines but
are hoping and expecting -- with occasional qualms -- that
Russian cooperation with the Western Allies will extend in-
to the post-war future.
British officials do not believe that there are any
tangible signs, in spite of the Polish question, that Rus-
sian policy as decided upon at Moscow and Tehran has under-
gone any fundamental change in the direction of isolation.
They believe that Russian needs for reconstruction and reha-
bilitation and her natural desire to raise the standard of
living of her war-stricken people will prevent Russian na-
tionalism from going to extremes for some time after the war.
They say, however, that this factor should not be exagger-
ated. They likewise believe with us that the fatigue factor
is important and works in favor of cooperation with the West.
It would be dangerous for the Soviet Government to strain the
Russian people further by depicting another period of strug-
gle against Western capitalist powers. This reluctance to
confront his people with another period of tightened belts
and preparation for another threat of war will constitute an
important element, the British feel, making for Stalin's
cooperation in a world security organization.
-12-
PORTUGUESE WOLFRAM
Mr. Eden gave his assurances that the British would
take a position on Portuguese wolfram comparable to that
which is finally worked out with regard to Spanish wolfram.
They feel themselves in a difficult position, however, to
impose severe blockade sanctions before July 1, 1944, be-
cause of the supply commitments in their agreement with
Portugal concerning the use of the Azores bases. The Brit-
ish implied, however, that the United States is under no
such disability and that they would support such action on
our part should it become necessary. As to the Anglo-
Portuguese alliance, the British are apparently not pre-
pared to consider denouncing it if Portugal does not meet
our wishes.
-13-
ARGENTINA
Both the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden gave their firm
assurances that Britain would support any position which the
United States finds it necessary to take with regard to
Argentina, provided only that the problem of meat and other
critical imports from Argentina can be solved. The British
are quite aware of the danger of a South American bloc hos-
tile to Britain and the United States being formed around
an intransigent Argentina, and they realize the necessity
for firm joint action to prevent this.
-14-
BRAZILIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Prime Minister Churchill stated on April 15th with
great directness that he felt it would be a serious error
to permit more than a token force or "a brigade" to be sent
overseas from Brazil at this time, and that this force
should be assigned to the Mediterranean theater because of
similar climatic conditions there.
After receipt of ESDEL 22 on April 16th, the Under
Secretary impressed upon the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden
the political importance both within Brazil and from the
standpoint of her prestige as an ally of avoiding any fur-
ther delay in the embarkation of the B.E.F. Mr. Eden prom-
ised the Under Secretary on April 24th that he would review
the matter with the War Cabinet. He himself was favorably
inclined and seemed hopeful that the Prime Minister and the
War Cabinet would grant the necessary approval. We under-
stand that the necessary British approval has now been forth-
coming.
-15-
THE GOVERNMENTS-IN-EXILE
American Diplomatic Representation
Many of the representatives of the Governments-in-Exile
in London expressed genuine concern over the fact that an
American diplomatic representative with the rank of Ambassa-
dor has not been appointed to them. This was particularly
true of the Norwegians who explained that this was resented
in Norway and that it had served to create doubts about the
friendship of the United States for Norway. Mr. Trygve Lie,
Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that the
change in Mr. Biddle's status from an Ambassador to a Lieu-
tenant Colonel has created fears that the United States in-
tends to deal with Norway through some military organization
such as AMGOT rather than through diplomatic channels.
Participation in Work of E.A.C.
Representatives of the Exiled Governments were also much
concerned over the fact that they have not been consulted
about the surrender terms for Germany. Dr. E. N. van Kleffens,
Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated, for in-
stance, that there are certain questions involved in the Ger-
man surrender terms with which the Netherlands Government is
vitally concerned, but, that as things stand now it has had
no opportunity to make its views known or to find out what
decisions are being reached by the European Advisory Commis-
sion.
Refund of Currency made Available for Pay of United States
Troops.
The Belgian and Dutch Finance Ministers stated to the
Under Secretary their great concern over the position taken
by the United States Treasury that currency made available
by Western European countries for pay of United States troops
might not be reimbursed by the United States. They feel that
the Reciprocal Aid Agreements settled this point in clear un-
mistakable language, and they cannot understand why we are
now proposing a different arrangement, particularly in the
light of the fact that we pay dollars for the sterling used
to pay our troops in Britain. The Belgian Finance Minister
pointed out also that the British had agreed to pay in ster-
ling for the Belgian currency made available to the British
Army.
-16-
Recommendations
1) We recommend that a single Ambassador be appointed
for all the Governments-1n-Exile in London to fill the post
left vacant by Mr. Biddle. Although Governments such as the
Norwegian Government obviously feel entitled to a full-
time Ambassador appointed to their country alone, they seem
to appreciate the embarrassment which might result from ap-
pointment of ambassadors to each of the Exiled Governments
in the event that the authority of some of these governments
is challenged after the liberation of their homelands. The
possibility of such embarrassment is greatly reduced, of
course, by the device of having one ambassador for all the
Governments-1n-Exile.
2) We recommend that the question of the refunding of
currency made available for payment of American troops be
reopened with the Treasury. Whatever the merits or demerits
of the original determination to exclude payment of troops
from Reverse Lend-Lease, this policy was definitely embodied
in the Reciprocal Aid Agreements and we feel from our con-
versations in London that what they regard as our sudden de-
cision to abandon this policy has left a very unfortunate 1m-
pression with the Governments-in-Exile.
II
POST-WAR TOPICS
-17-
WORLD ORGANIZATION
There were frank and detailed comments by British
officials, including the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary
Eden, Under-Secretary Sir Alexander Cadogan and others, on
the world security organization. In general, British
thinking on this subject seems very similar to our own.
The following points from the discussions on world
security seem to us the most important from the point of
view of future preparatory study and discussion within the
Department.
The Executive Council
In order to provide larger representation for small
states, the composition of the Executive Council is more
broadly conceived by the British than by our Government.
They feel that the experience of the League Council demon-
strates that the small states do not combine against the
large states at critical times or on critical issues.
Only by increasing representation of small states, they
believe, can we avoid two dangers: 1) The small states
will claim that the Great Powers, possessing overwhelming
military power, are ruling the world arbitrarily and by
force; 2) The small representation of small states in the
Council may tend to force the discussion of questions of
security into the general assembly and to this the Prime
Minister has expressed most emphatic opposition since he
believes that futile debates would be the result.
The chief functions of the Executive Council as con-
ceived by the British are:
1) The prompt exercise of force, if necessary, in
the interest of security.
2) To harmonize policies and conciliate powers and
regions.
3) To refer to regional councils certain questions
for recommendation and report, if not for action.
The example was given of the Flemish question
as a type of question which could be referred to
a possible European council for study and report
instead of being taken up in either the assembly
or the executive council of the world organiza-
tion.
-18-
In order further to avoid the charge of arbitrary
action by the Great Powers, some British officials have
been considering the possibility of a "Defense Committee"
of the Executive Council to assist the Council in dealing
directly and swiftly with security issues. Such a Defense
Committee would be advisory only. It would be in effect a
subcommittee of the Executive Council, to receive the
reports of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and make a pre-
liminary study of them.
Regional Councils
With respect to the need for a World Organization,
there is no difference of opinion between the Prime
Minister and his Government. The form of it, however, is
very much in question. The Prime Minister's view stems
from his belief in the need for the decisive exercise of
power in order to keep the post-war world on an even keel.
He doubts the wisdom of reestablishing a World Organiza-
tion on vague general lines, preferring to make more pre-
cise the several fields of responsibility.
Regional councils for security are to the Prime
Minister a primary objective. He would have three princi-
pal ones in the world: a Western Hemisphere council, a
European council, and an Asiatic council. His Foreign
Office and his experts generally would put the weight of
world security upon the World Organization rather than
upon regional councils. In conversation it was clear that
Mr. Churchill has not thought out the operations and com-
plexities of regional councils. For example, he would
resolve interregional disputes by appointing a commission
under the Executive Council. This seems to us a weak setup
for a highly important dispute that might shake world
security.
International Military Bases
Military bases under international authority seem
necessary to the British, but they feel that they cannot
be distributed throughout the world in great numbers. In
our conversations, reference was made repeatedly to Panteller-
1a, the Marquesas Islands, New Caledonia, Truk, Singapore,
the Caribbean Islands, Dakar and Madagascar, and one or two
of the Japanese Mandated Islands to be selected for this
purpose. From these examples, we have the impression that
the British stand somewhat midway between the position of
our military advisers at Washington, who incline toward few
bases, and the position of those who desire many widely
distributed bases.
-19-
Mr. Churchill repeatedly emphasized the need for
international funds to support international bases, even
under a trusteeship arrangement. He believes that in this
way the United Nations will learn how expensive it is to
maintain a security system such as the British have main-
tained in the past through national bases under Empire
organization.
International Military Force
The use of military contingents with a distinctive
insignia for international security is much in the Prime
Minister's mind. He seems somewhat theoretical and
imaginative in his treatment of this aspect of the matter
rather than soundly convinced himself of its feasibility.
His officials in the Foreign Office and the study group
associated with it do not share his enthusiasm, although
they are willing to examine the question impartially.
Regulation of Armaments
The regulation of armaments is believed possible by
the British only through positive action. Negative
prohibitions will get us nowhere, they feel, in view of
the probably Russian position that inspection, or indeed
any implication of outside control, is unacceptable.
Positive action offers a fairly wide field for con-
sideration, the British feel. The standardization of arms
with uniform calibre might be discussed, for instance,
although the wartime problems arising from this question
as between just the British and Americans warn of
difficulties in this regard. The large states, of course,
will have the problem of preventing excess armaments by
small states. The airplane introduces an element of
special difficulty. We cannot stop aeronautical experi-
mentation and it will be difficult to agree on standards
of construction and operation, since the needs of various
countries differ as to the type of plane and the type of
services required.
Mandated Territories
The disposal of the Mandated Territories of 1919 was
discussed apart from the colonial question. The legal
position of the Mandates is a troublesome question which
may or may not need to be resolved before the World
Organization is set up with a section in it to deal with
dependent peoples.
Since France as a nation is not in being at the moment,
we cannot ask her to subscribe to a decision respecting the
Mandated Territories. Only preliminary work on the legal
-20-
aspects would seem to be useful now. Afterward the Mandated
Territories can be treated in one of several ways: they
can become parts of the general problem of dependent
peoples, or they can form a part of a general system with
a special status, or, theoretically at least, they can be
treated separately and in an individual manner, depending
upon the nature of the problems in each. Whatever solution
is worked out, account must be taken of improvements,
invested capital, etc., which form a part of the between-
wars period of British and French administration. The
legal questions involved are complicated and novel. Pre-
sumably the title of these territories reverts to the
Allied and Associated Powers. A mandates have been largely
settled or are in process of settlement. Iraq has become
independent; Syria and Lebanon have been promised indepen-
dence after the war; and Palestine must under any circum-
stances have special treatment. B mandates are not yet
ready for self-government. C mandates are largely under
the sovereignty of the Dominions who would have to be
consulted about them.
-21-
WORLD COURT
Discussion of a World Court, from the British point of
view, begins with consideration of the "Report of the
Informal Inter-Allied Committee on the Future of the
Permanent Court of International Justice" of February 10,
1944. It is the work of a committee of experts formed
early in 1943, whose members were chosen from eleven
different countries. The Chairman was Sir William Malkin.
It is our understanding that this report 1s now under
consideration in the Office of the Legal Adviser of the
Department of State. Sir William Malkin expressed the hope
that comment from the Department upon the above report
would be received by him at an early date.
So far as Sir William Malkin represents his Govern-
ment, it 1s important to realize that he is apparently
ready to accept within reason whatever plan of a World Court
the Government of the United States finds "politically
feasible". He considers representation by the United States
on the Court and in the preliminaries of organization as
vital to its success.
Sir William stated that in his view the value of the
Court's work lies in enlarging the cooperating machinery
and habits of the world. He recognizes that the cases
brought before the Court in the twenty years between world wars
do not represent the real causes of wars, which lie in the
political and economic fields. Yet there is a great need
for a Court in order to fasten the attention of the world
upon the possibilities of international law. Conciliation
and arbitration have their due place, but they do not
represent consistent views on international behavior except
in so far as they enlarge the hope of using machinery other
than war for the settlement of disputes.
Sir William Malkin considers it desirable to limit the
work of the World Court to justiciable disputes and advisory
opinions. It cannot take up political disputes. On the
question of universal jurisdiction there is considerable
doubt. I gather that this is considered a more remote
object in the development of world political thinking than
the actual constitution and operation of the Court in the
near future.
Sir William said that he realized the desirability of
employing new terms in setting up the new World Organization,
-22-
since League memories are not altogether happy ones.
Moreover, some of the powers that withdrew from the League,
in order to save face, desire to have the Court's name
changed and its functions redefined. For these reasons,
the Report of the Inter-Allied Committee states that the
existing connection between the Court and the League of
Nations should be discontinued and should not be replaced
by an organic connection with any new international
organization in the sense of being established by an
article of such organization.
A novel element introduced into the Report is pre-
sented in Chapter XI, "Regional Chambers". It is
especially designed to attract non-European countries to
a system of international law and a World Court to inter-
pret it. It is recognized that there is a danger in
decentralization in that doubt may be cast on the legal
merits or finality of the decisions given. To meet this
doubt ingenious plans are proposed for securing prior
assent to the selection of judges for the Regional Court
by agreement between the parties or by nomination of the
Court. This would secure "uniformity of jurisprudence
and a coherent and self-consistent Court".
Judges of different types of mind and methods of
legal thought will almost inevitably be represented by the
principal countries adhering to the Court. No specific
attempt should be made to represent particular legal
systems. Sir William emphasized the fact that the decisions
of the Court at The Hague over twenty years showed that no
fundamental difficulty arose because participants in an
action came from different legal systems.
Sir William thought that the Court should continue
to sit at The Hague.
Both Sir William and Professor Webster remarked that
they did not want to emphasize the World Court at the
present time if it diverted attention from an over-all
World Organization whose primary object was security.
Recommendation
Since it appears that the British are willing at the
present time to follow our lead in the organization of the
World Court, it is vital that our views be formulated and
made known to them as quickly as may be possible. We
recommend that this subject be considered by the Committee
on Post-War Programs in the near future.
-23-
COLONIAL POLICY
We were able to discuss the colonial question with
practically the whole of the upper Foreign Office staff.
There was also the opportunity of discussing it with Prime
Minister Churchill, Foreign Secretary Eden, and a study
group attached to the Foreign Office.
British Attitude Toward United States Statements on Colonial
Policy
In exchanges between our Government and the British
Government during the past year and a half, we have pre-
sented for British consideration a set of principles for
the guidance of the United Nations in the administration of
dependent peoples. These principles are cast in the most
general form, and emphasis was at first upon "independence",
later changed to "self-government", It is the British view
that these statements are vague and impractical. They
claim that the diversities of life and environment among
dependent peoples are so great that it is not possible to
make any real improvement in the relations of such peoples
to the metropole by setting up what they feel is a vague set
of general ideals.
In one of the replies of the British Government, an
Aide-Memoire dated May 26, 1943, the point is made that a
definite time table to be followed in giving an independent
status to colonial peoples is an impossible goal. One
cannot say in advance when the processes of education will
enable a given people to exercise self-government. This
point was expanded in our conversations. Self-governing
people, the British feel, are developed as a result of trial
and error. To put all dependent peoples under a general set
of principles is to pretend that all may be treated alike.
Moreover, an enduring security system is not achieved by
multiplying completely independent and small political
entities all over the world.
United Nations Supervision of Dependent Areas
The line of approach used in our conversations with
the British was the need for settling specific difficult
questions, such as Italian Somaliland, Libya, the Japanese
Mandated Islands, and the possible location of military
bases on French possessions such as New Caledonia,
Marquesas Islands, Madagascar, or French Indo-China.
-24-
At the beginning the general attitude of the British
officials was cool toward any form of international control,
which we presume reflected their disappointment with the
previous documents from this Government. We pointed out
that we are actually dealing in an international way with
dependent peoples, including colonies, when we undertake
to form a general security system under which both military
bases and economic matters may be agreed upon. In the
economic field, we have the standard of living of native
peoples being affected by forms of international control
of excess production of commercial agriculture in the
tropics. This became so clear in the Caribbean region,
when war interrupted normal commercial relations, that a
Caribbean Advisory Commission had to be set up. We asked
if similar commissions could not operate in other regions.
Colonel Stanley's first reaction to this question was
not favorable but Dr. Bowman pressed the matter and
requested further consideration of various possibilities.
At their second meeting, Colonel Stanley thought that
Southeastern Asia might well have a regional council for
the benefit of dependent peoples there. He thought that
a regional council might also operate in the case of the
Japanese Mandated Islands, though like all other officials
he expressed the hope that the flag of the United States
will fly in that region after the war. He also saw valuable
results from a regional council in East Africa where Italian
Somaliland and Eritrea come into the picture. In the case
of West Africa, he thought that & regional council was not
desirable, or if one were formed that the United States
should not be represented upon it because, speaking frankly,
he thought we were not popular there.
We and the British found ourselves much closer in our
thinking at the end of our several talks than we could have
hoped. The need for entering the French colonial field
was obvious to our British colleagues and the argument
seems to have been accepted that this hope could be realized
and the position of the United States in an international
scheme clarified with respect to the Pacific islands, only
if Great Britain were willing to have the question of
dependent peoples brought into the area of international
discussion.
Once we had reached this point the remaining question
was: Should we continue to seek agreement on the text of
a declaration by Great Britain and the United States with
respect to dependent peoples? On this point Colonel
Stanley said that the time had passed when such a joint
declaration would have any political value either in Great
- 25 -
Britain or, he thought, in the world. But he was willing
to take up the suggestion that a section on dependent
peoples should appear in the World Organization.
At the end of the conversations, Colonel Stanley
summarized under four heads the general situation as he
saw it, as follows:
1) Any statement of colonial policy should become
part of a section on dependent peoples in the
structure of world organization and should not
be a joint declaration.
2) The principle of regional commissions is accept-
able to the British 1f they are not executive
in character but are set up to study, recommend,
and advise. On them should be represented not
only parent nations but nations that have major
economic and strategic interests in such areas.
3) Local branches of functional world organizations
should be linked up to the regional commissions
in the fields of health, nutrition, labor, etc.
The functional organization would consult on the
recommendations of the regional commissions.
4) A definite obligation to publish annual reports
on each area should be assumed. This should be
an obligation on all the colonial powers. Such
reports would be sent to a control body where
they would be available and interchangeable.
Colonel Stanley was so hopeful of future agreement
along the above lines that he said he was willing to place
these four points before his associates in the Cabinet. Dr.
Bowman told him that he thought consideration on the
ministerial level was inappropriate at the present time, if
Colonel Stanley were going to refer in such presentation to
the position of the Government of the United States. The
exchanges in our conversations had been informal and
exploratory. On our side it was necessary to put the four
points he had mentioned into the stream of discussion in
the Department of State, after which Secretary Hull would
in due course convey our decision or proposal. Colonel
Stanley said that he understood this but that he thought
it desirable to consult his associates in the Cabinet in an
informal way and try out these four points as the beginning
of another chapter in our discussion of dependent peoples.
-26-
ARCTIC AND ANTARCTIC
Dr. Bowman inquired if the British Government desired
to include Arctic and Antarctic questions in the general
settlement following the war. He stated that there were
no questions in either region that could not be settled
fairly without argument, but that before the situation
got tangled by further explorations, such as the Japanese
had made in the Antarctic some years ago, we ought to make
a final territorial settlement of the conflicting or over-
lapping claims of the Norwegians, British and Americans.
Instructions were given to a representative of the
study group attached to the Foreign Office to look into
the Arctic and Antarctic question and advise the Foreign
Office on the desirability of undertaking a broad examina-
tion of this group of problems with a view to its considera-
tion in the final settlement.
III
ECONOMIC TOPICS
-27-
ECONOMIC ADVISERS TO SHAEF
Mr. Philip Reed expressed the opinion to the Under
Secretary that on the basis of our experience in North
Africa, Sicily and Italy, the responsibility for the
integration of American and British economic policies
with military planning in the coming European operations
should be centralized in SHAEF under the authority of the
Supreme Commander. This responsibility should be vested,
he feels, in representatives of the respective governments
attached to SHAEF as economic advisers to the Supreme
Commander.
This proposal was discussed with Ambassador Robert
Murphy in Marrakech and he concurs in it. He pointed out
that in North Africa it was necessary to set up the North
African Economic Board as a staff section of the Allied
High Command in order to centralize economic matters and
integrate them with military planning, and that the Board
constituted a convenient bridge between the economic
activities of the operational period and the post-military
period. Mr. Murphy pointed out that the problems which
will be faced by SHAEF are far more complex than those
faced in North Africa. It would be wise, he feels, to
develop civilian economic coordination with the military
as soon as may be convenient in order to deal both with the
short-range and long-range economic problems more
effectively.
Recommendation
We do not believe, of course, that economic advisers
should be urged on General Eisenhower if he does not feel
the need for them. We think it highly desirable, however,
that the problem be put before him in the near future. We
recommend that an informal letter be addressed to
General Eisenhower asking him whether he believes that
American and British economic advisers, occupying the same
status as the American and British political advisers now
attached to SHAEF, would be of value to him in the coming
operations.
-28-
UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC DISCUSSIONS
Resumption of Anglo-American Economic Talks
The early resumption of the economic talks was urged
on the British in numerous conversations. The officials
of the Foreign Office seem willing to proceed promptly with
the talks. The Prime Minister, however, feels that he must
proceed with great caution in this field. He stated that
thorough discussions with the Dominions and further discus-
sions in Parliament are necessary before the British can
resume the economic talks. He did state, however, that he
recognized that the political situation in the United
States may make it necessary to proceed at a faster pace,
and he gave his assurances that he would bear this fact
in mind.
Once the agreement of the Prime Minister has been ob-
tained, there should be little delay on the British side,
since the Foreign Office seems now to feel technically pre-
pared to resume discussions. In fact, Mr. Richard Law
stated that he was very anxious that they get under way
in May of this year.
United Nations Economic Steering Committee
The failure of the Prime Minister to answer the
President's two telegrams of February 23rd, concerning a
United Nations steering committee for international economic
discussion and the future of the Anglo-American Combined
Boards, was pointed out repeatedly in our conversations.
Although this was not stated by the British, it is our
belief that they are reluctant to set up a United Nations
steering committee for economic discussions until there is
already a considerable measure of agreement between Britain
and the United States as to the topics to be raised and the
countries which are to participate in the discussions.
Mr. Eden, however, agreed to take the matter up with the
War Cabinet and to secure an answer as quickly as possible.
On the last day of our visit, Mr. Eden apologized for the
fact that an answer had not yet been formulated and stated
that he would communicate with the State Department within
the next two weeks.
-29-
CARTELS
Cartels had apparently never been recognized as a
problem by the British Foreign Office until the economic
talks at Washington in October, 1943. British thinking
is still far behind ours on the subject. The Foreign
Office is concerned with it now, in fact, only because
we have taken a position and wish to continue discussions.
Some British officials were willing to admit the evils
of cartelization, but they emphasized that the unscrambling
process as far as Britain is concerned will be very long and
difficult. Their feeling is that we should start on a case
by case basis, taking the most flagrant examples first and
gradually working toward the abolition of all forms of
cartels that can definitely be shown to interfere with
international trade.
Other British officials, however, believe that cartels
are necessary to protect invested capital and commitments
to labor such as stabilized wages and pensions. They feel
that we in the United States will have to accept cartels
after our economy ceases to expand at such a swift rate.
It is unquestionable that there are both powerful indus-
trial and labor groups in Britain which will support the
maintenance of cartels.
Recommendation
1) We recommend that the discussion of cartels with
the British be conducted to a greater extent on a case by
case basis and that the American representatives be
thoroughly briefed on particularly flagrant cartel abuses
which the British will not be able to defend.
2) Since the argument is frequently raised that
cartels are a necessary machinery for the interchange of
technical information, we recommend that studies be made
of alternative methods for exchanging technical informa-
tion which will not involve the restrictive aspects of
cartelization.
-30-
SHIPPING
Officials of the British Government, almost without
exception, are acutely concerned over Britain's place in
post-war shipping and the threat of competition from subsi-
dized American shipping. The Prime Minister, Mr. Eden,
Lord Leathers and Sir Walter Layton discussed this subject
at considerable length in various conversations. The
British feel that a large merchant fleet is of great impor-
tance to them not only as a direct source of revenue but
also as the foundation of their export trade.
Lord Leathers stated that it is expected that he will
have a conversation with the President on shipping before
any final decisions are reached. It is clear that this
subject must be discussed at the highest levels. It will
be one of the most difficult of our mutual problems.
Recommendation
We recommend that studies be commenced immediately to
determine the advantages of an enlarged merchant fleet to
the economy of the United States and disadvantages of such
a fleet to the British economy. While strategic considera-
tions must play an important role in any final decision,
it is our feeling that the purely commercial aspects should be
more thoroughly explored before any position is crystallized.
-31-
BRITISH POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION
Priorities in Post-War Planning
British post-war domestic planning authorities stated
to Mr. Pratt that housing has been given first priority
of manpower and materials in post-war domestic reconstruc-
tion plans. The housing shortage is already a serious
problem, and it will become acute, the British feel, when
the demobilization of the armed forces begins. Second in
the post-war priority scale is the production of civilian
goods for domestic use, e.g., clothing, hardware, china,
and similar items, which are now almost impossible to
obtain.
The British post-war planning authorities stated that
they do not see how any substantial volume of goods can be
manufactured in Britain for export until these urgent domes-
tic needs have been met.
Notwithstanding that the present British planning gives
exports a lower priority than housing and civilian goods,
however, we believe that it would be unwise to expect that
when final decisions are made, manufacturing for export will
not have at least an equal priority with housing and
civilian goods.
The Interim Period after European Hostilities Cease
British officials state that it is unlikely that even
the urgent housing and civilian goods production jobs can
be gotten under way on a large scale in Britain between the
end of hostilities in Europe and total demobilization after
the Pacific war. The greatest limiting factor in British
reconstruction during this interim period will be manpower.
The British General Staff has estimated that after the
end of the war in Europe, personnel in the armed forces
and munition plants can be reduced by 25 percent. The
civilian authorities have asked for a re-examination of
this figure, but there is little possibility of more than
a 30 percent reduction. Taking into account the retire-
ment of over-age workers and the return of married women
to their homes, this reduction will produce only about
half a million workers for reconstruction purposes. It
is estimated that the housing job alone will take
1,250,000 to 1,500,000 workers. Thus, there will probably
be little increase in the production of civilian supplies
until the end of the Pacific war.
-32-
Termination of Lend-Lease
The British are very concerned over the possibility of
a diminution of the volume of Lend-Lease during the period
between the end of the European war and the end of the
Pacific war. Their import requirements will not decline,
since they will need continued food imports and imports of
raw materials for a substantial volume of continued war
production. The British stated that they see no possibility
of increasing their exports to any extent, however, in
order to pay for these imports until after the Japanese
war is over. They feel that financial assistance of some
sort from this country during that period will be necessary.
It was pointed out to the British that whatever the
financing arrangements for the period between the end of
hostilities in Europe and in the Pacific might be, it is
clear that Lend-Lease must draw to a close when general
hostilities cease. It is therefore vital that our two
Governments begin to plan now for financing arrangements,
perhaps in the form of long-term credits, to ensure the
continued flow of food and other necessary supplies from
this country to Britain without a prolonged transition
period of doubt and confusion which would work great hard-
ships on the economies of both countries.
Recommendation
We recommend that studies be commenced on the volume
and character of exports from the United States which will
probably be necessary to the maintenance of the British
economy, 1) in the interim period between the close of
hostilities in Europe and the Pacific, and 2) in the
immediate post-war period. The relationship of these
exports to the Lend-Lease program and the possibility of
long-term credit arrangements should also be studied.
-33-
BRITISH RECONVERSION AND DISPOSAL OF SURPLUS WAR MATERIALS
It became apparent in discussions by Mr. Pratt on the
disposition of war plants and surplus war materials, that
these problems have had very little attention at the
Ministerial level in Britain and that in general we in the
United States are a good deal further ahead in our planning
in this regard.
The disposition of Government-financed war plants is
a highly controversial political subject in Britain, and
the present coalition of government does not wish to raise
it at the present time. Mr. Oliver Franks of the Ministry
of Supply stated that a policy of short-term leasing of such
plants would probably be adopted in order to provide an
opportunity for a thorough national discussion of the long-
term disposition of them.
The British feel that the only surplus war materials
which will be a problem for them will be copper and wool.
Mr. Franks estimates that the British Government will have
in its possession at the end of the war a four years'
supply of each of these commodities. He is also concerned
over the world surplus of cotton which may result from the
great increase in Brazilian cotton production. It is his
feeling that these three products should be controlled by
commodity agreements in order to protect the British and
American producers by preventing a serious decline in
prices.
Sir David Whaley of the Treasury stated that he
believes Great Britain will not make again the mistake
which was made at the end of the last war of attempting
to dispose of surplus war materials too speedily. He
stated that there would be no pressure from the Treasury
at the end of this war for a hurried disposition of sur-
plus materials and war plants in order to reimburse the
Treasury.
IV
MIDDLE EAST TOPICS
-34-
PALESTINE
The British Government has undertaken to move to Pales-
tine any Jewish refugees coming from Europe via Turkey and
is prepared to cooperate actively in any efforts to rescue
refugees which will not redound to the benefit of the Axis.
The British intend, however, to stand firmly on the
White Paper policy as regards Jewish immigration into Pales-
tine until the end of the war. There are 27,500 remaining
quota numbers, of which only 8,000 are presently earmarked,
and the British regard this as ample provision for any fore-
seeable refugee traffic, Should the number of refugees
unexpectedly exceed this provision, they are confident of
their ability to provide places of refuge in the Near East,
although not necessarily in Palestine itself.
The British do not expect any trouble from either Jews
or Arabs in Palestine which they will be unable to handle,
unless the local populations should be aroused by a revival
of Zionist activity and agitation in the United States.
They accordingly hope that we will do anything possible to
prevent such development. At the moment the British regard
this situation as satisfactory, following the initiative of
General Marshall in forestalling the passage of the recent
Zionist resolutions in Congress. They therefore regard the
present issuance of a joint Anglo-American statement on Pal-
estine as more likely to stir than calm the American Zion-
ists, but desire to consider the matter again should devel-
opments necessitate.
- 35 -
AMERICAN CONSULAR REPRESENTATION IN BAHREIN
The British maintained their long-standing refusal to
allow an American consul to reside in Bahrein on the basis
of their unwillingness to create a precedent which would
require similar authorization for Persian, Iraqi, and Saudi
Arabian consular officers there and result in endless in-
trigue and administrative difficulties.
The British, however, in discussions with Mr. Murray
made satisfactory concessions to us by agreeing:
1) To allow the American Consul at Dahran to include
Bahrein in his consular district and pay frequent
visits thereto.
2) To appoint American constables to act under the
authority of the British political agent in mat-
ters involving American citizens.
3) To appoint American assessors -- a type of juryman
who advises the judge under the Indian Code apply-
ing to aliens in Bahrein -- to sit with the Brit-
ish Political Agent, in his judicial capacity, in
cases involving American citizens.
-36-
IRAN
The British affirmed their whole-hearted support of the
American advisers to the Iranian Government and agreed to
join with us in suggesting to the Soviet Government that con-
versations should be held in Tehran with a view to implement-
ing more fully the provisions of the Tehran declaration re-
garding Allied economic assistance for Iran. This suggest-
ion was made to the Soviet Ambassador by Mr. Eden and The
Under Secretary on April 25, 1944 and was favorably received.
The British are naturally and understandably concerned
with the maintenance of order throughout the Middle East.
They therefore proposed that an agreed Anglo-American pro-
gram of arms supply for Iran be worked out, and that efforts
subsequently be made to bring the Soviets into the agreed
program. This proposal is being studied in close consul-
tation with the War Department.
-37-
SAUDI ARABIA
Paramount British political and strategic interests and
paramount United States oil interests in Saudi Arabia were
explained and mutually recognized in discussions between Mr.
Murray and officials of the Foreign Office. It was agreed
that these special interests should not conflict. The Brit-
ish categorically disclaimed any intention to undermine or
to prejudice American oil rights in that country and agreed
that the larger financial and supply problems of Saudi Arabia
should be dealt with as far as possible on the joint basis in
consulation between the two Governments. It was felt by
representatives of both Governments that:
1) Anglo-American discussions in Washington regarding
the establishment of a currency and banking system
in Iran should be expedited.
2) An agreed joint program for the supply of goods to
Saudi Arabia should be worked out in Cairo.
3) Prompt consideration should be given to the organ-
ization of a joint Anglo-American military mission
to assist King Ibn Saud in training and establish-
ing a modern Saudi Arabian Army.
-38-
MIDDLE EAST SUPPLY CENTER
The British expressed appreciation of the work of Mr.
Landis as Director of American Economic Operations in the
Middle East. They fully agreed that his efforts to settle
controversial matters as soon as they come up will in the
long run contribute more to the effective maintenance of
good Anglo-American relations than a policy of nursing
grudges which might well be publicly and harmfully venti-
lated later. It was agreed that Mr. Landis, Lord Moyne, and
all other British and American representatives in the Middle
East should be instructed to arrange local machinery whereby
rumors, criticisms and complaints will be raised frankly,
jointly examined and disposed of as soon as they arise.
The British were sincerely anxious that American partic-
ipation in the MESC should be strengthened by the addition
of further American personnel.
As regards the future of the Center, it was agreed that
the Middle Eastern Governments should if possible be drawn
gradually into closer association with the Center so that
they may be aided to co-operate with each other and provided
with general and technical guidance for dealing with their
common social and economic problems and for raising the stan-
dard of living and health throughout the Middle East. While
it was recognized that the nature of British and American
participation must be left for subsequent consideration, it
was agreed that the ultimate objective should be the devel-
opment of an autonomous economic institution serving the
peoples of the Middle East and operated and supported by
them.
V
LIST OF CONVERSATIONS
-39-
List of Conversations
I. The Under-Secretary
BRITISH
King George VI of England.
Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill, Prime Minister.
Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Af-
fairs.
Rt. Hon. Sir John Anderson, Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Mr. F. T. A. Ashton-Gwatkin, Superintendent, Under-Secretary
of the Personnel Department.
Sir Clive Baillieu, Chairman of British Federation of Indus-
tries.
Dr. N. Baron, World Jewish Congress.
Rt. Hon. Lord Beaverbrook, Lord Privy Seal.
Rt. Hon. Ernest Bevin, Ministry of Labour and National Serv-
ice.
Hon. R. H. Brand, Ministry of Food.
Sir Edward Bridges, Secretary of the War Cabinet.
Mr. Neville Butler, Counsellor, Minister Plenipotentiary,
Foreign Office.
Rt. Hon. R. A. Butler, President, Board of Education.
Rt. Hon. Lord Catto, Governor of the Bank of England.
Hon. Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary of
State.
Rt. Hon. Lord Cherwell, Paymaster General, Assistant to
Prime Minister.
Sir John Duncanson.
Mr. A. L. Easterman, World Jewish Congress.
Mr. Arthur Guinness, International Chamber of Commerce.
Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings Ismay, Deputy Secretary of the War
Cabinet.
Rt. Hon. Lord Keynes, Treasury Chambers.
Rt. Hon. Richard K. Law, Minister of State.
Sir Walter Layton, Chairman of News Chronicle.
Rt. Hon. Lord Leathers, Minister of War Transport.
Rt. Hon. J. J. Lewellin, Minister of Food.
Rt. Hon. Oliver Lyttelton, Minister of Production.
Rt. Hon. Lord McGowan, Chairman of the Board of Directors,
Imperial Chemicals Industries.
Sir George Horatio Nelson, President, Federation of British
Industries.
Sir Maurice Peterson, Deputy Under-Secretary of State.
Mr. E. W. Playfair, The Treasury.
Rt. Hon. Lord Portal, Minister of Works.
-40-
Captain the Lord Reith.
Rt. Hon. Lord Riverdale, Chairman, Capital Steel Works.
Sir William Rootes.
Sir Orme Sargent, Deputy Under-Secretary of State.
Rt. Hon. The Earl of Selborne, Minister of Economic Warfare.
Sir Robert Sinclair, Ministry of Production.
Sir William Strang, British Representative on European Ad-
visory Commission.
Dr. Chiam Weizmann, World Zionist Leader.
Rt. Hon. Lord Woolton, Minister of Reconstruction.
OTHER GOVERNMENTS
Belgium
Mr. Camille Gutt, Belgian Finance Minister.
Mr. Hubert Pierlot, Prime Minister of Belgium.
Mr. P. H. Spaak, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Brazilian
Senhor J. J. Moniz de Aragao, Brazilian Ambassador.
China
Dr. Wellington Koo, the Chinese Ambassador.
Czechoslovakia
Dr. Edward Benes, President of Czechoslovakia.
Monsignor Jan Sramek, Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia.
Mr. Jan Mazayk, Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Dr. Hubert Ripka, Czechoslovak Minister of State and Act-
ing Minister for Foreign Affairs.
France
M. Pierre Vienot, Free French representative in London.
Greece
King George of Greece.
M. George Papandreou, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of
Greece.
M. Thanassis Aghnides, Greek Ambassador to London.
M. Kyriacos Varvaressos, Greek Ambassador at Large.
M. George Mantzavinos, Greek Minister of Finance.
M. Spyros Skouras.
-41-
Luxembourg
The Grand Duchess of Luxembourg.
Mr. Josef Bech, Luxembourg Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Netherlands
Mr. Van den Broeck, Netherlands Finance Minister.
Dr. P. S. Gerbrandy, Prime Minister of the Netherlands.
Dr. E. N. van Kleffens, Royal Netherlands Minister of For-
eign Affairs.
Norway
King Haaken of Norway.
Crown Prince Olaf of Norway.
Mr. Trygve Lie, Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Mr. Wilhelm Morgenstierne, Norwegian Ambassador to Washing-
ton.
Mr. Johan Nygaardsvold, Prime Minister of Norway.
Poland
Mr. Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, Prime Minister of Poland.
Mr. Tadeusz Romer, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs.
USSR
Mr. Feodor Gousev, Soviet Ambassador.
Yugoslavia
Mr. Bozhidar Puritch, Yugoslav Prime Minister.
U.S. DIPLOMATIC AND CIVILIAN
Mr. John G. Winant, Ambassador to Great Britain.
Mr. Howard Bucknell, Jr., Minister-Counselor, American Em-
bassy.
Congressman J. William Fulbright, Chairman, Educational Com-
mittee.
Mr. W. J. Gallman, Counselor, Embassy in London.
Mr. Harvey Gibson, Red Cross.
Mr. Archibald MacLeish, Librarian of Congress.
Mr. Lithgow Osborne, Deputy Director of UNRRA.
Mr. Herbert Pell, War Crimes Commission.
Ambassador William Phillips, Civil Affairs Adviser, SHAEF.
Mr. Philip Reed, Ministry for Economic Affairs.
Hon. Winfield R. Riefler, Minister, Board of Economic Warfare.
Mr. Rudolph Schoenfeld, Charge d'Affaires.
Mr. Robert Sherwood, Office of War Information.
-42-
U.S. ARMY
Major General Anderson
Col. Anthony J. D. Biddle, Jr.
Brig. General G. T. Davis
Lt. General James Doolittle.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Brig. Gen. Julius C. Holmes.
Lt. General J. G. H. Lee.
Brigadier General F. S. Ross.
Lt. General W. Bedell Smith.
Lt. General Carl Spaatz.
Lt. Col. George A. Spiegelberg.
Colonel Wallace S. Whittaker.
U.S. NAVY
Admiral Harold R. Stark.
Commander Junius S. Morgan.
-43-
II. Dr. Isaiah Bowman
BRITISH
Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill, Prime Minister.
Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Af-
fairs.
Hon. Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary of
State.
Mr. H. Ashley Clarke, Acting Counsellor, Foreign Office.
Sir George Gater, Colonial Office.
Mr. H. M. G. Jebb, Counsellor of the Foreign Office, Eco-
nomic and Reconstruction Department.
Rt. Hon. Richard K. Law, Minister of State.
Sir William Malkin, Legal Advisor, Foreign Office.
Sir Maurice Peterson, Superintending Under-Secretary, East-
ern Department.
Professor Lionel Robbins, University of London.
Mr. Nigel B. Ronald, Assistant Under-Secretary of State.
Colonel Oliver Stanley, Colonial Secretary.
Sir William Strang, British Representative on European Ad-
visory Commission.
Mr. A. J. Toynbee, Research Department, Foreign Office.
Mr. J. M. Troutbeck, Sounsellor, Central Department, Foreign
Office.
Mr. J. G. Ward, Economic and Reconstruction Department, For-
eign Office.
Professor Charles K. Webster, Research Department, Foreign
Office.
Sir Alfred Zimmern, Research Department, Foreign Office.
OTHER GOVERNMENTS
Dr. Ivan Pchok, President, National Council of Yugoslavia
from Italy.
U.S. DIPLOMATIC AND CIVILIAN
Ambassador John G. Winant, U.S. Ambassador to the Court of
St. James.
Mr. Eric Biddle, Bureau of the Budget Representative in
London.
Dr. E. F. Penrose, Special Assistant to the Ambassador,
American Embassy.
Mr. Lawrence Preuss, American Delegation on War Crimes Com-
mission.
-44-
U.S. ARMY AND NAVY
General Bedell Smith, Chief of Staff, GHQ.
Admiral Harold R. Stark, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in
Europe.
-45-
III. Mr. John Lee Pratt
BRITISH
Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill, Prime Minister.
Rt. Hon. Sir John Anderson, Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Rt. Hon. Lord Beaverbrook, Lord Privy Seal.
Rt. Hon. Hugh Dalton, President of the Board of Trade.
Proffessor Dennison, War Cabinet Office.
Rt. Hon. Sir Andrew Rae Duncan, Minister of Supply.
Mr. Enfield, Ministry of Agriculture.
Mr. Oliver Franks, Ministry of Supply.
Rt. Hon. Richard K. Law, Minister of State.
Rt. Hon. Lord Leathers, Minister of War Transport.
Mr. Lee, The Treasury.
Rt. Hon. Oliver Lyttelton, Minister of Production.
Viscount Moore, War Cabinet Offices.
Mr. John Maud, Ministry of Reconstruction.
Rt. Hon. Lord McGowan, Chairman of the Board of Directors,
Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd.
Lord Riverdale, Chairman, Capital Steel Works.
Dr. Lionel Robbins, University of London.
Mr. Nigel B. Ronald, Foreign Office.
Mr. Steere, Agricultural Attache.
Sir David Whaley, Under-Secretary of the Treasury.
Rt. Hon. Lord Woolton, Ministry of Reconstruction.
U.S. DIPLOMATIC AND CIVILIAN
Ambassador John G. Winant.
Mr. Phillip Reed, Ministry for Economic Affairs.
Dr. Ernest Penrose, UNRRA.
Hon. Winfield R. Riefler, Minister, Board of Economic War-
fare.
U.S. ARMY AND NAVY
Admiral Harold R. Stark.
Major General John C. H. Lee, Deputy Theatre Commander ETO &
Commanding General, sos, ETOUSA.
-46-
IV. Mr. Wallace Murray
BRITISH
Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Af-
fairs.
Rt. Hon. Leopold S. Amery, Secretary of State for India.
Sir Clive Baillieu, Chairman of British Federation of Indus-
tries.
Mr. C. W. Baxter, Head, Eastern Department, Foreign Office.
Mr. Neville Butler, Counsellor, Minister Plenipotentiary,
Foreign Office.
Mr. H. Ashley Clarke, Acting Counsellor, Foreign Office.
Hon. Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary of
State, Foreign Office.
Mr. George L. Clutton, Southern Department, Foreign Office.
Sir Robert Waley-Cohen, Anglo-Jewish Association.
Rt. Hon. George Hall, Parliamentary Under-Secretary.
Hon. R. M. A. Hankey, Eastern Department, Foreign Office.
Mr. Douglas Howard, Head, Southern Department, Foreign Office.
Mr. A. H. Joyce, India Office.
Rt. Hon. Richard K. Law, Minister of State.
Rt. Hon. Oliver Lyttleton, Minister of Production.
Mr. G. MacKereth, Egyptian Department, Foreign Office.
Sir David Monteath, Under Secretary of State for India, For-
eign Office.
Sir Firouz Khan Noon, member of the War Cabinet.
Mr. Peale, India Office.
Mr. Patrick, India Office.
Sir Maurice Peterson, Superintending Under Secretary, Refugee
Department.
Mr. A. W. G. Randall, Refugee Department, Foreign Office.
Mr. Frank K. Roberts, Head, Central Department, Foreign Of-
fice.
Sir Orme Sargent, Superintending Under-Secretary, Southern
Department, Foreign Office.
Mr. P. S. Scrivener, Head, Egyptian Department, Foreign Office.
Mr. R. L. Speaight, French Department, Foreign Office.
Col. the Hon. Sir Oliver Stanley, Secretary of State for the
Colonies, Foreign Office.
Mr. G. R. Villiers, Ministry of Economic Warfare.
OTHER GOVERNMENTS
Mr. Agnides, Greek Ambassador.
His Excellency Mr. Taghi Zadeh, Iranian Ambassador.
Mr. Ghods, Counselor, Iranian Embassy.
General Lombard, Free French Delegate in London.
The Maharajah of Kashmir.
Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, Ambassador of Saudi Arabia.
Mr. Constantine Zinchenko, Counsellor of Soviet Embassy.
-47-
U.S. DIPLOMATIC AND CIVILIAN
Ambassador John G. Winant, U. S. Ambassador to England.
Mr. Eric Biddle, Bureau of the Budget Representative in
London.
Mr. Hugh Jackson, UNRRA.
Mr. Charles Noyes, Ministry for Economic Affairs.
Mr. William Phillips, U. S. Ambassador.
Mr. Winfield W. Riefler.
Mr. Phillip Reed, Ministry for Economic Affairs.
Mr. Rudolph Schoenfeld, Counsellor of Embassy.
Mr. Spyros Skouras, President of 20th Century Fox Film Co.
Dr. Chaim Weizmann, World Zionist Organization.
U.S. ARMY
General A. C. Wedemeyer, Deputy Chief of Staff to
Lord Mountbatten.
-48-
V. Mr. H. Freeman Matthews
BRITISH
Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Af-
fairs.
Mr. Neville Butler, Counsellor, Minister Plenipotentiary, For-
eign Office.
Hon. Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.
Col. Leslie Caner, War Cabinet Officer.
Lord Catto, Governor of the Bank of England.
Mr. H. Ashley Clark, Far Eastern Department, Foreign Office.
Mr. George Clutton, Foreign Office.
Lt. Gen. Humphrey Gale, Deputy Chief of Staff, SHAEF.
Lt. General Arthur E. Grasett, British Army.
Mr. Oliver C. Harvey, Superintending Under-Secretary, French
Department, Foreign Office.
Lt. General W. G. Holmes, British Army.
Mr. Douglas F. Howard, Head, Southern Department, Foreign
Office.
Mr. H. M. E. Jebb, Foreign Office.
Rt. Hon. Richard K. Law, Minister of State, Foreign Office.
Mr. John Litterby, Bank of England.
Mr. W. H. B. Mack, Head, French Department, Foreign Office.
Mr. Charles Peake.
Dowager Marchioness of Reading, Chairman, Woman's Voluntary
Services.
Mr. F. K. Roberts, Acting Head, Central Department, Foreign
Office.
Mr. Nigel Ronald, Foreign Office.
Sir Orme Sargent, Superintending Under-Secretary, Southern
Department, Foreign Office.
Sir David Scott, Assistant Under-Secretary of State.
Sir William Strang, British Representative on European Ad-
visory Commission.
Mr. J. M. Troutbeck, Head, Central Department, Foreign Office.
Maj. Gen. J. F. M. Whiteley, SHAEF.
Mr. Christopher Warner, Head, Northern Department, Foreign
Office.
OTHER GOVERNMENTS
Czechoslovakia
Mr. John Masaryk, Foreign Minister.
France
M. Vienot, French Delegate in London.
M. Paris, French Delegate in London.
-49-
M. Cambon.
M. Comert.
M. Louis Marin.
M. Dejean.
U.S. DIPLOMATIC AND CIVILIAN
Ambassador John G. Winant.
Dr. E. F. Penrose, UNRRA.
Ambassador William Phillips.
Hon. Winfield W. Riefler, Minister, Board of Economic Warfare.
Mr. Rudolph Schoenfeld.
Mr. Howard Bucknell.
Mr. W. J. Gallman.
Mr. Philip Reed.
U.S. ARMY AND NAVY
Brig. General T. J. Davis.
General Dwight Eisenhower.
General Bedell Smith.
Admiral H. S. Stark.
Lt. Gen. James Doolittle.
Brig. Gen. Julius Holmes Spaty.
Commander B. R. Kittredge.
Brig. Gen. Robert McClure, SHAEF.
-50-
VI. Mr. R. J. Lynch
BRITISH
Sir Gilbert Braithwaite, Office of the War Cabinet.
Sir Edward Bridges, Secretary of the War Cabinet.
Mr. Neville Butler, Counsellor, Minister Plenipotentiary, For-
eign Office.
Mr. W. M. Codrington, Assistant Under-Secretary of State.
Sir George Hall, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State.
Sir David Scott, Assistant Under-Secretary of State.
Mr. Geoffrey Willson, Russian Division of the Foreign Office.
DIPLOMATIC AND CIVILIAN OFFICIALS
Ambassador John G. Winant, American Ambassador to England.
Mr. Howard Bucknell, Minister Counselor, American Embassy.
Mr. W. J. Gallman, Counselor of American Embassy in London.
Mr. Rudolph Schoenfeld, Chargé d'Affaires, Embassy Near the
Allied Governments.
Mr. Henry Stebbins, Second Secretary and Consul.
Mr. John Stone, Second Secretary and Vice Consul.
PSF Stettime folder State fie 2.44 -
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
June 16, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY
The Secretary has asked me to handle
the attached. This is the matter about which
I sent you a note on the 14th. If the
President is still desirous of discussing
it, of course, I shall be available any
time at his convenience.
Stettinius fresce 2-40
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
file
June 14, 19/4
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY
You sent to ne as Acting Secretary the President's
memorandum of the 12th, enclosing cable 4627 from London
relative to an article in the London Daily Express on-
titled "F.D.R. Has Plan for France", with the instruction
to speak to the President about it. In view of Mr. Hull's
return, I have handed this menorandum to him, with the
thought that he would raise it with the President in con-
versation.
Phone
Stettinius folder 2-44
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 12, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.
Will you speak to me about this
at your convenience?
F.D.R.
Telegram to Dept. of State, No. 4627 from
Winant, 6-9-44, requesting check on statement
appearing in the Daily Express on June 8th
in column "United States newsfront" by C.V.R.
Thomson and headed "F.D.R. has plan for
France", in re plan for rebirth of the Third
French Republic.
DEPARTMENT
INCOMING
DIVISION OF
OF
TELEGRAM
COMMUNICATIONS
STATE
AND RECORDS
VIIT-825
PLAIN
London
Dated June 9, 1944
Rec'd 5:17 p.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
4627, Ninth.
In the DAILY EXPRESS of June 8th in the column en-
titled "United States nowsfront" by C.V.R. Thomson and
headed "F.D.R. has plan for France" thore appoared the
following under a New York Wednosday dateline: Prosident
Roosovelt has boforo him a new plan for the robirth of the
Third French Republic. It is based on the French Consti-
tution enacted after the Franco-Prussion Vicr. As soon CS
the Germans are expolled from half of France onch dopart-
mont would send two dologates to C. General Council. With
the backing of the poople, the Council would thon summon
Parliament and call back to office a Constitutional Prosi-
dont, probably Albert loBrun, now under houso arrost in
Northern France. LoBrun would, according to tho Washington
report, ask C prominont anti-Vichy Frenchmen to form 0
Cabinet. This temporary government would rulo France until
Fronch prisoners in Gormany could be repatricted and
domocratic
-2- #4627, ninth, from London
democratic elections hold. Goneral deGcullo would, pro-
summbly, hold an important post in France's first govern-
mont"
Would you please check on this, sending copy of this
message to the White House?
WINANT
HTM
2-44
filent
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
October 26, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS GRACE TULLY
Knowing how pressed the President is, as you
observed, I have not been bothering him but it
occurred to me it would be helpful for him to have
from me every two or three days a two page high
spot record covering important developments in
foreign relations that he could glance at, say
twice a week.
You might wish to present him with the first
memorandum of this kind and then give me the benefit
as to the President's reaction and whether or not he
would like me to continue this for the next couple of
weeks.
Unless I hear from you to the contrary, I shall
send something of this kind along twice a week.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
October 24, 1944
SPECIAL INFORMATION FOR THE PRESIDENT
These international developments of the past two
or three days will be of especial interest to you:
INFORMATION FROM THE FIELD
Bulgarian Armistice Terms. The draft text of the
armistice terms and protocol regarding Bulgaria has been
cleared by the European Advisory Commission and has been
referred by the delegates to their respective capitals
for approval. Kirk reports that Eden is said to believe
that Russia considers Bulgaria a part of the Soviet's
special Slavic sphere and that the British were obliged
to yield on points of national influence in Bulgaria to
the Russians in order to obtain certain concessions from
the Soviets in Yugoslavia.
Hungarian Armistice Terms. The Hungarian armistice
terms appear to be bogged down in discussions of repara-
tions. No definite developments are expected until con-
ditions in Hungary are more clearly known.
Portuguese Negotiations. Ambassador Norweb is con-
cerned lest negotiations regarding Portuguese participa-
tion in the liberation of Timor cause difficulties in
our efforts to proceed with the construction of an air
base on Santa Maria. He believes that if the War Depart-
ment should reject the Portuguese proposals we should
voluntarily abandon the Santa Maria project.
Italian Participation in German Armistice Terms.
Italian participation in the armistice terms to be
imposed upon Germany is not approved by Ambassador Winant
who foresees difficulties arising if this precedent is
established because other Allied nations will immediately
press for preferential treatment superior to that enjoyed
by Italy.
Yugoslav
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schemble Date
MAR 1972
-2-
Yugoslav Relief. Ambassador Kirk sees no necessity
for hasty action on a draft agreement regarding Yugoslav
relief submitted by Elliott of the Balkan Air Force.
Kirk intends to press for its reference to the Combined
Chiefs of Staff for consideration.
Soviet-Iranian Relations. Recent Soviet newspaper
attacks on Iran, following the breaking off by the
Iranians of negotiations for oil concessions, are some-
what ominous.
Greek Political Situation. One day after arriving
in Greece, Prime Minister Papandreou resigned, was re-
appointed and set about reestablishing the Cabinet.
This was done under a prior arrangement with the King,
who is still making all major decisions in London although
the Crown Prince is still nominally regent and remains
in Cairo. British sources believe that, if the Prime
Minister can survive the present week, he will probably
remain for an indefinite period.
Greek Relief. The Greek Government still expresses
great concern over what it considers the inadequacy of
the relief planning of the military. The question of
available bottoms, rather than of supplies, is stated
to be the crux of the matter.
Millspaugh Mission in Iran. The problem of Dr. Mills-
paugh's status has become further complicated by the
refusal of the Cabinet to sanction his attempted dismissal
of the politically powerful head of the national bank.
Arab Concern Regarding Zionism. The Arab Chambers
of Commerce in Jerusalem and Haifa cancelled appointments
with the Culbertson mission in the past few days as a
protest against the President's statement on Palestine.
Reports from Iraq indicate that the President's state-
ment and those of Secretary Stimson and others recently
also caused great concern there.
Guatemalan and Salvadoran Revolutions. The success-
ful revolution in Guatemala was conducted by a mixed junta
of uncertain but probably Leftist orientation, while the
new ruling group in El Salvador is reported to be com-
posed of military reactionaries. American recognition
of these two new governments will await inter-American
consultation.
ACTION
-3-
ACTION IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT
France in the United Nations. Telegrams have been
dispatched to Paris, London, Moscow and Chungking pro-
posing that France become one of the United Nations.
Meeting of American Foreign Ministers. The Depart-
ment is considering suggesting to Padilla that he call
a meeting of American Foreign Ministers in Mexico City,
possibly in December.
Future of the Combined Boards. The Americans and
British have agreed that the three combined boards,
CRMB, CPRB and CFB, should continue in existence until
six months after the end of the war, but that in the
meantime they should restrict their activities to items
in short supply and items involving shipping difficulties.
Surplus Property. Discussions are beginning this
week with the British and Canadians in an effort to
work out mutually satisfactory arrangements on the
disposal of goods declared surplus.
-
PSF.Stettinine freder 2.44
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
October 30, 1944
tillet
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS GRACE TULLY
Subject: Attached Memorandum for
the President
Would you please see that the
attached memorandum is brought to the
President's attention as soon as possible.
Sputhing
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
October 27, 1944
SPECIAL INFORMATION FOR THE PRESIDENT
These international developments of the past two
or three days will be of especial interest to you:
INFORMATION FROM THE FIELD
DIVERSION OF AIR FORCE FROM ITALY TO BALKANS. Kirk expresses
great anxiety at diversion by the British, presumably for
political reasons, of Allied Air Force from Bologna Front,
where U.S. troops are hard pressed, to various parts of
the Balkans.
EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION. London Embassy reports
Soviets now ready to proceed rapidly with work of EAC
including plans for control of German economy and for
occupation of Austria. Embassy believes we must also be
prepared with our views on these subjects, or onus for
delay will fall on us alone.
BELGIAN SHORTAGES. Recent public demonstrations in regard
to shortage of food, clothing and fuel may affect the
stability of the Belgian Government. The Allied military
are considering the possibility of bringing in small
supplies of food.
SUPPLIES FOR ITALY. Ambassador Kirk on the Allied Com-
mission continues to urge the vital necessity of immediate
implementation of the President's announcement in regard
to civilian supplies for Italy.
ITALIAN AMBASSADOR TO UNITED STATES. Bonomi has requested
agreement for Sforza's appointment as Ambassador to Washington.
PARTITION OF GERMANY. Massigli stated belief that the
Soviet offer of German territory to Poland is designed to
make Poland the principal object of future German revenge.
He stated that this fact alone would deter France from
making a claim to any German territory.
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
RUMANIAN
MAR 6 1972
By J. Schauble Date
-2-
RUMANIAN FEARS OF RUSSIA. Maniu who has expressed fear
that Rumania will be voted into the Soviet Union has
been reassured by a British statement that the Control
Commission could take action on any such attempt.
SWEDISH REQUEST FOR AIRCRAFT. The Swedes have made an
urgent request for the presentation of seventy Thunderbolt
fighters.
SWEDISH EXPORTS TO GERMANY. Minister Johnson has been
instructed immediately to make 8. joint démarche with
his British colleague in regard to the stoppage of Swedish
exports to Germany. However, our London Embassy raises
question whether it is desirable to press Swedes to cut
off all trade with Germany since this would lead to
Germans retaliating by preventing vital Swedish relief
to Holland and Norway.
SITUATION IN SERBIA. Mihailovich wishes to place himself
under orders of General Wilson but Wilson fears to jeop-
ardize British relations with Tito. OSS officer just
out of Serbia reports there will be a blood bath if Tito
takes over and that the Serbs favor a Serb state in a
Balkan federation.
ANGLO-ETHIOPIAN AGREEMENT. British are insisting on
post-war control of large reserved areas in Ethiopia and
the Emperor has asked the U.S. to appeal to the British
on this point.
SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS. Soviet Embassy in Tehran has
taken numerous occasions to make clear in an unofficial
manner that they want Prime Minister Saed dropped and
will see to it that he is.
ACTION IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT
PORTUGUESE NEGOTIATIONS. Department has transmitted to
General Arnold Portuguese proposals concerning Santa Maria
Airfield and Timor and has urged that they be accepted.
BRITISH-ARGENTINE NEGOTIATIONS. Department and British
Embassy are endeavoring to arrange for a visit of British
Minister of Food to Washington next week to discuss
Argentine meat contract.
LEND-LEASE
-3-
LEND-LEASE DURING PHASE II. In our lend-lease discussions
with the British we have reached substantial agreement
both as to types of items to be furnished during Phase II
as well as on the modifications of policy in regard to
the White Paper.
FRENCH LEND-LEASE. Treasury believes French program
includes two billion dollars for reconstruction which
it consid ers inconsistent with Lend-Lease Act.
SOVIETS AT AVIATION CONFERENCE. Soviets have informed
Department that they cannot participate in aviation con-
ference because of attendance of Switzerland, Spain and
Portugal. Department is endeavoring to obtain a change
in Soviet position.
CIVILIAN SUPPLY FOR THE BALKANS. The Army feels that
supplies for the Balkans should be at the bottom of the
priority list, but State and FEA assert that they should
be on an equal footing with supplies for all liberated
areas outside forward military zones. Army is preparing
a memo to the President.
CANADIAN LIQUOR HOLIDAY. In view of liquor holiday which
Canada is planning to put into effect October 28 WFA is
proposing an immediate export embargo on corn to Canada.
PSF: Stettinius forder 14
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
file
November 1, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS GRACE TULLY
Subject: Attached Memorandum for
the President
Would you please see that the attached
memorandum is brought to the President's
attention as soon 85 possible?
Effating
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
October 31, 1944
SPECIAL INFORMATION FOR THE PRESIDENT
These international developments of the past two
or three days will be of especial interest to you:
INFORMATION FROM THE FIELD
GAUSS RESIGNATION. A returning Foreign Service officer
was asked by Gauss to inform Department that he proposed
to resign as of November 1 and that his decision is final.
(Department wired Gauss that it was highly desirable that
his resignation be postponed in view of the Secretary's
absence.)
INTERNAL SITUATION IN CHINA. Gauss reports that there is
no indication that Chiang contemplates bringing various
factions together or making any move, military or political,
which might weaken his personal position. He apparently
has no desire to collaborate with Soviet Russia or to
compromise the Communist problem. He presumably considers
ousting of Stillwell a diplomatic victory over the U.S.
U.S. military officers increasingly feel that American
aid should be given to Communists or any other Chinese
forces fighting Japan. Successful Japanese drives to
Chengtu or Kunming might result in fall of Chinese
Government.
JURISDICTION OVER INDOCHINA. British staff of SEAC has
protested to London the inclusion of Indochina in the
American theater of operations.
ARGENTINE REQUEST FOR CONFERENCE. Preliminary reaction
to Argentine request indicates that other republics are
unshaken in their attitude toward Argentina. Some, however,
would favor a conference of Foreign Ministers. (It is
expected that the Board of the Pan American Union will
merely refer request to the twenty governments.)
ARGENTINE
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date
MAR 6 1972
-2-
ARGENTINE-BRITISH MEAT CONTRACT. British Food Ministry
states it cannot meet its responsibility to supply country
with an adequate supply of meat in the most effective
manner if purchases in Argentina are indefinitely continued
on a month-to-month basis.
RECOGNITION OF GUATEMALA AND EL SALVADOR. Other American
republics appear inclined to recognize liberal regime in
Guatemala but to withhold recognition of reactionary
military clique in El Salvador.
LATIN AMERICA AND SPAIN. Reports from several posts
indicate a growing antipathy in Latin America to Franco
regime. Certain republics contemplate breaking relations
with Spain.
OPENING OF STRAITS. Turkish Prime Minister has stated
there is no objection to passage of defensively armed
merchant vessels through the Straits. (Joint Chiefs of
Staff have been informed that from political point of
view such vessels may immediately begin to transit the
Straits with all categories of war materiel. Arrangements
are being made with Russians for use of Black Sea ports.)
SOVIET ACTION IN IRAN. Soviet representative in Iran has
stated that his Government can no longer collaborate with
Iranian Prime Minister. A large demonstration against
Prime Minister is believed by our Ambassador to have
been staged by the Russians.
WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIETS FROM AVIATION CONFERENCE. In reply-
ing to our Charge's comments on withdrawal, Vyshinsky
expressed great bitterness at Switzerland and Spain and
added that the U.S. is attempting too broad a basis of
collaboration.
FRENCH REPRESENTATION ON EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION.
Soviet Government states that it favors participation of
France as a fourth permanent member of Commission and
believes that French representative should be invited
at once to participate in EAC discussions on Germany.
(U.S. Government has expressed agreement to the la tter
proposal and instructed American representative to
associate hims elf with an invitation to the French
Ambassador in London.)
DISARMING
-3-
DISARMING OF FRENCH CIVILIANS. Communist reaction has
been strongly adverse to French Government's decision
to disarm civilians and the National Council of Resistance
believes it should have been consult ed beforehand.
De Gaulle informed the NCR that the Government would not
compromise its right to act without consultation with the
Council.
RUMANIAN RELATIONS WITH JAPAN. U.S. and British Governments
have approached Rumanian and Soviet Governments in regard
to Rumanian failure to break relations with Japan.
U.S. POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN RUMANIA. Soviet Govern-
ment states it has no objection to the appointment of a
U.S. political representative in Rumania.
RUMANIAN INTERNAL SITUATION. British have protested to
the Soviet Government its failure to disarm the "Communist
Guard" in Rumania. Formation of new Rumanian government
based on four major political parties may improve internal
conditions.
CONTROL COMMISSION IN BULGARIA. Chief of Soviet delega-
tion on Commission, commenting on delay in arrival of
American mission, has inquired whether British would
act for U.S. Soviet Government, replying to Winant's
reservation regarding Article XVIII of Bulgarian armistice
terms, refuses to admit equal responsibility for the
three Allies after the cessation of hostilities with
Germany.
SWEDISH EXPORTS TO GERMANY. Minister Johnson believes
that recent Swedish action substantially meets our demands
in regard to the stoppage of exports.
ACTION IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT
DIRECTIVES CONCERNING GERMANY. A number of directives
for Germany, including one in regard to the machinery
of military government, have in the last few days been
approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and transmitted
to Winant for presentation to the EAC.
ES.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
November 3, 1944
flet
SPECIAL INFORMATION FOR THE PRESIDENT
These international developments of the past two
or three days will be of especial interest to you:
INFORMATION FROM THE FIELD
DISARMAMENT OF FRENCH RESISTANCE GROUPS. Despite objec-
tions from Resistance elements and open opposition from
the Communists, the Provisional Government 1s apparently
determined to enforce its decision to disarm Resistance
groups.
FRENCH RECRUITING FOR INDOCHINA. The French Minister of
Colonies states that, with the knowledge of our military
authorities, officers and men are being recruited who
might be interested in serving in the Pacific and par-
ticularly in Indochina.
VISIT OF CHURCHILL AND EDEN TO PARIS. On the invitation
of the French Provisional Government Churchill and Eden
plan to proceed to Paris at the end of next week.
WESTERN EUROPEAN REGIONALISM. A Foreign Office official
states that conversations between Eden and representatives
of Western European countries on regional collaboration
will be resumed in the near future. Among other things,
the problem of rearmament will be discussed.
POLISH-SOVIET SITUATION. Mikolajczyk, when expressing
appreciation for the President's message, stated that
no decisions had been made on the Moscow proposals.
He was generally pessimistic.
SOVIET APPROPRIATION OF U.S. OIL EQUIPMENT. The British
are protesting the Russian action in removing oil
refinery equipment and accessories from the establish-
ments of British and American companies in Rumania.
The British have suggested corresponding deductions in
lend-lease supplies to Russia if a satisfactory solution
is not found.
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
MAR 6 1972
CANADIAN
By J. Schauble Date
-2-
CANADIAN CABINET REORGANIZATION. Prime Minister King
resolved a very serious Cabinet crisis by the replace-
ment of his Minister of Defense who believed that the
time had come to use abroad armed forces conscripted
for home service only.
HITLER'S HEALTH. The Swiss Foreign Minister states that
after July 20 Hitler developed nervous disorders and is
now in seclusion, Himmler being in full control of the
Government.
GREEK ECONOMIC SITUATION. The combination of a nightmare
inflation and German destruction of transport facilities
has practically deprived the Greek economy of any motion
at all.
SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS. The U.S. cannot concur in any
interference in internal Iranian affairs, Moscow was
informed in 8 note delivered by Kennan, under instruction.
Reference was made to the Tehran declaration of December 1,
1943. Disturbances and agitation against the Saed Govern-
ment continued in Iran and were reported by the Embassy
in Tehran to be indisputably of Soviet origin.
ANTI-SEMITIC ATTITUDE OF IBN SAUD. Ibn Saud expressed
his "hate for Jews" and his intention to "butcher" any
who enter his kingdom, in addressing an MESC agricultural
mission and a group of courtiers at Riyadh.
GALÁPAGOS BASE.. Ecuadoran Constitutional Assembly is
favorable to letting U.S. keep Galápagos base but com-
pensation in some form will be expected.
ARANHA INTERVIEW. Aranha has given an interview to Time
correspondent in Rio in which he attacks U.S.-Argentine
policy, accuses Vargas of "Fascist ways" and opposes
a fourth term for President Roosevelt.
GUATEMALAN RECOGNITION. There is general agreement
among the American republics that the new regime in
Guatemala should be recognized, probably early next week.
ACTION IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT
CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS. Ambassador Messersmith
is proceeding tomorrow to Mexico City where he will suggest
that
-3-
that Padilla call a conference of Foreign Ministers,
excluding Argentina, to consider international organiza-
tion and, as a last item on the agenda, the Argentine
request for a conference.
SWEDISH-GERMAN TRADE. Joint Chiefs of Staff have
informed the Department that they wish all Swedish
trade with German-held territory cut off in spite of
any disadvantages which resulting closure of Swedish
ports might entail.
HUNGARIAN REPARATIONS. The American position that repara-
tions should be treated generally on a tripartite basis
at a later date and in conformity with requirements of
European economic stability rather than on a unilateral
basis is again to be presented to the Soviet Government.
Failing Soviet agreement, we will not withhold signature
of the Hungarian terms but will instead make a reservation
on the reparations clause.
ITALIAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON. The Italian Government
is to be informed that the American Government agrees
to the appointment of Count Sforza as Ambassador to
Washington.
ITALIAN PARTICIPATION IN AVIATION CONFERENCE. Kirk has
been informed that the decision not to invite Italy to
participate in the aviation conference was based upon
the subject to be discussed and does not constitute a
reflection of general policy.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
November 7, 1944
fua
SPECIAL INFORMATION FOR THE PRESIDENT
These international developments of the past two
or three days will be of especial interest to you:
INFORMATION FROM THE FIELD
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARGENTINA. The suggestion
has been conveyed to Padilla of Mexico through Ambassador
Messersmith that Mexico counter the Argentine proposal
for a meeting of foreign ministers with the recommenda-
tion that a meeting of American Foreign Ministers,
excluding Argentina, be held to discuss international
security and related matters and to consider as the last
item on the agenda Argentina's request for a hearing.
Padilla's final reply has not yet been received though
his preliminary reaction is inclined to be negative.
There is increasing evidence of a desire on the part
of other American republics to have a meeting of foreign
ministers.
RECOGNITION OF GUATEMALA. The U.S., in company with
most of the other American republics, will recognize
the new regime in Guatemala Tuesday, November 7. Action
on El Salvador is being withheld pending clarification
of the revolutionary situation there.
AUSTRIAN CONTROL MACHINERY. Future planning by AFHQ
regarding the occupation of Austria is reportedly suspended
pending the receipt of political guidance. Molotov has
told our Chargé that the question of establishing a tri-
partite control commission for Austria should be discussed
in the European Advisory Commission.
DE GAULLE INTERVIEW. General de Gaulle outlined to
Ambassador Caffery the American need for a strong France.
He reasons that neither the U.S.S.R. nor Great Britain
are European powers. Both de Gaulle and Bidault have
told Caffery of France's need for equipment in order
that more troops can be sent to the front.
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
FRENCH
By J. Schauble Date MAR 6 1972
-2-
FRENCH CONSULTATION WITH EAC. An invitation has been
addressed to the French Ambassador in London to take
part "in the consideration of German affairs" when these
are on the agenda of the European Advisory Commission.
FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO U.S. The French Government has sug-
gested Henri Bonnet as Ambassador to Washington. (The
American Government is informing the French that, while
any Ambassador whom the French care to name will be
welcomed, we do not regard Henri Bonnet as a happy choice
because he is unknown in this country.)
DISARMING OF FRENCH CIVILIANS. Discussing the statute
proposed by the Council of National Resistance to trans-
form the patriotic militia into a "civic republic guard",
the French Foreign Minister told Caffery that the Govern-
ment intended to stick to its guns in view of the sentiment
of the French people for order.
RUMANIAN CONTROL COMMISSION. The British have reiterated
their interest in having American representatives on the
Rumanian Control Commission arrive as quickly as possible
to lend support to the British efforts to prevent Russian
removal of oil refinery equipment. Advance members of
the American delegation have arrived at Bucharest and
have been well received by the Russians.
RUSSIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM AVIATION CONFERENCE. Our missions
in Moscow and London report that British observers have
advanced four reasons for Russian failure to attend the
Aviation Conference: an expected difference of opinion
between U.S. and British delegations; Russia's wish to
emphasize her position vis-a-vis "hostile" neutrals;
Russian opposition to reported British Commonwealth bloc
established in Montreal; and Russian fear of being left
in a solitary position as at the EITO and UNRRA Conferences.
.N
GERMAN AIR TRAFFIC WITH SPAIN. Spain has expressed a
willingness to terminate German commercial air services
if the Allies permit the establishment of Spanish air
service from Barcelona to Zurich.
SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS. Further reports of a gradual
change in the Russian attitude led Ambassador Morris to
feel on November 4 that the situation had improved slightly.
Mossadegh, an elder statesman, may succeed Saed. He is
critical of American, British and Soviet policy and
opposes foreign oil concessions. He is also very anti-
Millspaugh.
CONDITIONS
-3-
CONDITIONS IN GREECE. A considerable advance in plans
to deal with inflation is reported, and concrete action
may be taken in the coming week. The Government also has
a project, in which the British concur, to raise & security
force of 40,000 men, to be equipped by the British with
small arms and clothing.
ASSASSINATION OF LORD MOYNE. Lord Moyne's assailants are
reported to have been two Palestine terrorists.
CONTROL MACHINERY FOR GERMANY. Agreement has been reached
in the EAC on control machinery in Germany and the protocol
may be signed Wednesday or Thursday.
ACTION BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT
AVIATION CONFERENCE. Organization of the conference is
proceeding smoothly. There is still wide difference
between U.S. and British positions on both the ultimate
division of traffic and on the provisional arrangement
of air routes. In spite of British opposition we have
commenced bilateral discussions of the latter question
with the French, Swedish and Icelandic delegations.
Mr. Berle has informed the Latin American group that we
are not wedded to any particular scheme of organization
for the international aviation body and are open to
suggestions.
NIMITZ-GREW CONSULTATIONS. Mr. Grew departs on November 8
for Honolulu to consult with Admiral Nimitz at the
Admiral's request on questions relating to Japan.
BRITISH AND FRENCH POLICY IN INDOCHINA. The Department
instructed the Embassy at Chungking to request General
Wedemeyer to give his views and information regarding
British and French political policies, both present
and post-war, in regard to French Indochina.
PSF: stettinius freder 2-44
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
file
November 13, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS GRACE TULLY
During the campaign, you will recall my
sending over twice weekly a spot digest of
current foreign affairs matters. Here is
another one. Will you please give me your
personal advice as to whether or not the
President finds these of interest. Would
// armered by
you prefer that I keep him up to date
verbally?
bup these digester
Es
Attachment
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
November 11, 1944
SPECIAL INFORMATION FOR THE PRESIDENT
These international developments of the past two
or three days will be of especial interest to you:
INFORMATION FROM THE FIELD
FRENCH ATTITUDE TOWARD WESTERN EUROPEAN BLOC. Apparently
inspired French press comment indicates that the French are
opposed to the establishment of a Western European bloc
including England, France, Holland and Belgium and favor
the achievement of an entente between France, Great Britain,
the Soviet Union and the United States within the frame-
work of an international organization including all powers.
HUNGARIAN ARMISTICE TERMS. An approach will be made by
the American Charge d'Affaires in Moscow and the British
Ambassador there to Molotov in regard to early resumption
of tripartite discussion on armistice terms for Hungary.
The American position on reparations will be presented
and it is hoped will be supported by the British.
ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR. General Wilson has directed
that immediate steps be taken to have American-held
Italian prisoners of war brought to Italy from North
Africa. Since this decision was taken on the basis of
operational necessity, Ambassador Kirk did not actively
oppose it.
ESTABLISHMENT OF DUTCH GOVERNMENT IN NETHERLANDS. On
the specific request of Prime Minister Churchill SHAEF
has agreed to the establishment on Dutch soil of an
advance headquarters of the Dutch Government.
RELIEF FOR POLAND. The Embassy at Moscow has been instructed
again to write to Molotov concerning the delay in Soviet
DECLASSIFIED
clearance
State Dept. Letter, 1.11.72,
MAR 6 1972
By J. Scheuble Date
-2-
clearance of the transmission of relief supplies to
Poland. The Red Cross is prepared immediately to send
representatives to Poland to supervise the distribution
of medical supplies.
POLISH-SOVIET RELATIONS. British pressure has brought
about an early but negative reply on the part of the
Polish Government to the proposals made at Moscow. The
negative reply was based on the Polish desire for a
clarification of certain points at issue, particularly
those relating to the British guarantee of a western
boundary and of new Poland. Although Churchill stated
that this reply might make it necessary to withdraw
his support of the Polish Government, Eden subsequently
indicated British willingness to negotiate for the con-
tinuation of the Anglo-Polish treaty.
NEW RUMANIAN GOVERNMENT. Previous reports to the effect
that the new Rumanian Government was not approved by
the King appear to be incorrect. However, the King is
understood to have no faith in the new Government.
Vyshinski arrived in Rumania and gave no warning of his
trip to either the British or American Embassies in
Moscow.
AGREEMENT BETWEEN YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT AND TITO. The
British appear to be concerned over the very one-sided
agreement reached between Tito and Subasic under which
the Royal Government will have only three out of twenty-
eight seats in the new Government. The British political
representative at Bari has stated that Brigadier MacLean
has made a mess of Yugoslav affairs.
REED RESIGNATION. Philip Reed, Chief of Mission for
Economic Affairs, London, wants to be relieved of his
job by December 1. He has strongly urged that 8. successor
be appointed to represent the Government agencies includ-
ing State, who would constitute the economic representa-
tive under the Ambassador and be responsible to all agencies.
Suggestions for a successor are now under review.
ECONOMIC ADVISER ON GERMANY. A joint State-FEA designation
of Leon Henderson as United States adviser on German
2
economic affairs has been approved throughout the Depart-
ment and is being cleared with FEA.
EUROPEAN
-3-
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMITTEE. The Russians have inquired
as to the purposes of the Committee in more detail, but
the British have urged the Russians to join the group
before further delay.
CONDITIONS IN GREECE. The last few days have seen the
greatest political and economic progress since liberation.
An anti-inflation program, the most essential desideratum
of all, is scheduled for application in the next few days.
A formula for disbanding of the ELAS, EAM and EDES has
apparently been adopted and will come into force gradually
over the next month.
SOVIET-IRANIAN CRISIS. The Soviet-Iranian crisis has
begun to show some signs of abating, in the past few days.
The Iranian Premier, however, has yielded his post,
though his successor is thought almost certain to take
the same view on new concessions.
PALESTINE PROBLEM. The assassination of Lord Moyne,
apparently by Jewish terrorists, has seriously complicated
the already sorely vexed Palestine picture. The British
Government is said to be "furious". The Iraqi Government
has been at special pains in the past ten days to impress
upon Minister Henderson that American action regarding
Palestine, favoring the Zionists, would end United States-
Iraqi relations.
MEETING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN MINISTERS. Mexican Foreign
Minister Padilla, in reply to the Department's suggestion
that he call a meeting of For eign Ministers, excluding
Argentina, to discuss hemispheric post-war problems with
addendum consideration of the Argentine problem has uni-
laterally proposed to the other American republics that
no meeting be held on Argentina and that a meeting on
post-war problems be held about February 1. Solution
of the Argentine problem should he thinks be left to
diplomatic consultations, a timely solution of which
might permit Argentine attendance at the February 1
meeting.
CONTROL OF AXIS FIRMS IN ARGENTINA. A new Argentine
decree contains regulations for the control of Axis firms.
PSF: Stettinius folder
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
November 14, 1944
full
SPECIAL INFORMATION FOR THE PRESIDENT
These international developments of the past two or
three days will be of especial interest to you:
INFORMATION FROM THE FIELD
CHURCHILL - DE GAULLE CONVERSATIONS. Churchill has dis-
cussed with de Gaulle the possible arming of additional
French divisions for front-line service and the creation
of a French zone in Germany. Churchill is inclined to
agree to cede a small part of the British zone to France
and has expressed to Ambassador Caffery the hope that
the U. S. will be willing to do likewise. According to
Eden no steps toward the establishment of a Western
European bloc were or will be taken, though in the dis-
tant future special economic arrangements, and possibly
even other arrangements, might be made. The Soviet
Ambassador at Paris has stated to Caffery his opposition
to any British attempt to set up a Western European bloc.
FRENCH ECONOMIC CRISIS. The French Delegate for Inter-
Allied Affairs has written a critical note to SHAEF re-
garding the status of relations between France and the
Allied military authorities. Ambassador Caffery believes
that this may indicate a French attempt to place on the
Allies the blame for grave and growing French economic
difficulties. SHAEF believes that joint representations
regarding this matter should be made directly to the
French Foreign Minister. De Gaulle has urged Caffery
that we supply at once arms for four or five divisions,
claiming the French will support their economic crisis
quietly only if they feel they are participating in the
war.
DECLASSIFIED
BRITISH-BELGIAN
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
MAR 6 1972
By J. Schauble Date
IME ORDER 26cm
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
-2-
BRITISH-BELGIAN CONVERSATIONS. British conversations
with the Belgian Foreign Minister concerned food and
armaments and did not touch on security questions. The
British Foreign Office has assured the Embassy that any
regional security arrangement drawn up for Western
Europe will be fitted into an international organization.
EAC WORK ON GERMANY. Soviet representative on EAC has
informed our London Embassy that his Government desires
to proceed rapidly with German directives in order to
avoid any differences of policy among the three zones of
occupation which might lead Germans to feel one occupy-
ing power was more or less harsh or lenient than the
others. Soviets wish to start with discussion of elimi-
nation of Nazis and Hitler regime.
SWEDISH EXPORTS TO GERMANY. The British have expressed
surprise and concern over the Department's instructions
to Stockholm in regard to an approach designed to obtain
an immediate cessation of Swedish exports to Germany.
This matter is still being discussed with the British.
HUNGARIAN ARMISTICE TERMS. Molotov has been informed
that we are now prepared to proceed with discussions of
the Hungarian armistice terms.
VISIT TO MOSCOW OF YUGOSLAV PRIME MINISTER. Subasic has
left Belgrade en route to Moscow.
STATUS OF ITALIAN PARTISANS. AAI has informed AFHQ that
the granting of a military status to Italian Partisans
would be difficult to defend and might affect Allied con-
sideration of the Volksturm movement.
EL SALVADOR. Opposition to the Aguirre regime is gaining
in strength and organization. Our embarrassing recogni-
tion problem may be thus solved in El Salvador.
SOVIET-IRANIAN
the your
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
-3-
SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS.
The resignation of the Saed
Government has contributed to abatement of the crisis
with the Soviet Union, which had already set in about
ten days ago. A new Cabinet is still under discussion.
GREEK ECONOMIC CRISIS. The institution of a program to
combat inflation is expected to make a start toward
eliminating generally chaotic economic conditions. The
Export-Import Bank may be able to assist Greece imme-
diately by financing U. S. exports, if the credit could
be extended to a nongovernmental entity, the Greek Govern-
ment having been in default to this country since 1934.
IRAOI ATTITUDE TOWARD ZIONISM. Implementation of pre-
election statements in the U. S. favoring 8. Jewish state
in Palestine would render impossible further Iraqi rela-
tions with the U. S., the Iraqi Foreign Minister told
Minister Henderson.
ACTION BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT
MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS. The U. S. has circulated
a memorandum presenting our views on Mexican Foreign
Minister Padilla's counter proposal for a meeting of
Foreign Ministers to discuss post-war problems. The
main divergence between our views is the unwillingness
of the U. S. to work for some formula to provide for the
return of the present Argentine Government to the family
of American republics prior to the meeting. (Padilla,
upon seeing our memorandum, has stated that he sees no
essential difference between the two views and that he
never intended to seek a formula for recognition unless
Argentina manifests a change of heart.)
CENTRAL
the national
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
-4-
CENTRAL AMERICA. Recent developments in Central America
have led the Department to remind the Governments of the
Republics there of their obligations under the 1933 Monte-
video Convention to avoid interference in the internal
affairs of others.
KING CAROL'S TRIP TO EUROPE. The Department has informed
various missions in Europe that former King Carol is be-
lieved to be proceeding to Portugal by way of Brazil and
has asked them to report on the possible accuracy of
information to the effect that the Russians are backing
Carol.
Effactiff
3684
has
PSF Stettinius State folder
THE WHITE HOUSE
washington
November 18, 1944,
MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. E. R. STETTINIUS:
Will you speak to me about
this?
F.D.R.
Memorandum for the President from Isador Lubin,
10/25/44, in re a permanent United States Foreign
Intelligence Service, the nucleus of such an
organization already being in existence in the
Office of Strategic Services.
PSF: stettinins folder 2-44
file
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
November 17, 1944
SPECIAL INFORMATION FOR THE PRESIDENT
These international developments of the past two
or three days will be of especial interest to you:
INFORMATION FROM THE FIELD
FRANCO-BRITISH CONVERSATIONS. Reports on the British-
French conversations have been received from both
sides. Bidault stated France has no desire to annex
German territory but wishes to take part in a per-
manent international control of the Rhineland, Ruhr
and Saar. France also desires an occupation zone
taken from British and U. S. zones. Although France
has no love of Franco, she desires order on her South-
ern border and believes opposition to Franco too dis-
united to be effective. French are stated to have no
territorial ambitions vis-à-vis Italy and believe that
the Italian North African possessions might well be
left to the Italians. France expects to re-occupy
Indochina but will grant extensive rights to the
natives. France does not desire a Western European
bloc and this subject was not discussed.
WEST EUROPEAN CUSTOMS UNION. Ambassador Caffery has
learned that members of the French Government tend to
support a proposal for a customs union between Belgium,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and France.
BRITISH VIEWS ON TREATMENT OF GERMANY. The British
Government is reported to believe that purely negative
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72 MAR 6 1972
measures
By J. Scheuble Date
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
-2-
measures regarding economic treatment of Germany will
have limited effectiveness in providing security since
public opinion probably would not be willing indefi-
nitely to support drastic economic prohibitions. While
the British favor certain negative measures, including
the prohibition of armament, aircraft and synthetic oil
production, they believe that positive steps should be
taken to turn the Germans toward useful production. The
British are inclined to favor reparations in kind, the
total amount to be determined at a later date, as against
a probable Soviet desire for a fixation of total repara-
tions in monetary terms.
DUTCH ATTITUDE TOWARD WEST EUROPEAN BLOC. The Nether-
lands Foreign Minister has stated that his Government
will not enter into conversations looking toward the
establishment of a Four-Power political military alliance
since these conversations would involve commitments bind-
ing upon the Government to be formed after the liberation
of the Netherlands.
EXPANSION OF POLISH ARMY. Ambassador Kirk has learned
that an early conference will be held in London with
Polish Generals in regard to the determination of a long-
term policy connected with the expansion of the Polish
Army.
TITO-SUBASIC AGREEMENT. The British Chiefs of Staff
have informed General Wilson that the Agreement between
Tito and Subasic cannot become effective until approved
by the King and the Yugoslav Government in London.
Yugoslav Acting Foreign Minister has displayed anxiety
over the agreement concluded between Tito and Subasic.
EVACUATION
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
-3-
EVACUATION OF MIHAILOVITCH. MacMillan, on instruc-
tions from the British Foreign Office, has asked Kirk
to request the OSS to evacuate Mihailovitch and to ar-
range for his transportation to the U. S. where he
would be "much happier". Kirk in reply pointed out
that serious complications would confront the American
Government if it took the action suggested. MacMillan
is recommending to the Foreign Office that this matter
be raised in a proper manner through the British Ambas-
sador at Washington.
GREEK INTERNAL SITUATION. Reports received by British
counter-intelligence that a coup may be attempted by
EAM-ELAS and the Communists before the guerillas begin
to be disbanded on December 1 are regarded as probably
extreme by MacVeagh. Nevertheless, he believes that
this period will be a critical one.
IRAQ. Declaring himself concerned for the future of
Iraq, the Foreign Minister of that country appealed to
Minister Henderson for U. S. and British pressure on
Russia to abate its campaign in Iran.
PRISONERS OF WAR IN JAPANESE HANDS. The Japanese For-
eign Minister states that representatives of the Inter-
national Red Cross may now visit prisoner-of-war camps
in occupied territory.
CHINESE-SOVIET DIFFICULTIES. The Chinese imply that
recent disturbances in Sinkiang were inspired by the
Soviets, who wish to prevent the Chinese Government
from actually exercising control over border regions.
ACTION
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
-4-
ACTION BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT
PADILLA PROPOSAL. We are informing Padilla that, if he
agrees that nothing can be accomplished by dealing with
the men now in power in Argentina and that steps in that
direction are premature, we can reach an understanding
on the meeting of Foreign Ministers which he proposes.
PURCHASE OF FATS AND OILS FROM ARGENTINA. Because of
world shortage of fats and oils the State Department has
had to tell the American side of the Combined Boards to
make available supplies from Argentina on an allocation
basis. There is no alternative unless a severe ration-
ing program is undertaken in this country.
ITALIAN PARTICIPATION IN GERMAN SURRENDER ARRANGEMENTS.
Ambassador Kirk has been informed of the American Gov-
ernment's belief that, although no invitation should be
extended by the European Advisory Commission to the
Italian Government for presentation of the latter's
views on German surrender arrangements, the Italians
might well submit their views on this subject in an in-
formal manner to the American, British and Russian rep-
resentatives in Rome. The American Government would then
expect to forward the Italian views to its representa-
tive on the EAC.
SWEDISH EXPORTS TO GERMANY. The Department has informed
the Embassy at London that British alternative proposals
in regard to an approach to Sweden concerning the cessa-
tion of Swedish-German trade are not acceptable and that
military requirements make necessary an early approach
to the Swedish Government on this subject.
BRITISH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
-5-
BRITISH STATEMENT REGARDING PRISONERS OF WAR. The
Department informed London of its objections to making
any official statement of prisoner-of-war atrocities,
which might endanger pending exchange negotiations.
file
2-44
State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
November 21, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Free Port in Mexico
Some time ago you asked us to study the possible
economic advantages of such a free port in more detail.
This is taking considerable time, as there is little
data available on which to work but it is having our
best attention as well as that of other agencies of
the Government with which we are in consultation. I
hope to have something more for you on it in the near
future.
PSF: stethnius fredeng-vy
GEODET
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
OLONE
WASHINGTON
fall
SECRETI
November 21, 1944
SPECIAL INFORMATION FOR THE PRESIDENT
These international developments of the past two or
three days will be of especial interest to you:
INFORMATION FROM THE FIELD
De GAULLE VISIT TO MOSCOW. The visit of de Gaulle to
Moscow will probably take place within a few days. The
British are offended because they learned of the invita-
tion only through announcements in the press. The French
Communist press has taken note of French uneasiness over
Soviet policy and is endeavoring to reassure Frenchmen.
ECONOMIC TREATMENT OF GERMANY. British experts do not
favor permanent international control of the Ruhr. They
fear Soviets might interpret this arrangement as a spe-
cial Anglo-U.S.-French sphere of influence and would want
a similar sphere for themselves in Eastern Germany.
British experts incline to favor control of strategic
mineral imports into Germany though they believe effective
enforcement would involve world-wide control of these
minerals.
U.S. PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING OCCUPATION OF AUSTRIA.
General Wilson has asked for the assignment of several
U.S. Army officers to AFHQ (G-5 Staff) to participate in
planning the occupation of Austria. The Allied Commission
for Austria in London supports Wilson's proposal and sug-
gests that a ruling be obtained from the Combined Chiefs
of Staff.
SWEDISH
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-7-MAR
6 1972
By J. Schauble Date
OFODET
-2-
SWEDISH EXPORTS TO GERMANY. The Swedish Government has
maintained that it must continue at least token shipments
to Germany, pending the arrival of essential buna from
the U. S., else the Germans will prevent the buna from
arriving. Minister Johnson believes that Sweden will
curtail all essential exports as soon as buna supplies
reach Sweden.
SWEDISH MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO NORWAY. Swedes have in-
formed Norwegian Government that under certain circum-
stances they would join Norwegians in military operations
in Norway.
VISIT TO MOSCOW OF NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER. Foreign
Minister was pleased by Moscow conversations during which
Molotov showed no interest in ideology of Norwegian Gov-
ernment and only in its resistance to Germans.
MOSCOW VISIT OF YUGOSLAV PRIME MINISTER. Subasic, who
has just arrived in Moscow, refused to comply with
Mr. Churchill's urgent request that he return to London
before proceeding to Moscow. Kirk observes that Subasic
is more realistic than London in his appreciation of the
fact that Yugoslav affairs are determined in Moscow.
SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD BULGARIA. Bulgarian Foreign
Minister informed the British representative in Sofia
that the Soviet authorities in Moscow have insisted to
him that under no circumstances must Bulgaria become a
Communist state.
RUMANIAN COMPLIANCE WITH ARMISTICE TERMS. Vyshinski's
visit to Bucharest was designed to expedite the execution
of the armistice terms. King Mihai has informed the
American representative that Rumania's delay in fulfill-
ing the armistice terms is to a large extent due to the
disruption of transportation facilities by the Russians.
HUNGARIAN REPARATIONS. Great Britain is ready to support,
with minor amendments, the American proposals regarding
Hungarian reparations
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
MAR
6
1972
FINNISH
By J. Schauble Date
SEGRET
-3-
FINNISH AFFAIRS. The attitude of the new Finnish
Cabinet toward Russia and its reflection of Finnish
Leftist trends are regarded as improvements. The ap-
pointment of an American representative to Finland is
not expected to evoke objections from the Soviets.
ITALIAN CABINET CHANGES. Bonomi is expected to make
cabinet changes soon without waiting for the liberation
of Northern Italy.
GREEK INTERNAL AFFAIRS. British counter-intelligence
has urged London to send reinforcements against the pos-
sibility of an EAM coup before December 1, but Ambassador
MacVeagh does not believe that SO extreme a move is con-
templated. British commander has blockaded Athens against
anyone bearing arms. The food problem is very serious,
and labor is demanding trebled wages.
FRENCH POLICY TOWARD SYRIA AND LEBANON. Franco-British
discussions in Paris made little progress except to indi-
cate a difference of views. The French are determined to
maintain as strong a position as possible.
BRAZILIAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS.
Vargas feels it would be a mistake to hold any conference
of Foreign Ministers in the near future as the Argentine
problem would be predominant in spite of plans to the
contrary.
ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON ARGENTINA. Uruguayan Foreign
Minister stresses need of U.S. and British economic pres-
sure on Argentina regime which he says would not then
hold out much longer.
BOLIVIAN REVOLT. A Bolivian revolutionary movement ap-
pears to have been localized at Oruro.
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CHILE AND U.S.S.R. Chile
has requested U.S. assistance in approaching U.S.S.R. on
establishing diplomatic relations. Moscow report says
direct approach has been unproductive.
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date
MAR
6
1972
PSF: 2-44
DEPORT
14
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
SECRET
WASHINGTON
November 22, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY
Subject: Work Sheets for the President
Attached are copies of the work sheets I had with
me when I saw the President yesterday and which you may
wish to keep for your files.
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
MAR 6 1972
By J. Schauble Date
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
J
WASHINGTON
November 21, 1944
PRESIDENT'S WORK SHEET
ITEMS TO DISCUSS
WITH THE PRESIDENT
1. Economic Treatment of Germany - You wish to discuss
with me the draft proposal on the Economic Treat-
ment of Germany which I forwarded to you on Novem-
ber 11.
2. Argentina - I have prepared a comprehensive state-
ment of our policy toward Argentina. Until there
is a real turnover in Buenos Aires, the Department
will do everything possible to maintain the
"quarantine" to the full extent in political rela-
tions and to the maximum extent in economic rela-
tions. British support economically, however, has
not been whole-hearted, and the Farrell regime has
been heartened by it. Full British support would,
in the opinion of one most competent observer,
liquidate the whole problem quickly.
3. Congressional
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
MAR 6 1972
By J. Schauble Date
-2-
3. Congressional Groups - May I confer with them on
open Dumbarton questions, especially voting?
4. Dumbarton Message to Stalin and Churchill - Approval
of attached drafts - Not to be sent until after con-
versations with Congressional groups.
5. Firmer position with Russia regarding Iran -
Russians continuing to agitate for oil concessions
in Iran. British have protested to Russians in sup-
port of Iranian sovereignty. Do you approve Depart-
ment backing up the British on this?
6. Radio Station in Saudi Arabia - It is very impor-
tant to operations of the Arabian American Oil
Company to have accessible communications facili-
ties. The Saudi Government is willing to erect a
radio station which could be used by the oil com-
pany but is unwilling to do so in the face of
objection by the British Government. The British-
owned Cable and Wireless have a monopoly in Saudi
Arabia, the facilities are not readily accessible,
and the company is supported by the British Govern-
ment. If British objection to the radio station is
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
not
By J. Schauble Date MAR 6 1972
PEODIT
-3-
not withdrawn by December 1, the Saudi Government
cannot abrogate its contract with the British com-
pany for five years. I have prepared a proposed
message for you to send to Mr. Churchill asking
him to withdraw the British objection.
7. Foreign Service Bill - Hope we may have your sup-
port of the bill in current session of Congress.
Bill provides for more adequate compensation of
low-grade clerical employees which has been re-
quested several times by congressional sub-
committees. It also removes percentage limitations
on higher classes of Foreign Service officers which
are now holding up much-needed promotions of junior
officers.
8. Lend Lease, Stage 2 - Final meeting with the British
to be held tomorrow.
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
MAR 6 1972
By J. Schauble Date
I
PEODET
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
November 21, 1944
PRESIDENT'S WORK SHEET
MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS
TO DISCUSS WITH THE PRESIDENT
1. Visit with Secretary Hull -
2. Mr. W. D. Pawley - You have mentioned Mr. W. D.
Pawley for both Czechoslovakia and India. Believe
there are considerations involving Treasury Depart-
ment which should be examined carefully.
3. Ambassador to Brazil - You approved Ambassador
Norweb a few months ago but post has been kept
open. Ambassador Scotten, just appointed to
Ecuador, doing good job there.
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble DatMAR 6 1972
GEORET
-2-
4. Dr. Sailing Baruch - We are planning to send
Dr. Baruch to Portugal as you requested as soon as
possible.
5. Mr. Bernard Baruch - What are your wishes regard-
ing Mr. Baruch's request for an opportunity to
talk with the Department about Germany and aid to
the British?
6. Mr. Harry C. Hawkins - Do you approve giving
Mr. Harry C. Hawkins the honorary rank of Minister
in London, to which post he was recently assigned
as Counselor of the Embassy for economic affairs?
His approach to government officials would be
greatly facilitated if he had this rank as he will
gradually absorb the functions of the mission which
has been headed by Mr. Phillip Reed.
7. Mr. Joseph E. Davies
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
MAR
By J. Schauble Date
6 1972
OLORE
-3-
7. Mr. Joseph E. Davies - Do you approve of asking
Mr. Davies to make a trip to England on your behalf
and the Secretary's to review the matter of dealing
with war criminals and to look into the matter of
exchanging prisoners.
8. Congratulatory Messages to Heads of other Govern-
ments - What is your preference with regard to
handling messages to heads of foreign governments:
a. Do you prefer to send such messages on the
national holiday or on the birthday of the
ruler? The former has been traditional and
each foreign government has been consulted
by us so that we know its preference.
b. When you receive a message from the head of
another government, do you wish to reciprocate
on a like occasion?
9. Mrs. J. Borden Harriman - Mrs. Harriman is a little
disappointed that she was not returned to Norway.
State DECLASSIFIED Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date MAR 6 1972
PSF: Stittinius
file
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
November 27, 1944
By J. Schauble Date MAR 6 1972
SPECIAL INFORMATION FOR THE PRESIDENT
These international developments of the past two
or three days will be of especial interest to you:
GOERING PEACE FEELER. An intermediary representing that
he speaks for Goering informs our Embassy in Paris that
Goering believes the war lost and is ready to proceed to
Sweden and publicly urge the German nation to lay down
its arms.
DEFEATISM IN CHINA. Pessimism and defeatism are spread-
ing in Chungking, and recent governmental changes are
being shrugged off as too late in view of the military
situation. Chungking officials feel Chinese military
resistance is disintegrating. American military are
doing everything possible to maintain Chinese morale.
Much depends on the direction of the next Japanese
advance.
AMERICAN CIVILIAN EVACUATION OF SOUTHEAST CHINA. The
Embassy at Chungking has instructed the Consulate
General at Kunming to implement plans for the with-
drawal of American citizens from Kewiyang and other
places threatened by present Japanese drive. U.S. Air
Force assistance is not available because of military
necessity. The British are taking similar action.
REORGANIZATION OF CHINESE GOVERNMENT. Chinese Cabinet
changes are "in the family", made prior to nominal parti-
cipation of Communists in the Government. The Communists
will probably refuse this nominal participation, or any
compromise not meeting their minimum desires.
SOUTHEAST ASIA. Missions and consulates abroad have been
informed that you have decided that U.S. approval must
not be given to a French mission to SEAC, and that our
officers in the Far East should not make political deci-
sins on the future of Southeast Asia with the French or
anyone else.
EXCHANGE NEGOTIATIONS.
-2-
EXCHANGE NEGOTIATIONS. The Swiss have been requested to
propose to the Japanese Government an exchange of Japanese
forces on isolated Pacific islands for allied prisoners
of war in Japanese hands.
FRENCH ADHERENCE TO UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION. French
state they are ready to adhere to the United Nations
Declaration, adding they assume such adherence means
they will participate in all international conferences
organized within the framework of the United Nations.
BELGIAN POLITICAL SITUATION. Despite large-scale demon-
strations against the Government, Pierlot firmly maintains
that Resistance elements must be disarmed.
RELATIONS BETWEEN SHAEF AND FRENCH GOVERNMENT. General
Bedell Smith has recommended abolition of the office of
"Delegate for Allied Affairs" in the French Government
which has been held by M. Coulet. In consequence Duff
Cooper and Caffery will urge Bidault to rule that all
problems arising in French civil ministries shall be
referred through the Foreign Office to the Allied
Embassies. Military matters will be subject to direct
discussion between SHAFF and the Defense Ministries.
GERMAN CIVILIAN MORALE. Bern reports a growing Catholic
and Socialist opposition in South Germany where morale
among bombed-out civilians is at a new low.
GERMAN SCORCHED EARTH POLICY IN NORWAY. The Swedish
Government has made strenuous efforts at Berlin to obtain
permission from the Germans to bring Swedish relief to
quarter million Norwegians in Northern Norway whose plight
is critical as a result of the scorced earth policy of
the Germans.
YUGOSLAV AFFAIRS. Mr. Churchill has answered King Peter's
reproachful comments on one-sidedness of Tito-Subasic
agreement by assuring him that the U.S.S.R. will take
no action pending return to London of Subasic and study
of agreement by both British and Yugoslav Governments.
General Wilson
-3-
General Wilson has complained to Mr. Churchill that Tito
places politics before war and has failed to cooperate
with the Western Allies in planning for enlarged mili-
tary operations in Dalmatia. Accusations of brutality
on the part of the Partisans in Chetnik areas made by
Mihailovitch have been confirmed by recently returned
OSS representative.
DISARMAMENT OF RESISTANCE FORCES. British Minister
McMillan has been requested by General Wilson to discuss
in Washington and London General Wilson's recommendation
that a joint statement be issued by the Allied Governments
regarding the disarmament of non-regular forces in liberated
countries.
GREEK POLITICAL SITUATION. British intelligence continues
to report indications that a coup is planned by ELAS before
December 10, when disarming of that body is to start.
BRITISH REPRESENTATIONS TO SOVIETS ON IRAN. In a letter
to Molotov, the British Ambassador suggested a Soviet
statement that the Soviet Government, in agreement with
the American and British Governments, will let the con-
cessions matter rest until the end of the war. The letter
asked clarification of the Russians view and expressed
British concern over evidence of continuing Soviet pressure.
SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD ZIONISM. Russia is unqualifiedly
opposed to the Zionist program, the Iraqi Minister in
Beirut claims he was told in confidence by the new Soviet
Minister there.
BOLIVIAN INSURRECTION. Bolivian Government has completely
suppressed insurrection. Composition of revolutionary
movement still is obscure, but pro-totalitarian party and
military extremists are expected further to consolidate
their position in the Government.
ECUADORAN PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR. Ecuador has been
informed that a declaration of war on Axis by it would
be well received in Washington.
BRAZILIAN
-4-
BRAZILIAN DISSATISFACTION WITH U.S. COTTON AND COFFEE
POLICY. Brazilian reaction to U.S. cotton subsidy plan
and maintenance of coffee price is unfavorable. Both
actions are of major political and economic importance
to Brazil and may weaken President Vargas' position.
PSF: stettinies frea 2-44
THE UNDER SECRETARY fib-> OF STATE
SECRET
WASHINGTON
November 28, 1944
SPECIAL INFORMATION FOR THE PRESIDENT
These international developments of the past two or
three days will be of especial interest to you:
ITALIAN CABINET CRISIS. Following the resignation of the
Bonomi Government, Prince Umberto is expected to ask
Bonomi to form a new Government within the framework of
the six party coalition. The British Ambassador has
informed Bonomi that the appointment of Sforza as Foreign
Minister would not be acceptable.
TRANSIT TRAFFIC THROUGHSWITZERLAND. General Wilson
has urged immediate diplomatic representations to the
Swiss demanding that transit traffic and exports to
Italy be terminated.
FRENCH ADHERENCE TO UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION. The
French representative in Washington has been authorized
to sign the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942.
U.S. TREATMENT OF GERMAN PRISONERS IN FRANCE. General
Reckard has endeavored to point out to the French press
that our treatment of German prisoners-of-war does not
exceed the simple humanitarian requirements stipulated
by the Geneva Convention.
SOVIET SEIZURE OF OIL EQUIPMENT IN RUMANIA. Neither
Vyshinski nor General Vinogradov have been willing to
do more than inform Moscow of American protests voiced
by Berry and General Schuyler that American oil refinery
equipment had been designated as war booty and removed
without prior consent of this Government.
DECLASSIFIED
RUMANIAN
Dept. Letter, 1-11-78
MAR 6 1972
&
J. Scheuble Date
SECRET
-2-
RUMANIAN AND FINNISH REPARATIONS. The British have in-
formed the Soviet Government that they can agree only
to the evaluation of Rumanian and Finnish reparations
items at prices prevailing at the time of delivery and
not at pre-war prices as the Soviets are demanding.
The U.S. Embassy in Moscow has been authorized to sup-
port the British representations.
RELATIONS BETWEEN TITO AND BRITISH. A British source has
informed Kirk in strictest confidence that political com-
mitments binding Mr. Churchill as well as the delicate
state of British-Partisan relations have prevented the
Prime Minister from demanding military cooperation from
Tito in accordance with General Wilson's request.
PARTISAN AMNESTY FOR CHETNIKS. The Partisans have pub-
lished a decree granting amnesty to Chetniks who desert
to the Partisans before January 15, 1945.
U.S. AND MIHAILOVITCH. The Acting Yugoslav Foreign
Minister in London has complained to Ambassador Patterson
concerning report that the U.S. is removing Mihailovitch
from Yugoslavia.
ALBANIAN RESISTANCE. FNC forces which now control four-
fifthsof Albania will occupy Tirana today on the anni-
versary of Albanian independence.
CIVILIAN SUPPLIES FOR ALLIED GOVERNMENTS. Our Missions
to the French, Belgian, Luxembourg, Netherlands and
Norwegian Governments have been informed that the U.S.
hopes that the Washington representatives of these nations
will be authorized to discuss arrangements for obtain-
ing civilian supplies during the post-military period.
OCCUPATION OF AUSTRIA. The American delegate on the EAC
has been instructed to proceed with the formulation of
recommendations for the occupation and control of Austria
on the basis of British plans for the occupation of
Germany as amended by American suggestions and on the
basis of American proposals regarding control for Germany.
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
INTERNATIONAL
By J. Scheuble Date MAR 6 1972
SECRET
-3-
INTERNATIONAL RESTITUTION COMMISSION. The British Govern-
ment has proposed, through its delegate on the EAC, for
the establishment of a Restitution Commission to deal
with property confiscated by the Nazis.
KUOMINGTANG-COMMUNIST NEGOTIATIONS. Pessimism continues
regarding a KMT-Communist settlement, although the door
is not closed.
BRITISH POLICY TOWARD THAILAND. Anthony Eden's reply con-
cerning the post-war status of Thailand contained no un-
equivocal statement as to complete independence. On the
other hand, it contained reservations regarding security
and economic collaboration and regarding territorial
arrangements in the Kra Isthmus.
CHINESE WPB. The Chinese WPB regulations, drafted in
accordance with Donald Nelson's suggestions, will soon
be published, but not in their entirety.
CHINESE POST-WAR COMMERCIAL POLICY. The Embassy at
Chungking was informed that the proposed statement of
the Chinese Government regarding post-war commercial
policy was seemingly at variance with the Atlantic Charter
and other instruments and agreements. Chinese officials
are to have their attention called to the importance
attached by this Government to the principles of equality
of opportunity and elimination of discrimination.
U.S. - ECUADORAN NEGOTIATIONS. Ecuadoran Ambassador Galo
Plaza has left Washington for Quito to discuss the Estrada
mission, the Galapagos, and Ecuador's desire to join
United Nations.
CHILE-BOLIVIA BORDER INCIDENT. The Bolivian-Chilean border
incident following the Bolivian insurrection has been
settled to the satisfaction of both republics.
EXECUTION
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter,
1-11-MAR 6 1972
By J. Schauble Date
SECRET
-4-
EXECUTION OF BOLIVIAN REVOLUTIONISTS. The execution
of captured Bolivian revolutionists has made a bad
impression in several republics. Two of those shot
were former Cabinet officers.
BRITISH-ETHIOPIAN NEGOTIATIONS. The negotiations with
the British have been suspended and may be terminated.
Haile Selassie finally conceded the British the lease
they demanded on the reserved areas and the Ogaden.
Disagreement arose over the time when the lease would
end.
ARABIAN PIPELINE. King Ibn Saud is cordial to the
project for a pipeline. According to an Arabian American
Oil Co. message, the company thinks the Palestine route
is best, the Syria-Lebanon route being second choice.
MAR 6 1972
By J. Schauble Dela
PSF. stettinins folder 2-44
how
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
November 30, 1944
file
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Ben Cohen
I talked to Justice Byrnes yesterday on the
possibility of Ben Cohen joining the State Depart-
ment as Assistant Legal Adviser.
Jimmy stated that he had expected to have the
services of Will Clayton as Deputy, but now he only
had Ben Cohen and Russell and if he were to carry
out his difficult responsibilities in the recon-
version field, effectively, it would be essential
for him to retain Ben's services at this time.
Jimmy stated he was going to send you a memo-
randum on the subject himself.
I do not believe there is anything further
that can be done at the moment. Perhaps on your
return you, Jimmy and I can discuss it some time
when we are alltogether. I still feel, for many
reasons, that Ben Cohen would be a very valuable
addition to the State
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter,
1-1MAR 6 1972
By J. Schauble Date
PSF State Stettinius perer 2-44
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
PRESIDENT'S WORK SHEET
Items to discuss with the President
1.
Postwer rehabilitation - memorandum for approvel
attached.
N 2.
Foreign economic policy - memorandum attached."
3.
Executive Committee on Foreign Economic Policy -
approval of attached memorandum suggesting the
make-up of the Committee.'
4.
Grew to be our top negotistor on international
evistion discussions.
5.
British petroleum discussions - instructions
in view of attached message from Prime Minister.*
6.
Future of Combined Boards - present proposed mes-
sages to Stelin end Churchill attached.'
7.
United Nations organization - President wishes
to discuss attached menorandum and suggested
cables with you.
8.
Doller belances - present proposed letter to
Churchill and memorandum attached. -
9.
State Department personnel - memorandum listing
new men in Department since November 1.*
10.
Palestine resolution - does President have any
instructions on procedure.
11.
FEA and State - future relations
12.
Foreign Service Administration - copy of memo-
randum attached."
13.
Spenish wolfram - new development - memorendum
atteched.
14.
Princess Juliane - possible visit to Venezuele -
memorandum attached.*